05000354/LER-2023-001, Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Declaring the Suppression Chamber and Primary Containment Inoperable
| ML23173A087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/2023 |
| From: | Agster T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| LR-N23-0039 LER 2023-001-00 | |
| Download: ML23173A087 (1) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) |
| 3542023001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236
0 PSEG Nuclear ILG
LR-N23-0039
June 20, 2023
U.S. Nu clear Re gulatory Co mmission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001
Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject: Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00, Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Declaring the Suppression Chamber and Primary Containment Inoperable
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), PSEG Nuc lear LLC submits Licensee Event Report (LER) 2023-001-00.
There are no r egulatory commi tments contained in this l etter.
Please contact Mr. H arry Bal ian at (856) 33 9 - 217 3 if y ou have q uestions.
Sincerely, Agster, Digitally signed by Agster, Thomas R.
Thomas R. Date: 2023.06.20 20:00:41 -04'00' Thomas R. Agster Plant Manager, Hope Creek Generating Station
Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00 Page 2 LR-N23-0039
cc: USNRC Regional Administrator í Region 1 USNRC NRR Project Manager - Hope Creek USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek NJ Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
President & Chief Nuclear Officer, PSEG Nuclear Senior Vice President, PSEG Nuclear Operations Site Vice President, Hope Creek Plant Manager, Hope Creek Vice President, PSEG Nuclear Engineering Executive Director Regulatory Affairs & Nuclear Oversight Director Site Regulatory Compliance, Regulatory Affairs Manager, Nuclear Oversight Corporate Commitment Coordinator, PSEG Nuclear, LLC Records Management (Record Type 3E.111)
Abstract
On April 30, 2023, Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) completed a technical specification (TS) required shutdown because limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment Integrity, was declared inoperable. LCO 3.6.1.1 was declared inoperable because drywell-to-torus differential pressure could not be established to perform surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.2.1.f, and LCO 3.6.2.1, SUPPRESSION CHAMBER, could not be met. HCGS demonstrated containment Operability and returned to power operation.
HCGS will supplement this licensee event report (LER) when a root cause evaluation (RCE) is complete.
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Containment Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breakers {BF}*
Station documentation refers to torus and suppression chamber interchangeably.
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
Event Date: April 30, 2023 Discovery Date: April 30, 2023
Station activities that caused or contributed to this event may have occurred before April 30, 2023. Those activities will be reported in a supplement to this licensee event report (LER) when the root cause evaluation (RCE) is complete.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE
OPCON 1, POWER OPERATION.
No other structures, systems or components that could have contributed to the event were inoperable during the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
On April 30, 2023, HCGS attempted to perform surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.2.1.f but could not establish the initial test conditions (drywell-to-torus differential pressure). HCGS declared SUPPRESSION CHAMBER and PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY inoperable and completed a plant shutdown in accordance with TS. Event notification56495 reported the technical specification required shutdown per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and this LER is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).
EN 56494 reported a seriously degraded principal safety barrier per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and a condition that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Subsequent engineering analysis demonstrates that principal safety barriers were not seriously degraded. Therefore, a LER is not required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii). The engineering analysis also demonstrates that the primary containment safety function would be fulfilled if called upon.
However, this LER is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) because primary containment is a single train system that was declared inoperable based on the inability to establish test conditions.
The RCE may identify additional reporting requirements when complete.
CAUSE OF EVENT
HCGS will supplement this LER when the RCE is complete.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences because of this event. An engineering analysis determined that primary containment and the suppression chamber (torus) were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, per NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, this will not be counted as a safety system functional failure.
PREVIOUS EVENTS
No similar LER or corrective action occurrences were found following a review of station LERs and the corrective action program for the past three years.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
HCGS identified bypass leakage through one torus-to-drywell vacuum breaker, completed repairs, satisfactorily performed SR 4.6.2.1.f, and returned to power operation on May 6, 2023.
HCGS will supplement this LER when the RCE is complete.
COMMITMENTS
There are no regulatory commitments in this LER.