ML22112A046
| ML22112A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle, 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1997 |
| From: | ABB Combustion Engineering |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148A597 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705090171 | |
| Download: ML22112A046 (1) | |
Text
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- System 80+
} standardplant i 1 k Design ControlDocument i iO l Volume 13 L i k i i Combustion Engineering, Inc.
O Copyright C 1997 Combustion Engineering, Inc., All Rights Reserved, Warning, Legal Notice and Disclaimer of Liability The design, engineering and other information contained in this document have been prepared by or for Combustion Engineering, Inc. in connection with its application to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) for design certification of the System 80+5 nuclear plant design pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 52. No use of any such information is authorized by Combustion Engineenng, Inc. except for use by the US NRC and its contractors in connection with review and approval of such application. Combustion Engineering, Inc. hereby disclaims all responsibility and liability in connection with unauthorized use of such information Neither Combustion Engineering, Inc. nor any other person or entity makes any warranty or representation to any person or entity (other than the US NRC in connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) concerning such information or its use, except to the extent an express warranty is made by Combustion Engineering, Inc. to its customer in a wntten contract for the sale of the goods or services described in this document. Potential users are hereby warned that any such information may be unsuitable for use except in connection with the performance of such a written contract by Combustion Engineering, Inc. Such information or its use are subject to copyright, patent, trademark or other rights of Combustion Engineering, Inc. or of others, and no license is granted with respect to such rights, except that the US NRC is authorized to make such copies as are necessary for the use of the US NRC and its contractors in coranection with the Combustion Engineering, Inc. application for design certification. Publication, distribution or sale of this document does not constitute the performance or engineering or other professional services and does not create or establish any duty of care towards any recipient (other than the US NRC in connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) or towards any person affected by this document. For information address: Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Systems Licensing, 2000 Day Hill Road; Windsor, Connecticut 06095 O
System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument
.o I Q Introduction Certified Design Material 1
1.0 Introduction 2.0 System and Structure ITAAC 3.0 Non-System ITAAC 4.0 _ Interface Requirements 5.0 Site Parameters Approved Design Material - Design & Analysis 2 1.0 General Plant Description i
- 2.0 : Site Characteristics
' 3.0 Design of Systems, Structures & Components 4.0 Reactor 5.0 RCS and Connected Systems ,
6.0 Engineered Safety Features 7.0 Instrumentation and Control 8.0 Electric Power 9.0 - Auxiliary Systems 10.0 Steam and Power Conversion 11.C Radioactive Waste Management (. 12.0 Radiation Protection
\- 13.0 Conduct of Operations i 14.0 Initial Test Program 1 15.0 Accident Analyses 16.0 Tecimical Specifications 17.0 Quality Assurance
. 18.0- Human Factors 19.0 - Probabilistic Risk Assessment 20.0 Unresolved and Generic Safety Issues Approved Design Material - Emergency Operations Guidelines 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Standard Post-Trip Actions 3.0 Diagnostic Actions 4.0 Reactor Trip Recovery 5.0 Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery 6.0 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery 7.0 Excess Steam Demand Event Recovery 8.0 Loss of All Feedwater Recovery 9.0 Loss of Offsite Power Recovery 10.0' Station Blackout Recovery 11.0 Functional Recovery Guideline [(f , caona
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- System 80+ .
standardplant 4 Approved Design Material .O ' Design & Analysis j l
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1 Svstem 80+ oeska ceneret oocanent .
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- 9.3 Process Anvillaries 9.3.1
- Compressed Air Systeens j f
9.3.1.1- Design Bases 1 i The Compressed Air Systems are non-safety related systems consisting of the Instrument Air, Station Air, , . iand Breathing Air Systems. The Instnnnent Air System supplies clean, oil free, dried air to all air .; operated instrumentation and valves. The Station Air System supplies compressed air for air operated i tools, miscellaneous equipment, and various maintenance purposes. The Breathing Air System supplies ; i 1 clean, oil free, low pressure air to various locations in the plant, as required for breathing protection .i
! against airborne contamination while performing certain maintenance and cleaning operations. ~
i t (. 9.3.1.1.1 Codes and Remadars 3 i i The compressed air systems and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes _ l Jand standards? The design conforms to General Design Criteria'1,2 and 5 and meets the intent of the 1 Standard Review plan. { ^ 9.3.1.2 Systeun Description j 9.3.1.2.1 Instnanent Air System 1 A flow diagram of the Instrument Air System is shown in Figure 9.3.1-1. t The Instrument Air System consists of four parallel trains of instnunent air compressors and associated I equipment. Each trah of equipment is capable of supplying the plant's instrument air needs. The ! U Instrument Air System equipment is located in the Nuclear Annex with two instrument air trains located ! in each division. Each instrument air train consists of an instrument air compressor, an air receiver, and i an instrument air dryer connected in series. l b Each compressor is of oil-free, water-cooled design and is capable of providing 100% of the instrument l r air requirements for the generating unit. Cooling water is supplied to the compressors from the j Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). The compressors are designed to cool the hot comp.nsed l 4 air and remove water condensed in the cooling process. Each compressor is furnished with an iroke { filter / silencer rated to remove all particles greater than 5 microns ( m). The compressor intakes are ! located in an area free of corrosive contaminants and hazardous gases. !
, j During normal plant operating conditions, one of the compressors is selected for continuous operation i n while the other compressors serve as standbys and start automatically if the continuously operating __
compressor cannot meet system demand. The compressor controls are designed to allow continuous ! operation of any. number of the compressor motors with the compressors automaticahy loaded and l i unloaded in response to system pressure. -The controls also permit automatic start and stop operation of l any number of the congressor motors in response to system pressure as evidenced by a pressure drop j in the instrument air distribution piping. The compressor controls are designed such that failure of an j operating compressor will not cause system pressure to decrease below the minimum required system ; operating pressure. ? compressor switching arrangement allows any one of the compressors to be chosen j j,,, V as the base w+wsor while the others serve as standbys. This capability enables the compressors to
, have equal wear. Startup of a standby compressor is annunciated in the control room.
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System 80+ Design Control Document Downstream of each air compressor, the compressed air flows into an instrument air receiver. The air receivers dampen pressure fluctuations and serve as a pressure reservoir for sudden demands on the system. The air receivers are designed with adequate reserve capacity to allow time for standby compressors to start and recharge the air receivers to operating pressure following a compressor trip. Control room indicators are provided for individual air receiver temperature and pressure to allow remote monitoring of system operation status for each supply train on an onsfemand basis. D:wnstream of the air receivers the instrument air passes through an instrument air dryer before being distributed to the instrument air piping system. Each air dryer is equipped with a coalescing prefilter, an air dryer assembly, and an afterfilter connected in series which are capable of drying the compressed air to a dewpoint of -40'F at line pressure and filtering the air of hydrocarbons, water aerosols, and particulates greater than one micron in size. These specifications meet the manufacturer's air supply requirements for all pneumatic equipment that is either safety related or relied upon to perform a safety function. Downstream of the air dryers, the four instrument air trains are headered together and connecting distribution piping supplies instrument air throughout the plant. The instrument air lines penetrating the containment have an electrically operated isolation valve located outside containment which is installed in series with a check valve located in.dde the containment. The instrument air system piping material is stainless steel and of welded construction to prevent air leakage. 9.3.1.2.2 Station Air System The Station Air System is shown in Figure 9.3.1-2. Station air is supplied by two, oil-free,100% capacity station air compressors. Each compressor package contains an intercooler, aftercooler, and moisture separators. The compressors use cooling water from the TBCW system to cool the hot compressed air and any water condensed in the cooling process is removed by the compressor moisture separators and automatic drain valves. Downstream of the compressors the air flows to air receivers which serve to smooth out pressure surges. The air is then dried by one of two redundant station air dryers prior to being distributed throughout the plant via station air headers. The station air system piping material is either galvanized carbon steel or stainless steel. 9.3.1.2.3 Breathing Air System The Breathing Air System is shown in Figure 9.3.1-3. Breathing Air is supplied by two, oil-free,100% capacity breathing air compressors. Each compressor package contains an intercooler, aftercooler, and moisture separators. The compressors use cooling water from the TBCW system to cool the hot compressed air and any water condensed in the cooling process is removed by the compressor moisture separators and automatic drain valves. Downstream of the compressors the air flows to air receivers to smooth out pressure surges. Breathing air purifiers are provided downstream of the receivers to purify the air to meet ANSI /CGA G-7.1 requirements. The purifier discharge lines join and supply breathing air to various locations in the Nuclear Annex and inside Containment. The breathing air system piping material is stainless steel and of welded construction to prevent air leakage. l l Approved Design Material Ausnary Systems Page 9.3-2 1
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument
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( ) 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation LJ The Compressed Air Systems are designed to provide dependable sources of compressed air for all plant uses. Sufficient redundancy is provided to give a high degree of reliability to the air supply at all times. Sufficient air receiver capacity is provided to meet system high air demand transients. The Instrument Air System, Station Air System, and Breathing Air Systems are non-safety related systems with the exception of the containment isolation portion of the systems. The containment isolation valves and associated piping are designated Safety Class 2, Seismic Category I. Failure of the Compressed Air Systems will not render any safety system equipment or its function inoperable. A loss of instrument air during an accident or plant blackout would cause all pneumatically operated valves in the station which are essential for safe shutdown to fail in the safe position. Therefore, the Compressed Air Systems are not relied upon for any safe shutdown or accident mitigation function. Inadvertent actuation of safety-related valves due to failure of the Instrument Air System will not cause any unsafe conditions that preclude achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. The active safety-related valves having an instrument air supply are listed in Table 9.3.1-1, " Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air". These valves are designed to fail in the safe position on a loss of instrument air to the valve actuator. The fail safe position of these valves takes into account any inadvertent actuations which may occur from loss of instrument air, to insure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. This is evident from the following review of the safety function of p the valves listed in Table 9.3.1-1 and the systems containing these valves. As listed in Table 9.3.1-1, the majority of the pneumatically operated valves with an active safety function are containment isolation valves. By design, the containment isolation valves are required to close following a design basis event. These valves have been determined to be nonessential for achieving , safe shutdown and are designed to fail in the closed position. Inadvertent closure of the air operated l containment isolation valves due to a loss of instrument air would have no impact on the plant's ability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown. l The EFWS contains pneumatically operated valves with an active safety-related function. The EFW pump turbine steam supply isolation valves and steam supply bypass valves permit steam flow to the steam driven emergency feedwater pump turbines. A loss of instrument air will cause these normally l closed valves to fail safe in the open position allowing steam flow to the EFW pump turbines. Inadvertent opening of the valves due to a loss of instrument air will start the turbine driven pumps and thus does not render the EFWS inoperable. With the valves in a failed open position, initiation of the EFWS is possible. Therefore, a loss of instrument air to these valves will not result in an unsafe ; condition or impede safe shutdown. l l l Unintentional actuation of the active, air operated Component Cooling Water System GCWS) valves due to a loss of instrument air will not restrict the plant's ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown. The pneumatically operated CCWS valves which serve to isolate nonessential portions of the system are not required for safe shutdown. As nonessential isolation valves, they isolate portions of the CCWS which i I are not required for safe shutdewn and ar.: designed to fail closed. The air operated CCWS flow control valves, with the exception of the component cooling water heat exchanger bypass flow control valves, are required to fail to the open position to ensure system operability for safe shutdown and accident (] 's mitigation. Excessive flow is prevented by use of travel stops on the valves should they fail open. 1 1 Approved Design Materia!. Austrary Systems Page 9.3-3
System 80+ Design controlDocument The Loop 2B letdown isolation valves on the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) are system isolation valves and are not essential to achieving safe shutdown. These valves fail closed on loss of instrument air. This is their safe position which prevents further letdown should there be a break in the letdown line. The instnunent air compressors and air dryers can be manually powered by the Non-Class IE Alternate AC Source Standby Power Supply during a loss of offsite power. This provision is made to facilitate shutdown, especially during a Control Room evacuation coincident with a loss of offsite power. The reliable power source for the compressors in this case is the Non-Class 1E Alternate AC Source Standby Power Supply, and the reliable cooling water source for the compressors is the component cooling water system. 9.3.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The instrument air system preoperational testing and inspection is in accordance with intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68.3 prior to initial operation. The air at the discharge of the air dryers is checked and verified to have an acceptable dew point. Periodically, the air at the filter discharge is tested for dew point and particulate contamination. Air samples are taken at selected remote locations on the instrument air system and checked for oil and particulate matter as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.68.3 and in accordance with ANSI /ISA-S7.3-1975 (R 1981). Adequate operating performance monitoring by the operator assures system integrity. 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements Sufficient instrumentation is provided to monitor system performance and to control the system automatically or manually under all operating conditions. 9.3.2 Process and Post-Accident Sampling Systems 9.3.2.1 Design Bases The sampling system is designed to collect and deliver representative samples of liquids and gases in various process systems to various sample stations for chemical and radiological analysis. The system consists of the primary and secondary sampling subsystems, and permits sampling during reactor operation, cooldown and post-accident modes without requiring access to the containment. Remote . samples can be taken of fluids in high radiation areas without requiring access to these areas. The sample system performs no safety function. 9.3.2.1.1 Perfomiance Design Criteria
- Collection Environment The system permits sampling without requiring access to the containment or entry into high radiation areas.
- Flow to Continuous Monitors The system provides a constant and continuous sample flow to the on-line monitors or analyzers identified in Table 9.3.2-1. An alternative source of water is available to liquid monitors for use when normal samples cannot be obtained.
Attwered Design htstennt
- AuxWary Systems page 9.3,4
System 80+ Desinrr controlDocument i T 'e Grab Samples i Unless sampling is done for total dissoi ed gases, grab samples are provided at atmospheric , pressure. For grab samples of pure water systems for which pH and conductivity measurements are made, a sample sink is provided to allow for sample flow past portable measuring equipment.
- l. Pressurized samples for dissolved gases are obtained using sample bombs. !
j- ; e Pressure / Temperature Reduction'
.i Samples are reduced to a pressure that is compatible with on-line monitors or analyzers, and to atmospheric pressure for grab samples not being analyzed for dissolved gases. Samples are ;
typically cooled to 77'F for on-line monitors and analyzers, and to a maximum temperature of 1 120'F for grab samples. i
! e Representative Samples l Samples are representative of the sampled stream. The sampling system provides isokinetic *
- samples if a vapor or gaseous phase may exist in the process fluid being sampled (e.g., wet steam or fluid streams samplul for particulates). For tanks, provisions are made to sample the f
recirculation loop of the *.ank contents and to avoid sampling from low points or from potential sediment traps. For process stream samples, sample points are located in turbulent flow zones. { Stagnant areas are ave;ded since these areas do not have mixing. Gaseous samples of process streams and isnks are in accordance with ANSI N13.1-1969. Representative sampling of the bulk :
, fluid in each steam generator is assured through continuous on-line monitoring of any two of the ;
following three sample points: the hot leg blowdown, the cold leg blowdown, and the ; downcomer water. j e Sample Segregation j ] Samples are segregated so that low conductivity equipment drains and high conductivity, or high l , solid, samples are not mixed for discharge to radwaste, or return to downstream of the point of l origin. In addition, the effluent from analyzers which add chemicals to samples (e.g., sodium l and silica analyzers) are routed to a high conductivity waste tank. Samples that are radioactive ; or potentially radioactive are segregated from non-radioactive samples. Sample system discharges i are returned to the system being sampled (instead of radwaste) whenever possible. ; e Sample Flow Rate l The sample flow rate assures turbulent flow (e.g., Re > 4000) in the sample line up-stream of-the sampling or monitoring location. Sample flow rate capabilities are selected based on sample line size, fluid temperature and sample station location to assure that the turbulent flow requirement is met. A constant flow rate is maintained for continuous samples. . I
- e. Post-Accident Sampling -
l
- 1. The system is designed to obtain reactor coolant samples for boron concentration and j
. total dissolved gas measurements at 8 hours and 24 hours, respectively, after plant ,
- p shutdown. Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples for radiological l
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System 80+ Design ContmlDocument measurements can be obtained at 24 hours after plant shutdown. These features are consistent with the NRC recommendations in the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93487, dated July 21,1993.
- 2. The system design appropriately integrates the normal and post-accident functions so as to maximize the familiarity of plant operators with post-accident operation (s). The design utilizes common sample lines and points for both normal and post-accident sampling to the maximum extent possible.
- 3. Any function which is not performed during normal sampling operations has testing capability to enable periodic verification of operability and familiarization with system operation.
- 4. The system provides the capability for obtaining reactor coolant and containment l atmosphere samples for the analyses identified above. These analyses are performed either continuously, or by grab sample as.:! analysis. Backup grab samples are provided for any on-line monitoring capability consistent with Clarification (8) of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3. Gas chromatography equipment is not used for on-line analysis.
- 5. Provisions are made for dilution of liquid and gas grab samples for subsequent laboratory analysis. Dilution of the liquid and gas grab samples for subsequent laboratory analysis.
Dilution of the liquid and gas grab samples shall be performed either at the sampling station, or in the laboratory, whichever leads to simpler equipment consistent with ALARA practices. Collection and dilution of the post-accident samples is performed remotely to the maximum extent feasible, and is the responsibility of the COL applicant.
- 6. All remotely operated valves required for post-accident sampling have assured power supplies and system level reset features which allow reopening of the valves after containment isolation without clearing the isolation signal for other containment isolation valves. Individual valve reset features are provided to allow opening of individual sampling valves after system reset. Valves and operators which are inaccessible during an accident are environmentally qualified to ensure operability under accident conditions.
- 7. Two independent non-1E sources are available to provide electrical power for post-accident sampling. After loss of normal off-site power, power is automatically supplied from on site. During loss of offsite power, an alternate backup power source, not necessarily the vital IE bus, is available that can be energized in sufficient time to meet l the time limit requirements of 8 hours and 24 hours specified above for boron, and total dissolved gas and radiological measurements, respectively.
- Fire Protection In the event of a fire, reactor coolant boron sampling is available to verify shutdown margin, consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
O Approved Design Material- Auxdiary Systems (2/95) Page 9.34
System 80+ Design ControlDocument y) 9.3.2.2 System Description 9.3.2.2.1 General System Description The process sampling system consists of the primary and secondary sampling subsystems, and includes sampling lines, heat exchangers, sample vessels, sample sinks or racks, analysis equipment, and instrumentation. The sampling points have been selected to provide the required chemical and radiological information while keeping the system simple for reliability and ease of maintenance. Tables 9.3.2-1 and 9.3.2-2 list the sample locations, types of samples required, and method of sample removal for normal and post-accident sampling, respectively. The process sampling system is designed to collect samples of the fluids in the primary and secondary systems for water quality analysis by the plant operating staff. Chemical and radiochemical analyses are performed on these samples to determine such fluid characteristics as boron concentration, fission and corrosion product activity, crud concentration, dissolved gas and corrosion product concentrations, chloride concentration, fluid pH and conductivity, and noncondensible gas concentration. The results of these analyses are used to regulate the reactor coolant boron concentration, monitor the fuel cladding integrity, evaluate ion exchanger and filter performance, specify chemical additions to the various systems, and maintain the proper hydrogen concentration in the Reactor Coolant System. A data management and surveillance system gives daily evaluation of plant chemistry, and tracks and plots chemistry trends. / The seismic design classification and quality group classification of sample lines and components conform (]/ to the classification of the system to which each sampling line and component is connected, out to such a point where classification to lower seismic and quality group classification is justified on the basis that adequate isolation valving or flow restriction is provided. The design of the sample probes and their connection to sampled system piping assure the structural integrity of the sample probe within the pipe. Sample lines penetrating the containment are provided with isolation valves in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A General Design Criteria 55 and 56. The process sampling system has the following system features:
- Configuration The system configuration is such that, under normal operation, samples are transported from a number of different locations to various centralized sample racks, where samples are cooled and depressurized as necessary. For samples containing dissolved gases, sample bombs are located at the exit of each sample cooler to facilitate the collection of samples. In addition, the system configuration is such that under post-accident conditions samples of containment atmosphere and containment liquids are transported to an accessible location for grab sampling.
- Arrangement
- 1. Sample lines have continuous slope either upward or downward to the sample station,
,-3 depending on the type of sample (i.e., sloping downward for liquid samples and sloping ('} upward for gaseous samples). Traps and pockets in which condensate or sludge may settle, or in which gas pockets may form, are avoided. Appromed Design Atatorini. Auskary 5ystems Page 9.3-7
System 80+ Design Control Document A shut-off valve is placed in the sample line immediately downstream of the point from 2. which the sample is withdrawn.
- 3. If sample coolers / condensers are required, a valve, capable of being locked wide open, is placed at the sample cooler / condenser inlet. Throttling devices are placed downstream of the sample cooler / condenser.
- 4. Sample station locations are selected to consolidate samples within a location or locations consistent with:
- Common building areas.
- Minimization of sample line lengths consistent with other functional requirements, such as fluid hold-up to allow decay of radioactivity.
- Minimization of travel time and distance for sampling personnel.
- Accessibility to personnel.
- Area radiation as low as practicable to minimize radiation doses to plant personnel.
- Proximity of sample stations to the chemical laboratories.
- Maintaining sufficient pressure head for turbulent flow.
- 5. Sampling station components that retain potentially radioactive fluids, such as sample coolers, isolation valves, throttle valves, control valves, relief valves and drain lines, are located behind a wall which provides radiation shielding.
- 6. Connections for flushing process stream monitoring probes in radioactive systems are installed where practical. Probe removal and replacement is designed to be as simple as possible to further reduce radiation exposure.
- Overpressurization Protection Relief valves are provided for overpressurization protection. The discharge of the relief valves is routed to an ap; ropriate collection point, consistent with sample segregation requirements.
- Exhaust-Ventilated, Hooded Enclosures Sample points for radioactive satnples are located within a vented sampling hood. The hooded enclosure confines any leakage or spillage of radioactive samples. The enclosure allows any liquid leakage to be collected in a sink and drained to an equipment drain header for processing through the liquid radioactive viaste system.
O Approved Desiger Atoterial- AuxAliary Systems Pope 9.38
.I System 80+ Deslan comar Document e' Purging of Sample Lines {
- L
.1. Sample sinks, drained sumps and/or collection headers are provided to allow flow of l continuous samples through on-line instrumentation and to allow purging of sample hnes ,
and sample bombs prior to be collection of samples. l
- 2. ~ Sample purge collection headers are routed back to the system of origin or radwaste consistent with process parameters (e.g., reactor coolant grade water samples are purged to the Volume Control Tank or Equipment Drain Tank). If process parameters do not
- permit this recycling, the purge flow is directed to a collection tank consistent with the !
chemistry and activity of the sample. j e - Materials l l Sample system materials are selected so that the system. does not contribute to sample l contamination via such mechanisms as cobalt or corrosion product release. Sample lines in - l contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent, such that the material is j compatible with the fluid chemistry. ; e Sample Lines Sample line components and fittings are procured for a single, maximum pressure and temperature rating. Expansion loops or other means are provided to prevent undue buckling and i bending when large temperature changes occur. e Valves ) i
- 1. Remotely-controlled system isolation valves fail in the closed position on loss of power !
or loss of control signal. j 1
- 2. . Sample lines which contain radioactive fluids are provided with packless valves for all ]
applications other than pressure relieving and flow throttling. e Sample Coolers
- 1. The sample cooler coil or tube (s) is made of material resistant to corrosion by both the j sample fluid on one side and cooling water on the other.
- 2. The tube (s) through which the sample flows is continuous and extends completely through the cooling jacket.
- o. Passive Flow Restriction 3 Sample lines which are not isolable from the RCS during normal system operations (including Shutdown Cooling System operation) are provided with a flow restriction device (7/32" ID x 1"
. - orifice) to limit the loss of coolant in the event of a sample line piping break. 4
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.3.2.2.2 Detailed System Description 9.3.2.2.2.1 Primary Sampling System The function of the primary sampling system is to provide liquid and gaseous samples for analysis in order to provide a basis for control of the RCS chemistry and radiochemistry. The system provides representative samples for both on-line and laboratory analysis during normal conditions, and for laboratory analysis during post-accident conditions. The primary sampling system is controlled from the sampling room, with the exception of the containment isolation valves, which are operated from the main control room. , Figur: 9.3.2-1 illustrates that portion of the primary sampling system used for reactor coolant sampling durir normal s operations. Connections to the RCS hot leg and SCS normal sample lines for post-accident sampling are also shown. Figure 9.3.2-2 provides a functional flow diagram for post-accident sampling of reactor coolant consistent with the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087 dated July 21,1993. In addition to the general system requirements discussed above, the following specific primary sampling requirements ensure a reliable system. e Reactor Coolant System Samples
- 1. The primary sampling system provides a means of obtaining remote liquid samples from the Reactor Coolant System pressurizer surge line and one RCS hot leg. A sample connection is also provided from the pressurizer steam space via the pressurizer safety valve inlet piping. Each of these sample lines contains a 7/32-inch by 1-inch orifice.
This orifice functions as the Safety Class 1 to Safety Class 2 boundary in the sample line 1 per ANSI N18.2a - 1975.
- 2. Sampling of the RCS hot leg is possible during both normal and post-accident operations.
Sampling of the pressurizer surge line and pressurizer steam space is only possible during normal operations.
- 3. The normal high-pressure and high-temperature samples from the pressurizer surge line, J l
the pressurizer steam space and the hot leg are individually routed to a sampling station where they are first cooled in a sample heat exchanger to 120*F or less, and then j reduced in pressure by a throttling valve to approximately 25 psig. See Figure 9.3.2-1. l 1
- 4. Provisions are made to allow sampling of the Reactor Coolant System during startup.
For this mode of operation it can be assumed that the Reactor Coolant System pressure is approximately 250 psig.
- 5. Provisions are made to allow Reactor Coolant System sampling during Shutdown Cooling l System operation.
- 6. On-line monitoring is provided for determining the boron concentration and radiation l level of the reactor coolant. Continuous indication and recording of these parameters is l provided in the control room. The sample points for these monitors provide a !
representative sample for a wide range of plant operating and accident conditions, 1 including low temperature and pressure in the Reactor Coolant System. In addition, the l I Approved Design Atatorio! AuxhGary Systems Page 9.3-10
m Sv' tem 80+ ' Deslan ControlDocumrt sample point locations and sample stream flow rate are designed to have a response time ; ! of less than two minutes. Alternate sample points, isolated by manual . valving are provided to allow monitoring of reactor coolant boron concentration with an RCS loop } drained.
]
- 7. The RCS sample lines provide a delay time of at least 60 seconds inside the containment to allow decay of N-16 activity. -i e Safety injection System Samples
- 1. Sample points for the SIS are located in the:
l e miniflow line for safety injection pumps 1 and 3. e miniflow line for safety injection pumps 2 and 4. , The above sample points provide the operator with a remote means of measuring IRWST pH and boron concentration during normal operations. These samples are at a
- temperature of less than 350*F and a pressure of less than 2050 psig. ;
i t
- 2. Remote sampling lines are also provided on the safety injection tanks (four sample points, t one per tank). Samples from the safety injection tanks are at a pressure ofless than 700 !
i psig and a temperature of less than 200*F. The valves on the sample lines are sized to p limit flow to an acceptable level at the sample collection pomt. l G 3. In order to permit post-accident sampling of the IRWST (the containment sump), two
-- r sample taps are provided on the Holdup Volume Tank. These taps are headered together prior to exiting the containment building, and routed to the post-accident sampling subsystem depicted in Figure 9.3.2-2. A post-accident sample pump is provided in this line to provide sufficient motive force.
e Shutdown Cooling System Samples i )
- 1. The primary sampling system provides a means of obtaining remote liquid samples from ,
the Shutdown Cooling System for chemical and radiochemical laboratory analysis. Four sample points are provided l e SCS Miniflow Heat Exchanger 1 Inlet (900 psig,400*F). ] e SCS Miniflow Heat Exchanger 2 Inlet (900 psig,400'F). e Shutdown cooling pump 1 suction line, (900 psig,400'F). 1 i e Shutdown cooling pump 2 suction line, (900 psig,400'F). J During normal operations, all four sample points are available. During post-accident conditions, only the miniflow heat exchanger samples are available. O 2. In addition to the sample points described above, a sample tap is also provided ir each CS (Containment Spray) Miniflow Heat Exchanger inlet line (total of two taps). Ihese i L- . 2 Dee@w aseennin! Aunelery 3ponenne Page 9.3-11 4
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.-- - _, - ,_ - )
System 80+ Design ControlDocument taps permit sampling during shutdown cooling operations when a containment spray pump is being utilized. These taps, as well as the SCS Miniflow Heat Exchanger taps, also permit sampling of the IRWST during normal operations.
- Chemical and Volume Control System Samples
- 1. The primary sampling system is capable of individually processing samples from the following points:
- Purification filter influent Temperature 120 - 140'F Pressure 60 - 200 psig Activity See Chapter 11 Chemical N~- Primary water or refueling water
- Purification filter effluent Temperature 120 - 140*F Pressure 58 - 200 psig Activity See Chapter 11 Chemical Nature Primary water or refueling water
- Purification /deborating ion exchanger effluent Temperature 120 - 140*F Pressure 50 - 200 psig Activity See Chapter 11 Chemical Nature Primary water or refueling water
- 2. The sample flow rates from each point at the sample sink are:
Sample flow rate 0.50 - 1.00 gpm Purge flow rate 1.00 gpm
- Gaseous Waste Management System Samples
- 1. The Gas Analyzer Sampling System is part of the primary sampling system, and is designed to sample the gas spaces of the plant components specified below. The sampled gas is discharged to either the process vent header (PVH) or the process gas header (PGH) as indicated:
GWMS Charcoal Guard Bed, PGH GWMS Charcoal Absorber (2), PGH CVCS Reactor Drain Tank, PGH CVCS Volume Control Tank, PGH CVCA Gas Stripper, PGH Asywovent Design Material Auxnary Systems Page 9.312
Svetem 80+ Design ControlDocument
' CVCS Equipme,t Drain Tank, PGH CVCS Holdup Tank, PVH -
SWMS Spent Resin Tank (3), PVH
- 2. The following system requirements are met:
e influent to the Gas Analyzer (except the VCT)
' Pressure 5 psig maximum Temperature 105'F maximum
' 'e . Influent to the process vent header (Gas Analyzer effluent)
Pressure atmospheric Temperature 105'F maximum Flow 1 SCFM maximum o Influent to the process gas header (Gas Analyzer effluent) Pressure' 5 psig Temperature 105'F maximum Flow 1 SCFM maxunum
- 3. The VCT gas sample pressure is regulated to 50 psig.
l
- 4. The charcoal guard bed, charcoal absorbers, and gas stripper have flow restricting orifices in the gas sample lines. The maximum permissible orifice size for these lines is 0.0486 inches in dianr:ter.
- 5. Local sample points are located off the charcoal absorber inlet and discharge headers.
Grab samples can be tsken from each point for radioactivity analysis. The following gas effluent is expected from these sample points: Pressure (design) . 5 psig Temperature (design) 105'F Fluid Nitrogen, Hydrogen, and traces of Oxygen gases
- 6. The maximum available APs for sample sources at minimum source pressure:
AP Available at Minimum Source Minimum Source Sample Sources - Pressure (osin) Pressure (osi) Charcoal Absorber System 0 3 Gas stripper- 2' 5 Remaining samples -O 3 Asswesed ase(ps aseender. AssmIwy syssess . Pese s.3-f3
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.3.2.2.2.2 Secondary Sampling System The secondary sampling system takes samples from the condenser hotwell, steam generators, condensate pump discharge, condensate polishing demineralizer discharge, high pressure feedwater heater outlets, and other locations designated for remote sample removal in Table 9.3.2-1. Water quality analyses are performed to provide a basis for the control of the secondary cycle water chemistry. The analyses performed on the samples (either continuously or by grab sample and lab analysis) determine pH, sodium, hydrazine, dissolved oxygen, and cation and specific conductivity values, as appropriate. In addition, continuous radiation monitoring of each steam generator is also provided. The secondary sampling system is monitored and controlled from a sampling room. In addition to the general process sampling system requirements discussed'in Sections 9.3.2.1.1 and 9.3.2.2.1, the following specific requirements ensure a reliable secondary sampling system.
- 1. Sampling lines are as short as possible and of the smallest practicable bore to facilitate flushing and reduce transport time.
- 2. Sample lines are 3/8-inch 18 BWG tubing or equivalent. Material is stainless steel (or equivalent) at least as resistant to steam as 18 chromium, 8 nickel stainless. On high temperature lines which may present a personnel hazard, lagging is provided.
- 3. As rnuch as practicable, sample lines are pitched downward at least 10 degrees to provide self drainage so as to prevent settling or separation of solids contained by the water sample. Traps and pockets in which condensate or sludge may settle are avoided since they may be panially emptied with changes in flow conditions and may result in sample contamination.
- 4. The steam sample nozzle is of multiport design (ports facing upstream) and designed for:
sufficient strength to eliminate the possibility of failure through vibration or wear, isokinetic sampling, high velocity beyond the inlet port. and of a material which will not contaminate the sample. The nozzle is not located immediately after a pipe bend or valve (unless valve aperture is concentric with the pipe). In order of preference, location is in:
- Vertical pipe, downward flow.
- Vertical pipe, upward flow.
- Horizontal pipe, vertical insertion.
- Horizontal pipe, horizontal insertion.
- 5. All probes are 90 degrees to the pipe wall.
- 6. Four sample points are provided for each steam generator:
- llot leg blowdown.
- Cold leg blowdown.
ApprendDesign Afatoriel Audney Systems Page 8.314
System 80+ oesnan canarolcocwnent l l e Recirculating (downcomer) water. j i i e Main Steam. Samples from the blowdown lines originate as close to the blowdown noa.les as possible. Main steam samples for each steam generator are extracted downstream of the Main Steam Isolation ; 1 Valves (MSIVs), but upstreaca of the equalization header. All four samples (hot and cold leg - blowdown, downcomer, and main steam) run outside containment without headering to allow independent simultaneous grab samples to be drawn, and to allow the samples to be continuously ; monitored in accordance with Table 9.3.2-1. Alarms are provided for all on-line monitors to
! . alert operators of out of specification chemical conditions. .
9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation j
. 'All sample lines have the required indicators, pressure throttling valves, heat exchangers, and other !
- components to ensure plant operator safety when collecting samples. The sampling system serves no ,
i .cmergency function, j > Sample lines which penetrate the Containment are provided with isolation valves. For the prunary ' sampling system (i.e., the RCS hot leg, pressurizer steam space, pressurizer surge line, Holdup Volume Tank, and Safety injection Tank samples), these valves close on receipt of a Containment isolation signal, ! are normally closed. designed to fail closed, and can only be operated from the main control room. For ! the secondary sampling system (i.e., the steam generator hot leg blowdown, cold leg blowdown, and l downcomer samples), these isolation valves close on receipt of a Main Steam Isolation, Emergency l
~ Feedwater Actuation, or Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal (MSIS, EFAS, or AFAS, respectively). !
3 Although these valves are normally open, they are designed to fail closed, and can only be operated from ,
- the main control room. All samples have the ability to be isolated manually at the sample source and/or l l prior to entering the sampling station (s). !
i ' The CVCS purification filter outlet and RCS hot leg samples provide redundant locations for continuous boron and radiation monitoring during normal operations. Connections made to the RCS pressure boundary are fitted with flow restriction devices to satisfy NRC General Design Criterion 33. Sample system piping, up to and including the passive flow restrictors, is
, designed and fabricated in accordance with the same safety class and codes as the system that it is j connected to. The piping and components in proximity to the sample sink are provided with pressure j relief for protection of personnel. ;
1 ! The Sampling System has the following special safety features due to handling of radioactive, or i 4 potentially radioactive, samples: i
.j
- o. Sample lines from the RCS provide a delay time of at least 60 seconds inside contamment to l' allow decay of N-16.
- e. ~ Adequate shielding is provided to protect personnel when taking a sample during either normal !
or post-accident conditions. ! 4provedDes(pm Asesordsf. AmeAnry Syssesw Page 9.J-75 ; . l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument e Exhaust hoods are provided for each sample sink to ensure that leakage of any gases will be exhausted from the sample room. e Sample sinks are provided to collect all spillage. The routing of high pressure and temperature sample lines outside the reactor containment is not considered hazardous because of the limited flow capacity. 9.3.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.3.2.4.1 Inspection During the fabrication of the components and during the installation of the systems, Safety Class 2 components and systems are examined to the requirements of ASME Section III, Article NC-5000. Non-Nuclear Safety Class components and systems are examined to industry standards. After installation the system is examined for correct routing of piping, placement of hangers, insulation where utilized, and the sample vessels are removed and reinstalled to test the functioning of the disconnects. 9.3.2.4.2 Testing After installation is completed the system is hydrostatic and leak tested to the requirements of ASME Section III, Article NC-6000. Before system operation, valves are operated and observed to function properly, and cooling flow to and from the sample heat exchangers is observed to function. After the sampled system is pressurized. sample flow is observed to meet minimum requirements and instrumentation is observed to function. After the sampled system is pressurized and heated, the adequacy of the sample heat exchangers to cool the sample flow is observed. 9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local pressure, temperature, and flow indicators are provided to facilitate manual operation, and to verify sample conditions before samples are drawn. Temperature and pressure indication of sample streams downstream of each sample cooler are provided. Flow indication is provided for every sample line. Alarms are provided, as appropriate, based upon inlet sample temperature, continuous parameter monitoring requirements, and the potential for transients which demand swift corrective action (s). Radiation menitors are provided for continuous monitoring of reactor coolant and steam generator blowdown samples. A boronometer is provided for continuous monitoring of the reactor coolant boron concentration. Continuous analyzers (as defined by Table 9.3.2-1) monitor specific water quality conditions in the secondary plant. 9.3.2.5.1 Process Radiation Monitor The process radiation monitor provides a continuous recording in the control room of reactor coolant gross gamma radiation and specific fission product gamma activity, thus providing a measure of fuel j cladding integrity. A high alarm is annunciated in the control room. Local and remote samples in the 1 Approved Design Atatenet. Ausnery Systems (a/95) Page 9.3-16
f System 80+ Design ControlDocument n CVCS provide the primary means for determining RCS activity. The process radiation monitor serves only as a trending device to warn the operator of possible fuel cladding failure. Verification of the process radiation monitor reading is done by grab sample measurements. P The design of the process radiation monitor is based on the following criteria:
- 1. Increasing trends in fission product activity in the RCS shall be used as an indication of fuel element cladding failures.
- 2. The response time of the process radiation monitor shall be reasonably fast.
- 3. The process radiation monitor shall be insensitive to N-16 and other radiation-induced activities in the reactor coolant from structural materials.
- 4. The process radiation monitor shall be sensitive enough to detect a trend in gross fission product activity in the RCS with less than 1 % failed fuel.
- 5. The process radiation monitor shall have sufficient range to preclude detector saturation at failed fuel levels less than or equal to 1%.
The process radiation monitor utilizes the gamma-ray spectrometry detection principle. Gamma spectrometry allows isolated measurement of a selected isotope, such as Rb 88 which is high on the fission yield curve, and whose presence in the reactor coolant is a sign of possible clad leakage. The O process radiation monitor continuously monitors either a slip stream off the letdown flow path, or the RCS hot leg sample. Flow through the process radiation monitor is controlled by a throttling valve located in a line parallel with the process radiation monitor. Another valve located upstream of the process radiation monitor stops flow to the instrument on high temperature in order to protect against possible damage. The detector is located in a shielded stainless steel well abutting the sample chamber, and continuously measures the gamma activity of the sample water. After processing by a local amplifier, the detector output signal is fed to a linear ratemeter/ analyzer and a logarithmic ratemeter located in the control room. The linear ratemeter/ analyzer can monitor a specific fission product gamma activity by appropriate selection of window and threshold. In addition, the logarithmic ratemeter measures gross gamma activity. A control room instrument trends and displays simultaneously the single selected fission product activity and the gross activity of the other products in the reactor coolant. Alarms, with adjustable setpoints, are also provided. 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 9.3.3.1 Design Bases The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (EFDS) segrega:es and transports liquids containing wastes to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS). Noncontaminated floor drain waste is routed to the turbine bunding floor drain sump where it is monitored for radioactivity and released to the environs. The EFDS has components in the nuclear island structures, the turbine building, and the radwaste building. (J) T LiDoelps A0eneniel Auanery Sptoms Page 9.347
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Section 11.2, Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS), contains a discussion of the subsystems provided to collect, control, process, handle, store, and dispose of liquid radioactive waste. The equipment and floor drains are separated into equipment drains, floor drains, chemical waste drains, and detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes are routed to the LWMS subsystem that processes me particular waste type. Separate drain headers are provided for each drain type to prevent mixing of different types of liquid wastes. To prohibit the inadvertent release of radioactive waste to the environs, the drainage and collection systems used to handle radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid waste are separate and isolated from the systems used to handle strictly non-radioactive waste. The exception to this requirement is the Turbine Building floor drain sump which is provided with a normally isolated cross connection for routing radioactive liquid wastes to the LWMS for processing. The floor drainage system serving areas with safety-related equipment and components is segregated into independent systems such that a postulated flooding of one area does not impair the safety of the redundant equipment. Water filled loop seals are provided in floor drain piping to preclude the flow of con'aminated air from one building area to another. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System is capable of preventing a backflow of water that might exist from maximum flood levels resulting from external or system leakage to areas of the plant containing safety-related equipment. The Turbine Building equipment and floor drains are segregated and collected separately. Drains and discharges from sumps in the Turbine Building are not normally processed by the LWMS and are released to the environment and monitored by a radiation monitor. Closed cooling water systems located in controlled access areas have the equipment drains and pump seai leakage collected and recycled to the respective closed cooling water system or monitored and released outside of the LWMS. Sumps, tanks, and pumps are located at lower levels to facilitate transfer to the LWMS. Sumps are sized to accommodate drainage required during normal plant operations and maintenance activities. Sumps and drain collection tanks located in radioactive areas are sized to retain the volume equal to one-half of the expected continuous daily inputs. Sump pumps are sized to pump at a rate at least equal to the maximum expected input rate, including tank overflows. Potential discharge of fixed fire suppression systems and fire hoses is considered in the sizing of floor drains. Locations of equipment and floor drains coincide with locations of componems and system vents and drains where practical to facilitate draining and venting activities during normal pkn'. operations and maintenance. Approvmf Design Atatorial. Auxatiary Systems Page 9.3-18
System 80+ Design ControlDocument ( j Wastes routed to sumps shall flow by gravity.
.v Radioactive leakage from pump shaft seals and radioactive water from pump casing drains are collected and routed to the appropriate LWMS subsystem.
Pump ba,eplate drains are routed to the floor drain system. Liquid radioactive wastes from radioactive or potentially radioactive plant systems are directly piped to sumps or tanks in the various buildings or directly to the LWMS radwaste collection tanks. t Where feasible, the sources and quantities of wastes flowing to each collection point (sump or tank) shall ] be identified, and those from each collection point shall be measurable. Sumps shall be provided with sampling capability. Provisions are made to segregate oil from the floor drain system in locations where sigLificant any, unts of oil are present and near oil containing systems. l 9.3.3.2 System Description l Flow diagrams of the plant floor drainage system are provided in Figures 9.3.3-1 through 9.3.3-5. Flow diagrams of the Liquid Waste Management System in Section 11.2 (Figure 11.2-1, Sheets I through
- 4) contain diagrams of the plant equipment drains, chemical drains, and detergent drains.
p) ( The Equipment and Floor Drainage System within the various areas of the plant consists of equipment and floor drains, vertical drain risers, sloped horizontal drain pipes, sumps, sump pumps, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The equipment and floor drainage piping is embedded in the floor where possible. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System segregates the different waste types by providing separate and , independent drain paths for each waste type. l l A simplified flow diagram of the LWMS system for equipment wastes is given in Figure 11.2-1, Sheet 4, which shows a segregated equipment waste drain header and its inputs. l Figure 11.2-1, Sheet 3 is a simplified flow diagram of the floor drain LWMS system. The diagram { shows the different floor drain inputs to the floor drain header and illustrates the segregation of the floor ! drain header. Equipment and Floor Drainage System inputs to the Floor Drain Header include the Containment Floor Drain and Reactor Cavity Sumps, Reactor Building Subsphere Floor Drain Sumps, Nuclear Annex Radioactive Floor Drain Sumps (which include the CVCS Area Floor Drain Sumps), Turbine Building Floor Drains (if radioactive), and the Radwaste Building Sumps. Floor drain wastes first pass through an oil separation tank prior to entering the floor drain waste tanks. This is required to prevent oil from fouling fih rs and ion exchange resins. The Turbine Building floor drain sump is equipped with a continuous radiation monitor and cross connection to the LWMS. The cross connection provides the capability of having turbine building floor drains routed to the LWMS for processing. Fail-safe air-operated valves (AOVs) prevent the inadvertent G routing of contaminated waste to noncontaminated drainage systems and inadvertent release of f
'x contaminated waste to the environment. AOVs are provided in se lines from the floor drains to the sumps, in the cross connection line between the sump and the LWMS, and also between the sump and Apnprmed Desepre Macewiat Audary Systems Page 9.1 r9
System 80+ Design controlDocument I the sump discharge. During normal operations, the AOVs in the cross connection are closed and the remaining AOVs are open allowing the floor drain waste to be touted to the plant discharge. A radiation mon.i tor allows continuous monitoring of the sump discharge to detect radioactivity in the normally noncontaminated waste. The presence of radiation in the sump discharge automatically closes the sump discharbe AOV and sounds an alarm to alert the operator. The contaminated waste is then routed to the LWMS for processing by the operator. A loss of air to the AOVs causes the valves to fail in a safe position with the sump discharge itolated and the cross connection to the LWMS closed. Separate drain headers are provided for chemical wastes which are segregated and directed by gravity to the LWMS Chemical Waste Tanks. Figure 11.2-1, Sheet 2 shows a simplified flow diagram of the chemical waste drain system. Non-detergent decontamination solutions, chemical sample drains, and radiochemistry laboratory drams are considered to be chemical wastes. Provisions are made for alternative routings in the event of high radiortivity content. Independent detergent drains segregate and direct detergent wastes which are potentially radioactive to the LWMS Laundry & Het Shower Tanks. Figure 11.2-1, Sheet 2 shows the flow diagram for the detergent waste drainage system. Detergent wastes include laundry drains, regulated shop drains, cask clean drains, persamel decon drains, detergent sample drains, and miscellaneous equipment drains. Radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid wastes are collected and transported by segregated equipment and floor drains throughout the plant. The wastes collected are pumped or drained to the LWMS for j proccssing. The equipment and floor drains provided in the various plant buildings are described below. l' i 9.3.3.2.1 Containment Building A . ow diagram of the Containment Building floor drains is shown in Figure 9.3.3-1. Lealige from all Containment Building floors is directed to the Holdup Volume Area, at the bottom of which is a Containment floor drain sump. The Reactor Cavity is also provided with a sump, at the lowest 4 point in the Containment Building. These sumps serve no safety-related function. ! The Reac*or Cavity sump is equipped with two 100% capacity sump pumps. The collected waste in the Reactor Crvity sump is automatically pumped to the LWMS Floor Drain Tankc by the sump pumps i which are controlled by sump level instrumentation. The Containment floor drain sump is provided with two 100% capacity sump pumps which operate automatically under control of its own level instrumentation. The floor drain sump pumps are aligned with the LWMS Floor Drain Tanks in the Radwaste Building. The Containment door drain sump and the Reactor Cavity sump are provided with a sump level monitoring system te detect unidentified leakage from the Reactor Coolant System. , 1 The sump pump discharge lines penetrating Containment to the Nuclear Annex are isolated by two fail-closed air operated comainment isolation valves (one inside Containment, one outside Containment). These valves close or a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and a High Radiation Actuation Signal (HRAS). The Containment Building floor drain piping is non-safety class piping except for the containment penetrati on piping and the containment isolation valves which are Safety Class 2. Ol ANwoved Desipar Matenet Aunbery Systarts Page 9.320
System 80+ Design ControlDocument b' Reactor coolant quality water from valve and equipment leakoffs, drains, and reliefs within Containment are collected in the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank. The tank is part of the CVCS System and is described in Section 9.3.4. Low radioactivity condcnsate from the Containment Cot erst is routed to and collected in the Containment Cooler Condensate Tanks. Figure 11.2-1, Sheet 1 is a sin:olified flow diagram of the containment cooler condensate liquid waste management subsystem. Condenution from the coolers collects in drip pans under the cooles, runs into a header that connects all the coolers, leaves Containment and enters one of the condensate tanks. 9.3.3.2.2 Reactor Building Subsphere Figure 9.3.3-2 shows the flow diagram for the Reactor Building Subsphere floor drains. The Reactor Building Subsphere floor drainage system is divided into four separate drainage subsystems, one subsystem for each quadrant of the building. No common floor drain lines are provided between quadrants or divisions. Etch quadrant is provided with a floor drain sump, independent of the sumps serving the other quadrants. The separate floor drain headers empty into the sumps, each of which is equipped with two 100%- capacity sump pumps. The sump pumps operating automatically under control of level instrumentation in the sump, pump the collected waste from the sump to the LWMS Floor Drain Tanks. The Reactor Building Subsphere floor drain sump pumps are safety grade pumps required to collect p) ( leakage from the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) pumps and to prevent flooding of the ESF pump rooms. The pumps are normally powered from their respective quadrants electrical channel. In the event of loss of offsite power, the sump pumps are powered from the diesel generators. The Reactor Building Subsphere is physically separated into quadrants by walls containing no unsealed penetrations up to elevation 70+0. This assures each train of safety-related equipment necessary for safe shutdown is isolated from a potential flood occurring in an adjacent quadrant. Above elevation 70+0 the subsphere is physically separated divisionally such that a potential flood in one division is prevented from flooding the other division. Curbs are provided at the higher elevations to further aid in the prevention of cross-flooding. Backflow valves throughout the floor drain system prevent backflow into safety-related equipment areas. Backflow valves to areas containing safety-related equipment are Safety Class 3. The Reactor Building Subsphere equipment drains are directed to the Equipment Drain Tank or the LWMS Equipment Waste Tanks depending on waste quality and activity. 9.3.3.2.3 Nuclear Annex Figures 9.3.3-3 and 9.3.3-4 are the flow diagrams for the Nuclear Annex floor drainage system. The Nuclear Annex is divisionally separated by walls with no unsealed penetrations up to elevation 70+0. The Nuclear Annex floor drainage system is divisionally separate having no common drain lines between divisions. Each division is provided with separate floor drain sumps which collect floor drainage from their respective divisions. i O AAarneed Desigre neateriel. Aunnery Systems Pope 9.3-21
1 System 80+ Design ControlDocument The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System :s detailed in Section 9.5.9. Recoverable reactor coolant quality water outside the Containment Building from selected equipment drains, valve leakoffs, and equipment reliefs drains to the Equipment Drain Tank in the Nuclear Annex. The emergency feedwater pump rooms are physically separated from the Reactor Building Subsphere. j Access to those rooms is provided from the Nuclear Annex. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System j collects and detects Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System leakage which may originate in each EFW l pump roam and areas containing EFW system piping where a moderate or high energy pipe rupture is postulated. The EFW pump room floor drains are routed to the Nuclear Annex radioactive floor drain sump. The sumps are equipped with leakage detection equipment to alert the control room of excessive EFW leakage. Separate floor drain sumps are provided in the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) equipment areas of the Nuclear Annex to collect floor drainage from the CVCS areas. One CVCS floor drain sump is provided in each division. Two full capacity sump pu;nps for each sump are installed to transport the collected waste to the LWMS Floor Drain Tanks for proce; sing. S:parate equipment drain sumps are provided in each division to collect CVCS equipment drainage in the Nuclear Annex. Two full capacity sun p pumps for each sump are provided to transfer the collected waste to the Equipment Drain Tank. Nonradioactive floor drain sumps are provided in each division to collect noncontaminated floor drainage from " clean" areas in the Nuclear Annex. Each sump is provided with redundant full capacity sump pumps which discharge to the Turbine Building sump where the waste is monitored for radioactivity from where it can be diverted to the Floor Drain Tanks if contaminated. Radioactive floor drain sumps are provided in each division to collect radioactive floor drainage from within the controlled access areas of the Nuclear Annex. Each sump is provided with redundant full capacny sump pumps which discharge to the Floor Drain Tanks for processing. All other equipment drains in the Nuclear Annex having a low probability of containing tritium or other radioactive elements drain to the LWMS Equipment Waste Tanks in the Radwaste Building. 9.3.3.2..f Turbine Building Turbine Building pump leakages, seal flows, cooling runoffs, drains and similar valve discharges are piped or channeled to the Turbine Building sump. Miscellaneous leaks from various sources and general water uses, such as flushing or washdown of floors or equipment, also enter the sump by way of channels, floor drains or trenches usually covered by open grating in an embedded network within the Turbine Building floors. During normal operating events, the Turbine Building sumps will not collect radioactive wastes and the contents are pumped to the discharge header via radiation monitors. The Turbine Building sump can become slightly radioactive should there be a Steam Generator primary-to-secondary leak at the same time that sizeable leaks exist in the Condensate-Feedwater Systems, Steam Generator Blowdown Systems, or the Polishing Demineralizer Waste System within the Turbine Building. Altwoved Design Atatonial. Aunnary Systems Page s.3 22
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument r\ Therefore, the sump is continuously monitored during normal operations for radioactivity. Upon detecting any radioactivity in the discharge, the discharge is automatically terminated and can be routed ' to the LWMS Floor Drain Tanks. 9.3.3.2.5 Radwaste Building The Radwaste Building equipment and floor drains are segregated and collected separately. The Radwaste Building is provided with a floor drain sump which collects floor drainage from the building. The sump is provided with two full capacity sump pumps which automatically pump the collected waste to the LWMS Floor Drain Tanks. Equipment waste from the Radwaste Building is directed to the Equipment Waste Tanks. 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation The Equipment and Floor Drainage System has been carefully and rigorously designed to accomplish the necessary segregation of liquid wastes as required by the LWMS. Drains are sized for draining of their corresponding equipment. Sump sizes and sump pump capacities are compatible to eliminate undesirable sump pump cycling operation. Sump pump capacities are sized large enough to handle the maximum leakage rate into their respmive sumps. Operators will be alerted when abnormal quantities of water are released to the Equipment and O Floor Drainage System by comparing pump discharge pressures and flows to the calculated and V experimental flows and pressure drops. Leakage detection devices will also be used in applicable component areas. All piping capable of flooding components needed for safe shutdown and accident mitigation is designed for Seismic Category 1. This minimizes the potential for flooding safety-related components. The Reactor Building Subsphere floor drain sump pumps and associated instrumentation are Safety Class 3 to prevent flooding of the ESF pump rooms. The pumps are powered from the diesel generators in the event of loss of offsite power. The Nuclear Annex and Reactor Building Subsphere divisions are physically separated such that flooding of one division will not affect the other division. The Reactor Building Subsphere is further separated l by cuadrants up to elevation 70+0. This assures train separation of safety-related equipment necessary for safe shutdown and prevents a potential floed in one quadrant from flooding into the other quadrants. , Good operating practice dictates that system operation will be either terminated or quickly switched over i to the redundant channel and the leaking component or header isolated. This minimizes the quantity of water available for flooding safety related equipment. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System has provisions to prevent back flow from equipment and floor i drains into safety related areas. 9.3.3A Inspection and Testing Ren.uirements i ("m) The system will be fully tested and inspected before initial operation. Adequate operating performance monitoring will assure system integrity. i l i Appraed Design hinterial- Aushery Systems Page 9.3-23 ! 1
Sctem 80+ Design Control Document The operability of equipment and floor drainage systems dependent on gravity flow can be checked by normal usage. Portions of these systems, dependent upon pumps to raise liquid waste to gravity drains, may be checked through instrumentation and alarms in the main control room. Safety Class 3 backflow valves shall be inspected and tested on a periodic basis to assure their operability. 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements Sufficient instmmentation is included in the system to assure sati.cfactory operation. Sumps and sump pumps have adequate instrumentation to start and stop pumps and monitor performance. Seismic Category I level alarms are provided for those sumps in the Reactor Building Subsphere and Nuclear Annex that r-rve safety-related pump rooms. High-temperature alarms and high-level indication, in addition to the leveFoperated switch used for pue.p cmrol, are provided for all sumps in the Containment, Reactor Building Subsphere, and the Nuclear Annex to provide backup indication of the presence of large leaks and to provide information as to the source. Level alarm is provided for all other sumps as well, Level alarms are di; played and monitored in the main control room. 9.3.4 Chemical and Vohune Control System 9.3.4.1 Design Bases 9.3.4.1.1 Functional Requirements The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is designed as a non-safety-related system. As such, the CVCS is Dqt required to perform any accident mitigation or safe shutdown function. In particular, the CVCS is not required to function in order to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, nor ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of plant accidents. It is not required to show acceptable results for safety analysis. For the System 80+ Standard Design, safety functions are performed by dedicated safety systems, Specifically, the safety injection system is credited for RCS inventory control and boration in Chapter 15 accident analyses, Chapter 6 Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA) events, and safe shutdowns. Pressure control during these events is accomplished via the safety depressurization and vent system. Although not required to perform any accident mitigation or safe shutdown functions, the chemical and volume control system is essential for the normal day-to-day operation of the plant. The CVCS has therefore been provided with a high degree of reliability and redundancy and has been designed in accordance with accepted industry standards and quality assurance commensurate with its importance to plant operations. The Dedicated Seal Injection System (DSIS) is integrated into the CVCS and is considered part of the CVCS. it provides a diverse and dedicated means of seal injection for reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal cooling. In particular, the DSIS provides enhanced coping capability during a Station Blackout (SBO). The Chemical and Volume Control System is designed to perform the following functions: e Maintain the chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant during normal operation and during O shutdowns. Approwd Desipar Material. Auxibery Systems Page 9.3-24
. .~ . - _ . . - - . . - - - . . - - - .
l
}
~ System 80+ Deslan conwot Document
; 1 i
j, * ' Maintain the required volume of water in the RCS, compensating for reactor coolant contraction l j \ or expansion resulting from changes in reactor coolant temperature and for other coolant .; ~ losses or additions. l o Receive, store and separate borated waste for recycle, or discharge to the Liquid Waste ; i Management System (LWMS). ; L
- Control the boron concentration in the RCS to obtain optimum Control Element Assembly (CEA) positioning, to compensate for reactivity changes associated with major changes in reactor ecolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon variations, and to provide shutdown margin for maintenance -
i and refueling operations.
- Provide auxiliary prer;urizer spray for (1) control of pressurizer pressure during the final stages ,
of shutdown and (2) to allow for pressurizer cooling.
- Provide injection water at the proper temperature, pressure, and purity for the reactor coolant l
- j. pump seals, and collect the controlled bleedoff from the reactor coolant pump seals. Provide l injection water to the reactor coolant pump seals via the DSIS when normal seal injection and component cooling water is not available. j
- Provide RCS hydrotesting capability.
ir
- Provide a reactor makeup water supply to various auxiliary equipment. -i l
l
- Provide a means for sluicing ion exchanger resin to the Solid Waste Managerr.ent System.
~
- Provide a means for continuous removal of noble gases from the RCS. l
- Provide borated makeup to the spent fuel pool.
1
- Provide purification of shutdown cooling flow, i
- Provide makeup for losses from small leaks in RCS piping. l 1
l
- Provide a means to purify the contents of the Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST). ,
t
- Provide a means to add makeup and adjust the chemistry of the IRWST.
9.3.4.1.2 Design Criteria The CVCS is designed in accordance with the following criteria: !
- The CVCS is designed to accept RCS letdown flow when the reactor coolant is heated at the maximum administrative rate of 75'F/hr and to provide the required makeup using one of the :
two charging pumps when the reactor coolant is cooled at the maximum administrative rate of !' 75'F/hr. O ! Anwwwod Des (pn adoemdef. AmdEwy Sposoms Asgo 3.3-20 i
i System 80+ Design ControlDocument i
- The CVCS is designed to supply makeup water or accept letdown due to power decreases or increases: l l
- 1. The system is designed for 10% step power increases between 15% and 90% of full l power and 10% step power decreases between 100% and 25% full power, as well as for '
ramp changes of iS% of full power per minute between 15 and 100% power.
- 2. The Volume Centrol Tank (VCT) is sized with sufficient capacity to accommodate the j inventory change resulting from a full to zero power decrease with no makeup system operation, assuming that the VCT level is initially in the normal operating level band.
- The CVCS provides a means for maintaining activity in the RCS within the appropriate technical specification limit, assuming a one percent failed fuel condition and continuous full power operation.
- The CVCS is designed to maintain the reactot 'oolant chemistry within the limits specified in l EPRI report NP-7077, PWR Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines: Revision 2 (dated November 1990), and repeated in Table 9.3.4-1.
- Letdown and charging portions of the RCPB are designed to withstand the design transients defined in Table 9.3.4-2 without any adverse effects, as applicable.
- The CVCS has the capacity to receive and process all excess reactor coolant generated during all normal and anticipated modes of operation. Excess coolant generated during typical plant operations is shown in Table 9.3.4-3.
- The CVCS is designed to provide 30 gpm of filtered flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump seals and to accept a 22 gpm controlled bleedoff flow. The DSIS is designed to provide 6.6 gpm of filtered seal injection flow to the seals of each reactor coolant pump when normal seal injection and component cooling water are not available.
- Components of the CVCS are designed in accordance with applicable standards or codes as shown in Table 9.3.4-4. Safety class and seismic category information is provided by Figure 9.3.4-1 Sheets 1 through 4, and Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-2.
- The CVCS active valves are identified in Table 9.3.4-7. Refer to Section 3.11 for environmental design criteria applicable to CVCS valves.
- The CVCS is designed to operate with no boric acid concentration above the point where precipitation could occur. The boric acid batching tank and discharge lines are the only portions of the system requiring heat tracing to preclude boric acid precipitation. These portions of the system can contain fluid concentrated to 12 weight percent boric acid. The remaining portions of the system contain a lower boric acid concentration (less than 2.5 wt%), and heat tracing to prevent precipitation is not required.
- One charging pump has the capacity to replace the flow lost to the containment due to a break in a small RCS line, such as instntment and sample lines. These lines have 7/32-inch I.D. by 1-inch long flow restricting orifices installed in their RCG nozzles to limit leakage in the event of a line break. ,
Apprownf Design MatwM- Astanary Systems (11/96) Pege 9.3-26
Srtem 80+ __ Design controlDocument O V
- The CVCS is designed to receive discharges from drains and relief valves in the RCS, SIS and
~SCS.
- The CVCS provides for boron concentration adjustment in the RCS by feed and bleed. The maximum possible rate of boron dilution is limited, such that the operator has sufficient time to identify and terminate a boron dilution incident prior to reaching criticality during any refueling operations (see Section 7.7.1.1.10 for a description of the boron dilution alarm).
- The CVCS concentrated boric acid reserve is sufficient to make the reactor subcritical in the cold shutdown condition with the most reactive CEA withdrawn.
9.3.4.1.3 System Functions 9.3.4.1.3.1 Reactor Coolant Inventory The volume of water in the RCS is automatically controlled using level instrumentation located on the pressurizer. The pressurizer level setpoint is programmed to vary as a function of RCS average temperature in order to minimize the transfer of fluid between the RCS and CVCS during power changes. This linear relationship is shown in Figure 5.4.10-2. Reactor power is directly proportional to the average reactor coolant temperature derived from hot and cold leg temperature measurements. A level error signal is obtained by comparing the programmed setpoint with the measured pressurizer water level. Volume control is achieved by automatic control of the charging and letdown flow control valves in accordance with the pressurizer level control program. l ,m Two parallel charging pump flow control valves, two parallel letdown flow control valves, and two (] parallel charging pumps are provided. During reactor power operations, one charging pump is running with one in standby. In addition, one of the letdown and one of the charging pump flow control valves are selected for use. The selected charging pump flow control valve is normally maintained by the pressurizer level control program at a preset position to give a constant flow rate at normal operating pressures. The position of the selected charging pump flow control valve is maintained constant by the pressurizer level control program, except in response to a high or low pressurizer level condition as shown in Figure 5 410-4. Fine control of pressurizer level is accompli.ched via letdown control. The position of the selected letdown flow control valve is varied by the pressurizer level control program in l response to the level error in order to compensate for small changes in pressurizer level. The level in the VCT is controlled automatically. Letdown flow is diverted to the holdup tank via the pre-holdup ion exchanger and gas stripper when the VCT high level serpoint is reached. The makeup system is normally set for the automatic mode of operation, in which flow at a preset blend of boric acid from the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) and demineralized water from the Reactor Makeup Water l Tank (RMWT) is provided to the VCT upon a low level signal. A low-low VCT level signal ! automatically isola es the VCT from the charging pumps, switching the charging pump suction to the ; BAST, closes an outlet valve on the VCT, opens the boric acid flow control bypass valve, and starts the boric acid makeup pumps. l 9.3.4.1.3.2 Reactor Coolant System Conrosion Control via the CVCS Two chemicais are added to the reactor coolant to control oxygen: (1) hydrazine during the precriticality O period, on after a long shutdown; and (2) hydrogen during post-criticality. Hydrazine is maimawd in () the reactor coolant in the range of 30 to 50 ppm whenever the reactor coolant temperature is ti >w 150*F and reactor coolant is circulating. This prevents halide-induced attack, which could occur il significant Approved Design Materie!- Aux 5ary Systems (11/96) Page 9.327
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 1 i quantities of fluorides or chlorides and significant amounts of dissolved oxygen are present. During heatup, any dissolved oxygen is scavenged by the hydrazine, eliminating the potential for general l corrosion. At higher temperatures, the hydrazine decomposes, forming ammonia. The resultant increase in pH aids in the development and maintenance of passive oxide films on Reactor Coolant System ! surfaces. It has been well established that the corrosion rates of Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy and 300-series stainless steels decrease with time when exposed to normal reactor coolant chemistry conditions, approaching low steady state values within approximately 200 days. A high pH minimizes corrosion product release and assists in the rapid development of the passive oxide film. Most of the film is established during pre-core operations within seven days at hot, high pH conditions. To aid in maintaining the pH during system passivation, lithium in the form of lithium hydroxide, is added to the coolant and maintained within a 1-2 ppm lithium-7 range. At power, oxygen concentration is limited by maintaining excess dissolved hydrogen gas in the coolant. T1.e excess hydrogen forces the water decomposition / synthesis reaction in the reactor core toward water synthesis, rather than hydrogen and oxygen formation. Oxygen added via makeup water is removed in this way. In order to minimize the effect of crud deposition on tr e reactor core heat transfer surfaces, lithium-7 hydroxide additions are made. Lithium-7 hydroxide produces pH conditions within the reactor coolant at operating temperatures that reduce the corrosion product solubility and, hence, the dissolved crud inventory in the circulating reactor coolant. The elevated pH promotes conditions within the coolant for selective deposition of corrosion products on cooler surfaces (steam generators) rather than hotter surfaces (core). An additional advantage is the formation of a more stable and tenacious passive oxide layer on out-of-core system surfaces. The lithium concentration is maintained within a 0.2-2.2 ppm lithium-7 range during normal operation. 9.3.4.1.3.3 Reactivity Control Boron concentration is normally controlled by feed-and-bleed. To change concentration, the makeup system supplies either reactor makeup water or boric acid to the VCT, and the letdown stream is diverted to the holdup tank via the pre-holdup ion exchanger and the gas stripper. Toward the end of a fuel cycle, with low boric acid concentration in the coolant, feed-and-bleed to further reduce boron concentration becomes inefficient, and the deborating ion exchanger is used. The deborating ion exchanger contains an anion resin initially in the hydroxyl form, which is converted to a borate form as boron is removed from the reactor coolant. l 9.3.4.1.4 Confining Dike Structure The Boric Acid Storage Tank, the Reactor Makeup Water Tank, and the Holdup Tank are contained within a reinforced concrete dike structure described in Section 3.8.4.1.11, and Section 11.6 of Appendix 3.8A. Specific design requirements include the following: l* The dike structure surrounding the tanks is designed to meet the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.143, " Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management Systems, Structures, and l Components Installed in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." Specifically, the tanks are located within a seismically-designed dike or retention pond of sufficient height / size capable of preventing runoff in the event of tank overflow / rupture. Aaproved Deshyn Materid. Aus6ery Systems (2/95) Page 9.3-28
System 80+ Design controlDocument (3
- All three tanks are located within a common dike structure designed to contain the maximum
( ,/ combined liquid inventory in the tanks.
- The dike stmeture will be designed to comply with applicable state and local regulations.
9.3.4.2 System Description 9.3.4.2.1 System The normal reactor coolant flow path through the CVCS is indicated by the heavy lines on the flow diagrams (Figure 9.3.4-1, Sheets I through 4). Design parameters for the major components are shown in Table 9.3.4-4. Normal operating parameters for the CVCS are listed in Table 9.3.4-5. Process flow data is shown in Table 9.3.4-6. Letdown flow from the RCS passes through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger where an initial temperature reduction takes place via heat transfer to cooler charging fluid on the shell side of the heat exchanger. The regenerative heat exchanger is designed to cool letdown flow to less than 450*F for all normal operations and to heat the charging flow by a minimum of 100*F. A final temperature reduction to the purification subsystem operating temperature is made by the letdown heat exchanger. The letdown heat exchanger is sized to cool inlet water from the maximum regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature to 120'F (or lower) for most operating conditions. Both the letdown and the regenerative heat exchangers are designed for fuli RCS pressure and both are located inside containment. ; Letdown fluid pressure is reduced from RCS pressure to the operating pressure of the purification ; hs d i subsystem in two stages. The first pressare reduction occurs at the letdown orifices and the second occurs at the letdown control valves located downstream of the orifices. The letdown orifices are located inside containment. The letdown orifices are sized to pass the maximum letdown flow at full RCS pressure with one control valve fall open. The orifice provides the pressure reduction necessary to minimize erosion of the letdown control valve seating surfaces during normal RCS operations. A bypass valve around the orifices is provided for low pressure operations. The process flow is then filtered via , the purification filter purified via a purification ion exchanger, and sprayed into the VCT. An excess l hydrogen inventory is maintained in the RCS by keeping a hydrogen overpressure on the VCT contents. l The charging pumps normally take suction from the VCT and discharge to the RCS. During normal operations, or.e charging pump is running and the other is in standby. The CVCS piping design limits the combined maximum charging flowrate to the RCS. One letdown and one charging pump flow control valve are normally selected for use. Seal injection water is supplied to the Reactor Coolant Pumps i (RCPs) by diverting a portion of the charging flow just downstream of the charging pumps. This seal l flow is then heated in the seal injection heat exchanger to approximately 125'F before filtering. Once j the flow has been filtered, the seal injection fluid is distributed to fne four RCPs. The undiverted I charging fluid is sent to the regenerative heat exchanger where it is heated before injection into the RCS. A chemical addition tank and a chemical addition metering pump are used to transfer chemical additives l to the charging line downstream of the seal injection takeoff connection. Sufficient connections exist between the CVCS and the IRWST to a!!ow for purifvation, inventory adjustments, and boron adjustments to the contents of that tank. l [N \v) l AMwwed Desigrs Material. Aux 6ery Systems (11/96) Page 9.3-29
System 80+ Design Control Document The boron recovery portion of the CVCS accepts letdown flow diverted from the VCT as a result of feed and bleed operations for shutdowns, startups, and boroa dilution ove core life. The diverted letdown flow, which has passed through a purification filter and ion exchanger, Jso passes through the pre-holdup ion exchanger. The pre-holdup ion exchanger retains cesium, lithium, and other ionic radionuclides with high efficiency. The process flow then passes through the gas stripper, where hydrogen and fission gases are removed with high efficiency; thus (1) precluding the buildup of explosive gas mixtures in the holdup tank and (2) minimizing the release of radioactive fission product gases in aerated vents or liquid discharges. The degassed liquid is automatically pumped from the gas stripper to the holdup tank. Reactor coolant quality water from valve and equipment leakoffs, drains, and reliefs within the containment is collected in the Reactor Drain Tank (RDT) and scheduled for b:tch processing. Recoverab!e reactor coolant quality water outside the containment from various equipment and valve leakoffs, reliefs, and drains is collected in the Equipment Drain Tank (EDT) and scheduled for batch processing. Reactor coolant collected in either of these tanks is periodically discharged by the reactor drain pumps through the reactor drain filter and pre-holdup ion exchanger, and processed in the same manner as divened VCT flow, as described above. This liquid is also pumped to the holdup tank. When a sufficient volume accumulates in the holdup tank, it is pumped by a holdup pump to the boric acid concentrator, where the bottoms are concentrated to within the range of 4000 to 4400 ppm boron. The boric acid concentrator bottoms are continuously monitored for proper boron concentration, and normally pumped directly to the BAST. In the event that abnormal quantities of radionuclides are present, the bottoms are discharged to the LWMS. The boric acid concentrator distillate passes through a boric acid condensate ion exchanger, where boric acid carryover is removed. The distillate is collected in the RMWT for reuse in the plant. If recycle is not desired, the distillate is divened to the LWMS. When the SCS is operational, a flow path through the CVCS can be established for purification. This O is accomplished by divening a ponion of the flow from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger to the letdown line upstream of the letdown heat exchanger. The flow then passes through the puritication filter, purification ion exchanger, and the letdown strainer to the VCT. The fluid is returned to the RCS by the charging pumps. When continuous degasification of the RCS is desired, the letdown flow is divened from the inlet of the VCT to the gas stripper, bypassing the pre-holdup ion exchanger. The letdown flow is processed in the gas stripper and is then returned to the VCT via the normal spray nozzle. If desired, VCT hydrogen overpressure can be used to replace the hydrogen removed during the gas stripping process. The charging pumps take suction from the VCT, and return the processed fluid to the RCS. A makeup subsystem of the CVCS provides for changes in RCS boron concentration. Boron is initially added to the CVCS using the boric acid batching tank (BABT). Reactor makeup water is added to the BABT via the makeup supply header, and the fluid is heated by inunersion heaters. Boric acid powder is added to the heated fluid while a mixer agitates the fluid. A boric acid concentration of as high as 12 weight percent can be prepared. Electric immersion heaters maintain the temperature of the solution in the boric acid batching tank high enough to preclude precipitation. The concentrated boric acid solution in the BABT is drawn into the boric acid batching eductor and diluted by fluid being circulated from the BAST via the boric acid makeup pumps. The reactor makeup water pumps can also be used by taking suction from the reactor makeup water tank and pumping the water through the eductor to the BAST. O Approved Design Meterial Auxihery 5ystems (11/96) Page 9.3-30
System 80+ Design ControlDocument n Boric acid solution stored in the BAST is normally supplied to the RCS via the boric acid makeup pumps, ('~') while the reactor makeup water stored in the RMWT is supplied via the reactor makeup water pumps. Four operational modes of CVCS makeup are provided: dilute, borate, manual and automatic. In the dilute mode, a preset quantity of reactor makeup water is introduced into the VCT, or directly into the charging pump suction header via the volume control tank bypass valve, at a preset rate. In the borate mode, a preset quantity of boric acid is introduced into the VCT, or directly into the charging pump suction header via the VCT bypass valve, at a preset rate. In the manual mode, the flow rates of the reactor makeup water and the boric acid can be preset to give any blended boric acid solution between zero and the boric acid solution concentration in tb BAST (4000-4400 ppm). In the automatic mode, a preset blended boric acid solution is automatically introduced into the VCT upon demand from the VCT level controller. The preset solution concentration is adjusted periodically by the operator to match the boric acid concentration in the RCS. The DSIS consists of a small capacity positive displacement pump which is placed in parallel with the CVCS centrifugal charging pumps. The DSIS is operated during off-normal plant conditions involving losses of all other RCP seal cooling methods. The DSIS pump takes suction from the VCT or the BAST and supplies seal injection water to the RCPs through the normal CVCS seal injection flow path. The DSIS seal injection water passes through the seal injection heat exchanger and is filtered before being distributed to the four RCP'.. Dedicated seal injection is controlled and monitored using the valves and instrumentation in the normal seal injection line. 9.3.4.2.2 Component Description (3 The major components of the CVCS are described in this section. The principal component data ( ,/ summary, inciuding component design code, is given in Table 9.3.4-4. Component seismic and safety classifications are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
- Regenerative Heat Exchanger The regenerative heat exchanger is a vertically mounted, shell and tube (U-tube) heat exchanger.
The regenerative heat exchanger conserves RCS thermal energy by transferring heat from the letdown fluid to the charging fluid. Heating the charging fluid serves to minimize charging nozzle thermal transients. The heat exchanger is designed to maintain a letdown outlet temperature below 450*F under all normal operating conditions. e Letdown Heat Exchanger The letdown heat exchanger is a horizontally mounted, shell and tube hest exchanger. The letdown heat exchanger uses component cooling water to cool the letdown fluif from the outlet temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger to a temperature suitable for operation of the purification system. The letdown heat exchar.ger is sized to cool the letdown fluid from the maximum outlet temperature of the regmerative heat exchanger (450*F) to below the maximum allowable operating temperature of ine ion exchange resins (140*F).
- Purification Filters g Each of the two purification filters is designed to remove insoluble particulates from the letdown i flow. Each filter is designed to pass the maximum letdown flaw without exceeding the allowable (d differential pressure across the filter elements in the maximum fouled condition. Each filter is i Asyveved Design atatoria!* AuxEsery Systems Page .9.3-3 r i
Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument designed for efficient remote removal of filter canridges due to the buildup of high activity levels during filter operation.
- Purification Ion Exchangers Each of the two purification ion exchangers contains a mixed bed resin and is provided with the necessary connections to replace the resin by sluicing. Each ion exchanger is designed to pass the maximum letdown flow and is identical in mechanical design to the other. The volume of resin contained in one ion exchanger is sufficient to continuously remove impurities and radionuclides from normal letdown flows. The other purification ion exchanger is used intermittently to control the lithium concentration in the reactor coolant.
- Deborating Ion Exchanger The deborating ion exchanger is identical to the purification ion exchangers in mechanical design.
The deborating ion exchanger contains an anion resin in the hydroxyl (OH-) form. The deborating ion exchanger is sized to reduce the reactor coolant boron concentration from 30 ppm to 0 ppm using two charges of anion resin.
- Volume Control Tank The VCT is designed to accumulate letdown water from the RCS, to provide for control of hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant, and to provide a reservoir of reactor coolant for the charging pumps. The VCT has sufficient volume below the normal operating band and above a reserve volume (provided for vortex prevention) to accommodate full charging flow for ten minutes with no makeup provided to the VCT. A VCT low level signal automatically actuates the boric acid makeup system to replenish VCT fluid for an extended period of time. The VCT has sufficient volume above the normal operating band to accumulate full letdown flow for five minutes (with charging secured), plus an additional volume for a gas cushion which is sized to maintain VCT pressure in the normal operating range. The normal operating level band acconunodates the maximum allowable RCS leakage for one hour without the need for makeup addition. The tank has hydrogen and nitrogen gas supplies, and a vent to the GWMS to enable venting of hydrogen, nitrogen, and fission gases.
- Charging Pumps The two charging pumps are multi-stage centri.ugal type pumps. Each pump is provided with vent, drain, and flushing connections to minimize radiation levels during maintenance operations.
- Charging Pump Mini-flow Heat Exchanger The charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger is a horizontally mounted, shell and tube heat exchanger. The mini-flow heat exchanger uses component cooling water to cool the recirculation flow from an operating charging pump.
- Boric Acid Batching Tank The boric acid batching tank allows the operator to conveniently mix boric acid. The tank is designed to permit handling of up to 12 weight percent boric acid. The tank is insulated and has Anwaved Design aceterial- Ausnery Systems Page 9.3 32
System 80+ Design controlDocument
/m '
a reactor makeup water supply from the makeup supply header. Sampling provisions, a mixer, (] temperature controller, and electric immersion heaters are provided. ,
- Boric Acid Storage Tank !
The BAST is sized to permit one back-to-back shutdown to cold shutdown, followed by a shutdown for refueling at the most limiting time in core cycle with the most reactive control rod withdrawn. The maximum concentration of boric acid in the tank shall be 2.50 weight percent.
- Holdup Tank The holdup tank is sized to store all recoverable reactor coolant generated by one back-to-back cold shutdown to five percent subcritical with the most reactive CEA withdrawn and subsequent startups at 90% core life.
- Reactor Makeup Water Tank The reactor makeup water tank capacity is based on providing dilution to allow total recycle.
The tank also provides dilution for a back-to-back shutdown and subsequent startup at 90 percent core life.
- Boric Acid Makeup Pumps A The two boric acid makeup pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are V induction, squirrel cage motors. The capacity of each boric acid makeup pump is greater than the maximum charging capacity.
- Reactor Makeup Water Pumps The two reactor makeup water pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are :
induction, squirrel cage motors. The capacity of each reactor makeup water pump is greater than the maximum charging capacity.
- lloldup Pumps The two holdup pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are induction, l squirrel cage motors. !
- Chemical Addition Package The chemical addition package consists of a chemical addition tank, a chemical addition pump, and a strainer. The capacity of the chemical addition tank is based upon the maximum anticipated amount of lithium to be added in one batch. The chemical addition pump is a positive displacement pump with a variable capacity.
- Boric Acid Filter I i The boric acid filter is designed to remove insoluble particulates from the BAST and makeup D' flow, ;
i
- A DenQ nienneda! Auumery Sysenme Page 9.3-33
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- Reactor Makeup Water Filter The reactor makeup water filter is designed to remove insoluble particulates from the reactor makeup water supply to the resin sluice supply header, makeup header, and makeup system.
- Reactor Drain Pumps The two reactor drain pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are induction, squirrel cage motors.
o Reactor Drain Filter The reactor drain filter is designed to remove insoluble particulates from the contents of the Reactor Drain Tank, Equipment Drain Tank, and holdup tank.
- Reactor Drain Tank The Reactor Drain Tank is designed to:
- 1. receive relief valve discharges from the Shutdown Cooling and Safety Injection Systems,
- 2. receive gravity drains and leakage of reactor coolant quality water from components located within containment, and
- 3. receive gravity drains from the RCS.
- Equipment Drain Tank The Equipment Drain Tank receives gravity drains from the recycle drain header and the ion exchanger drain header. The Equipment Drain Tank is also sized to accept gas stripper bypass flow for 30 minutes, and to accept discharges from miscellaneous relief valves.
- Preholdup lon Exchanger The preholdup ion exchanger is identical to the purification ion exchangers in mechanical design.
The preholdup ion exchanger contains a mixed bed resin and is designed to pass the maximum letdown flow. The volume of resin contained in the preholdup ion exchanger is sufficient to remove impurities and radionuclides from normal letdown flows.
- Gas Stripper The gas stripper achieves efficient gas stripping of reactor coolant by heating the process fluid and passing it through a packed tower which employs steam as a stripping medium. The gas stripper package includes pumps to transfer the degassed process fluid to the holdup tank, or to the VCT during continuous degassing of normalletdown flow. Noncondensible gases, along with trace quantities of fission gases and water vapor, flow to the GWMS.
O Asyveved Desiger Material Aux 5ary Systems Pope 9.3 34
f
. System 80+ oenlan contrat Docanent
( Boric Acid Concentrator Package The boric acid concentrator concentrates the boric acid solution in the process flow by means of l 7
. evaporation. The process flow enters the concentrator and is heated via recirculation through a steam heater. The vapor leaving the recirculation flow is stripped of entrained liquid by demisters, condensed,' and pumped to the RMWT. The concentrate (bottoms) is cooled and pumped to either the BAST or the LWMS. '
- Boric Acid Condensate Ion Exchanger i
I~ = The boric acid condensate ion exchanger contains an anion resin of sufficient volume to remove [ boron carryover from the boric acid concentrator distillate, and is designed to pass the maximum l boric acid concentrator bypass flow. , (
- Seal Injection Filters l
These two redundant filters are designed to remove insoluble particles from the seal injection flow I a to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Each unit is designed to pass the maximum anticipated flow without exceeding the allowable differential pressure across the element in the maximum fouled condition. o Seal Injection IIcat Exchanger The seal injection heat exchanger is a vertical heat exchanger which uses steam (shell side) to heat ] ,I the seal injection flow (tube side). The seal injection heat exchanger functions to maintain a relatively constant fluid temperature to minimize thermal transients to the RCP seals. e Dedicated Seal Injection Pump The dedicated seal injection pump is a positive displacement pump which is air cooled. Vent, ) drain, and flushing connections are provided to minimize radiation levels during maintenance operations. The pump is provided with a suction stabilizer and pulsation dampener. 9.3.4.2.3 System Operation The Chemical and Volume Control System is designed to be operated as follows: i e Plant Startup Plant startup is the series of operations which bring the plant from a cold shutdown condition to a hot standby condition (normal operating pressure, zero power temperature, with the reactor critical at a low power level). A charging pump and the letdown control valves are used during the initial phase of Reactor Coolant System heatup to maintain RCS pressure until the pressurizer steam bubble is established. Prior to establishing a pressurizer steam bubble, the RCS will be in a water solid condition with one charging pump, one letdown control valve, and one charging pump flow control valve in operation. The letdown orifices will be bypassed by diverting flow through the bypass line. The -
- i. charging pump flow control valve will be held in its minimum automatic position by the pressurizer level control program. A pressurizer steam bubble is formed by adjusting RCS Anymet osedan assesaw. Asmuser sy es esee s. sos
System 80+ Design ControlDocument pressure via the letdown control valves and then increasing the pressurizer temperature until it is heated to saturation. When reactor coolant is removed from the RCS, this causes flashing in the pressurizer steem space. During the RCS heatup, pressurizer leve! and RCS pressure is maintained by adjusting the position of the letdown control valves, in conjunction with placing individual orifices in service. The letdown orifice bypass valve is closed to limit downstream pressure. Finally, the pressurizer level control system is placed in automatic. RCS pressure will be automatically maintained by the letdown control valve. j The VCT is initially purged with nitrogen and a hydrogen overpressure is established. The RCS boron concentration may be reduced during heatup in accordance with shutdown margin l' limitations. The makeup controller is operated in the dilute mode to inject a predetermined amount of reactor makeup water at a preset rate. Compliance with the shutdown margin limitations is verified by sample analysis and boronometer indication.
- Normal Operation Normal operation includes hot standby operation and power generation (RCS operations at normal RCS pressure and temperature). A description of normal operation is contained in Section 9.3.4.2.1.
- Plant Shutdown Plant shutdown is a series of operations which brings the plant from a hot standby condition to a cold shutdown condition for maintenance or refueling.
Prior to the plant cooldown, the gas space of the VCT is vented to reduce fission gas activity and the RCS dissolved hydrogen concentration to less than 5 cc(STP)/kg. The purification rate may be increased to accelerate the degasification, ion exchange, and filtration processes. Degassing the reactor coolant is accomplished by diverting letdown flow to the gas stripper and returning the process fluid to the VCT. The normal VCT hydrogen overpressure is replaced with nitrogen purges to maintain a low reactor coolant hydrogen concentration. Addition of other chemicals is not normally required during a plant shutdown. Boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System is normally increased concurrently with the cooldown by direct charging from the BAST. Borating concurrently with the cooldown greatly
~ reduces the amount of liquid waste generated during the shutdown process.
Once the required RCS boron concentration has been reached, the charging pump suction is switched from the BAST to the VCT. Following this switchover, the low level condition in the VCT will cause automatic makeup at the required shutdown boron concentration. Pressurizcr level is maintained via positioning of the charging pump and letdown flow control valves. All or part of the charging flow may be used for auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer and increase its boron content when RCS pressure is below that required to operate the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Priot to scheduled refuelings, the IRWST boron concentration is verified to be at the maximum operating limit of 4400 ppm. Any borating operations of the IRWST which may be necessary to achieve this concentration are completed prior to the scheduled shutdown. As the reactor vessel head is removed during the shutdown, the containment spray or shutdown cooling system pumps take borated water from the IRWST to fill the refueling pool. Approvmf Desen Materal Auxhary Systems page 9.3 36 ;
N System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument The resulting concentration of the refueling pool and the RCS is between the lower operating C boron concentration limitation of the IRWST (4000 ppm) and the maximum operating boron concentration of the IRWST (4400 ppm). Thus., the contents of the refueling pool can be returned directly to the IRWST prior to plant startup without hindering plant operations. During refueling shutdowns, the reactor makeup water supply piping is continuously monitored ' via flow switch F-250. An alarm is annunciated if flow is detected in order to prevent dilution of the refueling pool. 9.3.4.3 Design Evaluation j 9.3.4.3.1 Availability and Reliability f A high degree of functional reliability is assured by providing standby components and by assuring fail-safe responses for the most probable modes of failure. Redundancy is provided as follows: C.gmoonent Redundancy Purification and Deborating Ion Exchangers Three identical components Charging Pumps One operating, one in standby
- Charging Pump Flow Control Valves One operating and one parallel, standby valve Letdown Control Valves One operating and one parallel, standby valve Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Two identical pumps in parallel, one operates on demand, one in standby Gas Stripper Package The gas stripper package includes redundant standby pumps Seal Injection Filters Two identical filters in parallel, one operational, one in standby Purification Filters Two identical filters in parallel, one operational, one in standby Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Two identical pumps in parallel, one operates on demand, one in standby Boric Acid Concentrator The concentrator package includes redundant standby pumps In addition to component redundancy, it is possible to operate the CVCS in a manner such that some components are bypassed. it is possible to transfer boric acid to the charging pump suction header by bypassing the VCT. The letdown filter, and the purification and deborating ion exchangers can be bypassed. Controlled bleedoff flow can be routed to the RDT rather than the VCT.
Independent and redundant gravity feed lines from the BAST to the charging pump suction are provided 4 ( ( to assure makeup. The charging pumps also have an alternate source of borated water from the spent fuel pool, which is maintained above 4000 ppm boron.
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= :.= Doeten neesenfel- Auenwy Systems (11/96) Page 9,3-37 l
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument In order to assure that the reliability and availability of the Dedicated Seal Injection System (DSIS) is maintained throughout the design and implementation phases, the DSIS is included in the System 80+ Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP). 9.3.4.3.2 Accident Response The letdown line is isolated on receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). A Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) i:,olates the letdown line, the resin sluice supply header (RSSH) line to the RDT, and the reactor drain pump suction line. A CIAS (or SIAS) does not isolate the charging line or stop the charging pumps. A sufficient volume of fluid exists in the VCT to provide ample time to align alternate feed lines from the BAST to the charging pump suction header. Maintaining charging flow following a CIAS continues to provide seal injection to the reactor coolant pump seals. The letdown line break analysis reported in Section 15.6 assumes that thirty minutes after the first indication of a letdown line break, the operator isolates the letdown line, thereby terminating any further release of primary flow to the nuclear annex. This is achieved by closing at least one of three isolation valves (CH-515, CH-516, and/or CH-575) in the letdown line within contaimnent. The design of these valves is discussed in Section 9.3.4.3.5. For a loss of offsite power (LOOP), the emr.gency diesel generators (EDG) will provide power to 2 of 4 available CCW pumps to provide RCP se,al cooling. The charging pumps can also be powered by the EDGs to provide RCP seal injection. if CCWS seal cooling water and charging pump seal injection are unavailable, the DSIS will be aligned to the EDG to provide seal cooling. The System 80+ design includes an onsite Alternate AC (AAC) power source to cope with station blackout. The AAC power source will be available within 10 minutes and as such, per Regulatory Guide 1.155, a coping analysis will not be required for the SBO event. During an SBO, the AAC power source will provide power to a charging pump and a CCW pump (both with redundant availability) to provide RCP seal cooling. If CVCS seal injecticn and CCW cooling is lost, the DSIS is aligned to the AAC power source to provide RCP seal injection. The DSIS can be operated for the entire cooldown until seal injection is no longer required. 9.3.4.3.3 Overpressure Protection In order to provide for safe operation of the CVCS, overpressure protection is provided throughout the system by relief valves. The following is a description of the relief valves that are located in the CVCS:
- Low Pressure Letdown Relief Valve The relief valve downstream of the letdown control valves protects the low pressure piping, purification filters, ion exchangers, and letdown strainer from overpressurization. The valve capacity is equal to maximum letdown flow. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the low pressure piping and components.
- Volume Control Tank Relief Valve The relief valve on the VC f is sized to pass a liquid flow rate equal xun of the following flow rates: the maximmn letdown flow rate possible without actuata e high flow alarm on Approwd Design Material- AumiNery Systems Page 9.3-38
.. . . . ~ .- . ., -- - - . - - . - - . . - . . - . - . . _
i 6 System 80+ Desian convalDocument j Ip . I y the letdown flow indicator; the design purge flow rate of the sampling system (SS); the normal , controlled bleedoff flow rate; and, the maximum flow rate of the boric acid makeup system
. (corrected for maximum VCT pressure). The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the ;
VCT. i e Volume Control Tank Gas Supply Relief Valve I This relief valve is sized to pass a flow rate greater than the combined maximum capacity of the ;
' nitrogen and hydrogen gas regulators. The set pressure is lower than the VCT design pressure.
. . t e Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Header Relief Valve !
- t
; The relief valve at the Reactor Coolant Pump controlled bleedoff header allows controlled
- bleedoff flow to be rerouted to the RDT in the event that a downstream valve in the controlled ! bleedoff line to the VCT is closed. It does not sesve an overpressure protection function. The
. valve is sized to pass the flow due to the failure of two seals in one reactor coolant pump, plus j the normal bleedoff from the other three reactor coolant pumps. ;
- o Boric Acid Batching Eductor Relief Valve !
A relief valve is provided for that portion of the boric acid batching system that is heat traced and l can be isolated. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the system piping. The valve is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if maximum 4 duplicate heat tracing power were inadvertently applied to the isolated line. a , 4 o Equipment Drain Tank Relief Valve , The EDT relief valve is sized to pass a liquid flow rate equal to the flow of the shutdown cooling return relief valve. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the EDT. o Reactor Drain Tank Relief Valve : s A relief valve which vents to the Holdup Volume Tank (containment sump) is provided for the . RDT. The relief valve is sized to pass a liquid flow equal to the total flow rate of all discharges into the RDT. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the RDT. e Charging Pump Mini-flow Relief Valve J The relief valve downstream of the charging pump mini-flow orifice protects the charging pump minimum flow piping from ove pressurization due to therns! expansion that might resuh from operating a charging pump with its discharge isolation valve closed. The relief valve is sized to pass the flow rate equal to the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur due to
. pump heat input.
1 e- Seal Injection Heat Exchanger Thermal Relief i The tube side of the seal injection heat exchanger is protected by a thermal relief valve. This relief valve is sized to protect the heat exchanger from overpressurization because of thermal expansion _of trapped water due to inadvertent closure of the isolation valves with s'.ce:: to the shell side. , i W W W
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Srtem 80+ oesign ControlDocument
- Regenerative Heat Exchanger Thermal Relief A thermal relief valve is provided in the charging line downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger to protect against overpressure from continued letdown operation with both charging and auxiliary spray isolated. It is sized to pass full charging flow should CH-208 fail closed.
- DSIS Pump Discharge Relief Valve The relief valve on the discharge side of the DSIS pump is sized to pass the maximum rated flow, with maximum backpressure, without exceeding the maximum rated total head of the pump assembly. The valve is set to open when the pump discharge pressure exceeds the design pressure of the DSIS pump discharge piping.
- DSIS Pump Suction Relief Valve The relief valve on the suction side of the DSIS pump is sized to pass the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if the pump were operated with the suction and discharge isolation valves closed. The set pressure of the valve is equal to the design pressure of the DSIS pump suction piping.
CVCS features to prevent intersystem loss of coolant accidents (ISLOCA) are presemed in Appendix SE and on Figure 9.3.4-1. 9.3.4.3.4 Chemistry and Purity Control The CVCS controls the chemistry and purity of the reactor ecolant in order to:
- minimize the corrosion of hardware, which includes minimizing the fouling of heat transfer surfaces;
- control core reactivity throughout the life of the core (by adjusting the chemical shim);
e limit the transport of radioactive corrosion products; and
- ensure that the quality of reactor coolant fluid is maintained within specific operating limits.
Table 9.3.4-1 describes the chemistry of the reactor coolant. The oxygen and chloride limits presented in Table 9.3.4-1 of s 0.10 ppm and s 0.15 ppm, respectively, were estAlished from the relationships between oxygen and chloride concentrations and their effect on the susceptil.ay to stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel. Current industry data reveals that no chloride stress corrosion occurs at oxygen concentrations below approximately 0.8 ppm. The oxygen limit in Table 9.3.4-1 was reduced by a factor of 8 to give a conservative concentration of 0.10 ppm oxygen. The maximum amount of oxygen from air dissolved in water at 77'F is approximately 8 ppm. At this concentration, a chloride concentration of less than approximately 1.50 ppm would preclude the possibility of chloride stress corrosion. This limit was reduced by a factor of 10 to provide a conservative chloride limit of 0.15 ppm. The fluoride limit of 0.15 ppm for reactor coolant is the result of the fluoride ion being identified as O causing intergranular corrosion of sensitized austenitic stainless steels. Based on this, it is essential to Appwved Des # Marwiel Ausmary Systeens Pope 555b
- - - .. - - ~_- _ -
j ) System 80+ DenInn convot occamart l l l
; minimize fluoride ions in the reactor coolant. Therefore, the concentration chosen as the maximum :
- limit is the lowest concentration which can be both: (1) readily detected in bulk water and (2) maintamed ,
j by the action of the purification ion exchanger. { l Chemistry control of the reactor coolant consists of preoperational removal of oxygen by hydrazine e scavenging, degasification (via the gas stripper) of makeup water if necessary during stanup, control of l oxygen concentration by maintaining an excess hydrogen concentration during normal operation, and pH -{ control by maintaining lithium within a specific control band. A chemical addition tank and pump are ,
! used to transfer hydrazine and/or lithium hydroxide to the discharge side of the charging pumps for j i injection into the RCS. ;
' 0 7 Lithium is generated in significant quantities in the core region by the reaction B (n,a)Li Therefore, lithium hydroxide is the logical choice for a pH control agent; However, there exists a threshold for accelerated attack of Zircaloy at approximately 35 ppm lithium. Therefore, a wide margin between the upper operating limit and the threshold for accelerated ritack is specified in the event any i- concentrating phenomena exist. j Early in core life, periodic removal of lithium by ion exchange is required to control the lithium ! concentration below the upper limit. One purification ion exchanger is used intermittently to control the ] lithium concentration. Prior to refueling shutdown, when large boration operations are necessary, lithium additions will be necessary to maintain the lithium concentration within the control band. The lower limit on lithium concentration crisures that sufficient lithium hydroxide is present during operation 4 to provide the benefits noted in Secti>n 9.3.4.1.3.2. j i The control of other impurities is accomplished by the continuous operation of the second purification ! , ion exchanger, which has been convened to the lithium or ammonia lithium form and does not remove ) lithium. The resin beds remove soluble nuclides by an ion exchange whanism, and insoluble panicles l by the impingement of these particles on the surface of the resin beads. l J The normal method of adjusting boron concentration is by feed an.1 bleed. To change concentration, the j
- makeup ponion of the CVCS supplies either reactor makeup water or boric acid to the VCT. Upstream l
! of the VCT, the incoming letdown stream is divened through the pre-holdup ion exchanger to the holdup tank, to avoid overfilling the VCT, Toward the end of the core cycle, the quantities of waste produced j i due to feed-and-bleed operations become excessive, and the deborating ion exchanger is used to reduce l the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. An anion resin, initially in the hydroxyl form, is ] convened to a borate form as boron is removed. Boric acid recovery from the reactor coolant liquid waste is accomplished by the Boric Acid Concentrator package at a processing rate of 20 gpm. Based on the waste estimates identified in Table 9.3.4-3, the concentrator once-through usage factor is less than 10 percent, thus resulting in an adequate opportunity for reprocessing of the RMWT contents, the BAST contents, or the IRWST contents if necessary. Various reactions taking place within the reactor during power operation result in the production of
. tritium, which appears in the reactor coolant as tritiated water. See Section 11.1.1.3 for a discussion of tritium.
9.3.4.3.5 Ca=8al===st Isolation There are eight penetrations through the containment structure to accommodate CVCS piping. Five of these penetrations (charging flow to RCS, purification stream from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger einmW aseen asea-w. AmmEwy Syspam Pepe 9..Mr r
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Syatem 80+ oesign controlDocument to the letdown heat exchanger, seal injection flow to RCPs, resin sluice supply header flow to the RDT and IRWST makeup) allow flow in the inward direction, and three of these penetrations (letdown line flow to purification ion exchangers, RCP controlled bleed-off flow, and RDT flow to reactor drain pumps) allow flow in the outward direction. The penetration for the charging piping to the RCS consists of a Safety Class 2 motor-operated valve (CH-524) outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-747) inside containment. CH-524 is operable from the control room and is provided with position indication in the control room. CH-524 does not receive an automatic close signal. The penetration for the purification stream from the SCS heat exchanger to the letdown heat exchanger consists of a Safety Class 2 manual isolation valve (CH-307) outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-304) inside containment. CH-307 is a normally closed, locked closed valve that is only opened after the RCS has been shutdown and placed in shutdown cooling. The penetration for seal injection flow consists of a Safety Class 2 motor-operated valve (CH-255) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-835) located inside containment. CH-255 is operable from the control room, with position indication in the control room, and does not receive an automatic close signal. The penetration for the resin sluice supply header flow to the RDT consists of a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-580) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-494) located inside containment. CH-580 is a failed close valve operable from the control room, and receives an automatic close signal on a CIAS. The penetration for the letdown line flow to the purification system consists of two Safety Class I pneumatic valves (CH-515 and CH-516) located inside containment, one Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve located inside containment (CH-575), and a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-523) located outside containment. All are fail-closed valves, operable from the control room, with position indication in the control room, and both CH-575 and CH-523 receive an automatic close signal on a CIAS. CH-515 and CH-516 receive an automatic close signal on an SIAS and are powered from different class 1E divisions. CH-515, CH-516 and/or CH-575 are manually closed following detection of a letdown line break. Valve closure is ensured by specirving valve operators sized to close the valves under the worst case pressure differentials expected during applicable design bases events. Valve operability under these conditions is assured via the Operability Assurance Program for pneumatically operated valves as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2.1.1. These valves are tested in accordance with the requirements specified in Table 3.9-15, inservice Testing for Safety Related Valves. Furthermore, since CH-575 is a containment isolation valve, it is designed to meet the design and testing requirements discussed in Section 6.2.4, and specified on Table 6.2.4-1, Containment Isolation Valve and Actuator Data. The penetration for RCP controlled bleed-off flow consists of a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-505) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-506) located inside contairuncat. Both CH-5% and CH-505 are fail-closed valves, operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and both receive an automatic close signal on CSAS. The penetration for the RDT flow to the reactor drain pumps consists of a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-560) located inside containment and a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-561) located outside containment. Both CH-560 and CH-561 are fail-closed valves operable from the control room, with position indication in the control room. Both receive an automatic close signal on a CIAS. The Penetration for the IRWST makeup consists of a Safety Class 2 motor-operated valve (CH-509) outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-189) inside containment. Ch-509 is operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and receives an automatic close signal on a CIAS. O Amvend Design Atoterial. Auanney Systems Page 9.342
System 80+ Design controlDocument /D 9.3.4.3.6 Leakage Detection and Control O' Components in the CVCS are provided with welded connections wherever possible, to minimize leakage to the atmosphere. Ilowever, flanged connections are provided on all pump suction and discharge lines, on relief valve inlet and outlet connections, and on some flow measuring devices to permit removal for maintenance. All valves larger than 2 inches, and all actuator-operated valves are provided with double-packing, lantern rings, and leakoff connections, unless the valves are diaphragm (packless) valves. Diaphragm valves are utilized around the VCT gas space to minimize activity release due to valve leakage. The CVCS is also used to monitor the total RCS water inventory. If there is no RCS or CVCS leakage, the level in the VCT and pressurizer should remain constant during steady-state operation. Therefore, a decreasing level in the VCT alerts the operator to a possible leak somewhere in the system. Increasing RDT or EDT levels may also be indicative of reactor coolant leakage. During refueling shutdowns, the reactor makeup water piping is monitored to detect leakage past isolation valve Cll-195 (which is locked shut during refueling shutdowns). If leakage occurs, an alarm is annunciated in the control room. 9.3.4.3.7 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Since the CVCS is not a safety-related system, a detailed failure mode and effects analysis is not required.
,, 9.3.4.3.8 Radiological Evaluation
( ) J Frequently used, manually-operated valves located in high radiation areas or inaccessible areas, are provided with extension stem handwheels which terminate in low radiation, accessible control areas. Manually-operated valves are provided with locking provisions if unauthorized operation of the valve is considered a potential hazard to plant operation or personnel safety. Refer to Section 12.2 for further information. 9.3.4.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the CVCS. A high-velocity flush using demineralized water is used to flush particulate material and other potential contaminants from all lines in the system. Instruments are calibrated during preoperational testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at i the proper setpoints, and alarm functions are checked for operability and proper setpoints. The relief I valve settings are checked and adjusted as required. All sections of the CVCS are operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanical operability. Pumps are tested to demonstrate head and capacity. The CVCS is tested for integrated operation with the RCS during hot functional testing. Testing of heat I exchanger performance, and the proper control of the letdown and charging pump flow control valves by the pressurizer level control program is included. The charging line is checked to assure that the piping is free of excessive vibration. Response of the makeup portion of the CVCS in the automatic, l n dilute, and borate modes is verified. Any defects in operation that could affect plant safety are corrected ! () before fuel loading. l Appreved Desigrr Material- Auskey Systems Page 9.343 l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument As part of normal plant operation, tests, inspections, data tabulation and instrument calibrations are made to evaluate the condition and performance of the CVCS equipment and instrumentation. Data is taken periodically during normal plant operations to confirm heat transfer capabilities and purification efficiency. Pump and valve leakage is monitored. Appropriate vents, drains, and test connections are provided to permit inservice testing of valves. Active safety related CVCS valves are listed in Table 9.3.4-7. These valves are inservice tested per Section 3.9.6. 9.3.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.3.4.5.1 Temperature Instrumentation
- Iloidup Tank and Reactor Makeup Water Tank Temperature The temperature of the contents of these tanks is indicated in the main control room. An alan a annunciates in the main control room to warn the operator of low temperature in either tarJc.
- Boric Acid Storage Tank Temperature Two instruments are installed in the BAST. One provides temperature indication in the control room. the other provides indication locally. Alarm annunciation in the control room warns the operator of an abnormally low tank temperature.
- Boric Acid Batching Tank Temperature The batching tank temperature measurement channel controls the tank's electric immersion heaters. Local indication is provided to facilitate batching operations.
- Letdown Line Temperature The letdown line (tubeside) regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature is indicated in the control room An alarm is provided to alert the r>perator to an abnormally high letdown temperature. The instrument also provides a signal that positions the letdown flow control valve automatically to minimum flow on high temperature conditions. The valve must be manually reset to restore normal letdown flow.
- Letdown liest Exchanger Outlet Temperature This instrument is used to control the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) flow through the letdown heat exchanger to maintain the proper letdown temperature for purification system operation. Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature is indicated in the control room.
- lon Exchanger Inlet Temperature This temperature instrument has two control functions: (1) on high temperature, it provides a signal which positions the letdown flow control valve automatically to minimum flow, and actuates isolation valves which bypass flow around the purification and deborating ion exchangers: (2) on high-high temperature, it shuts Cil-516, thus isolating letdown. Flow to the ion exchangers must be manually restored when the temperature decreases below the high Annwed Design Materiel- Ausnery Systems (11/96) Pope 9.3M
i System 80+ Design ControlDocument ( setpoint. Temperature indication, and high, and high-high temperature alarms are provided in f the control room. ! I e Volume Control Tank Temperature The VCT is provided with temperature indication in the control room. An alarm is provided to alert the operator to an abnormally high water temperature. . e Charging Line Temperature - The charging line (shellside) regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature is indicated in the control room. This indication is used to monitor heat exchanger performance and verify that auxiliary spray initiation conditions are satisfied, o Pre-holdup lon Exchanger Inlet Temperature This channel indicates gas stripper influent temperature in the control room. A high temperature i alarm annunciates in the control room, and flow is diverted to bypass the ion exchanger to i preclude resin damage. o Reactor Drain Tank Temperature The RDT is provided with temperature indication in the control room. An alarm is provided to alert the operator of abnormally high water temperature and the need for cooling of the tank a Contents. e Seal Injection Heat Exchanger Inlet and Outlet Temperature Temperature instruments on the inlet and outlet of the seal injection heat exchanger provide input to the seal injection temperature controller to maintain the outlet side fluid temperature within acceptable limits. The seal injection temperature controller positions CH-231, which regulates the flow which bypasses the heat exchanger. The proper mix of thru flow and bypass flow, for any given inlet temperature, will ensure a properly regulated outlet temperature. Indication and alarms are provided in the control room. e Equipment Drain Tank Temperature The EDT is provided with temperature indication in the control room. An alarm is provided to alert the operator of abnormally high water temperature and the need for cooling of the tank contents. e Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature This instrument is used to control the CCWS flowrate through the charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger to maintain adequate charging pump motor heat removal. ~ A U morewed conson neuemet . Ausnery syswns Pese 9.3-45
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.3.4.5.2 Pressure Instrumentation
- Letdown Line Pressures A pressure instrument upstream of the letdown control valves measures letdown pressure, with indication and alarms in the control room. This instrument also controls the letdown control valve position to maintain proper upstream pressure regardless of flow variations during low pressure operations.
A pressure sensor and controller with indication in the control room is provided downstream of the letdown flow control valves to initiate an automatic isolation of the letdown line by the containment isolation valve when high pressure is sensed. This provides automatic action to terminate an ISLOCA by preventing any further pressure communication downstream of the containment isolation valve.
- Purification Filter, Ion Exchanger and Letdown Strainer Differential Pressures Differential pressure instruments are provided to indicate the pressure loss across the purification filters and across the ion exchangers plus letdown strainer Both differential pressure indicators have local readouts and control room high differential pressure alarms. Periodic monitoring of these instruments will indicate any progressive loading of the units.
- Volume Control Tank Pressure This channel indicates VCT pressure in the control room. High and low pressures are annun-ciated in the control room.
- Charging Pump Suction Line Pressures A pressure switch on each charging pump suction manifold stops the associated charging pump on low suction line pressure, thus preventing damage due to cavitation.
A pressure sensor and controller with indication in the control room is provided to initiate an automatic isolation of the charging line by the containment isolation valve when high pressure is sensed. This provides automatic action to terminate an ISLOCA by preventing any further pressure communication upstream of the containment isolation valve.
- Boric Acid Makeup Pump Discharge Pressures The discharge pressure of each Boric Acid Makeup Pump is indicated in the control room and locally. Low pressure alarms, annunciating in the control room, are provided. If the pump has been manually tumed off by the operator, the discharge pressure alarm is suppressed. A low discharge pressure stops the respective pump, and starts the alternate pump.
- Boric Acid Filter Differential Pressure A differential pressure instrument with local readout is provided to indicate the pressure loss across the boric acid filter. A high pressure alarm is provided in the control roem.
Approwd Design Material- Ansinary Systems Page 9.3-46
System 80+ Desian canarat Document e Charging Line Pressure
- The charging line pressure is indicated in the control room. A low pressure alarm is provided )
in the control room. A low charging line pressure alarm during normal operation is indicative of chargin3 pump failure. t e Seal Injection Filter Differential Pressure A differential pressure instrument with Ixal indication and high differential pressure annunciation 1 in the control room is provided to determine the pressure loss across the seal injection filters. Periodic readings of this instrument will indicate any progressive loading of the operating filter. o Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Header Pressure A pressure measurement channel is provided to measure the pressure at the Reactor Coolant Pump controlled bleedoff header. Indication is provided in the control room, and the measuring device is designed for RCS design pressure as a means of overpressure protection. A high aiarm and a high-high alarm are annunciated in the control room. The high alarm indicates that a valve in the line to the VCT has been closed. The high-high alarm indicates that the controlled I blwioff flow has been isolated. e Ion Exchanger Drain Header Strainer Differential Pressure l-C A local differential pressure indicator is provided with a local alarm. These instruments will indicate any progressive loading of the strainer. o Equipment Drain Tank Pressure EDT pressure is indicated, and a high-pressure alarm annunciated, in the control room. This instrument also actuates valves to automatically isolate the Equipment Drain Tank from the gas analyzer, Gaseous Waste Management System, the recycle drain header, and the reactor drain j pumps when the tank pressure exceeds the high-pressure alarm setpoint. 9 Reactor Drain Tani Pressure This mstrument provides pressure indication in the control room and actuates an alarm on high pressure. The high pressure alarm is used to alert the operator that the tank has received a discharge from one or more relief valves inside containment. In order to prevent a potential radioactive release outside containment, this instrument closes the RDT isolatio'n valve to the GWMS and the containment isolation valve (inside containment) on high RDT pressure,
- e. Reactor Drain Pump Discharge Pressure Each pump's discharge pressure is indicated locally and in the control room, in order to monitor pump performance.
Apposed Domes afsesnish Assewy speemses page S.M
System 80+ Design controlDocument
- Reactor Drain Filter and Pre-holdup lon Exchanger and Strainer Differential Pressures Differential pressure instruments are provided to indicate the pressure loss across these components. Both differential pressures are indicated locally. High-pressure alarms are annunciated in the control room.
- Holdup Pumps Discharge Pressure ,
l Individual pump discharge pressures are indicated locally in order to monitor pump performance.
- Boric Acid Condensate ton Exchanger and Strainer Differential Pressure A local differential pressure indicator with a high alarm is provided. Periodic reading of this instrument will indicate any progressive loaaing of the ion exchanger and/or strainer. !
- Reactor Makeup Water Pump Discharge Pressure Reactor makeup water pump discharge pressure is indicated locally and in the control room. A low pressure r.larm annunciates in the control room. Low pressure on one pump stops that pump i
and starts the standby pump. If the pump has been manually turned off by the operator, the low discharge pressure alarm is suppressed. , e Reactor Makeup Water Filter Differential Pressure A differential pressure instrument, with local readout and a high differential pressure alarm in the control room is provided to indicate excessive loading of the reactor makeup water filter.
- DSIS Pump Suction Line Pressure Switch A pressure switch on the suction manifold of the DSIS pump stops the pump on low suction line pressure, thus preventing damage due to cavitation.
9.3.4.5.3 Level Instrumentation
- Holdup Tank and Reactor Makeup Water Tank Level i Level indication and alarms for these tanks are provided in the control room. On low level in the HT and low-low level in the R13WT, the respective pumps are automatically stopped. A low l
l level alarm for the RMWT warns the operators if they are entering the volume required for back-to-back cold shutdowns at 90% of core life. A high level alarm in the HT indicates that tr.k I processing should be commenced. A high level alarm in the RMWT and a high-high level riarm in the HT indicate that filling of th', respective tank should be secured.
- Volume Control Tank Level 1
l Redundant, differential pressure type level instruments provide VCT level indi ~. tion in the control room. One VCT level instrument controls the starting and stopping of the automatic makeup system on low and highlevelindications. The other channel automatically diverts Altvoved Desigrs Material- Auskry Systems Page 9.348
System 80+ oesign controlDocument g j letdown flow on high level to the gas stripper, via the pre-holdup ion exchanger. On low-low v level, both channels redundantly isolate the VCT after realigning charging pump suction to the BAST. Redundant high, low and low-low level alarms are provided in the control room.
- Equipment Drain Tank and Reactor Drain Tank Level Differential pressure type level instmments indicate level for each tank in the control room. The transmitters also activate high and low level alarms in the control room, and automatically stop the reactor drain pump on low level.
- Boric Acio Storage Tank Level Two instruments are provided with indication and alarms in the control room. One transmitter also stops the Boric Acid Makeup Pumps on low-low level.
9.3.4.5.4 Flow Instrumentation
- Letdown Flow An orifice-type flow meter indicates letdown flow in the control room. This channel actuates a high flow alarm in the control room.
- Charging Flow n
h Charging flow rate indication and low flow annunciation are provided in the control room. If the chr ging pump is manually turned off by the operator, the low flow alarm is suppressed.
- Seal Injection Flow Rate Orifice-type flow meters indicate seal injection flow to each Reactor Coolant Pump. These instruments control the seal injection flow control valves to maintain the desired flow to each pump. Control room indication and high, high-high, and low flow annunciation is provided.
- Volume Control Tank Hydrogen and Nitrogen Gas Flow Local indications of nitrogen and hydrogen gas flow to the VCT are provided. The nitrogen flow meter is used during VCT purging operations. The hydrogen flow meter is used during operations where a hydrogen overpressure is desired in the VCT.
I
- Reactor Makeup Water Flow An orifice-type flow meter is provided to measure the reactor makeup water flow rate to the VCT makeup blending tee. This channel controls the reactor makeup water control valve (CH-210X) to obtain a preset flow rate. High and low flow alarms are delayed to allow the set flow rate to become established. A high-high alarm is provided to avoid exceeding design flow of the reactor makeup water filter. The flow rate is recorded and the total quantity of reactor makeup water added is indicated in the control room.
I \ C' Approved Design Materia!. Auxnery Systems Page 9.3-49
System 80+ Design crntrolDocument
- Concentrated Boric Acid Flow An ultrasonic flow meter is provided to measure the BAST concentrated boric acid flow rate to the VCT makeup blending tee. This channel controls the boric acid control valve (CH-210Y) to obtain a preset flow rate. liigh and low flow alarms are delayed after initiation of the makeup signal to allow the set flow rate to become established. A high-high alarm is provided to avoid exceeding design flow of the boric acid filter. The flow rate is recorded and the total quantity of boric acid added is indicated in the control room.
- Reactor Makeup Water Flow Switch A flow switch located downstream of makeup controller flow indicator F-210X is used to indicate and alarm in the control room if demineralized water flow occurs during refueling operations.
During normal operations, the flow switch is not operational.
- Boric Acid Batching Flow This instrument locally indicates the flow of boric acid from the boric acid batching tank to the boric acid batching eductor.
- lon Exchanger Drain Header Flow Switch A flow switch is provided with local indication of flow. An indicator light is on whenever draining is in progress. The light goes off when an ion exchanger draining operation is complete.
When refilling an ion exchanger after changing resin, the light indicates overflow from the vent line drain, and therefore completion of the filling operation.
- Resin Sluice Supply Header Air Flow This instrument provides local indication of air flow to the resin sluice supply header.
- Reactor Makeup Water Flow to Resin Sluice Supply Header This instrument provides local indication of reactor makeup water flow to the resin sluice supply header.
9.3.4.5.5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 9.3.4.5.5.1 Gas Stripper Effluent Radiation Monitor This monitor provides condcacus indication, in the control room of the gross gamma activity leaving, the gas stripper and entering the holdup tad. A high alarm indicates improper operation of upstream purification equipment. Normally, however, an increasing activity trend will allow operators to take corrective measures (replace ion exchanger resin or filter cartridges) before significant activity increase occurs in the holdup tank. The radiation monitor consists of a logarithmic ratemeter which processes pulses from a shielded scintillation detector. O Approved Design Material- Ausnary Systems Page 9.3-50
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J System 80+ Desien contrat Document Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Sc" Iced by Instrument Air Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Falled Position Position Main Steam System SG-168 10.1-2 SG 1 MSIV Bypass Valve Containment Isolation C C C SG-169 10.1-2 SG 1 MSIV Bypass Valve Containment isolation C C C SG-182 10.1-2 SG 2 MSIV Bypass Valve Containment Isolation C C C SG-183 10.1-2 SG 2 MSIV Bypass Valve Containment Isolation C C C Main Feedwater System SG-130 10.1-2 SG 1 FW Downcomer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-132 10.1-2 SG 1 FW Economizer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-135 10.1-2 SG 2 FW Downcomer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-137 10.1-2 SG 2 FW Economizer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-172 10.1-2 SG 1 FW Downcomer Isolation Valve Containment isolation 0 C C SG-174 10.1-2 SG 1 FW Economizer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-175 10.1-2 SG 2 FW Downcomer Isolation Valve Containment Isolation 0 C C SG-177 10.1-2 SG 2 FW Economizer Isolation Valve Containment isolation 0 C C Emergency Feedw System EF-108 10.4.9-1.2 EFW Pump Turbine 1 Steam Supply Supply Steam to EFW C O O Isolation Valve Turbine EF-109 10.4.9-1.2 EFW Pump Turbine 2 Steam Supply Supply Steam to EFW C O O Isolation Valve Turbine EF-112 10.4.9-1.2 EFW Pump Turbine 1 Steam Supply Priming Steam to EFW C O O Bypass Valve Turbine Approved Design nieteriet- Ausmery Systems rage 9.351
System 80+ Design Control Document Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Emergency Feedwater System (Cont'd.) EF-113 10.4.9-1.2 EFW Pump Turbine 2 Steam Supply Priming Steam to EFW C O O Bypass V.ilve Turbine , g Component Cooling Water Syuem CC-100 CCWS IIx 1 A Bypass Control Valve Bypass Isolation Throttle C C 912-1.1 CC-101 9.2.2-1.1 CCWS lix IB Bypass Contri Valve Bypass isolation Throttle C C CC-102 9.2.2-1.1 Non U.ssential Supply lleader . ietation Isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW Flow CC-103 9.2.2-1.1 Non-Essential Return lleader I Isolation Isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW lleaders CC-Il0 9.2.2-1.2 SDC iix 1 Control Valve Flow Control Throttle 0 0 CC-112 9.2.2-1.2 Spent Fuel Pool IIX 1 Control Valve Clow Control Throttle 0 0 CC-122 9.2.2-1.1 Non-Essential Supply licader 1 Isolation Isotation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW Flow CC-123 9.2.2-1.1 Non-Essential Return lleader 1 Isolation Isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW lleaders CC-200 9.2.2-1.7 CCWS lix 2A Bypass Control Valve Bypass Isolation Throttle C C CC-201 9.2.2-1.7 CCWS IIx 2B Bypass Control Valve Bypass Isolation 'Ihrottle C C CC-202 9.2.2-1.7 Non-Essential Supply lleader 2 Isolation isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW Flow CC-203 9.2.2-1.7 Non-Essential Return lleader 2 Isolation isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW lleaders CC-210 9.2.2-1.8 SCS IIx 2 Control Valve Flow Control Throttle O O CC-212 9.2.2-1.8 Spent Fuel Pool llX 2 Control Valve Flow Control Throttle O O Approved Design Material- AuxiHary Systems Page 9.3-52 O O O
m ,a b b System 80+ Design control Document Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Con"d.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Component Cooling Water System (Cont'd.) CC-222 9.2.2-1.7 Non-Essential Supply lleader 2 Isolation Isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW Flow CC-223 9.2.2-1.7 Non-Essential Retarn lleader 2 Isolation Isolation Non-Essential O C C Valve CCW IIcaders Chemical and Volume Control System Cil-505 9.3.4-1.2 RCP Seal Return Valve Containment isolation O C C CII-506 9.3.4-1.2 RCP Seal Return Valve Containment Isolation O C C Cil-515 9.3.4-1.1 Loop 2B 12tdown isolation Valve System Isolation O C C Cil-516 9.3.4-1.1 Loop 2B Letdown Isolation Valve System Isolation O C C CII-523 9.3.4-1.1 Loop 2B Letdown Containment isolation Containment isolation O C C Valve Cil-551 9.3.4-1 Reactor Drain Tank Suction Isolation Containment Isolation O/C C C Valve Cil-561 9.3.4-1.3 Reactor Drain Tank Discharge Isolation Containment Isolation O/C C C Valve Cil-575 9.3.4-1.1 Loop 2B Letdown Containment Isolation Containment Isolation O C C Valve Cll-580 9.3.4-1.3 Resin Sluice Supply lleader to Reactor Containment Isolation C C C Drain Tank isolation Valve Approved Design Material- Auxaisey Systems Page 9.3-53
System 80+ oesign control occument - Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Safety-Related Normal I Loss of Air Safe Component Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Safety injection System S1-322 6.3.2-IC llot Leg Injection 1 Bleed Off Isolation RCS Pressure Isolation C C C Valve SI-332 6.3.2-IC llot Leg injection 2 Bleed Off Isolation RCS Pressure Isolation C C C Valve SI-611 6.3.2-IC SIT 4 Fill Line Valve System Isolation C C C SI-612 6.3.2-IC SIT 4 Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System Isolation C C C SI-618 6.3.2-lC SI Line 4 leakage Return Valve RCS Pressure Isolation C C C SI-619 6.3.2-IC SIT 4 Nitrogen Pressure Comrol Valve System Isolation C C C SI-621 6.3.2-lC SIT 2 Fill Line Vaive System Isolation C C C S1-622 6.3.2-IC SIT 2 Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System isolation C C C St.628 6.3.2-IC St Line 2 leakage Return Valve RCS Pressure Isolation C C C SI-629 6.3.2-lC SIT 2 Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System Isolation C C C SI-631 6.3.2-IC SIT 3 Fill Line Valve System Isolation C C C SI-632 6.3.2-lC SIT 3 Nitrogen Pressure Conttul Valve System Isolation C C C SI-638 6.3.2-lC SI Line 3 leakage Return Valve RCS Pressure Isolation C C C SI-639 6.3.2-IC SIT 3 Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System Isolation C C C SI-641 6.3.2-I C SIT I Fill Line Valve System isolation C C C SI-642 6.3.2-lC SIT 1 Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System Isolation C C C I SI-648 6.3.2-lC St Line I leakage Return Valve RCS Pressure Isolation C C C SI-649 6.3.2-lC SIT I Nitrogen Pressure Control Valve System Isolation C C C SI-661 6.3.2-IC l SIT Drain to RDT Isolation System Isolation C C C Approved Design Material- AuxHiery Systems Page 9.3-54 O O O
l' (%. m J > (m-) System 80+ ._ . _ - - .. Desian Control Documart Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Poshion Safety Injection System (Cont'd.) 51-670 6.3.2-lC SIT Drain to IRWST isolation System Isolation C C C 51-682 6.3.2- IC SIT Fill Line CIV Containment isolation C C C Containment Purge System lli Volume Containment Purge System Supply #1 XX-010 9.4-6 Outside Containment Isolation C C C , XX-011 9.4-6 Inside Containment isolation C C C Ili Volume Containment Purge System Supply #2 XX-012 9.4-6 Outside Containment Isolation C C C XX-013 9.4-6 Inside Containment Isolation C C C Ili Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #1 XX-014 9.4-6 Outside Containment Isolation C C C XX-015 9.4-6 Inside Containment Isolation C C C Hi Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #2 , XX-016 9.4-6 Outside Containment isolation C C C XX-017 9.4-6 Inside Containment Isolation C C C j 9 t Approved Design MaterM- AunAEnvy Systems Page 9.3-55
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System 80+ Design Coatrol Document Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Containment Purge System (Cont'd.) Lo Volume Containment Purge System Supply XX 018 9.4-6 Outside Containment isolation C C C la Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust XX-020 9.4-6 Outside Containment Isolation C C C XX-021 9.4-6 Inside Containment Isolation C C C l l Equipment and Floor Drainage System 1 XX-Il0 9.3.3-1 Containment Sump Pump Discharge CIV Containment isolation O C C XX-111 9.3.3-1 Containment Sump Pump Discharge CIV Containment isolation O C C Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System DF-130 9.5.4-1 FO Day Tank I Level Control Valve Day Tank level Control O/C C C DF-230 9.5.4-1 FO Day Tank 2 Level Control Valve Day Tank Level Control O/C C C Chilled Water System XX-196 9.2.9-1.12 NCW Containment Supply Division 1 Containment Isolation O C C XX-197 9.2.9-1.12 NCW Containment Supply Division .I Containment isolation O C C XX-198 9.2.9-1.12 NCW Containment Return Division 1 Containment isolation O C C XX-199 9.2.9-1.12 NCW Containment Return Division I Containment isolation O C C XX-200 9.2.9-1.16 NCW Containment Supply Division 2 Containment Isolation O C C XX-201 9.2.9-l.16 NCW Containment Supply Division 2 Containment Isolation O C C XX-202 9.2.9-1.16 NCW Containment Return Division 2 Containment isolation O C C l l Approved Design hfaterial- Ausmary Systems Page 9.3-66 O O O
O O O System 80+ _ _ Desian controlDocument
~ Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.)
Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Noenber Figure Description Act!ve Function Position Failed Nition Position Chilled Water System (Cont'd.) XX-203 9.2.9-1.16 NCW Containment Return Division 2 Containment Isolation O C C XX-2040 9.2.9-1.2 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air liandling Unit I A Control XX-2041 9.2.9-1.2 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit iB Control XX-2042 9.2.9-1.2 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit IC . Control XX-2043 9.2.9-l.2 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Hrottle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit ID Control XX-2044 9.2.9-1.6 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air Handling Unit 2A Control r XX-2045 9.2.9-1.6 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control ThrottM O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit 2B Control XX-2046 9.2.9-1.6 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit 2C Control & XX-2447 9.2.9-1.6 Channel Electrical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Brottie O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit 2D Control Approved Desspre Meterial- Auxiniary Systems Page 9.3-57
System 80+ - - - - -- - - _ - - . - _ - . - - _ . - - - --- Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Chilkd Wam System (Cont'd.) I XX-20a8 9.2.9-1.2 Division 1 Essential CW Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit Control XX-2049 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 Essential CW Room Chilled Water Flow Control nrottle O O Recirculation Air liar'dling Unit Control XX-2050 9.2.9-1.6 RSP Room Recirculatico Air flandling Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Unit Control Valve
- XX-2051 9.2.9-1.2 Division 1 MDEFW l' ump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV l XX-2052 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 MDEFW Pump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air Handling Unit CV t XX-2053 9.2.9-I.2 Division I TDEFW Pump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O
! Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV i XX-2054 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 TDEFW Pump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV l XX-2055 9.2.9-1.2 Division i CS IlX Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O l Air llandling Unit Control l XX-2056 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 CS IlX Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Air llandling Unit Control XX-2057 9.2.9-1.2 Division 1 SCS IlX Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Comrol Throttle O O Air llandling Unit Control i XX-2058 9.2.9-l.6 Division 2 SCS IlX Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Air llandling Unit Control l l XX-2059 9.2.9-1.2 St Pump Room i Pecirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O llandling Unit Control Approved Design afsterial- AuxHiary Systems Page 9.3-58 O O O
System 80+ Deston controlDocument Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safdy-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Coenponent Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed 1%ition Position Chilled Water System (Cont'd.) . XX-2060 9.2.9-1.6 SI Pump Room 2 Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O llandling Unit Control XX-2061 9.2.9-1.2 SI Pump Room 3 Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O , llandling Unit Control XX-2062 9.2.9-1,6 51 Pump Room 4 Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O IIandling Unit Control XX-2063 9.2.9-l.2 Division I CS Pump Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O Air llandling Unit Control XX-2064 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 CS Pump Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Air llandling Unit Control l XX-2065 9.2.9-1.2 Division 1 SCS Pump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit Control XX-2065 9.2.9-1.6 Division 2 SCS Pump Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit Control , XX-2067 9.2.9-l.2 CCW Pump I A Room Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O llandling Unit Control , XX-2068 9.2.9-1.2 CCW Pump IB Room Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O llandling Unit Control ; XX-2069 9.2.9 1.6 CCW Pump 2A Room Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Handling Unit Control XX-2070 9.2.9-1.6 CCW Pump 2B Room Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O llandling Unit Control XX-2071 9.2.9 *.? Vual C:: trical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O l Channel A Re:irculation Air llandling , l Unit 1 Control Valve Approved Desspor Motoriel- Aunniery 5ystems Page 9.3-59 I -.-.. - . . . - - .. -
System 80+ oesi.gn control Document Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Chilled Water System (Cont'd.) XX-2072 9.2.9-1.2 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel A Recirculation Air Handling Unit 2 Control Valve XX-2073 9.2.9-1.6 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel B Recirculation Air llandling Unit I Control Valve XX-2074 9.2.9-1.6 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel B Recirculation Air llandling Unit 2 Control Valve I XX-2075 9.2.9-1.2 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel C Recirculation Air Handling Unit I Control Valve ! XX-2076 9.2.9-1.2 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel C Recirculation Air liandling ( Unit 2 Control Valve XX-2077 9.2.9-1.6 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Channel D Recirculation Air llandling Unit 1 Control Valve XX-2078 9.2.9-1.6 Vital Electrical & Instrumentation Room Chilled Water Flow Control Brottle O O Channel D Recirculation Air liandling Unit 2 Control Valve l XX-2079 9.2.9-l.3 Penetration Room A Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O i llandling Unit 1 Control Valve i XX-2080 9.2.9-1.3 Penetration Room A Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Ilandling Unit 2 Control Valve l l Approved Desiger Material- AuxWiary Systems Page 9.360 l 1 O O O
System 80+ _ Desian control oocammnt Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Chilled Water System (Cont'd.) XX-2081 9.2.9-1.7 Penetration Room B Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O IIandling Unit I Control Valve XX-2082 9.2.9-1.7 Penetration Room B Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Handling Unit 2 Control Valve XX-2083 9.2.9-1.3 Penetration Room C Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Ilandling Unit 1 Control Valve i XX-2084 9.2.9-1.3 Penetration Room C Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O a Handling Unit 2 Control Valve XX-2085 9.2.9-1.7 Penetration Room D Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Handling Unit I Control Valve XX-2086 9.2.9-1.7 Penetration Room D Recirculation Air Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Handling Unit 2 Control Valve XX-2087 9.2.9 1.3 Division 1 Fuel Pool IIX Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV XX-2088 9.2.9-1.7 Division 2 Fuel Pool HX Room Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV XX-2089 9.2.9-1.4 Division 1 CR Mechanical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Room Recirculation Air Handling Unit CV XX-2090 9.2.9-1.8 Division 2 CR Mechanical Equipment Chilled Water Flow Control . Throttle O O Room Recirculation Air llandling Unit CV XX-2091 9.2.9-1.4 Division 1 Control Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Throttle O O Air Handling Unit Control Approveo %slyrr Meterial- Aux %ey Systems Pope 9.3-61
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air (Cont'd.) Component Safety-Related Normal Loss of Air Safe Number Figure Description Active Function Position Failed Position Position Chilled Water System (Cont *d.) XX-2092 9.2.9-1.8 Division 2 Control Room Recirculation Chilled Water Flow Control Titrottle O O Air llandling Unit Control l Control Complex Ventilation System GK-010 9.4-2.1 Division 1 CB Non-Essential Air Non-Essential Flow O C C Isolation Damper A Isolation GK-011 9.4-2.1 Division 1 CB Non-Essential Air Non-Essential Flow O C C Isolation Damper B Isolation GK-012 9.4-2.1 Division 2 CB Non-Essential Air Non-Essential Flow O C C Isolation Damper A Isolation GK4)l3 9.4-2.1 Division 2 CB Non-Essential Air Non-Essential Flow O C C isolation Damper B Isolation GK-014 9.4-2.1 Division 1 CR Filter Bypass Damper A Bypass Flow Isolation O C C GK-015 9.4-2.1 Division I CR Filter Bypass Damper B Bypass Flow Isolation O C C GK-016 9.4-2.1 Division 2 CR Filter Bypass Damper A Bypass Flow Isolation O C C GK-017 9.4-2.1 Division 2 CR Filter Bypass Damper B Bypass Flow Isolation O C C GK-018 9.4-2.1 CR Air intake TSC Isolation Damper A TSC Isolation C C C GK-019 9.4-2.1 CR Air intake TSC Isolation Damper B TSC Isolation C C Cl Approvmf Design Material- Auxiliary Systems Page 9.362 O O O
System 80+ oesian controlDocument O Table 9.3.2-1 Process Sampling Requirements Normal Operation Pressurized Continuous On Mode of Sample Line Analysis Sample Sample Origin Capability Provided Removal Primary Sampling (Liquid Only) Hot leg Loop 1 Yes Yes, Radioactivity Remote
& Boron Pressurizer Steam Space Yes None Remote Shutdown Cooling Suction No None Remote Lines 1 & 2 Shutdown Cooling System Miniflow No None Remote Heat Exchanger Inlet Lines Containment Spray Miniflow No None Remote Heat Exchanger Inlet Lines Safety injection Pump No None Remote Mini Flow Lines Purification Filter Inlet No None Remote Purification Filter Oudet, No Yes, Radioactivity Remote Ion Exchanger inlet & Boron Purification Ion Exchanger Outlet No None Remote Pressurizer Surge Line No None Remote Reactor Drain Pump Discharge Before No None local Filter Reactor Drain Pump Discharge After No None local Filter Pre-holdup lon Erhanger Outlet No None local Holdup Tank Inlet No None Local Boric Acid Condensate Ion Exchanger No None Local Inlet Boric Acid Condensate lon Exchanger No None local Outlet Reactor Makeup Water Pump No None Local Discharge Reactor Makeup Water Pump No None local Recirculation --O Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirculation No None local ca.= w neemew. Aussary svamme rege .s.3-s3
Sy0 tem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 9.3.2-1 Process Sampling Requirements Normal Operation (Cont'd.) Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sample Origin Capability Provided Removal Primary Sampling (Cont'd.) Boric Acid Makeup Pump No None local Discharge Boric Acid Batching Tank No None Local Reactor Makeup Water to No None local Volume Control Tank Volume Control Tank Drain to Recycle No None Local Drain Header Safety injection Tanks No None Remote Spent Fuel Pool No None local Secondary Sample Points Hotwell No Yes, cation Remote conductivity and sodium S/G 1 and 2 Hot leg BlowdownU I No Yes, cation and specific Remote conductivity, pH, radioactivity, sodium S/G 1 and 2 downcomer WaterUl No Yes, cation and specific Remote conductivity, pH, radioactivity, sodium Condensate Pump Discharge No Yes, cation and specific Remote conductivity, pH, radioactivity, sodium Condensate Polishing Demineralizers No Yes, cation and specific Remote Discharge conductivity, pH, radioactivity, sodium lleater Drains No None local Moisture Separator No None local Evaporator Drains No None Local Secondary Steam S/G 1 & 2 No Yes, cation conductivity Remote Feedwater (HP Heaters Outlets) No Yes, pH, oxygen, Remote sodium, cation and specific conductivity, and hydrazine Approved Design Material. Auxniary 5ystems Page 9.3-64
Sy tem 80+ Desian controlDocument Process Sampling Requirements Normal Operation (Cont'd.) Table 9.3.2-1 Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sampic Origin Capability Provided Removal Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank No None Local Makeup Effluent No Yes, conductivity Remote No None Local Demineralizer Water Tank Condensate Storage Tanks No None Local No None Local Aux Boiler Circulating Water No None Imcal Closed Cooling Water Systems No None Local Emergency Service Water No None Loca! Gas Sampling (Part of Primary Sampling) Gas Surge Tank No H2,02 Remote Gas Decay Tank Yes H2,02 Remote 3 Gas Stripper Yes H2,02 Remote Volume Control Tank No H2,02 Remote Equipment Drain Tank No H2,02 Remote e Reactor Drain Tank No H2,02 Remote Containment Atmosphere h No Radioactivity Remote Containment Purge Exhaust No Radioactivity Remote Plant Vent No Radioactivity Remote Radioactive and Conventional Waste System No Radioactivity Remote Notes: til . Process Sampling System permits continuous chemistry monitoring of any two of these sample points for
;v; each steam generator, and continuous radiation monitoring of any one of these sample points for each steam generator.
.^;;:.; Dennen nieteriet. Ausnery Systems Page 9.365
System 80+ Design C7ntrolDocument Table 9.3.2-2 Process Sampling Requirements Post-Accident Operation Pressurized Mode of Sample Continuous On Line Sample Sample Origin Capability Analysis Provided Removal llot Leg Loop 1 Yes N/A Remote , Holdup Volume Tank No N/A Remote Containment Air No N/A Remote Shutdown Cooling System Yes N/A Remote Miniflow licat Exchanger inlet Lines O O 1 Anwowd Desiers Materid - AuxiGery 5ysterros Page 9.3-66
l System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-1A Reactor Coolant Operating Limits Pre Core Hot Initial Core Load Startup & Power Shutdown and Analysis Functionalsti) and Cdticality Operation Refueling pH (77'F) 3.8 - 10.4 4.5 - 10.5 4.5 - 10.5 3.8 - 10.5 Conductivity [Nott 2] [ Note 2] [ Note 2] [ Note 2]
; Hydrazine 30-50Tpm l31 30-50 ppm131 1.5 x Oxygen ppm!'I -
~
(max. 20 ppm) ; Ammoniat5) 0-50 ppm 0-50 ppm 0-2 ppm 0 - 2 ppm Dissolved Gas - - [ Note 6] < 10 cc STP&g(H2O) Lithium 1-2 ppm 0.2-2.2 ppm 0.2-2.2 ppm -- Hydrogen - [ Note 7] 15-50 cc (STP)&g <5 cc STP&g(H20) (H 2O)tsj Oxygen 50.1 ppm s0.1 ppm'1 l s0.1 ppm - Suspended Solids 158 <0.35 ppm, <0.35 ppm, <0.35 ppm, - 2 ppm max.1301 2 ppm max.1801 2 ppm max.I 01 l Chloride 50.15 ppm 50.15 ppm 50.15 ppm 5 0.15 ppm Fluoride 50.15 ppm 50.15 ppm 50.15 ppm s 0.15 ppm Boron s Refueling 5 Refueling s Refueling s Refueling , Concentration Concentration Concentration Concentration Sulfate 151 s 0.1 ppm s .05 ppm s .05 ppm 5 0.1 ppm Notes: I1 Special hot conditioning limits: Temperature > 350*F for 7-10 days. l . I
- 12) Consistent with pH additive concentration.
- lll Hydrazine is maintained at 30-50 ppm any time the RCS is less than 150'F.
I'l Prior to exceeding 150*F during heatup or below 400'F during cooldown. 153 I This parameter is used for problem diagnosis. I61 Prior to a depressurization shutdown, reduce total gas to < 10cc(STP)Ag (H 2 O) to limit the possibility for explosive mixtures. F3 During the transition from post-core to operating, hydrogen should be maintained in the 15 to 25cc(STP)Ag l (H2O) range to minimize degassing requirements in case the reactor plant must be shutdown and depressurtred 181 Hydrogen should be < Scc (STP)&g (H 2O) before secunng the reactor coolant pumps. l l'1 Not applicable during core load. i 11 01 The abnormal condition of 0.35 to 2.0 ppm is permitted for up to 14 hours to allow for crud burst ! conditions. k Anreved Denkrr hinnerial AumEnvy Systems (2/95) Page 9.3-67
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t
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-1B Reactor Coolant Detailed Startup and Power Operation g Specifications W Analysis Rangel81 Normal Abnormal Immediate Shutdown pH 4.5 - 10.5 - - Conductivity INote 2] - Hydrazine, ppm 1.5 x 02 ppml33 - - (max. 20 ppm) Ammoniat41, ppm 0-2 - -- Lithium, ppm 0.2 - 2.2!51 - - flydrogen, cc (STP)/Kg 110 2 Power Operation 25 - 50 15 - 25 s5 Startup 15 - 25 -- - Oxygen, ppm s 0.1 > 0.1 < 1.0 Suspended Solidsl41, ppm s 0.35 - -- Chloride, ppm s 0.15 >0.15 > 1.5 Fluoride, ppm s 0.15 >0.15 > 1.5 Boron, ppm < Refueling -- - Concentration Sulfatel '1, ppm s .05 - - Notes: l 133 This table expands upon operation specifications as depicted on Table 9.3.4-1 A. 121 Consistent with additive concentrations. 131 Prior to exceeding 150'F during startup. I'l This parameter is used for rapid problem diagnosis. Isl Consistent with plant lithium management program. Approved Design Material. AuxRiary Gystems (?'95) Page 9. 3-68
Sy' tem 80+ Deslan controlDocument l (m) Table 9.3.4-2 Design Transients for CVCS Code Class 2 Components which are Part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Affected , . Event Occurrencest 3 Components:l3 )
- 1. Power operation with normal i NSSS parameter variations 1,000,000*_ L,C l l (5100% power) J
- 2. Daily load cycle of 100-50-100% power (2 hour ramps) 22,000 L,C l l
- 3. Frequency control 800,000 L,C l
- 4. Turbine power steps of i 10 percent (15-100% power) 2,000* L,C l
- 5. Turbine power steps of i I percent (515% power) 2,000* L,C l i
- 6. Turbine power ramps of i 1 %/ min (5-15 % power) 2,000* L,C l ;
- 7. Turbine load rejection up to 50% (50-100% power) 40 L,C l :
- 8. Turbine generator nmback to house load (15-100% power) 40 LC l !
- 9. Loss of a main feedwater pump without causing a reactor trip 40 L,C (50-100% power) ;
- 10. Uncomplicated reactor trips (5-100% power) 60 L.C l
- 11. NSSS operations with the control systems in the manual 2,000 L C.S mode (0-5% power)
- 12. NSSS operations with the control systems in the manual 2,000 L,C,S mode (5-100% power)
[ 13. Openmg of the FW economizer valve during power 400 LC increasing operations
- 14. Stanup and coastdown of a Reactor Coolant Pump at hot 4,000* C standby conditions
- 15. Operation of the auxiliary spray system 300 C l
- 16. Tie line thermal backup (i 20% power change) 60* L,C l
- 17. Plant heatup 300 L,C,S,B l
- 18. Plant cooldown 300 L.C,S,B l
- 19. Shift from normal to maximum CVCS flow rate and retum 2,000 L,C l
- 20. IAw-low VCT level and charging pump diversion to the 40 L,C,S I BAST
- 21. SCS purification operations at HSD 1,000 L,C l
- 22. Spurious pressurizer spray actuation 40 L,C l
- 23. Spurious pressurizer heater actuation 40 L,C l
- 24. Inadvenent closure of one economizer feedwater valve 40 L,C l
- 25. Inadvenent isolation of one main feedwater heater 40 L,C l
- 26. Decrease in feedwater temperature 20 L,C l
- 27. Increase in feedwater flow rate 20 L,C l
- 28. Increase in steam flow rate 20 L,C l
- 29. Inadvenent opening of a steam generator safety valve 10 'LC l
- 30. Less of load (turbine speed control systems operate properly) 19 L,C g l Q 31.
32. Turbine trip Loss of condenser vacuum 20 20 L,C L,C l l l
% ..; Deelgre hinteria!- Ausnary Systems (11/96) Page 9.3-69
l System 80+ Design controlDocument . l Table 9.3.4-2 Design Transients for CVCS Code Class 2 Components which are Part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (Cont'd.) i i Affected i Event Occurrencestil Componentst21
- 33. less of non-emergency AC power to the station auxiliaries 10 L,C,S,B l l
- 34. less of normal feedwater flow 20 L,C l
- 35. less of forced reactor coolant flow 20 L,C l
- 36. Uncontrolled CEA withdrawal from subcritical or low power 10 L,C conditions
- 37. Uncontrolled CEA withdrawal at power 10 L,C l
- 38. CEA Inisoperation, system malfunction, operator error or 20 L,C inadvenent RPCS operation
- 39. Natural circulation cooldown 30 L,C l
- 40. Loss of component cooling water to the letdown heat 10 L,C exchanger
- 41. Inadvertent boron dilution 10 L,C l
- 42. CVCS malfunction that increases RCS inventory 20 L,C l
- 43. CVCS leak test 40 L C.S.B l
- 44. CVCS hydrostatic test 40 L C.S,B l
- 45. Failure of small lines carrying coolant outside containment 5 L,C (sample line break)
- 46. Inadvenent MSIS at zero power 5 L,C l
- 47. Closure of a single MSIV 5 L,C l
- 48. less of load (turbine speed control system fails) ! L,C l
- 49. Inadvenent opening of a SDS Valve 1 L,C l
- 50. Steam system piping failure (SLB) 1 L,C l
- 51. Feedwater system pipe break (FWLB) 1 L,C l
- 52. Reactor coolant pump rotor seizure 1 L,C l
- 53. Reactor coolant pump shaft break 1 L,C l
- 54. Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) 1 L,C l
- 55. Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 1 L,C l
- 56. Inadvenent opening of a pressurizer safety valve 1 L,C l
- 57. Rod ejection accident i L,C l
Notes: [1] This is the total number of occurrences over 60 years for each event. This frequency of occurrence is for design purposes only and does not necessarily reflect the actual expected number of operational occurrences. An asterisk (*) denotes that the frequency is in each direction (e.g., there are 2000 power steps of +10% and 2000 power steps of -10%). [2] ne affected components are defined as follows: L.. Letdown line from the RCS nozzle to and inc',oding CH-523 C.. Charging line from and including CH-254 to the RCS charging nozzle S... Seal injection line from and including CH-255 to the reactor coolant pump seals B... Bleedoff line from the RCP seals to and including CH-505 Approwd Design Material- Auniniary Systems (11/96) Page 9.3-70
System 80+ Design ControlDocument n
' ")
( Table 9.3.4-3 Excess Reactor Coolant Generated During Typical Plant Operations Plant Operation Volume Generated Plant shutdown to refueling at 90% core cycle. 155,250 gallons Plant startup from refueling at beginning of core cycle. 293.603 gallons Plant shutdown to cold shutdown and startup at 50% core cycle. 79,538 gallons Anticipated daily leakage to reactor drain tank and equipment drain tauk. 250 gallons / day Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary Regenerative Heat Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube, vertical Code (tube and shcIl side) ASME III, Class 2 Tube Side (Letdown) Fluid Reactor coolant,2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 2485 psig Design temperature 650'F Materials Austenitic Stainless Steel Normal flow 100 gpm Design flow 200 gpm Shell Side (Charging) Fluid Reactor coolant,2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 550'F Materials Austenitic stainless steel Normal flow 90 gpm Design flow 200 gpm Letdown Heat Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube, horizontal Tube Side (Letdown) Fluid Reactor coolant,2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 2485 psig Design temperature $50'F Materials Austenitic stainless steel , Normal flow 100 gpm Design flow 200 gpm ( s Code ASME Ill, Class 2 Anwend Dee&n hiesoniel Ausmery Systems Pope 9,3-71
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) Shell Side (Cooling Water) Fluid Component cooling water Design pressure 150 psig Design temperature 200'F Materials Carbon steel Normal flow 950 gpm Design flow 2400 gpm Pressure loss 15 psid @ 1500 gpm & 105'F Code ASME 111, CLASS 3 SealInjection Heat Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube (steam heater), vertical Tube Side (Scal injection) Code ASME 111, Class 3 Fluid Reactor coolant,2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200*F Materials Austenitic stainless steel Pressure loss 10 psi @ 30 gpm & 120*F Normal flow 26 gpm Design flow 30 gpm Shell Side (Steam) Code ASME 111, Class 3 Fluid Steam-saturated Design pressure 110 psig Design temperature 360*F Materials Carbon steel Design flow 1740 lbm./hr. Charging Pumps Code ASME 111, Class 3 Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200*F , Normal flow (151 gpm at charging pump dis &arge) 90 gpm (to RCS loop) Shutoff head 6,300 ft. Normal suction pressure 38 psig Normal temperature of pumped fluid 120*F NPSil required 35 ft. at 130 gpm Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Charging Pump Mini-flow IIcat Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube, borizontal Apprend Desspor Materia!- Aushery Systems Page 9.3-72
System 80+ Desian controlDocument A Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Sunnuary (Cont'd.) V Chary,ing Pump Mini-flow Heat Exchanger (Cont'd.) Tube Side (Charging) Fluid Reactor coolant,2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum
~
Design Pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200*F Materials Austenitic stainless steel Normal flow 35 gpm Design Flow 100 gpm Code ASME III, Class 3 Shell Side (Cooling Water) Fluid Component cooling water Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200*F Materials Carbon Steel Normal flow 50 gpm Design Flow 200 gpm Code ASME 111, Class 3 Dedicated Seal Irde: tion Pump Quantity 1 Type Positive displacement, air cooled (qj Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200'F Design flow provided per RCP 6.6 gpm Design head 3025 psig Normal suction pressure 38 psig Normal temperature of pumped fluid 120'F NPSH required 1.5 psia Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt.% boric acid, maximum , Environmental Qualificatmn 55'F - 104'F Code ASME Ill, Class 3 Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200'F Rated head 300 ft Normal flow 180 gpm Normal operating temperature 40-120'F NPSH required 15 ft Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum O Material in contact with liquid Austenitic stainless steel U Code ASME III, Class 3 w w nneserier. Auumery systems rose .s.3-13
Sy^ tem 80 + Design controlDocument Table 9.3.4-4 Princ8 pal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Rated head 300 ft. Normal flow 180 gpm Normal operating ternperature 40-120'F NPSH required 15 ft Material in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid Demineralized water Code None IIoldup Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 100 psig Design temperature 200*F Rated head 145 ft Normal flow 50 gpm Normal operating temperature 40-120'F NPSil required 10 ft Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Code None Reactor Drain IMmps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Rated head 145 ft Normal flow 50 gpm Normal operating temperature 120*F NPSH required 10 ft Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Code for fluid end ASME Ill, Class 3 Volume Control Tank Quantity 1 Type Venical, cylindrical Internal volume 5,800 gallons (approx) Design pressure, internal 75 psig Design pressure, external 15 psig Normal operating temperature 120'F l Normal operating pressure 20-50 psig As.prowd Design ataterial Auxaiery Systems (11/96) Page 9.3-74
System 30+ oeska contrat oocument I Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) Volume Control Tank (Cont'd.) Blanket gas (during plant operation) l Hydrogen Code ASME Ill, Class 3 l i Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Matenal Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Batching Tank Quantity 1 Internal volume 630 gallons (minimum) Design pressure Atmospigg: Design temperamre 200'F l l Normal operating temperature 155'F Type heater Electric immersion l Heater capacity, minimum 45kW Fluid 12 wt % boric acid, maximum Material Austenitic stainless steel Normal operating pressure Atmospheric Code None Equipment Drain Tank Quantity 1 Type Horizontal, cylindrical l i - Internal volume 10,500 gallons (minimum) Design pressure 30 psig internal,15 psig external Design temperature 300'F Normal operating pressure 3 psig Normal operating temperature 120'F Code ASME III, Class 3 Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Material Austenitic stainless steel Reactor Drain Tank Quantity 1 Type Horizontal, cylindrical Design pressure (internal) 130 psig Design pressure (external) 15 psig Design temperature 350'F psig Normal operating pressurc 3 psig Normal operating temperature 120*F Internal volume 2850 ga!Mns (minimum) Blanket gas " Nitrogen !. Material Austenitic stainless steel Code ASME Vill Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Holdup Tank Quantity 1 Type Vertical (field fabricated) L ..;: Design aineeniel. ,iunnery 3yseenns Page p.3-75
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) lioldup Tank (Cont'd.) Total useful volume 475,000 gallons - Design pressure 1.5 psig { Design temperature 200*F f 1 l Operating pressure Atmospheric Operating temperature 40-120* F l Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel Code API-650 Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum ; Reactor Makeup Water Tank Quantity 1 Type Venical (field fabricated) Total useful volume 450,000 gallons Design pressure 1.3 psig Design temperature 200'F Operating pressure Atmospheric Operating temperature 40-120
- F Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel
~
Code API-650 Fluid Demineralized water Boric Acid Storage Tank Quantity 1 Type Vertical (field fabricated) Total useful volume 250,000 gallons Design pressure 1.5 psig Design temperature 200'F Operating pressure Atmospheric Operating temperature 60-120'F Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel Code ASME 111, Class 3 Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Purification and Deborating lon Exchangers Quantity 3 Type Flushable Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 120*F Resin volume, each (useful) 32.0 ft' (minimum required) Normal flow 100 gpm Design flow 150 gpm Code for vessel ASME 111 Class 3 Retention screen size 80 U.S. mesh Material Austenitic stainless steel Approved Design Meterial. AuxlGary Systems Pope 9.3-76
System 80+ Design ControlDocument i
- (j /
Tame 9,3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) Purification and Deborating Jon Fmh: sgers (Cont'd.) Resin Cation /arion mixed bed for purification; anion bed for deborating : Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum , Pre-holdup lon Exchanger Quantity I Type Flushable Design pressure 200 psig j Design temperature 200'F Normal operating temperature 120*F Resin volume, each (useful) 32.0 ft' (minimum required) d Normal flow 100 gpm . Design flow 150 gpm i Code for vessel ASME 111, Class 3 , Reter. tion screen size 80 U.S. mesh Material Austenitic stainless steel l Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Resin Cation / anion mixed bed Boric Acid Condensate Ion Exchanger Quantity i Flushable V Type I Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 120*F Resin volume (useful) 32 ft' (minimum required) Normal flow 20 gpm . Design flow 100 gpm Code for vessel ASME Vill Retention screen size 80 U.S. mesh Material Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 10 ppm boron, maximum Resin Anion Purification Filter Quantity 2 Type elements Replaceable cartridge Retention for 2 micron and larger panicles, % by wt 98 % Normal operating temperature 120'F Design pressure 200 psig Design temperarme 200'F Design flow 150 gpm ; Normal flow 100 gpm
- Code for vessel ASME 111 Class 3 V Material Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Amrod Oeenpn neerenet. Auanery systems Page 9.3-77 L
Syntem 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) h , Boric Acid Filter Quantity 1 Type elements Replaceable canridge Retention for 2 micron and larger particles, % by wt 98 % Normal operating temperature 40-120'F Design temperature 200'F Design pressure 200 psig Design flow 200 gpm Code for vessel ASME Ill, Class 3 Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Reactor Makeup Water Filter Quantity 1 Type elements Replaceable cantidge Retention for 2 micron and larger panicles, % by wt 98 % Normal operating temperature 40-120'F Design temperature 200'F Design pressure 200 psig Design flow 200 gpm Code for vessel ASME Vill Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid Demmeralized water Reactor Drain Filter Quantity 1 Retention for 2 micron and larger particles, % by wt 98 % Type elements Replaceable canridge Normal operating temperature 120*F Design temperature 200'F l Design pressure 200 psig l Design flow 100 gpm t Code for vessel ASME III, Class 3 l Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % botic acid, maximum Seal Injection Filter Quantity 2 j Type elements Replaceable cartridge Retention for 5 micron and larger particles, % by w1 (95% Normal operating temperature 125'r Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200'F Design flow 30 gpm Code for vessel ASME Ill, Class 3 Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 2.5 wt % boric acid, maximum Aptwoved Design Material. AaxiGary Systems Page 9.3-78
Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary (Cont'd.) Seal injection Filter (Cont'd.) Normal flow l 26 gpm Boric Acid Concentrator Quantity 1 Maximum distillate effluent concentration 10 pptn boron Rated flow 20 gpm Cooling water flow 700 gpm (maximum) Steam required at 50 psig 13,500 lb/hr Code ASME VIII Gas Stripper Quantity 1 Design DF 10' Rated flow (process) 140 gpm Cooling water flow 700 gpm (maximum) Steam required at 50 psig 20,000 lb/hr (maximum) Code ASME III, Class 3 Chemical Addit'sn Package Chemical Addition Tank: Quantity 1 Internal volume 8 gallons (minimum) Design pressure Atmospheric ( Design temperature 150'F Normal operating temperature 40-90'F Material Austenitic stainless steel 7 Fluid N2H4or Li 0H solution Code None Chemical Addition Pump: Quantity 1 Type Positive displacement, variable capacity Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 150'F Normal operating temperature 40-90* F Capacity 0-25 gal /hr Fluid N2H4or Li'OH solution Material in contact with fluid Austenitic stainless steel Code None O G ANwevent Destgra nietenie!. Amunnry Systems Pege 9.3-79
Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-5 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters Parameter Value l Normal letdown and purification flow 100 gpm Normal charging flow (to RCS) 90 gpm Normal charging mini-recirculation flow 35 gpm Normal seal injection flow 26 gpm Reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff (4 pumps) 16 gpm Normal letdown temperature at loop 556*F Normal charging temperature at loop 445'F lon exchanger operating temperature 120*F O O Approved Desbyn Materal Aux 6ary Systems (2/95) Pope 9.3-80
i l Cy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument k Table 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data Number I. CVCS Minimum Purification Operation (Minimum Charging and Letdown How) CVCS 14 cation:D3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flowt21(gpm) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 ) Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 l Temp. (*F) 556 170 120 120 120 120 120 120 l CVCS Iocation: 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 11b 12 Flowt23 (gpm) 30 30 46 46 81 46 46 46 Press. (psig) 60 50 50 50 50 2630 2630 2630 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 335 CYCS location: 12b 12c 12 d,c,f,g 12 h,ld,k 121 12m 13 a,b,c,d 13r Flowt21(gpm) 46 0 0 0 46 0 4 16 Press. (psig) 2455 2400 2400 2400 2525 2400 100 100 t Ternp. (*F) 335 120 120 120 120 120 180 180 CVCS lecation: 14 < Flowizj(Epm) 35 Press. (psig) 100 Temp. (*F) 100 s 11. CVCS Normal Purification Operation (Normal Charging and Letdown Flow) CVCS Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flowt:1 (gpm) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 i Temp. (*F) 556 290 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 11b 12 Flowr21(gpm) 100 100 116 116 151 116 90 90 Press. (psig) 60 50 50 50 50 2630 2630 2630 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 440 CVCS Location: 12b 12c 12 d,e f,g 12 h,ld,k 121 12m 13 a,b,c,d 13r l Flow :l 3 (gpm) 90 26 6.5 6.5 90 26 4 16 Press. (psig) 2455 2400 2400 2400 2500 2400 100 100 Temp. (*F) 440 120 125 125 120 125 180 180 CVCS Location: 14 3 Flowtzt (gpm) 35 Press. (psig) 100 Temp. ('F) 100 () Anwowed Design neoternal Ausnery Systems Page 9.3-81
I System 80+ Design crntrolDocument j Table 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Fl~w Data Number (Cont'd.) hl l 111. CVCS Maximum Purification Operation (Maximum Charging and Letdown How) CVCS Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flow!23 (gpm) 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 j Temp. (*F) 556 230 120 120 120 120 120 120
)
CVCS location: 8b 8e 8d 9 10 11 lib 12 Flow (23 (gpm) 150 150 166 166 201 166 140 140 Press. (psig) 60 50 50 50 50 2630 2630 2630 Temp. ("F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 334 CVCS Location: 12b 12c 12d,e,f,g 12h,ij,k 121 12m 13ab,c,d 13f Flowt21 (gpm) 140 26 6.5 6.5 140 26 4 16 Ess. (psig) 2400 2400 2400 2400 2450 2400 100 100 Temp. (*F) 265 120 125 125 120 125 180 180 CVCS Location: 14 Flowt2 (gpm) 35 Press. (psig) 100 Temp. ('F) 100 IV. CVCS Makeup System Operation
- 1) Automatic Mode (Blended Boric Acid Concentration = 900 ppm)
CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 18b 18c 19 Flowl21(gpm) 57 37 37 37 37 0 37 Press. (psig) 41 155 130 130 130 0 130 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 20 21 22 23 23b 24 25 Flowt2)(Epm) 180 163 143 143 20 143 143 Press. (psig) 130 15 160 130 15 130 130 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 2) Dilute Mode CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 18b 18c 19 Flow (21 (gpm) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Press. (psig) 41 41 41 41 41 0 41 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 20 21 22 23 23b 24 25 Flowl21 (gpm) 180 200 180 180 20 180 180 Press. (psig) 130 15 160 130 15 130 130 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 3) Shutdown Boration CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 18c Flowl21(gpm) 170 150 150 150 150 ApprovedDesbyn Acatorial. Auxaiary Systems Page 9.3-82
System 80+ oesian controlDocument G Table 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data Number V (Cont'd.) i IV. CVCS Makeup System Operation (Cont'd.) l
- 3) Shutdown Boration ;
Press. (psig) 41 155 130 170 130 l Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 )
- 4) BAST Boration (Boric Acid Batching Operations)
CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 18b 18e 18e 18f ) Flowm (Spm) 180 160 160 160 160 0 40 200 Press. (psig) 41 130 130 130 130 0 15 15 ; Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 155 155 l
- 5) Resin Sluicing CVCS Location: 21 22 23 23b 40 41 42 43 .
FlowW (gpm) 40 40 40 20 40 50sefm 40gpm 40gpm+
+50sefm 50sefm Press. (psig) 15 160 130 15 130 130 130 130 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 6) Borate Mode l CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 18c 19 20 Flowm (gpm) 120 100 100 100 0 100 100 :
y Press. (psig) 41 155 130 130 15 130 130 l Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
]
V. Boron Recovery System ]
- 1) Processing Normal VCT Diversion l CVCS Location: 32 33 34 Floww (Epm) 100 100 100 Press. (psig) 65 65 65 Temp. (*F) 120 120 130
, 2) Processing Maximum VCT IMyersion , CVCS Location: l 32 33 34 Flowm (gpm) 150 150 150 Press. (psig) 65 65 65 Temp. (*F) 120 120 130
- 3) Reactor Drain Tank Processing CVCS Location: 26 27 30 31 32 33 34 FlowW (gpm) 200 gpd 50 50 50 50 50 50 Press. (psig) 3 3 75 75 70 70 65 l
Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 4) Equipment Drain Tank Processing CVCS Location: 28 28a 29 30 31 32 33 34
) Flowm (gpm) 0 0 50 50 50 50 50 50 Press. (psig) 3 3 4 66 60 60 50 45 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 130 L.2 Donen nienwiel. Ananary Syssoms Page 9.3-83 . .__- .____ _ _ _ l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data Number (Cont'd.) h
- 5) Holdup Tank Processing CVCS Location: 35 36 37 38 39 Flowt2i(epm) 52 52 20 2 20 Press. (psig) 20 82 50 40 50 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 160 120 0
Notes: IU lecations correspond to numbers in ellipses on Figure 9.3.4-1 (Sheets 1 through 4). .t21 At 120*r Amunwed Deshm Motorial AunAnry Systems Page s.344
i l System 80+ Deslan controlDocument j ja V Table 9.3.4-7 Chemical and Volume Control System List of Active Valves i Actuator Valve Dow Diagram Valve Line Number Coordinates Type Size (in.) Type
Reference:
Figure 9.3.4-1. Sheet 1 of 4 CH-255 F-3 Globe 1.50 Motor CH-304 F-8 Check 3.00 None i CH 515 H8 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH 516 H-8 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH 523 E-7 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic 3 Diaphragm Cil-524 B-8 Globe 2.00 Motor CH 575 E7 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH 747 F-8 Check 2.00 Nor.e CH-835 F-2 Check 1.50 hone
Reference:
Figure 9.3.4-1, Sheet 2 of 4 CH-189 D-8 Check 3.00 None CH-505 F-7 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH-506 F-7 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH-509 D-7 Gate 3.00 Motor
Reference:
Figure 9.3.4-1, Sheet 3 of 4 CH-494 H-7 Check 1.50 None CH-560 D7 Globe 3.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm Cll-561 D-7 Globe 3.00 Pneumatic Diaphragm CH-580 H-6 Globe 1.50 Pneumatic Diaphragm u)
.^ u -- Dee&n Menerte! Ausnery Systems Page 9.3-85
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System 80+ oesign comrar occament 9.4- Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systents l Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are provided as required throughout all areas ; for personal comfort, personnel safety protection and equipment functional protection. The HVAC systems provided for each building or room are designed for the specific functional requirements of that individual building or room. t l For those buildings and rooms required for functional use during all plant operating modes (normal, t shutdown, emergency), two separate HVAC systems are provided although in most cases some safety-related air distribution ducting is shared. i Redundant Seismic Category I trains are provided for safety-related systems. , i >
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The meteorological conditions used as a basis for the design of theH. VAC systems are listed in Table 2.0-1. The HVAC systems of buildings, compartments and areas housing nuclear safety related systems j
- are designed for zero percent exceedance values. The HVAC Systems for non-essential areas in the Nuclear Annex are designed for one percent exceedance values. The HVAC system for the turbine-building is designed for five percent exceedance values. The inside design conditions for the systems l provided for each building, area or room are given in the Design Basis of each system.
A surnmary of the individual HVAC system design parameters and design details is tabulated in Table j 9.4-1. l Air flow diagrams are included for the systems. A schedule of the symbols used is shown in Figure i t ; 9.4-1. Radiation monitors are located upstream of filter inlets. ; l Ventilation Systems are division-specific so that fire or smoke in an area containing a safety related j division of equipment cannot migrate through the ventilation ducts to an area containing the redundant f i division of safety related equipment. Fire dampers are installed in fire rated barriers and have the same fire resistance rating as the barrier. Exceptions are the Containment Purge and Pressure Control Systems i i and Annulus Ventilation System which must function following some plant design basis accidents to prevent release of radioactivity. Fire dampers are not installed in these systems because failure or i spurious actuation would interfere with system safety function. For dedicated smoke removal systems l inside control complex, motor operated smoke control dampers are installed in lieu of thermally operated, ; i automatic closing fire dampers. In addition, the five multi-level stairwells in the nuclear annex have roof-mounted pressurizing fans. The fans are individually energized from the control room in order to provide a safe haven and safe exit for plant personnel. l l In the event of a fire, area fire detectors will sound an alarm in the control room and the supply fan n?ay j
= be deactivated manually if required. Smoke removal is then manually initiated from the Control Room :
or the Remote Shutdown Room by a smoke purge fan, outside makeup air and associated ductwork and i control dampers. [; . The Containment, the Reactor Building Subsphere, the Fuel Handling Area, the Nuclear Annex, and the - ! two diesel generator areas are ventilated, heated and cooled with 100% outside air systems. The supply i F and exhaust far 'e available for smoke control. The control area has dedicated smoke control fans. l The Turbine H. s - centilating fans are available for smoke control. j
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument The fire dampers in HVAC ductwork in fuel handling area and radwaste building close under design air flow condition. The Nuclear Annex Fuel Building, and Reactor Building Subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to the atmosphere. In order to control airborne activity, the outside air is generally supplied directly to the clean areas and exhausted from the potentially contaminated areas, creating a positive flow of air from the clean areas to the potentially contaminated areas. HVAC penetrations through security barriers are designed to provide security protection to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 5.65. Table 9.4 2 tabulates the RCS insulation heat loads within the Containment. Table 9.4-3 tabulates the data used for Chapter 15 offsite and control room dose analysis. With the exception of carbon adsorbers in the filtration units for the control room, no credit is taken for any carbon filtration for post accident dose analyses. Table 9.4-4 tabulates the heat loads from NSSS Support Structures within the Contaimnent. Table 9.4-6 provides the design comparison to regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 applicable to Non-safety-related Ventilation Exhaust Systems of System 80+. 9.4.1 Control Complex Ventilation System 9.4.1.1 Design Basis The Control Complex Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (CCVS) is designed to maintain the environment in the control room envelope and balance of control area within acceptable limits for the operation of unit controls, for maintenance and testing of the controls as required, and for uninterrupted safe occupancy of the control area during post-accident shutdown. These systems are designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2,4,5,19, and 60. Refer to Section 6.4 for further information regarding control room habitability. The control area consists of the main control room, the technical support center, the computer room, the essential and non-essential electric switchgear rooms, offices, vital instrument and equipment areas, and mechanical support equipment areas as shown on Figure 9.4-2. The control area is a Seismic Category I structure. The control room, and other support areas are designed to maintain approximately 73 *F to 78*F and 20 % to 60% maximum relative humidity. The battery room is designed to maintain approximately 77'F (60*F min. to 90F max.). The mechanical equipment room is designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 104*F. All other areas are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 85'F. These conditions are maintained continuously during all modes of operation for the protection of instrumentation and controls, and for the comfort of the operators. Outdoor design conditions are given in Table 2.0-1. Continuous pressurizatioa of the control room and the connecting offices is provided to prevent entry of dust, dirt, smoke, and radioactivity originating outside the pressurized zones in accordance with the intent of NUREG-0700 requirements. Pressurization is maintained slightly positive relative to the pressure outdoors and in surrounding areas. The entrance at the south east corner of the control room is the Approwd Design Material- AuniGary Systems Page 9.4-2
i Syrtem 80+ oesian contrat Document l primary entrance into the control room. All other entrances into the control room will be administratively ! locked closed. ' The remaining areas of the control complex are maintained slightly positive with respect ; . to the potentially contaminated adjacent areas. : i Outside air for pressurization is taken from either of two locations such that a source of uncontaminated
- air is available regardless of wind direction. Each air intake is located as far away from the diesel ,
- - generator exhaust as practical. ' The distance between the diesel generator exhaust and the control room .
air intake is at least 250 feet which is adequate to protect the control room inhabitants from the effects of diesel generator exhaust. All outside air is filtered. The minimum distance between the Control Room , Air Intakes and important plant releases points is specified on Figure 3.8-5. j l I Each outside air intake location is monitored for the presence of radioactivity, toxic gases, and products ; of combustion. Isolation of the outside air intake occurs automatically upon indication of high toxic gas ! or smoke concentration in the intake. Design provisions in case of high concentration of toxic gases or ! radioactivity at both intakes are discussed in Section 6.4. ! i The CCVS including the habitability systems is a safety-related system with the exception of components or subsystems identified otherwise. l I Each outside air intake is provided with a tornado isolation damper to prevent depressurization of the l control room and the control room area during a tornado. l 1 All safety-related air conditioning and ventilation equipment is able to perform required safety functions l assuming the worst single failure of an active component concurrent with a loss of offsite power. ! ! I j All safety-related air conditioning and ventilating equipment, ductwork and supports are designed to ! withstand the safe shutdown earthquake. In addition, this equipment is protected from the effects of i internally generated missiles, pipe breaks and water spray. Safety related electrical components required j l for the heating, cooling, and pressurization of the control room during accident conditions are connected j to emergency Class 1E standby power. i instrumentation is provided for the air conditioning systems to control and indicate the temperature, and ! i to indicate radioactivity levels. Early warning ionization-type smoke detectors are located in the supply, return and outside air ductwork serving the Control Room. i r 9.4.1.1.1 Codes and Standards l 1 l Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: e .- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards. e- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the national Electrical Manufacturers Association l (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). i l i
.o. The safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwod will be designed and tested as l outlined in Table 9.4-5. . ,
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
i Anmed DeatpEnneauint Aunnery srenome n ye s.t.2 .
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI). Cooling Coils in the safety-related cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
- liigh-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."
- Carbon filter media, Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Envirornnental Sciences.
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
- Nuclear Power Plant Air-Cleaning Units and Components," ASME N509,1989.
- " Testing of Nuclear Air Treatment Systems," ASME N510,1989.
- The following Regulatory Guides have special significance to the control area:
Reg. Guide Title . 1.29 Seismic Design Classification 1.52 Design, Testing and Maintenance for Post Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmo:pheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants: Table 9.4-5 provides the design comparison to regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52. 1,78 Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release 1.95 Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release 1.140 Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
- Welding of ductwork conforms to Sheet Metal Welding Code AWS D9.1.
9.4.1.2 System Description The main control room air-conditioning system consists of two Divisions. Each Division has an outside air intake, louver, tornado damper, dampers, filtration unit, an air conditioning unit with fan, ducting, instrumentation and controls. Each redundant air conditioning unit consists of filter, safety-related chilled water coil for heat removal, electric heating coil and fan for air circulation. Each of the filtration units consists of prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber, post filter (HEPA) and fan, along with ducts and valves and related instrumentation. Chilled water is supplied from the Essential Chilled Water System. AMwsmHf Desiger Material- AuxiGary 5ystems Page 9.4-4
Srtem 80 + Design ControlDocument (]/ U During normal operation, return air from the control room is mixed with a small quantity of outside air for ventilation, is filtered and conditioned in the control room air-conditioning unit, and is delivered to the control room through supply ductwork. Duct-mounted heating coils and humidification equipment provide final adjustments to the control room temperature and humidity for maintaining normal comfort conditions. Each air inlet structure is provided with redundant radiation monitoring devices and a smoke detector. The designated MCR filtration units and ventilation fan start automatically on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) or high radiation signal. Upon failure of the designated filtration unit, the redundant filtration unit starts automatically. The MCR filtration unit filters particulates and potential radioactive iodines from all of the return air, and delivers the filtered air to the inlet of the main air-conditioning unit. The Technical Support Center air-conditioning system consists of an air-conditioning unit, return air and smoke purge fans, and an emergency filter unit. The TSC is maintained at 1/8" water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas during post-accident conditions. A common supply air header and common outside air intake dampers are shared by the TSC and the control room to protect the TSC from the contaminants in the outside air intakes. The TSC can be isolated from the Main Control Room by using manual controls. The TSC is automatically isolated if control room pressurization falls below its design value. The TSC is provided with shielding protection from direct radiation from an external radioactive cloud and internal radioactive sources. The combined effect of all radiation protection measures is designed -m to be adequate to limit the overall calculated radiation exposure to the personnel inside the TSC to the requirements of General Design Criteria 19. The computer room air-conditioning system consists of two (V) 100% air-conditioning units and associated fans. Both the Technical Support Center and computer room air-conditioning systems are non-safety and non-seismic. l The balance of control complex air-conditioning systems consists of two redundant air-conditioning units, each with roughing filters, safety-related chilled water cooling coils and fans serving Division I electrical rooms, Channel A and Channel C. Two equal units serve Division II, Channels B and D. Each Division l will function with one of the redundant air conditioning units delivering filtered, conditioned air to the various electrical equiprnent rooms including essential battery rooms. Chilled water is supplied from the Essential Chilled Water System. Each Division also contains redundant battery rooms with fan operating continuously to maintain the hydrogen concentration below two percent. Outlet ducts in battery rooms are located near ceiling for hydrogen control. ! The Remote Shutdown Panel Room is located in the Division I area. Normally this room is cooled by the 70' Elevation Division 1 Electrical Equipment Room Air Conditioning Unit. For redundancy purposes, the Remote Shutdown Panel Room is also cooled by a Division Il- powered air conditioning unit which receives Division 11 Safety-related Chilled Water. I Return air from the various essential electrical equipment areas is mixed with a portion of outside air for ventilation, is filtered and conditioned in the air-conditioning unit, and is delivered to the rooms through supply ductwork. Duct-mounted heating coils provide final adjustments to temperature in selected equipment rooms. l l (3 The Operation Support Center, personnel decon rooms, Break Room, Shift Assembly and Offices, () Radiation Access Control and Central Alarm Station and Security Group areas all are served by an individual air conditioning unit consisting of a centrifugal fan, non-safety related chilled water coil and AMwoved Design Material- AuxiGary Systems (2/95) Page 9.&S
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument roughing filter. Two non-essential electrical and CEDM control rooms are served by two 100% air conditioning units consisting of a centrifugal fan, non-safety related chilled water coil and roughing filter. Each non-safety related electrical room A/C unit also serves non-safety related battery rooms and each of these battery rooms contains an exhaust fan operating continuously to maintain the hydrogen concentration below two percent. As shown on Figure 9.4-2 all of these areas can receive outside air from the cleanest of two sources described for the control room. The roof exhaust fan shown serving the break room, personnel decon rooms, and shift assembly offices is actually located at least 80 feet from the outside air intake. 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation The air-conditioning system serving the control room proper consists of two completely redundant, independent, full-capacity cooling systems. Each system is powered from independent, Class IE power sources and headered on separate Essential Chilled Water Systems. Equipment capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. The control room, and other support areas are designed to maintain approximately 73*F to 78'F and 20% to 60% maximum relative humidity. The battery room is designed to maintain approximately 77'F (60*F min. to 90*F max.) The mechanical equipment room is designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 104*F. All other areas are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 85'F. These conditions are maintained continuously during all modes of operation for the protection of instrumentation and controls, and for the comfort of the operators. Both the Technical Support Center and computer room air-conditioning systems are non-safety and non-O seismic. Failure of either does not compromise other safety-related air-conditioning systems or prevent safe shutdown. The balance of the Control Complex Ventilation System consists of two independent, full capacity systems. Each system serves the associated train of essential electrical equipment areas. Each system ; is powered from independent Class IE power sources and served from separate essential chilled water i systems. Equipment capacities are based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of surrounding area temperatures. l The control room emergency recirculation system consists of two completely redundant, independent, full-capacity filtration systems. Each system is powered from separate Class IE power sources, and is capable of providing the required cleanup effect. The dose assessment assumes the failure of one complete train of the emergency circulation system. The Control Room IIVAC System is a Safety Class 3 system. The redundant outside air intakes can be isolated, by use of redundant isolation dampers, upon detection of high radiation, toxic gas, or smoke i at the intakes. All safety-related components of the control equipment area ventilation systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, and will remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. Intake and exhaus' structures are protected from tornado-generated missiles, wind-generated missiles, rain, snow, ice or trash, Isolation dampes in :M main control room intake, relief and exhaust points are designed to withstand pressure differentials of a oostulated tornado. Safety-related areas without isolation dampers Appreset Design Material Austhery Systems Page 9.4-6
System 80+ Design ControlDocument A Q are designed to withstand pressure differentials of a postulated tornado. No componems are subjected to flooding by virtue of the location within the control area. Redundant components are physically separated, and none are subjected to pipe break effects such as pipe , whip or jet impingement. Components are designed and constructed so that exposure to a water-spray environment will not prevent performing the required safety function. All safety-related components of the control equipment area ventilation systems are powered from Class IE, diesel-backed power sources. Capacity of the control room air-conditioning system is based on . complete failure of one train. Capacity and evaluation of the control room emergency circulation system is also based on complete failure of one train. The control room. air-conditioning systems are tied to the trains of equipment that are served. Failure of one train of the control room air-conditioning system may t f cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of electrical components and electrical equipment areas is provided. Ducts that pass through walls, floors, and ceilings of the control room are bullet resistant. In addition, security barriers (i.e., rebar or segmented ducts) are provided within ducts that pass through vital boundaries. No other HVAC system ducts other than MCR air-handling system ducts pass through the MCR emergency zone (MCREZ). 9.4.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Control Complex Ventilation System is in continuous operation and is accessible for periodic O V inspection. Safety-related electrical components, switchcovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter to dernonstrate system readiness and operability. Performance characteristics of the Control Complex Ventilation System will be verified through : qualification testing of safety-related components as follows: i
- Air-handling fans are tested in accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristics and '
performance curves. Remaining fans are qualified by similarity.
- lleating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or hydrostatically, to assure integrity.
- HEPA filters are manufactured and tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. HEPA )
filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter. Carbon adsorbers i are leak-tested initially and periodically thereafter to ensure bypass leakage through the adsorber i section is less than that asstuned in the dose assessment. j l
- Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA. ]'
Where applicable, duct and housing leak tests are performed in accordance with the provisions of ASME N510. All Main Control Room Air-Conditioning System (MCRACS) ductwork outside MCREZ including the filtration units is either leak tight or is of welded construction. The applicable welding code is AWS D9.1. The ductwork will be periodically visually examined and pressure tested for leakage. The leakage through MCR intake ductwork shall be less than the maximmn allowable for the associated design. ('
- The safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
ANweved Deelper Meterief. Auuniary Systems Page 9.4-7
System 80+ Design control Document Functional testing is performed prior to initial startup to verify proper operation of the controls and interlocks. Response times of applicable components are verified. 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation Application Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to permit verification of their operation. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and pressurization filter trains) is provided locally at each filter train. Iligh room temperature alarm for the remote or unmanned control room area (electrical equipment rooms, battery rooms, switchgear rooms, etc.) is provided in the control room. Table 9.4-3A lists the minimum instrumentation provided to the ESF filter trains. The tollowing data shall be available to determine system performance:
- Entering aN aving air temperature for air handling units.
- Entering and leaving chilled water temperatute at air handling units.
- Air flow rate for fans.
- Chilled water flow rate to air handling units.
The safety.related and non-safety related battery rooms have hydrogen detection devicer, to monitor hydrogen concentration. Indication of high radioactivity and toxic gas at outside air intakes is provided in control room. 1 Each Control Room Intake is provided with redundant, Seismic Cxegorv 1, CWs IE, safety rMated radiation monitors. The CR air intake radiation monitors are locatej outside. (mtream) of the Main CR intake dampers so that they can continue to monitor the air immediately outside the intakes to wpport the automatic selection capability. Upon detection of high radiation at either Control Room Irdake ct upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Eignal (SIAS), component control logic will automatically divert the control room air intake and recircuhtion air flows to pass through the designated Control Room j Filtration Unit. Upon failure of the designated filtration unit to start, the redundant filtration unit will ! start automatically. At the same time, component control logic will isolate the Control Room Intake i which has the greater radiation level and block the isolation of the Control Room Intake which has the lesser radiation level. These automatic features ensure that positive pressurization of the Control Room is maintained by uninterrupted pressurization air flow via the lesser contaminated Control Room Intake. ! Also, automatic selection logic is provided to continuously monitor and compare the radiation levels at l both Control Room Intakes and effect Control Room Intake isolation damper realignments as needed so ; that the lesser contaminated Control Room Intake supplies pressurization air to the Control Room, even , if radiation levels change. In addition, component control logic will ensure that the Control Room l Intat.e isolation damper with the lesser radiation level is opened before the Control Room Intake I Anoroved Design Matonni Ausbary Systems Pope 9.4-8
Sy ~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument n (v ) isolation damper with the greater ra:!iatian level is closed. In the event of alignment failure, the operator is alerted by a Control Room alarm so that manuai actions may be taken. A t Fuel Building Ventilation System 9.4.2.1 Design Basis The Fuel Building Ventilation System is designed to:
- Maintain a suitable environment for the operation, maintenance, and testing of equipment.
- Maintain a suitable access and working environment for personnel.
- Maintain the fuel handling and storage building at a negative pressure relative to the atmosphere to minimize outleakage.
The fuel-handling building exhaust system is designed to mitigate the consequences of a postulated fuel-handling accident. Dose at the site boundary shall be well within the values of 10 CFR Part 100, consistent with the Standard Review Plan 15.7.4. The exhaust side of the Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System consists of two 100 percent exhaust systems. Each exhaust system consists of one 100 percent capacity filter train and fan. This meets the single failure criterion. Switchover between filter trains is accomplished manually by the operator. O \ l Electrical and control component separation is maintained between trains. L/ All safety-related fans, filters, dampers, ductwork and supports are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake. Safety-related electrical components required for ventilation of the fuel handling area during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class IE standby power. In order to control airborne activity, the ventilation air is generally supplied directly to the clean areas and exhausted from the potentially contaminated areas, creating a positive flow of air from the clean areas to the potentially contaminated areas. The bypass damper will be administratively locked closed and the Fuel Building Ventilation System will be in operation whenever irradiated fuel handling operations above or in the fuel pool are in progress. The design temperature range for the fuel building is 40'F to 104*F. The Fuel Building Ventilation System is located completely within a Seismic Category I structure and all safety-related components (exhaust filter trains, exhaust fans, exhaust ductwork) are fully protected from floods and tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and 1 interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. The outside air intake opening for the ventilating air supply unit is protected by missile shields above and in front of the opening. 1 This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 5, 60, and 61. j (~gi i k Approwd Desiges Material Auxikery Systems Page 9.4-9
l Design ControlDocument _SyTrem 80+ 9.4.2.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
- The safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI). Cooling coils in the safety-related cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
- liigh-efficiency paniculate air (IIEPA) filters conform to ORN' -NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of liigh-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for ciuclear Application."
- Carbon filter media, Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Environmental Science.
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
- " Nuclear Power Plant Air-Cleaning Units and Components." ASME N509,1989.
- " Testing of Nuclear Air Treatment Systems," ASME N510,1989.
- The following Regulatory Guides have special significance in the Fuel Building:
Reg. Guide Title 1.29 Seismic Design Classification 1.52 Design Testing and Maintenance for Post Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.140 Design, Maintenance and Testing Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
- Carbon adsorbers credited with more than 70% efficiency in 10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix I analyses will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
O Appresed Design Meterial. AuuRiery 3yttems Page 9.4-r0
System !~0 + Design ControlDocument n 9.4.2.2 System Description lv) The Fuel Building Ventilating System (Air Flow Diagram, Figure 9.4-3) ronsists of the following components:
- One 100% capacity ventilation supply air handling unit and associated dampers and ductwork.
- Two 100% capacity Exhaust Systems complete with filter trains and associated fans, dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems.
Outside air is supplied to the fuel handling area by a supply system consisting of one 100% capacity fan with heating and cooling coils, filter section and associated ductv,ork. Cooling coils are served by the normal chilled water system. The Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust System consists of t vo 100% capacity filter trains. This portion of the Fuel Building Ventilation System is an engineered safety feature. The two filter trains receive separate emergency power. Each of the filter trains consists of a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber and post filter (IIEPA) along with ducts and valves and related instrumentation. It is equippe:I with a bypass section. The normal mode of operation for the filter trains is in the bypass position. Radiation detection is provided in the duct system header, upstream of the filter train inlet to monitor radioactivity. Upon indication of high radioactivity in the exhaust duct system, the bypass a dampers will automatically close and the filter train inlet dampers will automatically open to direct air () flow through the filter trains. Air from the Fuel Building Exhaust System is directed to the unit vent, where it is monitored before release to the atmosphere. During all fuel handling operations, the 100% outside air supply system remains in operation and the 100% exhaust air system is set manually in the filtered mode. Both filtration units of the FBVS operate continuously during fuel handling operations and the radiation monitor has no control function during this time. The nuclear annex, fuel building, and reactor building subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to the atmosphere. 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation The Fuel Building Exhaust System is an engineered safety feature. Each redundant filter train (two 100% capacity), fan, and motor operated damper is served from a separate train of the emergency Class IE standby power. This assures the integrity and availability of the Exhaust System in the event of any single active failure. Air exhausted from the fuel handling area is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct header between the fuel handling area and the inlet to the filter trains. The radiation detectors are located to ensure that dampers will have completely actuated to direct exhaust flow through the fiber trains before the first airborne radioactive material reaches the bypass dampers. O V Indication of ra:lioactivity above allowable limitr will automatically divert the flow of air through the filter trains prior to discharge into the atmosphere through the unit vent. Additional monitoring of exhaust air is provided in the unit vent. Asyveved Design Material- Auxbery Systems Pope 9.4-1 r
Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument The Inservice Testing Program will be implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XI to allow inservice testing as required by applicable standards and codes. The 100% exhaust air system is manually set to the filtered mode during all fuel handling operations. The dose analysis to support 10CFR100 limits following a fuel handling accident only takes credit for the llEPA filter in the referenced filter train. No credit is taken f* the carbon adsorbers. The Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust system is available following a loss of offsite power; however, fuel building supply will not be available. 9.4.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Performance char.'cteristics of the Fuel Building Ventilation System will be verified through qualification testing of components as follows:
- The safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- One fuel building supply fan and one fuel building exhaust fan is tested in accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristic performance curves. One of each type of safety-related cooling fan will also be tested in accordance with AMCA.
- Heating and cooling coils are leak tested with air, or hydrostatically, to assure integrity. Coils are rated in accordance with ARI standards.
- HEPA filters are manufactured and tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. HEPA filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter to verify filter integrity.
- Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA.
Initial functional testing of the Fuel Building Ventilation System will verify fan flow rates, cooling water flow distribution, and operation of interlocks and controls. 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Application Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to permit verification of their operation. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided locally at the filter trains, Table 9.4-3A lists the minimum instrumentation provided to the ESF filter trains. O A;ywwwd Deslyn Atatorial. Auxmary 5ptems Pope 9.4-12
. - ~ .__ _ _- _-- __ . __ __ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . .. . _. E i ( Sy~ tem 80 + Deslan ControlDocument The following data shall be available to determine system performance: ( e Entering and leaving air temperature for the ventilation supply unit. j e Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at the ventilation supply unit. ! e Air flow rate for the supply and exhaust units. e Water flow rate for the supply unit cooling coil. ; 9.4.3 Radwaste Building Ventilation System l 9.4.3.1 Design Basis The Radwaste Building Ventilation Systems consist of a supply and exhaust ventilation system that j performs heating, cooling, and ventilating functions. 1 The Radwaste Building Ventilation System is designed to: : i e Maintain a suitable environment for the operation, maintenance, and testing of equipment. l 1 e Maintain a suitable access and working environment for personnel. j The radwaste building is maintained at a siight negative pressure with respect to the environment to assure O that all potentially radioactive releases are monitored prior to discharge. The design tenverature range for the radwaste building is 40*F to 100'F. I 9.4.3.1.1 Codes and Standards j l Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards, e Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
e The non-safety related equipment, fans, dampers, coils, and ductwork are designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-6.
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
e Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI). Cooling coils in the safety-related cooling units are designed in
- accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
e- High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning s- Handbook.* Aneroweat Deeve aseenner. Aunnery speenme rege s.4-13
Syatem 80+ Design ControlDocurnent
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA. l I
- RG 1.140 " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. ;
- Carbon filter media Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Environmental Scaences.
9.4.3.2 System Description The radwaste building ventilation system (Air Flow Diagram, Figure 9.4-9) consists of supply air handling units, cooling coils, heating coils, particulate exhaust filter units, fans, ductwork, and accessories to provide normal ventilation and building temperature control. Air is generally supplied to corridors, and is exhausted from the individual equipment compartments. More air is exhausted than supplied to maintain the building at a slight negative pressure. The system utilizes a once-through cycle for the ventilation air. The ventilation system is not safety-related and performs no function essential to safe shutdown or post-accident operation. The radwaste building ventilation system is located within the radwaste building, except for the portion which connects with the unit vent at the juncture of the shield building and the nuclear annex. 9.4.3.2.1 Component Descdption The radwaste building ventilation supply system consists of two 50% capacity supply units. Supply units contain filters, heating coils, and chilled water cooling coils. Cooling coils are served from the Normal Chilled Water System. The supply fans are large, direct-drive centrifugal type with inlet isolation dampers. The radwaste building ventilation exhaust system consists of two 50% capacity particulate filtration exhaust units and exhaust fans. Each of the two filter units consists of; a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute filter, carbon filter, and post filter, and is equipped with a bypass section. Details of the ventilation system filtration components associated with the effluent model are provided in Section 11.3, and in Tables 11.3-1 and 11.3-2. The normal mode of operation is with the filter units in standby with all flow directed through the bypass. In order to monitor radioactivity, radiation detection is provided in ductwork which serve potentially occupied areas where the potential for the release of radiation exists, and in the duct system header, upstream of the inlets to the filter units. Variable inlet vanes in the exhaust fans are provided to maintain constant design flow through the system, and to maintain the building at a slight negative pressure during normal modes of operation. The exhaust fans are large centrifugal type with variable inlet vanes and outlet isolation dampers. Exhaust fans discharge through the nuclear annex to the unit vent. O Approved Desigrr hinterial. Aux 5ary 5ystems Page 9.414
1 Sy~ tem 80+ Design controlDocument i 9.4.3.2.2 System Operation 1 During normal operation of the ventilation system, outside air is supplied by two 50f, :apacity supply I units. The air is filtered and then conditioned as needed by the heating and cooling coils. The exhaust air is bypassed around the two 50% capacity particulate filter systems, and is discharged to the unit vent by 50% capacity exhaust fans. Upon indication of high radioactivity from the radia ion detector, the bypass dampers will be manually closed and the ventilation flow directed through the filter units. The discharge from the Radwaste Building exhaust system is directed to the unit vent, where it is monitored j prior to release to the atmosphere. Effluent monitoring is described in Section 11.5. Supply and exhaust fans are electrically interlocked such that the building will always remain under a slight negative pressure. Normal operation of the heating, cooling and ventilation system is with the equipment operating as required to maintain space temperatures within the design values. The system will operate based on heat load as indicated by room temperature. 9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation < e Air exhausted from the Radwaste Building is monitored by particulate and iodine radiation detectors which sample the air in ductwork which serve potentially occupied areas where the potential for the release of radiation exists, and in the exhaust duct header upstream of the filter units. Indication of radioactivity above allowable limits will result in a manual diversion of the flow of air through the filter units prior to discharge into the atmosphere through the unit vent. O Additional monitoring of exhaust air is provided in the unit vent. Radioactivity above allowable limits U will be indicated and alanned in the control room and alarmed locally. The Radwaste Building Ventilation System is a non-safety system and operates only during normal plant conditions. 9.4.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Performance characteristics of the Radwaste Building Ventilation System will be verified through qualification testing of components as follows:
- One radwaste building supply fan and one radwaste building exhaust fan is tested in accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristic performance curves.
2
- Heating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or hydrostatically, to assure integrity. Coils are rated in accordance with ARI standards.
- IIEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to installation as outlined in Table 9.4-6.
- The non-safety related equipment, fans, dampers, coils, and ductwork are designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-6.
Initial functional testing of the radwaste building ventilation system will verify fan flow rates, cooling g water flow distribution, and operation of interlocks and controls. N ! L ::Deskn nieteniel- Ausniery Systeens Pope 9.4-15
Sy^ tem 80 + Design Control Document 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is included to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily. Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the Radwaste Building control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the Radwaste Building and the main control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the Radwaste Building control room. In response to a high radiation signal, an alarm is activated in the Radwaste Building control room. Abnormal conditions within the Radwaste Building ventilation system are annunciated in the urin control room. hidication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided locally at the filter trains. The following data is provided to determine system performance:
- Entering and leaving air temperature for the supply ventilation unit.
- Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units.
- Air flow rates for the supply and exhaust units.
- Chilled water flow rates to supply ventilation units.
9.4.4 Diesel Building Ventilation System 9.4.4.1 Design Basis Each of the two Divisions of the Unit is served by a standby Diesel located in a separate area. Each Diesel Building Ventilation System is designed to provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment and personnel access for inspection, testing, and maintenance. Each Diesel Building Ventilation System is designed to maintain the diesel generator area temperature between 40*F minimum and 120'F maximum when the diesel is not operating, and between 40'F minimum and 122*F maximum when the diesel is operating. Outdoor design temperatures are shown in Table 2.0-1. Each Diesel Building Ventilation System shall perform its heat removal function assuming a single failure of an active component. Each ventilation train shall be capable of receiving electrical power from its associated diesel generator. Each Diesel Building Ventilation System shall remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake, and shall withstand the effects of appropriate natural phenomena such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods (GDC 2). The two diesel generator areas are separated by the Reactor Building and the building design protects the ventilation system from the effects of missiles, pipe whip, and jet forces (GDC 4). Approved Design Materiel- Ausmery Systems Page 9A 16
Sy' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument [ Safety related electrical components required for ventilation of the diesel generator areas during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class IE standby pcwer. This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 5,17 and 60 in l addition to GDC 2 and 4 mentioned above. 9.4.4.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: I
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
i
- Safety-related equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG 1.
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
O i 9.4.4.2 System Description I l Each Diesel Building Ventilation System cons sts of supply air intakes, normal ventilation fan and emergency ventilation exhaust fans with associated dampers and controls for the diesel generator area. The Diesel Building Ventilation System is shown on Figure 9.4-7. Components of the Diesel Building Ventilation System shown on Figure 9.4-7 are safety related unless noted NNS. Heat energy from the i diesel engine and other sources is absorbed by the ventilation supply air and discharged to the building exterior by the exhaust fas. Two 50% capacity exhaust fans, each equipped with a two speed motor, create negative pressure inside
, the diesel generator area which causes outside air to be pulled into the diesel generator area through the common outside air louvers. The fans are provided with modulating inlet vanes and automatic controls which modulate the inlet vanes to meet air flow demand. The inlet vanes are desig d to fail open.
Should the inlet vanes fail open, the automatic controls will sequence the fans and their speeds for controlling the diesel generator area temperature within the specified limits. When the diesel generator is shut down, the ventilation system can be manually activated if necessary to provide cooling for maintenance or testing access. A low diesel generator area temperature setpoint will shut down all fans in order to limit the minimum diesel generator area temperature to 40*F and prevent freezing. Unit heaters will be installed to hold the diesel generator area temperature above 40*F. I i A missile barrier is provided over each air intake and exhaust louver to prevent the penetration of a /] V missile into either diesel generator area. Intake and exhaust ducts are protected by appropriate security barriers. i i M idee &,r Meteriel. Ausnery Sysnoms Page 9.417
?
1 l Syst:m 80+ Design ControlDocument The area adjacent to the diesel generator areas is the nuclear annex which is maintained under slightly negative pressure with respect to the diesel generator areas. 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation Each Diesel Building Ventilation System automatically maintains a suitable environment in each diesel generator area under all operating conditions. Each Diesel Building Ventilation System has sufficient croling capacity to maintain the diesel generator area at 122*F or below with the diesel operating at rated load and with ambient outside design air temperature as shown in Table 2.0-1. Diesel generator space heaters are cycled as necessary to maintain a minimum temperature of 40'F for freeze prevention. The diesel generator space heaters are electric space heaters carrying an electric current through a resistance coil with a fan blowing air over the coil. They are wired in such a way that the coil is de-energized when the fan is not running. Their location is carefully selected to avoid potential fire hazards. Upon failure af the diesel generator space heater to maintain the diesel generator area temperature above 40*F. the associated diesel generator is started administratively to provide a substitute safety-related source of heat. IIcat losses from equipment are conservatively estimated based on calculations and operating experience. A single failure will not prevent the Diesel Building Ventilation System from performing the intended heat removal function. Each ventilation exhaust fan is powered by a Class IE electrical system capable of being fed from the associated diesel generator. Safety-related components of the Diesel Building Ventilation System and diesel generator areas housing the system are designed to Seismic Category I requirements and will remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. Two diesel generator ventilation exhaust fans are located in each of the diesel generator areas. Each penetration into the diesel generator areas is provided with protection from external missiles. No high or moderate energy piping is located in the vicinity of the ventilation equipment or controls. The fresh air intake for each of the Diesel Building Ventilation Systems is located 20 feet above grade to minimize the intake of dust into the diesel generator areas. All exposed diesel generator area interior surfaces are painted to aid in dust control. 9.4.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Performance characteristics of the Diesel Building Ventilation System are verified through the following qualification testing of safety-related components:
- One of each set of diesel generator ventilation supply fans and diesel generator ventilation exhaust fans is tested in accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristic performance curves.
Safety-related electrical components, switchovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter coincident to testing of the diesels. All safety-related components in the DBV s are designed to permit in-service inspection. Apyweved Design Matenal. Ausmary Systems Page 9.4-18
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l System 80+ Deslan controlDocumart i [ i 9.4.4.5 Instrinne=tation Application ! ( Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to permit verification of their operation ~
- Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room.
Indication of damper posi tions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Spee temperature indication is provided and high and low temperature alarms are provided in the control : Tcom. , 9.4.5 Subsphere Budding Ventilation System , 9.4.5.1 Design Basis i The Subsphere Building Ventilation System consists of a general supply and exhaust ventilation system that performs heat removal and air exchange functions. The ventilation system is supplemented by j t individual cooling units and ventilation fans that serve essential mechanical equipment areas. The Subsphere Building Ventilation System serves all areas of the Subsphere.
'the safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling systems are designed to maintain the space i i
temperatures below 100*F. At least one train of essertial mechanical equipment rooms is maintained ; below 100*F assuming a single failure of an active component concurrent with a loss of offsite power. ; Exhaust fans are powered from the diesel generators. The safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling systems perform the required safety function following a safe shutdown earthquake, and are able to withstand the effects of appropriate natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes (GDC 2). } The safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling systems are protected from the effects of internally generated missiles, pipe break effects, and water spray (GDC 4). l 4 The Subsphere Building safety related HVAC System is designed to limit the offsite and control room dose following a LOCA or DBA within the requirements of 10 CFR 100 and Standard Review Plan 1 Section 6.4 respectively. Radiological consequences are discussed in Section 15. The Subsphere Building Ventilation Systems are separated according to Divisions with each 100% exhaust system containing a filter train consisting of a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber, post filter (HEPA), along with ducts and valves, related instrumentation and two 100% fans as shown in Figure 9.4-5. The safety-related mechanical room cooling units are shown in Figure 9.4-4. The nuclear annex, fuel building, and reactor building subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to atmosphere. Anpowed Doetyr nenannien Aanneer sposome reges.4 rs
System 80+ Design C'ntrol Document 9.4.5.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
- The Safety-related eouipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4 3.
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Cooling coils in the safety-related cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section 111, Class 3.
- liigh-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."
- Carbon filter media, Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Environmental Sciences.
- Carbon adsorbers credited with more than 70% efficiency in 10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix I analyses will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
- The following Regulatory Guides have special significance to the Subsphere:
Reg. Guide Title 1.29 Testing of Nuclear Air Treatment Systems ASME N510 1.52 Design Testing and Maintenance for Post Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.140 Design, Maintenance and Testing Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Powered Plants. 1 9.4.5.2 Systcm Description l l The Subsphere Building Ventilation System is shown in Figure 9.4-5 and consists of the following:
- A supply air system complete with air-handling unit, two 100% fans, dampers and associated O,
ductwork for each division. Appresed Design Material- Auxnary Systems Page 9.4-20 l I
l i Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument e An exhaust air system rated for higher capacity than the supply air system, complete with full u filter train, two 100% exhaust fans and associated ductwork for each division. e Safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling units. The safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling units consist of a cooling coil with recirculation fan and dampers to remove heat generated within the space. A recirculation cooling unit is provided in addition to a once-through ventilation system because the served areas are potentially contaminated. Applicable safeguard component areas include the safety injection pump rooms, shutdown cooling pump rooms, containment spray pump rooms, fuel pool heat-exchanger rooms, motor-driven and steam <iriven emergency feed water pump rooms, shutdown cooling heat-exchanger rooms, containment spny heat- , exchanger rooms, shutdown cooling heat-exchanger rooms, penetration rooms, and associated piping and valve galleries. 9.4.5.2.1 Component Description The safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling units consist of chilled water cooling coil, direct-drive centrifugal recirculation fan, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. The chilled water coils are served from the essential chilled water system. The safety-related mechanical equipment room ventilation units contain intake filters, direct-drive centrifugal supply and exhaust fans, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. There > are heating and cooling coils to temper the outside air as required. 9.4.5.2.2 System Operation The Subsphere Building Ventilation System is composed of two divisionally separate, fully redundant ventilation systems each capable of being provided outside air by one 100% capacity supply unit and two 100% capacity supply fans per division. The supply air is filtered and then conditioned as needed by the heaters and cooling coils. There are two 100% capacity exhaust fans provided per division. Air exhausted is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct upstream of the exhaust filter train. The exhaust air is continuously processed through one 100% exhaust filter train complete with particulate filters and carbon adsorbers prior to discharge into the atmosphere. Additional monitoring of the exhaust air is provided in the unit vent. Supply and exhaust fans are electrically interlocked such that the building will always remain under a slight negative pressure to direct all releases through the exhaust filter train. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, the ventilation equipment will continue to operate normally as long as offsite power is available. On LOOP, the exhaust fans will be powered from the Class 1E diesel generators. Normal operation of the safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling and ventilation units is as required to maintain space temperatures. The cooling systems will operate based on heat load as indicated by room temperature. In the event of a LOCA or DBA, all units are automatically staned and will operate throughout the event. 9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation . The safety-related mechanical equipmew room cooling systems consist of two completely redundant,
/Q independent full-capacity systems. Division I cooling system serves Division I essential mechanical
(/ equipment rooms, and Division Il cooling system serves Division Il essential mechanical equipment Anarewed Deeign neeenriel Aundliary Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-21
oesign CrntrolDocument Syntemj10 + rooms. Each train is powered from independent, Class IE power sources. (Units with chilled water cooling coils are headered on separate Essential Chilled Water Cooling Systems.) Equipment capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. Failure of one train may cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of essential mechanical components is provided. All safety-related components of the mechanical equipment room cooling systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, and will remain functional following a design basis earthquake. Intake and exhaust structures are protected from wind-generated or tornado-generated missiles. The ductwork from the building exit up to and including the isolation damper are qualified for the tornado differential pressure. Redundant components of the safety-related mechanical equipment room cooling systems are physically separated and protected from internally generated missiles. When subjected to pipe break effects, the components are not required to operate because the served mechanical equipment is located in the same space as the cooling components. Therefore, a pipe break in the same mechanical safety train is the only possible means of affecimg the cooling system. The Subsphere Buildmg essential HVAC exhaust filter trains are shown in Figure 9.4-5. The HEPA filters are designed to html the offsite dose within the requirements of 10 CFR 100. The dose analysis
- for post accident releases from the subsphere only takes credit for the HEPA filters in the filter train.
No credit is taken for the carbon adsorbers. l A differential pressure indicator controller located across the carbon adsorber modulates a damper downstream of the filter train to maintain a constant system resistance as the filters load up. This j arrangement assures a constant system flow. High and low differential pressure alarms provide indication of any abnormality in flow rates. l All safety-related components in the subsphere ventilation system are designed to permit inservice inspection. l Fresh air intakes are located in the control building duct shaft and are protected against adverse environmental conditions high winds, rain, snow, ice, etc. The fresh air intakes for the Subsphere Building Ventilation System are located at least 30 feet above grade elevation to minimize intake of dust into the building. The fresh air intakes are provided with tornado dampers. 9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Performance characteristics of the Subsphere Building Ventilation System will be verified through qualification testing of components as follows: e The safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- One of each type of safety-related cooling fan will also be tested in accordance with AMCA.
- Coils are rated in accordance with ARI standards. Coils associated u ith the safety-related cooling units are tested in accordance with ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
Approved Desigru Material- Auxiliary Systems Page 9.4-22
S Design ControlDocument f tem 80 + i !
- HEPA filters are manufactured and tested accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. HEPA filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter to verify filter integrity.
- Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA.
Initial functional testing of the Subsphere Building Ventilation System will verify fan flow rates, cooling water flow distribution, and operation of interlocks and controls. The safety-related recirculation systems will be tested by initiating the system. Fan performance, proper cooling water flow, cooling coil performance, and system response time will be tested initially and periodically during the plant operating life. 9.4.5.5 Instrumentation Application Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to permit verification of their operation. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided locally at the filter train. Q Qj Temperature indication for the essential mechanical equipment rocms is provided in the control room. Table 9.4-3A lists the minimum instrumentation provided to the ESF filter trains. The following data shall be available to determine system performance:
- Entering and leaving air temperature for the supply ventilation unit.
- Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units.
- Air flow rates for the supply and exhaust units.
- Chilled water flow rates to supply ventilation units.
9.4.6 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System 9.4.6.1 Design Basis The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is designed to maintain acceptable temperature limits inside containment to ensure proper operation of equipment and controls during normal plant operation, normal shutdown and for personnel access during inspection, testing, and maintenance. It is comprised of the following subsystems as shown on Figure 9.4-6.
- The containment recirculation cooling subsystem functions during normal plant operation to maintain a suitable ambient temperature for equipment located within the containment. This
(
) system also operates during a loss of offsite power.
Apprmd Design Atatorial AuxiGary Systems Page 9.4 23
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- The control element drive mechanism (CEDM) cooling subsystem functions during normal plant operation to maintain a suitable air temperature around the rod drive mechanisms.
- The containment air cleanup subsystem operates before and during personnel entries to reduce airborne radioactivity.
- The cavity cooling subsystem functions to control the temperature of the concrete surrounding the reactor within acceptable limits.
- The high purge supply operates before and during personnel entries to reduce airborne radioactivity.
- The low purge is a pressure relief system used to relieve containment pressure during start-up or shutdown. The IRWST purge supply and exhaust is normally closed. It is opened only for personnel access.
- The containment high volume purge mitigates the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident inside containment. Dose at site boundary is well within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100.
The containment high volume purge system is not an Engineered-Safety-Feature system. During a postulated fuel handling accident, the HEPA filtration is credited with filtration of the release, but no credit is taken for release reduction resulting from contaimnent isolation. Similarly, following a Control Element Ejection Accident, credit is taken for the HEPA filters in the exhaust ductwork of the containment low volume purge. No credit is taken for the carbon adsorbers in either of the containment exhaust paths. The Containment Purge System will be designed to comply with NRC Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4, " Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations." The containment recirculation cooling subsystem is designed to maintain the average containment air temperature between 60*F and 110*F during normal plant operation with three of four cooling units operating and one in standby, The containment cooling subsystem includes capacity to remove the heat loads from RCS insulation tabulated in Table 9.4-2 and the heat loads from the NSSS support structures tabulated in Table 9.4-4. The CEDM cooling system is designed to limit the normal air temperature exiting the CEDM shroud to approximately 170*F during normal operation with one cooling unit operating. The containment air cleanup unit is designed to reduce the containment airborne concentrations to approximately seven maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) to permit personnel access. The containment cleanup systems are designed to meet the requirements of ANSI /ANS-56.6. The Reactor and pressurizer compartment cooling fans, in conjunction with the containment recirculation cooling system, maintains the average compartment temperatures at or below 130*F. 9.4.6.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: AMwwwwd Design Material- Aunaiary Systems Page 9.4-24
Sy' tem 80+ Design controlDocument
.
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
- The safety-related HEPA filters and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI). Cooling coils in the safety-related cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
- High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21 " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."
- Carbon filter media, Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Environmental Science.
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's
- Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
p
- Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Ventilation Systems, ANSI /ANS-56.6,1986.
t i v.
- Carbon adsorbers credited with more than 70% efficiency in 10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix I analyses will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
9.4.6.2 System Description The containment recirculation cooling system consists of four large cooling units, each with cooling coils and recirculation fan for heat removal. The system provides continuous air recirculation and cooling for , all major areas inside containment. Heat energy is transferred to a non-safety related leg of the chilled ! I water system through chilled water cooling coils located in the recirculation cooling units. The cooled air is delivered to the lower floors of the containment by the containment recirculation fans. Funher i distribution of air to the various compartments is accomplished with individual distribution fans. The air absorbs heat as it rises through the companments, and is retumed to the cooling units to complete the recirculation cycle. Distnbution fans include the following: )
- Pressurizer compartment cooling fans Redundant fans are provided for the pressurizer companment to mairitain compartment temperatures within design limits. The fans draw in cool air discharged from the containment ;
recirculation cooling units, and deliver it to the pressurizer companment. As the air picks up ! heat from the components and hot surfaces, a natural stack effect is created that assists the circulation provided by the distribution fans. ; A U j i opew o w u. maw- a=*.ey sysums reuesus l I
System 80 + Design C'ntrolDocument e Reactor compartment cavity cooling fans Redundant fans are provided for the reactor compartment to maintain the compartment temperature within design limits. The fans draw in cool air discharged from the containment recirculation units, and deliver it to the compartment beneath the reactor vessel. The air is forced up through the annulus space between the vessel insulation and the primary shield wall. A portion of the air flows across the reactor vessel supports and continues through the hot and cold leg penetrations in the primary shield wall. The remainder of the air flows out through openings in the seal ring near the reactor vessel flange. The CEDM cooling system consists of two 100% capacity cooling units each with cooling coils and fan for heat removal with a continuous flow of cool air across the drive mechanisms where it is released into the containment and returned over the bridge wall to be recirculated. The low purge has two 100% capacity supply fans and one 100% capacity exhaust fan with filters and heat coil to temper the supply air and a filter train for the exhaust. The high purge has two 100% capacity supply fans and one 100% capacity exhaust fan with filters, heating coil, cooling coil to temper the supply air and a filter train for the exhaust. Each of the high purge and low purge exhaust filtration trains consists of a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber, post filter (HEPA) along with ducts and valves, fan, and related instrumentation. The containment air cleanup system consists of two filtration units, each consisting of a prefilter, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber, post filter (HEPA), along with ducts and valves, related instrumentation, and centrifugal fan. The units circulate a portion of the containment atmosphere for cleanup prior to and during a personal entry into containment. They also serve to reduce airborne activity prior to making a routine atmospheric release of containment air. The containment recirculation cooling system consists of four 33% capacity recirculation cooling units, each connected to an associated recirculation fan. The CEDM cooling system consists of two 100% capacity cooling units, each with associated 100% capacity fan. The containment air cleanup systems each have one third capacity and the high purge has one third capacity to give a total of 100% capacity required by ANSI /ANS-56.6. The cavity cooling subsystem consists of two 100% capacity supply fans. 9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System provides adequate cap? city to assure that proper temperature levels are maintained in the containment under operating conditions. Sufficient redundancy is included to assure proper operation of the system with one active component out of service. Although not required, this system operates to maintain the containment temperature within acceptable limits during a loss of offsite power. Approved Design Meterial AumWary Systems Page 9.4 26
System 80+ Design ControlDocument ex The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is not an Engineered Safety Feature. Except as noted, ( k') no credit has been taken for the operation of any subsystem or component in analyzing the consequences of design basis accidents. The high volume purge system HEPA filters are credited with filtration of the release from a postulated fuel handling accident, as are the low volume purge system HEPA filters following a Control Element Ejection Accident. No credit is taken for the carbon adsorbers in either of the containment purge exhaust paths. The containment purge HEPA filters are designed to meet the intent of the Regulatory Guide 1.52 and the ductwork from the containment penetration to the filter train is Seismic Category I. Each Containment Purge Ventilation System supply and exhaust penetration through the containment vessel is equipped with two normally closed isolation valves, each connected to separate control trains. A faih're in one train will not prevent the remaining isolation valve from providing the required isolation capability. Containment purge isolation valve closure will not be prevented by debris which could become entrained in the escaping air and steam. The isolation valves and cc Jnment penetrations are the only portions of the Containment Purge Ventilation System that are engir . d safety features. Redundant containment isolation valves are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2. The valves are leak-tested periodically to verify acceptability of seat leakage. Pneumatically operated valves are designed to fail closed in the event of loss of power or loss of instrument air. Although the high volume containment purge system containment isolation valves (supply and exhaust) are required by Technical Specifications to be closed when the Reactor Coolant System exceeds hot p shutdown conditions, a CIAS is provided to them to further assure closure. High volume containment Q purge system containment isolation valves (supply and exhaust) isolate upon detection of high exhaust effluent radiation levels by a dedicated radiation monitor located in the high volume containment purge system exhaust ducting. These containment isolation valves also isolate upon receiving a High Humidity Actuation Signal (HHAS). Pneumatically operated low volume containment purge system containment isolation valves (supply and exhaust) isolate on a CIAS and upon detection of high radiation by a dedicated radiation monitor located in the low volume containment purge system exhaust ducting. These containment isolation valves also isolate upon receiving a High Humidity Actuation Signal (HHAS). The containment purge exhaust HEPA filters are designed to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Ductwork from the containment penetration to the filter train is Seismic Category I, low-leakage design. The containment purge exhaust system is isolated on high radiation or high relative humidity signals. Relative humidity is controlled and monitored upstream of the containment purge exhaust filter trains. The air intakes are protected against tornado-generated external missiles. The air intakes are located near columns W and 15 on Figure 1.2-10A showing floor plan at EL.170 + 0. The piant grade elevation is 91 + 9. The low purge and high purge systems are designed to maintain the containment under slight negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere.
,y I )
.)
Approwd Design Materie!. Auxiniary Systems Page 9.4-27
Sy~ tem 80+ Design controlDocument 9.4.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Performance characteristics of the containment ventilation system are verified through qualification testing of safety-related components as follows:
- One of four containment recirculation fans is tested in accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristics performance curves. All other fans are rated in accordance with AMCA standards.
- Ileating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or hydrostatically, to ensure integrity. Coils are rated in accordance with ARI standards.
- The safety-related HEPA filters and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-5.
- Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA.
Major components located outside containment are accessible during normal plant operation for inspection, maintenance, and periodic testing. Components located inside containment are accessible during plant shutdown. Operational testing will be performed prior to initial startup. 9.4.6.5 Instrumentation Application Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to pennit verification of their operation. Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. Indication of pressure drop across all filters is provided locally at the filter train, liigh vibration alarms are provided for all fans located inside containment. Temperature is indicated for various representative areas inside containment. The following data shall be available to detennine system performance:
- Entering and leaving air temperature for the containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
- Entering and leaving chilled water temperature at containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units supply units.
- Air flow rates for containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
- Chilled water flow rates to the containment recirculacion cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
Approved Design Materant. Aushery Systems Page 9.4-28
System 80+ Design controt Document (% 9.4.7 Turbine Building Ventilation System 9.4.7.1 Design Basis The Turbine Building Ventilation System is designed to provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment and personnel access as required for inspection, testing, and maintenance. The Turbine Building Ventilation System removes the heat dissipated by equipment, piping, lighting, and solar heat gain. Ambient temperature limits within the turbine building are maximum 110*F and minimum 40*F. The design outside air temperature for the Turbine Building HVAC System will be based on the 5% exceedance air temperature values. Treatment and monitoring of exhaust air is not provided since the turbine building normally has no potentially contaminated areas. This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 5, and 60. 9.4.7.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of tb- ules and standards listed below: Q Q
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.7.2 System Description The Turbine Building Ventilation System is composed of ventilating fans, intake dampers, and exhaust fans, and ductwork as required. Outside air is drawn into the turbine building through outside air intake louvers located in the turbine building outside walls at individual floors and exhausted through roof mounted exhausters. Where required, recirculation fans are provided to provide mixing of the air to create a more uniform temperature in the building. Information pertaining to the radiation monitoring capabilities is contained Q V in Section 11.5. Roof mounted heat vents which vent directly to the atmosphere are provided for protection of the structure in case of fire. Approvar w menww Ammuy synnees roue s.4-2s
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation - The Turbine Building Ventilation System maintains a suitable environment in each turbine building during normal plant operation. This system is not an Engineered Safety Feature and no credit is taken for its operation during an accident. 9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Turbine Building Ventilation System is in continuous operation during normal plant operation and is accessible for routine inspection. System components and controls are tested during preoperational testing and thereafter system equipment operability is verified periodically. 9.4.7.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system from local control panels. Instrumentation is also provided to permit verificatica that the system is operating satisfactorily. Indication of the fan operating status is provided on the ',ocal control panel. Failure of a running fan is alarmed locally. 9.4.8 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System 9.4.8.I Design Basis The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is designed to provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment, and personnel access for inspection, testing, and maintenance. Ambient temperature limit is 125'F within the station service water pump structure. All safety-related fans, dampers, ductwork and supports, are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake. Safety-related electrical components required for ventilation of the building during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power. The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is located completely within a Seismic Category I structure and all safety-related components are fully protected from tornado missile damage. The location of the station service water pump structure ventilation system intakes minimize the ingress of dust. All electrical cabinets located in the station service water pump structure are provided with features (e.g., cabinet gaskets) to prevent dust ingress. This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2,4,5,17, and 60. 9.4.8.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: Asyvowd Desipre atatorial. Auxniary Systems Page 9.4-30
. l System 80+ Deslan ControlDocument j i
*/ Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufactureis' Association -
(NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). j
-r
~
- Safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with j ASME/ ANSI AG-1. ;
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
e' Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA. i i 9A.8.1.2 Interface Requirunents , The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is an out of scope item which shall be i j provided by the applicant. The licensee shall verify that the following interface requirements are met to j ensure adequacy with the System 80+ Standard Design: i
~
e' The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System shall be designed as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I, with Class 1E power supplied to safety-related components. ;
/~ e The Station' Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System shall remain functional during or ,
after any of the following events: i
- 1. Natural phenomera, including SSE, floods, tornados, and hurricanes. l
^
- 2. Externally and intertully generated missiles.
i
- 3. Failure of any single safety-related active component.
4 4. Failure of non-safety related portion of the system. ; e The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System design shall permit inservice testing and inspection of components important to safety.
- The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System fresh air intakes shall be located a minimum of 20 feet above grade and away from plant discharges to minimize contaminants entering the system.
- The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System shall provide a suitable environment ensuring the safety and comfort of plant personnel and operability of plant equipment during normal operating and postulated design basis accident conditions. .
- The Station Service Water Pump Stmeture Ventilation System shall be divisionally separated with physical barriers.
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System 80+ Design control Document
- The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System shall be controlled from the main control room. Instrumentation and controls shall be provided in accordance with ANSI /ANS 59.2 and be designed such that the following operational criteria are met:
- 1. Fans shall be automatically started whenever a pump associated with that panicular division is started.
- 2. Fans shall always be stopped manually.
- 3. A manual start shall be provided for fans for use during testing and maintenance.
- If required by the historical site weather conditions, non. safety heating shall be provided to maintain the temperature within the station service water pump structure greater than 40*F.
9.4.8.2 System Description ((The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System consists of two 100% capacity essential vane-axial supply fans with associated dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems per pump compartment. A non-safety related vane-axial fan is provided to supply ventilation air to the pool area below the pumps when maintenance or inspection is performed in this area. The ventilation fans are automatically activated in response to temperature. A low temperature control will deactivate the fans when the temperature is below 40'F. Each safety-related fan is provided with a check damper on the fan discharge to prevent backflow through the fan on standby.))! 9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is an engineered safety feature. The two 100% capacity fans in each pump compartment are powered from separate trains of the onsite power system. This assures the integrity and availability of the ventilation system in the event of a loss of offsite power or any single active failure. 9.4.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System operates as required to limit temperature in the pump structure and is accessible for periodic inspection. Safety-related electrical components, switchcovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests. 9.4.8.5 Instrumentation Application (( Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily. Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. O ' Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. ANuowdDesign hinterW- Ausnery Systerns Page 9.4-32
~
System 80+l oesten contrat Document
, ' Space temperature indication for the pump structee is provided in the control room along with alarm ;
' indication of high and low temperatures.))! ;
~ 9.4.9 e Nuclear Annes Ventilation System i -9.4.9.1 Design Basis l 4 The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System consists of a general supply and exhaust ventilation system that performs heat removal and air exchange functions. The ventilation system is supple:nented by individual ~ , cooling units and ventilation fans of the Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) and Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) discussed in Section 9.2.9 that serve essential and non-essential' mechanical equipment areas. The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System serves all areas of the Nuclear Annex Building. The Nuclear Annex structure is designed to Seismic Category I standards as noted in Table 3.2-1. ; The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems are designed to maintain the space
. temperatures below 100*F at times when the served equipment must operate. At least one train of essential mechanical equipment rooms is maintained below 100*F assuming a single failure of an active component concurrent with a loss of offsite power.
The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems perform the required safety function following a safe shutdown earthquake, and are able to withstand the effects of appropriate natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes (GDC 2). , Q k ,,) The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems are protected from the effects of internally generated missiles, pipe break effects, and water spray (GDC 4). The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System is designed to provide ventilation and heat removal for personnel l access to non-essential areas of the building. The design temperature range for the non-essential building areas is 60*F to 100*F. 1 The Nuclear Annex building is maintained at a slight negative pressure with respect to the environment to assure that all potentially radioactive releases are monitored prior to atmospheric discharge. As an ) ALARA consideration, design air flow patterns within the building are generally from clean areas to potentially contaminated areas. 9.4.9.1.1 Codes and Standartis j Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below. ; l
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards. l
- Fan ndors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
J
- The non-safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested .
' as outlined in Table 9.4-6.
l , ,~I Conceptual Design infonnation; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. Anonemed Deakn neennd . Aunnery Spetens Page9 M
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
- Cooling coils in the safety-related ECWS cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
8 High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ERDA-76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."
- Carbon filter media, Nuclear Grade as defined by the Institute for Environmental Sciences.
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.9.2 System Description The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System, shown in Figure 9.4-8, consists of a supply air unit with two supply fans, prefilter, cooling and heating coils and dampers for each division. An exhaust air unit with larger capacity, a full filter train and two exhaust fans with dampers for Division I, and two filter trains with two exhaust fans per train for Division II. Each filter train consists of a moisture eliminator, prefilter, electric heater, absolute (HEPA) filter, carbon adsorber, post filter (HEPA) along with ducts and valves and related instrumentation. The activated carbon depth of the carbon adsorber is 2 inches minimum. The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling units consist of a cooling coil with recirculation fan and dampers to remove heat generated within the space. A recirculation cooling unit is provided in addition to a once-through ventilation system. Applicable areas include CCWS pump rooms, and essential chilled water system pump and chiller rooms. The safety-related mechanical equipment ECWS cooling units are 100% capacity redundant separated by Division boundaries for positive fire, flood and smoke control. Non-safety related equipment in the Nuclear Annex in areas served by non-safety related HVAC includes:
- Normal Chillers and Pumps
- CVCS Tanks and Pumps
- Hot Machine and Hot Tool Rooms
- Sample Rooms
- Instrument Air Rooms 9.4.9.2.1 Component Description The Nuclear Annex Building ventilation supply systems consist of one 100% capacity supply unit and two 100% capacity supply fans per division. Supply units contain filters, heating coils, and chilled water cooling coils. Cooling coils are served from the Non-essential Chilled Water System. The supply fans are large, direct-drive centrifugal type and inlet isolation dampers.
Approwd Design Atatorial Auxnary Systems Page 9.4-34
t . System 80+ oesian control Document , ( The Nuclear -Annex Building ventilation exhaust systems consist of one 100% capacity particulate filtration exhaust unit and two 100% capacity exhaust fans for Division 1, and two 50% capacity i particulate filtration exhaust units and two exhaust fans per exhaust unit for Division 2. i The exhaust fans are large direct-drive centrifugal type with outlet isolation dampers. Exhaust fans ;
' discharge to the unit vent. l' t
The safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling units consist of chilled water cooling coil, j direct-drive centrifugal recirculation fan, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. The j chilled water coils are served from the essential chilled water system. The essential mechanical equipment room ECWS ventilation units contain intake filters, direct-drive -l centrifugal supply and exhaust fans, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. There [ are heating and cooling coils to temper the outside air as required.- 9.4.9.2.2- System Operation i During normal operation of the ventilation system, outside air is supplied by one 100% capacity supply unit and one of two 100% capacity, redundant supply fans per division. The supply air is filtered and j conditioned as needed by the heaters and cooling coils, and the exhaust air is bypassed around the exhaust filter train. There are two exhaust fans provided per filter train. The exhaust air is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct upstream of the exhaust filter train. Upon detection of radioactivity, the exhaust air is processed through one 100% capacity, exhaust filter ! train for Division 1 or two 50% capacity exhaust filter trains for Division 2 complete with particulate ! filters and carbon adsorbers prior to discharge into the atmosphere. Additional monitoring of the exhaust l air is provided in the unit vent. Supply and exhaust fans are electrically interlocked such that the ; building will always remain under a slight negative pressure. The nuclear annex, fuel building, and ;
- reactor building subsphere are maintained under negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The ;
leakage taking place from one of these areas to the other is filtered before it is released to atmosphere. ; In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, the general ventilation equipment will continue to operate ; normally, assuming off-site power is still available. Ducts to areas with essential cooling units will be isolated to enable proper operation of the emergency equipment. l 1 Normal operation of the safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling ed ventilation units is with the equipment operating as required to maintain space temperatures. The cooling systems will operate based on heat load as indicated by room temperature. In the event of a LOCA or DBA, all units are started with the equipment being served, and will operate t at full capacity throughout the event. j 9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation ). The safety related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems consist of two completely redundant, independent full-capacity systems. Division i ECWS cooling system serves Division I i essential mechanical equipment rooms, and Division 11 ECWS cooling system serves Division Il essential mechanical equipment rooms. Each train is powered from independent, Class IE power sources. (Units with chilled water cooling coils are headered on separate safety-related chilled water cooling systems.) l
, Equipment capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and \ conservative assumpticas of adjacent area temperatures. Failure of one train may cause subsequent loss t
I w Dee6n nonennno Aumaney spoenme roer s.ns ; t i
1 Sy-tem 80+ Design ControlDocument of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of ECWS srfety-related mechanical components is provided. All safety-related components of the mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systems are designe1 l as Seismic Category I equipment, and will remain functional following a design basis earthquake. Intak e i and exhaust structures are protected from wind-generated or tornado-generated missiles. The fresh a r l intakes for the Nuclear Annex Ventilation System are located at least 30 feet above grade elevatior> > o minimize intake of dust into the building. Redundant components of the safety-related mechanical equipment room ECWS cooling systent are physically separated and protected from intermlly generated missiles. When subjected to pipe break effects, the components are not required to operate because the served mechanical equipment is located in the same space as the cooling components. Therefore, a pipe break in the same mechanical safety train is the only possible means of affecting the cooling system. 9.4.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements F t:nnance characteristics of the Nuclear Annex Building Ventilation System will be verified through qualif. cation testing of components as follows:
- The non-safety-related equipment, fans, dampers, coils and ductwork will be designed and tested as outlined in Table 9.4-6.
- One of each type of safety-related ECWS cooling fan will also be tested in accordance with AMCA.
- Coils are rated in accordance with ARJ standards. Coils associated with the safety-related ECWS cooling units are tested in accordance with ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3.
- HEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to installation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.140. HEPA filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter to verify filter integrity.
- Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA.
Initial functional testing of the Nuclear Annex Building Ventilation System will verify fan flow rates, cooling water flow distribution, and operation of interlocks and controls. The safety-rehted recirculation systems will be tested by initiating the system. Fan performance, proper cooling wster flow, cooling coil performance, and system response time will be tested initially and periodically during the plant operating life. The system wtl be designed to provide for in-service inspection of safety-related ECWS components. 9.4.9.5 Instnunentation Application Fan status indication is provided locally and in the control room to permit verification of their operation. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Approved Design Material. Aundary Systems Page 9.4-36
l l System 80+ oesign controlDocument Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. ( Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided locally. 1 Temperature indication for the essential mechanical equipment rooms is provided in the control room. l The following data shall be available to determine system performance: j
- Entering and leaving air temperature for the supply ventilation unit.
- Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units.
- Air flow rates for the supply and exhaust units.
- Chilled water flow rates to supply ventilation units.
9.4.10 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems 9.4.10.1 Design Basis The Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems are designed to maintain - a suitable environment for the operation, maintenance, and testing of equipment, and to maintain a suitable access and working environment for personnel. Each system consists of an exhaust fan, dampers, and unit heaters (as shown on Figure 9.4-10 ), that perform air exchange and heating functions. The CCW lieat Exchanger Structure (s) ventilation systems are located completely within Seismic i Category I structures, and all components (fans, dampers, ductwork) are fully protected from floods and
. tornado missile damage and interaction with other non-seismic systems. The fans, dampers, unit heaters, ductwork and supports are designed as Seismic Category 11 and Safety Class NNS. The outside air intake and exhaust openings are protected by missile shield walls and bird screens, and are provided with physical barriers in accordance with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 5.65. Air intakes are located a minimum of 20 feet above grade and away from plant discharges to minimize the ingress of dust and contaminants mio the system. These design features provide a high degree of reliability, although, the ventilation system is not required for proper operation of the CCW system.
Two CCW }{ eat Exchanger Structures ventilation systems are provided, one for each CCW heat exchanger divisional structure. There are no interconnections between the two ventilation systems. 9.4.10.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: i
- Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
- Fan motors conform to applicable standard of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
f, *hi V e Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
%2 Deskn A0esenial Ausniery 5ystems Page 9.4-37
Design controlDocument QIgn 80+
- Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.10.2 System Description Each of the two Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems consists of one vane-axial exhaust fan, with associated dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems. The ventilation fans operate as required to ventilate and maintain temperature. Electric resistance unit heaters automatically activate to maintain ambient temperature above 40*F. 9.4.10.2.1 Component Description Each of the two CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) ventilation systems consists of an exhaust fan, and motor operated intake and exhaust dampers. Unit heaters mounted on the walls consist of thermostatically controlled electric resistance heating coils and fans to heat and circulate the air. 9.4.10.2.2 System Operation During operation of the ventilation systems, outside air is drawn in through the intake damper and exhausted by fans to the outside. Air is drawn into the upper and lower floors of the structure, then collected by the exhaust ductwork and discharged to the outdoors. The unit heaters are sized to maintain minimum structure environmental conditions, taking into account transmission losses and ventilation air flow rates. 9.4.10.3 Safety Evaluation The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems are Safety Class NNS, and are not required to operate for the CCW system to perform its safety function. The CCW system has the potential to become radioactively contaminated, but the fluid is monitored by radiation detectors and is contained within the piping system, so no provisions are made by the ventilation system to contain the release of radioactive materials in the CCW Heat Exchanger Stmeture. 9.4.10.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems operate as required to limit temperature in the heat exchanger structure and are accessible for periodic inspection. O Approved Design Material AuxKary Systems Page 9.4-38
u as-.-- . . a_. - - n aa x a - + - - . ..a+ 2 System 80+ oestan controlDocument 4 9.4.10.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided for automatic os miual operation of the system, from local er iemote locations, and permits verification that the system is operating satisfactorily. I Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. Space temperature indication for the CCW heat exchanger structure is provided in the control room along with alarm indication of high and low temperature. 4 l v . l f i l i i l O
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-1 IIVAC System Design Parameters Operational l Flow Area or Mode Type IIcat Load Rate / Unit No, Units / Power Location System Btu /hr % Capacity Supply Equipment Air . Cool Water Normal Essential CD1 gpm Control Room X lleat/ Cool 300,000 6,000 70 2/100 460/120 Prefilter, cooling coil, fan, heat coil, humidifier Control Room X Filter - 6,000 - 2/100 460/120 Filter train and fan Control Room X Cool 36,000 900 7 2/100 460/120 Prefilter. Mech Area cooling coil and fan Control Room X Smoke - 10,000 - 1/100 460/120 Fan Fan Tech Sup Mech X Filter - 1,000 - 1/100 460/120 Filter train and fan Tech Sup Mech X Smoke - 10,000 - 1/100 460/120 Fan Fan Tech Sup X Heat / Cool 240,000 7,000 48 2/100 460/120 Prefilter, cooling coil, heat coil, fan Computer X Heat / Cool 240,000 7,000 48 '31I 9 460/120 Prefilter, cooling coil, heat coil, humidifier, fan Operatsn X 11 eat / Cool 120,000 3.500 24 1/100 460/120 Prefilter, Support Center cooling coil, heat coil, fan Break Rm X IIcat/ Cool 170,000 5,000 35 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, cooling coil, fan, elec heat Radiation X lleat/ Cool 200,000 6,000 40 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, Access Control cooling coil, fan, elec heat Shift Assembly X IIcat/ Cool 145,000 4,000 28 1/100 120/460 Prefilter,
& Offices cooling coil, fan, elec heat Central Alarm X Cool 110.000 3,200 22 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, Station and cooling coil.
Security fan 9 Approved Design Material- Aunmary Sy:twns Page 9.4-40
Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument i (3) f Table 9.4-1 IIVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Operational Flow Area or Mode Type licat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power 14 cation System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Btu /br CFM gpm Normal Essential Vital Inst. X Cool 300,000 10,000 70 2/100 120/460 Prefdter, Div I cooling coil,
& Equip. I fan,10 BHP Channel A Vital Inst. X Cool 300,000 10,000 70 2/100 120/460 Prefilter,
& Equip. H Div Il cooling coil, fan,10 BHP ChannelB Vital Inst. X Cool 300 000 10,000 70 2/100 120/460 Prefdter, Div i cooling coil,
& Equip. I fan,10 BHP Channel C Vital Inst. X Cool 300,000 10,000 70 2/100 120/460 Preftlter, Div H cooling coil,
& Equip. U fan,10 BHP Channel D Essential X Exhaust - 700 - 2/100 120/460 Fan,1 BHP Battery Rm. I Div 1 A&C Essentia! X Exhaust - 700 - 2/100 120/460 Fan,1 BHP ,
Battery Rm.11 Div H l B&D X Recirculatmg 250,000 3,000 45 1/100 Train A Cooling l / S1 Pump Room 120/460 coil, fan, A[7] AllU f 3 BHP, I filter S! Pump Room B X Recirculating 250,000 3,000 45 1/100 Train B Cooling AHU 120/460 coil, fan, l [10] 3 BHP, l filter i Essential X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, I Elec. Room AIIU Div i cocimg coil, Div. I Cha. A fan,3 BHP Essential X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, l Elec. Room AHU Div H cooling coil, Div I Cha. C fan,3 BHP Containment X Recirculatmg 180,000 4.500 40 1/100 Train A Cooling Spray AHU 120/460 coil, l Pump Room Div, fan,3 BHP,
! [6]
filter Containment X Recirculating 180,000 4,500 40 1/100 Train B Cooling Spray AHU 120/460 coil, Pump Room fan,3 BHP, l Div. H [11) filter Shutdown Cooling X Recirculating 180,000 4,000 30 1/100 Train C Cooling ! System Pump AHU 120/460 coil, , Room fan,3 BHP, l Div.1 [3] filter i Shutdown Coolms X Recirculatmg 180,000 4,000 30 1/100 Train D Cooling j ( () System Pump AHU 120/460 coil, fan,3 BHP, Room Div. Il [14] filter
]
Approveet Dessgru Motorial Auxnery Systems Page 9.4 41 i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-1 IIVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) h Operational Flow Area or Mode Type IIcat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment 14 cation Air Cool water Btu /hr CFM gpm Normal Essential SI X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 1/100 Train C Cooling Pump Room C AIIU 120/460 coil, fan,3 BHP, Div. I [2] filter SI X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 1/100 Train D Cooling Pump Room D AHU 120/460 coil, fan,3 BHP, Div. Il (15] filter Cont Spray X Recirculating 220.000 4,500 40 1/100 Train C Cooling AHU 120/460 coil, fleat X Div.1 [1] fan,3 BHP, filter Turb Emerg X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 1/100 Tsain C Cooling FDW Pump Div. I AIIU 120/460 coil, fan,3 BHP, [4] filter Mtr. Emerg. X Recirculating 220,000 4,500 40 1/100 Train A Cooling FDW Pump Div. I AHU 120/460 coil. fan,3 BHP, [5] filter Shutdown Cooling X Recirculating 170,000 4,000 30 1/100 Train A Cooling Heat X Div I [8] AliU 120/460 coil, fan,3 BHP, filter Shutdown Coolmg X Recirculating 170.000 4,000 30 1/100 Train B Cooling AIIU 120/460 coil, lleat X Div.11 [9] fan,3 BHP, filter Cont Spray X Recirculaung 220,000 4,500 40 1/100 Train D Cooling Ileat X Div. II AHU 120/460 coil, [16] fan,3 BHP, filter Mtr Emerg X Recirculating 220,000 4,500 40 1/100 Train B Cooling FDW Pump Div. AHU 120/460 coil, II{l2] fan,3 BHP, filter Turb Emerg X Recirculating 250,000 5,000 45 1/100 Train D Cooling FDW Pump Div. AIIU 120/460 coil. Il[13] fan,3 BHP filter Containment X Cooling 12 x 106 100,000 800 4/33 Normal Cooling 120/460 coil, 100 HP fan 9 Approved Designs Atatorial- AuxiGary Systems Page 9.4 42 1
t L 1 System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Operational Flow Area or Mode Type Heat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power Iecation System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Btu /hr CFM spm Normal Essential Contamrnent X High Purge 1,4 x 10 6 30,000 280 2/100 Normal Prefilter, Supply 120V HEPA, i 220/460 cooling coil, heat, 2 fans, 100 HP Containtnent X Low Purge 58,400 1,250 0 2/100 Normal Prefilter, Supply 120/460 HEPA, cooling coil, heat, 2 fans, 3 HP Containment X CEDM 3.07 x 100,000 614 2/100 Normal Cooling 106 460/120 coil, fan,100 HP Containment X Pressurizer Included 10,000 - 2/100 Normal Fan,5 HP Cooling in 460V ; Contain ment Normal Fan,10 HP O Containment X Reactor Cooling included in Contain 20,000 - 2/100 460V ment ; Containment X Containment - 30.000 - 2/100 Normal Filter train Clean-up 460V and fan, 75 BHP - Containment X High Purge - 30,000 - 1/100 Filter Normal Filter train Exhaust 1/100 Fan 460V and 100 HP, I fan Containment X Low Purge - 1,250 - 1/100 Filter Normal Filter train Exhaust 1/100 Fan 460V and 5 HP, I fan Subsphere X Heat / Cool - 11,000 - 2/100 120/460 Prefilter, Vent. Sup. I Fans 1IBHP cooling heat coil, fan Subsphere X Heat / Cool - 11,000 - 2/100 120/460 Prefilter, Vent. Sup.11 Fans 11 BHP cooling heat coil, fan Subsphere 1 X Exh. to - 13,200 - 2/100 120/460 Filter train. Vent Exh Unit Vent Fans 40 BHP Subsphere 11 X Exh to - 13,200 - 2/100 120/460 Filter train, Vent Exh Unit Vent Fans 40 BHP Fuel l'ool Cooling X Recirculating 150,000 3.200 - 1/100 Train D Cooling Pumproom & Heat AHU 120/460 coil, Exchanger Room fan,3 BHP, C' Div,11 [17] filter Anwownf Deelen niesenief Aunnlary Systems . Page 9.4 43
Syotem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-1 IIVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) h Operational Flow Area or Mode Type Ileat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power Location System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Normal Essential Btu /hr CFM gpm Fuel Pool Cooling X Recirculating 150,000 3,200 - 1/100 Train C Cooling Pumproom & Ileat AHU 120/460 coil, Exchanger Room fan,3 BHP, Div. ! [20] filter Penetration Room X Recirculating 90,000 2,000 18 2/100 Train C Cooling Div. I Cha. C AHU 120/460 coil, fan,1 BHP, [19] and [21] filter Penetration Room X Recirculating 90,000 2,000 18 2/100 Train D Cooling Div. H Cha. D AHU 120/460 coil, fan,1 BHP, [18] and [22] filter Penetration Room X Recirculating 90,000 2,000 18 2/100 Train A Pr-filter, Div. I Cha. A Al!U 120/460 cooling coil, fan,1 BHP [23] and [25] Penetration Room X Recirculating 90,000 2,000 18 2/100 Train B Prefilter. Div. H Cha. B AHU 120/460 cooling coil, fan,1 BHP [24) and [26] Essential X Recirculating 170.000 7,000 45 1/100 Train B Prefilter, Elec. Room AHU 120/460 cooling coil, Div. H Cha B fan,3 BHP Essential X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 1/100 Train D Prefilter, Elec. Room AHU 120/460 coolmg coil, Div. U Cha. D fan,3 BHP Div. I+H Ess. & X Smoke Purge - 15,000 - 2/100 120/460 Fan 7.5 HP Non-Ess El, Vit Fan Ins & Eq Rms Stairwells X Smoke Fan - 12.000 - 5/100 120/460 Fan. 5 HP Annulus X Exhaust - 18,000 - 2/100 120/460 Fan,63 BHP, filter train Fuel Bldg. X Supply 1.0x106 21,600 130 1/100 120/460 Fan,20 AHU BHP prefilter, heat coil, cool coil j Fuel Bldg. X Exhaust - 25,000 - 2/100 120/460 Fan,75 Filter Train BHP, filter j train l Non-Essential X Recirculating 200,000 6,000 40 2/100 120/460 Prefilter, Elec. Rm. AHU cooling coil. CEDM Control fan,5 BHP Elec. Rm. X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 2/100 120/460 Prefilter, . x El 91 + 9 AHU cooling coil, l fan,3 BHP Approved Desigre Material- Amu *niary Systems Page 9.444 l
4 Sy: tem 80+ oesign controloocument n V Table 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Operational Flow Area or Mode Type Heat Rate / Unit No. Unhs/ Power location System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Normal Essential Stu/hr CFM spm Elec. Rm. X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 2/200 120/460 Prefilter, xEl91+9 AHU cooling coil, fan. 3 BHP Elec. Rm. X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 2/100 120/460 Preftlter. - y El 91 +9 AHU cooling coil, fan,3 BHP Elec, Rm. X Recirculating 170,000 7,000 45 2/100 120/460 Prefilter, y El 91+9 AHU cooling coil, fan,3 BHP Control Bldg. X Exhaust - 3,000 - 1/100 120/460 Roof Exh. j Toile. Fan, I HP Non-Essential X Ventilate - 700 - 1/100 120/460 Fan,I HP Battery Rm. I Non Essential X Ventilate - 700 - 1/100 120/460 Fan, I HP Battery Rm.11 1 Diesel Rm. I X Ventilate - 166,000 - 2/50 460 Fan,120 HP Diesel Rm. Il X Ventilate - 166,000 - 2/50 460 Fan,120 i HP 1/100 (Unit) 120/460 Prefilter, Nuclear Annes X Cooling and 1.0x10$ 38,000 130 Supply Units - Il Ventilation 2/100 cooling coil, I (Fans) elec heat, ! fan 38 HP Battery Rm. I X Ventilate - 700 - 1/100 120/460 Fan,1 BHP Ess. Elec, Rm. Battery Rm. Il X Ventilate - 700 - 1/100 120/460 Fan,1 BHP Ess Elec. Rm. Hot Tool Crib X A/C and - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU and (El.115 + 6) Ventilate exhaust fan 8 Ilot Machine Shop X A/C and - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU and Ventilate exhaust fan flot Tool Crib I X A/C and """~ 7 - - 1/100 120/460 AHU and (El.146 + 0) Ventilate exhaust fan flot Tool Crib 11 X A/C and - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU and (El.146 +0) Ventilate exhaust fan Personnel Decon X Heat / Cool 110,% 0 3,200 22 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, Rm. (El.146+0) cooling coil, clec heat, fan Personnel Decon X Heat / Cool 85,000 2,400 17 1/100 120/460 Prefilter, Rm. (El.146+0) cooling coil, elec heat. fan Instrument X A/C - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU
~ Air Room i I
I I L .a: Design nesseniel- Ausnery Systems Pope 9.4-45
I System 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) h Operational Flow Area or Mode Type lleat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power IAcation System load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Btu /hr CFM gpm Normal Essential Instnament X A/C - - - 1/100 120/460 AIIU Air Room 11 Maintenance Work X A/C - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU Area 1 (El.50 + 0) Maintenance Work X A/C - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU Area 11 (El.50 + 0) Equip. Staging X Kecirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 AHU Area AHU (El. 146 + 0) RB Access Area I X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, AIIU cooling coil, (El 50 + 0) fan RB Access Area Il X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, AHU cooling coil, (El 50 + 0) tan RB Access Area I X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, AllU cooling coil, (El 70 + 0) fan RB Access Area Il X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, AHU cooling coil, (El 70 + 0) fan RB Access Area I X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, AHU cooling coil, (El 91 + 0) tan RB Access Area 11 X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120!460 Filter, AHU cooling coil, (El 91 + 0) fan RB Access Area 1 X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, (El 115 + 0) AHU cooling coil, fan RB Access Area Il X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, (El 115 + 0) AIIU cooling coil, fan
~
Nuclear Annex X Filters - 30,000 - 1/100 (Unit) 120/460 Filter train, Filter Units - 1 2/100 Fan, 80 HP (Fans) Nuclear Annex X Ventilating 1.0x10 6 24,000 130 1/100 (Unit) 120/460 Prefilter, Supply Units I and Cooling 2/100 elec heat, (Fans) Fan,24 HP Nuclear Annex X Filter - 24,000 - 2/50 (Unit) 120/460 Filter train, , Filter Units II - - - 4/100 Fan,72 HP (Fans) Approved Destgra Material Aux %ery Systems Page 9.4-46 l
Sy: tem 80+ oesign controlDocument r~ h) Table 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Operational Flow Area or Mode Type Heat Rate / Unit No, Units / Power Location System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Normal Essential Btu /hr CFM spm r Remote Shutdown X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 1/100 460 Served by Panel Roomi 'l AHU Division H Fan, I HP Charging Pump X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 1/100 120/460 Filter, RoomI AHU cooling coil, Fan, I HP Charging Pump X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 1/100 120/460 Filter, Room H AHU cooling coil. Fan, I HP Access Area X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 2/100 120/460 Filter, II (El.130+6) AHU cooling coil, Fan, I HP Normal Chiller X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, Room Div. I AHU cooling coil, fan Component X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 2/100 120/460 Filter, Cooling Water AHU cooling coil, l Pump Room fan l Div. I Normal Chiller X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, Room Div,11 AHU cooling coil, fan l l Component X Recirculating 100,000 2,000 20 2/100 120/460 Filter, Cooling WPter AHU cooling coil, j Pump Room fan ! Div. II Essennal Chiller X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, Room Div,1 AHU cooling coil, fan
~
Essentia! Chiller X Recirculating - - - 1/100 120/460 Filter, Room Div. H AHU cooling coil, l fan Component X Exhaust - - - 1/100 120/460 Fan { Cooling Water i Heat Exchanger Structure Div. I Component X Exhaust - - - 1/100 120/460 Fan Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure Div, II ( 1 ('M l O 1I Essential Electrical Room A/C units on floor EL. 70' + 0* supply Div. I A/C function to Remote j Shutdown Panel Room. ;
)
.%...: Design Monerw Ausaiery sysnems Pope 9.4-47
Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Operational Flow Area or Mode Type IIcat Rate / Unit No. Units / Power location System Load % Capacity Supply Equipment Air Cool Water Normal Essential Bru/hr CFM gpm Radwaste Building X Supply - - - 2/50 120/460 Fan, AllU prefilter, heat coil, cool coil i Radwaste Building X Exhaust - - - 2/50 120/460 Fan, filter Filter Train train Table 9.4-2 RCS Insulation Heat Loads IIcat Load Per Component IIeat Load Per (Blu/hr) Plant (Btu /hr) Reactor Vessel Closure Head 45,200 45,200 Reactor Vessel and Bottom llead 187,400 187,400 Pressurizer 134,420 134,420 Steam Generator (primary head only) 56,900 113,800 Reactor Coolant Pump Casing 15,500 62,000 Reactor Coolant System Piping 213,200 213,200 0 ApprovedDestgre Atatorial Ausmary Systems Pope 9.4-48
System 80+ Design ControlDocument , Table 9.4-3 Input for Release Analysis Filter Efficiencies
,. ~J Design / Maximum '
Testing Ventilation Recirculation HEPAT 21 Carbon t)) In-Leakage Area Identity Standard CFMUI CFMUI (Particulate) CFM Control Room RG 1.52 2,000 4,000 99 95 10 Subsphere RG 1.52 13,200 N/A 99 N/A N/A Annulus RG 1.52 18,000 18,000 99 N/A 1,000 Fuel Building RG 1.52 25,000 N/A 99 N/A N/A Containment RG 1.140 30,000 60,000 99 N/A N/A O I 9 l l l i Notes: l 1 ' UI Ventilation CFM is shown for each Division.
'p pl The listed efficiency is for particular size 0.3 microns or greater.
0 t)) No credit has been taken for the carbon adsorbers in filter trains located in subsphere, annulus, fuel l l building and containment. The depth of carbon bed is 2* minimum for all filter trains. l CziDeepr Mosend. Ausninry Systems Page 9.M9 l l l
\
i I l Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-3A Minimum Instrumentation, Readout, Recording and Alarm Provisions , for ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems Sensing Location Local Readout / Alarm Control Room Readout / Alarm Unit inlet or outlet Flow rate (indication) Flow rate (recorded indication, high alarm and low alarm signals) Demister Pressure Drop (indication) Electric heater Status indication Space between heater and Temperature (indication, Temperature (indication, high prefilter high alarm and low alarm alarm, low alarm, trip alarm signals) signals) Prefilter Pressure drop (indication, high alarm signal) First HEPA (Pre-HEPA) Pressure drop (indication, Pressure drop (recorded high alarm signal) indication) Space between Adsorber and Temperature (two stage high Temperature (indication, two-stage second HEPA (Post-HEPA) alarm signal) high alarm signal) Second HEPA (Post-HEPA) Pressure drop (indication, high alarm signal) Fan Hand switch, status indication Valve damper / operator Status indication Deluge valve (Note 1) System inlet to outlet Summation of pressure drop across total system, high alarm signal Note: til Deluge Valve and associated instrumentation is not pmvided because analyses in Section 9.5.1 require no fixed fire suppression systems.
- Approved Desegru Material- Auxaiary Systems Page 9.4-50
. - . - . . _ .- . _ _~
l l 1 System 80+ Design ControlDocument i Table 9.4-4 Heat Loads from NSSS Support Structures Heat Load Component , Heat Load Per Heat IAnd per ' Component (Btu /hr) Plant (Btu /hr) j Reactor Vessel Suppon (nozzle pad and venical column) 62,500 62,500 Structural Interface at Reactor Vessel Column Base Plate 13,750 13,750 Steam Generator lower Suppon System (skin and sliding 27,500 55,000 j base) , Reactor Coolant Pump Suppon System (support skin and 4 40,000 160,000 vertical and 2 horizontal columns at the skin only) ; 1 Pressurizer Upper Key - Suppon Structure 13,250 13,250 Steam Generator Upper Key - Suppon Structure 14,500 29,000 Reactor Coolant Pump Snubbers 4,000 16,000 , Steam Generator Snubbers 12,000 24,000 RCP Upper Horizontal Suppons 4,000 16,000
~[d a.
5 e h V 4pred Dee# niennd Auanery Syshuns Page 9.4-51
Syctem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-5 Design Cornparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 U1 g Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l
- 1. Environmental Design Criteria
- a. The design of an engineered-safety-feature atmosphere cleanup Complies.
l system should be based on the maximum pressure differential, radiation dose rate, relative humidity, maximum and minimum temperature, and other conditions resulting from the postulated DBA and on the duration of such conditions.
- b. The design of each ESF system should be based on the radiation Complies, except radiation l
dose to essential services in the vicinity of the adsorber section, source term is consistent integrated over the 30-day period following the postulated DBA. with NUREG 1465 in lieu of The radiation source term should be consistent with the assumptions Regulatory Guide 1.4. found in Regulatory Guides 1.3,1.4 and 1.25. Other engineered safety features, including pertinent components of essential services such as power, air, and control cables should be adequately shielded from the ESF atmosphere cleanup systems. l c. The design of each adsorber should be based on the concentration Complies, except radiation and relative abundance of the iodine species (elemental, particulate, sources term is consistent and organic), which should be consistent with the assumptions with NUREG 1465 in lieu of found in Regulatory Guide.1.3,1.4 and 1.25. Regulatory Guide 1.4. l d. The operation of any ESF atmosphere cleanup system should not Complies. deleteriously affect the operation of other engineered safety features such as a containment spray stem, nor should the operation of other enginected safety features such as a containment spray system deleteriously affect the operation of any ESF atmosphere cleanup system. l e. Components of systems connected to compartments that are Complies. unheated during a postulated accident should be designed for post-accident effects of both the lowest and highest predicted temperatures. l UI Design requirement of this Regulatory Guide (Revision 2) as applicable to the System 80+ Control Complex Ventilation System, safety-related components of other filtration trains and carbon adsorbers credited with more than 70% efficiency in 10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix ! analyses. Approved Design Materiel- Auxnary Systems (2/95) page 9,4 52
Sy tem 80 + Design ControlDocument () 7 Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l 2, System Design Criteria
- a. ESF atmosphere cleanup systems designed and installed for the Complies, except for Control l purpose of mitigating accident doses should be redundant. The Complex Ventilation System systems should consist of the following sequential components: demisters are not provided.
(1) demisters, (2) prefilters (demisters may serve this function), (3) Water droplets will not be llEPA filters before the adsorbers, (4) iodine adsorbers entrained in the airstream. (impregnated activated carbon or equivalent adsorbent such as Humidity control is provided metal zeolites), (5) HEPA filters after the adsorbers, (6) ducts and by safety-related air-valves, (7) fans, and (8) related instrumentation. Heaters or conditioning system which cooling coils used in conjunction with heaters should be used when has provisions for both the humidity is to be controlled before filtration. dehumidifying and heating to maintain relative humidity below 60L Heaters are provided in the filtration unit.
- b. The redundant ESF atmosphere cleanup systems should be Complies. l physically separated so that damage to one system does not also cause damage to the second system. The generation of missiles from high-pressure equipment rupture, rotating machinery failure, O)
(s" or natural phenomena should be considered in the design for separation and protection.
- c. All components of an engineer-safety-feature atmosphere cleanup Complies. l system should be designated as Seismic Category I (see Regulatory Guide 1.29) if failure of a component would lead to the release of significant quantities of fission products to the working or outdoor environments,
- d. If the ESF atmosphere cleanup system is subject to pressure surges Not applicable. The systems l resulting from the postulated accident, the system should be are located outside of the protected from such surges. Each component should be protected containment and not exposed with such devices as pressure relief valves so that the overall to pressure surges.
system will perform its intended function during and after the passage of the pressure surge. e, la the mechanical design of the ESF system, the high radiation Complies. l levels that may be associated with buildup of radioactive materials on the ESF system components should be given partiet consideration. ESF system construction materials shou effectively perform their intended function under the postulated radiation levels. The effects of radiation should be considered not only for the demisters, heaters. HEPA filters, adsorbers, and fans, but also for any electrical insulation, controls, joining compounds, dampers, gaskets, and other organic-containing materials that are necessary for operation during a postulated DBA. I ) Q) Approwd Design Material. Audary Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-53
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l l l 2, System Design Criteria (Cont'd.)
- f. The volumetric air flow rate of a single cleanup train should be Complies.
l limited to approximately 30,000 ft3 /mia. If a total system air flow ; in excess of this rate is required, multiple trains should be used. For case of maintenance, a filter layout three IIEPA filters high j 1 and ten wide is preferred.
- g. The ESF atmosphere cleanup system should be instrumented to Complies.
l signal, alarm, and record pertinent pressure drops and flow rates at the control room.
- h. The power supply and electrical distribution system for the ESF Complies, l
atmosphere cleanup system described in Section C.2.a above should be designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.32. All instrumentation and equipment controls should be designed to IEEE Standard 279. The ESF system should be qualified and tested under Regulatory Guide 1.89. To the extent applicable, Regulatory Guides 1.30,1.100, and 1.!!8 and IEEE 334 should be considered in the design.
- 1. Unless the applicable engineered-safety-feature atmosphere cleanup Complies.
l system operates continuously during all times that a DBA can be postulated to occur, the system should be automatically activated upon the occurrence of a DBA by (1) a redundant engineered-safety feature signal (i.e., temperature, pressure) or (2) a signal from redundant Seismic Category I radiation monitors. l j. To maintain radiation exposures to operating personnel as low as is Complies. reasonably achievable during plant maintenance, ESF atmosphere cleanup systems should be designed to control leak ge and facilitate maintenance in accordance with the guidelines of Regulaimy Guide 8.8. The ESF atmosphere cleanup train should be total!y enclosed. I Each train should be designed and installed in a manner that ) permits replacement of the train as an intact unit or as a minimum number of segmented sections without removal of individual components. l k. Outdoor air intake openings should be equipped with louvers. Complies. grills, screens, or similar protective devices to minimize the effects of high winds, rain, snow, ice, trash, and other contaminants on the operation of the system. If the atmosphere surrounding the plant could contain significant environmental contaminants, such as dusts and residues from smoke cleanup systems from adjacent coal buming power plants or industry, the design of the system should consider these contaminants and prevent them from affecting the ' operation of any ESF atmosphere cleanup system. Approved Desigrr Matsnal. Auxniary systams (2/95) Page 9.4-S4 l l l
Srtem 80 + Design controlDocument i n < V Tab e 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52 Position C System 80+ l
- 2. System Design Criteria (Cont'd.)
- 1. ESF atmosphere cleanup system housings and ductwork should be Complies.
designed to exhibit on test a maximum total leakage rate as defined in Section 4.12 of ANSI N509-1976. Duct and housing leak tests should be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of ANSI N510-1975.
- 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing
- a. Demisters should be designed. constructed, and tested in Not applicable. See response accordance with the requirements of Section 5.4 of ANSI N509- to Regulatory Position 2.a 1976. Demisters should meet UL Class I requirements. above.
- b. Air heaters should be designed, constmeted, and tested in Complies. l accordance with the requirements of Section 5.5 of ANSI N509-1976.
- c. Materials used in the prefilters should withstand the radiation levels Complies. l and environmental conditions prevalent during the postulated DBA.
[,. i Prefilters should be designed, constructed, and tested in accordance V with the provisions of Section 5.3 of ANSI N509-1976.
- d. The HEPA filters should be designed, constructed, and tested in Complies. l accordance with Section 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976.
Each HEPA filter should be tested for penetration of diocryl phthalate (DOP) in accordance with the provisions of MIL-F-51068 and MIL-STD0282.
- c. Filter and adsorber mounting frames should be constructed and Complies. l designed in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.6.3 of ANSI N509-1976.
- f. Filter and adsorber banks should be arranged in accordance with Complies. l the recommendations of Section 4.4 of ERDA 76-21. ;
- g. System filter housings, including floors and doors, should be Complies. l )
constructed and designed in accordance with the provisions of ! Section 5.6 of ANSI N509-1976.
)
- h. Water drains should be desinged in accordance with the Complies. l l recommendations of Section 4.5.8 of ERDA 76-21. :
- 1. The adsorber section of the ESF atmosphere cleanup system may Complies. l l contain any adsorbent material demonstrated to remove gaseous iodine (elemental iodine and organic iodides) from air at the (N required efficiency. Since impregnated activated carbon is Q commonly used, only this adsorbent is discussed in this guide.
l I Approwd Design Materieh Auxniary Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-55
System 80+ Design CvntrolDocument Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C Sgtem 80+ l l 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing (Cont'd.)
- 1. (Cont'd.)
Each original or replacement batch of impregnated activated carbon Complies. l used in the adsorber section should meet the qualification and batch test results summarized in Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976. In this table, a " qualification test" should be interpreted to mean a test that establishes the suitability of a product for a general application, normally a one-time test reflecting historical typical performance of material. In this table, a
- batch test" should be interpreted to mean a test made on a production batch of product to establish suitability for a specific application. A " batch of activated carbon" should be interpreted to mean a quantity of material of the same grade, type, and series that has been homogenized to exhibit, within reasonable tolerance, the same performance and physical characteristics and for which the manufacturer can demonstrate by acceptable tests and quality control practices such uniformity.
All material in the same batch should be activated, impregnated, Complies. l and otherwise treated under '.he same process conditions and procedures in the same process equipment and should be produced under the same manufacturing release and instructions. Material produced in the same charge of batch equipment constitutes a batch; material produced in different charges of the same batch equipment should be included in the same batch only if it can be 3 homogenized as above. The maximum batch size should be 350 ft of activated carbon. l If an adsorbent other than impregnated activated carbon is Complies, proposed or if the mesh size distribution is different from the specifications in Table 5.1 of ANSI N5091976, the proposed adsorbent should have demonstrated the capability to perform as well as or better than activated carbon in satisfying the specifications in Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976. l If impregnated activated carbon is used as the adsorbent, the Complies. adsorber system should be designed for an average atmosphere residence time of 0.25 see per two inches ofidsorbent bed. The adsorption unit should be designed for a max mum loading of 2.5 mg of total iodine (radioactive plus stable) p:r gram of activated carbon. No more than 5% of impregnant (."0 mg of impregnant per gram of carbon) should be used. The radiation stability of the type of carbon specified should be demon <trated and certified (see Section C.1,b of this guide for the desip source term). O Approved Design Material. Aux 5ary Systerns (2/95) Page 9.4 56
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
,m
( ) Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l
- 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing (Cont'd.) l
- j. Adsorber cells should be designed, constructed, and tested in Complies. l accordance with the requirements of Section 5.2 of ANSI N509-1976.
- k. The design of the adsorber section should consider possible iodine Complies. Anticipated l desorption and adsorbent auto-ignition that may result from charcoal bed loading is not radioactivity-induced heat in the adsorbent and concomitant sufficient to raise bed temperature rise. Acceptable designs include a low-flow air bleed temperature to the desorption system, cooling coils, water sprays for the adsorber section, or range.
other cooling mechanisms. Any cooling mechanism should satisfy the single-failure criterion. A low-flow air bleed system should satisfy the single-failure criterion for providing low-humidity (less than 70% relative humidity) cooling air flow.
- 1. The system fan, its mounting, the ductwork connections should be Complies. l designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with the requirements of Sections 5.7 and 5.8 of ANSI N509-1976.
( m. The fan or blower used on the ESF atmosphere cleanup system Complies. l (]f should be capable of operating under the environmental conditions postulated, including radiation.
- n. Ductwork should be designed, constructed, and tested in Complies. l accordance with the provisions of Section 5.10 of ANSI N509-1976.
- o. Ducts and housings should be laid out with a minimum of ledges, Complies. l protrusions, and crevices that could collect dust and moisture and i that could impede personnel or create a hazard to them in the performance of their work. Straightening vanes should be installed where required to ensure representative air flow measurement and I uniform flow distribution through cleanup components. I
- p. Dampers should be designed, constructed, and tested in accordance Complies. l l
with the provisions of Section 5.9 of ANSI N509-1976.
- 4. Maintenance
- a. Accessibility of components and maintenance should be considered Complies. l l in the design of ESF atmosphere cleanup systems in acconiance with the provisions of Section 2.3.8 of ERDA 76-21 and Section 4.7 of ANSI N509-1976.
(^\ v) l Amrowd Design Material- Auxnary Systems (2/9 51 Pope 9.4-57
1 Sy~ tem l'0 + Design ControlDocument , l Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.) h Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l l 4. Maintenance (Cont'd.)
- b. For case of maintenance, the system design should provide for a Complies.
l minimum of three feet from mounting frame to mounting frame between banks of components. If cotnponents are to be replaced, the dimension to be provided should be the maximum length of the component plus a minimum of three feet.
- c. The system design should provide for pertnanent test probes with Complies.
l external connections in accordance with the provisions of Section 4.11 of ANSI N509-1976.
- d. Each ESF atmosphere cleanup train should be operated at least 10 Complies.
l hours per month, with the heaters on (if so equipped), in order to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
- e. The cleanup components (i.e., HEPA filters, prefilters, and Complies.
l adsorbers) should not be installed while active construction is still in progress.
- 5. In-Place Testing Criteria
- a. A visual inspection of the ESF atmosphere cleanup system and all Complies.
l associated components should be made before each in-place airflow distribution test, DOP test, or activated carbon adsorber section leak test in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of ANSI N510-1975. l b. The airflow distribution to the HEPA filters and iodine adsorbers Complies. should be tested in place for uniformity initially and after maintenance affecting the flow distribution. The distribution should be within 20% of the average flow per unit. The testing should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of " Industrial Ventilation" and Section 8 of ANSI N510-1975. l c. The in-place DOP test for HEPA filters should conform to Section Complies. 10 of ANSI N510-1975. HEPA filter sections should be tested in place (1) initially, (2) at least once per 18 months thereafter, and (3) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system to confirm a penetration of less than 0.05% at rated flow. An engineered-safety-feature air filtration system satisfying this condition can be considered to warrant a 99% removal efficiency for particulates in accident dose evaluations. HEPA filters that fail to satisfy this condition would be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to regulatory position C.3.d of this guide. If the HEPA filter bank is entirely or only partially replaced, an in-place DOP test should be conducted. knproved Design Atatorial- AuxiGary Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-S8
System 80+ nesign contror Document
'(O) Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Cont'd.)
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Position C System 80+ l
- 5. In-Place Testing Criteria (Cont'd.) l
- c. (Cont'd.) l If any welding repairs are necessary on, vdthin, or adjacent to the Complies. l ducts, housing or mounting frames, the filters and adsorbers should be removed from the housing during such repairs. The repairs should be completed prior to periodic testing, filter inspection, and in-place testing. The use of silicone scalants or any other temporary patching material on filters, housing, mounting frames, or ducts should not be allowed.
- d. The activated carbon adsorber section should be leak tested with a Complies. l gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant in accordance with Section 12 of ANSI N510-1975 to ensure that bypass leakage through the adsorber section is less than 0.05%. After the test is completed, air flow through the unit should be maintained until the residual refrigerant gas in the effluent is less than 0.01 ppm.
Adsorber leak testing should be conducted (1) initially, (2) at least p once per 18 months thereafter, (3) following removal of an Q adsorber sample for laboratory testing if the integrity of the adsorber section is affected, and (4) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 6. Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon
- a. 'Ihe activated carbon adsorber section of the ESF atmosphere Complies. l cleanup system should be assigned the decontamination efficiencies ,
given in Table 2 for elemental iodine and organic iodides if the following conditions are met: (1) The adsorber section meets the conditions given in regulatory position C.S.d of this guide. , (2) New activated carbon meets the physical property j specifications given in Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976, and , (3) Representative samples of used activated carbon pass the laboratory tests given in Table 2. If the activated carbon fails to meet any of the above conditions, it should not be used in engineered-safety-feature adsorbers. O 4premt Des \pn nieseriet- Aummary Systems 42/95) Page 9.4 59 1
i l System 80+ Design controlDocument l t Table 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 ) l (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.52 Position C System 80+ l l 6. Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon (Cont'd.) The efficiency of the activated carbon adsorber section should be Complies. l b. determined by laboratory testing of representative samples of the activated carbon exposed simultaneously to the same service conditions as the adsorber section. Each representative sample should be not less than two inches in both length and diameter, and each sample should have the same qualification and batch test characteristics as the system adsorbent. There should be a sufficient number of representative samples located in parallel with the adsorber section to estimate the amount of penetration of the system adsorbent throughout its service life. The design of f e samplers should be in accordance with the provisions of Appendix A of ANSI N509-1976. Where the system activated carbon is greater than two inches deep, each representative sampling station should consist of enough two-inch samples in series to equal thickness of the system adsorbent. Once representative samples are removed for laboratory test, their positions in the sampling array should be blocked off. Laboratory tests of representative samples should be conducted, as Complies. l indicated in Table 2 of this guide, with the test gas flow in the same direction as the flow during service conditions. Similar laboratory tests should be performed on an adsorbent sample before loading into the adsorbers to establish an initial point for comparison of future test results. The activated carbon adsorber section should be replaced with new unused activated carbon meeting the physical property specifications of Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976 if (1) testing in accordance with the frequeticy specified in Footnote c of Table 2 results in a representative sample failing to pass the applicable test in Table 2 or (2) no representa;ive sample is available for testing. O Approved Design Material AuxHiery 5ystems (285) Page 9.4-60
- Sy' tem 80 + Design controlDocument O.g Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 l Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l
- 1. Environmental Design Criteria
- a. The design of each atmosphere cleanup system installed in a normal Complies. l ventilation exhaust system should be based on the anticipated range of operating parameters of temperature, pressure, relative humidity, "
and radiation levels.
- b. If the atmosphere cleanup system is located in an area of high Complies. l radiation during normal plant operation, adequate shielding of cotuponents and personnel from the radiation source should be provided,
- c. The operation of any atmosphere cleanup system in a normal Complies. l ventilation ethaast system should not degrade the expected operation of any engineered-safety-feature system that must operate after a design basis accident.
- d. The design of the atmosphere cleanup system should consider any Complies. l significant contammants such as dusts, chemicals, or other particulate matter that could degrade the cleanup system's operation.
- 2. System Design Criteria '
d a. Atmosphere cleanup systems installed in normal ventilation exhaust Complies. Heaters or l systems need not be redundant nor designed to Seismic Category I cooling coils are not classification, but should consist of the following sequential required. However, heaters components t Ii HEPA filters before adsorbers, (2) iodine are provided. adsorbers timpregnated activated carbon or equivalent adsorbent such as metal icohtes), (3) fans, and (4) interspersed ducts, dampers, and related instrumentation. If it is desired to reduce the particulate load on the HEPA filters and extend their service life, the installation of prefilters upstream of the initial HEPA bank is suggested. Consideration should also be given to the installation of a HEPA filter bank downstream of carbon absorbers to retain carbon fmes. Ileaters or cooling coils used in conjunction with ! heaters should be used when the humidity is to be controlled before ; filtration. Wheneser an atmosphere cleanup system is designed to remove only particulate matter, a component for iodine adsorption need not be included,
- b. To ensure reliable in-place testing, the volumetric air flow rate of a Complies. ;
l single cleanup train should be limited to approximately 30,000 ft 3/ min. If a total system air flow in excess of this rate is required, multiple trains should be used. For case of maintenance, a filter : layout that is three HEPA filters high and ten wide is preferred. Note: m Design requirements of this Regulatory Guide (Revision 1) are applicable to the Non-safety-related Ventilation l Exhaust Systems of System 80+. Anwomed Deskpr nietenial Auxnery Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-61
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l l Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Cont'd.) h Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l l 2. System Design Cdteria (Cont'd.)
- c. Each atmosphere cleanup system should be instrumented to monitor Complies, l
and alarm pertinent pressure drops and flow rates in accordance with the recommendations of Section 5.6 of ERDA 76-21.
- d. To maintain the radiation exposure to operating and maintenance Complies.
l personnel as low as is reasonably achievable, atmosphere cleanup systems and components should be designed to control leakage and facilitate maintenance, inspection, and testing in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As low As is Reasonably Achievable."
- c. Outdoor air intake openings should be equipped with louvers, grills, Complies, l
screen, or similar protective devices to minimize the effects of high winds, rain, snow, ice, trash, and other contammants on the operation of the system. If the atmosphere surrounding the plant could contain significant environmental contaminants, such as dusts and residues from smoke cleanup systems from adjacent coal burning power plants or industry, the design of the system should consider these contaminants and prevent them from affecting the operation of any atmosphere cleanup system.
- f. Atmosphere cleanup system housings and ductwork, as defined in Complies.
l Section 5.10.8.1 ANSI N509-1976 should be designed to exhibit on test a maximum total leakage rate as defined in Section 4.12 of ANSI N509-1976. Duct and housing leak tests should be perfonned in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of ANSI N510-1975.
- 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing
- a. Adsorption units function efficiently at a relative humidity of 70% See response to Regulatory or less. If the relative humidity of the atmosphere entering the air Position 2.a above.
cleanup system is expected to be greater that 70% during normal Relative Humidity need not reactor operation, beaters or cooling coils used in conjunction with be controlled to 70% or 'ess heaters should be designed to reduce the relative humidity of the for iodine removal entering atmosphere to 70% or less. Heaters should be designed, decontamination factors of constructed, and tested in accordance with the requirements of 95% or less. Penetration Section 5.5 of ANSI N509-1976 exclusive of sizing cri teria. tests will be conducted at 95% Relative Humidity instead of 70% Relative Humidity per ASTM D3803 89. O Approved Design Material- Auskery Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-62
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 10
,Q Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 l (Cont'd,) l Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l
- 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualifica!!on Testing (Cont'd.) l
- b. The HEPA filters should be designed, constructed, and tested in Complies. l accordance with the requirements of Section 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976. Each HEPA filter should be tested for penetration of dioctyl phthalate (DOP) in accordance with the provisions of Ml!<F-51068 and M11-STD-282.
- c. Filter and adsorber mounting frames should be designed and Complies. l coratructed in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.6.3 of ANSI N5091976.
- d. Filter and adsorber banks should be arranged in accordance with the Complies. l recommendations of Section 4.4 of ERDA 76-21.
- c. System filter housings, including floors and doors, and electrical Complies. l conduits, drains, and piping installed inside filter housings should be designed and constructed in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.6 of ANSI N509-1976. i l
s f. Ductwork associated with the atmosphere cleanup system should be Complies. l l'
) designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.10 of ANSI N5091976.
- g. The adsorber section of the atmosphere cleanup system may contain Complies. l any adsorbent material demonstrated to remove gaseous iodine (elemental iodine and organic iodides) from air at the required efficiency. Since impregnated activated carbon is commonly used, only this adsorbent is discussed in this guide. Each original or replacement batch of impregnated activated carbon used in the adsorber section should meet the qualification and batch test results summarized in Table 1 of this guide. If an adsorbent other than impregnated activated carbon is proposed Complies. l or if the mesh size distribution is different from the specifications in Table 1, the proposed adsorbent should have demonstrated the capability to perform as well as or better than activated carbon in satisfying the specifications in Table 1. If impregnated activated carbon is used as the adsorbent, the adsorber system should be designed for an average atmosphere residence time of at least 0.25 see per 2 inches of adsorbent bed.
- h. Adsorber cells should be designed, constructed, and tested in Complies. l accordance with the requirements of Section 5.2 of ANSI N509 1976.
g i. The system fan and motor, mounting, and ductwork connections Complies. l l should be designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with the
\- requirements of Sections 5.7 and 5.8 of ANSI N509-1976.
L ' Deedyrs ateteriet Ausnery Systems (2/95) Pege 9.4-63
Sptem 80+ Desig s Control Document l Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 l (Cont'd.) Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l l 3. Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing (Cont'd.) The fan and motor used in the atmosphere cleanup :ystem should be Cornplies, l J. capable of operating under the environmental conditions postulated.
- k. Ducts and housing should be laid out with a minimum of ledges, Complies.
l protrusions. and crevices that could collect dust and moisture and that could impede personnel or create a hazard to them in the performance of their work. Turning vanes or other air flow distribution deuces should be installed where required to ensure representaine air flow measurement and uniform flow distribution through cleanup components.
- 1. Dampers should be designed, constructed, and tested in accordance Complies.
l with the provisions of Section 5.9 of ANSI N509-1976.
- m. If prefilters are used in the atmosphere cleanup system, they should Complies.
l be designed, constructed, and tested in .accordance with the provisions of Section 5.3 of ANSI N5091976.
- 4. Maintenance
- a. Accessibiht) of components and maintenance should be considered Complies.
l in the design of atmosphere cleanup systems in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.3.8 of ERDA 76-21 and Section 4.7 of ANSI N5091976.
- b. For case of inspection and maintenance with minimum danger of Complies.
l damage to the system. its design should provide for a minimum of 3 feet clear access space in each compartment after allowing for the component dimension itself and the maximum length of the component during changeout.
- c. The system design should provide for permanent test probes with Complies.
l external connections in accordance with the provisions of Section 4.11 of ANSI N509-1976. l d. The cleanup components (e.g., IIEPA filters and adsorbers) should Complies. be installed after construction is completed.
- 5. In-Place Testing Criteda l a. A visual inspection, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 Complies.
of ANSI N5104975, of the atmosphere cleanup system and all associated cor:ponents should be made before each in. place airtlow distribution test, DOP test, or activated carbon adsorber section leak test. O Amradit hsign Materiel. Auskry Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-64
Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument i p Q Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Cont'd.) l l Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l S. In-Place Testing Criteria (Cont'd.) l j
- b. The airflow distribution to the HEPA filters and iodine adsorbers Complies. l should be tested in place for uniformity initially and after maintenance affecting the flow distribution. The distribution should be within i20% of the average flow per unit when tested in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of " Industrial Ventilation" and Section 8 of ANSI N510-1975.
- c. The in-place DOP test for HEPA filters should conform to Section Complies. l 10 of ANSI N5101975. HEPA filter sections should be tested in place initially and at interval of 18 months thereafter. The HEPA l filter bank upstream the adsorber section should also be tested following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system in such a manner that the HEPA filters could become adversely affected by the fumes, chemicals, or foreign materials. DOP penetration tests of all HEPA filter banks ,
should confirm a penetration of less than 0.05% at rated flow. A ; tiltration system satisfying this condition can be considered to j warrant a 99% removal efficiency for particulates. HEPA filters n that fail to satisfy the in-place test criteria snould be replaced with D) ( filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.b of this guide. If the HEPA filter bank is entirely or only panially replaced, an in-place DOP test should be conducted, if any welding repairs are necessary on, within, or adjacent to the Complies. l ducts, housing or mounting frames, the filters and adsorbers should i i be removed from the housing during such repairs. Those repairs should be completed prior to periodic testing, filter inspection, and in place testing. The use of silicone scalants or any other temporary patching material on filters, housing, mounting frames, or ducts should not be allowed. I l I
?w.2 Deeign asesordet. Aunnery Systems (2/95) Page 9.4-65 ,
I l
i System 80+ Design ControlDocument l l Table 93-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Cont'd.) h System 80+ l ]tegulatory Guide 1.140, Position C ,
- 5. In-Place Testing Criteria (Cont'd.)
- d. The activated carbon adsorber section should be leak tested with a Complies.
gaseous halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant in accordance with Section 12 of ANSI N510-1975 to ensure that bypass leakage through the adsorber section is less than 0.05%. After the test is completed, air flow through the unit should be maintained until the residual refrigerant gas in the effluent is less than 0.01 ppm. Adsorber leak testing should be conducted (1) initially, (2) at least once per 18 months thereafter, (3) following removal of an adsorber sample for laboratory testing if the integrity of the adsorber section is affected, and (4) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system in such a manner that the charcoal adsorbers could become adversely affected by the fumes, chemicals, or foreign materials.
- 6. Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon
- a. The activated carbon adsorber section of the ESF atmosphere Complies.
l cleanup system should be assigned the decontamination efficiencies given in Table 2 for elemental iodine and organic iodides if the following conditions are met: (1) The adsorber section meets the conditions given in regulatory position C.S.d of this guide. (2) New activated carbon meets the physical property specifications given in Table 5.1 of ANSI N509-1976, and (3) Representative samples of used activated carbon pass the laboratory tests given in Table 2. If the activated carbon fails to meet any of the above cor.dtions, it should not be used in adsorber units. O Approved Design Matenal- Aux 5ary Systems (2/95) page 9.4 66
i l System 80+ Design ControlDocument O Q Table 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Cont'd.) l l Regulatory Guide 1.140, Position C System 80+ l
- 6. Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon (Cont'd.) l
- b. The efficiency of the activated carbon adsorber section should be Complies.
determined by laboratory testing of representative samples of the , activated carbon exposed simultaneously to the same service conditions as the adsorber section. Each representative sample should be not less than two inches in both length and diameter, and each sample should have the same qualification and batch test characteristics as the system adsorbent. There should be a sufficient number of representative samples located in parallel with the adsorber section to estimate the amount of penetration of the system adsorbent throughout its service life. The design of the samplers should be in accordance with the provisicas of Appendix A of ANSI N509-1976. Where the system activated carbon is greater than two inches deep, each representative sampling station should consist of enough two-inch samples in series to equal and thickness of the system adsorbent. Once representative samples are removed for laboratory test, their positions in the sampling array should be blocked off. Laboratory tests of representative samples should be conducted, as Complies. l indicated in Table 2 of this guide, with the test gas flow in the same direction as the flow during service conditions. Similar laboratory tests should be performed on an adsorbent sample before loading into the adsorbers to establish an initial point for comparison of future test results. The activated carbon adsorber section should be l replaced with new unused activated carbon meeting the physical j property specifications of Table 1 if (1) testing in accordance with the frequency specified in Footnote c of Table 2 results in a representative sample failing to pass the applicable test in Table 2 or (2) no representative sample is available for testing. l l l i l 1 t v > Amromt Deng nieterial AuxiGery Systems W95) Pope 9.4-67
9 Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument (O) der C ON ROW N CATE VALVE. OPEN WOTOR OPERATED DAMPER N CATE VALVE. CLOSED
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