ML22056A517

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University of Missouri-Columbia - Reactor Operations Annual Report (Jan 1, 2021 Through Dec. 31, 2021)
ML22056A517
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Site: University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date: 12/31/2021
From: Astrino R
Univ of Missouri - Columbia
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 INTRODUCTION The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is a multi-disciplinary research and education facility providing a broad range of analytical, materials science, and irradiation services to the research community and the commercial sector. Scientific programs include research in archaeometry, epidemiology, materials science, plant science, nuclear medicine, radiation effects, radioisotope studies, targeted radiotherapy, and nuclear engineering; as well as research techniques including neutron activation analysis, neutron scattering, and gamma-ray imaging. The heart of this facility is a pressurized, graphite and beryllium reflected, open pool-type, light water moderated and cooled, heterogeneous reactor designed for operation at a maximum steady-state power level of 10 Megawatts thermal

- the highest-powered university-operated research reactor in the United States.

The Reactor Operations Annual Report presents a summary of reactor operating experience for calendar year 2021.

Included within this report are changes to MURR Reactor Operations and Reactor Health Physics procedures, revisions to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), facility modifications, new tests and experiments, reactor physics activities, and environmental and health physics data.

This report is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to meet the administrative requirements of MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The success of MURR and its scientific programs is due to the dedication and hard work of many individuals and organizations. Included within this group are: the University of Missouri (MU) administration; the governing officials of the State of Missouri; the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP); the City of Columbia Police Department (CPD);

the University of Missouri Police Department (MUPD); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); our regulators; those who have provided funding, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the NRC; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL);

Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); the researchers; the students; the Columbia Fire Department (CFD); the MU Campus Facilities organization; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); members of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR); and many others who have made, and will continue to make, key contributions to our overall success. To these individuals and organizations, the staff of MURR wishes to extend its fondest appreciation.

Some of the major facility projects that were supported by Reactor Operations during this past calendar year included:

(1) installing an uninterruptible power supply alternate source to inverter maintenance disconnect; (2) installing reactor plant LED status indicators and pushbuttons on the reactor control console; (3) removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; (4) transferring electrical power supply for the facility evacuation and containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply system; (5) replacing the cabinet and solenoid-operated valves for the 16-inch ventilation exhaust system; (6) upgrading the facility evacuation and containment isolation system relays; (7) installing a variable i

frequency drive on reactor containment building ventilation supply fan SF-2; (8) adding an approximately 1,600 ft2 expansion to the Shipping and Receiving Building; and (9) demolishing and renovating Rooms 231/231A to support a new radioisotope processing line.

The facility continues to actively collaborate with the NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3)

Reactor Conversion Program and five other U.S. high-performance research and test reactor facilities, including one critical facility, that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement. Although each one of the five high-performance reactors is responsible for its own feasibility and safety studies, regulatory interactions, fuel procurement, and conversion, there are common interests and activities among all five reactors that will benefit from a coordinated, working-group effort. This past year, work focused on:

(1) LEU fuel element fabrication drawings and specifications; (2) the Design Demonstration Elements (DDE), one without uranium and one with uranium, that will be flow tested at the Oregon State University Hydro-Mechanical Fuel Testing Facility and inserted into an experimental position at the INL Advanced Test Reactor to achieve prototypic MURR operating conditions; (3) fuel specification impact assessment analyses; and (4) a technical report on preliminary shipping and backend information, which includes activities for analysis, licensing, and planning of fresh and spent LEU fuel element shipments and backend operations for receipt and storage of the spent nuclear fuel at DOE facilities, which is currently Savannah River Site.

Reactor Operations management also wishes to commend one individual who received their Reactor Operator certification and one individual who received their Senior Reactor Operator certification from the NRC. These individuals participated in a rigorous training program of classroom seminars, self-study, and on-the-job training. The results of this training are confident, well-versed, decisive individuals capable of performing the duties of licensed staff during normal and abnormal situations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pages I. Reactor Operations Summary ............................................................................................... I-1 through 7 II. MURR Procedures ...............................................................................................................II-1 through 5 A. Changes to Reactor Operations Procedures B. Changes to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures C. Changes to Radiological Control, Byproduct Material Shipping, and Preparation of Byproduct Material for Shipping Procedures III. Revisions to the Safety Analysis Report ............................................................................ III-1 through 2 IV. Plant and System Modifications ......................................................................................... IV-1 through 5 V. New Tests and Experiments ................................................................................................................. V-1 VI. Special Nuclear Material and Reactor Physics Activities .................................................................. VI-1 VII. Radioactive Effluent.......................................................................................................... VII-1 through 2 Table 1 - Sanitary Sewer Effluent Table 2 - Stack Effluent VIII. Environmental Monitoring and Health Physics Surveys ................................................. VIII-1 through 6 Table 1 - Summary of Environmental Set 99 - Spring 2021 Table 2 - Summary of Environmental Set 100 - Fall 2021 Table 3 - Environmental TLD Summary Table 4 - Number of Facility Radiation and Contamination Surveys IX. Summary of Radiation Exposure to Facility Staff, Experimenters, and Visitors ............................... IX-1 iii

SECTION I REACTOR OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 The following table and discussion summarize reactor operations during calendar year 2021.

Full Power Full Power Month Full Power Hours Megawatt Days

(% of total time) (% of scheduled*)

January 681.34 283.94 91.6 102.5 February 602.71 251.23 89.7 100.5 March 653.48 272.36 87.8 98.3 April 563.24 234.77 78.2 87.7 May 662.00 275.93 89.0 99.6 June 655.80 273.33 91.1 102.1 July 682.55 284.45 91.7 102.7 August 656.29 273.56 88.2 98.8 September 655.59 274.06 91.1 102.1 October 669.15 278.87 89.9 100.7 November 614.26 256.11 85.3 95.7 December 622.35 259.40 83.6 93.7 Total for the Year 7,718.76 3,218.01 88.11 98.71 MURR is scheduled to average at least 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> of full power operation per week. Total time is the number of hours in the month or year listed.

JANUARY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in January with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 88-11, Addendum 2:

Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect; repairing control blade selector switch 1S3; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

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FEBRUARY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in February with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of facility security.

On February 2, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently repositioned in accordance with Standing Order 21-01 to maintain system pressure. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO), and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.

On February 10, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valve V543B. The pneumatic actuator for valve V543B and the anti-siphon system low pressure alarm set point were adjusted, and applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, were completed satisfactorily. Valves V543A and V543B were closed in accordance with Standing Order 21-02, and the primary coolant system was restarted. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.

Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing control blade C control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) with a rebuilt spare; and performing two reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).

MARCH 2021 The reactor operated continuously in March with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and three shutdowns for physics measurements. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of the Radiation Protection and Shipping Programs.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators; repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; performing a chemical cleaning and backflush of the secondary coolant side of pool coolant heat exchanger HX-521; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the primary coolant demineralizer system; and performing five reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

APRIL 2021 The reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

On April 18, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram and containment building isolation were initiated by Area Radiation Monitor System (ARMS) Air Plenum 1 Module. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed.

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Investigation revealed that the module appeared to be operating erratically and was subsequently replaced with a spare.

Applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-30, ARMs and Associated Horns and Lights, were completed satisfactorily. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.

On April 21, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V453B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently removed, rebuilt, and reinstalled. Compliance procedures CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, and CP-24, Anti-Siphon System Valves 543A/B, were satisfactorily completed, and the anti-siphon system was channel tested per operating procedure OP-RO-410, Primary Coolant System. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.

Major maintenance items for the month included: removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; performing a chemical cleaning of the secondary coolant side of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503A; loading new de-ionizing bed K and placing it on pool coolant system service; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

MAY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered one reactor operator and one senior reactor operator licensing examination.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing the biennial change-out of control blade A offset mechanism; completing compliance procedure CP-26, Containment Building Compliance Test; performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11(D); and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

JUNE 2021 The reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 1: Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS); replacing relay 2K26; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).

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JULY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in July with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

On July 5, during a normal reactor startup at a transient power level of 2 MW in the manual control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to sporadic height indication for shim control blade D on the rod position indication (RPI) panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedures REP-2, Reactor Scram, and REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Control blade D CRDM was removed and taken to the Instrumentation Support Shop for troubleshooting. It was determined that control blade D RPI encoder was failing. Control blade C CRDM was subsequently moved to the D position, and a spare CRDM was placed in the C position. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.

On July 26, during a normal reactor startup with the reactor operating in a subcritical condition in the manual control mode, the Blade Full In light illuminated for shim control blade B. Although RPI for CRDM B indicated a control blade height of approximately 10.30 inches, inspection revealed that the ball screw for CRDM B had detached from the top of the drive mechanism allowing the ball screw, electromagnet, and shim control blade B to fall to the fully inserted position. The LSRO directed another operator to shut down the reactor by initiating a manual scram by placing Master Control Switch 1S1 to the TEST position. All immediate and applicable subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-8, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Failure or Stuck Rod, were completed.

After the reactor was secured, CRDM B was removed for further investigation and a spare CRDM was installed in the B position. Compliance procedure CP-10, Rod Drop Times, for shim control blade B was completed satisfactorily. Performing CP-10 operated the CRDM and its associated offset mechanism with the control blade through its entire range of motion while staff members could observe the CRDM and offset mechanism for binding or any other abnormalities. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to reactor operation to perform CP-10. During CP-10, two staff members performed a careful visual and audible inspection of the entire assembly as it moved through its full range of travel.

No abnormalities were noted during the inspection, and the Reactor Manager deemed the spare CRDM operable. A normal reactor startup was performed, and the reactor returned to 10 MW operation. With the ball screw detached from the top of CRDM B, CRDM B was considered inoperable, which resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.a, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-01 was submitted to the NRC on August 9, 2021.

Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

AUGUST 2021 The reactor operated continuously in August with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction.

On August 20, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated after a Rod Not In Contact rod run-in was received due to shim control blade C anvil disengaging from its electromagnet during a routine sample handling evolution. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. The reactor was refueled and permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.

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Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 90-03, Addendum 1: 16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement; loading new de-ionizing bed B and placing it on pool coolant system service; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

SEPTEMBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in September with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 2: Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).

OCTOBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in October with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.

On October 11, while the reactor was shut down for scheduled routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, surveillance testing on reactor core outlet pressure instrument channel 944B (pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel) revealed that the PT 944B instrument channel did not initiate a reactor scram at the appropriate TS set point.

Troubleshooting revealed the component in the PT 944B instrument channel that caused the set point deviation to be dual alarm unit 920F. Dual alarm unit 920F was replaced with an exact spare and successfully retested. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation. Failure of the dual alarm unit to provide a reactor scram within the TS-required set point resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-02 was submitted to the NRC on October 25, 2021.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-04, Security Upgrades; replacing pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel dual alarm unit 920F; performing a zero and span on pressure transmitter PT 943; and performing special maintenance procedure SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21.

NOVEMBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in November with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one planned shutdown for nuclear instrumentation adjustment, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of Reactor Operations and Emergency Preparedness.

On November 4, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram was initiated due to a sustained loss of normal electrical power. All immediate actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-10, Sustained Loss of Normal Electrical Power, were completed. Investigation by University of Missouri Energy Management (EM) discovered a failed circuit card within the smart switch that feeds the facilitys 1,500 and I-5

2,000 kVA transformers. EM restored power and permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO. The reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.

On November 8, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the anti-siphon system high water level rod run-in function did not activate within the required specification during the performance of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-in and Low Pressure Alarm. Troubleshooting revealed that the stainless steel cable that connects level controller LC 965 instrument channel to the suspended displacer (float) had developed loops in it, effectively shortening the cable. The loops in the cable were removed, and level controller LC 965 instrument channel was retested and documented to be back in compliance. Engineering analysis subsequently concluded that prior to removing the loops from the level controller cable, the rod run-in was actuating at a level greater than the maximum of 6 inches above anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B as required by TS 3.2.f.6. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of level controller LC 965 to actuate before the maximum allowable 6 inches of water above the valves resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.f.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-03 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021.

On November 15, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the control room operators determined that the Reflector Hi-Low Diff Pressure Scram annunciation did not illuminate as pool coolant flow rate decreased to zero after shutting down the pool coolant system. Investigation and further testing revealed that the low reflector differential pressure reactor scram from pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel did not activate due to a failed alarm meter unit. The alarm meter unit was replaced with a new spare and subsequently calibrated after installation. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel to initiate a reactor scram resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.10, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-04 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021.

Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-05, Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; adjusting anti-siphon system LC 965 level controller displacer; replacing pressure transmitter PT 917 alarm meter unit; replacing the fission chamber and associated cabling for nuclear instrumentation signal processor no. 1; and completing compliance procedure CP-25, Control Blade Inspection, for shim control blade C.

DECEMBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in December with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and three unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered three senior reactor operator licensing examinations.

On December 14, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a control room operator inadvertently placed the reactor in the manual control mode. While attempting to return the reactor to the automatic control mode, an automatic high power rod run-in occurred. After reactor power had reduced to below the trip set point, the LSRO reset the rod run-in, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.

On December 24, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to incorrect regulating blade height indication on the RPI panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Investigation revealed that a setscrew on the coupler attaching the drive motor to the RPI encoder on the regulating rod drive mechanism had backed out, allowing the coupler to slip. The regulating rod drive mechanism was removed and a I-6

rebuilt spare was installed. Permission to restart the reactor was received from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.

On December 30, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to a lowering of pressurizer liquid level. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. Investigation revealed a leak on the diaphragm of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503B outlet throttle valve. The reactor remained shutdown for the remainder of the year to perform repairs.

Major maintenance items for the month included: repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).

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SECTION II MURR PROCEDURES January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 As required by administrative MURR Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.e(5), this section of the Reactor Operations Annual Report includes a summary of procedure changes. These procedure changes were reviewed by the Reactor Manager or Reactor Health Physics Manager, as applicable, and others to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These procedure changes were also reviewed by the Reactor Safety Procedure Review Subcommittee and/or the Isotope Use Procedure Review Subcommittee of the Reactor Advisory Committee to meet the requirements of TS 6.2.a(2).

A. CHANGES TO REACTOR OPERATIONS PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Reactor Operations procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.

There were 57 revisions issued to the Reactor Operations policies, procedures, and forms. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one new procedure and one new policy were issued, while one procedure was obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, and forms:

Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-RO-105 MURR Operator Requalification Process 2 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-110 Conduct of Operations 30 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-135 Reactor Utilization Requests 5 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-003 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 15 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-010 Facility Access Criteria 24 3/4/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-011 Facility Access Process 24 3/30/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-024 Ombudsman Program 9 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-110 Pneumatic Tube System 3 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 17 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 18 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 19 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 20 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 31 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 32 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 33 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 18 2/18/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 19 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-11 Reactor Shutdown Checksheet 9 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial FM-15 10 CFR 50.59 Qualified Reviewers List 26 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-56 Reactor Routine Patrol 28 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial FM-57 Long Form Startup Checksheet 35 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial FM-63 DI Water Makeup Log 13 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial II-1

Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes Customer Sample Pre-Encapsulation Evaluation FM-66 11 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial Worksheet FM-97 Routing Form for Facility Drawing Revisions 12 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 8 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 9 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial Authorization to Conduct Background Investigation FM-200 6 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial for Unescorted Access to MURR GS-RA-100 MURR Equipment Tag Out 18 12/28/2021 Full Review IRR-PSO-Receipt of Non-Radioactive Material for Irradiation 11 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial 104 OP-RO-101 Instrument Air System 14 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-250 In-Pool Fuel Handling 24 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-410 Primary Coolant System 19 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-461 Pool Coolant System - One Pump Operation 20 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-465 Pool Level Control - Skimmer System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-466 Pool Level Control - Pool Coolant System 15 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-480 Secondary Coolant System 26 6/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 13 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-533 Skimmer System 11 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-555 Fire Protection System 18 6/22/2021 Obsoleted OP-RO-741 Waste Tank System Operation 26 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 6 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 7 7/16/2021 Minor Editorial POL-30 MURR Filter Management Program 0 9/22/2021 New Policy RM-RO-400 Waste Tank System Filter Replacement 12 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 20 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 21 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-RO-100 Fuel Movement 16 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RP-RO-200 10 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial RTP-11 (D)

Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap RP-RO-201 6 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B)

Measurement of Primary Coolant/Moderator RP-RO-203 2 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity, RTP-19 Receipt, Inspection, Accounting, and Shipping of RP-RO-300 8 1/21/2021 Full Review Unirradiated Fuel SM-RO-011 Beryllium Reflector Replacement 9 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset SM-RO-025 4 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial Mechanism Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset SM-RO-025 5 11/23/2021 Minor Editorial Mechanism SM-RO-555 Fire Protection System 0 6/22/2021 New Procedure SM-RO-636 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'B' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-637 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'C' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-638 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'D' Liner 8 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-639 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'E' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial II-2

B. CHANGES TO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Emergency Plan implementing procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.

There were 11 revisions issued to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures, forms, and operator aids. All of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one form was obsoleted. The following is a list of the revised and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids:

Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes EP-RO-002 Emergency Responsibilities 10 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-004 Fire 10 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-006 Radiological Emergency 12 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-013 Facility Evacuation 13 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 43 2/10/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 44 4/1/2021 Obsoleted OA-9 Combined Emergency Flowcharts 8 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-10 Fire Extinguisher Locations and Types 17 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 28 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 29 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 26 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 27 6/14/2021 Minor Editorial II-3

C. CHANGES TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, BYPRODUCT MATERIAL SHIPPING, AND PREPARATION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL FOR SHIPPING PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Health Physics Manager reviewed the radiological control procedures and the procedures for the preparation for shipping and shipping of byproduct materials.

There were 54 revisions issued to the radiological control, byproduct materials shipping, and preparation for shipping byproduct material policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, three new procedures and one new form were issued, while two procedures were obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids:

Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-HP-115 Iodine 131 Bioassay 6 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-119 High Radiation Area Access 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-125 Review of Unplanned Radiation Exposure 8 1/14/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-129 Hot Cell HC-01 Control 20 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-130 Reactor License Projects Annual Review 9 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial Access Authorization Program for Category 1 and/or AP-RR-013 7 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or AP-RR-017 0 3/8/2021 New Procedure Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or AP-RR-017 1 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials Administrative Procedure - Radioactive Material AP-SH-001 14 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial Shipping Notification for Category 2 Material Per Export AP-SH-004 3 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial License PXB143.01 BPB-SH-020 Receipt Inspection Of Type B Shipping Package 10 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS BPB-SH-031 1 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial Insert Model No. 3987 Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS BPB-SH-031 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial Insert Model No. 3987 Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Packaging BPB-SH-032 0 8/26/2021 New Procedure of Type B Radioactive Material Type B Shipment of Spent Fuel Using the BEA FB-SH-110 9 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial Research Reactor Package FM-17 Radiation Work Permit 16 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial FM-29 Dosimetry Request Packet 13 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-FM-50 0 8/26/2021 New Form 522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-FM-50 1 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial 522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 33 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 34 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 35 11/19/2021 Minor Editorial Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A FM-147 8 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial Radioactive Material Using Tracerco LS-15 Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of FM-159 14 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial Radioactive Material Shipment Documentation Radiation Protection Data Sheet 'A' for cMo-99 FM-165 6 3/11/2021 Minor Editorial Process in Hot Cell HC-02A/B II-4

Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of FM-173 Excepted (Limited) Quantity Radioactive Material 4 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial Shipment Control Checksheet for Documentation and Labeling FM-201 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial of NorthStar Radioactive Material Shipment Hot Cell Preparation of Radioactive Material for HC-PSO-002 21 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial Shipment HC-PSO-005 Hot Cell-01 Loading of Host Cans 18 11/18/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-300 Calibration - Radiation Survey Instruments 11 5/12/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-306 Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Flow Calibration 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Iodine IC-HP-308 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial Channel Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-309 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial Particulate Channel Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-310 10 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial Particulate Channel Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-310 11 7/14/2021 Minor Editorial Particulate Channel Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-311 11 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial Iodine Channel Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-312 10 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial Gas Channel Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-312 11 3/21/2021 Minor Editorial Gas Channel IC-HP-345 Calibration - Canberra S5 XLB Swipe Counter 0 6/15/2021 New Procedure IC-HP-348 Calibration - Canberra S5XLB-G 8 5/12/2021 Obsoleted IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 7 1/11/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 8 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor -

IC-HP-354 2 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial Particulate Channel Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Flow IC-HP-356 5 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial Calibration Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA OA-99 3 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial DOT 7A MURR Model 1500 OP-HP-222 Air Sampling - Containment Building Ar-41 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-228 Performing Iodine 131 Bioassay Measurements 9 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-300 Receipt of Radioactive Material 14 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-353 Waste Tank Sample - Analysis 11 6/15/2021 Minor Editorial Iodine 131 Processing Hot Cells Radiation Monitor OP-HP-365 4 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial (ALMO-6)

OP-HP-400 Gemstone Shipping Barrel Analysis 12 1/14/2021 Obsoleted POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 21 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 22 11/12/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-005 Type B QA Personnel Training 7 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-006 Type B Shipping Program Quality Audits 4 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-008 Training for Type B Shipment Leak Test Performers 6 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-105 Transfer of Radioactive Material Within the Facility 15 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-120 Personnel Radioactive Contamination 16 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-135 Room 114 Entry - Self Monitored 12 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial Removal of Waste from Hot Cell HC-11A Using WM-SH-116 1 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial Shielded Container II-5

SECTION III REVISIONS TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 On August 31, 2006, MURR submitted a request to the NRC to renew Amended Facility Operating License No. R-103 for another twenty years of operation, at which time MURR also provided its proposed Safety Analysis Report (SAR). On January 4, 2017, the NRC issued Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103.

From 2017 through 2021, a significant amount of effort was spent by MURR staff to update the August 31, 2006, SAR with all of the facility changes and modifications that had occurred between 2006 and 2017, and with applicable information from the hundreds of MURR responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information during the relicensing process.

During calendar year 2021, modifications or changes to the facility occurred that required the following revisions to the SAR, as submitted to the NRC in 2006 for relicensing. The following changes have been reviewed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, by licensed staff and members of the Reactor Safety Subcommittee; determined not to involve a change to the MURR Technical Specifications; and approved by the Reactor Manager.

CHAPTER 1 - THE FACILITY Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.1 (page 1-5)

Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 1 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Basement Level, Rev. 19, dated 09/21/21 Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.2 (page 1-6) (as revised by the 2019 Reactor Operations Annual Report)

Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Grade Level, Rev. 42, dated 09/30/21 CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL Section 7.6.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-37) (as revised by the 2018 Reactor Operations Annual Report)

Insert new sentences at end of paragraph to read: The chart recorder will display an additional trend line on a loss of electrical power to the primary coolant circulation pumps. A pair of relays are connected to the control circuits for primary coolant circulation pumps P501A and P501B that will provide a real time indication of electrical power to the pumps. This feature assists in data collection for a primary coolant system flow coast down.

Section 7.8.2.1, first paragraph (page 7-58)

Delete: 2. Parallel relays R2A and R2B and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; Replace with: 2. Parallel R2 series relays (R2A-R2F) and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; III-1

Section 7.8.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-58)

Delete: De-energizing either relay R2A or R2B (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur:

Replace with: De-energizing the R2 series relays (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur:

Section 7.8.2.2, first paragraph (page 7-59)

Delete: 2. All actions caused by relays R2A and R2B de-energizing.

Replace with: 2. All actions caused by the R2 series relays de-energizing.

Section 7.8.2.2, second paragraph (page 7-59)

Delete: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relays 2K2, R2A, and R2B; and Replace with: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relay 2K2 and the R2 series relays; and Section 7.9.2.1, Figure 7.11 (pages 7-63/64)

Update with Print No. 203, Sheet 1 of 1, Area Monitoring System, Rev. 16, dated 07/22/21 CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.1 (page 8-4)

Update with Print No. 2294, Sheet 1 of 1, Uninterruptible Power Supply Interconnect Diagram, Rev. 4, dated 01/22/21 Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.2 (pages 8-5/6)

Update with Print No. 522, Sheet 1 of 8, Electrical Distribution Reactor/Laboratory, Rev. 53, dated 09/07/21, and Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 8, Electrical Distribution Emergency Electrical Power System, Rev. 3, dated 01/22/21 CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIIARY SYSTEMS Section 9.12.2, third and fourth paragraphs (pages 9-20 and 9-21)

Delete: In addition to the water treatment system discussed above, an ion exchange demineralizer system (DI-300) serves as a backup. This system consists of a 300-gallon (1,136-l) rubber-lined carbon steel tank sized to hold 24 cubic feet (0.68 m3) of mixed bed resin, filters before and after the demineralizer tank, and associated piping and valves.

Demineralized water from either system may then be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or the reactor plant.

Replace with: Demineralized water from the RO unit may be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or reactor plant.

III-2

SECTION IV PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 For each facility modification described below, MURR has on file the safety screen or evaluation, as well as the documentation of review, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 1 Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)

This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation and Isolation, documents the transfer of electrical supply power to the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system. Historically, there have been momentary losses of normal electrical power that have been long enough in duration to cause a reactor scram from either the facility evacuation or the reactor containment isolation system; however, not long enough to cause a reactor scram due to decreased primary coolant or pool coolant system flow rate. This change should decrease the probability that the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems will actuate during a momentary loss of normal electrical power, thus increasing operational reliability.

MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 2 Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation and Isolation, documents the replacement of relays (R1A, R1B, R2A, R2B, R3A, and R3B) in the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems. The new Schneider relays replace obsolete Square D relays; however, the functionality of the relays remain the same.

MODIFICATION RECORD 88-11, ADDENDUM 2 Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect This addendum to Modification Record 88-11, Reactor Control Power Upgrade (Replacing Line Conditioner with Uninterruptible Power Supply), documents the maintenance required to replace a malfunctioning transformer on the UPS system inverter. To assist in this maintenance, an additional 70-amp fused disconnect was added to the output of the alternate source to allow isolation of the inverter without securing power to all UPS panels. This disconnect was installed to the output of the alternate source and the corresponding contacts on the inverter. This line is a sensing line that supplies the inverter and provides an input to the inverter for detection of the phase for the alternate source.

IV-1

MODIFICATION RECORD 90-03, ADDENDUM 1 16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement This addendum to Modification Record 90-03, 16 Valve Solenoid Cabinet, documents the replacement of the 16-inch ventilation exhaust solenoid-operated isolation valves cabinet. Replacement of the cabinet also included replacement of all of the solenoid-operated valves, which were upgraded to more robust and reliable continuous duty Parker N3554104853 3-way valves, and associated piping inside the cabinet. Additionally, all security features installed under Modification Record 90-03 were removed following a change in license requirements authorized by the MURR Physical Security Plan.

MODIFICATION RECORD 19-02 Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration This modification record was generated for the purpose of providing a means for documenting structural changes to the laboratory building. It is intended to capture changes such as the addition or removal of walls, combining or separating laboratory building spaces, etc. It can also be used to capture service changes to laboratory building spaces.

Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed.

MODIFICATION RECORD 20-03 Substation B, MCC-5 Micro-Versa-Plus Trip Unit This modification record documents replacement of Substation B motor control center MCC-5 breaker with a refurbished General Electric Type AK 2A-25-1 unit retrofitted with a solid state MicroVersaTrip+ (MVT+) unit.

MODIFICATION RECORD 21-01 Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators This modification record documents the replacement of the original-style lamps and pushbuttons utilized for various reactor plant indicators and controls on the reactor control console. The original lamps and pushbuttons, which are General Electric (GE) CR103 incandescent bulbs and GE-style pushbuttons, respectively, were upgraded to confront obsolescence. The packages used in this modification are IDEC AL6 LED Pilot Lights and IDEC AL6 Illuminated Pushbutton switches. These changes were analyzed from an electrical perspective in Tech Note 20-005.00 and found to be suitable replacements for the existing GE lamps and pushbuttons. The listed mechanical life of the proposed pushbuttons is a minimum of 100,000 operations for the selected style of operation. Using a conservative estimation of 6 operations per week, the proposed pushbuttons have a rated operational lifetime of over 300 years.

MODIFICATION RECORD 21-02 Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement This modification record documents the replacement of the sealing gasket solenoid-operated valves for the reactor containment building truck entry door (Door 101), ventilation supply and exhaust plenums (Doors 504 and 505), and IV-2

the personnel airlock (Doors 276 and 277) with a newer model (ASCO 8344 Dual Action Piston/Poppet Solenoid Valves) due to obsolescence of the previously-installed solenoid-operated valves.

MODIFICATION RECORD 21-04 Security Upgrades This modification record was created as a means of documenting changes to various MURR security features and storing them in one common location. The intent of this modification record is to host various letters to file that describe necessary changes to MURR security that do not warrant a modification record on their own. Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. Typical information in each letter to file will include a description of the change, procedural changes, and print changes. This Modification Record is handled as Safeguards Information and is controlled as such.

MODIFICATION RECORD 21-05 Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive This modification record documents the replacement of the undersized motor contactor on motor control center MCC-4 that supplies electrical power to reactor containment building supply fan SF-2.

MODIFICATION REDORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 2, 2020)

Addition of Exhaust Ventilation to Room 241 Oven This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents adding additional exhaust ventilation for Room 241 for an oven which will support potentially radioactive work.

MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 22, 2020)

Room 236 Exhaust Ventilation Renovation This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the addition of a larger exhaust ventilation trunk to support a welding snorkel in Room 236, in addition to the existing room exhaust ventilation.

MODIFICATION RECORD 15 LETTER TO FILE (February 11, 2021)

Anti-Siphon Actuator Flow Throttling This letter to Modification Record 15-01, Additional Coupling Joint for Anti-Siphon System Isolation Valves V543A and V543B, documents a procedural change to throttle the air supply valve for the pneumatic actuators that this modification record describes. The intent of this change was to reduce wear and tear on the actuators, linkages, and valves.

IV-3

MODIFICATION RECORD 88-07, ADDENDUM 3 - LETTER TO FILE (February 24, 2021)

HC-11 Solenoid Cabinet Pneumatic Exhaust Addition This letter to Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3, Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion, documents the relocation of hot cell HC-11 solenoid cabinet pneumatic exhaust from HC-11B to the exhaust line just before the charcoal filters in Room 299V. Previously, the pneumatic exhaust was routed back to HC-11B creating a potential release path into the surrounding room. This change routes all the pneumatic exhaust to the facility exhaust ventilation system and installs a block-off plate on the abandoned HC-11B penetration.

MODIFICATION RECORD 86-01, ADDENDUM 5 - LETTER TO FILE (February 25, 2021)

Thermal Neutron Flux Changes Due to Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements 5A and 5B in Year 2020 This letter to Modification Record 86-01, Addendum 5, Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements in Reflector Tank Positions 5A and 5B, documents the effects of changing graphite reflector elements 5A and 5B in calendar year 2020. After installation of element 5B in February of 2020, MURR Reactor Health Physics noted that Argon-41 levels were approximately 10% higher than previous levels. Replacement of element 5A was postponed until further modifications and procedural changes could be implemented to reduce Argon-41 production. Following the changes that are outlined in their applicable modification records, total annual Argon-41 activity released has been maintained at or slightly below pre-2020 levels.

MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (March 26, 2021)

Lab 215A Ventilation Control This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the modification to the exhaust ventilation system for Room 215A. The previously-installed ventilation system for Room 215A was non-functional. The original configuration for this laboratory utilized control air to manipulate dampers and an exhaust fan. This change will replace the exhaust fan control with an on-off switch and fully open the dampers for maximum flow.

MODIFICATION RECORD 13-02, ADDENDUM 1 - LETTER TO FILE (July 21, 2021)

Secondary Chemistry Modifications This letter to Modification Record 13-02, Addendum 1, Secondary Coolant Chemistry Control, documents, at the request of NALCO Water, the relocation the injection point of the liquid biocide agent. This move is intended reduce chemical usage through increased efficiency.

MODIFICATION RECORD 99-01, Addendum 1 - LETTER TO FILE (August 6, 2021)

Primary Coolant System Coast Down Data Collection This letter to Modification Record 99-01, Addendum 1, Replace Process Instrumentation Recorders - 2018, documents the utilization of the functions of the digital paperless chart recorders to generate a signal when the primary IV-4

coolant pumps are de-energized. This change allows MURR to more accurately evaluate the coast down times for the primary coolant system when the pumps are secured.

MODIFICATION RECORD 03-03, ADDENDUM 4 - LETTER TO FILE (August 8, 2021)

SaRB Fire Protection Expansion This letter to Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 4, Fire Protection System in the Shipping and Receiving Building, documents the expansion of the fire protection system in the Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) in support of an approximately 1,600 ft2 building expansion.

MODIFICATION RECORD 93 LETTER TO FILE (September 22, 2021)

Removal of DI-300 AND Associated Piping This letter to Modification Record 93-01, The Installation of Three New DI Tanks in the North Tower, documents the removal of the ion exchange column (DI-300) that was originally used to supply demineralized water to the facility and reactor plant.

MODIFICATION RECORD 21 LETTER TO FILE (November 5, 2021)

Solenoid Cabinet Isolation Valve This letter to Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement, documents the addition of an additional isolation valve for the containment building airlock.

MODIFICATION RECORD 91 LETTER TO FILE (November 23, 2021)

Rod Drop Timer This letter to Modification Record 91-01, Replacement of Mechanical Rod Drop Timers and Photoelectric Cells with Digital Rod Drop Timers and Wavelength Sensitive Photoelectric Cells, documents the addition of a fuse on the power supply to the rod drop timer circuitry. This fuse helps reduce the cycling of Breaker No. 9 located in UPS Panel No. 2.

IV-5

SECTION V NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 The following amended tests or experiments were approved during calendar year 2021 under a Reactor Utilization Request (RUR):

RUR 406, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Enriched Ytterbium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of up to 3.5 grams of enriched ytterbium oxide in the flux trap position of the reactor.

RUR 440, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Tellurium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of tellurium oxide at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s. This change was necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions due to a planned graphite reflector reconfiguration.

RUR 458, AS AMENDED Molybdenum Metal Irradiation This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of molybdenum metal at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s and a maximum fluence of 3.5 E+20 n/cm2. These changes were partly necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions and partly due to an increase in end-of-irradiation activity needs.

RUR 459, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Enriched Uranium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the long-term irradiation of small quantities (approximately 36 mg) of 3.44%

enriched uranium oxide pellets to support research and development efforts of Texas A&M University researchers.

Each of these tests or experiments has a written safety evaluation on file and a 10 CFR 50.59 Screen, if applicable, to assure that the test or experiment is safe and within the limits of MURR Technical Specifications. The safety evaluations have been reviewed by the Reactor Manager, Reactor Health Physics Manager, Assistant Reactor Manager-Physics, and the Reactor Safety Subcommittee, as applicable.

V-1

SECTION VI SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 INSPECTIONS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted one routine inspection reviewing special nuclear material (SNM) activities during calendar year 2021. All records and activities were found to be in compliance with NRC rules and regulations. No violations were noted.

REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS Fifty-seven refueling evolutions were completed in 2021. Reactor core excess reactivity verifications were performed for each refueling. The largest measured excess reactivity was 3.77%. MURR Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.a requires reactor core excess reactivity above reference core condition to be less than 9.8%.

REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS Five differential blade-worth measurements of the shim control blades were performed either following a planned replacement of a control blade or to ensure compliance with TS 4.2.g.

Five reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the total reactivity worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister, in addition to all samples loaded in the center test hole region of the reactor.

Four reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the worth of various samples that are irradiated in the center test hole region of the reactor and another one to estimate the worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister.

VI-1

SECTION VII RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 TABLE 1 SANITARY SEWER EFFLUENT Descending Order of Activity Released for Nuclide Totals > 1.000E-02 mCi Nuclide Activity (mCi)

H-3 1.51E+02 Co-60 6.27E+00 S-35 3.24E+00 Te-125m 1.22E+00 Zn-65 7.81E-01 Lu-177 4.64E-01 P-32 1.88E-01 Ca-45 1.66E-01 Be-7 7.26E-02 Sc-46 5.34E-02 Mo-99 4.88E-02 In-115m 2.62E-02 Cd-115 2.31E-02 Na-24 2.09E-02 Tc-99m 2.03E-02 Fe-59 1.69E-02 Ag-110m 1.65E-02 Total H-3 1.51E+02 Total Other 1.28E+01 Sanitary sewer effluents are in compliance with 10 CFR 20.2003, Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage.

VII-1

TABLE 2 STACK EFFLUENT Ordered by % Technical Specification Limit Average Concentration Total Release Isotope TS Limit Multiplier  % TS

(µCi/ml) (µCi)

Ar-41 2.25E-06 1.04E+09 350 64.1836 I-131 1.07E-12 4.98E+02 1 0.5360 H-3 2.45E-08 1.14E+07 350 0.0701 Kr-79 9.38E-09 4.35E+06 350 0.0383 Xe-131m 1.10E-07 5.13E+07 350 0.0158 C-14* 2.04E-11 9.14E-03 1 0.0068 Re-186 1.03E-11 4.76E+03 350 0.0015 Bi-214 4.74E-12 2.20E+03 350 0.0014 Sc-46 2.81E-15 1.31E+00 1 0.0009 Br-82 1.82E-12 8.46E+02 350 0.0001 Hg-203 7.85E-16 3.65E-01 1 0.0001 Os-191 1.16E-15 5.36E-01 1 0.0001 C-14 activity is calculated based on the ratio of argon to nitrogen in the air and the (n, p) reaction cross sections for the activation of N-14 to C-14.

Isotopes observed at < 0.0001% Technical Specification (TS) limit are not listed.

Stack Flow Rate = ~30,000 cfm Stack effluent releases are in compliance with University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103 TS.

VII-2

SECTION VIII ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEYS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations and analyzed for radioactivity. Soil and vegetation samples are also taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three locations, while subsurface soil samples are taken at six locations each period. Analytical results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 3 lists the radiation doses recorded by the environmental monitors deployed around MURR in 2021. All doses fluctuate around background with the exception of monitor numbers 4, 8, 9, and 45. These monitors are located near a loading dock area where packages containing radioactive material are loaded or traversed prior to being placed on transport vehicles. The doses recorded by these monitors are considered to be the result of exposure to packages in transit. The environmental monitoring program confirms that minimal environmental impact exists from the operation of the MURR facility. Data from the fourth quarter is unavailable at this time due to changes in dosimetry provider and logistical issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This data will be provided in a follow-up report to the NRC once it is available.

The number of radiation and contamination surveys performed each month is provided in Table 4.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 Detection Limits*

Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 0.99 pCi/g 9.47 pCi/g 1.20 pCi/g 7.51 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.52 pCi/g 0.58 pCi/g N/A Water 0.40 pCi/g 3.58 pCi/g 186.60 pCi/L 7.04 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.91 pCi/g 0.44 pCi/g N/A Activity Levels - Vegetation Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V99 <MDA 17.44 <MDA <MDA 2V99 <MDA 19.37 <MDA <MDA 3V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 4V99 <MDA 14.23 <MDA <MDA 5V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 6V99 <MDA 14.02 <MDA <MDA 7V99 <MDA 22.79 <MDA <MDA 10V99 <MDA 9.74 <MDA <MDA VIII-1

TABLE 1 (Contd)

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 Activity Levels - Soil Alpha Beta Gamma Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S99 1.05 13.21 2.24 2S99 0.45 8.72 2.62 3S99 0.60 13.11 2.40 4S99 0.90 12.36 3.49 5S99 0.30 13.00 3.00 6S99 1.05 12.14 2.89 7S99 0.75 13.11 2.65 10S99 1.05 15.14 4.58 Activity Levels - Water Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 6W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 10W99 <MDA 4.79 <MDA <MDA Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil Alpha Beta Gamma Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)

E99 <MDA 12.57 3.73 S99 1.05 10.97 3.79 SW99 1.05 11.82 3.43 W99 1.35 10.00 3.12 N99 1.50 11.72 3.52 NE99 1.05 10.65 4.05 Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than minimum detectable activity (MDA).

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TABLE 2

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 Detection Limits*

Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 1.40 pCi/g 4.16 pCi/g 1.59 pCi/g 2.85 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 2.02 pCi/g 0.57 pCi/g N/A Water 0.00 pCi/g 2.09 pCi/g 188.47 pCi/L 3.33 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.99 pCi/g 2.08 pCi/g 0.51 pCi/g N/A Activity Levels - Vegetation Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V100 2.10 14.88 <MDA <MDA 2V100 <MDA 11.96 <MDA <MDA 3V100 <MDA 11.34 <MDA <MDA 4V100 <MDA 13.21 <MDA <MDA 5V100 <MDA 14.25 <MDA <MDA 6V100 <MDA 15.08 <MDA <MDA 7V100 <MDA 11.55 <MDA <MDA 10V100 <MDA 19.25 <MDA <MDA Activity Levels - Soil Alpha Beta Gamma Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S100 0.30 9.52 3.09 2S100 1.05 6.29 3.46 3S100 1.35 7.23 3.27 4S100 0.45 7.54 3.14 5S100 0.60 6.81 2.62 6S100 0.15 4.63 2.36 7S100 0.45 3.69 2.04 10S100 0.45 8.06 4.18 VIII-3

TABLE 2 (Contd)

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 Activity Levels - Water Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W100 <MDA 4.51 <MDA <MDA 6W100 0.30 5.01 <MDA <MDA 10W100 0.36 12.94 1492 <MDA Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil Alpha Beta Gamma Sample (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)

E100 1.05 13.89 3.64 S100 1.20 14.51 4.08 SW100 <MDA 13.47 3.17 W100 <MDA 14.10 4.11 N100 <MDA 14.82 3.59 NE100 1.20 13.99 4.13 Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than MDA.

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TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTAL TLD

SUMMARY

Badge Direction from Meters from 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Total**

Number MURR MURR Stack (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) 0 Control N/A 24 25 25 N/A 74 1* Control N/A 23 23 26 N/A 72 2* Control N/A 22 24 24 N/A 70 3 W 30 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 4 SW 59 19 9 3 N/A 31 5 ENE 110 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 6 NNE 84 4 2 3 N/A 9 7 ENE 55 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 8 SW 32 21 20 6 N/A 47 9 SSE 27 11 26 13 N/A 50 10 NE 139 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 11 N 135 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 12 NE 284 2 1 0 N/A 3 13 NNE 305 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 14 S 168 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 15 SSE 74 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 16 SE 113 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 17 E 299 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 18 NE 453 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 19 NE 673 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 20 NE 893 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 21 SSE 239 2 <MDA 0 N/A 2 22 SE 158 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 23 NW 89 2 1 1 N/A 4 24 SSW 308 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 25 SSW 435 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 26 SSW 365 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 27 SW 170 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 28 NW 229 0 0 1 N/A 1 29 NW 260 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 30 N 335 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 31 NNE 677 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 32 NW 760 0 <MDA 1 N/A 1 33 ESE 578 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 34 ENE 596 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 35 SSE 477 2 4 2 N/A 8 36 SE 446 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 37 NE 732 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 38 NW 487 2 3 2 N/A 7 39 W 528 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 40 N 503 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 41 NE 161 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 42 In Building N/A 8 9 8 N/A 25 43 In Building N/A 3 3 1 N/A 7 44 SW 102 0 0 <MDA N/A 0 45 SE 94 6 9 0 N/A 15 46 SE 105 4 2 <MDA N/A 6 The control monitors are approximately 10 miles NW of MURR, and gross values are shown.

These totals exclude 4th Quarter data, which will be provided to the NRC in a follow-up report once it is available.

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TABLE 4 NUMBER OF FACILITY RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION SURVEYS Receipt of Surface Radiation Month Radiation Air Samples** Radioactive Contamination* Work Permits Materials January 125 125 42 20 3 February 84 84 36 13 7 March 111 111 45 17 8 April 117 117 43 20 12 May 93 93 44 10 13 June 108 108 48 9 20 July 126 126 50 10 17 August 102 102 47 18 11 September 119 119 47 10 16 October 130 130 48 11 6 November 101 101 43 16 8 December 94 94 46 19 3 TOTAL 1,310 1,310 539 173 124 In addition, general building contamination surveys are conducted each normal working day.

Air samples include stack Ar-41, containment Ar-41, sump entries, and hot cell entries.

Miscellaneous Note During calendar year 2021, MURR shipped 1,525 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste containing 20,249 mCi of activity.

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SECTION IX

SUMMARY

OF RADIATION EXPOSURE TO FACILITY STAFF, EXPERIMENTERS, AND VISITORS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 Total Personnel Dose (mrem) by Dosimetry Group BCS DO FOE HC HP IRR NA NS NSP OPS PRD QA RES RP SH TEE Total January 8 32 54 170 302 0 5 71 99 771 186 36 14 17 52 12 1,829 February 9 1 34 141 160 12 92 7 109 706 155 41 12 33 39 33 1,584 March 10 9 68 140 295 0 13 7 641 887 333 67 3 11 38 15 2,537 April 13 9 76 86 261 6 13 7 44 1,752 194 53 15 25 81 8 2,643 May 13 0 30 136 200 57 1 45 76 808 202 74 14 38 41 13 1,748 June 28 13 165 117 397 79 23 17 50 939 179 56 6 27 30 1 2,127 July 33 19 157 TR 193 145 32 66 114 848 248 30 4 39 55 27 2,010 August 10 41 275 TR 200 246 83 29 297 1,316 257 84 21 32 51 6 2,948 September 6 26 33 TR 226 147 15 136 161 855 178 55 6 14 28 6 1,892 October 18 17 150 TR 327 139 29 34 123 886 203 96 25 31 44 14 2,136 November 10 1 244 TR 702 416 32 35 342 2,325 456 245 33 40 193 24 5,098 December IX-1 Total for Year 158 168 1,286 790 3,263 1,247 338 454 2,056 12,093 2,591 837 153 307 652 159 26,552 Monthly Average 13 14 107 66 272 104 28 38 171 1,008 216 70 13 26 54 13 2,213 Highest WB 25 22 573 TR 586 535 27 139 504 737 254 214 25 61 122 24 (annual)

High Extremity 111 NM 2,799 TR 643 1,326 1,261 65 6,581 2,510 9,140 1,517 100 462 631 84 (annual)

BCS-Business & Central Services HP-Health Physics NSP-NorthStar Partners RES-Research DO-Director's Office IRR-Irradiations OPS-Operations RP-Radiopharmaceutical FOE-Facilities Operations & Engineering NA-Neutron Activation PRD-Production SH-Shipping HC-Hot Cell NS-Neutron Scattering QA-Quality Assurance TEE-Trace Elemental Epidemiology WB-Whole Body NM-Not Monitored OB-Obsolete TR-Transfer to New Group Analysis of personnel exposure levels indicates that exposures are significantly below the limits of 10 CFR 20.1201 and are generally maintained ALARA.

No significant personnel exposures occurred during this monitoring year.

Dosimetry services are provided by Mirion Technologies (except self-reading dosimetry).

Due to COVID-19 and supply issues, dosimetry services scheduling experienced interruptions from October through December, 2021. This caused dosimetry-wear periods to be uneven from month-to-month. December 2021 dosimeters were only issued to personnel with 11 days remaining in December, making November badges almost two months worth of data. This report excludes data for the remaining 11 days of December 2021 and will be provided to the NRC in a follow-up report once it is available.