ML20238F864

Discusses NRC Followup Actions to Util 830504 Notification of Questionable Performance of Matl & Weld NDEs by One Contractor Technician.Enforcement Action Not Warranted. Related Info Encl

ML20238F864
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/04/1984
From:	Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20238F776	List: ML20238F774 ML20238F839 ML20238F847 ML20238F853 ML20238F864 ML20239A000 ML20239A176
References
FOIA-86-188 NUDOCS 8709160399
Download: ML20238F864 (10)

Text

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JAfi 0 - E; MEMORANDUM FOR:

T. E. Morley, Regional Administrator, Region I FROM:

R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs

SUBJECT:

NRC FOLLOW-UP - SEABROOK NDE FALSIFICATION On May 4,1983 Region I was notified, by Public Service Company of New Hampshire, in accordance with 30 CFR 50.55(e), of the questionable performance of material and weld surface nondestructive examinations (NDE) by one contractor technician.

Prior to any determination of falsification, the licensee's internal investiga-tion revealed that NDE procedures had been violated. This information was sufficient to cause the contractor to terminate the subject technician and l

place on hold all 2,399 nondestructive examinations perfcrmed by the individual, until re-examination and disposition could be performed. It is noted that although only 33*e of the suspect NDE work was performed on safety-related welds, the licensee decided to evaluate all 2,399 cases. As a result of this incident in May, I personally contacted the Executive Vice President of PSNH, Mr. David Merrill, and emphasized to him the need for a thorough and complete l reassessment of all work done by the f alsifier. PSNH acknowledged that they had l

already taken steps in this matter. Additional ' meetings were also held with both PSNH and YAEC to discuss the performance in general of the subject

! contractor.

As part of our effort we have been reviewing a number of licensee-initiated reports as well as conducting independent inspections. Upon completion of the 01 effort we were able to conclude that there was no management complicity.

However, IE staff expressed their interest by telephone and my staf f has kept ]

them fully informed and advised.

i By memo dated December 23, 1983 IE requested certain actions relative to the Seabrook NDE f falsification issue. Our prior actions appear to have adequately i l

anticipated the IE concerns since we also had the same concerns last May.

However, it is d',sheartening to note that telephone discussions on this very topic were not sufficient and resources had to be . diverted to prepare additional documentation several manths af ter we have conducteti meetings with the licensee and on-site inspections cf. the topic. In an environment where resources are extremely strained and where the subject plant is in the midst of a volatile public hearing, I question ,the motivation to div.ert inspection resources to prepare more ' paper' in light of the f act that the information is already

' available and documented. More recent inspection effort will be documented shortly. .

Review, by resident and regional inspectors, independently, of the audit program, in existence at the time of the incident indicated that the program was being conducted in accordance with NRC requirements and FSAR commitments.

The contractor NDE staff organizationally reports to the contractor Field QA Manager. Contractor QA auditors, located on-site, and licosee (thru their agent - Yankee Atomic Electric Company, YAEC) auditors conduct periodic audits I

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Memo to T. E. Murley 2 J/A 0 y 1384 of the contractor NDE program. A key operation in providing assurance of QC field activities is the YAEC surveillance program. Specifically, YAEC NDE personnel had been and still do conduct 100*, review of contractor accepted radiographs. Also, YAEC QA inspectors conduct both random and scheduled sur-veillances of field NDE work. An example of this activity is appended to the subject investigation report, in that a YAEC surveillance report documents an earlier identified violation of the conduct of a liquid penetrant examination by the offending NDE technician. In this case, the work was nonsafety-related and corrective action consisted of reconduct of the examination and verifica-tion that the technician was knowledgeable of the procedural requirements. It should also be noted that the original NDE falsification problem was identified by the contractor when another NDE technician identified a concern with the offending technician's acceptance of a weld. Followup of that concern through the contractor's program led to the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.

The re-examination of previously accepted work is not considered to be required for an effective audit program. Yet in this case, which involved random and periodic falsification, it appears that a re-examination program may have been the only quantitative method to establish the existence of a problem. As one of the corrective actions, the licensee has instituted a sample NDE re-examination program. Although this action is beyond any regulatory requirement 'and beyond the norm of NDE activities observed in the nuclear construction industry the licensee did institute this effort and we strongly encouraged the initiative at senior management levels.

1 Subsequent to the identification of the NDE falsification, the licensee committed j to the following actions relative to oversight of NDE activities. These com:nitments are documented in Inspection Report 50-443, 444/83-06, and were discussed during a June 7, 1983 meeting.

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-- A sample re-inspection of other contractor NDE technician work with I results confirming that the problem was restricted to the one individu01.

-- Increased contractor supervisory field checks and independent auditing.

Increased licensee surveillance of NDE activities on all shifts.

-- Establishment of a licensee program for "information only" NDE to be pcrformed by an independent contractor to verify that ongoing NDE work has been and is being satisfactorily performed and correctly evaluated.

While the current NDE audit program may be more prescriptive and better directed to the identification of NDE problems, we do consider the former NDE audit program to have been consistent with existing QA guidance and to have been effectively implemented by the licensee.

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1554 Memo to T. E. Marley 3 I

The evaluation of a11' suspect areas was completed by the licensee on December  !

15, 1983. The re-examinaiton process identified 94 welds with rejectable j indications. NRC Region I technicians conducted an inspection of the licensee's j re-examination program in November,1983, independently examining a sample of accepted welds and evaluating the disposition of others. No adverse findings resulted from that inspection. After review of the Final 50.55(e) Report, dated December 21, 1983, a fin ther inspection is planned to evaluate, in detail, the status and disposition of each of the questioned welds. However, it appears from the information available that the licensee is adequately addressing I all hardware concerns and'with the final repair or replacement of the rejected 94 welds, no hardware problems will remain, i

In addition to the concerns for hardware and program adequacy, as discussed above, a further Region I concern regarding ' management knowledge and involve-ment in this issue, particularly the falsification aspects, was addressed by an NRC investigation conducted by 01. The final report, which has been issued to the Region and also transmitted to the Department of Justice for their review, confirms falsification by one technician, but finds no menagerial wrongdoing q or conspiratorial cover-up activities. The falsification by the technician went beyond his conduct of certain nondestructive evaluations and involved apparently 1 forged and false certification of past NDE employment and false statements of educational level.

While it may be argued that a more thorough background check would have uncovered that certain of the individual's prior certification claims were false, we find no technical or regulatory requirement for such a rigorous background check. In this case the personnel qualification and certification practices of the American Society for Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-IA were followed in that the subject technician had " proof of prior certification" (albeit falsified) and was given General, Specific and Practical Examinations at Seabrook to demonstrate his ability to perform the NDE work he'would be  ;

assigned. In f act, the contractor went beyond these recommended practices by contacting the individual's last employer (US Testing working for Florida Power and Light on the St. Lucie project) to verify his employment and certification, which were substantiated. It is interesting to note that had US Testing'or FP&L conducted a similar verification with the previous employer, they would have determined that the technician was terminated for cause at Pittsburgh Testing Labs for falsifying radiographs.

The above discussion illustrates the lack of specific regulatory guidance in the area of personnel certification. Currently at Seabrook, the subject contractor has a program for verifying an NDE employee's entire resume with regard to claims of prior certification. This program has been backfitted to all technicians. This is being accomplished because the subject problem occurred at Seabrook, and not because of any regulatory requirement.

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, 5f 0 4 E4 Memo to T. E. Murley 4 Of the listing provided in the enclosure to the December 21, 1983 letter from Mr. DeYoung, Circular No. 80-22 is the most relevant IE information to this problem on the subject of Confirmation of Employee Qualifications. However, it is silent as to what constitutes an acceptable employment policy. The appro-priate (ie: SNT-TC-1A) measures were in practice at Seabrook and employment procedures reflected a reasonable attempt at past employment confirmation.

Based upon NRC inspections and investigation efforts and upon licensee correc-tive action programs, we conclude there is currently no known hardware or programmatic problem at Seabrook with regard to the conduct of NDE work. Based on the licensee's six supplemental and Final 50.55(e) Report, further in-spection will be conducted to evaluate and close this issue, i

In my view, current information indicates a situation which does not warrant enforcement action. The problem was licensee identified and appears to have been- adequately corrected, both programmatic and hardware issues, by licensee  !

initiated actions. No technical or regulatory requirement was violated by the licensee. A net positive result of the entire incident was to rid the nuclear construction effort at Seabrook of an individual of questionable integrity.

While enforcement action is not recommended, we do recognize the need to g highlight the lack of NRC guidance on the subject of certification to IE Headquarters. To reinforce this need, one can postulate that the subject technician may currently be working as an NDE technician at some other nuclear site.

A copy of this letter is being provided to IE Headquarters not only to reinforce our position with regard to the counterproductive impact of enforcement action, i but also to provide a background and basis for the generic review of the need for further guidance in the area of certification and background checks of professional employees.

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Richard Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs CC:

J. Axelrad, Director, Enforcement Staff W. Haas, IE J. Taylor, IE O

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_ _ _ - . - - -___:__..___-_____.________.a__J

Summary of NRC Actions relative to the Suspect NDE Construction Deficiency Report April 27,1983 - Seabrook Resident Office verbally informed that licensee investigation of improper, NDE is in proaress ,

May 4,1983 - Region I telephonically received 10CFR50.55(e) Report of Potential CDR May 23,1983 - NRC Office of Investigations commenced investigation of NDE issueatSeabrooksite(MatakasReport)

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June 3,1983 - Dateoffirstinterim10CFR50.55(e)ReportonSuspectNDE Examinations (Note: Updated Interim Reports were also submitted, dated July 5, August 4, August 16, September 9, October 12, and December 2,19,83; next report I due by January 15,1984) i June 7,1983 - Management Meeting with PSNH held in Region I, in-part to discuss the NDE re-examination status and corrective actions  !

( documented in Combined Meeting Report 50-443/83-10 & - 4 50-444/83-07)

August 8,1983 - Regional inspection commenced at Seabrook in-part to inspect the j NDE re-examination program, status, and certification of the i licensee hired, examining technicians (documented in i Inspection Report 50-443/83-12)

November 14,19P3 - kegional inspection commenced at Seabrook, in-part for NRC (Level II technician) re-examination of a sample of the questionable welds and review of licensee disposition of re-examined welds l w (documented in Combined Inspection Report 50-443/83-18 & I 50-444/83-14)

(Note: this IR may not yet be published)

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NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING RE: PERFORMANCE OF PIPING CONTRACTOR

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1. LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTION A) MOBILIZATION OF SUPERVISORY GROUP.

l l l B) INCREASED SURVEILLANCE & AUDIT FREQUENCY.

I D) MANAGEMENT COMMITMENTS REQUESTED OF PIPING CONTRACTOR COPR0 RATE EXECUTIVES.

E) WEEKLY MEErlNGS WITH PIPING CONTRACTOR CORPORATE PERSONNEL TO ASSESS EFFECTIVE-NESS OF CONTRACTOR COMMITMENTS AND PERSONNEL,

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NRC MANAGEMENT' MEETING (CONT'D.) ..

11. CONN (ACTOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS a

A) ASSIGNMENT OF CORPORATE DIRECTOR OF  !

QA PPP FABRICATION ~TO SITE ON FULL ~- 1 TIME BASIS.

B) SITE INTERNAL SURVEILLANCE GROUP' TO INCREASE-IN BOTH NUMBERS ANDL l

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EXPERTISE. j 1

C) CORPORATE V.P. QA AND/0R DIRECTOR OF QA WILL BE ON SITE REGULARLY TO EVAL-UATE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS AND REPORT j TO YAEC QA MANAGER.

l D) CORPORATE POLICY REGARDING TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL WILL BE CLOSELY MONITORED  :

AND ENFORCED.

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NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING (CONT'D.)

III. CONTRACTOR SUSPECT NDE EXAMINATIONS A) 10CFR50.55(E) STATUS.

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SUMMARY

OF AFFECTED ITEMS. i l

C) STATUS OF REEXAMINATIONS AND EVALUATIONS ALL NDE METHODS AND ACTIVE PERSONNEL.

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D) STATUS OF WELD'S/ ITEMS EXAMINED BY TECHNICIAN IN QUESTION.

E) SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETE RESOLUTION.

F) ACTIONS BY LICENSEE.

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