Text

Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-1 & 4.3-1, Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation & Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, Respectively.Description of Changes & NSHC Encl
	ML20234C074
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Site:	Byron, Braidwood, 05000000
Issue date:	12/23/1987
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
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ML20234C057	List: ML20234C055; ML20234C074;
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	4021K, NUDOCS 8801060095
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ATTACHMENT A I

PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72, and NPP-75 s I

j Byron Station Braidwood Station Revis_ed Pages: 3/4 3-4 R_e_y.i, sed Pages: 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-12a 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-12a l

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ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) j ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one l'ess than the. Minimum- !

Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations-involving l l positive reactivity changes. '

j

'1 ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum -

Channels OPERABLE' requirement restore the inoperable channel to ,

OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or within the next hour open the l l

reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes, and verify valves CV-111B, CV-8428, CV-8439, J CV-8441 and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position.With 1 no channels OPERABLE verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN I requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, .j l and take the actions stated above within 'l hour and verify. i l compliance at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter. ..

]

ACTION 6 - With'the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following' conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable' channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hourr;,and .j

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, I the inoperable channel may.be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1. -

ACTION 7 - Deleted ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the~ associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 9 - With the number.of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement,- be in at least' HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less.than the Minimum Chennels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel' to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the Reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels 'are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS j

1 (10) Setpoint verification is not applicable. l r-he )ac(t- 11)cactorAt least ence per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the trip breakers, the IP,IP AC40ATING OC'!!CE OPE"ATIONAt--TEST shsil D' g IWScy+ ~1"r%4ndenendent ver444sation of the-Undenohage--and4 hunt--t+4ps,--

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~~ W t 19ast once per 18 months during shutdown verify that on a simulated Boron Dilution Doubling test signal CVCS valves 112D and E open and 112B,and C close within 30 seconds. ,

(13) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

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ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) !

1 ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving j

1 positive reactivity changes.

j ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum k

' Channels OPERABLE requirement restore the inoperable channel to i OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or within the next hour open the reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes, and verify valves CV-111B, CV-8428, CV-8439, CV-8441 and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position. With i no channels OPERABLE verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN (

requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, and take the actions stated above within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and verify compliance at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed l provided the following conditions are satisfied: ;

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; and i

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, (

the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - Deleted ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state I for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided i,he other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum l Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel i

to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the Reactor trip l breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number i

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TABLE NOTATIONS

.i

With the Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive ;;

System capable of rod withdrawal.

- These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Operational Test Frequency for these channels in Table 4.3-2 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling. !

7he specified 18 month interval may be extended to 32 inonths far cycle 1 only. )

1. Selow P-6 (Interm'ediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint. l

1. 1. Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) If not perf.ormed in previous 7 days'.

(2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED l THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric -j power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Speci- i fication 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE above-l 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrates if the absolute difference is I

greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

O (5e) Ie4 tie, n,eteee cerves sheil be measeree for eec8 detecter. Subseneemt plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial Gl curves. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(Sb) With the high voltage setting varied as recommended by the manufacturer, an initial discriminator hias curve shall be measured for each detector. Sub-l sequent discriminator bias curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves.

(6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provi-sions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. )

(8) With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required )

l ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that the inter-I lock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(9) Surveillance in MODES 3*, 4*, and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window. Surveil-lance shall include verification of the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint 1 of less than or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a ,

l 10-minute period.

( ) Set oint verif' at' is not applicable, s11) At least once per 10 mcat-hs-end fellceg maintenance er-adj=tment of +he i n--_4-- Am _r.___L-.- 4L- e TDTD A f'Ti f ATT MQ{UT f'C fiD C D ATT HMa l TURT chn11 "O O I dO 1 0 3 ' "

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BR 10 WOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT NO. 2

4 TABLE 4.3-1 (Centinued)

TABLE NOTATIONS i

(12) At least once per 18 mor.tho during shutdown verify that on a simulated Boron Dilution Doubling test 5,igr,a1 CVCS valves 112D and E open and i 1128 and C close within 30 seconds.

(13) C NNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

(14) "See Inse r + C" O

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BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12a

INSERT A ACTION 12 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or Shunt Trip Attachment) inoperable, the breaker may be considered OPERABLE, provided the di'Jerse trip feature is restored to 6PERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 9. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is itioperable, except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the diverse trip feature to OPERABLE status.

INSERT B (11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall be performed such that each train is tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip breakers and shall include independent verification of the undervolteje and shunt trip attachment.

INSERT C (14) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the underveltage and staunt trip circuits for the manual reactor trip function.

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The final proposed change involves the addition of a new item, the reactor trip, bypass breaker to Table 4.3-1. In order to assess the need to include bypass breaker testing in the Technical Specifications, the Westinghouse owners Group (WOG) has calculated the impact of tne bypass breaker failure probabilty er the reactor trip system failure probability and concludes that the bf) /35 breaker contribution is insignificant. These calculations are based ou ;he reactor trip breaker fault tree model presented in Supplement i so WCAP-10271.

In WOG Letter No. OG-106, which transmitted the WOG response to NRC questions on WCAP-10271, a typical Westinghouse PWR reactor trip unavailability is estimated to be'1.5 E-5. No credit was taken for operation of the bypass breaker in the evaluation from which these calculations were derived. The impact on the reactor trip system unavailability, including the unavailability of the reactor trip bypass breakers, was calculated with the following results:

1. The bypass breakers are placed in service only when one train of the reactor protection system (RPS) is in test. The only circumstance in which the bypass breaker could affect RPS -

unavailability is the cutset when one traln is in test, a signal is generated in the operable redundant train and the main breaker fails to open.

2. The unavailability of the RPS attributable to failure of a main trip breaker with the opposite train in test is 3.7 E-7 or 2.5% of the total RPS unavailability (i.e., 1.5 E-5). This cutset constitutes the only configuration in which the bypass breaker can affect RPS unavailability.

3. Taking credit for the bypass breaker would reduce the probability value of this cutset to (3.4 E-7)(3.5 E-4) = 1.3 E-10 where 3.5 E-4 is the unavailability of the bypass breaker assuming j bimonth!.y testing or, I (3.7 E-7)(3.5 E-3) = 1.3 E-9 where 3.5 E-3 is the unavailability of the bypass breaker assuming testing on an 18 month interval.

Based on the above, it is commonwealth Edison's position that testing of bypass breakers is not necessary in the Byron and Braidwood Technical Specification periodic test of the main trip breakers. As shown above, testing the bypass breakers on a 2 month or 18 month test interval will result in a E-9 or E-10 level contribution to the RPS unavailability of approximately E-5. Alternatively, the RPS unavailability increase that occurs by increasing the bypass breaker failure probability from 0% to 100%

is only 2.5% at the RPS level.

Given the minimal impact of bypass breaker testing it is recommended that Byron and Braidwood Stations be allowed to continue to administrative 1y control bypass breaker testing outside of the Technical Specifications, as is currently being done.

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Several other points require consideration on why a bypass breaker surveillance should not be added, as proposed in Generic Letter 85-09. .

Generic Letter 85-09 discusses a shunt trip attachment operability test for ]

the bypass breakers. When the term " shunt trip attachment" was used i previously, it referred to the relay / contact combination installed on the l reactor trip breaker, not to the shunt trip coil on the breaker. The Byr6n and Braidwood Station's bypass breakers were not modified to add a shunt trip attachment, therefore, an operability test could only be performed on j the shunt trip coil.

Currently the Technical Specifications do not require the bypass breaker to be operable and as a result no Technical Specification surveillance are required. No modifications have been made to these breakers but the Staff has proposed that operability surveillance be added J to Technical Specification Table 4.3-1. However, there are no revisions proposed for Tables 2.2-1 or 3.3-1 which identify that the bypass breakers ;

are required to be operable or which identify an Action to be performed if !

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the breakers do not pass the new surveillance and are declared inoperable.

Having a surveillance with no operability requirements is inconsistent with how the Technical Specifications are normally established. Without an Action Statement, an operator might institute 3.0.3 if a bypass breaker failed one of the surveillance proposed for Table 4.3-1. This could result in a unit being shutdown because one bypass breaker failed a surveillance or l could prevent a startup until the bypass breaker passed its surveillance. ;

Since the bypass breaker is only used when testing is performed on the reactor trip breaker and only one bypass breaker can be racked in at a time, the Station does not believe the intent is for a unit to shutdown or remain shutdown because one bypass breaker is inoperable.

i Also, the NRC proposed change requires a Trip Actuating Device Operational Test be performed every month on each bypass breaker. However, ,

the proposed Note 13 states that the test must be performed prior to placing f the breaker into service. Since the breakers are only placed into service j when testing 1: being performed on the reactor trip breakers and each trip i breaker is tested on alternate montns, there is an inconsistency. This note i would require further clarification.

I Therefore, based on the small impact of bypass breaker failure probability on the reactor trip system failure, the potential for a unnecessary unit shutdown due to the NRC proposed Technical Specification i wording and the fact that the Station has effectively demonstrated i I

administrative control for surveillance for the bypass breakers, a revision to the Technical Specification for the bypass breakers is not proposed.

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. ATTACHMENT B DESCRIPTION AND

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSE 3 CHANGES As a consequence of the Salem ATWS event, Item 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28 established the requirement fer the automatic actuation of the i shunt trip attachment for the reactor trip breakers. Generic Letter 85-09 ;

provided guidance on the Technical Specifications a licensee s.hould propose I in responre to Item 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28. In the NRC's evaluation, it was concluded that the licensee should propose Technical Specification changes to explicitly require independent testing of the undervoltage (UV) and shunt trip attachments (STA) during power operation and independent l testing of the control room manual switch contactu during each refueling )'

outage. These testa are necessary to ensure reliable reactor trip breaker operation. Commonwealth Edison believes the proposed scendment addresses and implements the guidelines presented in Generic Letter 85"09.

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The NRC's first proposed change involved the addition of an action statement for the reactor trip breakers to permit continued plant operation for up to forty-eight (48) hours with one of the diversk trip features inoperable, before further action needs to be taken. In response to this, Commonwealth Edison proposes the addition of Action Statenient 12 to Functional Unit 20 of Technical Specification Table 3.3-1. With one diverse trip feature inoperable (UV or STA), the reactor trip breaker (PTB) is still considered operable, and only the diverse trip feature must be restored to operable status in forty-eight (48) houts, before the RTB is declared inoperable and the requirements of Action Stateinent 9 are made to apply. Ve believe that the proposed wording clarifies the reactor trip breaker operability, versus diverse trip feantre operability. This change recognizes the increased diversity associated with the addition of the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment.

The next proposed change adds Note 14 to the Trip Actuating Device operational Test for the Manual Reactor Trip on Technical Specification Table 4.3-1. Note 14 requires independent verification of the undervoltage f and shunt trip circuits, for the manual reactor trip. The reference to the !

I test, that will provide verification of operability of the bypass breaker I trip circuit, has not been included. If a bypass breaker fails the surveillance, but both reactor trip breakers pass, plant startup could not continue because Action Statement 10 on Table 3.3-1 would apply, per Technical Specification 3.0.4, the unit is not permitted to change operational modes while in an Action Statement. As such, the bypass breaker would have to be restored to an operable status before the startup could continue. We believe that this is an overly restrictive requirement, since the reactor trip breakers would be operable and racked in, whil_e the bypass breakers poeld be providing no safety fianction.

The next proposed change involves a revision to Note 11 on the Trip l Actuating Device Operational Test for the reactor trip br.eaker on Table i 4.3-1. The NRC's proposed change does not require testing following maintenance cr adjustment of the reactor trip breakerF, which is currently I required by the technical Specifications. Therefore the Station's proposed revision combines Notes 7 and 11, into a new Note 11, with the regu'irement to independently verify the UV and STA.

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i ATTACHMENT C i

~

J EVALUATION Of SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l

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Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and has determined that it involves no significant hazards considerations.

According to 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating licence involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not: j l

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences <

of an accident previously evaluated; or l l

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment involves revisions to the operability and surveillance requirements given in Technical Specification Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1 for the Byron and Braidwood Stations. The changes allow forty-eight (48) hours to restore one of the diverse reactor trip features before the l breaker is declared inoperable; independent verification of the undervoltage I and shunt trip circuits for the manual reactor trip during each refueling i outage; and independent verification of the undervoltage had shunt trip attachment of the reactor trip breaker during power operation. l The proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The addition of the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment provides an alternate method to open the reactor trip breakers. Therefore, when a reactor trip signal is generated there are diverse mechanisms to provide a reactor breaker trip which should minimize the possibility of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) occurring. The proposed changes revise the surveillance to require independent te' stir.g of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachment for the manual reactor trip and the reactor trip breakers.

These surveillance ensuro reactor trip breaker operability when required.

Since there are now two dive.rse trip m0chanisms, a change is also proposed to allow forty-eight (49) hours to restore one of the trip features when it becomes inoperable, before the reactor trip breaker is declared inoperable.

This is conservative because it recognizes tha't there are two trip mechanisms instead of one and allows forty-eight (48) hours t9 restore the inoperable trip feature. The reactor trip breater remains operable because the other trip feature can open the reactor trip . breaker, if required.

The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, because the revisions do not change the manner in which the reactor protection system provider plant protection. The addition of the shunt trip attachment 4021K w___-

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provides an alternate method to open the breakers when a reactor trip signal ,

is generated. Therefore, if one trip mechanisms fails, the other trip {

mechanism is available which increases the reliability of the reactor I protection system and decreases the possibility of an ATWS event.

The proposed changes are expected to increase the overall margin of safety because there 6re alternate methods to trip the breakers, thereby, limiting the potential for an ATWS event. The surveillance changes proposed are designed to verify operability of the reactor trip breakers, l I

Therefore based upon the previous analysis, commonwealth Edison concludes that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not ,

involve a significant hazards consideration.

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ML20234C074

Text

SUMMARY

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