ML20237E815

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Lilco Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 1,2 & 9 - Immateriality.*
ML20237E815
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 12/18/1987
From: Zeugin L
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20237E542 List:
References
OL-3, NUDOCS 8712290203
Download: ML20237E815 (15)


Text

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LILCO, December 18, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF CONTENTIONS 1,2, AND 9 -IMMATERIALITY LILCO hereby moves, pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.749, for summary disposition of cmergency planning Contentions 1, 2, and 9 on the grounds of immateriality. LILCO asks that the Board decide this issue in LILCO's favor, and against Interveners, on the ground that no genuine triable issue of material f act exists, and that LILCO is entitled to judgment as a matter of the law. LILCO bases this motion on portions of the Board's earlier Partial Initial Decision, LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644 (1985) ("PID"), on the evidenti-ary record that has already been compiled in this proceeding, on the Commission's deci-sion in CLI-86-13,24 NRC 22 (1986), and on prior revisions to the Shoreham Offsite Ra-dialogical Emergency Response Plan ("LILCO Plan") which have reduced what in LILCO's view were already insignificant differences in the evacuation time estimates between a controlled evacuation and an uncontrolled one.M y Under the LILCO Plan, a " controlled" evacuation has been defined as one in which Traffic Guides and special traffic control treatments are in place at the time they are able to affect evacuation times. The special traffic control treatments that have been included in the LILCO Plan include converting a section of roadway to one-way flow, blocking lanes and providing several special channelization treatments.

An " uncontrolled" evacuation is one in which all traffic control points remain unmanned throughout the entire evacuation and no special traffic control treatments are implemented.

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l L Applicable Law on Summary Disposition j The law applicable to summary disposition was summarized by this Board in its i

Order Ruling on LILCO's Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 24.B,33, 45, 46, and 49, dated April 20,1984. A licensing board is empowered to grant summary dis-position on the pleadings if it finds that "there is no genuine issue as to any material i fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law." 10 CFR S 2.749(d). The party seeking summary disposition has the burden of proving the ab- l sence of any genuine issue of material fact. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977). However,an opponent of the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or deni,als of his an-swer;" his answer must " set forth specific f acts showing that there is a genuine issue of f act." 10 CFR S 2.749(b); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584,11 NRC 451,453 (1980). "h party cannot avoid sum-mary disposition on the basis of guesses or suspicions or on the hope that at the hearing the licensee's evidence may be discredited or that something may turn up." Memoran-dum and Order (Ruling on Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 8 re: Vogtle Quality Assurance), Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ASLBP No. 84-499-01-OL, Doc. Nos. 50-424-OL and 50-425-OL (Oct. 3,1985), slip op.

at 2-3, citing Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10,1 NRC 246, 248 (1975). All material facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are deemed admitted unless controverted by the opponent's statement of specific f acts.

10 CFR S 2.749(a). The Commission has encouraged the use of summary disposition where no genuine issue of material fact exists "so that evidentiary hearing time is not unnecessarily devoted to such issues." Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CL1-81-8,13 NRC 452,457 (1981).

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l II. Legal Background j

Contentions 1 and 2 - Traffic Control Contentions 1 and 2 allege that New York State law prohibits LERO from di-recting traffic, blocking roadways, erecting barriers in roadways and channeling traffic and that this prohibition prevents LILCO from demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). In response to these contentions, LILCO argued, as one part of a summary disposition motion, that even assuming LERO was prohibited from directing traffic and implementing special traffic control treatments the contentions should nev-ertheless be decided in LILCO's favor because the traffic guidance provisions contained in the LILCO Plan are not required to meet NRC regulations. See PID,21 NRC at 913.

LILCO's argument began by noting that the NRC regulations do not provide specific evacuation times that must be met in order for an evacuation plan to be judged ade-quate. Instead, the regulations require accurate evacuation time estimates so that the decisionmaker can decide on the proper course to ensure dose minimization. LILCO then argued that the difference between the evacuation time estimates for a controlled and uncontrolled evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ under normal summer weather conditions was only 95 minutes and that the evacuation time estimate for an uncontrolled evacuation - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes - was comparable to evacuation time es-timates for other nuclear power plants. On these bases, LILCO contended that the LILCO Plan complied with NRC requirements even if no traffic guides or traffic con-trol treatments were provided in the Plan. See id.

Af ter finding that summary disposition of the immateriality issue was appropri-ate, see PID, 21 NRC at 913 n.15, the Board rejected LILCO's argument. The Board summarized the applicable law as follows:

Federal guidance provides, in part, that: the purpose of emergency planning is to achieve dose savings to the general public; absolute protection of the public against all radiation doses cannot be guaranteed and is not required for all possible accident scenarios; the emergency response plans should be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities including the worst accidents; and that there is no standard time required to be met for evacuation in a radiological emer-gency.

PID, 21 NRC at 916-17. Applying this law to LILCO's immateriality argument, the Board found that an uncontrolled evacuation would reduce the range of protective ac-tions relative to a controlled evacuation, that the means of achieving dose reductions would also be reduced, and that the response plan would be framed to cope with a smaller spectrum of accident possibilities. Ld. at 917. In so holding, the Board added that it was not requiring LILCO "to guarantee the best possible evacuation" since that would be beyond regulatory requirements. Id. at 918.

The Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing Board's decision. Long Island ~ Lighting h (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-818,22 NRC 651,677 (1985). The Appeal Board began by noting that "the Commission's regulations do not spell out the precise manner in which an evacuation is to be conducted if necessary." Id. However, .

the Appeal Board then concluded that the Commission regulations do require "provi-sions" and " procedures" for the evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ and that an uncontrolled evacuation did not embody the requisite degree of planning required by those regula-tions. See id. In its decision, the Appeal Board expressly declined to decide whether -

every item that was the subject of Contentions 1-4,9 and 10 was material for a proper f

evacuation plan. Id. at 677 n.105.

The Commission reversed the Licensing Board's and the Appeal Board's decisions on this question. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 32 (1986). The Commission did not provide detailed reasoning for its reversal but simply indicated that the materiality issues were subsumed within I

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. the scope of the realism issues which the Commission was also remanding to the Li-censing Board. Ld. In discussing related realism issues, the Commission noted that its emergency planning rules were intended to be " flexible." Id. at 29. The Commission also indicated that emergency planning requirements do not have fixed criteria, stating:

Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose sav-ing or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident. Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reductions under the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for an-other.

Ld. at 30; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 42,080 col. 3. The Commission added:

The record tells us that an evacuation without traffic controls would be delayed from li to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, but how important is this time delay? For which scenarios, if any, does it eliminate evacuation as a viable protective action?

To answer these questions, more information is needed about the shortcomings of the LILCO plan in terms of possible less-er dose savings and protective actions foreclosed, assuming a best-effort State and County response using the LILCO plan as the source for basic emergency planning information and options.

CLI-86-13,24 NRC at 31-32.M y The quoted language discusses the question of the effect of a less " controlled" evacuation on dose savings and available protective actions in the context of a best-effort State and local response. For the purpose of this motion, the effect of a best-effort State and local response is not considered. Instead, the motion contends that given the population and roadway characteristics of the Shoreham EPZ, a traffic con-trol plan, whether implemented by LERO, Suffolk County or New York State, does not have such a significant effect on evacuation time estimates that it is required by NRC regulations.

A best-effort response by the State or local government is addressed in other LILCO summary disposition motions.

In the preamble to the Commission's recent revision of 10 CFR S 50.47(c),

52 Fed. Reg. 42,078 (Nov. 3,1987), which codified the Commission's realism decision in CLI-86-13, the Commission clarified its decision in CLI-86-13 by explaining that it did not read its decision:

as requiring a finding of the precise dose reductions that would be accomplished either by the utility's plan or by a hy-pothetical plan that had full state and local participation; such findings are never a requirement in the evaluation of emergency plans. The final rule makes clear that every emergency plan is to be evaluated for adequacy on its own merits, without reference to the specific dose reductions which might be accomplished under the plan.

Id. at 42,084 cols.1-2. In addition, the Commission's final rule also "makes clear that a finding of adequacy for any plan ic to be considered generally comparable to a finding of adequacy for any other plan." 52 Fed. Reg. 42,084 col. 2,42,085 col.1 (Nov. 3,1987).

Thus, in reconsidering the immateriality argument on Contentions 1 and 2 the Board needs to decide whether an uncontrolled evacuation will achieve reasonable dose reduc-tions under the circumstances of the Shoreham EPZ.

Contention 9 In Contention 9, Interveners allege that because LERO is prohibited by law from dispensing fuel to automobiles along roadsides the LILCO Plan falls to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). The f actual allegations in Contention 9 that form the basis for Interveners' claim that S 50.47(b)(10) is not met if LERO is prohibited from dispensing fuel to evacuees were litigated and resolved against Interveners in Contentions 65.D and 66.F.

In Contention 65.D, Interveners asserted that LILCO had underestimated evacua-tion times because it f ailed to account for roadway impediments, including cars running out of gas. Part of the f actual dispute on the contention focused on the number of cars that would run out of gas during an evacuation. Af ter hearing evidence from all parties-on this question, the Board concluded that it did not need to resolve the issue because

common sense remedies existed for cars that ran out of gas. PID,21 NRC at 797, Spe-cifically, the Board found that (1) some people would buy gas before beginning their evacuation, (2) stalled cars could be pushed off the roads, (3) drivers could coast off the road when they ran out of fuel, (4) tow trucks could clear blockages, and (5) LERO would dispense fuel to motorists. Id. Based on these five different means of mitigation, i the Board concluded that "the number of vehicles involved in actual road blockage would be modest relative to the total evacuating traffic." Ld.

The litigation of Contention 65 also included sensitivity runs by LILCO on the ef-feet of four roadway blockages on evacuation time estimates. The results of these runs showed evacuation time estimates to be totally insensitive to these blockages. PID,21 NRC at 796. In accepting these analyses, the Board acknowledged Interveners' testimo-ny that roadway blockages could delay some individuals, but noted that the delay would not extend total evacuation times because of the capacity-constrained nature of the Shoreham evacuation network. PID,21 NRC at 807. The Board recognized that while impediments could delay individual evacuees for a time, the queue downstream of the accident would have moved only a little in the time needed to clear the impediment thus allowing individuals trapped by the impediment to catch up with the tall of the queue. See id.

In Contention 66.F. Interveners challenged the planning aspects of LERO's fuel distribution scheme arguing that it would cause congestion and delay evacuation. PID, 21 NRC at 816. The Board found LILCO's scheme reasonable "even though not required by any regulation or guideline." Ld. The Board went on to observe that "[i]f imple-l mented [the fuel distribution plan] could provide incremental enhancement of an 1

evacuation." Ld.

In resolving LILCO's prior motion for summary disposition on Contentions 1-4,9 and 10 on grounds of immateriality, the Board did not individually address whether the provision of fuel to evacuees was a necessary element of an evacuation plan. Instead, the Board lumped the distribution of fuel with the other elements of Contentions 1-4,9 and 10, including traffic guidance measures, and concluded that exclusion of these items would be contrary to 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (b)(10). PID, 21 NRC at 917. As noted above, the Appeal Board likewise declined to address the specific items of Con-tentions 1-4,9 and 10. In remanding the immateriality question to this Board, the Com-mission offered no guidance beyond that previously noted.

III. Discussion Contentions 1 and 2 Factual Background in filing this motion for summary disposition, LILCO does not ask the Board to excuse it from conducting planning for the evacuation of residents from the Shoreham EPZ. On the contrary, LILCO has engaged in detailed planning for an evacuation of the Shoreham EPZ. It has used a state-of-the-art traffic model to calculate evacuation time estimates.EI Considerable work was performed to obtain the extensive input 3/ In the PID, the Board reached the following conclusions about the traffic model used by LILCO's consultant, KLD Associates, to calculate evacuation time estimates:

The Board finds that the DYNEV modelis conceptually sound for the purpose of estimating evacuation times and has been subject to reasonable validation in the past at locations other than Long Island. . . . Contentions 65.A through 65.H do not attack the intrinsic validity of the DYNEV model. . . .

At this point the Board finds that the DYNEV modelis valid and reliable for the use intended. KLD is a recognized au-thority on traffic simulation models.

PID,21 NRC at 783.

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information needed by the DYNEV model. See Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff.

Tr. 2337, at 25-26. LILCO's consultant, KLD Associates, performed roadway surveys and conducted queue discharge headway measurements in Suffolk County to obtain site-specific calibrating data needed to run the model. PID at 784-85. The traffic assign-ment and traffic simulation models of the DYNEV system were iteratively executed to I

refine trip assignments, and hence lower total evacuation times, by identifying bottle-necks and means to reduce their effects. See Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff.

Tr. 2337, at 35-39.

In all, 3C different scenarios were presented by LILCO during the litigation of Contention 65. See PID,21 NRC at 783. These scenarios examined the effect on evac-uation times of such f actors as adverse weather conditions, shadow phenomenon, road-way impediments, uncontrolled evacuation, noncompliance by evacuees with recom-mended routes, and the addition of a new roadway in the EPZ. Id. The Board accepted, as reasonable, the assumptions used by KLD in performing these evacuation times esti-matesO and concluded with regard to those estimates:

LILCO's estimates of evacuation times are reasonable in the sense that they have not been systematically over- or underest;mi w ) The analysis shows that the roadway net-work has g.dem stability; the time estimates are not disturbed greatly by reasonably foreseeable contingency or de-viation from analytical assumptions. Therefore, rigid adher-ence by an evacuating population to assumptions made for the purpose of modeling is not necessary for implementation of an evacuation within the approximate time limits stated.

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PID,21 NRC at 807-08.

4/ In particular, af ter testimony by both Suffolk County and New York Stato ques-tioned the capacities used by KLD in calculating evacuation time estimates the Board found that KLD's methods and results were reasonable and that there was "no obvious systematic bias in KLD [ capacity] estimates relative to the County's." PID,21 NRC at 785.

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. The Board also accepted the routing recommendations LILCO proposed to pro-vide to the general public. PID,21 NRC at 791. These routing instructions are given to the public on a zone-by-zone basis as part of the public information brochure and by a variety of other means to persons who do not have access to a brochure. PID,21 NRC at 765-66. They would be provided to the public even if the LILCO Plan contained only.

provisions for an uncontrolled evacuation. Thus,' to the extent the Appeal Board deci-

- sion on the immateriality assumed that an uncontrolled evacuation of the Shoreham EPZ involved no planning or contained no " provisions" or " procedures" for evacuation, it is Iactually incorrect.

At the time of,the Board's prior resolution of the immateriality argument on Contentions 1 and 2, the difference between the evacuation time estimates for a con-trolled and uncontrolled evacuation for the entire Shoreham EPZ under normal summer weather conditions was 95 minutes (Lieberman Affidavit 14).E! See PID, 21 NRC at

' 913. Subsequent to' the close of the record in the emergency planning litigation, the evacuation time estimates in OPIP 3.6.1 were revised in Revision 5 to the Plan to pro-I vide decisionmakers with the evacuation time estimates for a series of 90' keyholes in-

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stead of the 67* keyholes that were used for protective actions in Revision 3 of the Plan (Lieberman Affidavit 15).SI As part of this update of the Plan, it was decided to

' model more explicitly those evacuees living in Zone Q (Fact 3, Lieberman Affidavit 15).

Prior to the Revision 5 evacuation time estimates, 690_ cars had been modeled as

. evacuating Zone Q on the evacuation network; the remaining vehicles evacuating from 3

!/. The evacuation time estimate for a controlled evacuation was 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 55 minutes; the time estimate for an uncontrolled evacuation was 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes (Lieberman Affidavit 14).

g/ The reason for this change was to use the same size keyhole whether one made

~ a protective action recommendation based solely on plant conditions or on the calcula-tion of. dose effects of sheltering versus evacuating.

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Zone Q were not explicitly modeled but were assumed to evacuate the EPZ by local l roadways (Lieberman Affidavit SS). For Revision 5, approximately 2,000 vehicles were explicitly modeled as evacuating from Zone Q on the evacuation network; about 300 cars were still assumed to evacuate by local roadways not represented as links in the evacuation network (Lieberman Affidavit 15).

To model these additional Zone Q vehicles, additional roads in Zone Q were rep-resented as links in the evacuation network and additional origin centroids were defined to represent Zone Q vehicles accessing these links (Lieberman Affidavit 15). As with the prior evacuation time estimates, the traffic assignment model of the DYNEV sys-tem waz run to assign traffic to those paths of travel on the evacuation network that would minimize the travel time from each origin centroid to each associated destina-tion node (Fact 4, Lieberman Affidavit 16). The traffic simulation model was then run to calculate evacuation time estimates (Fact 4, Lieberman Affidavit 16).

The, Revision 5 evacuaticn time estimates for a controlled evacuation of the en-tire Shoreham EPZ under normal summer weather conditions is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 5 minutes - an increase in 10 minutes over the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 55 minute estimate previously litigated (Fact 5, Lieberman Affidavit 17). The Revision 5 estimate for an uncontrolled estimate under the same conditions was 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes - a decrease of 50 minutes from the previ-ously litigated estimate of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes (Fact 6. Lieberman Affidavit 17).I Thus, the difference between the evacuation time estimates for a controlled and an uncontrolled evacuation is now 35 minutes instead of the prior 95 minutes (Lieberman Affidavit 17).

1/ As is explained by Mr. Lieberman in the attached affidavit, the decrease in the uncontrolled evacuation time estimate is largely the result of the reassignment of traf-fic from two subzones in Zone F which had the effect of diverting traffic demand from the section of roadway converted to one-way flow under the LILCO Plan to move southern routes (Lieberman Affidavit 17). This results in the one-way flow treatment having less of an effect on total evacuation times.

Artrument LILCO contends that as a matter of fact and of law that this 35-minute differ-ence demonstrates that provisions for traffic guides and special traffic control treat-ments are not required to demonstrate reasonable assurance under 10 CFR 5 50.47(a).

Accordingly, the Board should summarily resolve Contentions I and 2 in LILCO's favor.

First, the new evacuation time estimates raise no issues of genuine material fact. The adequacy of KLD's DYNE 7 model and Mr. Lieberman's qualifications have al-ready been resolved by the Board. PID,21 NRC at 783. In addition, the method used by KLD to establish the evacuation network and assign evacuees to given evacuation routes was also approved by the Board. PID,21 NRC at 783-85,791. Likewise, the as-sumptions used to calculate evacuation time estimates were previously litigated and de-cided in LILCO's favor. S_eee PID, 21 NRC at 805-09. The new evacuation time esti-mates are merely a more recent application of all these previously approved items.

Accordingly, they raise no issues of genuine material f act.

Second, as a matter of law, LILCO is entitled to summary rejection of Conten-tions 1 and 2. In the PID, the Board accepted LILCO's evacuation time estimates know-ing that they had limited precision. The Board recognized that LILCO's evacuation time estimate for a controlled evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ was accurate plus or minus 30 minutes. PID,21 NRC at 792. The Board also acknowledged that the j cvacuation time estimates involved uncertainties given the assumptions that must be made to calculate them. The Board stated:

The Board therefore finds that interval estimates in addition to point estimates would be helpful for conveying to decision- .

makers realistic evacuation times and their associated uncer- '

tainty. The Board has considerably more confidence, for ex-ample, in the asserted capability for a general evacuation of the full EPZ in about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, 30 minutes than it does in a point estimate of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,55 minutes.

PID,21 NRC at 808. The Board went on to conclude:

The Board has reasonable assurance that LILCO's evacuation time estimates are reliable within the limits of uncertainty identified in the sensitivity analyses. The inherent uncertain-ties would not seriously degrade the capability to make deci-sions about protective actions in most emergencies although decisional dilemmas could arise in special cases where the projected time scale for serious releases of radiation was about the same as the time scale for evacuation. This is a problem that could arise no matter what the time estimates for evacuation were.

PII',21 NRC at 808 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).

Since the 35-minute c'fference between the evacuation time estimates for con-trolled and uncontrolled evacuations is of essentially the same magnitude as the uncer-tainty of the controlled evacuation time estimate standing alone, it follows that the provision of traffic guides and special traffic control treatments is not a material ele-ment for the emergency plan at Shoreham and does not have a significant effect on dose reduction. This is not to suggest that provisions for traffic guidance need never be part of an emergency plan. What it does mean is that given the population of the Shoreham EPZ, the capacity of available roadways in the EPZ and the location of the EPZ population relative to those roadways, provisions for Traffic Guides and for special traffic control treatments are not required to be part of the LILCO Plan in order for that Plan to meet NRC requirements.

Contention 9 In reconsidering Contention 9 on the grounds of immateriality, the Board does not need to look beyond the existing record. The Board has already concluded that the provision of fuel trucks is "not required by any regulation or guideline." PID,21 NRC at I

816. Factually, there is no reason for requiring them at Shoreham. If fuel trucks are not supplied, the number of cars running out of gas will not generally impede the evac-uation of others.N PID, 21 NRC at 797. Indeed, modeling runs have shown that 8/ As was litigated in detail, evacuees in cars that run out of gas will have a num-ber of options for exiting the EPZ, including catching a ride from another evacuee, riding on one of the hundreds of buses being supplied by LERO for evacuation of the general public, or getting a ride from a LERO road crew. PID,21 NRC at 812-13.

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Tevacuation time estimates are very insensitive to roadway blockages. PID,21 NRC at 796. As a result, overall population dose would not be reduced, or at most by only mini-mal amounts, by the presence of fuel trucks. Accordingly, the Board should summarily dispose of Contention 9.

s CONCLUSION l

For the reasons stated above, the Board should summarily resolve Contentions 1, 2 and 9 in LILCO's favor on the grounds of immateriality.

Respectfully submitted, Do'nald P.frfir.f)

James N. Christman Lee B. Zeugin Hunton & . Williams 707 East Main Street P.O.-Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: December 18, 1987 m_.-._.___ __ ___

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON i

CONTENTIOKiS t 2, AND 9 -IMMATERIALITY f~

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1. The LILCO Plan contains evacuation time estimates for controlled and uncontrolled evacuations. OPIP 3.6.1, Att. 2.
2. The LILCO Plan also contains the results of sensitivity studies which examine the effects on evacuation time estimates of weather conditions, evacuees' compliance with routing assignments and the presence of a shadow phenomenon. OPIP 3.6.1, A tt. 7.
3. In Revision 5 of the LILCO Plan, the evacuation time estimates were revised.

These revisions included a more detailed modeling of evacuees living in Zone Q.

4. The same evacuation plann'ag model(the DYNEV model) was used and the same modeling procedures were followed in calculating the Revision 5 evacuation time esti-mates as were used to calculate the evacuation time estimates that were previously lit-igated in this proceeding.
5. The Revision 5 evacuation time estimate for a controlled evacuation of the en-tire Shoreham EPZ under normal summer weather conditions is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 5 minutes -- an increase of 10 minutes in the previously litigated evacuation time estimate for the same set of assumptions.
6. The Revision 5 evacuation time estimate for an uncontrolled evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ under normal summer weather conditions is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes -

a decrease of 50 minutes in the previously litigated evacuation time estimate for the same set of assumptions.

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