ML20238A130

Testimony of Wc Hopkins on Contention 6.* Testimony of Wc Hopkins on Contention 6 Re Potential for Matls Deterioration or Failure of Pool Liner & Concrete Pool Structure Due to Radiation.Related Correspondence

ML20238A130
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/31/1987
From:	Hopkins W BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237L743	List: ML20237L739 ML20237L816 ML20238A021 ML20238A042 ML20238A075 ML20238A130 ML20238A236 ML20238A273
References
OLA-2, NUDOCS 8709090143
Download: ML20238A130 (10)

Text

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\ 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-2 6 ) 50-251-OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER & )

7 LIGHT COMPANY )

(Turkey Point Nuclear ) (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion) 8 Generating Station, )

Units 3 & 4) )

9 10 Testimony of William C. Hopkins On Contention Number 6 11 12 Q1: Please state your name and address.

13 A1: My name is William C. Hopkins. I'm employed by Bechtel 14 Eastern Power Corporation as an engineering specialist 15 on the staff of the Nuclear Engineering Department. My 16 business address is 15740 Shady Grove Road, 17 Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877.

18 Q2: Please describe your professional qualifications and 19 experience.

20 A2: A summary of my professional qualifications and experi-21 ence is attached to this testimony as Exhibit A and is 22 incorporated herein by reference.

23 Q3: What is the purpose of your testimony?

24 A3: The purpose of my testimony is to address Contention 6.

25 Contention 6 and the bases for that contention are as 26 follows:

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~2. Contention 6 i 3- 'The Licensee and Staff,have not adequately 17 considered or analyzed materials'deterior-4' ation or' failure in materials-integrity resulting.from the increased generation

'S heat and radioactivity,-as a result of increased capacity and lor g-term storage,

.6 in the spent fuel pool..

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Bases for Contention 8

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The spent ~ fuel.' facility.at Turkey. Point 9' was originally designed to store a lesser amount of fuel for a.short' period of time.

10 Some'of the problems that have not been analyzed properly are:

-11 (a) deterioration of fuel cladding as a 12 result of increased exposure and decay heat and radiation levels-11 3 during extended periods of pool-storage.

14 (b) loss of materials integrity of 15- storage ^ rack and pool liner as a result of exposure to higher-levels 16 of radiation over~ longer periods.

17- (c) deterioration of concrete pool structure as a' result of exposure to 18 increased heat'over extended periods )

of time. I 19-Specifically, the purpose of my testimony is to address 20 I

the potential for materials deterioration or failure of 21 the pool liner and concrete pool structure due to 22 radiation from the increased storage capacity of the 23-Turkey Point spent fuel pools. Other issues raised by 24- 4 Contention 6 are addressed in the Testimony of Eugene W. l 25 j Thomas on Contention Number 6 (deterioration or failure )

26 i of pool liner and concrete due to the heat load in the 1 27  !

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.c 1 2 spent fuel pool), the Testimony of Dr. Gerald R. Kilp 3 and Russell Gouldy on Contention Number 6 (radiat. ion and 4 heat loads in the spent fuel pool and deterioration or I 5 failure of the fuel assemblies and storage racks due to  !

6~ these loads), and the Testimony of William A. Boyd on 7 Contention Number 6 (impact on K-effective of postulated 8 gaps in the Boraflex plates in the Turkey Point spent 9 fuel storage racks).

10 04: What gamma and neutron radiation levels are expected in 11 the Turkey Point spent fuel pool following the re-rack?

12 A4: Gamma and neutron radiation levels expected in the 13 Turkey Point spent fuel pool following the re-rack have i

14 been calculated by Westinghouse. As discussed in the

'15 Testimony of Dr. Gerald R. Kilp and Russell Gouldy on 16 Contention Number 6, the integrated radiation doses, 17 calculated for a 40-year exposure, are 1.9 x 10 10 Rads 18 of gamma radiation and a neutron fluence of 4.8 x 10 13 ,

19 2 neutrons /cm . These exposures were calculated assuming 20 an infinite array of spent fuel assemblies each 21 discharged after an average burn-up of 36,000 Megawatt-22 days per metric ton of uranium (mwd /MTU).

23 05: What impact would these loads have on the Turkey Point 24 spent. fuel pool liner?

25 A5: The spent fuel pool liner plate is ASTM (American 1

26 Society for Testing and Materials) A-240 Type 304 27 stainless steel. Stainless steel was chosen for the 28 I

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'2 liner plate in part.because of its. demonstrated ability

'3 to perform in'various nuclear power plant applications, 4 including? applications subject to radiation environments

,t 5 much more severe than'those encountered:in a spent fuel 6' pool (e.g.,, fuel: assemblies, in-core supports, pressure 7 piping). To. support its. widespread.use in nuclear power 8 plants, stainless steels have been the' subject of 9 extensive research anderadiation testing.

10 Gamma radiation,-which is the predominant source of 11 exposure in the spent fuel pool, has been shown to have 12 a negligible effect on the mechanical properties of i 13' materials such as stainless steel due to direct 14 radiation damage mechanisms. The results of neutron 15 irradiation tests have demonstrated the ability of 16 stainless steels to withstand, without loss of material 17 integrity-from direct radiation damage, neutron fluences 18 which are. orders of magnitude higher than those

- 19 predicted for the spent fuel pool s,torage environment.

20 This research has shown that neutron radiation levels 21 significantly higher than those produced in a reactor ,

22 core vould have to be present before the radiation would 23 begin to affcet the physical properties of stainless 24 steel. The expected radiation levels in the spent fuel 25 pool are well below the damage'threshhold. The indirect 26 effect of nuclear heating of stainless steel as a result ]

27 of absorption of the energy of the radiation is negli- l 28 l

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~l 2 gible_for the radiation 5.evels expected on the liner 3 plate. ' Consequently, no deterioration or loss of

y 4 integrity of the spent fuel pool liner will occur as a' S result of the long-term exposure of the liner to radia-6 tion levels expected in the spent fuel pool.

7 'QSs What impact would these radiation loads have on the 8 / Turkey Point- spent fuel pool concrete structure?

9 I' A6: " Concrete'is used throughout a nuclear plant for its.

10' c inherent structural support and radiation shielding 11 characteristics. Gamma radiation has been shown to have 12 ~lr$gligible a effect on the mechanical propertie.s of 13 concrete. A concrete shield / structure can also 14 withstand neutron fluences u'p to 10 21 n/cm 2 without. loss 15 of material integrity, which is many orders of magnitude 16 higher than the'4'.8 x 10 13 n/cm 2 expected in the Turkey 17- Point spent fuel pool. Reports on the irradiation of 18 concrete have not identified any defects in concrete 19 which would be'directly traced to direct radiation

!i 20 damage. Nuclear heating of concrete as a result of 1

21 irradiation has been observed. The heating is a result 22 of the absorption of the energy of the radiation.

'23 Howeyer, this effect is negligible for the radiation 24 levels incident on the Turkey Point spent fuel pool 25 structure. Consequently, no deterioration or loss of x

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%~ 'l j p 2: . integrity.of-the concrete fuel pool structure,will 3 result from the long-term exposure to' discharged fuel 14 assemblies in the spent fuel pool.-  ;

5' '07:- Interveners. state that the burn-up of fuel assemblie's in ]

6 the Tu: Ley Point spent fuel pools' may reach as high as 7 55,000 mwd /MTU. Would storage of spent fuel with burn-8 up.of 55,000 mwd /MTU result in any deterioration to the I 9L spent fuel pool liners or concrete strucc.res?-

10 . - A7: 'No. Storage of spent fuel with a burn-up as high as.

ll 55,000. mwd /MTU would have no appreciable effect upon 'l

12. fuel pool liner or concrete structure integrity. As 13 noted above, both the stainless steel liner and-the-14 concrete pool structure'are capable of withstanding, 15 without deterioration, levels of radiation which are 16 orders of magnitude higher than will be experienced in 17 the' Turkey Point spent fuel pools. Furthermore, as

.18 discussed in the Testimony of Dr. Gerald R. Kilp and 19 Russell Gouldy on Contention Number 6, storage of spent 20 fuel with a burn-up of 55,000 mwd /MTU rather than 36,000 21 mwd /MTU would result in a small increase in the radia-22 tion levels in the Turkey Point spent fuel pools (i.e.,

23 10 the dose levels would be about 2.9 x 10 Rads gamma and 24 14 1.7.x 10 n/cm ). Consequently, the increase in 25 radiation levels resulting from storage of spent fuel 26 with 55,000 mwd /MTU burn-up would not have any effect on 27 the integrity of the liner and concrete structure.

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. .1 2 08: What are your conclusions with respect to whether the 3 spent fuel pool liner and the concrete pool structure 4 will deteriorate as a result of radiation levels which 5 will be present after the re-racking?

6 A8: The spent fuel pool liner consists of stsinless steel 7 and the pool structure consists of concrete. These 8 materials are commonly used in nuclear applict ions and 9 have a proven ability to withstand large amounts of 10 exposure to radiation. The radiation levels expected in 11 the Turkey Point spent fuel pool are relatively small 12 and are orders of magnitude below the levels predicted 13 to cause any direct or indirect damage to stainless 14 steel and concrete. Consequently, no deterioration or 15 loss of integrity of the Turkey Point spent fuel pool 16 liner or concrete structure are expected to occur as a 17 result of the spent fuel pool expansion.

18 09: Does Florida Power & Light Company have a surveillance 19 or monitoring program to detect any radiation-induced 20 degradation of the Turkey Point spent fuel pool liners 21 and concrete pool structures?

22 A9- No. Such a program is unnecessary for the following 23 reasons:

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5) 2 o As discussed in the Testimony of Dr. Gerald R. Kilp I

3 and Russell Gouldy on Contention Number 6, the '

4 Turkey Point spent fuel pool expansion amendments 5 will result in a relatively small increase in the 6 total radiation levels in the spent fuel pools.

7 o Stainless steel and concrete have a demonstrated 8 ability to withstand the effects of radiation for 9 long periods of time. In particular, there are 10 several plants with spent fuel pools that have been 11 used for five to ten years longer than those at 12 Turkey Point without any reports of material 13 degradation due to radiation.

14 o The total integrated exposure of the Turkey Point 15 spent fuel pool liners and concrete structures will 16 be orders of magnitude below the levels predicted 17 to cause any direct or indirect damage. Therefore, 18 there is an extremely large margin of safety 19 inherent in these materials.

20 o It is not typical for utilities to establish 21 surveillance programs to detect radiation-induced 22 damage in their spent fuel pool liners or concrete 23 structures. To my knowledge, no utility has 24 conducted such a program.

25 010: Does this conclude your testimony?

26 A10: Yes.

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1 NL 1 2  : Exhibit A 3  !

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4 Statement of Professional Qualifications and Experience l

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5 of William C. Hopkins 6

WORK HISTORY 1 7

ENGINEERING SPECIALIST - Bechtel (11-1/2 Years)

Mr. Hop < ins is an engineering specialist on the ataff of the 9 Nuclear Engineering Department with Bechtel Eastern Power.

10 Corporation. Most recently, he has supervised and coordin-ated the. reanalysis of the radiation environments of Browns

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1 Ferry 2 as part of Bechtel's overall' equipment qualification 11 project for TVA. He was a principal investigator for a study [

12 on Nuclear. Plant Life Extension for EG&G (INEL). hr. Hopkins  !

also serves as technical advisor for the Three Mile Island

. Unit 2 Recovery Program project on the subjects of critical- l 13 ity, ALARA, and advanced computer applications for radiation ,

transport: analyses and experiments. He was an original y 14 imember of Bechtel's Three Mile Island Initial Planning Study  !

Team established, shortly after the incident, to plan the 15- decontamination and. recovery of Unit 2. Mr. Hopkins also serves as the coordinator of the Bechtel Eastern Power 16 Corporation's radiation protection group, an interdivisional I group within Bechtel which establishes positions and provides

-17 guidance in the areas of in-plant radiation protection, including shielding and dose reduction (ALARA).

LEAD-ENGINEER - Bechtel (1 Year)

Earlier, for Mississippi Power & Light Company's 1300 BWR 20 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station project, Mr. Hopkins was involved in shadiding design for the containment and drywell 21 buildings. He was responsible for coordination of radiation (ALARA) zone maps between project engineering and nuclear 22 engineering department staff.

23 ENGINEER - Bechtel (2-1/2 Years) 24 During his initial assignment on the staff of the Nuclear Engineering Department, Mr. Hopkins was engaged in enhance-25 ment of several computer codes for radiation analyses,  !

including neutron and gamma ray shielding and real time 26 simulations of radwaste systems These computer codes were used~to provide design data for several PWR and BWR nuclear 27 plants, as well as in the preparation of safety analysis reports.

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.. I 2 EDUCATIQH 3 BS, Mechanical. Engineering, University of Kentucky MS, Nuclear Engineering, North Carolina State University 4

REGISTRATION / CERTIFICATION 5 .

i Professional Engineer in Maryland ,

6- 'l PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS -i 7

Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 Member, American Nuclear Society Member, ANS 6.1.1 - Neutron and Gamma Ray Flux-to-Dose Rate 9 Factors Member, ANS 6.1.2 - Neutscn'and Gamma Ray Cross Sections for 10 Nuclear Radiation Protection Calculations Member,-ANS 6.2.1 - Shielding Benchmark Problems

.11 Member,' Executive Committee of the Radiation Protection and ,

. Shielding' Division (1982-1985) l 12 Member, Program Committee of the Radiation Protection and Shielding Division

-13 Member, American Society for Testing and Materials j Member, E10.05 - Nuclear Metrology- 1 14 Member, E10.03 - Decontamination and Decommissioning of j Nuclear Facilities i 15 Lead Author, A3TM Standard'E1035-85: Standard Practice for Determinir.g . Radiation Exposure to Reactor Vessel Support 16 Structures Member, US NRC LWR - Pressure Vessel Surveillance Dosimetry Program Review Committee 17 {

Member, GEND Three Mile Island Technical Working Group for i 18 Research & Development Data Examination Member, GEND Three Mile Island Fission Product Transport 19 Technical Planning Group Member, GEND Three Mile Island Technical Evaluation Group for 20 Radiation and Environment Chairman, ANS 6.9/5.5 - Radiological Design Criteria for 21 Post-Accident Condition in LWR's Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy J 22 Coordination: Office of Science & Technology - The i White House j 23 j PUBLICATIONS l 24 l Has authored or coauthored various papers and publications, i 25 including papers related to equipment qualifications in l radiation environments and impacts of radiation on nuclear 26 components.

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