ML20238A273

Testimony of Wa Boyd on Contention 6.* Testimony of Wa Boyd on Contention 6 Re Impact of Postulated Gaps in Boraflex Neutron Absorbing Matl Utilized in Spent Fuel Storage Racks. W/Certificate of Svc.Related Correspondence

ML20238A273
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/31/1987
From:	Boyd W WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237L743	List: ML20237L739 ML20237L816 ML20238A021 ML20238A042 ML20238A075 ML20238A130 ML20238A236 ML20238A273
References
OLA-2, NUDOCS 8709090226
Download: ML20238A273 (16)

Text

- - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _

4 1 2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR hEGULATORY COMMISSION 4 BFFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5

b 6 )

In the Matter of )

7 )

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-250, OLA-2 8 (Turkey Point Nuclear ) 50-251, OLA-2 Generating Station c ) (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion) 9 Units 3 & 4) )

) i 10  !

11 Testimony of William A. Boyd ,

on Contention Number 6 12 13 01: Please state your name, occupation and business 14 address.

15 A1: My name is William A. Boyd. I am a Senior Engineer ,

16 in Nuclear Design for the Nuclear Fuel Division of 17 Westinghouse Electric Corporation. My business 18 address is Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 19 Monroeville Mall Office Building, P.O. Box 3912, 20 Pittsburgh, PA, 15320.

21 Q2: Please describe your professional qualifications.

22 A2: A summary of my professional qualifications and 23 experience is attached as Exhibit A, and is incor-24 porated herein by reference.

25 03: What is the purpose of your testimony?

26 27 28 9709090226 B70831 DR ADOCK05000ggO

,: 1 2 A3:- -The purpose of my testimony is to. address

.3 ' Contention 6. Contention 6 and the bases for that

-4 contention are as follows:

'S Contention 6 6 The Licensee and Staff have not ade-quately considered or analyzed 7 materials deterioration or failure in materials integrity resulting 8 from. increased generation.and heat and radioactivity, as a result of 9 increased capacity and long-term storage, in the spent fuel pool.

Bases for Contention 11 The spent fuel facility at Turkey 12 Point was originally designed to store a lesser amount of fuel for a 13 short period of time. Some of the problems.that have not been. analyzed 14 properly are:

15 (a) deterioration of fuel cladding and decay heat and radiation levels 16 during extended periods of pool storage.

(b) loss of materials integrity of 18 storage rack and pool liner as a result of exposure to higher levels 19 of radiation over longer periods.

20 (c) deterioration of concrete' pool structure as a result of exposure to j 21 increased heat over extended periods of time.

22

}

In particular, the purpose of my testi-23 mony is to address the impact of postulated gaps in the Boraflex neutron absorbing material utilized in 25 l the Turkey Point spent fuel storage racks. The Testimony of William C. Hopkins on Contention 28 L________-___-__-____--_

~,.

)

e- 1 I

2 Number 6 and the Testimony of Eugene W. Thomas on l 3

Contention Number 6 discuss the materials integrity 4

of the spent fuel pool liner and the spent fuel

.5 - pool concrete structure. The testimony of Dr.

6 Gerald R. Kilp and Russell Gouldy on Contention 7 Number 6 discusses the materials integrity of the 8 fuel assemblies and spent fuel storage racks in the

• 9 spent fuel pool environment.

10 04: Have you previously prepared an affidavit in this 11 proceeding?

12- A4: Yes. I prepared the Affidavit of William A. Boyd 13 on Contention 10 (January 20, 1986), which was 14 submitted in support of Licensee's Motion for 15 Summary Disposition of Interveners' Contentions 16 (January 23, 1986). The purpose of that affidavit 17 was to describe the criticality analyses performed 18 by me for the Turkey Point spent fuel pool expan-19 sion amendments, to demonstrate that the analyses I 20- conformed with applicable industry standards and 21 employed methods accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory 22- Commission (NRC), and to show that the results of l 23 the analyses satisfy applicable NRC criteria. As a H24 result of these analyses, the K-effective of Region 25 I was calculated to be 0.9403 and the K-effective 26 of Region II was calculated to be 0.9304, 27 accounting for all uncertainties and assuming the I t

28 )

)

4-

. 1 2 absence of boron in the spent fuel pool water.

3 These values satisfy various NRC guidelines and 4 industry standards which state that the K-effective l 5 of the spent fuel pools should be less than or 6 equal to 0.95. At pages 53-61 of its Memorandum 7 and Order of March 25, 1987, the Licensing Board 8 granted summary disposition of Contention 10 based j 9 upon my affidavit and those submitted by the NRC 10 Staff.

11 05: What assumptions did the analyses described in your 12 affidavit ma'.e t with respect to the Boraflex in the 13 spent fuel racks?

14 AS: The analyses included an assumption that the 15 Boraflex panels in the spent fuel racks would 16 remain intact and would not develop gaps.

17 06: How are Boraflex panels arranged in the Turkey 18 Point spent fuel pool racks?

19 A6: There are two regions in the Turkey Point spent 20 fuel pools. Tha Region I racks are designed to 21 hold fuel assemblies with a maximum Uranium-235 22 enrichment of 4.5%, and the Region II racks are 23 designed to hold fuel assemblies with a maximum  !

24 reactivity equivalent to the reactivity of assem-25 blies having an initial enrichment of 1.5%.

26 27 28

1 2 The Region I spent fuel storage racks at 3 Turkey Point are each composed of a number of 4 cells. The cells are essentially square vertical 5 tubes. A cross-section of a storage cell, viewed 6 from directly above the cell, is depicted in Figure 7 1. Each cell is composed of a stainless steel cell 8 enclosure, Boraflex panels which run along the 9 length of the cell outside the cell enclosure on 10 each of the four sides of the cell, and thin steel l

11 wrappers which hold the Boraflex in place. thus, 12 the Boraflex panels provide neutron absorbing 13 capability on all sides of the cell. The Region II 14 racks have a somewhat similar structure, but 15 spacing between individual cells is smaller and the 16 density of the Boraflex panels is lower than in the 2

17 Pegicn I racks (Boron-10 area density of 0.02gm/cm 18 for Region I versus 0.012 gm/cm 2 ist Region II).

19 Q7: Have you made any analyses of the impact on K-20 effective of postulated gaps in the Boraflex 21 plates?

22 A7: Yes. After the reports of gaps in the Boraflex in 23 the storage racks at Quad Cites in Spring 1987, 24 Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) requested that 25 Westinghouse perform a sensitivity analysis to 26 determine the impact of postulating the existence 27 of various types of gaps in the Boraflex panels.

28

l

' =

r )

a .

6 2

0 1 1

_ A

(

N f-  ;

• R O

_ _ E I T

8 N G E

4 E C R 1 -

O

- _ T E

- /

• - H m

- - - /

R T S

) = E L

" 1

' T RL E 5 .. N OE 7 E 1 FC 0 C

)

_ " 0 j L E SE L R NG

( 2 2 x M E 0

E ) C C U OA

( R " / G I R SO U 50 I E

T S

O 7 8 1

1 F ESNT A L C X M

/ . M L I P N G " D E 8 5 R 7 2 7 =

E L 0 0 l ' l L

P L E 8 1

A P ( 0 .

N A C (

I R X H E M

\

L O F

R 1 N R

O B

z 1

n =

- - ' - s : '

1ll1 \l l l i1

1 t

i l

.i 1

2 This analysis was performed for the Region I 3

storage racks, because (1) the K-effective (K,gg) j I

4 is higher for Region I than for Region II, and l l

5 (2) the Region I spent fuel racks utilize a greater 6 thickness of Boraflex (Boron-10 area density of 2

7 0.020 gm/cm ) than the Region II racks (Boron-10 j 8 area density of 0.012 gm/cm 2). Thus, any gaps .in 9 the Boraflex in Region I racks would have more of ]

1 10 an effect on K eff levels than similar gaps in the 11 Region II racks and would be more likely to cause '

12 spent fuel pool K,gg levels to exceed the 0.95 13 limit.

14 08: What assumptions concerning the maximum enrichment 15 of fuel in the Turkey Point spent fuel pool were 16 made in your analysis?

17 A8: Two sets of calculations of K,gg were performed.

18 One set of calculations assumed that the stored >

19 fuel has a maximum fuel enrichment of 4.5% of )

20 Uranium 235, which is the maximum level of fuel 21 enrichment authorized to be stored at Turkey Point. j l

22 The second set of calculations assumed a maximum j 23 fuel enrichment of 4.1% of Uranium 235, which is j

24 the maximum fuel enrichment planned to be used at 25 Turkey Point prior to the next surveillance and I 26 27 a

28

-y- .

. 1 ,

2 testing of the Boraflex. The enrichment of the 3 fuel currently used at Turkey Point ranges from 4 3.4% to 3.6%.

5 09: What assumptions were made concerning the condition 6 of the Boraflex neutron absorbing material?

7 A9: Two cases were analyzed. First, gaps were postul-8 ated to exist in every Boraflex panel and to be

~

9 aligned at the mid-point of the fuel assemblies. )

10 Second, gaps were postulated to exist in half of 11 the Boraflex panels and to be aligned at the mid-12 point of the fuel assemblies. In both cases, the

^

13 gap size in the analysis was varied from 0 to 10 14 inches.

15 010: What method did you use to calculate the resulting 16 g  ?

eff 17 A10: The method used to calculate K,gg was the same as 18 that described on pages 10 to 17 of my affidavit.

19 This method was accepted by the Board in its 20 March 25, 1987 Memorandum and Order, which granted -

21 summary disposition of Contention 10.

22 Oll: What were the results of your calculations?

23 All: If a 4.5% fuel enrichment level is assumed, the 24 calculations demonstrate that the Turkey Point 25 design basis K,ff limit of 0.95 is not exceeded in 26 the Region I racks even if aligned gaps up to 2" in 27 length are postulated to exist in all of the 28

._8-4 1 I 2 Boraflex panels. If gaps are postulated to exist 3 in only one-half of the panels, aligned gaps of up 4 to 3.5" may exist without exceeding the 0.95 K eff 5- limit. These results are depicted on Figure 2.

i 6 If a fuel enrichment level of 4.1% is assumed, 7 the calculations demonstrate that aligned gaps of j 8 up to 3.5" may exist in all panels without 9 exceeding the 0.95 K,gg limit, and aligned gaps of l 10 up to 7" may exist in one-half of the panels 11 without exceeding the 0.95 K,gg limit. These 12 results are depicted on Figure 3.

13 fr 2 : Are the assumptions used in your calculations ones 14 which can reasonably be expected to exist in the 15 Turkey Point spent fuel pools?

16 A12: No. The assumptions upon which these calculations 17 were based are very conservative and unrealistic 18 given the experience at Quad Cites. For example:

19 o Less than a third of the Boraflex panels 20- examined at Quad Cities had cracks. Assuming 21 gaps in more of the Boraflex plates results in 22 an increase in K,gg.

23 o For those Boraflex panels at Quad Cities which 24 had gaps, the average cumulative gap size (sum 25 of the length of all gaps on a single Boraflex '

I 26 27 l

28 l

6 y > ,

c -

s u

/

e t

+.  :

a ,

S ./ 1 3

5 4

y f

o ,

t 2 i -

5 n v  :

3 '

i 4

i :

s s 2  : 2 .. e h

L i

- , c n

es c

U ,

I n

r r i o / 3 i

u -

e z

gS i

w .

i S

F.l E ,

p a

a 5 G 2

G 1 ,

X ,

E ,

_ t -

1 r i m

A i

L R .

S 0 T 3

: _[  : -  : - ~  : : __~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 8 7 6 5 3 0 9 9 9 9 9 9

. . . . ~ .

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 mm ~ a ; 8O c~-

!)il iij l

,i!l. l:i;) ;IIjll!1 I 11a,IIi1 .

0

/'

y ,

1 c .

u 9 t .

S s t

e.

a 8

y l . s ,

t P e ,

t i

4 l

a ,

v 5 7

1 .

P ,

l i

3 A 4 ,

.3t i

2 f i.

n

[ f o

6 h s

e c

U s p j 2 .

n es .a n I

r n /

G , i .

n

u. o -

s P .

5 i

e z

gS G

,i w ,

i S

4 p p

[

/

_- a a'.

. G

.G 4 ,

3

/

.X ,

E t 2

_ i ,

m

/

i A L ,

1 R S ,

O T B 5 : _ ~ - i [ ..- _: _ - : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 4 2 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 1

0 0 0 0 O

• e- C2~

o5n [

<!illll l

-9_

. 1 2 panel) was 1.5 inches. Assuming gap sizes 3 greater than 1.5 inches results in an increase 4 in K eff*

5 o The gaps were located at different' elevations 6 along the Boraflex at Quad Cities and were not 7 aligned at the center of the fuel assembly.

8 Assuming alignment of the gaps results in an 9 increase in K Gaps which are out of eff.

10 alignment by more than approximately 5" (along 11 the 139" length of the Boraflex panels) would.

12 have a much smaller effect on K,gg levels.

13 Finally, the method utilized to calculate the 14 K,gg levels under these conditions contained a 15 number of other conservatism. These were 16 described in my affidavit and noted by the Board on 17 page 56 of its March 25, 1987 Memorandum and Order.

18 Q13: Do you have any conclusions with respect to the j 19 impact of postulated gaps in the Boraflex in the 20 Turkey Point spent fuel storage racks?

21 A13: Yes. Based on my calculations, the Turkey Point 22 spent fuel pools would remain within the 0.95 K,gg 23 limit even with a conservative estimate of 24 postulated gaps in the Boraflex panels. i

-25 26 27 28

t

, 1 EXHIBIT A 2

STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 3 OF WILLIAM A. BOYD

~

4 My name is William A. Boyd, and my business address 5

is Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P.O. Box 3912, k 6

l '

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15230. I am a Senior Engineer in 7

the Core Engineering section of the Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel l

8 1 Division.

I graduated from Alliance College in 1973 with a \

10 Bachelors Degree in Mathematics. In 1975, I received a 11 Masters Degree from Drexel University in Electrical Engineering. I received a Masters Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977.

15 From 1977 to 1981, I was a Design Engineer at the 16 General Electric Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in -

Schenectedy, New York. My duties included the nuclear design and evaluation of a light water breeder reactor and certain navy propulsion reactors.

In June of 1981, I joined Westinghouse in the Nuclear Design section of the Nuclear Fuel Division, as a Senior Engineer B. My duties included the reload nuclear

• core design of the Turkey Point Unit 4 reactor. I was later given the added responsibility of fuel rack and shipping container criticality coordinator of the Nuclear Fuel Division. As the criticality coordinator my duties included 28

1 the direction, coordination, development and review of the methods used to perform all fuel rack and shipping container criticality analysis for the Nuclear Fuel Division. In 1984, 4

I was promoted to the position of Lead Engineer with the technical responsibility for the efforts of several engineers and technicians in the reload core nuclear design and anal-7 l ysis of the Point Beach Units 1&2, R. G. Ginna, and Prairie l 8 Island Units 1&2.

(

In 1986, I was transferred to the lead engineer position for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

f a

i

" fiOC K! IE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t:g t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

'BEFORE THE ATOMIC SA'FETY AND LICENSING BOARD '87 SEP -1 P2:29

)- Grrt tycKE Ok 4 <

vf i E h r W-

)

.In the Matter of ).

) Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER.& LIGHT COMPANY ) 50-251 OLA-2

)

(Turkey Point' Nuclear Generating )

Units ~3 & 4). )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that' copies of the attached letter and:

Testimony of Harry E. Flanders, Jr. on Contention Number 5; Testimony of Edmund E. DeMario on Contention Number 5;

' Testimony of Russell Gouldy on Contention Number 5; Testimony of Eugene W. Thomas on Contention Number 6;

Testimony of William C. Hopkins on Contention Number 6; Testimony of Dr. Gerald R. Kilp and Russell Gouldy on Contention Number 6; Testimony of William A. Boyd on Contention Number 6 in the-above captioned proceeding were served on the following by deposit in the. United States mail, first class, properly stamped and' addressed, on the date shown below.

Dr. Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• J Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke L Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I

Washington, D.C. 20555 l

l

f L DrL Richard.F. Cole l- ' Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U .' S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washingtony

D.C. 20555 g Atomic Safety and' Licensing Board Panel H U.S.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

' Atomic Safetyfand Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, .D.C. 20555~

office of Secretary U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryfCommission Washington, D.C. ~20555-Attention: Chief, Docketing and' Service Section (Original plus two copies)

Joette.Lorion 7210 Red Road #208 Miami,'FL. 33143 Colleen P. Woodhead.

Office ~of' Executive Legal Director U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. D.C. 20555 Norman-A. Coll

' Coll, Davidson, Carter, Smith, Salter & Barkett 3200 Miami Center 100 Chopin Plaza Miami, FL 33131 S

Steven.P. Frantz d Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Dated: . August 31, 1987

_ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _