05000275/FIN-2012003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform a 50.59 Evaluation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, because the licensee failed to document an evaluation providing a basis that changes made to the facility and associated changes to Procedure OP J-2:VIII, Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP, did not require prior NRC approval. When a 50.59 review was performed, the licensee incorrectly concluded that only a screening was needed. Plant operators use Procedure OP J-2:VIII to determine the operability of the preferred offsite power system for various transmission system configurations. This change accepted a reduction in the preferred offsite power capacity and capability, below the minimum specified by the current licensing basis, due to local service area load growth. This condition would have likely required prior NRC approval had a 50.59 evaluation been performed. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program as Notification 50492767. The failure to perform a 50.59 evaluation was also a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that this issue involved traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with modification design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors concluded this finding was of very low safety significance because the duration of potential losses of a single offsite power source safety function was less than the technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of risk significant non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions to adopt the licensing basis requirement during decision making. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
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| Report | IR 05000275/2012003 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson M Peck L Willoughby N O 'Keefen Greene N Makris |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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