05000382/FIN-2011005-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Translate Tornado Impact on the Ultimate Heat Sink During a Refueling Outage |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III because the licensee did not translate applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis into specifications and instructions. Specifically, the licensee did not translate the design basis tornado event into a design calculation. This outage-specific calculation was referenced by operations as the basis to ensure that the number of dry cooling tower fans needed for decay heat removal remained available. As a result, additional analysis needed to be performed to verify that the ultimate heat sink would have been able to perform its design function had a design basis tornado occurred during refueling outage RF-17. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WF3- 2011-6480. The immediate corrective actions taken to restore compliance included analysis of the condition and actions to ensure that future outage specific calculations include the tornado design basis event.
The performance deficiency is more than minor because it challenges the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Since the calculation was used when the plant was shutdown, the inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, \"\"Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, and Appendix G, Attachment 1, \"\"Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists.\"\" The issue was determined to have a very low safety significance (Green) because it did not require a quantitative assessment. Through calculation review, the inspectors concluded that this failure resulted in the potential to enter an unanalyzed condition. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area in that the licensee failed to incorporate accurate design information into instructions. |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2011005 Section 4OA1 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71151 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson G Guerra C Smith P Elkmann M Davis G George L Carson D Allen D Overland B Correll S Hedger N Greene D Bradley |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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