05000416/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform an Adequate Inspection of Probable Maximum Precipitation Door Seals Protecting Safety Related Equipment |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to perform an adequate inspection of probable maximum precipitation door seals protecting safety related equipment. Inspectors found the entrance door to the diesel generator building and the entrance door to the division 2 diesel generator in a degraded condition. The inspectors identified that the door seals did not make complete contact with the door frames all the way around as required by procedure. The licensee initiated compensatory actions for the degraded seals, staging sand bags in the area and requiring monitoring of the affected doors during heavy rainfall. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2011-02575. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors used the seismic, flooding, and severe weather Table 4b and determined it would affect multiple trains of safety equipment. The inspectors consulted the regional senior reactor analyst, who performed a Phase 3 analysis. The result was a delta-core damage frequency of 3.3E-7/yr and a delta-large early release frequency of 6.6E-8/yr. These results confirmed that the finding had very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined the apparent cause of this finding was that licensee personnel were not adequately trained to perform these inspections. Therefore this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources in that the licensees training of personnel was not adequate in performing inspection of the probable maximum precipitation door seals. |
Site: | Grand Gulf |
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Report | IR 05000416/2011003 Section 1R01 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Drake M Baquera R Kumana R Smith V Gaddy A Fairbanks B Rice E Uribe J Braisteda Fairbanksr Kumana R Smith V Gaddy |
CCA | H.9, Training |
INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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