ML20311A627
| ML20311A627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2017 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20311A627 (254) | |
Text
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : March 29, 2002
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : March 27, 2002
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : March 26, 2002
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 4 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service.
Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 4 A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 4 result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 4 Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2002
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service. Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily.
Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. due to Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4, resulting in a Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-01-04283. This finding was of very low safety significance because the pressure boundary leakage was considered to be minimal, as the volume of boron residue was reportedly only one cubic inch, and the leakage was not detectable during routine NC system leakage calculations conducted while the plant was operating (4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures.
Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance.
Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : July 22, 2002
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 7 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 22, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Operable per Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3 Operation of Both Units in Mode 1 with Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Inoperable from February 24 to February 27, 2002, Resulting in Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3. The licensee unknowingly operated both units with the A and B trains of CRACWS system inoperable because of inadequate troubleshooting of an existing problem with the A-train chiller, which allowed it to remain inoperable when the licensee removed the B-train chiller from service for planned maintenance. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-02-01042. This finding was of very low safety significance because the chillers' function to maintain control room temperatures could have been compensated by operator actions contained in the licensee's procedures. (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 7 Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service. Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 7 Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 7 operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. due to Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4, resulting in a Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-01-04283. This finding was of very low safety significance because the pressure boundary leakage was considered to be minimal, as the volume of boron residue was reportedly only one cubic inch, and the leakage was not detectable during routine NC system leakage calculations conducted while the plant was operating (4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 7 Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 6 of 7 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 7 of 7 root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2002 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 7 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Reactor Trip Caused by Moisture Intrusion into Main Feedwater Pump 2B Speed Control Circuitry Poor workmanship and inadequate oversight of turbine building roof repairs, coupled with inadequately constructed roof drainage systems, resulted in a June 5, 2000, Unit 2 reactor trip. Water from heavy rains that day could not be properly drained from the turbine building roof, partially due to debris and other roofing material that had collected in the drainage system. Water overflowed from the roof and into the turbine building, and leaked into the 2B main feedwater pump turbine speed control cabinet. A secondary plant transient resulted, which ultimately led to a turbine trip/reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect the ability of mitigating systems to perform their safety functions (Section 4OA3.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 22, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Operable per Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3 Operation of Both Units in Mode 1 with Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Inoperable from February 24 to February 27, 2002, Resulting in Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3. The licensee unknowingly operated both units with the A and B trains of CRACWS system inoperable because of inadequate troubleshooting of an existing problem with the A-train chiller, which allowed it to remain inoperable when the licensee removed the B-train chiller from service for planned maintenance. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-02-01042. This finding was of very low safety significance because the chillers' function to maintain control room temperatures could have been compensated by operator actions contained in the licensee's procedures. (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.6.9 due to Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System Inoperable Ignitors on Both Trains of the Hydrogen Ignition System Due to a Common Cause Failure Mode on Non-Safety Related Equipment Resulting in Inoperable Hydrogen Ignition System and a Violation of TS 3.6.9.
Inspection Report# : 2001006(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: NRC
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 7 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions Associated With the Unit 2 FWST Level Channels Failures The inspectors identified a failure to implement effective corrective actions for the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level channels 1 and 3 that was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Specifically, portions of the instrument cables experience conduit temperatures of 275 degrees Fahrenheit which exceed the cable design rating of 194 degrees. This condition was identified in 1996 but was not promptly evaluated nor has the problem been fully resolved. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because all mitigation systems remained operable, the ability to manually swap the emergency core cooling system suction source from the FWST to containment sump was still available, and the channel failures did not render the system unavailable to perform its function. (Section 1R12.2)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 22, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify A Condition Adverse to Quality that Rendered the "A" Chiller Inoperable Operations personnel failed to identify a condition adverse to quality which contributed to not recognizing that the "A" Train of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable. The successful start of the "A" chiller was the basis for calling "A" Train CRACWS operable. However, the fact that maintenance personnel assisted in the chiller start and unreliable operation of the chiller pressure switch was exhibited in earlier testing was not factored into the operability decision. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was determined to be of very low safety significance because the "A" Train CRACWS functioned properly while "B" Train CRACWS was being restored to service. Also during subsequent tests, the "A" chiller operated satisfactorily. Additional information on this finding is provided in NRC letter to Duke Energy Corporation dated January 9, 2002. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failed to Demonstrate Performance of the Station Drinking Water System as Backup Cooling Water to the Unit 1 and 2 A Train Charging Pumps The licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the station drinking water system, a risk-important system that provides backup cooling water to the Unit 1 and 2 A train charging pump motors and bearing oil coolers, was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance (including surveillance activities). This resulted in a failure to recognize and correct a degraded system pressure condition, until it was identified by the inspectors. The degraded pressure condition was determined to be of very low safety significance because an analysis performed by the licensee demonstrated that the backup function to cool the charging pumps and motors would have been provided at the degraded pressure (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Perform TS SR 3.4.9.3 for Pressurizer Heaters A non-cited violation was identified regarding the licensees failure to properly perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.3, which verifies that pressurizer heaters can be automatically transferred from their normal power supplies to their emergency power supplies. Once identified, the portion of the automatic circuit that had been omitted from the test was properly tested on February 5, 2001, and was verified to be functional. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the licensee had never demonstrated the full automatic capability of the power supply transfer circuitry for the pressurizer heaters, which are important for maintaining pressurizer pressure control during a loss of offsite power event. The finding was also the latest in a number of missed surveillance requirements
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 7 identified at Catawba over the last two to three years. This finding was of very low safety significance because the circuit was functional when tested and because of provisions in the licensee's emergency procedures for manually aligning the heaters to their emergency power source had the automatic transfer failed during a loss of normal power event (Section 1R22).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Identify Two Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures Affecting the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors identified a failure to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) affecting the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system, one involving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the other involving the A motor-driven pump. Both of these occurred on October 5, 2000, following an inadvertent transfer of pump control to a local control panel. Although the finding did not involve a violation of the maintenance rule, it represented a recurring performance problem in this area as the latest of several missed maintenance preventable functional failure determinations involving different safety systems over the last year and a half. This finding was of very low safety significance because the failure to identify these MPFFs did not directly affect the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its safety function (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope an Accident Mitigating Function Associated with ECCS Leak Detection in the Maintenance Rule The licensee failed to include in its maintenance rule scope an accident mitigating function for a control room alarm associated with emergency core cooling system post-accident leak detection capability. The alarm was tied to residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump levels and was identified in 1998 as a mitigating function, as described in the Catawba Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. As a result, two functional failures were not properly classified in February 2000. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) and was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's scoping and functional failure determination errors did not directly result in additional unavailability of the alarm function (Section 1R12.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: FIN Finding Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators Steam generator power operated relief valve 2SV-19 failed to open on April 15, 2000, due to mispostioned nitrogen pressure regulators, which are required to function during a design basis event involving the loss of normally available instrument air. The licensee determined the mispositioned regulators to be a human performance issue, but were not able to pinpoint when the actual mispositioning took place. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance due to the availability of other steam generator power operated relief valves and diverse means of cooling the secondary plant (Section 1R22.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 7 Failure to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19)
The licensee failed to properly classify a maintenace rule functional failure of the Unit 2 A steam generator power operated relief valve (2SV-19) when it failed to open on April 15, 2000. The licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve's failure was not a functional failure because other redundant valves were available at the time. This issue was determined to have very low safety significance because the licensee's error did not result in additional equipment unavailability (Section 1R12.1).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on Safety-Related Sump Pump Level Switches Residual heat removal and containment spray pump room sump level alarm function was lost for several months up to February 2000 due to inadequate maintenance procedures associated with sump level switch calibrations. This issue was characterized as a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the availability of other emergency core cooling system leak detection methods (Section 4OA3.2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. due to Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4, resulting in a Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-01-04283. This finding was of very low safety significance because the pressure boundary leakage was considered to be minimal, as the volume of boron residue was reportedly only one cubic inch, and the leakage was not detectable during routine NC system leakage calculations conducted while the plant was operating (4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000.
The licensee did not properly evaluate plant risk associated with emergent work for the Unit 2 hydrogen ignition system on April 27, 2000. As a result, the unit was in an unevaluated increased risk condition while planned work associated with the containment spray system was ongoing. This condition was allowed by Technical Specifications and plant procedures, but plant procedures required that a written contingency plan be developed prior to the work commencing, which was not done. This issue was of very low safety significance due to the availability of diverse and redundant systems designed to accomplish the hydrogen mitigation and containment pressure control functions (Section 1R13).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 7 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent the Release of Radioactive Byproduct Material from the Radiological Control Area and Plant Site A non-cited violation was identified for the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on April 7, 2000, the licensee failed to prevent the release of radioactive byproduct material (e.g., a radioactive particle on a contract employee's lanyard) from the radiological control area and plant site. Based on the activity of the particle and the resulting occupational dose assessment for the affected contract employee, this finding was determined to be of very low significance (Sections OS2, 2PS3).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Jun 24, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Secure Two Vital Area Openings Exceeding 96 Square Inches in February 1999 A non-cited violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified for the licensee's failure to secure two vital area openings exceeding 96 square inches in February 1999. This issue was determined to have very little significance, given the non-predictable basis of the failures and the fact that there was no evidence that the vulnerabilities had been exploited (Section 3PP2).
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R).
However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 6 of 7 and a lack of detail in operability reviews.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to Perform Adequate Testing Following Replacement of the Evaporator Differential Pressure Switch for the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01333 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Contrary to this, on March 13, 2001, the licensee failed to perform adequate testing following replacement of the evaporator differential pressure switch for the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01333.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Appropriate Written Procedures or Documented Instructions for Maintenance Activities Performed on the A train YC Chiller as Described in PIP C-01-01994 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, required that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly planned and performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions. Contrary to this, on May 3, 2001, the licensee failed to develop appropriate written procedures or documented instructions for maintenance activities performed on the A train YC chiller as described in PIP C-01-01994.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the licensee's corrective action program was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the corrective action program was sufficiently low. Reviews of operating experience information were comprehensive. In general, the licensee properly prioritized items (by Action Category) in its corrective action program database, which ensured that timely resolution and appropriate causal factor analyses were employed commensurate with safety significance. Some exceptions were noted in the area of problem identification, where all relevant issues of problems were not identified and equipment performance was adversely affected. The inspection identified three exceptions in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues, where more comprehensive root cause determinations would have provided more effective evaluations and corrective actions. In the area of effectiveness of corrective actions, it was noted that the corrective action program was not timely in resolving various documentation deficiencies with Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report changes and TS bases changes. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the corrective action program. The results of the last comprehensive corrective action program audit conducted by the licensee (September 1999) were properly entered and dispositioned in the corrective action program. Based on discussions with plant personnel and the apparently low threshold for items entered in the corrective action program database, the inspectors concluded that workers at the site generally felt free to raise safety concerns to their management.
Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Dec 23, 2000 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 7 of 7 Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolut Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 7, for failing to have adequate procedures to control the release of radioactive material during a pressurizer gas space venting evolution on October 14, 2000, as described in the licensee's corrective action program. Reference PIPs C-00-04914 and 05241.
Inspection Report# : 2000005(pdf)
Last modified : December 02, 2002
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 2 Catawba 2 Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 22, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Operable per Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3 Operation of Both Units in Mode 1 with Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Inoperable from February 24 to February 27, 2002, Resulting in Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3. The licensee unknowingly operated both units with the A and B trains of CRACWS system inoperable because of inadequate troubleshooting of an existing problem with the A-train chiller, which allowed it to remain inoperable when the licensee removed the B-train chiller from service for planned maintenance. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-02-01042. This finding was of very low safety significance because the chillers' function to maintain control room temperatures could have been compensated by operator actions contained in the licensee's procedures. (Section 4OA7)
Inspection Report# : 2002002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 23, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. due to Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage while Operating in Modes 1 through 4, resulting in a Violation of TS 3.4.13.a. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-01-04283. This finding was of very low safety significance because the pressure boundary leakage was considered to be minimal, as the volume of boron residue was reportedly only one cubic inch, and the leakage was not detectable during routine NC system leakage calculations conducted while the plant was operating (4OA7).
Inspection Report# : 2001007(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 2 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R). However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation and a lack of detail in operability reviews.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : March 25, 2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 2 Catawba 2 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jan 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update and Maintain Control of Design Calculations A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for inadequate control of design calculations.
This finding adversely affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and is greater than minor because there were multiple examples of Type II calculation deficiencies that were significant enough to require revision of several design calculations to ensure the component cooling water system met design criteria. Specific examples of inadequate design calculations included failure to use appropriate and/or current calculation inputs, out of date active design calculations, and the failure to incorporate design changes into the existing design calculations. This finding is of very low safety significance because the resulting design calculation revisions did not show that the component cooling water system was operating outside of it's design criteria. (Section 1R21.231 b)
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Falsification of Radiological Survey Records A Severity Level IV violation that was characterized as an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4 and 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for a period of at least January 1 through June 4, 2002. This involved a health physics technician failing to perform required, routine radiation surveys on numerous occasions and deliberately fabricating data on the radiological survey records, which are required to be maintained by 10 CFR 20.2103. Because this issue involved willfulness on the file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/22/2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 2 part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was willful and involved required radiation surveys, some involving high radiation areas, that were not made over an extended period of time. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Dec 20, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with Interim Compensatory Measure B.4.f A non-cited violation of Provision III.A of the February 25, 2002, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Catawba was identified. The finding was more that minor because it was associated the "Response to Contingency Events" attribute and affected the objective of the Physical Protection Cornerstone to provide adequate assurance that the physical protection system can protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. It was determined to be of very low safety significance in that it involved a failure to meet regulatory requirements and represented a vulnerability in safeguards systems or plan; however, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the previous four quarters. (Section V.F Inspection Report# : 2002009(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R).
However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation and a lack of detail in operability reviews.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : May 30, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 07/22/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jan 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update and Maintain Control of Design Calculations A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for inadequate control of design calculations.
This finding adversely affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and is greater than minor because there were multiple examples of Type II calculation deficiencies that were significant enough to require revision of several design calculations to ensure the component cooling water system met design criteria. Specific examples of inadequate design calculations included failure to use appropriate and/or current calculation inputs, out of date active design calculations, and the failure to incorporate design changes into the existing design calculations. This finding is of very low safety significance because the resulting design calculation revisions did not show that the component cooling water system was operating outside of it's design criteria. (Section 1R21.231 b)
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Post a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to post a radiation area as required by 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting Requirement, paragraph (a), Posting of Radiation Areas. Radioactive samples having a dose rate greater than 5 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 millirem/hour at 30 centimeters were stored in the chemistry lab in such a manner that an individual could receive a whole body dose from the stored material without the proper radiation sign posting. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because this finding was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Routine Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to perform adequate radiological surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501, General, paragraph (a). Three radiological surveys conducted in the chemistry laboratory over a three month period were insufficient to detect radiation levels from potential radiological hazards that could create radiation areas. The finding was more than minor because they were associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring to protect the worker from exposure to radiation. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because it was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Falsification of Radiological Survey Records A Severity Level IV violation that was characterized as an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4 and 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for a period of at least January 1 through June 4, 2002. This involved a health physics technician failing to perform required, routine radiation surveys on numerous occasions and deliberately fabricating data on the radiological survey records, which are required to be maintained by 10 CFR 20.2103. Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was willful and involved required radiation surveys, some involving high radiation areas, that were not made over an extended period of time. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Dec 20, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Failure to comply with Interim Compensatory Measure B.4.f A non-cited violation of Provision III.A of the February 25, 2002, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Catawba was identified. The finding was more that minor because it was associated the "Response to Contingency Events" attribute and affected the objective of the Physical Protection Cornerstone to provide adequate assurance that the physical protection system can protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. It was determined to be of very low safety significance in that it involved a failure to meet regulatory requirements and represented a vulnerability in safeguards systems or plan; however, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the previous four quarters. (Section V.F Inspection Report# : 2002009(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R).
However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation and a lack of detail in operability reviews.
Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)
Last modified : September 04, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jan 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update and Maintain Control of Design Calculations A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for inadequate control of design calculations.
This finding adversely affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and is greater than minor because there were multiple examples of Type II calculation deficiencies that were significant enough to require revision of several design calculations to ensure the component cooling water system met design criteria. Specific examples of inadequate design calculations included failure to use appropriate and/or current calculation inputs, out of date active design calculations, and the failure to incorporate design changes into the existing design calculations. This finding is of very low safety significance because the resulting design calculation revisions did not show that the component cooling water system was operating outside of it's design criteria. (Section 1R21.231 b)
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of RCP Thermal Barrier Rupture on MOV Closure and Containment Isolation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 3, Design Control, due to inadequate design measures. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure adequate relief valve sizing to prevent exceeding the design pressure of the component cooling water (KC) piping in the event of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier rupture. This finding represented a performance deficiency because it involved the licensee's failure to assure the design adequacy of the KC relief valve to protect the piping from exceeding design limits in the event of a RCP thermal barrier leak. This finding is more than minor because it affects the Reactor Safety Cornerstone, Barrier Integrity attribute of design control and affects the associated objective. The inadequately sized relief valve represents a potential open path way in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. The NRC performed a phase three significance determination screening analysis and concluded the finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Post a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to post a radiation area as required by 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting Requirement, paragraph (a), Posting of Radiation Areas. Radioactive samples having a dose rate greater than 5 millirem/hour at 30 centimeters were stored in the chemistry lab in such a manner that an individual could receive a whole body dose from the stored material without the proper radiation sign posting. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because this finding was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Routine Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to perform adequate radiological surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501, General, paragraph (a). Three radiological surveys conducted in the chemistry laboratory over a three month period were insufficient to detect radiation levels from potential radiological hazards that could create radiation areas. The finding was more than minor because they were associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring to protect the worker from exposure to radiation. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because it was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Falsification of Radiological Survey Records A Severity Level IV violation that was characterized as an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4 and 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for a period of at least January 1 through June 4, 2002. This involved a health physics technician failing to perform required, routine radiation surveys on numerous occasions and deliberately fabricating data on the radiological survey records, which are required to be maintained by 10 CFR 20.2103. Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was willful and involved required radiation surveys, some file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 involving high radiation areas, that were not made over an extended period of time. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Significance: Dec 20, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to comply with Interim Compensatory Measure B.4.f A non-cited violation of Provision III.A of the February 25, 2002, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Catawba was identified. The finding was more that minor because it was associated the "Response to Contingency Events" attribute and affected the objective of the Physical Protection Cornerstone to provide adequate assurance that the physical protection system can protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. It was determined to be of very low safety significance in that it involved a failure to meet regulatory requirements and represented a vulnerability in safeguards systems or plan; however, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the previous four quarters. (Section V.F Inspection Report# : 2002009(pdf)
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 01, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 4 Catawba 2 4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Known Conditions Adverse to Quality - two examples: (1) 1B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger and (2) 2B Diesel Generator Battery The inspectors identified the first of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take effective corrective actions. Specifically, in this first example, the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to prevent the 2B diesel generator battery bank from becoming inoperable sometime between October 18 - 25, 2003. Corrective actions resulting from the increased battery surveillance frequency were not adequate to identify an adverse trend in cell voltages prior to multiple cells being below the TS voltage. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of the system. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no loss of safety function on the battery bank. The safety function was verified by the licensee performing capacity testing on two battery cells, which showed sufficient capacity existed and therefore cell reversal conditions were not present. (Section 1RST)
The inspectors identified the second of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions. Specifically, in this second example, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct deficiencies and nonconformances in the 1B containment spray heat exchanger for known structural degradation of the tube support baffle plates from approximately 1992 until October 6, 2003. The finding is greater than minor because the finding effected the Barriers cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events, specifically the cornerstone attribute of maintaining the functionality of the containment by maintaining design structural integrity. Additionally, the finding is greater than minor because the heat exchanger actually was declared inoperable in excess of the allowed TS LCO time, which directly affected the cornerstone objective of functionality of the containment. The finding is under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and is of very low safety significance because, the finding did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment since the other train was available and was designed for one hundred percent capability to meet design requirements. Extensive licensee engineering analysis, with vendor support, determined that heat exchanger past operability was maintained because service water flow during design accident system configurations was below newly developed limits due to system flow balancing.(Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Significance: Jan 31, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 4 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update and Maintain Control of Design Calculations A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for inadequate control of design calculations.
This finding adversely affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and is greater than minor because there were multiple examples of Type II calculation deficiencies that were significant enough to require revision of several design calculations to ensure the component cooling water system met design criteria. Specific examples of inadequate design calculations included failure to use appropriate and/or current calculation inputs, out of date active design calculations, and the failure to incorporate design changes into the existing design calculations. This finding is of very low safety significance because the resulting design calculation revisions did not show that the component cooling water system was operating outside of it's design criteria. (Section 1R21.231 b)
Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of RCP Thermal Barrier Rupture on MOV Closure and Containment Isolation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 3, Design Control, due to inadequate design measures. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure adequate relief valve sizing to prevent exceeding the design pressure of the component cooling water (KC) piping in the event of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier rupture. This finding represented a performance deficiency because it involved the licensee's failure to assure the design adequacy of the KC relief valve to protect the piping from exceeding design limits in the event of a RCP thermal barrier leak. This finding is more than minor because it affects the Reactor Safety Cornerstone, Barrier Integrity attribute of design control and affects the associated objective. The inadequately sized relief valve represents a potential open path way in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. The NRC performed a phase three significance determination screening analysis and concluded the finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Routine Surveys file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 4 The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to perform adequate radiological surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501, General, paragraph (a). Three radiological surveys conducted in the chemistry laboratory over a three month period were insufficient to detect radiation levels from potential radiological hazards that could create radiation areas. The finding was more than minor because they were associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring to protect the worker from exposure to radiation. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because it was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Post a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to post a radiation area as required by 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting Requirement, paragraph (a), Posting of Radiation Areas. Radioactive samples having a dose rate greater than 5 millirem/hour at 30 centimeters were stored in the chemistry lab in such a manner that an individual could receive a whole body dose from the stored material without the proper radiation sign posting. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because this finding was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Falsification of Radiological Survey Records A Severity Level IV violation that was characterized as an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4 and 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for a period of at least January 1 through June 4, 2002. This involved a health physics technician failing to perform required, routine radiation surveys on numerous occasions and deliberately fabricating data on the radiological survey records, which are required to be maintained by 10 CFR 20.2103. Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was willful and involved required radiation surveys, some involving high radiation areas, that were not made over an extended period of time. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Last modified : March 02, 2004 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\CAT2\cat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Seal Not Installed in a Cable Conduit Penetrating a Fire Barrier The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.5 for the licensee's failure to have a penetration seal installed in a cable conduit located in a 3-hour fire barrier separating the Unit 2 A and B Electrical Penetration Rooms.
This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective in that the committed fire boundary separating two Safe Shutdown trains was not intact. The finding is of very low safety significance because a credible or likely fire scenario resulting in damage to the opposite train of equipment could not be identified following analysis and review of industry test data.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Known Conditions Adverse to Quality - two examples: (1) 1B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger and (2) 2B Diesel Generator Battery The inspectors identified the first of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take effective corrective actions. Specifically, in this first example, the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to prevent the 2B diesel generator battery bank from becoming inoperable sometime between October 18 - 25, 2003.
Corrective actions resulting from the increased battery surveillance frequency were not adequate to identify an adverse trend in cell voltages prior to multiple cells being below the TS voltage. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of the system. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no loss of safety function on the battery bank. The safety function was verified by the licensee performing capacity testing on two battery cells, which showed sufficient capacity existed and therefore cell reversal conditions were not present. (Section 1RST)
The inspectors identified the second of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions. Specifically, in this second example, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct deficiencies and nonconformances in the 1B containment spray heat exchanger for known structural degradation of the tube support baffle plates from approximately 1992 until October 6, 2003. The finding is greater than minor because the finding effected the Barriers cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events, specifically the cornerstone attribute of maintaining the functionality of the containment by maintaining design structural integrity. Additionally, the finding is greater than minor because the heat exchanger actually was declared inoperable in excess of the allowed TS LCO time, which directly affected the cornerstone objective of functionality of the containment. The finding is under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and is of very low safety significance because, the finding did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment since the other train was available and was designed for one hundred percent capability to meet design requirements. Extensive licensee engineering analysis, with vendor support, determined that heat exchanger past operability was maintained because service water flow during design accident system configurations was below newly developed limits due to system flow balancing.
(Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity 07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 Significance: Sep 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of RCP Thermal Barrier Rupture on MOV Closure and Containment Isolation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 3, Design Control, due to inadequate design measures. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure adequate relief valve sizing to prevent exceeding the design pressure of the component cooling water (KC) piping in the event of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier rupture. This finding represented a performance deficiency because it involved the licensee's failure to assure the design adequacy of the KC relief valve to protect the piping from exceeding design limits in the event of a RCP thermal barrier leak. This finding is more than minor because it affects the Reactor Safety Cornerstone, Barrier Integrity attribute of design control and affects the associated objective. The inadequately sized relief valve represents a potential open path way in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. The NRC performed a phase three significance determination screening analysis and concluded the finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Post a Radiation Area The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to post a radiation area as required by 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting Requirement, paragraph (a), Posting of Radiation Areas. Radioactive samples having a dose rate greater than 5 millirem/hour at 30 centimeters were stored in the chemistry lab in such a manner that an individual could receive a whole body dose from the stored material without the proper radiation sign posting. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because this finding was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Routine Surveys The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to perform adequate radiological surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501, General, paragraph (a). Three radiological surveys conducted in the chemistry laboratory over a three month period were insufficient to detect radiation levels from potential radiological hazards that could create radiation areas. The finding was more than minor because they were associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring to protect the worker from exposure to radiation. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because it was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.2)
Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection 07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Miscellaneous Last modified : May 05, 2004 07/14/2004
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 2Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct YC System Chiller Divider Plate Clamps The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to perform prompt corrective actions to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality on the control room area ventilation chilled water (YC) system A' chiller inlet flow divider plate support clamp. This resulted in a test failure of the YC system A' chiller.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events. The finding is of very low safety significance because, both trains of YC were not inoperable at the same time and each train is fully capable of performing the mitigating system safety function; therefore, there was not a complete loss of system function.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain/Control the Thickness of the Ground Barrier Missile Protection Shield Over RN Train B' Electrical Conduits The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, to assure that the minimum tornado missile protection shield thickness of 5.0 feet was maintained or controlled when the ground barrier over the Unit 2, nuclear service water (RN), train B' electrical conduits was removed with the remaining ground coverage less than 5 feet.
The finding is more than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring equipment reliability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of tornados, the relative small amount of electrical conduit that did not have the required ground coverage, the short exposure time, and the low impact on mitigating systems since just one pump in one train of RN was involved.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Seal Not Installed in a Cable Conduit Penetrating a Fire Barrier The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.5 for the licensee's failure to have a penetration seal installed in a cable conduit located in a 3-hour fire barrier separating the Unit 2 A and B Electrical Penetration Rooms.
This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective in that the committed fire boundary separating two Safe Shutdown trains was not intact. The finding is of very low safety significance because a credible or likely fire scenario resulting in damage to the opposite train of equipment could not be identified following analysis and review of industry test data.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Known Conditions Adverse to Quality - two examples: (1) 1B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger and (2) 2B Diesel Generator Battery The inspectors identified the first of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take effective corrective actions. Specifically, in this first example, the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 to prevent the 2B diesel generator battery bank from becoming inoperable sometime between October 18 - 25, 2003. Corrective actions resulting from the increased battery surveillance frequency were not adequate to identify an adverse trend in cell voltages prior to multiple cells being below the TS voltage. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of the system. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no loss of safety function on the battery bank. The safety function was verified by the licensee performing capacity testing on two battery cells, which showed sufficient capacity existed and therefore cell reversal conditions were not present. (Section 1RST)
The inspectors identified the second of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions. Specifically, in this second example, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct deficiencies and nonconformances in the 1B containment spray heat exchanger for known structural degradation of the tube support baffle plates from approximately 1992 until October 6, 2003. The finding is greater than minor because the finding effected the Barriers cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events, specifically the cornerstone attribute of maintaining the functionality of the containment by maintaining design structural integrity. Additionally, the finding is greater than minor because the heat exchanger actually was declared inoperable in excess of the allowed TS LCO time, which directly affected the cornerstone objective of functionality of the containment. The finding is under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and is of very low safety significance because, the finding did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment since the other train was available and was designed for one hundred percent capability to meet design requirements. Extensive licensee engineering analysis, with vendor support, determined that heat exchanger past operability was maintained because service water flow during design accident system configurations was below newly developed limits due to system flow balancing.(Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Effect of RCP Thermal Barrier Rupture on MOV Closure and Containment Isolation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 3, Design Control, due to inadequate design measures. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure adequate relief valve sizing to prevent exceeding the design pressure of the component cooling water (KC) piping in the event of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier rupture. This finding represented a performance deficiency because it involved the licensee's failure to assure the design adequacy of the KC relief valve to protect the piping from exceeding design limits in the event of a RCP thermal barrier leak. This finding is more than minor because it affects the Reactor Safety Cornerstone, Barrier Integrity attribute of design control and affects the associated objective. The inadequately sized relief valve represents a potential open path way in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. The NRC performed a phase three significance determination screening analysis and concluded the finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2003004(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Miscellaneous Last modified : September 08, 2004
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct YC System Chiller Divider Plate Clamps The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to perform prompt corrective actions to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality on the control room area ventilation chilled water (YC) system A' chiller inlet flow divider plate support clamp. This resulted in a test failure of the YC system A' chiller.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events. The finding is of very low safety significance because, both trains of YC were not inoperable at the same time and each train is fully capable of performing the mitigating system safety function; therefore, there was not a complete loss of system function.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain/Control the Thickness of the Ground Barrier Missile Protection Shield Over RN Train B' Electrical Conduits The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, to assure that the minimum tornado missile protection shield thickness of 5.0 feet was maintained or controlled when the ground barrier over the Unit 2, nuclear service water (RN), train B' electrical conduits was removed with the remaining ground coverage less than 5 feet.
The finding is more than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring equipment reliability.
The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of tornados, the relative small amount of electrical conduit that did not have the required ground coverage, the short exposure time, and the low impact on mitigating systems since just one pump in one train of RN was involved.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Seal Not Installed in a Cable Conduit Penetrating a Fire Barrier The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.5 for the licensee's failure to have a penetration seal installed in a cable conduit located in a 3-hour fire barrier separating the Unit 2 A and B Electrical Penetration Rooms.
This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective in that the committed fire boundary separating two Safe Shutdown trains was not intact. The finding is of very low safety significance because a credible or likely fire scenario resulting in damage to the opposite train of equipment could not be identified following analysis and review of industry test data.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Significance: Dec 20, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Known Conditions Adverse to Quality - two examples: (1) 1B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger and (2) 2B Diesel Generator Battery The inspectors identified the first of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 due to a failure to promptly identify and take effective corrective actions. Specifically, in this first example, the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to prevent the 2B diesel generator battery bank from becoming inoperable sometime between October 18 - 25, 2003.
Corrective actions resulting from the increased battery surveillance frequency were not adequate to identify an adverse trend in cell voltages prior to multiple cells being below the TS voltage. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of the system. The finding is of very low safety significance because there was no loss of safety function on the battery bank. The safety function was verified by the licensee performing capacity testing on two battery cells, which showed sufficient capacity existed and therefore cell reversal conditions were not present. (Section 1RST)
The inspectors identified the second of two examples of a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to a failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions. Specifically, in this second example, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct deficiencies and nonconformances in the 1B containment spray heat exchanger for known structural degradation of the tube support baffle plates from approximately 1992 until October 6, 2003. The finding is greater than minor because the finding effected the Barriers cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events, specifically the cornerstone attribute of maintaining the functionality of the containment by maintaining design structural integrity. Additionally, the finding is greater than minor because the heat exchanger actually was declared inoperable in excess of the allowed TS LCO time, which directly affected the cornerstone objective of functionality of the containment. The finding is under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and is of very low safety significance because, the finding did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment since the other train was available and was designed for one hundred percent capability to meet design requirements. Extensive licensee engineering analysis, with vendor support, determined that heat exchanger past operability was maintained because service water flow during design accident system configurations was below newly developed limits due to system flow balancing.
(Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2003005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba 2004 PI&R The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth.
However, the licensee was slow at times to initiate Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) for documenting conditions adverse to quality that met the initiation criteria established in the program procedures. In addition, examples were identified where problems where not accurately and throughly described in PIPs; thereby, adversely impacting the licensee's ability to properly code the problems for trending and develop proper corrective actions. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Several examples of recurring problems were noted after corrective actions had been completed. It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensee's self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2004009(pdf)
Last modified : December 29, 2004
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Inspections of the 2A Containment Sump Following Repairs The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspection, because inadequate quality control (QC) inspections were performed in Unit 2 on the 2A containment sump. Specifically, containment sump screen gaps, which were intended to be closed via repair activities, were not discovered by QC inspection following the repairs. The gap would allow a containment sump bypass flow path for debris to affect downstream emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components during containment recirculation. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, in that inadequate QC inspection failed to identify containment sump bypass flow paths for debris to affect the availability and reliability of ECCS components during containment recirculation. The finding was evaluated using the phase 1 SDP analysis and was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the small size of the gaps and the low probability that material could bypass the sump screen in that area. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct YC System Chiller Divider Plate Clamps The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to perform prompt corrective actions to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality on the control room area ventilation chilled water (YC) system A' chiller inlet flow divider plate support clamp. This resulted in a test failure of the YC system A' chiller.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events. The finding is of very low safety significance because, both trains of YC were not inoperable at the same time and each train is fully capable of performing the mitigating system safety function; therefore, there was not a complete loss of system function.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain/Control the Thickness of the Ground Barrier Missile Protection Shield Over RN Train B' Electrical Conduits The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, to assure that the minimum tornado missile protection shield thickness of 5.0 feet was maintained or controlled when the ground barrier over the Unit 2, nuclear service water (RN), train B' electrical conduits was removed with the remaining ground coverage less than 5 feet.
The finding is more than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring equipment reliability.
The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of tornados, the relative small amount of electrical conduit that did not have the required ground coverage, the short exposure time, and the low impact on mitigating systems since just one pump in one train of RN was involved.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Seal Not Installed in a Cable Conduit Penetrating a Fire Barrier The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.5 for the licensee's failure to have a penetration seal
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 2 installed in a cable conduit located in a 3-hour fire barrier separating the Unit 2 A and B Electrical Penetration Rooms.
This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective in that the committed fire boundary separating two Safe Shutdown trains was not intact. The finding is of very low safety significance because a credible or likely fire scenario resulting in damage to the opposite train of equipment could not be identified following analysis and review of industry test data.
Inspection Report# : 2004003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba 2004 PI&R The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth.
However, the licensee was slow at times to initiate Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) for documenting conditions adverse to quality that met the initiation criteria established in the program procedures. In addition, examples were identified where problems where not accurately and throughly described in PIPs; thereby, adversely impacting the licensee's ability to properly code the problems for trending and develop proper corrective actions. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
Several examples of recurring problems were noted after corrective actions had been completed. It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensee's self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2004009(pdf)
Last modified : March 09, 2005
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 4 Catawba 2 1Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Surveillance Procedures The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level.
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section 1R15b.(2))
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section 1R15b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Insufficient Fire Drill Oversight to Ensure Fire Brigade Performance Deficiencies are Identified The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPF-52 (Unit 2), Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement the provisions of the approved fire protection program (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) set forth in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) regarding fire brigade training and drills. Specifically, during the fire drill on February 10, 2005, the drill evaluator did not observe and assess the performance of the three teams attacking the simulated hydrogen fire on the Unit 2 main generator or operators in the main control room. As a result, some fire brigade member performance weaknesses were not noted during the drill, discussed during the post-drill critique or subsequently noted for development of appropriate corrective actions. The licensee recognized the drill team deficiency and implemented a change that required adequate team evaluators for future drills. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it involved the degradation of a plant fire protection feature and has a credible impact on safety since fire brigade performance deficiencies may prevent a fire from being extinguished or allow a fire to propagate leading to a more significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy and the noted deficiencies produced a minimal impact on the fire fighting capabilities of the fire brigade. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, since
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 4 the single evaluator did not identify all of the drill deficiencies that occurred during the drill. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Documentation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for making a change to the facility (implemented as a change to the UFSAR in 1995) that involved an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ), for which no written evaluation provided an adequate bases for the determination that the change did not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Specifically, the UFSAR change reflected an increased length of time for incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation, as well as gaseous and particulate radiation monitors, to detect a 1 gpm leak. This increased the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety evaluation report for the reactor coolant system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) leak rate predictions, because the ability to detect a 1 gpm leak within one hour was relied on and credited in the leak-before-break design analysis. The significance of the violation was evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule that was in effect at the time of the change, as well as the current 10 CFR 50.59 Rule. The current 10 CFR50.59 Rule requires, in part that "records must include a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a license amendment". This information (i.e., the ability to detect a 1gpm leak within one hour) was relied on in part, by NRC for approval of the leak-before-break analysis. Since, the NRC Enforcement Manual states that violations which existed under the old and new rule should be categorized using the current enforcement guidance, this finding was assessed as a SL IV violation. The significance of this violation was not formally evaluated under the Reactor Oversight Process per the Enforcement Policy, because the Agency views 10 CFR 50.59 issues as potentially impeding the regulatory process (i.e., it precluded NRC review of a change to the facility). The finding was not suitable for evaluation using the SDP. Given that the change to the incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation sensitivity capabilities and the gaseous and particulate radiation monitor sensitivities increased the length of time to detect a 1 gpm leak, and the fact that a diverse means of detecting a 1 gpm leak within one hour existed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, the delta core damage frequency for the applicable core damage accident sequences stemming from LOCA initiating events were determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Inspections of the 2A Containment Sump Following Repairs The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspection, because inadequate quality control (QC) inspections were performed in Unit 2 on the 2A containment sump. Specifically, containment sump screen gaps, which were intended to be closed via repair activities, were not discovered by QC inspection following the repairs. The gap would allow a containment sump bypass flow path for debris to affect downstream emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components during containment recirculation. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, in that inadequate QC inspection failed to identify containment sump bypass flow paths for debris to affect the availability and reliability of ECCS components during containment recirculation. The finding was evaluated using the phase 1 SDP analysis and was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the small size of the gaps and the low probability that material could bypass the sump screen in that area. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Correct YC System Chiller Divider Plate Clamps The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to perform prompt corrective actions to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality on the control room area ventilation chilled water (YC) system A' chiller inlet flow divider plate support clamp. This resulted in a test failure of the YC system A' chiller.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events. The finding is of very low safety significance because, both trains of YC were not inoperable at the same time and each train is fully capable of performing the mitigating system safety function; therefore, there was not a complete loss of system function.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2004
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 4 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain/Control the Thickness of the Ground Barrier Missile Protection Shield Over RN Train B' Electrical Conduits The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, to assure that the minimum tornado missile protection shield thickness of 5.0 feet was maintained or controlled when the ground barrier over the Unit 2, nuclear service water (RN), train B' electrical conduits was removed with the remaining ground coverage less than 5 feet.
The finding is more than minor because it affected the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring equipment reliability.
The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of tornados, the relative small amount of electrical conduit that did not have the required ground coverage, the short exposure time, and the low impact on mitigating systems since just one pump in one train of RN was involved.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
(2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses.
This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 4 Significance: SL-IV Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR Involving Dose Calculations A violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified involving DECs failure to update the FSAR to reflect correct design basis accident dose calculations. Because of its low safety significance and because the issue was entered into their corrective action program (Problem Investigation Process reports G-04-0334 and C-04-4116), the NRC is treating this Severity Level IV violation as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Aug 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba 2004 PI&R The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth.
However, the licensee was slow at times to initiate Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) for documenting conditions adverse to quality that met the initiation criteria established in the program procedures. In addition, examples were identified where problems where not accurately and throughly described in PIPs; thereby, adversely impacting the licensee's ability to properly code the problems for trending and develop proper corrective actions. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
Several examples of recurring problems were noted after corrective actions had been completed. It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensee's self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2004009(pdf)
Last modified : June 17, 2005
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 4 Catawba 2 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Insufficient Fire Drill Oversight to Ensure Fire Brigade Performance Deficiencies are Identified The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPF-52 (Unit 2), Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement the provisions of the approved fire protection program (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) set forth in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) regarding fire brigade training and drills. Specifically, during the fire drill on February 10, 2005, the drill evaluator did not observe and assess the performance of the three teams attacking the simulated hydrogen fire on the Unit 2 main generator or operators in the main control room. As a result, some fire brigade member performance weaknesses were not noted during the drill, discussed during the post-drill critique or subsequently noted for development of appropriate corrective actions. The licensee recognized the drill team deficiency and implemented a change that required adequate team evaluators for future drills. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it involved the degradation of a plant fire protection feature and has a credible impact on safety since fire brigade performance deficiencies may prevent a fire from being extinguished or allow a fire to propagate leading to a more significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy and the noted deficiencies produced a minimal impact on the fire fighting capabilities of the fire brigade. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, since the single evaluator did not identify all of the drill deficiencies that occurred during the drill. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Surveillance Procedures The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level.
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section 1R15b.(2))
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 4 1R15b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Evaluate Potential RHR System Differential Pressure During Postulated Accident Conditions In Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Testing Program A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate design control as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, in that, the licensee found that they had incorrectly assumed that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump suction valves needed to function under a maximum 20 pound per square inch pressure differential (psid) and then implemented periodic testing under their Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program to ensure the valves would open against this psid. Subsequent licensee analysis determined that the valves could experience up to 364 psid during specific accident conditions. Because this violation appeared to be of greater significance than the licensee's initial characterization of the issue, this finding is being treated as an NRC-identified violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Guidance. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not determine the proper design parameters and conditions for all required accident scenarios.
This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone for availability and reliability, in that excessive psid across the containment sump suction valves could prevent the valves from opening and providing a required injection supply source to the emergency core cooling system pumps. The finding was assessed using the significance determination process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The evaluation determined that the finding exceeded the threshold that required evaluation under Phase 3 of the significance determination process. The Phase 3 analysis conducted by the Regional Senior Reactor Analyst, determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the dominant factor in the analysis was that the need for sump recirculation would have to coincide with a degraded grid condition and such an initiating event frequency was sufficiently low enough to conclude the deficiency was Green. (Section 1R15b.2).
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Documentation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for making a change to the facility (implemented as a change to the UFSAR in 1995) that involved an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ), for which no written evaluation provided an adequate bases for the determination that the change did not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Specifically, the UFSAR change reflected an increased length of time for incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation, as well as gaseous and particulate radiation monitors, to detect a 1 gpm leak. This increased the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety evaluation report for the reactor coolant system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) leak rate predictions, because the ability to detect a 1 gpm leak within one hour was relied on and credited in the leak-before-break design analysis. The significance of the violation was evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule that was in effect at the time of the change, as well as the current 10 CFR 50.59 Rule. The current 10 CFR50.59 Rule requires, in part that "records must include a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a license amendment". This information (i.e., the ability to detect a 1gpm leak within one hour) was relied on in part, by NRC for approval of the leak-before-break analysis. Since, the NRC Enforcement Manual states that violations which existed under the old and new rule should be categorized using the current enforcement guidance, this finding was assessed as a SL IV violation. The significance of this violation was not formally evaluated under the Reactor Oversight Process per the Enforcement Policy, because the Agency views 10 CFR 50.59 issues as potentially impeding the regulatory process (i.e., it precluded NRC review of a change to the facility). The finding was not suitable for evaluation using the SDP. Given that the change to the incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation sensitivity capabilities and the gaseous and particulate radiation monitor sensitivities increased the length of time to detect a 1 gpm leak, and the fact that a diverse means of detecting a 1 gpm leak within one hour existed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, the delta core damage frequency for the applicable core damage accident sequences stemming from LOCA initiating events were determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Inspections of the 2A Containment Sump Following Repairs The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspection, because inadequate quality control (QC) inspections were performed in Unit 2 on the 2A containment sump. Specifically, containment sump screen gaps, which were intended to be
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 4 closed via repair activities, were not discovered by QC inspection following the repairs. The gap would allow a containment sump bypass flow path for debris to affect downstream emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components during containment recirculation. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, in that inadequate QC inspection failed to identify containment sump bypass flow paths for debris to affect the availability and reliability of ECCS components during containment recirculation. The finding was evaluated using the phase 1 SDP analysis and was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the small size of the gaps and the low probability that material could bypass the sump screen in that area. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-IV Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR Involving Dose Calculations A violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified involving DECs failure to update the FSAR to reflect correct design basis accident dose calculations. Because of its low safety significance and because the issue was entered into their corrective action program (Problem Investigation Process reports G-04-0334 and C-04-4116), the NRC is treating this Severity Level IV violation as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 4 (2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses.
This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: N/A Aug 27, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba 2004 PI&R The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth.
However, the licensee was slow at times to initiate Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) for documenting conditions adverse to quality that met the initiation criteria established in the program procedures. In addition, examples were identified where problems where not accurately and throughly described in PIPs; thereby, adversely impacting the licensee's ability to properly code the problems for trending and develop proper corrective actions. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
Several examples of recurring problems were noted after corrective actions had been completed. It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensee's self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2004009(pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2005
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 3Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Insufficient Fire Drill Oversight to Ensure Fire Brigade Performance Deficiencies are Identified The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPF-52 (Unit 2), Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement the provisions of the approved fire protection program (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) set forth in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) regarding fire brigade training and drills. Specifically, during the fire drill on February 10, 2005, the drill evaluator did not observe and assess the performance of the three teams attacking the simulated hydrogen fire on the Unit 2 main generator or operators in the main control room. As a result, some fire brigade member performance weaknesses were not noted during the drill, discussed during the post-drill critique or subsequently noted for development of appropriate corrective actions. The licensee recognized the drill team deficiency and implemented a change that required adequate team evaluators for future drills. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it involved the degradation of a plant fire protection feature and has a credible impact on safety since fire brigade performance deficiencies may prevent a fire from being extinguished or allow a fire to propagate leading to a more significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy and the noted deficiencies produced a minimal impact on the fire fighting capabilities of the fire brigade. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, since the single evaluator did not identify all of the drill deficiencies that occurred during the drill. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Surveillance Procedures The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level.
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section 1R15b.(2))
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 1R15b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Control Of Purchased Equipment The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to the procurement documents as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the licensee's commercial grade dedication program did not verify manufacturing defects existed on previously dedicated commercial grade relays. The licensee was responsible to acquire the necessary information to assure the procured equipment maintained original design specifications and quality control.
The finding was assessed using the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The finding was evaluated using the SDP Phase 2 plant notebook and it was determined a Phase 3 evaluation was required, based on the increase in the probability failure rate of the relays which represented an increase in the likelihood of the loss of safety function of the nuclear service water (RN) system and its associated initiating event frequency. The regional SRA performed a Phase 3 SDP for the finding. Electrical schematics were reviewed to determine mode of failures caused by the relays. A time line was constructed to verify the time periods the various relays were in service. Conservative screening values were established for relay failure rates, based on number of demands experienced by the inservice relays. Fault trees were developed to estimate the relay failure impact on the Loss of Service Water initiating event frequency. Using these conservative values, the NRC's plant risk model was run to determine an upper limit for the risk due to the finding. The risk associated with the finding was determined to be GREEN. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Complex Lift Plan The inspectors identified a NCV for the failure to follow the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section II, Quality Assurance Plan, when the inspectors determined that a complex lift was going to occur over the top of a safety-related structure with no developed or documented lift plan as required by the licensee lifting procedure. The finding is greater than minor because the finding could be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Without a complex lift plan to ensure quality measures were taken and compensatory actions were considered, had the 23 ton steel structure fallen on the RN lake intake structure, a potential loss of RN may have occurred which would have required prompt action by the operators to transfer the assured water source to the standby nuclear service water pond. Damage to the RN pump structure could have adversely impacted reactor safety and affected the availability and reliability of a mitigating system performance attribute of the reactor safety cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, using the significance determination phase 1 worksheet, because the lack of a documented complex lift plan did not result in the loss of safety function of the RN system as the lift was deferred until a plan was developed. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not follow or implement the requirements of the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Evaluate Potential RHR System Differential Pressure During Postulated Accident Conditions In Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Testing Program A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate design control as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, in that, the licensee found that they had incorrectly assumed that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump suction valves needed to function under a maximum 20 pound per square inch pressure differential (psid) and then implemented periodic testing under their Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program to ensure the valves would open against this psid. Subsequent licensee analysis determined that the valves could experience up to 364 psid during specific accident conditions. Because this violation appeared to be of greater significance than the licensee's initial characterization of the issue, this finding is being treated as an NRC-identified violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Guidance. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not determine the proper design parameters and conditions for all required accident scenarios.
This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone for availability and reliability, in that excessive psid across the containment sump suction valves could prevent the valves from opening and
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 providing a required injection supply source to the emergency core cooling system pumps. The finding was assessed using the significance determination process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The evaluation determined that the finding exceeded the threshold that required evaluation under Phase 3 of the significance determination process. The Phase 3 analysis conducted by the Regional Senior Reactor Analyst, determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the dominant factor in the analysis was that the need for sump recirculation would have to coincide with a degraded grid condition and such an initiating event frequency was sufficiently low enough to conclude the deficiency was Green. (Section 1R15b.2).
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Documentation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for making a change to the facility (implemented as a change to the UFSAR in 1995) that involved an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ), for which no written evaluation provided an adequate bases for the determination that the change did not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Specifically, the UFSAR change reflected an increased length of time for incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation, as well as gaseous and particulate radiation monitors, to detect a 1 gpm leak. This increased the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety evaluation report for the reactor coolant system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) leak rate predictions, because the ability to detect a 1 gpm leak within one hour was relied on and credited in the leak-before-break design analysis. The significance of the violation was evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule that was in effect at the time of the change, as well as the current 10 CFR 50.59 Rule. The current 10 CFR50.59 Rule requires, in part that "records must include a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a license amendment". This information (i.e., the ability to detect a 1gpm leak within one hour) was relied on in part, by NRC for approval of the leak-before-break analysis. Since, the NRC Enforcement Manual states that violations which existed under the old and new rule should be categorized using the current enforcement guidance, this finding was assessed as a SL IV violation. The significance of this violation was not formally evaluated under the Reactor Oversight Process per the Enforcement Policy, because the Agency views 10 CFR 50.59 issues as potentially impeding the regulatory process (i.e., it precluded NRC review of a change to the facility). The finding was not suitable for evaluation using the SDP. Given that the change to the incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation sensitivity capabilities and the gaseous and particulate radiation monitor sensitivities increased the length of time to detect a 1 gpm leak, and the fact that a diverse means of detecting a 1 gpm leak within one hour existed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, the delta core damage frequency for the applicable core damage accident sequences stemming from LOCA initiating events were determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Inspections of the 2A Containment Sump Following Repairs The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspection, because inadequate quality control (QC) inspections were performed in Unit 2 on the 2A containment sump. Specifically, containment sump screen gaps, which were intended to be closed via repair activities, were not discovered by QC inspection following the repairs. The gap would allow a containment sump bypass flow path for debris to affect downstream emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components during containment recirculation. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, in that inadequate QC inspection failed to identify containment sump bypass flow paths for debris to affect the availability and reliability of ECCS components during containment recirculation. The finding was evaluated using the phase 1 SDP analysis and was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the small size of the gaps and the low probability that material could bypass the sump screen in that area. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2004006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide surveys for workers making at power' lower containment entries The inspector identified a NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide concentration surveys prior to personnel making Unit 1 (U1) or Unit 2 (U2) lower containment at power' entries. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure grab samples collected using the U1 and U2 Containment Air Release and Addition System effluent monitor system (EMF) -38,-39, -40 skid supply line were representative of lower containment airborne conditions. This finding is greater than minor because the failure to conduct adequate surveys of lower containment airborne radionuclide concentrations decreased the effectiveness of radiological controls for workers entering potential airborne radiation areas. The finding was associated with radiation protection program and process attributes of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding is of very low safety significance because workers who may have entered lower containment airborne areas were provided with appropriate external radiation monitoring devices, were screened for internally deposited radionuclides upon exiting the radiologically controlled area, and the assigned doses resulting from external radiation sources and from internally deposited radioactive materials were within regulatory limits. This finding has a Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting aspect due to the February 2005 evaluation for the ventilation alignment issue not being thorough nor comprehensive. The licensee has entered this finding in its corrective action program as PIP C-05-05169 and was evaluating corrective actions to take (Section 2OS1).
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
(2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses.
This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR Involving Dose Calculations A violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified involving DECs failure to update the FSAR to reflect correct design basis accident dose calculations. Because of its low safety significance and because the issue was entered into their corrective action program (Problem Investigation Process reports G-04-0334 and C-04-4116), the NRC is treating this Severity Level IV violation as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : November 30, 2005
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 4 Catawba 2 4Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Insufficient Fire Drill Oversight to Ensure Fire Brigade Performance Deficiencies are Identified The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPF-52 (Unit 2), Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement the provisions of the approved fire protection program (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) set forth in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) regarding fire brigade training and drills. Specifically, during the fire drill on February 10, 2005, the drill evaluator did not observe and assess the performance of the three teams attacking the simulated hydrogen fire on the Unit 2 main generator or operators in the main control room. As a result, some fire brigade member performance weaknesses were not noted during the drill, discussed during the post-drill critique or subsequently noted for development of appropriate corrective actions. The licensee recognized the drill team deficiency and implemented a change that required adequate team evaluators for future drills. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it involved the degradation of a plant fire protection feature and has a credible impact on safety since fire brigade performance deficiencies may prevent a fire from being extinguished or allow a fire to propagate leading to a more significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy and the noted deficiencies produced a minimal impact on the fire fighting capabilities of the fire brigade. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, since the single evaluator did not identify all of the drill deficiencies that occurred during the drill. (Section 1R05.2)
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Surveillance Procedures The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Written Procedures, because the licensee failed to establish and maintain an adequate surveillance procedure for containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.15.2 and SR 3.4.15.4, in that the associated alarm function was not set or tested to alarm at a value equivalent to 1 gallon per minute in one hour for a realistic current reactor coolant activity level.
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section 1R15b.(2))
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because the containment gaseous and particulate channel radiation monitors were not capable of performing the design bases function for an extended period of time. Additionally, the operability of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation alarming functions was not verified for an extended period of time. The inoperability resulted in potential impact on reactor safety and adversely affected the availability and reliability of the barrier integrity equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leak detection were available to the licensee and no actual leakage above 1gpm was indicated through the RCS water balance surveillance. The unavailability of the gaseous and particulate channel leak detection functions and the RCS leakage detection instrumentation alarm indications did not contribute to an increase in core damage sequences when evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 worksheets. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution. The licensee had evaluated the operability of the radiation monitors via the corrective action program and incorrectly determined that the radiation monitors were operable. (Section
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 4 1R15b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Control Of Purchased Equipment The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to the procurement documents as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the licensee's commercial grade dedication program did not verify manufacturing defects existed on previously dedicated commercial grade relays. The licensee was responsible to acquire the necessary information to assure the procured equipment maintained original design specifications and quality control.
The finding was assessed using the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The finding was evaluated using the SDP Phase 2 plant notebook and it was determined a Phase 3 evaluation was required, based on the increase in the probability failure rate of the relays which represented an increase in the likelihood of the loss of safety function of the nuclear service water (RN) system and its associated initiating event frequency. The regional SRA performed a Phase 3 SDP for the finding. Electrical schematics were reviewed to determine mode of failures caused by the relays. A time line was constructed to verify the time periods the various relays were in service. Conservative screening values were established for relay failure rates, based on number of demands experienced by the inservice relays. Fault trees were developed to estimate the relay failure impact on the Loss of Service Water initiating event frequency. Using these conservative values, the NRC's plant risk model was run to determine an upper limit for the risk due to the finding. The risk associated with the finding was determined to be GREEN. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Complex Lift Plan The inspectors identified a NCV for the failure to follow the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section II, Quality Assurance Plan, when the inspectors determined that a complex lift was going to occur over the top of a safety-related structure with no developed or documented lift plan as required by the licensee lifting procedure. The finding is greater than minor because the finding could be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Without a complex lift plan to ensure quality measures were taken and compensatory actions were considered, had the 23 ton steel structure fallen on the RN lake intake structure, a potential loss of RN may have occurred which would have required prompt action by the operators to transfer the assured water source to the standby nuclear service water pond. Damage to the RN pump structure could have adversely impacted reactor safety and affected the availability and reliability of a mitigating system performance attribute of the reactor safety cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, using the significance determination phase 1 worksheet, because the lack of a documented complex lift plan did not result in the loss of safety function of the RN system as the lift was deferred until a plan was developed. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not follow or implement the requirements of the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Evaluate Potential RHR System Differential Pressure During Postulated Accident Conditions In Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Testing Program A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate design control as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, in that, the licensee found that they had incorrectly assumed that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump suction valves needed to function under a maximum 20 pound per square inch pressure differential (psid) and then implemented periodic testing under their Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program to ensure the valves would open against this psid. Subsequent licensee analysis determined that the valves could experience up to 364 psid during specific accident conditions. Because this violation appeared to be of greater significance than the licensee's initial characterization of the issue, this finding is being treated as an NRC-identified violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Guidance. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not determine the proper design parameters and conditions for all required accident scenarios.
This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone for availability and reliability, in that excessive psid across the containment sump suction valves could prevent the valves from opening and
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 4 providing a required injection supply source to the emergency core cooling system pumps. The finding was assessed using the significance determination process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The evaluation determined that the finding exceeded the threshold that required evaluation under Phase 3 of the significance determination process. The Phase 3 analysis conducted by the Regional Senior Reactor Analyst, determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the dominant factor in the analysis was that the need for sump recirculation would have to coincide with a degraded grid condition and such an initiating event frequency was sufficiently low enough to conclude the deficiency was Green. (Section 1R15b.2).
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Documentation The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for making a change to the facility (implemented as a change to the UFSAR in 1995) that involved an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ), for which no written evaluation provided an adequate bases for the determination that the change did not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Specifically, the UFSAR change reflected an increased length of time for incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation, as well as gaseous and particulate radiation monitors, to detect a 1 gpm leak. This increased the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety evaluation report for the reactor coolant system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) leak rate predictions, because the ability to detect a 1 gpm leak within one hour was relied on and credited in the leak-before-break design analysis. The significance of the violation was evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule that was in effect at the time of the change, as well as the current 10 CFR 50.59 Rule. The current 10 CFR50.59 Rule requires, in part that "records must include a written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a license amendment". This information (i.e., the ability to detect a 1gpm leak within one hour) was relied on in part, by NRC for approval of the leak-before-break analysis. Since, the NRC Enforcement Manual states that violations which existed under the old and new rule should be categorized using the current enforcement guidance, this finding was assessed as a SL IV violation. The significance of this violation was not formally evaluated under the Reactor Oversight Process per the Enforcement Policy, because the Agency views 10 CFR 50.59 issues as potentially impeding the regulatory process (i.e., it precluded NRC review of a change to the facility). The finding was not suitable for evaluation using the SDP. Given that the change to the incore instrumentation room sump instrumentation sensitivity capabilities and the gaseous and particulate radiation monitor sensitivities increased the length of time to detect a 1 gpm leak, and the fact that a diverse means of detecting a 1 gpm leak within one hour existed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, the delta core damage frequency for the applicable core damage accident sequences stemming from LOCA initiating events were determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide surveys for workers making at power' lower containment entries The inspector identified a NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide concentration surveys prior to personnel making Unit 1 (U1) or Unit 2 (U2) lower containment at power' entries. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure grab samples collected using the U1 and U2 Containment Air Release and Addition System effluent monitor system (EMF) -38,-39, -40 skid supply line were representative of lower containment airborne conditions. This finding is greater than minor because the failure to conduct adequate surveys of lower containment airborne radionuclide concentrations decreased the effectiveness of radiological controls for workers entering potential airborne radiation areas. The finding was associated with radiation protection program and process attributes of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding is of very low safety significance because workers who may have entered lower containment airborne areas were provided with appropriate external radiation monitoring devices, were screened for internally deposited radionuclides upon exiting the radiologically controlled area, and the assigned doses resulting from external radiation sources and from internally deposited radioactive materials were within regulatory limits. This finding has a Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting aspect due to the February 2005 evaluation for the ventilation alignment issue not being thorough nor comprehensive. The licensee has entered this finding in its corrective action program as PIP C-05-05169 and was evaluating corrective actions to take (Section 2OS1).
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 4 Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
(2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses.
This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the FSAR Involving Dose Calculations A violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified involving DECs failure to update the FSAR to reflect correct design basis accident dose calculations. Because of its low safety significance and because the issue was entered into their corrective action program (Problem Investigation Process reports G-04-0334 and C-04-4116), the NRC is treating this Severity Level IV violation as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : March 03, 2006
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Derating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program. The licensee made a change to the approved fire protection program which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability.
Specifically, the licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery powered emergency lighting units (ELUs) from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The evaluation for this change was not adequate to ensure that derating the ELUs would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact the licensees post-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the event of a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. The finding was of very low risk significance (Green) because operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Risk Assessment and Management Associated With Planned Nuclear Service Water System Maintenance An NRC-identified non-cited violation was identified for the failure to adequately assess and manage the risk pertaining to a portion of the maintenance activities associated with the removal of the A train of nuclear service water (RN) from service for a planned 14-day outage as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A train diesels were unavailable (<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Control Of Purchased Equipment The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to the procurement documents as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the licensee's commercial grade dedication program did not verify manufacturing defects existed on previously dedicated commercial grade relays. The licensee was responsible to acquire the necessary information to assure the procured equipment maintained original design specifications and quality control.
The finding was assessed using the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The finding was evaluated using the SDP Phase 2 plant notebook and it was determined a Phase 3 evaluation was required, based on the increase in the probability failure rate of the relays which represented an increase in the likelihood of the loss of safety function of the nuclear service water (RN) system and its associated initiating event frequency. The regional SRA performed a Phase 3 SDP for the finding. Electrical schematics were reviewed to determine mode of failures caused by the relays. A time line was constructed to verify the time periods the various relays were in service. Conservative screening values were established for relay failure rates, based on number of demands experienced by the inservice relays. Fault trees were developed to estimate the relay failure impact on the Loss of Service Water initiating event frequency. Using these conservative values, the
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 NRC's plant risk model was run to determine an upper limit for the risk due to the finding. The risk associated with the finding was determined to be GREEN. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Complex Lift Plan The inspectors identified a NCV for the failure to follow the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section II, Quality Assurance Plan, when the inspectors determined that a complex lift was going to occur over the top of a safety-related structure with no developed or documented lift plan as required by the licensee lifting procedure. The finding is greater than minor because the finding could be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Without a complex lift plan to ensure quality measures were taken and compensatory actions were considered, had the 23 ton steel structure fallen on the RN lake intake structure, a potential loss of RN may have occurred which would have required prompt action by the operators to transfer the assured water source to the standby nuclear service water pond. Damage to the RN pump structure could have adversely impacted reactor safety and affected the availability and reliability of a mitigating system performance attribute of the reactor safety cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, using the significance determination phase 1 worksheet, because the lack of a documented complex lift plan did not result in the loss of safety function of the RN system as the lift was deferred until a plan was developed. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not follow or implement the requirements of the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Evaluate Potential RHR System Differential Pressure During Postulated Accident Conditions In Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Testing Program A non-cited violation was identified for inadequate design control as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, in that, the licensee found that they had incorrectly assumed that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump suction valves needed to function under a maximum 20 pound per square inch pressure differential (psid) and then implemented periodic testing under their Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program to ensure the valves would open against this psid. Subsequent licensee analysis determined that the valves could experience up to 364 psid during specific accident conditions. Because this violation appeared to be of greater significance than the licensee's initial characterization of the issue, this finding is being treated as an NRC-identified violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Guidance. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not determine the proper design parameters and conditions for all required accident scenarios.
This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Cornerstone for availability and reliability, in that excessive psid across the containment sump suction valves could prevent the valves from opening and providing a required injection supply source to the emergency core cooling system pumps. The finding was assessed using the significance determination process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The evaluation determined that the finding exceeded the threshold that required evaluation under Phase 3 of the significance determination process. The Phase 3 analysis conducted by the Regional Senior Reactor Analyst, determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the dominant factor in the analysis was that the need for sump recirculation would have to coincide with a degraded grid condition and such an initiating event frequency was sufficiently low enough to conclude the deficiency was Green. (Section 1R15b.2).
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide surveys for workers making at power' lower containment entries The inspector identified a NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide concentration surveys prior to personnel making Unit 1 (U1) or Unit 2 (U2) lower containment at power' entries. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure grab samples collected using the U1 and U2 Containment Air Release and Addition System effluent monitor system (EMF) -38,-39, -40 skid supply line were representative of lower containment airborne conditions. This finding is greater than minor because the failure to conduct adequate surveys of lower containment airborne radionuclide concentrations decreased the effectiveness of radiological controls for workers entering potential airborne radiation areas. The finding was associated with radiation protection program and process attributes of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding is of very low safety significance because workers who may have entered lower containment airborne areas were provided with appropriate external radiation monitoring devices, were screened for internally deposited radionuclides upon exiting the radiologically controlled area, and the assigned doses resulting from external radiation sources and from internally deposited radioactive materials were within regulatory limits. This finding has a Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting aspect due to the February 2005 evaluation for the ventilation alignment issue not being thorough nor comprehensive. The licensee has entered this finding in its corrective action program as PIP C-05-05169 and was evaluating corrective actions to take (Section 2OS1).
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
(2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses.
This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : May 25, 2006
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 2Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Periodic Inspection Procedures for Seals on Below-Grade Electrical Conduits Entering Plant Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment.
The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.b, for failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance. Specifically, no procedure or program existed to periodically inspect underground electrical conduit seals to identify and repair any degradation of seals which provided protection from external flooding.
The finding was more than minor in that it is associated with the protection against External Factors attribute and affected the Mitigating Events cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that the licensee failed to establish a program, process or procedure to periodically inspect and assess the condition of seals in below-grade electrical conduits to identify degradation and ensure that the seals were properly maintained or repaired as needed. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Derating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program. The licensee made a change to the approved fire protection program which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically, the licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery powered emergency lighting units (ELUs) from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The evaluation for this change was not adequate to ensure that derating the ELUs would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact the licensees post-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the event of a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. The finding was of very low risk significance (Green) because operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Risk Assessment and Management Associated With Planned Nuclear Service Water System Maintenance An NRC-identified non-cited violation was identified for the failure to adequately assess and manage the risk pertaining to a portion of the maintenance activities associated with the removal of the A train of nuclear service water (RN) from service for a planned 14-day outage as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A train diesels were unavailable (<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Control Of Purchased Equipment The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to assure that purchased equipment conformed to the procurement documents as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII. This finding was greater than minor because it affected an objective and attribute of the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the licensee's commercial grade dedication program did not verify manufacturing defects existed on previously dedicated commercial grade relays. The licensee was responsible to acquire the necessary information to assure the procured equipment maintained original design specifications and quality control. The finding was assessed using the SDP for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The finding was evaluated using the SDP Phase 2 plant notebook and it was determined a Phase 3 evaluation was required, based on the increase in the probability failure rate of the relays which represented an increase in the likelihood of the loss of safety function of the nuclear service water (RN) system and its associated initiating event frequency. The regional SRA performed a Phase 3 SDP for the finding. Electrical schematics were reviewed to determine mode of failures caused by the relays. A time line was constructed to verify the time periods the various relays were in service. Conservative screening values were established for relay failure rates, based on number of demands experienced by the inservice relays. Fault trees were developed to estimate the relay failure impact on the Loss of Service Water initiating event frequency. Using these conservative values, the NRC's plant risk model was run to determine an upper limit for the risk due to the finding.
The risk associated with the finding was determined to be GREEN. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Complex Lift Plan The inspectors identified a NCV for the failure to follow the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section II, Quality Assurance Plan, when the inspectors determined that a complex lift was going to occur over the top of a safety-related structure with no developed or documented lift plan as required by the licensee lifting procedure. The finding is greater than minor because the finding could be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Without a complex lift plan to ensure quality measures were taken and compensatory actions were considered, had the 23 ton steel structure fallen on the RN lake intake structure, a potential loss of RN may have occurred which would have required prompt action by the operators to transfer the assured water source to the standby nuclear service water pond. Damage to the RN pump structure could have adversely impacted reactor safety and affected the availability and reliability of a mitigating system performance attribute of the reactor safety cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, using the significance determination phase 1 worksheet, because the lack of a documented complex lift plan did not result in the loss of safety function of the RN system as the lift was deferred until a plan was developed. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance since individuals did not follow or implement the requirements of the Duke Power Company Lifting Program procedure. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Sep 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide surveys for workers making at power' lower containment entries The inspector identified a NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) for failure to conduct adequate airborne radionuclide concentration surveys prior to personnel making Unit 1 (U1) or Unit 2 (U2) lower containment at power' entries. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure grab samples collected using the U1 and U2 Containment Air Release and Addition System effluent monitor system (EMF) -38,-39, -40 skid supply line were representative of lower containment airborne conditions. This finding is greater than minor because the failure to conduct adequate surveys of lower containment airborne radionuclide concentrations decreased the effectiveness of radiological controls for workers entering potential airborne radiation areas. The finding was associated with radiation protection program and process attributes of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The finding is of very low safety significance because workers who may have entered lower containment airborne areas were provided with appropriate external radiation
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 monitoring devices, were screened for internally deposited radionuclides upon exiting the radiologically controlled area, and the assigned doses resulting from external radiation sources and from internally deposited radioactive materials were within regulatory limits. This finding has a Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting aspect due to the February 2005 evaluation for the ventilation alignment issue not being thorough nor comprehensive. The licensee has entered this finding in its corrective action program as PIP C-05-05169 and was evaluating corrective actions to take (Section 2OS1).
Inspection Report# : 2005004(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: SL-III Jan 24, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information Involving MOX Amendment Fuel Assemblies and Related Dose Calculations 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on February 27, 2003, November 3, 2003, and March 16, 2004, the licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information regarding a proposed amendment to the facility operating license, to allow the irradiation of four mixed oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs). Specifically:
(1) The proposed license amendment of February 27, 2003, failed to indicate that the reactor core would also include eight next generation fuel LTAs as part of the complete core loading of 193 fuel assemblies. This information was material to the NRC in that, as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the thermal-hydraulic conditions and mechanical design arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
(2) The above submittals included radiation dose evaluations that were not based on the current plant design basis accident radiation doses. This information was material to the NRC, in that as part of the license amendment review, substantial further inquiry by the NRC was necessary to review the radiation doses arising from the proposed reactor core composition.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII) with no civil penalty assessed.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : August 25, 2006
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 3 Catawba 2 3Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Senior Reactor Operator Operating Examinations An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.59 was identified for failure to adequately examine Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). Job Performance Measures (JPMs) that contained immediate operator actions was excluded from the sample of JPMs used to examine SROs.
The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would lead to a more significant safety concern and affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. This finding affected an individual operating examination, was related to examination quality, and affected more than 20% of the SRO operating tests. Using MC 0609 Appendix I, License Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Periodic Inspection Procedures for Seals on Below-Grade Electrical Conduits Entering Plant Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment.
The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.b, for failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance.
Specifically, no procedure or program existed to periodically inspect underground electrical conduit seals to identify and repair any degradation of seals which provided protection from external flooding.
The finding was more than minor in that it is associated with the protection against External Factors attribute and affected the Mitigating Events cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that the licensee failed to establish a program, process or procedure to periodically inspect and assess the condition of seals in below-grade electrical conduits to identify degradation and ensure that the seals were properly maintained or repaired as needed. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2006003(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Derating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program. The licensee made a change to the approved fire protection program which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically, the licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery powered
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 3 emergency lighting units (ELUs) from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The evaluation for this change was not adequate to ensure that derating the ELUs would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact the licensees post-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the event of a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. The finding was of very low risk significance (Green) because operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Risk Assessment and Management Associated With Planned Nuclear Service Water System Maintenance An NRC-identified non-cited violation was identified for the failure to adequately assess and manage the risk pertaining to a portion of the maintenance activities associated with the removal of the A train of nuclear service water (RN) from service for a planned 14-day outage as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A train diesels were unavailable (<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 25, 2006 Identified By: NRC
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 3 Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. However, there were examples where the licensee failed to initiate corrective action documents for conditions adverse to quality. In addition, there were examples where problems were not accurately and thoroughly described in corrective action documents, adversely impacting the licensees ability to properly code the problems for trending. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensees self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Last modified : December 21, 2006
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 1 of 5 Catawba 2 4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurring Scaffolding Installation Deficiencies The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurring deficiencies associated with the erection of scaffolding around safety related equipment. For the examples identified by the inspectors, the licensee removed or adjusted the scaffolding to correct the condition.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's repeated failure to erect scaffolding in accordance with the Duke Scaffold Manual and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in that multiple occurrences were identified of scaffolding being located in a manner where safety-related equipment could be adversely impacted without the appropriate engineering evaluation or approval. In accordance with Appendix B, "Issue Screening," of IMC 0612, the inspectors determined that the finding was of more than minor significance since the finding was associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of equipment that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the "Appropriate and Timely Corrective Actions" aspect of the "Corrective Action Program" component, in that ineffective corrective actions were established resulting in additional scaffolding deficiencies being identified over an 18 month period. The licensee has entered this issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-06-8183 and has identified scaffold construction and usage as an adverse trend requiring additional focus in 2007.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish a procedure for mitigating the consequences of an external flooding event.
A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1b was identified for failing to establish procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 6, Procedures for Combating Emergencies and Other Significant Events. Specifically, no procedure existed to combat or mitigate the consequences from an external flooding event.
The finding is greater than minor because the failure to establish appropriate procedures to cope with an external flood affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesireable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and did not result in the total loss of any safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. This violation was placed in the corrective action program as PIP C-06-08287, Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 2 of 5 Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to conduct an adquate extent of condition review following multiple water intrusion events to ensure risk significant SSC's were proted from loss due to flooding.
An NRC identified finding was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct adequate extent of condition reviews following multiple water intrusion events at the site by limiting the focus of the reviews to only safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and excluding those identified as being risk significant.
The finding is greater than minor as it was associated with the Proteciton Against External Factors and Equipment Performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that by narrowly focusing extent of condition reviews to only encompass safety-related SSCs and excluding risk-significant SSCs, systems required to respond to and mitiage initiating events could be adversely affected. It was determined to be of very low safety significance because, while limiting extent of condition reveiws to safety-related SSCs has the potential to adversely affect the ability of the station to respond to initiating events, failing to include risk significant equipment in the reviews conducted for the water intrusion events in 2006 after the 1A DG conduit seasls were repaired did not result in an overall increase in plant risk in excess of the green/white threshold. The vulnerabilities of other risk-significant SSCs to flooding have been addressed by the station.
This finding has captured in PIPs C-06-8246 and C-06-8311.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Senior Reactor Operator Operating Examinations An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.59 was identified for failure to adequately examine Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). Job Performance Measures (JPMs) that contained immediate operator actions was excluded from the sample of JPMs used to examine SROs.
The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would lead to a more significant safety concern and affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. This finding affected an individual operating examination, was related to examination quality, and affected more than 20% of the SRO operating tests. Using MC 0609 Appendix I, License Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Periodic Inspection Procedures for Seals on Below-Grade Electrical Conduits Entering Plant Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment.
The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.b, for failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance.
Specifically, no procedure or program existed to periodically inspect underground electrical conduit seals to identify and repair any degradation of seals which provided protection from external flooding.
The finding was more than minor in that it is associated with the protection against External Factors attribute and affected the Mitigating Events cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that the licensee failed to establish a program, process or procedure to periodically inspect and assess the condition of seals in below-grade electrical conduits to identify degradation and ensure that the seals were properly maintained or repaired as needed. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 3 of 5 Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Derating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Operating License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program. The licensee made a change to the approved fire protection program which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically, the licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery powered emergency lighting units (ELUs) from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The evaluation for this change was not adequate to ensure that derating the ELUs would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact the licensees post-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the event of a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. The finding was of very low risk significance (Green) because operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Risk Assessment and Management Associated With Planned Nuclear Service Water System Maintenance An NRC-identified non-cited violation was identified for the failure to adequately assess and manage the risk pertaining to a portion of the maintenance activities associated with the removal of the A train of nuclear service water (RN) from service for a planned 14-day outage as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A train diesels were unavailable (<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance.
Inspection Report# : 2006002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Recognition, Assessment and Management of the Increased Shutdown Risk Associated With the Failure of the 1B KF Pump with the Core in the Spent Fuel Pool and the 1A DG Inoperable The inspectors identified a green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensee failing to adequately recognize, assess, and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the single operable spent fuel pool cooling pump with the opposite trains emergency diesel generator inoperable and the recently unloaded Unit 1 reactor core in the spent fuel pool.
The finding was more than minor because the deficiency is consistent with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Section 3, Minor Screening Question (5)(i). Specifically, the licensee failed to expeditiously develop and implement risk management actions to address the elevated risk the unit was in based on the 1B KF pump failure and other equipment out of service or in an outage alignment; i.e., core in the spent fuel pool and the 1A DG disassembled. The finding was associated with the Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of maintaining the functionality of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," and determined that the performance deficiency represented a
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 4 of 5 finding of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability being below 1E-6. This was derived from discussions with the Region II Senior Reactor Analysts based on the time to boil in the Spent Fuel Pool being >24 hours which allows for operator actions to mitigate the effect of a postulated loss of cooling scenario. This finding has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) C-06-7829 and C-06-7840. The pump was returned to operable status approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the failure occurred. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance under the Safety Significant / Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component, in that the licensee failed to adequately recognize, assess and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) pump during outage conditions on Unit 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design control for ice condenser lower inlet doors The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits. The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the TS surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. It was determined to be more than minor using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, in that an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA); however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases.
The licensee contracted the vendor to reconstruct the design basis of the 40-degree torque test and has incorporated this analysis into the applicable surveillance procedure, Technical Specification and Design Basis Documents. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete Documentation and Component Labeling aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Page 5 of 5 Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 25, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. However, there were examples where the licensee failed to initiate corrective action documents for conditions adverse to quality. In addition, there were examples where problems were not accurately and thoroughly described in corrective action documents, adversely impacting the licensees ability to properly code the problems for trending. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensees self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2007
Catawba 2 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurring Scaffolding Installation Deficiencies The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurring deficiencies associated with the erection of scaffolding around safety related equipment. For the examples identified by the inspectors, the licensee removed or adjusted the scaffolding to correct the condition.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's repeated failure to erect scaffolding in accordance with the Duke Scaffold Manual and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in that multiple occurrences were identified of scaffolding being located in a manner where safety-related equipment could be adversely impacted without the appropriate engineering evaluation or approval. In accordance with Appendix B, "Issue Screening," of IMC 0612, the inspectors determined that the finding was of more than minor significance since the finding was associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of equipment that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the "Appropriate and Timely Corrective Actions" aspect of the "Corrective Action Program" component, in that ineffective corrective actions were established resulting in additional scaffolding deficiencies being identified over an 18 month period. The licensee has entered this issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-06-8183 and has identified scaffold construction and usage as an adverse trend requiring additional focus in 2007.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish a procedure for mitigating the consequences of an external flooding event.
A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1b was identified for failing to establish procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 6, Procedures for Combating Emergencies and Other Significant Events. Specifically, no procedure existed to combat or mitigate the consequences from an external flooding event.
The finding is greater than minor because the failure to establish appropriate procedures to cope with an external flood affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesireable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and did not result in the total loss of any safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. This violation was placed in the corrective action program as PIP C-06-08287, Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006
Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to conduct an adquate extent of condition review following multiple water intrusion events to ensure risk significant SSC's were proted from loss due to flooding.
An NRC identified finding was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct adequate extent of condition reviews following multiple water intrusion events at the site by limiting the focus of the reviews to only safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and excluding those identified as being risk significant.
The finding is greater than minor as it was associated with the Proteciton Against External Factors and Equipment Performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that by narrowly focusing extent of condition reviews to only encompass safety-related SSCs and excluding risk-significant SSCs, systems required to respond to and mitiage initiating events could be adversely affected. It was determined to be of very low safety significance because, while limiting extent of condition reveiws to safety-related SSCs has the potential to adversely affect the ability of the station to respond to initiating events, failing to include risk significant equipment in the reviews conducted for the water intrusion events in 2006 after the 1A DG conduit seasls were repaired did not result in an overall increase in plant risk in excess of the green/white threshold. The vulnerabilities of other risk-significant SSCs to flooding have been addressed by the station.
This finding has captured in PIPs C-06-8246 and C-06-8311.
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Senior Reactor Operator Operating Examinations An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.59 was identified for failure to adequately examine Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). Job Performance Measures (JPMs) that contained immediate operator actions was excluded from the sample of JPMs used to examine SROs.
The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would lead to a more significant safety concern and affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. This finding affected an individual operating examination, was related to examination quality, and affected more than 20% of the SRO operating tests. Using MC 0609 Appendix I, License Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Establish Periodic Inspection Procedures for Seals on Below-Grade Electrical Conduits Entering Plant Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment.
The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.b, for failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance.
Specifically, no procedure or program existed to periodically inspect underground electrical conduit seals to identify and repair any degradation of seals which provided protection from external flooding.
The finding was more than minor in that it is associated with the protection against External Factors attribute and affected the Mitigating Events cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that the licensee failed to establish a program, process or procedure to periodically inspect and assess the condition of seals in below-grade electrical conduits to identify degradation and ensure that the seals were properly maintained or repaired as needed. (Section 4OA5.1)
Inspection Report# : 2006003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Recognition, Assessment and Management of the Increased Shutdown Risk Associated With the Failure of the 1B KF Pump with the Core in the Spent Fuel Pool and the 1A DG Inoperable The inspectors identified a green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensee failing to adequately recognize, assess, and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the single operable spent fuel pool cooling pump with the opposite trains emergency diesel generator inoperable and the recently unloaded Unit 1 reactor core in the spent fuel pool.
The finding was more than minor because the deficiency is consistent with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Section 3, Minor Screening Question (5)(i). Specifically, the licensee failed to expeditiously develop and implement risk management actions to address the elevated risk the unit was in based on the 1B KF pump failure and other equipment out of service or in an outage alignment; i.e., core in the spent fuel pool and the 1A DG disassembled. The finding was associated with the Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of maintaining the functionality of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability being below 1E-6. This was derived from discussions with the Region II Senior Reactor Analysts based on the time to boil in the Spent Fuel Pool being >24 hours which allows for operator actions to mitigate the effect of a postulated loss of cooling scenario. This finding has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) C-06-7829 and C-06-7840. The pump was returned to operable status approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the failure occurred. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance under the Safety Significant / Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component, in that the licensee failed to adequately recognize, assess and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) pump during outage conditions on Unit 1.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design control for ice condenser lower inlet doors The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits. The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the TS surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. It was determined to be more than minor using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, in that an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA); however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The licensee contracted the vendor to reconstruct the design basis of the 40-degree torque test and has incorporated this analysis into the applicable surveillance procedure, Technical Specification and Design Basis Documents. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete Documentation and Component Labeling aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to maintain
complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 25, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. However, there were examples where the licensee failed to initiate corrective action documents for conditions adverse to quality. In addition, there were examples where problems were not accurately and thoroughly described in corrective action documents, adversely impacting the licensees ability to properly code the problems for trending. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensees self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Last modified : June 01, 2007
Catawba 2 2Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required Weld Inspections on the Fuel Handling Cask Cranes Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively implement the requirement to fully inspect fuel handling cask crane welds in accordance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1.4.2.3 following reinforcements made in response to a Part 21 notification. Following implementation of the modification to restore the fuel handling cask cranes capacity to 125 tons, the licensee had performed visual weld inspections rather than magnetic particle or liquid penetrant testing as required by the UFSAR. The licensee performed the required inspections prior to actual use of the cranes to lift loaded spent fuel casks. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-07-2028.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern in that improperly performed inspections on fuel handling equipment could impact the safe movement of nuclear fuel and increase the probability of a fuel handling accident. This finding is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during spent fuel movement. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the affected welds on the fuel handling cask cranes were properly inspected prior to lifting fully loaded fuel casks in the spent fuel pool building. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Operating Experience Evaluation aspect of the Operating Experience component, in that the licensee failed to properly evaluate the Part 21 notification received from Whiting Corporation to ensure all testing requirements were identified prior to implementing the required modification and declaring the cranes fully operable (P.2.a). (Section 1R17b.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 B Train KC Heat Exchanger Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to effectively implement the risk mitigation actions contained in the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with work on the Unit 2 B Train Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger to manage and minimize the resulting increased plant risk. Specifically, during the cleaning of the Unit 2 B Train KC heat exchanger tubes, the offsite power supply was not protected and in fact, work was conducted within the switchyards protective fence. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability associated with the work being performed in the switchyard in conjunction with
the 2B KC heat exchanger tube cleaning being less than 1E-6. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component, in that the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities to ensure the operational impact of the planned work was controlled and the increased risk minimized in accordance with the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with the cleaning of the Unit 2 B train KC heat exchanger (H.3.b). (Section 1R13b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With the Excavation of the RN Supply Headers Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to develop and implement an effective Complex Evolution Plan associated with excavation and inspection of the nuclear service water (RN) supply headers in order to manage and minimize the risk associated with the activity. Specifically, during the excavation phase of the activity, the potential of damaging the RN headers was not adequately controlled to minimize the increased risk resulting from the excavation. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C 2079.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that in the event an RN supply header was damaged during the excavation, the licensee could complete repairs to the header within the TS allowable out-of-service time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Supervisory and Management Oversight aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to ensure that the appropriate level of supervisory oversight was provided during the excavation phase to ensure the expectations pertaining to the use of mechanized equipment when digging in close proximity to the RN supply headers were properly implemented (H.4.c). (Section 1R13b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for CA System Air Entrainment Issue Identified in PIP C-97-01579 The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate corrective action associated with an air entrainment issue in the auxiliary feed water system (CA) pump suction line identified in PIP C-97-01579. The corrective actions in PIP 97-01579 were inadequate in that they did not address the potential impact of the air entrainment on the swap over instrumentation for the assured water supply located in the suction line upstream of the pumps. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program.
This finding is more than minor because the engineering calculation error which failed to include the potential impact of the air entrainment on the RN/CA swap over pressure switches resulted in a condition in which there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the CA pumps. The finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's engineering evaluations performed during the inspection determined that there was no adverse impact on the pressure switches and therefore no loss of the CA pumps capability for short term heat removal. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate and Timely Corrective Action to Identify and Resolve an Equipment Design Deficiency of the Alternate Power Supply for the 125 VDC Vital I&C Distribution Center 1EDF
The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate and timely corrective actions to resolve a potential equipment design deficiency of the 1DGBB battery and distribution which provided the alternate power supply to the 125 VDC Vital I&C distribution panel 1EDF. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in that 125 VDC distribution center 1EDF provides control power to critical equipment such as the 4.16kV vital bus which aligns power to ECCS pumps and valves. The finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute of design control. This finding is of very low safety significance because the team identified no occurrence, since this issue was identified on July 20, 2006, in which the station was aligned in the vulnerable condition relying on the alternate power supply to 1EDF. Additionally, the normal power supply, the vital battery, is a highly reliable power source and the alignment to the alternate power source requires manual action. Therefore there was no loss of the 1EDF safety function to provide adequate vital I&C control power for safe shutdown of the plant. This finding involved the crosscutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the evaluation, specifically the operability assessment, was inadequate and contributed the inadequacy of subsequent corrective actions. (P.1.c) (Section 1R21.2.12)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for Analyzing the Impact of Updated Vendor Technical Information on Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance and Inspection Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedure NSD 319, Vendor Technical Information Program, Rev. 2, which requires performance of technical impact reviews of maintenance and surveillance procedures due to vendor manual changes and technical updates. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because procedure inconsistencies were identified between the reactor trip breaker vendor manual and procedure SI/0/A/5100/002, Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance Procedure, Rev. 18, which indicated that the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of the reactor trip breaker safety function to open on a scram signal. (Section 1R21.2.15)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurring Scaffolding Installation Deficiencies The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurring deficiencies associated with the erection of scaffolding around safety related equipment. For the examples identified by the inspectors, the licensee removed or adjusted the scaffolding to correct the condition.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's repeated failure to erect scaffolding in accordance with the Duke Scaffold Manual and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in that multiple occurrences were identified of scaffolding being located in a manner where safety-related equipment could be adversely impacted without the appropriate engineering evaluation or approval. In accordance with Appendix B, "Issue Screening," of IMC 0612, the inspectors determined that the finding was of more than minor significance since the finding was associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of equipment that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the "Appropriate and Timely Corrective Actions" aspect of the "Corrective Action Program" component, in that ineffective corrective actions were established resulting in additional scaffolding deficiencies being identified over an 18 month period. The licensee has entered this issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-06-8183 and has identified scaffold construction and usage as an adverse trend requiring additional focus in 2007. P.1.d]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish a procedure for mitigating the consequences of an external flooding event.
A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1b was identified for failing to establish procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 6, Procedures for Combating Emergencies and Other Significant Events. Specifically, no procedure existed to combat or mitigate the consequences from an external flooding event.
The finding is greater than minor because the failure to establish appropriate procedures to cope with an external flood affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesireable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, , "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and did not result in the total loss of any safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. This violation was placed in the corrective action program as PIP C-06-08287, Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to conduct an adquate extent of condition review following multiple water intrusion events to ensure risk significant SSC's were proted from loss due to flooding.
An NRC identified finding was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct adequate extent of condition reviews following multiple water intrusion events at the site by limiting the focus of the reviews to only safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and excluding those identified as being risk significant.
The finding is greater than minor as it was associated with the Proteciton Against External Factors and Equipment Performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that by narrowly focusing extent of condition reviews to only encompass safety-related SSCs and excluding risk-significant SSCs, systems required to respond to and mitiage initiating events could be adversely affected. It was determined to be of very low safety significance because, while limiting extent of condition reveiws to safety-related SSCs has the potential to adversely affect the ability of the station to respond to initiating events, failing to include risk significant equipment in the reviews conducted for the water intrusion events in 2006 after the 1A DG conduit seasls were repaired did not result in an overall increase in plant risk in excess of the green/white threshold. The vulnerabilities of other risk-significant SSCs to flooding have been addressed by the station. This finding has captured in PIPs C-06-8246 and C-06-8311. P.1.a]
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Senior Reactor Operator Operating Examinations An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.59 was identified for failure to adequately examine Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). Job Performance Measures (JPMs) that contained immediate operator actions was excluded from the sample of JPMs used to examine SROs.
The finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would lead to a more significant safety concern and affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. This finding affected an individual operating examination, was related to examination quality, and affected more than 20% of the SRO operating tests. Using MC 0609 Appendix I, License Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design and Implementation of Modifications to the Hydrogen Igniter System on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively design and implement a modification that replaced the containment hydrogen ignition systems glow plugs with upgraded glow coils to ensure the systems operability was maintained. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils in both units, certain breakers and fuses in the individual igniter circuits were found to be undersized, resulting in breakers tripping and fuses failing when called upon to provide power to the igniters for extended periods. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the HIS on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIPs C-06-8562 and C-06-8742.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, Phase 2, based on the under-rated breakers or fuses not resulting in the loss of coverage in two adjacent areas inside of containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to follow the guidance contained in their Nuclear System and Department-level procedures governing the modification process to ensure that a safety-related system remained operable under all postulated design requirements . (Section 1R17b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Test Procedure Used to Verify the Operability of the Hydrogen Igniter System Glow Coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure that surveillance procedures were adequate to verify the operability of the newly-installed hydrogen igniter glow coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils, the voltage for several igniters was set below the required value to ensure the temperature specified in the TS was obtained due to an inadequate surveillance procedure. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the hydrogen ignition system on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-06-8562.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process based on the actual temperatures of the affected hydrogen igniters being above the value that was subsequently shown to result in hydrogen ignition. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete and Accurate Procedures aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to develop an adequate surveillance procedure to ensure voltages on hydrogen igniter glow coil circuits would produce temperatures that met the acceptance criteria specified in the TS (H.2.c). (Section 1R17b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Recognition, Assessment and Management of the Increased Shutdown Risk Associated With the
Failure of the 1B KF Pump with the Core in the Spent Fuel Pool and the 1A DG Inoperable The inspectors identified a green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensee failing to adequately recognize, assess, and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the single operable spent fuel pool cooling pump with the opposite trains emergency diesel generator inoperable and the recently unloaded Unit 1 reactor core in the spent fuel pool.
The finding was more than minor because the deficiency is consistent with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Section 3, Minor Screening Question (5)(i). Specifically, the licensee failed to expeditiously develop and implement risk management actions to address the elevated risk the unit was in based on the 1B KF pump failure and other equipment out of service or in an outage alignment; i.e., core in the spent fuel pool and the 1A DG disassembled. The finding was associated with the Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of maintaining the functionality of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability being below 1E-6. This was derived from discussions with the Region II Senior Reactor Analysts based on the time to boil in the Spent Fuel Pool being >24 hours which allows for operator actions to mitigate the effect of a postulated loss of cooling scenario. This finding has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) C-06-7829 and C-06-7840. The pump was returned to operable status approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the failure occurred. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance under the Safety Significant / Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component, in that the licensee failed to adequately recognize, assess and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) pump during outage conditions on Unit 1. H.1.a]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design control for ice condenser lower inlet doors The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits. The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the TS surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. It was determined to be more than minor using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, in that an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA); however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The licensee contracted the vendor to reconstruct the design basis of the 40-degree torque test and has incorporated this analysis into the applicable surveillance procedure, Technical Specification and Design Basis Documents. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete Documentation and Component Labeling aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 25, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. However, there were examples where the licensee failed to initiate corrective action documents for conditions adverse to quality. In addition, there were examples where problems were not accurately and thoroughly described in corrective action documents, adversely impacting the licensees ability to properly code the problems for trending. This was especially true with respect to human performance deficiencies.
It was also noted that actions taken to correct equipment problems have sometimes been slow; but, licensee management applied increased attention to equipment problems and increasing equipment reliability through the Equipment Reliability Initiative started in early 2004. The licensees self-assessments and audits were effective in identifying deficiencies in the corrective action program. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance by plant personnel to report safety concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Last modified : August 24, 2007
Catawba 2 3Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required Weld Inspections on the Fuel Handling Cask Cranes Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively implement the requirement to fully inspect fuel handling cask crane welds in accordance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1.4.2.3 following reinforcements made in response to a Part 21 notification. Following implementation of the modification to restore the fuel handling cask cranes capacity to 125 tons, the licensee had performed visual weld inspections rather than magnetic particle or liquid penetrant testing as required by the UFSAR. The licensee performed the required inspections prior to actual use of the cranes to lift loaded spent fuel casks. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-07-2028.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern in that improperly performed inspections on fuel handling equipment could impact the safe movement of nuclear fuel and increase the probability of a fuel handling accident. This finding is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during spent fuel movement. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the affected welds on the fuel handling cask cranes were properly inspected prior to lifting fully loaded fuel casks in the spent fuel pool building. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Operating Experience Evaluation aspect of the Operating Experience component, in that the licensee failed to properly evaluate the Part 21 notification received from Whiting Corporation to ensure all testing requirements were identified prior to implementing the required modification and declaring the cranes fully operable (P.2.a). (Section 1R17b.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 03, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation ELU Replacement Batteries Not Tested After Installation Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Units 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) for failure to follow the emergency battery lighting maintenance and testing procedure IP/0/B/3540/002, Emergency Battery Lighting Periodic Maintenance and Testing, Revision 33, during replacement of failed batteries. The licensee stated that the batteries were routinely tested prior to installation while in the maintenance shop; however, this bench test was neither required by the periodic maintenance and testing procedure nor documented in any test record. This NCV was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the external factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective. The finding involved systems or components (i.e., emergency lights) required for post-fire safe shutdown of the reactor. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, had very low safety significance (Green) and no further analysis was required. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the procedural compliance aspect of
the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedure compliance for testing of replacement emergency lighting batteries (H.4.b). (Section 1R05.09.b)
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 B Train KC Heat Exchanger Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to effectively implement the risk mitigation actions contained in the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with work on the Unit 2 B Train Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger to manage and minimize the resulting increased plant risk. Specifically, during the cleaning of the Unit 2 B Train KC heat exchanger tubes, the offsite power supply was not protected and in fact, work was conducted within the switchyards protective fence. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability associated with the work being performed in the switchyard in conjunction with the 2B KC heat exchanger tube cleaning being less than 1E-6. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component, in that the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities to ensure the operational impact of the planned work was controlled and the increased risk minimized in accordance with the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with the cleaning of the Unit 2 B train KC heat exchanger (H.3.b). (Section 1R13b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With the Excavation of the RN Supply Headers Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to develop and implement an effective Complex Evolution Plan associated with excavation and inspection of the nuclear service water (RN) supply headers in order to manage and minimize the risk associated with the activity. Specifically, during the excavation phase of the activity, the potential of damaging the RN headers was not adequately controlled to minimize the increased risk resulting from the excavation. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C 2079.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that in the event an RN supply header was damaged during the excavation, the licensee could complete repairs to the header within the TS allowable out-of-service time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Supervisory and Management Oversight aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to ensure that the appropriate level of supervisory oversight was provided during the excavation phase to ensure the expectations pertaining to the use of mechanized equipment when digging in close proximity to the RN supply headers were properly implemented (H.4.c). (Section 1R13b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for CA System Air Entrainment Issue Identified in PIP C-97-01579 The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate corrective action associated with an air entrainment issue in the auxiliary feed water system (CA) pump suction line identified in PIP C-97-01579. The corrective actions in PIP 97-01579 were inadequate in that they did not address the potential impact of the air entrainment on the swap over instrumentation for the assured water supply located in the suction line upstream of the pumps. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program.
This finding is more than minor because the engineering calculation error which failed to include the potential impact of the air entrainment on the RN/CA swap over pressure switches resulted in a condition in which there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the CA pumps. The finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's engineering evaluations performed during the inspection determined that there was no adverse impact on the pressure switches and therefore no loss of the CA pumps capability for short term heat removal. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate and Timely Corrective Action to Identify and Resolve an Equipment Design Deficiency of the Alternate Power Supply for the 125 VDC Vital I&C Distribution Center 1EDF The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate and timely corrective actions to resolve a potential equipment design deficiency of the 1DGBB battery and distribution which provided the alternate power supply to the 125 VDC Vital I&C distribution panel 1EDF. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in that 125 VDC distribution center 1EDF provides control power to critical equipment such as the 4.16kV vital bus which aligns power to ECCS pumps and valves. The finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute of design control. This finding is of very low safety significance because the team identified no occurrence, since this issue was identified on July 20, 2006, in which the station was aligned in the vulnerable condition relying on the alternate power supply to 1EDF. Additionally, the normal power supply, the vital battery, is a highly reliable power source and the alignment to the alternate power source requires manual action. Therefore there was no loss of the 1EDF safety function to provide adequate vital I&C control power for safe shutdown of the plant. This finding involved the crosscutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the evaluation, specifically the operability assessment, was inadequate and contributed the inadequacy of subsequent corrective actions. (P.1.c) (Section 1R21.2.12)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for Analyzing the Impact of Updated Vendor Technical Information on Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance and Inspection Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedure NSD 319, Vendor Technical Information Program, Rev. 2, which requires performance of technical impact reviews of maintenance and surveillance procedures due to vendor manual changes and technical updates. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because procedure inconsistencies were identified between the reactor trip breaker vendor manual and procedure SI/0/A/5100/002, Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance Procedure, Rev. 18, which indicated that the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of the reactor trip breaker safety function to open on a scram signal. (Section 1R21.2.15)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurring Scaffolding Installation Deficiencies The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurring deficiencies associated with the erection of scaffolding around safety related equipment. For the examples identified by the inspectors, the licensee removed or adjusted the scaffolding to correct the condition.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's repeated failure to erect scaffolding in accordance with the Duke Scaffold Manual and implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in that multiple occurrences were identified of scaffolding being located in a manner where safety-related equipment could be adversely impacted without the appropriate engineering evaluation or approval. In accordance with Appendix B, "Issue Screening," of IMC 0612, the inspectors determined that the finding was of more than minor significance since the finding was associated with the equipment performance and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of equipment that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the "Appropriate and Timely Corrective Actions" aspect of the "Corrective Action Program" component, in that ineffective corrective actions were established resulting in additional scaffolding deficiencies being identified over an 18 month period. The licensee has entered this issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-06-8183 and has identified scaffold construction and usage as an adverse trend requiring additional focus in 2007. P.1.d]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish a procedure for mitigating the consequences of an external flooding event.
A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1b was identified for failing to establish procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 6, Procedures for Combating Emergencies and Other Significant Events. Specifically, no procedure existed to combat or mitigate the consequences from an external flooding event.
The finding is greater than minor because the failure to establish appropriate procedures to cope with an external flood affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesireable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, , "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because it only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and did not result in the total loss of any safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. This violation was placed in the corrective action program as PIP C-06-08287, Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 01, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to conduct an adquate extent of condition review following multiple water intrusion events to ensure risk significant SSC's were proted from loss due to flooding.
An NRC identified finding was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct adequate extent of condition reviews following multiple water intrusion events at the site by limiting the focus of the reviews to only safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and excluding those identified as being risk significant.
The finding is greater than minor as it was associated with the Proteciton Against External Factors and Equipment Performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that by narrowly focusing extent of condition reviews to only encompass safety-related SSCs and excluding risk-significant SSCs, systems required to respond to and mitiage initiating events could be adversely affected. It was determined to be of very low safety significance because,
while limiting extent of condition reveiws to safety-related SSCs has the potential to adversely affect the ability of the station to respond to initiating events, failing to include risk significant equipment in the reviews conducted for the water intrusion events in 2006 after the 1A DG conduit seasls were repaired did not result in an overall increase in plant risk in excess of the green/white threshold. The vulnerabilities of other risk-significant SSCs to flooding have been addressed by the station. This finding has captured in PIPs C-06-8246 and C-06-8311. P.1.a]
Inspection Report# : 2006010 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design and Implementation of Modifications to the Hydrogen Igniter System on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively design and implement a modification that replaced the containment hydrogen ignition systems glow plugs with upgraded glow coils to ensure the systems operability was maintained. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils in both units, certain breakers and fuses in the individual igniter circuits were found to be undersized, resulting in breakers tripping and fuses failing when called upon to provide power to the igniters for extended periods. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the HIS on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIPs C-06-8562 and C-06-8742.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, Phase 2, based on the under-rated breakers or fuses not resulting in the loss of coverage in two adjacent areas inside of containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to follow the guidance contained in their Nuclear System and Department-level procedures governing the modification process to ensure that a safety-related system remained operable under all postulated design requirements . (Section 1R17b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Test Procedure Used to Verify the Operability of the Hydrogen Igniter System Glow Coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure that surveillance procedures were adequate to verify the operability of the newly-installed hydrogen igniter glow coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils, the voltage for several igniters was set below the required value to ensure the temperature specified in the TS was obtained due to an inadequate surveillance procedure. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the hydrogen ignition system on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-06-8562.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process based on the actual temperatures of the affected hydrogen igniters being above the value that was subsequently shown to result in hydrogen ignition. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete and Accurate Procedures aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to develop an
adequate surveillance procedure to ensure voltages on hydrogen igniter glow coil circuits would produce temperatures that met the acceptance criteria specified in the TS (H.2.c). (Section 1R17b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Recognition, Assessment and Management of the Increased Shutdown Risk Associated With the Failure of the 1B KF Pump with the Core in the Spent Fuel Pool and the 1A DG Inoperable The inspectors identified a green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensee failing to adequately recognize, assess, and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the single operable spent fuel pool cooling pump with the opposite trains emergency diesel generator inoperable and the recently unloaded Unit 1 reactor core in the spent fuel pool.
The finding was more than minor because the deficiency is consistent with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Section 3, Minor Screening Question (5)(i). Specifically, the licensee failed to expeditiously develop and implement risk management actions to address the elevated risk the unit was in based on the 1B KF pump failure and other equipment out of service or in an outage alignment; i.e., core in the spent fuel pool and the 1A DG disassembled. The finding was associated with the Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of maintaining the functionality of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low risk significance (Green), based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability being below 1E-6. This was derived from discussions with the Region II Senior Reactor Analysts based on the time to boil in the Spent Fuel Pool being >24 hours which allows for operator actions to mitigate the effect of a postulated loss of cooling scenario. This finding has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) C-06-7829 and C-06-7840. The pump was returned to operable status approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after the failure occurred. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance under the Safety Significant / Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component, in that the licensee failed to adequately recognize, assess and manage the increased risk resulting from the failure of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) pump during outage conditions on Unit 1. H.1.a]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement adequate design control for ice condenser lower inlet doors The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to have design documentation to support the ice condenser lower inlet door surveillance procedure test acceptance limits. The licensee subsequently received the supporting information from the vendor and incorporated it into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have design documentation that supported the acceptance criteria contained in the TS surveillance procedures used to test the ice condensers lower inlet doors at the 40-degree open position was a performance deficiency. The requirement to maintain design bases documentation for tests performed on safety-related SSCs is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The requirement to implement a test program that incorporates the design basis for these components is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. It was determined to be more than minor using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, in that an excessively high closing torque could adversely impact the ability of the lower inlet door to modulate properly in the event of a small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA); however, with no lower limit defined in the surveillance tests acceptance criteria, this condition might not have been identified and corrected prior to returning the unit to power operation. The finding is associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the integrity of the reactor containment structure; i.e., the ice condensers ability to control internal pressure following a LOCA event, and protect the public from radio-nuclide releases. The licensee contracted
the vendor to reconstruct the design basis of the 40-degree torque test and has incorporated this analysis into the applicable surveillance procedure, Technical Specification and Design Basis Documents. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete Documentation and Component Labeling aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation and procedures. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2006005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 07, 2007
Catawba 2 4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required Weld Inspections on the Fuel Handling Cask Cranes Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively implement the requirement to fully inspect fuel handling cask crane welds in accordance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1.4.2.3 following reinforcements made in response to a Part 21 notification. Following implementation of the modification to restore the fuel handling cask cranes capacity to 125 tons, the licensee had performed visual weld inspections rather than magnetic particle or liquid penetrant testing as required by the UFSAR. The licensee performed the required inspections prior to actual use of the cranes to lift loaded spent fuel casks. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-07-2028.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern in that improperly performed inspections on fuel handling equipment could impact the safe movement of nuclear fuel and increase the probability of a fuel handling accident. This finding is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during spent fuel movement. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the affected welds on the fuel handling cask cranes were properly inspected prior to lifting fully loaded fuel casks in the spent fuel pool building. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Operating Experience Evaluation aspect of the Operating Experience component, in that the licensee failed to properly evaluate the Part 21 notification received from Whiting Corporation to ensure all testing requirements were identified prior to implementing the required modification and declaring the cranes fully operable (P.2.a). (Section 1R17b.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 03, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation ELU Replacement Batteries Not Tested After Installation Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Units 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) for failure to follow the emergency battery lighting maintenance and testing procedure IP/0/B/3540/002, Emergency Battery Lighting Periodic Maintenance and Testing, Revision 33, during replacement of failed batteries. The licensee stated that the batteries were routinely tested prior to installation while in the maintenance shop; however, this bench test was neither required by the periodic maintenance and testing procedure nor documented in any test record. This NCV was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the external factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective. The finding involved systems or components (i.e., emergency lights) required for post-fire safe shutdown of the reactor. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, had very low safety significance (Green) and no further analysis was required. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the procedural compliance aspect of
the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedure compliance for testing of replacement emergency lighting batteries (H.4.b). (Section 1R05.09.b)
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 B Train KC Heat Exchanger Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to effectively implement the risk mitigation actions contained in the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with work on the Unit 2 B Train Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger to manage and minimize the resulting increased plant risk. Specifically, during the cleaning of the Unit 2 B Train KC heat exchanger tubes, the offsite power supply was not protected and in fact, work was conducted within the switchyards protective fence. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability associated with the work being performed in the switchyard in conjunction with the 2B KC heat exchanger tube cleaning being less than 1E-6. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component, in that the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities to ensure the operational impact of the planned work was controlled and the increased risk minimized in accordance with the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with the cleaning of the Unit 2 B train KC heat exchanger (H.3.b). (Section 1R13b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With the Excavation of the RN Supply Headers Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to develop and implement an effective Complex Evolution Plan associated with excavation and inspection of the nuclear service water (RN) supply headers in order to manage and minimize the risk associated with the activity. Specifically, during the excavation phase of the activity, the potential of damaging the RN headers was not adequately controlled to minimize the increased risk resulting from the excavation. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C 2079.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that in the event an RN supply header was damaged during the excavation, the licensee could complete repairs to the header within the TS allowable out-of-service time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Supervisory and Management Oversight aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to ensure that the appropriate level of supervisory oversight was provided during the excavation phase to ensure the expectations pertaining to the use of mechanized equipment when digging in close proximity to the RN supply headers were properly implemented (H.4.c). (Section 1R13b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for CA System Air Entrainment Issue Identified in PIP C-97-01579 The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate corrective action associated with an air entrainment issue in the auxiliary feed water system (CA) pump suction line identified in PIP C-97-01579. The corrective actions in PIP 97-01579 were inadequate in that they did not address the potential impact of the air entrainment on the swap over instrumentation for the assured water supply located in the suction line upstream of the pumps. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program.
This finding is more than minor because the engineering calculation error which failed to include the potential impact of the air entrainment on the RN/CA swap over pressure switches resulted in a condition in which there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the CA pumps. The finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's engineering evaluations performed during the inspection determined that there was no adverse impact on the pressure switches and therefore no loss of the CA pumps capability for short term heat removal. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate and Timely Corrective Action to Identify and Resolve an Equipment Design Deficiency of the Alternate Power Supply for the 125 VDC Vital I&C Distribution Center 1EDF The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate and timely corrective actions to resolve a potential equipment design deficiency of the 1DGBB battery and distribution which provided the alternate power supply to the 125 VDC Vital I&C distribution panel 1EDF. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in that 125 VDC distribution center 1EDF provides control power to critical equipment such as the 4.16kV vital bus which aligns power to ECCS pumps and valves. The finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute of design control. This finding is of very low safety significance because the team identified no occurrence, since this issue was identified on July 20, 2006, in which the station was aligned in the vulnerable condition relying on the alternate power supply to 1EDF. Additionally, the normal power supply, the vital battery, is a highly reliable power source and the alignment to the alternate power source requires manual action. Therefore there was no loss of the 1EDF safety function to provide adequate vital I&C control power for safe shutdown of the plant. This finding involved the crosscutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the evaluation, specifically the operability assessment, was inadequate and contributed the inadequacy of subsequent corrective actions. (P.1.c) (Section 1R21.2.12)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for Analyzing the Impact of Updated Vendor Technical Information on Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance and Inspection Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedure NSD 319, Vendor Technical Information Program, Rev. 2, which requires performance of technical impact reviews of maintenance and surveillance procedures due to vendor manual changes and technical updates. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because procedure inconsistencies were identified between the reactor trip breaker vendor manual and procedure SI/0/A/5100/002, Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance Procedure, Rev. 18, which indicated that the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of the reactor trip breaker safety function to open on a scram signal. (Section 1R21.2.15)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design and Implementation of Modifications to the Hydrogen Igniter System on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively design and implement a modification that replaced the containment hydrogen ignition systems glow plugs with upgraded glow coils to ensure the systems operability was maintained. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils in both units, certain breakers and fuses in the individual igniter circuits were found to be undersized, resulting in breakers tripping and fuses failing when called upon to provide power to the igniters for extended periods. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the HIS on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIPs C-06-8562 and C-06-8742.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, Phase 2, based on the under-rated breakers or fuses not resulting in the loss of coverage in two adjacent areas inside of containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to follow the guidance contained in their Nuclear System and Department-level procedures governing the modification process to ensure that a safety-related system remained operable under all postulated design requirements . (Section 1R17b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Test Procedure Used to Verify the Operability of the Hydrogen Igniter System Glow Coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure that surveillance procedures were adequate to verify the operability of the newly-installed hydrogen igniter glow coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils, the voltage for several igniters was set below the required value to ensure the temperature specified in the TS was obtained due to an inadequate surveillance procedure. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the hydrogen ignition system on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-06-8562.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process based on the actual temperatures of the affected hydrogen igniters being above the value that was subsequently shown to result in hydrogen ignition. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete and Accurate Procedures aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to develop an adequate surveillance procedure to ensure voltages on hydrogen igniter glow coil circuits would produce temperatures that met the acceptance criteria specified in the TS (H.2.c). (Section 1R17b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 04, 2008
Catawba 2 1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required Weld Inspections on the Fuel Handling Cask Cranes Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively implement the requirement to fully inspect fuel handling cask crane welds in accordance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1.4.2.3 following reinforcements made in response to a Part 21 notification. Following implementation of the modification to restore the fuel handling cask cranes capacity to 125 tons, the licensee had performed visual weld inspections rather than magnetic particle or liquid penetrant testing as required by the UFSAR. The licensee performed the required inspections prior to actual use of the cranes to lift loaded spent fuel casks. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-07-2028.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern in that improperly performed inspections on fuel handling equipment could impact the safe movement of nuclear fuel and increase the probability of a fuel handling accident. This finding is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during spent fuel movement. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the affected welds on the fuel handling cask cranes were properly inspected prior to lifting fully loaded fuel casks in the spent fuel pool building. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Operating Experience Evaluation aspect of the Operating Experience component, in that the licensee failed to properly evaluate the Part 21 notification received from Whiting Corporation to ensure all testing requirements were identified prior to implementing the required modification and declaring the cranes fully operable (P.2.a). (Section 1R17b.(3))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify an Inoperable CRACWS Chiller Prior to Removing the Remaining Chiller from Service Placed Both Units in TS 3.0.3 for Approximately 110 minutes (Section 4OA2.2(2))
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, Administrative Procedures. Specifically, the licensed operators in the main control room and work control center failed to identify that the A Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable prior to removing the remaining chiller from service for testing. This placed both Catawba units in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 110 minutes without any of the required actions being taken.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable over time. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the
Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process. The issue would only become evident if the 2A diesel generator failed to re-energize the 2A 4.16kV vital bus following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event with the A chiller control power aligned to the 2A bus and the length of time available before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed.
The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively follow multiple station procedures to ensure redundant CRACWS chillers were not removed from service, resulting in a potential loss of chilled water cooling for areas supplied by the CRAVS H.4.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-7073. (Section 4OA2.2(2))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code Section XI Leakage Testing The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping portions of the service water system as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the second 10-year Inservice Inspection interval for Units 1 and 2. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. (Section 1R08.1)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Lift Plan and Risk Management Actions for the Replacement of Piping Over a Safety-Related SSC The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10CR50.65(a)(4) for the failure to manage and minimize the risk associated with the replacement of portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system. More specifically, the licensee failed to develop a Complex Lift Plan as required by Corporate procedures and develop appropriate risk management actions as part of the Critical Activity Plan.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems designed to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. An unexpected loss of the 2A train of spent fuel pool cooling (from an inadequately controlled RN piping lift above it) could have resulted in undesirable consequences with the recently off-loaded reactor core being in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that the actual RN piping replacement had not begun at the time the deficiencies were identified and the lifts were deferred until the appropriate actions were developed and implemented. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Safety Significant/Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component (H.1.a), in that the licensee failed to develop a lift plan and applicable risk management actions in accordance with station and corporate requirements to ensure the risk associated with moving RN piping over in-service spent fuel pool cooling piping was controlled and minimized. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inspections of the Unit 2 ECCS Containment Sump Installation Failed to Identify Deficiencies Prior to Declaring the Safety-Related Structure Operable The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspections, for the licensees failure to adequately implement inspections of the new Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) containment sump to ensure it was installed in accordance with design specifications so as to support operability when required by Technical Specifications (TSs).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. Following final inspections of the ECCS containment sump modification, inspectors identified deficiencies that required resolution prior to declaring the sump operable as required by TSs to support unit restart. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that Unit 2 had not yet entered an operational mode in which the ECCS containment sump was required to be operable at the time the construction deficiencies were identified. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Human Performance and Error Prevention aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to implement the required inspections of the ECCS sump to ensure the permanent modification was installed in accordance with design specifications and would remain operable under all postulated accident conditions (H.4.a).
This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 03, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation ELU Replacement Batteries Not Tested After Installation Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Units 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) for failure to follow the emergency battery lighting maintenance and testing procedure IP/0/B/3540/002, Emergency Battery Lighting Periodic Maintenance and Testing, Revision 33, during replacement of failed batteries. The licensee stated that the batteries were routinely tested prior to installation while in the maintenance shop; however, this bench test was neither required by the periodic maintenance and testing procedure nor documented in any test record. This NCV was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the external factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective. The finding involved systems or components (i.e., emergency lights) required for post-fire safe shutdown of the reactor. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, had very low safety significance (Green) and no further analysis was required. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the procedural compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedure compliance for testing of replacement emergency lighting batteries (H.4.b). (Section 1R05.09.b)
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 B Train KC Heat Exchanger Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to effectively implement the risk mitigation actions contained in the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with work on the Unit 2 B Train Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger to manage and minimize the resulting increased plant
risk. Specifically, during the cleaning of the Unit 2 B Train KC heat exchanger tubes, the offsite power supply was not protected and in fact, work was conducted within the switchyards protective fence. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability associated with the work being performed in the switchyard in conjunction with the 2B KC heat exchanger tube cleaning being less than 1E-6. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component, in that the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities to ensure the operational impact of the planned work was controlled and the increased risk minimized in accordance with the approved Critical Evolution Plan associated with the cleaning of the Unit 2 B train KC heat exchanger (H.3.b). (Section 1R13b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With the Excavation of the RN Supply Headers Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to develop and implement an effective Complex Evolution Plan associated with excavation and inspection of the nuclear service water (RN) supply headers in order to manage and minimize the risk associated with the activity. Specifically, during the excavation phase of the activity, the potential of damaging the RN headers was not adequately controlled to minimize the increased risk resulting from the excavation. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C 2079.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that in the event an RN supply header was damaged during the excavation, the licensee could complete repairs to the header within the TS allowable out-of-service time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Supervisory and Management Oversight aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to ensure that the appropriate level of supervisory oversight was provided during the excavation phase to ensure the expectations pertaining to the use of mechanized equipment when digging in close proximity to the RN supply headers were properly implemented (H.4.c). (Section 1R13b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for CA System Air Entrainment Issue Identified in PIP C-97-01579 The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate corrective action associated with an air entrainment issue in the auxiliary feed water system (CA) pump suction line identified in PIP C-97-01579. The corrective actions in PIP 97-01579 were inadequate in that they did not address the potential impact of the air entrainment on the swap over instrumentation for the assured water supply located in the suction line upstream of the pumps. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program.
This finding is more than minor because the engineering calculation error which failed to include the potential impact of the air entrainment on the RN/CA swap over pressure switches resulted in a condition in which there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the CA pumps. The finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's engineering evaluations performed during the inspection determined that there was no adverse impact on the
pressure switches and therefore no loss of the CA pumps capability for short term heat removal. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate and Timely Corrective Action to Identify and Resolve an Equipment Design Deficiency of the Alternate Power Supply for the 125 VDC Vital I&C Distribution Center 1EDF The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to perform adequate and timely corrective actions to resolve a potential equipment design deficiency of the 1DGBB battery and distribution which provided the alternate power supply to the 125 VDC Vital I&C distribution panel 1EDF. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in that 125 VDC distribution center 1EDF provides control power to critical equipment such as the 4.16kV vital bus which aligns power to ECCS pumps and valves. The finding is associated with the cornerstone attribute of design control. This finding is of very low safety significance because the team identified no occurrence, since this issue was identified on July 20, 2006, in which the station was aligned in the vulnerable condition relying on the alternate power supply to 1EDF. Additionally, the normal power supply, the vital battery, is a highly reliable power source and the alignment to the alternate power source requires manual action. Therefore there was no loss of the 1EDF safety function to provide adequate vital I&C control power for safe shutdown of the plant. This finding involved the crosscutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the evaluation, specifically the operability assessment, was inadequate and contributed the inadequacy of subsequent corrective actions. (P.1.c) (Section 1R21.2.12)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 20, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Procedure for Analyzing the Impact of Updated Vendor Technical Information on Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance and Inspection Procedures The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedure NSD 319, Vendor Technical Information Program, Rev. 2, which requires performance of technical impact reviews of maintenance and surveillance procedures due to vendor manual changes and technical updates. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program. This finding is more than minor because procedure inconsistencies were identified between the reactor trip breaker vendor manual and procedure SI/0/A/5100/002, Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance Procedure, Rev. 18, which indicated that the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on similar issues. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of the reactor trip breaker safety function to open on a scram signal. (Section 1R21.2.15)
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Affecting the Ability of Both CRAVS Chillers to Operate as Designed Following a SBO due to Inadequate Troubleshootin The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality affecting the ability of both control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) chillers to operate as designed following a station blackout (SBO).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radio-nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the CRAVS would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using abnormal operating procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that the issue would only become evident if one CRAVS chiller was out-of-service at the time of a SBO event and the time available to restore at least one chiller before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed. Based on a review of station Probabilistic Risk Assessment data, the likelihood of a SBO event in conjunction with one chiller being inoperable was determined to be extremely low. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems aspect of the Corrective Action Program component, in that the licensee failed to take the necessary actions to identify and correct the cause (i.e., high resistance fuse installed in temperature reset circuit) of the A CRAVS chiller failing to restart during engineered safety features (ESF) testing to ensure both chillers would function as designed under all postulated transients (P.1.c). This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
(Section 1R19)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Design and Implementation of Modifications to the Hydrogen Igniter System on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to effectively design and implement a modification that replaced the containment hydrogen ignition systems glow plugs with upgraded glow coils to ensure the systems operability was maintained. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils in both units, certain breakers and fuses in the individual igniter circuits were found to be undersized, resulting in breakers tripping and fuses failing when called upon to provide power to the igniters for extended periods. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the HIS on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIPs C-06-8562 and C-06-8742.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, Phase 2, based on the under-rated breakers or fuses not resulting in the loss of coverage in two adjacent areas inside of containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to follow the guidance contained in their Nuclear System and Department-level procedures governing the modification process to ensure that a safety-related system remained operable under all postulated design requirements . (Section 1R17b.(1))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Test Procedure Used to Verify the Operability of the Hydrogen Igniter System Glow Coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to ensure that surveillance procedures were adequate to verify the operability of the newly-installed hydrogen igniter glow coils on Catawba Units 1 and 2. Specifically, following the installation of the hydrogen igniter glow coils, the voltage for several igniters was set below the required value to ensure the temperature specified in the TS was obtained due to an inadequate surveillance procedure. The licensee implemented corrective actions to restore the hydrogen ignition system on both units to full operability. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-06-8562.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier
Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that a physical design barrier (i.e., containment) would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process based on the actual temperatures of the affected hydrogen igniters being above the value that was subsequently shown to result in hydrogen ignition. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Complete and Accurate Procedures aspect of the Resources component, in that the licensee failed to develop an adequate surveillance procedure to ensure voltages on hydrogen igniter glow coil circuits would produce temperatures that met the acceptance criteria specified in the TS (H.2.c). (Section 1R17b.(2))
Inspection Report# : 2007003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 05, 2008
Catawba 2 2Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify an Inoperable CRACWS Chiller Prior to Removing the Remaining Chiller from Service Placed Both Units in TS 3.0.3 for Approximately 110 minutes (Section 4OA2.2(2))
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, Administrative Procedures. Specifically, the licensed operators in the main control room and work control center failed to identify that the A Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable prior to removing the remaining chiller from service for testing. This placed both Catawba units in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 110 minutes without any of the required actions being taken.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable over time. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process. The issue would only become evident if the 2A diesel generator failed to re-energize the 2A 4.16kV vital bus following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event with the A chiller control power aligned to the 2A bus and the length of time available before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed.
The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively follow multiple station procedures to ensure redundant CRACWS chillers were not removed from service, resulting in a potential loss of chilled water cooling for areas supplied by the CRAVS H.4.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-7073. (Section 4OA2.2(2))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code Section XI Leakage Testing The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping portions of the service water system as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the second 10-year Inservice Inspection interval for Units 1 and 2. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. (Section 1R08.1)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Lift Plan and Risk Management Actions for the Replacement of Piping Over a Safety-Related SSC The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10CR50.65(a)(4) for the failure to manage and minimize the risk associated with the replacement of portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system. More specifically, the licensee failed to develop a Complex Lift Plan as required by Corporate procedures and develop appropriate risk management actions as part of the Critical Activity Plan.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems designed to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. An unexpected loss of the 2A train of spent fuel pool cooling (from an inadequately controlled RN piping lift above it) could have resulted in undesirable consequences with the recently off-loaded reactor core being in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that the actual RN piping replacement had not begun at the time the deficiencies were identified and the lifts were deferred until the appropriate actions were developed and implemented. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Safety Significant/Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component (H.1.a), in that the licensee failed to develop a lift plan and applicable risk management actions in accordance with station and corporate requirements to ensure the risk associated with moving RN piping over in-service spent fuel pool cooling piping was controlled and minimized. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inspections of the Unit 2 ECCS Containment Sump Installation Failed to Identify Deficiencies Prior to Declaring the Safety-Related Structure Operable The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspections, for the licensees failure to adequately implement inspections of the new Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) containment sump to ensure it was installed in accordance with design specifications so as to support operability when required by Technical Specifications (TSs).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. Following final inspections of the ECCS containment sump modification, inspectors identified deficiencies that required resolution prior to declaring the sump operable as required by TSs to support unit restart. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that Unit 2 had not yet entered an operational mode in which the ECCS containment sump was required to be operable at the time the construction deficiencies were identified. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Human Performance and Error Prevention aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to implement the required inspections of the ECCS sump to ensure the permanent modification was installed in accordance with design specifications and would remain operable under all postulated accident conditions (H.4.a).
This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 03, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation ELU Replacement Batteries Not Tested After Installation Inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Units 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(5) for failure to follow the emergency battery lighting maintenance and testing procedure IP/0/B/3540/002, Emergency Battery Lighting Periodic Maintenance and Testing, Revision 33, during replacement of failed batteries. The licensee stated that the batteries were routinely tested prior to installation while in the maintenance shop; however, this bench test was neither required by the periodic maintenance and testing procedure nor documented in any test record. This NCV was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report C-07-2025.
This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the external factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective. The finding involved systems or components (i.e., emergency lights) required for post-fire safe shutdown of the reactor. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, had very low safety significance (Green) and no further analysis was required. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the procedural compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedure compliance for testing of replacement emergency lighting batteries (H.4.b). (Section 1R05.09.b)
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Affecting the Ability of Both CRAVS Chillers to Operate as Designed Following a SBO due to Inadequate Troubleshootin The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality affecting the ability of both control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) chillers to operate as designed following a station blackout (SBO).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radio-nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the CRAVS would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using abnormal operating procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that the issue would only become evident if one CRAVS chiller was out-of-service at the time of a SBO event and the time available to restore at least one chiller before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed. Based on a review of station Probabilistic Risk Assessment data, the likelihood of a SBO event in conjunction with one chiller being inoperable was determined to be extremely low. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems aspect of the Corrective Action Program component, in that the licensee failed to take the necessary actions to identify and correct the cause (i.e., high resistance fuse installed in temperature reset circuit) of the A CRAVS chiller failing to restart during engineered safety features (ESF) testing to ensure both chillers would function as designed under all postulated transients (P.1.c). This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
(Section 1R19)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 29, 2008
Catawba 2 3Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify an Inoperable CRACWS Chiller Prior to Removing the Remaining Chiller from Service Placed Both Units in TS 3.0.3 for Approximately 110 minutes (Section 4OA2.2(2))
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, Administrative Procedures. Specifically, the licensed operators in the main control room and work control center failed to identify that the A Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable prior to removing the remaining chiller from service for testing. This placed both Catawba units in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 110 minutes without any of the required actions being taken.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable over time. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process. The issue would only become evident if the 2A diesel generator failed to re-energize the 2A 4.16kV vital bus following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event with the A chiller control power aligned to the 2A bus and the length of time available before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed.
The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively follow multiple station procedures to ensure redundant CRACWS chillers were not removed from service, resulting in a potential loss of chilled water cooling for areas supplied by the CRAVS H.4.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-7073. (Section 4OA2.2(2))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code Section XI Leakage Testing The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping portions of the service water system as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the second 10-year Inservice Inspection interval for Units 1 and 2. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. (Section 1R08.1)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop a Lift Plan and Risk Management Actions for the Replacement of Piping Over a Safety-Related SSC
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10CR50.65(a)(4) for the failure to manage and minimize the risk associated with the replacement of portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system. More specifically, the licensee failed to develop a Complex Lift Plan as required by Corporate procedures and develop appropriate risk management actions as part of the Critical Activity Plan.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems designed to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. An unexpected loss of the 2A train of spent fuel pool cooling (from an inadequately controlled RN piping lift above it) could have resulted in undesirable consequences with the recently off-loaded reactor core being in the spent fuel pool.
The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding using Appendix K of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, and determined that the performance deficiency represented a finding of very low safety significance on the basis that the actual RN piping replacement had not begun at the time the deficiencies were identified and the lifts were deferred until the appropriate actions were developed and implemented. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Safety Significant/Risk Significant Decisions aspect of the Decision Making component (H.1.a), in that the licensee failed to develop a lift plan and applicable risk management actions in accordance with station and corporate requirements to ensure the risk associated with moving RN piping over in-service spent fuel pool cooling piping was controlled and minimized. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R13)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inspections of the Unit 2 ECCS Containment Sump Installation Failed to Identify Deficiencies Prior to Declaring the Safety-Related Structure Operable The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, Inspections, for the licensees failure to adequately implement inspections of the new Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) containment sump to ensure it was installed in accordance with design specifications so as to support operability when required by Technical Specifications (TSs).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences was maintained. Following final inspections of the ECCS containment sump modification, inspectors identified deficiencies that required resolution prior to declaring the sump operable as required by TSs to support unit restart. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that Unit 2 had not yet entered an operational mode in which the ECCS containment sump was required to be operable at the time the construction deficiencies were identified. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Human Performance and Error Prevention aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to implement the required inspections of the ECCS sump to ensure the permanent modification was installed in accordance with design specifications and would remain operable under all postulated accident conditions (H.4.a). This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Affecting the Ability of Both CRAVS Chillers to Operate as Designed Following a SBO due to Inadequate Troubleshootin The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality affecting the ability of both control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) chillers to operate as designed following a station blackout (SBO).
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radio-nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the CRAVS would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using abnormal operating procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process, based on the fact that the issue would only become evident if one CRAVS chiller was out-of-service at the time of a SBO event and the time available to restore at least one chiller before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed. Based on a review of station Probabilistic Risk Assessment data, the likelihood of a SBO
event in conjunction with one chiller being inoperable was determined to be extremely low. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Thorough Evaluation of Identified Problems aspect of the Corrective Action Program component, in that the licensee failed to take the necessary actions to identify and correct the cause (i.e., high resistance fuse installed in temperature reset circuit) of the A CRAVS chiller failing to restart during engineered safety features (ESF) testing to ensure both chillers would function as designed under all postulated transients (P.1.c). This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. (Section 1R19)
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 26, 2008
Catawba 2 4Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 A Train KC Heat Exchanger The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to provide sufficient details for equipment protection in the approved Critical Activity Plan. In addition, the risk mitigation actions contained in the plan intended to manage and minimize the increased plant risk associated with work on the Unit 2 A Train of Component Cooling Water (KC). The finding was more than minor because the risk mitigation strategies in the Critical Activity Plan were not effectively implemented. In addition, the plan lacked specific guidance on what components were to be posted to provide adequate protection of the 2B train of KC. As a result, work activities were allowed to take place that could have adversely affected the remaining train of KC. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability was less than 1E-5 and the licensees implementation of more than three Risk Management Actions. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component H.3.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-08-6133. (Section 1R13.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate System Leakage Tests (Section 4OA2.a.3)
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) for a failure to comply with 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) in that, the licensee failed to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried Nuclear Service Water (RN) piping repairs. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Identification Process C-08-07137.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved failure to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried RN piping repairs. Specifically, wooden plugs remained in through wall defects during system leakage tests to verify the quality of eight repair welds to RN piping. By leaving the plugs in place, the repair welds cannot be shown to have been subject to the system pressure required by the ASME B&PV Code, resulting in inadequate system leakage tests, therefore the quality of the welds cannot be fully demonstrated. The failure to perform adequate system leakage tests is more than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety/Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality (testing procedures) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of the RN system. Because the RN system remained operable but degraded and there was no loss of safety function, the failure to perform adequate system leakage tests was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution in the component of corrective action program because the licensees extent of condition failed to recognize that repairs were non-conforming despite being signed by an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.a.3).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify an Inoperable CRACWS Chiller Prior to Removing the Remaining Chiller from Service Placed Both Units in TS 3.0.3 for Approximately 110 minutes (Section 4OA2.2(2))
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the failure to adequately establish and implement procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, Administrative Procedures. Specifically, the licensed operators in the main control room and work control center failed to identify that the A Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS) was inoperable prior to removing the remaining chiller from service for testing. This placed both Catawba units in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 110 minutes without any of the required actions being taken.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. While the Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS) would have remained operable in terms of filtering air in the areas it services, without chilled water providing cooling, operators would have had to bypass the filtered air paths using Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) guidance in order to maintain area temperatures at values needed to ensure equipment in the areas remained operable over time. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance using the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet of Inspection Manual 0609, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Significance Determination Process. The issue would only become evident if the 2A diesel generator failed to re-energize the 2A 4.16kV vital bus following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event with the A chiller control power aligned to the 2A bus and the length of time available before the AP would have had to be entered and the filtered air flow paths bypassed.
The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Procedural Compliance aspect of the Work Practices component, in that the licensee failed to effectively follow multiple station procedures to ensure redundant CRACWS chillers were not removed from service, resulting in a potential loss of chilled water cooling for areas supplied by the CRAVS H.4.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-07-7073. (Section 4OA2.2(2))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba December 2008 PI&R Summary On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that in general, your corrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution program (PI&R). However, several observations were identified in the area of an issue screening and prioritization.
The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the team found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : April 07, 2009
Catawba 2 1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to translate design requirements into a maintenance program to ensure Component Cooling Water system operability was maintained over the design life of the plant (Section 4OA3.1)
- Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the failure to translate the design basis for the Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger Nuclear Service Water (RN) outlet control valve and the vendors construction drawings into maintenance procedures to ensure the valve would remain operable over the design lifetime of the component. More specifically, the valves actuator arm assembly was not scoped into the licensees maintenance procedures for replacement, despite the fact that the vendor drawing identified the assembly as a consumable. As a result, an initially undetected failure of the assembly rendered the 1A train of KC inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, which included three periods of time (in excess of the unit shutdown requirements in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3) in which the 1B train was also unavailable due to planned maintenance.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of Design Control. It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to adequately maintain the valve actuator arm assembly resulted in a train of safety-related equipment being rendered inoperable, which was determined to be a safety system functional failure.
Using the IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,"
of IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 Worksheets for Catawba Nuclear Station. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based upon the Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report C-09-0546. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 A Train KC Heat Exchanger The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to provide sufficient details for equipment protection in the approved Critical Activity Plan. In addition, the risk mitigation actions contained in the plan intended to manage and minimize the increased plant risk associated with work on the Unit 2 A Train of Component Cooling Water (KC). The finding was more than minor because the risk mitigation strategies in the Critical Activity Plan were not effectively implemented. In addition, the plan lacked specific guidance
on what components were to be posted to provide adequate protection of the 2B train of KC. As a result, work activities were allowed to take place that could have adversely affected the remaining train of KC. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability was less than 1E-5 and the licensees implementation of more than three Risk Management Actions. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component H.3.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-08-6133. (Section 1R13.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate System Leakage Tests (Section 4OA2.a.3)
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) for a failure to comply with 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) in that, the licensee failed to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried Nuclear Service Water (RN) piping repairs. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Identification Process C-08-07137.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved failure to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried RN piping repairs. Specifically, wooden plugs remained in through wall defects during system leakage tests to verify the quality of eight repair welds to RN piping. By leaving the plugs in place, the repair welds cannot be shown to have been subject to the system pressure required by the ASME B&PV Code, resulting in inadequate system leakage tests, therefore the quality of the welds cannot be fully demonstrated. The failure to perform adequate system leakage tests is more than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety/Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality (testing procedures) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of the RN system. Because the RN system remained operable but degraded and there was no loss of safety function, the failure to perform adequate system leakage tests was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution in the component of corrective action program because the licensees extent of condition failed to recognize that repairs were non-conforming despite being signed by an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.a.3).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba December 2008 PI&R Summary On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that in general, your corrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution program (PI&R). However, several observations were identified in the area of an issue screening and prioritization.
The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the team found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : May 28, 2009
Catawba 2 2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to translate design requirements into a maintenance program to ensure Component Cooling Water system operability was maintained over the design life of the plant (Section 4OA3.1)
- Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the failure to translate the design basis for the Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger Nuclear Service Water (RN) outlet control valve and the vendors construction drawings into maintenance procedures to ensure the valve would remain operable over the design lifetime of the component. More specifically, the valves actuator arm assembly was not scoped into the licensees maintenance procedures for replacement, despite the fact that the vendor drawing identified the assembly as a consumable. As a result, an initially undetected failure of the assembly rendered the 1A train of KC inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, which included three periods of time (in excess of the unit shutdown requirements in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3) in which the 1B train was also unavailable due to planned maintenance.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of Design Control. It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to adequately maintain the valve actuator arm assembly resulted in a train of safety-related equipment being rendered inoperable, which was determined to be a safety system functional failure.
Using the IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,"
of IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 Worksheets for Catawba Nuclear Station. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based upon the Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report C-09-0546. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 A Train KC Heat Exchanger The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to provide sufficient details for equipment protection in the approved Critical Activity Plan. In addition, the risk mitigation actions contained in the plan intended to manage and minimize the increased plant risk associated with work on the Unit 2 A Train of Component Cooling Water (KC). The finding was more than minor because the risk mitigation strategies in the Critical Activity Plan were not effectively implemented. In addition, the plan lacked specific guidance
on what components were to be posted to provide adequate protection of the 2B train of KC. As a result, work activities were allowed to take place that could have adversely affected the remaining train of KC. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability was less than 1E-5 and the licensees implementation of more than three Risk Management Actions. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component H.3.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-08-6133. (Section 1R13.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate System Leakage Tests (Section 4OA2.a.3)
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) for a failure to comply with 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) in that, the licensee failed to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried Nuclear Service Water (RN) piping repairs. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Identification Process C-08-07137.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved failure to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried RN piping repairs. Specifically, wooden plugs remained in through wall defects during system leakage tests to verify the quality of eight repair welds to RN piping. By leaving the plugs in place, the repair welds cannot be shown to have been subject to the system pressure required by the ASME B&PV Code, resulting in inadequate system leakage tests, therefore the quality of the welds cannot be fully demonstrated. The failure to perform adequate system leakage tests is more than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety/Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality (testing procedures) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of the RN system. Because the RN system remained operable but degraded and there was no loss of safety function, the failure to perform adequate system leakage tests was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution in the component of corrective action program because the licensees extent of condition failed to recognize that repairs were non-conforming despite being signed by an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.a.3).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba December 2008 PI&R Summary On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that in general, your corrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution program (PI&R). However, several observations were identified in the area of an issue screening and prioritization.
The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the team found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : August 31, 2009
Catawba 2 3Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Inaccurate fire watch records The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) requirements when it was determined that multiple contract fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed fire watch ICM forms resulting in inaccurate fire watch records. Specifically, on seven occasions fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed the fire watch ICM forms and then another qualified employee performed the fire watch but failed to correct the inaccurate ICM form. The licensee entered the deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution.
This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency.
Furthermore, the failure to provide complete and accurate information has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Although the investigation revealed that no fire watch surveillances were actually missed, this issue is considered more than minor due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement VII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV violation because it involved information that the NRC required be kept by a licensee that was incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor safety significance. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because this performance deficiency was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. (Section 1RO5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to translate design requirements into a maintenance program to ensure Component Cooling Water system operability was maintained over the design life of the plant (Section 4OA3.1)
- Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the failure to translate the design basis for the Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger Nuclear Service Water (RN) outlet control valve and the vendors construction drawings into maintenance procedures to ensure the valve would remain operable over the design lifetime of the component. More specifically, the valves actuator arm assembly was not scoped into the licensees maintenance procedures for replacement, despite the fact that the vendor drawing identified the assembly as a consumable. As a result, an initially undetected failure of the assembly rendered the 1A train of KC inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, which included three periods of time (in excess of the unit shutdown requirements in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3) in which the 1B train was also unavailable due to planned maintenance.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of Design Control. It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to adequately maintain the valve actuator arm assembly resulted in a train of safety-related equipment being rendered inoperable, which was determined to be a safety system functional failure.
Using the IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,"
of IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 Worksheets for Catawba Nuclear Station. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based upon the Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report C-09-0546. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Risk Management Actions Associated With Planned Maintenance on the Unit 2 A Train KC Heat Exchanger The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensees failure to provide sufficient details for equipment protection in the approved Critical Activity Plan. In addition, the risk mitigation actions contained in the plan intended to manage and minimize the increased plant risk associated with work on the Unit 2 A Train of Component Cooling Water (KC). The finding was more than minor because the risk mitigation strategies in the Critical Activity Plan were not effectively implemented. In addition, the plan lacked specific guidance on what components were to be posted to provide adequate protection of the 2B train of KC. As a result, work activities were allowed to take place that could have adversely affected the remaining train of KC. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core Damage Probability was less than 1E-5 and the licensees implementation of more than three Risk Management Actions. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance under the Work Activity Coordination aspect of the Work Control component H.3.b]. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) C-08-6133. (Section 1R13.1)
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate System Leakage Tests (Section 4OA2.a.3)
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) for a failure to comply with 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) in that, the licensee failed to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried Nuclear Service Water (RN) piping repairs. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Identification Process C-08-07137.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved failure to perform adequate system leakage tests of buried RN piping repairs. Specifically, wooden plugs remained in through wall defects during system leakage tests to verify the quality of eight repair welds to RN piping. By leaving the plugs in place, the repair welds cannot be shown to have been subject to the system pressure required by the ASME B&PV Code, resulting in inadequate system leakage tests, therefore the quality of the welds cannot be fully demonstrated. The failure to perform adequate system leakage tests is more than minor because it is associated with the Reactor Safety/Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality (testing procedures) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of the RN system. Because the RN system remained operable but degraded and there was no loss of safety function, the failure to perform adequate system leakage tests was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution in the component of corrective action program because the licensees extent of condition failed to recognize that repairs were non-conforming despite being signed by an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.a.3).
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Catawba December 2008 PI&R Summary On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that in general, your corrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution program (PI&R). However, several observations were identified in the area of an issue screening and prioritization.
The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the team found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Last modified : December 10, 2009
Catawba 2 4Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Tornado Missile Protection A NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified in that the installed emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents did not meet the design basis of bending without crimping. The licensee completed corrective actions to install tornado missile protection to prevent crimping of the vents.
The licensees failure to correctly translate the licensing basis into specifications for the vent piping was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone design control attribute and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the vent piping could bend and completely crimp on impact of a tornado generated soft missile. A Phase 3 analysis was required because the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event. A qualitative assessment was performed to determine the risk significance because factors required for determining the risk were not easily quantifiable. Based on the qualitative assessment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A cross-cutting aspect for this issue was not identified as it was determined to be a legacy design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sump valves for units 1 and 2 The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) sump valves for Units 1 and 2. PIPs C-09-05020 and C-09-04390 initiated immediate corrective actions, including testing of the subject valves during the inspection, wherein valve 1WL848 failed to stroke. Additionally, the licensee increased the maintenance category of the affected components and made procedural modifications to provide positive valve position controls.
The team determined that the licensees failure to monitor the performance and condition of Valve 1WL848 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to perform periodic testing or preventative maintenance resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the valves would perform their function of protecting CAPT. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified since the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: VIO Violation Inaccurate fire watch records The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) requirements when it was determined that multiple contract fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed fire watch ICM forms resulting in inaccurate fire watch records. Specifically, on seven occasions fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed the fire watch ICM forms and then another qualified employee performed the fire watch but failed to correct the inaccurate ICM form. The licensee entered the deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution.
This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency.
Furthermore, the failure to provide complete and accurate information has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Although the investigation revealed that no fire watch surveillances were actually missed, this issue is considered more than minor due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement VII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV violation because it involved information that the NRC required be kept by a licensee that was incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor safety significance. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because this performance deficiency was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. (Section 1RO5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to translate design requirements into a maintenance program to ensure Component Cooling Water system operability was maintained over the design life of the plant (Section 4OA3.1)
- Green: A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the failure to translate the design basis for the Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchanger Nuclear Service Water (RN) outlet control valve and the vendors construction drawings into maintenance procedures to ensure the valve would remain operable over the design lifetime of the component. More specifically, the valves actuator arm assembly was not scoped into the licensees maintenance procedures for replacement, despite the fact that the vendor drawing identified the assembly as a consumable. As a result, an initially undetected failure of the assembly rendered the 1A train of KC inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, which included three periods of time (in excess of the unit shutdown requirements in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3) in which the 1B train was also unavailable due to planned maintenance.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of Design Control. It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to adequately maintain the valve actuator arm assembly resulted in a train of safety-related equipment being rendered inoperable, which was determined to be a safety system functional failure.
Using the IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the finding resulted in a loss of safety function. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,"
of IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and the Phase 2 Worksheets for Catawba Nuclear Station. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based upon the Phase 2 evaluation. This finding was reviewed for crosscutting aspects and none were identified. This issue has been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program as Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report C-09-0546. (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2010
Catawba 2 1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Tornado Missile Protection A NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified in that the installed emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents did not meet the design basis of bending without crimping. The licensee completed corrective actions to install tornado missile protection to prevent crimping of the vents.
The licensees failure to correctly translate the licensing basis into specifications for the vent piping was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone design control attribute and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the vent piping could bend and completely crimp on impact of a tornado generated soft missile. A Phase 3 analysis was required because the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event. A qualitative assessment was performed to determine the risk significance because factors required for determining the risk were not easily quantifiable. Based on the qualitative assessment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A cross-cutting aspect for this issue was not identified as it was determined to be a legacy design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sump valves for units 1 and 2 The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) sump valves for Units 1 and 2. PIPs C-09-05020 and C-09-04390 initiated immediate corrective actions, including testing of the subject valves during the inspection, wherein valve 1WL848 failed to stroke. Additionally, the licensee increased the maintenance category of the affected components and made procedural modifications to provide positive valve position controls.
The team determined that the licensees failure to monitor the performance and condition of Valve 1WL848 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to perform periodic testing or preventative maintenance resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the valves would perform their function of protecting CAPT. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified since the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: VIO Violation Inaccurate fire watch records The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) requirements when it was determined that multiple contract fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed fire watch ICM forms resulting in inaccurate fire watch records. Specifically, on seven occasions fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed the fire watch ICM forms and then another qualified employee performed the fire watch but failed to correct the inaccurate ICM form. The licensee entered the deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution.
This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency.
Furthermore, the failure to provide complete and accurate information has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Although the investigation revealed that no fire watch surveillances were actually missed, this issue is considered more than minor due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement VII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV violation because it involved information that the NRC required be kept by a licensee that was incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor safety significance. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because this performance deficiency was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. (Section 1RO5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 26, 2010
Catawba 2 2Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Tornado Missile Protection A NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified in that the installed emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents did not meet the design basis of bending without crimping. The licensee completed corrective actions to install tornado missile protection to prevent crimping of the vents.
The licensees failure to correctly translate the licensing basis into specifications for the vent piping was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone design control attribute and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the vent piping could bend and completely crimp on impact of a tornado generated soft missile. A Phase 3 analysis was required because the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event. A qualitative assessment was performed to determine the risk significance because factors required for determining the risk were not easily quantifiable. Based on the qualitative assessment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A cross-cutting aspect for this issue was not identified as it was determined to be a legacy design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sump valves for units 1 and 2 The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) sump valves for Units 1 and 2. PIPs C-09-05020 and C-09-04390 initiated immediate corrective actions, including testing of the subject valves during the inspection, wherein valve 1WL848 failed to stroke. Additionally, the licensee increased the maintenance category of the affected components and made procedural modifications to provide positive valve position controls.
The team determined that the licensees failure to monitor the performance and condition of Valve 1WL848 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to perform periodic testing or preventative maintenance resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the valves would perform their function of protecting CAPT. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified since the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC
Item Type: VIO Violation Inaccurate fire watch records The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) requirements when it was determined that multiple contract fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed fire watch ICM forms resulting in inaccurate fire watch records. Specifically, on seven occasions fire watch employees deliberately pre-signed the fire watch ICM forms and then another qualified employee performed the fire watch but failed to correct the inaccurate ICM form. The licensee entered the deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution.
This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency.
Furthermore, the failure to provide complete and accurate information has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Although the investigation revealed that no fire watch surveillances were actually missed, this issue is considered more than minor due to the willful aspects of the performance deficiency. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement VII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV violation because it involved information that the NRC required be kept by a licensee that was incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor safety significance. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because this performance deficiency was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. (Section 1RO5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 02, 2010
Catawba 2 3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible material in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified Green NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when transient combustible materials of greater than 15 pounds and located near an ignition source were stored in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room without prior review and approval as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-10-5521.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of fire and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the adjacent 600V pressurizer heater breaker panel could ignite the combustibles and cause damage to safety-related containment pressure transmitters. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the requirements of NSD 313 were not clearly communicated
H.4(b). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Tornado Missile Protection A NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified in that the installed emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents did not meet the design basis of bending without crimping. The licensee completed corrective actions to install tornado missile protection to prevent crimping of the vents.
The licensees failure to correctly translate the licensing basis into specifications for the vent piping was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone design control attribute and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the vent piping could bend and completely crimp on impact of a tornado generated soft missile. A Phase 3 analysis was required because the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event. A qualitative assessment was performed to determine the risk significance because factors required for determining the risk were not easily quantifiable. Based on the qualitative assessment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A cross-cutting aspect for this issue was not identified as it was determined to be a legacy design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 15, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sump valves for units 1 and 2 The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) sump valves for Units 1 and 2. PIPs C-09-05020 and C-09-04390 initiated immediate corrective actions, including testing of the subject valves during the inspection, wherein valve 1WL848 failed to stroke. Additionally, the licensee increased the maintenance category of the affected components and made procedural modifications to provide positive valve position controls.
The team determined that the licensees failure to monitor the performance and condition of Valve 1WL848 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to perform periodic testing or preventative maintenance resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the valves would perform their function of protecting CAPT. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified since the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.5)
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 29, 2010
Catawba 2 4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible material in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified Green NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when transient combustible materials of greater than 15 pounds and located near an ignition source were stored in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room without prior review and approval as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-10-5521.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of fire and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the adjacent 600V pressurizer heater breaker panel could ignite the combustibles and cause damage to safety-related containment pressure transmitters. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the requirements of NSD 313 were not clearly communicated
H.4(b). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to notify the commission of a change in medical status
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.25 was identified when the licensee failed to notify the NRC of a permanent change in the medical status of a licensed operator within 30 days of learning of the change.
The failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.25 was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the violation should be dispositioned using the Traditional Enforcement process because the PD impacted the regulatory process. The inspectors assessed the PD using the NRCs Enforcement Policy, Section 6.4, Licensed Reactor Operators, and determined the violation should be dispositioned as a SL-IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to PDs dispostioned using Traditional Enforcement. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain retrievable quality related records An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance Records, was identified for the failure to maintain retrievable records of activities affecting quality. Several work orders from the fall of 2009
were irretrievably lost prior to electronic archiving, including records of calibrations performed on Unit 1 containment high-range area radiation monitors.
The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain quality records was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that records of activities affecting quality (e.g. containment high-range radiation monitor calibrations) must be maintained in order to provide auditable assurance of system operability. The inspectors evaluated the finding and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of self and peer-checking in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the lost documents were destroyed prior to completion of electronic archiving. H.4(a)
(Section 2RS5)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs in Unit 2 lower containment
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, High Radiation Area (HRA), was identified for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs inside Unit 2 lower containment.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately control HRAs was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute of Program & Process (RP controls) and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that HRAs must be posted and properly controlled to avoid unnecessary worker exposure.
The finding was was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of appropriately planning work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area because the potential job site conditions (radiological hazards) associated with down-posting large areas of lower containment were not adequately identified H.3(a). (Section 2RS1)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 16, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 Catawba PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Program (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the inspectors found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed.
Based on interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Last modified : March 03, 2011
Catawba 2 1Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible material in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified Green NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when transient combustible materials of greater than 15 pounds and located near an ignition source were stored in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room without prior review and approval as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-10-5521.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of fire and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the adjacent 600V pressurizer heater breaker panel could ignite the combustibles and cause damage to safety-related containment pressure transmitters. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the requirements of NSD 313 were not clearly communicated
H.4(b). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to notify the commission of a change in medical status
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.25 was identified when the licensee failed to notify the NRC of a permanent change in the medical status of a licensed operator within 30 days of learning of the change.
The failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.25 was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the violation should be dispositioned using the Traditional Enforcement process because the PD impacted the regulatory process. The inspectors assessed the PD using the NRCs Enforcement Policy, Section 6.4, Licensed Reactor Operators, and determined the violation should be dispositioned as a SL-IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to PDs dispostioned using Traditional Enforcement. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain retrievable quality related records An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance Records, was identified for the failure to maintain retrievable records of activities affecting quality. Several work orders from the fall of 2009
were irretrievably lost prior to electronic archiving, including records of calibrations performed on Unit 1 containment high-range area radiation monitors.
The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain quality records was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that records of activities affecting quality (e.g. containment high-range radiation monitor calibrations) must be maintained in order to provide auditable assurance of system operability. The inspectors evaluated the finding and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of self and peer-checking in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the lost documents were destroyed prior to completion of electronic archiving. H.4(a)
(Section 2RS5)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update bases for EAL changes An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensees ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP)
C-11-2304.
The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. H.2(c) (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs in Unit 2 lower containment
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, High Radiation Area (HRA), was identified for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs inside Unit 2 lower containment.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately control HRAs was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute of Program & Process (RP controls) and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that HRAs must be posted and properly controlled to avoid unnecessary worker exposure.
The finding was was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of appropriately planning work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area because the potential job site conditions (radiological hazards) associated with down-posting large areas of lower containment were not adequately identified H.3(a). (Section 2RS1)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 16, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 Catawba PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Program (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the inspectors found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed.
Based on interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Last modified : June 07, 2011
Catawba 2 2Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequately control transient combustible material in accordance with the fire protection program An NRC-identified Green NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when transient combustible materials of greater than 15 pounds and located near an ignition source were stored in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room without prior review and approval as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-10-5521.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of fire and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the adjacent 600V pressurizer heater breaker panel could ignite the combustibles and cause damage to safety-related containment pressure transmitters. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the requirements of NSD 313 were not clearly communicated
H.4(b). (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2010004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedures for obtaining lube oil samples from the 2B NI pump A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to provide adequate instructions for obtaining oil samples on the 2B safety injection (NI) pump. As a result, maintenance technicians inserted a plastic tube into the pump gear box introducing foreign material (FM) into the bearing oil system. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP and corrective actions included labeling of the oil sampling tube and establishing a written pre-job briefing for taking oil samples.
The licensees failure to provide adequate instructions to perform oil sampling on the 2B NI pump was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that FM was introduced into the pumps bearing oil system that could have resulted in the 2B NI pump not performing its safety function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because a detailed pre-job brief or an appropriate questioning attitude by the technicians would have prevented this condition.
H.4(a) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to notify the commission of a change in medical status
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.25 was identified when the licensee failed to notify the NRC of a permanent change in the medical status of a licensed operator within 30 days of learning of the change.
The failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.25 was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the violation should be dispositioned using the Traditional Enforcement process because the PD impacted the regulatory process. The inspectors assessed the PD using the NRCs Enforcement Policy, Section 6.4, Licensed Reactor Operators, and determined the violation should be dispositioned as a SL-IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to PDs dispostioned using Traditional Enforcement. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain retrievable quality related records An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance Records, was identified for the failure to maintain retrievable records of activities affecting quality. Several work orders from the fall of 2009 were irretrievably lost prior to electronic archiving, including records of calibrations performed on Unit 1 containment high-range area radiation monitors.
The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain quality records was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that records of activities affecting quality (e.g. containment high-range radiation monitor calibrations) must be maintained in order to provide auditable assurance of system operability. The inspectors evaluated the finding and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of self and peer-checking in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the lost documents were destroyed prior to completion of electronic archiving. H.4(a)
(Section 2RS5)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update bases for EAL changes An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensees ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP)
C-11-2304.
The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance
deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. H.2(c) (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs in Unit 2 lower containment
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, High Radiation Area (HRA), was identified for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs inside Unit 2 lower containment.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately control HRAs was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute of Program & Process (RP controls) and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that HRAs must be posted and properly controlled to avoid unnecessary worker exposure.
The finding was was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of appropriately planning work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area because the potential job site conditions (radiological hazards) associated with down-posting large areas of lower containment were not adequately identified H.3(a). (Section 2RS1)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 16, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 Catawba PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of
Problem Investigation Program (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the inspectors found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed.
Based on interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Last modified : October 14, 2011
Catawba 2 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedures for obtaining lube oil samples from the 2B NI pump A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to provide adequate instructions for obtaining oil samples on the 2B safety injection (NI) pump. As a result, maintenance technicians inserted a plastic tube into the pump gear box introducing foreign material (FM) into the bearing oil system. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP and corrective actions included labeling of the oil sampling tube and establishing a written pre-job briefing for taking oil samples.
The licensees failure to provide adequate instructions to perform oil sampling on the 2B NI pump was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that FM was introduced into the pumps bearing oil system that could have resulted in the 2B NI pump not performing its safety function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because a detailed pre-job brief or an appropriate questioning attitude by the technicians would have prevented this condition.
H.4(a) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to notify the commission of a change in medical status
- SL-IV. An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 55.25 was identified when the licensee failed to notify the NRC of a permanent change in the medical status of a licensed operator within 30 days of learning of the change.
The failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.25 was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the violation should be dispositioned using the Traditional Enforcement process because the PD impacted the regulatory process. The inspectors assessed the PD using the NRCs Enforcement Policy, Section 6.4, Licensed Reactor Operators, and determined the violation should be dispositioned as a SL-IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to PDs dispostioned using Traditional Enforcement. (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain retrievable quality related records An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance Records, was identified for the failure to maintain retrievable records of activities affecting quality. Several work orders from the fall of 2009
were irretrievably lost prior to electronic archiving, including records of calibrations performed on Unit 1 containment high-range area radiation monitors.
The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain quality records was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that records of activities affecting quality (e.g. containment high-range radiation monitor calibrations) must be maintained in order to provide auditable assurance of system operability. The inspectors evaluated the finding and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of self and peer-checking in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the lost documents were destroyed prior to completion of electronic archiving. H.4(a)
(Section 2RS5)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update bases for EAL changes An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensees ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP)
C-11-2304.
The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. H.2(c) (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Dec 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs in Unit 2 lower containment
- Green. A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, High Radiation Area (HRA), was identified for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post HRAs inside Unit 2 lower containment.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately control HRAs was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the cornerstone attribute of Program & Process (RP controls) and negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that HRAs must be posted and properly controlled to avoid unnecessary worker exposure.
The finding was was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of appropriately planning work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area because the potential job site conditions (radiological hazards) associated with down-posting large areas of lower containment were not adequately identified H.3(a). (Section 2RS1)
Inspection Report# : 2010005 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 16, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding 2010 Catawba PI&R The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected.
The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Program (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, several minor observations were identified in the area of issue screening and prioritization.
The inspectors determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the inspectors found one example where operating experience was not adequately addressed.
Based on interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve concerns.
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Last modified : January 04, 2012
Catawba 2 4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedures for obtaining lube oil samples from the 2B NI pump A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to provide adequate instructions for obtaining oil samples on the 2B safety injection (NI) pump. As a result, maintenance technicians inserted a plastic tube into the pump gear box introducing foreign material (FM) into the bearing oil system. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP and corrective actions included labeling of the oil sampling tube and establishing a written pre-job briefing for taking oil samples.
The licensees failure to provide adequate instructions to perform oil sampling on the 2B NI pump was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that FM was introduced into the pumps bearing oil system that could have resulted in the 2B NI pump not performing its safety function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because a detailed pre-job brief or an appropriate questioning attitude by the technicians would have prevented this condition.
H.4(a) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to update bases for EAL changes An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensees ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions.
The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP)
C-11-2304.
The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events
associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. H.2(c) (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 02, 2012
Catawba 2 1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate procedures for obtaining lube oil samples from the 2B NI pump A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to provide adequate instructions for obtaining oil samples on the 2B safety injection (NI) pump. As a result, maintenance technicians inserted a plastic tube into the pump gear box introducing foreign material (FM) into the bearing oil system. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP and corrective actions included labeling of the oil sampling tube and establishing a written pre-job briefing for taking oil samples.
The licensees failure to provide adequate instructions to perform oil sampling on the 2B NI pump was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that FM was introduced into the pumps bearing oil system that could have resulted in the 2B NI pump not performing its safety function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because a detailed pre-job brief or an appropriate questioning attitude by the technicians would have prevented this condition.
H.4(a) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 29, 2012
Catawba 2 2Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequatley implement tagout procedures A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags. The licensee implemented a tagout that was not supported by plant conditions which resulted in the inoperability of the 2B ND train while in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Immediate actions were taken to declare the 2B ND train inoperable and manually reopen the loop isolation valves inside containment. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Identification Program (PIP) report C-12-2313.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of reactor coolant system pressure SSPS relays prevented the opening of the 2B ND loop isolation valves resulting in the 2B ND train being inoperable. Using the screening criteria in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity <23 feet, a Phase 2 risk analysis was required because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal. A Phase 3 risk analysis determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because of the less than one hour exposure time. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the effect of the tagout on ND system operation was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation. H.3(b) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: TBD Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Unit 2 Offsite Power Circuits Inoperable Due to Improper Unit 1 Zone G Modification Self-revealing findings were identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the need for the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 1 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power without this blocking feature. This finding resulted in an apparent violation (AV) of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown, for Unit 2 because the installed modification resulted in inoperability of the offsite power source for both units. Unit 2 was impacted whenever offsite power was provided from Unit 1. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-12-3403.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that an offsite power supply would not have been available to mitigate expected operational transients and design basis
events. For Unit 2, the significance was determined to be Green. No separate cross-sutting aspect is assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012010 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper Unit 2 Zone G Modification A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 2 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power and offsite power was provided from Unit 2 without this blocking feature. The licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would result in a more significant safety concern in that Unit 2 would have had a LOSP anytime the generator tripped from a high power condition. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the programming error was corrected prior to unit restart; therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The same cross-cutting aspect for the Unit 1 finding also applies to this finding; therefore, no separate cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous
Last modified : September 20, 2012 3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 3Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequatley implement tagout procedures A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags. The licensee implemented a tagout that was not supported by plant conditions which resulted in the inoperability of the 2B ND train while in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Immediate actions were taken to declare the 2B ND train inoperable and manually reopen the loop isolation valves inside containment. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Identification Program (PIP) report C-12-2313.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of reactor coolant system pressure SSPS relays prevented the opening of the 2B ND loop isolation valves resulting in the 2B ND train being inoperable. Using the screening criteria in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity <23 feet, a Phase 2 risk analysis was required because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal. A Phase 3 risk analysis determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because of the less than one hour exposure time. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the effect of the tagout on ND system operation was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation. H.3(b) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between essential switchgear rooms An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 1 and 2 Facility Operating Licenses, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified gaps in the emergency switchgear room (ESR) hatch covers separating two fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment which were not evaluated. The licensee placed the issue into the corrective action program and implemented fire watches and prohibited storage of transient combustibles in the area.
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3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 The inspectors determined the gaps in the ESR hatch covers was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the gaps in the hatch covers would prevent fire propagation across the 3-hour fire rated barrier. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of condition as described in the corrective action program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area. P.1(c) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain requalification examination integrity An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to examination procedure standards that allow no more than 50 percent scenario overlap between examinations. The licensee subsequently revised the 2012 annual operating examination to preclude the scenario overlap issue that would have occurred and entered the issue in their corrective action program as PIP C-12-06949 and PIP C-12-06950.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to adhere to examination overlap standards adversely affected the quality of the administration of the operating exams. Using the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no actual compromise of the examinations occurred. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedures of the resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. H.2(c) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unit 2 Offsite Power Circuits Inoperable Due to Improper Unit 1 Zone G Modification Self-revealing findings were identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the need for the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 1 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power without this blocking feature. This finding resulted in an apparent violation (AV) of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown, for Unit 2 because the installed modification resulted in inoperability of the offsite power source for both units. Unit 2 was impacted whenever offsite power was provided from Unit 1. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-12-3403.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that an offsite power supply would not have been available to mitigate expected operational transients and design basis events. For Unit 2, the significance was determined to be Green. No separate cross-sutting aspect is assigned to this Page 2 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2012010 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper Unit 2 Zone G Modification A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 2 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power and offsite power was provided from Unit 2 without this blocking feature. The licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would result in a more significant safety concern in that Unit 2 would have had a LOSP anytime the generator tripped from a high power condition. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the programming error was corrected prior to unit restart; therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The same cross-cutting aspect for the Unit 1 finding also applies to this finding; therefore, no separate cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
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3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Miscellaneous Last modified : November 30, 2012 Page 4 of 4
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequatley implement tagout procedures A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags. The licensee implemented a tagout that was not supported by plant conditions which resulted in the inoperability of the 2B ND train while in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Immediate actions were taken to declare the 2B ND train inoperable and manually reopen the loop isolation valves inside containment. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Identification Program (PIP) report C-12-2313.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of reactor coolant system pressure SSPS relays prevented the opening of the 2B ND loop isolation valves resulting in the 2B ND train being inoperable. Using the screening criteria in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity <23 feet, a Phase 2 risk analysis was required because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal. A Phase 3 risk analysis determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because of the less than one hour exposure time. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the effect of the tagout on ND system operation was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation. H.3(b) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between essential switchgear rooms An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 1 and 2 Facility Operating Licenses, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified gaps in the emergency switchgear room (ESR) hatch covers separating two fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment which were not evaluated. The licensee placed the issue into the corrective action program and implemented fire watches and prohibited storage of transient combustibles in the area.
The inspectors determined the gaps in the ESR hatch covers was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the gaps in the hatch covers would prevent fire propagation across the 3-hour fire rated barrier. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding Page 1 of 4
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 was related to the cross cutting-aspect to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of condition as described in the corrective action program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area. P.1(c) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain requalification examination integrity An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to examination procedure standards that allow no more than 50 percent scenario overlap between examinations. The licensee subsequently revised the 2012 annual operating examination to preclude the scenario overlap issue that would have occurred and entered the issue in their corrective action program as PIP C-12-06949 and PIP C-12-06950.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to adhere to examination overlap standards adversely affected the quality of the administration of the operating exams. Using the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no actual compromise of the examinations occurred. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedures of the resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. H.2(c) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Adequate Test to Ensure Minimum SMP Flow Requirements The team identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, for the licensees failure to establish a leakage acceptance criteria past check valves that supported minimum, post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) design flow requirements of the standby shutdown system. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7717 and conservatively limited the allowed Total Accumulative RCS [reactor coolant system] Leakage to gain additional standby makeup pump (SMP) flow margin.
The licensees use of inadequate test acceptance criteria for back-leakage through check valves was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute in that, if backleakage through check valves 1(2)NV-46, 1(2)NV-57, 1(2)NV-68, and 1(2)NV-79 was to degrade to the allowed limits in the test procedure, the SMP would not be capable of meeting the 26 gpm reactor coolant system makeup requirement to support the standby shutdown system post-fire SSD function. The inspectors evaluated this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was assigned the category of post-fire SSD and a low degradation rating that reflected the severity of the identified deficiency. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the condition existed since initial issuance of the test procedure and was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
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4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Procedure to Ensure EQ MOV Cycle Limit Is Not Exceeded The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure that the requirements in EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual, were not exceeded to maintain the environmental qualification of motor-operated valves (MOVs). The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7121, declared MOVs 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A as operable but degraded/nonconforming, and instituted guidance to periodically review the cycles of all MOVs to ensure the maximum limit is not exceeded.
The licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure the MOV cycle requirements of EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, were not exceeded was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, the lack of procedural guidance to track the cycles of MOVs resulted in 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A exceeding their environmental qualification cycle limit of 2,000 cycles and decreased the reliability and capability of the MOVs. The team assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in a loss of MOV operability. The finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of implementation and institutionalization of operating experience in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area. P.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unit 2 Offsite Power Circuits Inoperable Due to Improper Unit 1 Zone G Modification Self-revealing findings were identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the need for the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 1 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power without this blocking feature. This finding resulted in an apparent violation (AV) of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown, for Unit 2 because the installed modification resulted in inoperability of the offsite power source for both units. Unit 2 was impacted whenever offsite power was provided from Unit 1. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-12-3403.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that an offsite power supply would not have been available to mitigate expected operational transients and design basis events. For Unit 2, the significance was determined to be Green. No separate cross-sutting aspect is assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2012010 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper Unit 2 Zone G Modification A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Page 3 of 4
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Unit 2 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power and offsite power was provided from Unit 2 without this blocking feature. The licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would result in a more significant safety concern in that Unit 2 would have had a LOSP anytime the generator tripped from a high power condition. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the programming error was corrected prior to unit restart; therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The same cross-cutting aspect for the Unit 1 finding also applies to this finding; therefore, no separate cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 28, 2013 Page 4 of 4
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 1Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to adequatley implement tagout procedures A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags. The licensee implemented a tagout that was not supported by plant conditions which resulted in the inoperability of the 2B ND train while in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Immediate actions were taken to declare the 2B ND train inoperable and manually reopen the loop isolation valves inside containment. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Identification Program (PIP) report C-12-2313.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of reactor coolant system pressure SSPS relays prevented the opening of the 2B ND loop isolation valves resulting in the 2B ND train being inoperable. Using the screening criteria in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity <23 feet, a Phase 2 risk analysis was required because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal. A Phase 3 risk analysis determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because of the less than one hour exposure time. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the effect of the tagout on ND system operation was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation. H.3(b) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between essential switchgear rooms An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 1 and 2 Facility Operating Licenses, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified gaps in the emergency switchgear room (ESR) hatch covers separating two fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment which were not evaluated. The licensee placed the issue into the corrective action program and implemented fire watches and prohibited storage of transient combustibles in the area.
Page 1 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 The inspectors determined the gaps in the ESR hatch covers was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the gaps in the hatch covers would prevent fire propagation across the 3-hour fire rated barrier. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of condition as described in the corrective action program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area. P.1(c) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain requalification examination integrity An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to examination procedure standards that allow no more than 50 percent scenario overlap between examinations. The licensee subsequently revised the 2012 annual operating examination to preclude the scenario overlap issue that would have occurred and entered the issue in their corrective action program as PIP C-12-06949 and PIP C-12-06950.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to adhere to examination overlap standards adversely affected the quality of the administration of the operating exams. Using the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no actual compromise of the examinations occurred. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedures of the resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. H.2(c) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Adequate Test to Ensure Minimum SMP Flow Requirements The team identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, for the licensees failure to establish a leakage acceptance criteria past check valves that supported minimum, post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) design flow requirements of the standby shutdown system. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7717 and conservatively limited the allowed Total Accumulative RCS [reactor coolant system] Leakage to gain additional standby makeup pump (SMP) flow margin.
The licensees use of inadequate test acceptance criteria for back-leakage through check valves was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute in that, if backleakage through check valves 1(2)NV-46, 1(2)NV-57, 1(2)NV-68, and 1(2)NV-79 was to degrade to the allowed limits in the test procedure, the SMP would not be capable of meeting the 26 gpm reactor coolant system makeup requirement to support the standby Page 2 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 shutdown system post-fire SSD function. The inspectors evaluated this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was assigned the category of post-fire SSD and a low degradation rating that reflected the severity of the identified deficiency. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the condition existed since initial issuance of the test procedure and was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Procedure to Ensure EQ MOV Cycle Limit Is Not Exceeded The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure that the requirements in EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual, were not exceeded to maintain the environmental qualification of motor-operated valves (MOVs). The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7121, declared MOVs 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A as operable but degraded/nonconforming, and instituted guidance to periodically review the cycles of all MOVs to ensure the maximum limit is not exceeded.
The licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure the MOV cycle requirements of EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, were not exceeded was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, the lack of procedural guidance to track the cycles of MOVs resulted in 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A exceeding their environmental qualification cycle limit of 2,000 cycles and decreased the reliability and capability of the MOVs. The team assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in a loss of MOV operability. The finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of implementation and institutionalization of operating experience in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area. P.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unit 2 Offsite Power Circuits Inoperable Due to Improper Unit 1 Zone G Modification Self-revealing findings were identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the need for the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 1 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power without this blocking feature. This finding resulted in an apparent violation (AV) of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown, for Unit 2 because the installed modification resulted in inoperability of the offsite power source for both units. Unit 2 was impacted whenever offsite power was provided from Unit 1. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as PIP C-12-3403.
The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that an Page 3 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 offsite power supply would not have been available to mitigate expected operational transients and design basis events. For Unit 2, the significance was determined to be Green. No separate cross-sutting aspect is assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2012010 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 18, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper Unit 2 Zone G Modification A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 2 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power and offsite power was provided from Unit 2 without this blocking feature. The licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would result in a more significant safety concern in that Unit 2 would have had a LOSP anytime the generator tripped from a high power condition. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the programming error was corrected prior to unit restart; therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The same cross-cutting aspect for the Unit 1 finding also applies to this finding; therefore, no separate cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this finding.
Inspection Report# : 2012009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related Page 4 of 5
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 04, 2013 Page 5 of 5
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 2Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between essential switchgear rooms An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 1 and 2 Facility Operating Licenses, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified gaps in the emergency switchgear room (ESR) hatch covers separating two fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown equipment which were not evaluated. The licensee placed the issue into the corrective action program and implemented fire watches and prohibited storage of transient combustibles in the area.
The inspectors determined the gaps in the ESR hatch covers was a performance deficiency (PD). The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the gaps in the hatch covers would prevent fire propagation across the 3-hour fire rated barrier. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of condition as described in the corrective action program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area. P.1(c) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain requalification examination integrity An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to examination procedure standards that allow no more than 50 percent scenario overlap between examinations. The licensee subsequently revised the 2012 annual operating examination to preclude the scenario overlap issue that would have occurred and entered the issue in their corrective action program as PIP C-12-06949 and PIP C-12-06950.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to adhere to examination overlap standards adversely affected the quality of the administration of the operating exams. Using the Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this Page 1 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no actual compromise of the examinations occurred. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedures of the resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. H.2(c) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Develop Adequate Test to Ensure Minimum SMP Flow Requirements The team identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 License Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, for the licensees failure to establish a leakage acceptance criteria past check valves that supported minimum, post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) design flow requirements of the standby shutdown system. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7717 and conservatively limited the allowed Total Accumulative RCS [reactor coolant system] Leakage to gain additional standby makeup pump (SMP) flow margin.
The licensees use of inadequate test acceptance criteria for back-leakage through check valves was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute in that, if backleakage through check valves 1(2)NV-46, 1(2)NV-57, 1(2)NV-68, and 1(2)NV-79 was to degrade to the allowed limits in the test procedure, the SMP would not be capable of meeting the 26 gpm reactor coolant system makeup requirement to support the standby shutdown system post-fire SSD function. The inspectors evaluated this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was assigned the category of post-fire SSD and a low degradation rating that reflected the severity of the identified deficiency. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the condition existed since initial issuance of the test procedure and was not reflective of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 14, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Implementation of Procedure to Ensure EQ MOV Cycle Limit Is Not Exceeded The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure that the requirements in EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual, were not exceeded to maintain the environmental qualification of motor-operated valves (MOVs). The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PIP C-12-7121, declared MOVs 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A as operable but degraded/nonconforming, and instituted guidance to periodically review the cycles of all MOVs to ensure the maximum limit is not exceeded.
The licensees failure to establish a procedure to ensure the MOV cycle requirements of EQMM 1393.01-A01-00, were not exceeded was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, the lack of procedural guidance to track the cycles of MOVs resulted in 1KCC37A, 1WL807B, and 2KCC37A exceeding their environmental Page 2 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 qualification cycle limit of 2,000 cycles and decreased the reliability and capability of the MOVs. The team assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in a loss of MOV operability. The finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of implementation and institutionalization of operating experience in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area. P.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2012007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to inspect control room door seal
- Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications, 5.5.16, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the program. The seals on the control room doors were not being inspected and maintained as required.
The performancy deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the seals could continue to degrade and challenge the control room habitability envelope. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the lack of control room door seal inspections only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect of providing complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the necessary procedures and work packages were inadequate to assure compliance with the licensees Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2013003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Page 3 of 4
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 03, 2013 Page 4 of 4
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 3Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: May 24, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Deficiencies in the Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Maintenance Rule, for the licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the 8-hour emergency light preventive maintenance program.
The licensee entered the issues into their corrective action program as PIPs-C-13-03973, C-13-00996, C-13-03536 and C-13-03537. The deficiency will be mitigated by the operators use of flashlights until the deficiencies are corrected.
The licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the emergency light preventive maintenance program was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of protection against external events. Specifically, the high failure rate of emergency light testing resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that adequate lighting would be available during fire events.
The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors noted that operators were required to obtain and carry flashlights. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution area. P.1(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to inspect control room door seal
- Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications, 5.5.16, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the program. The seals on the control room doors were not being inspected and maintained as required.
The performancy deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the seals could continue to degrade and challenge the control room habitability envelope. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the lack of control room door seal inspections only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect of providing complete, accurate Page 1 of 2
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the necessary procedures and work packages were inadequate to assure compliance with the licensees Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2013003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 03, 2013 Page 2 of 2
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program An NRC-identified NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.5, was identified for failing to adequately implement transient combustible controls. Transient combustible material stored adjacent to the B rod control motor generator (MG) set and in front of a manual hose station was not in an established housekeeping area, and was not evaluated for acceptability by the site fire protection engineer (FPE) as required by the FPP specified procedure, Nuclear System Directive NSD-313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The failure to control transient combustibles in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern in that an electrical fault in the adjacent MG set panel could ignite the combustibles which could lead to additional damage to rod control wiring and a potential plant transient. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the combustibles did not meet the criteria requiring a phase 2 or 3 analysis as described in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 2. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the Resources component of the area of Human Performance because the personnel involved were not adequately trained in the procedural requirements of NSD-313 (H.2(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: May 24, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Deficiencies in the Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Maintenance Rule, for the licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the 8-hour emergency light preventive maintenance program.
The licensee entered the issues into their corrective action program as PIPs-C-13-03973, C-13-00996, C-13-03536 and C-13-03537. The deficiency will be mitigated by the operators use of flashlights until the deficiencies are corrected.
The licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the emergency light preventive maintenance program was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of protection against external events. Specifically, the high failure rate of emergency light testing resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that adequate lighting would be available during fire events.
Page 1 of 3
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors noted that operators were required to obtain and carry flashlights. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution area. P.1(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to inspect control room door seal
- Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications, 5.5.16, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the program. The seals on the control room doors were not being inspected and maintained as required.
The performancy deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the seals could continue to degrade and challenge the control room habitability envelope. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the lack of control room door seal inspections only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect of providing complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the necessary procedures and work packages were inadequate to assure compliance with the licensees Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2013003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports Page 2 of 3
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 24, 2014 Page 3 of 3
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 1Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program An NRC-identified NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.5, was identified for failing to adequately implement transient combustible controls. Transient combustible material stored adjacent to the B rod control motor generator (MG) set and in front of a manual hose station was not in an established housekeeping area, and was not evaluated for acceptability by the site fire protection engineer (FPE) as required by the FPP specified procedure, Nuclear System Directive NSD-313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The failure to control transient combustibles in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern in that an electrical fault in the adjacent MG set panel could ignite the combustibles which could lead to additional damage to rod control wiring and a potential plant transient. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the combustibles did not meet the criteria requiring a phase 2 or 3 analysis as described in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 2. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the Resources component of the area of Human Performance because the personnel involved were not adequately trained in the procedural requirements of NSD-313 (H.2(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: May 24, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Identify and Correct Deficiencies in the Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance Program The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Maintenance Rule, for the licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the 8-hour emergency light preventive maintenance program.
The licensee entered the issues into their corrective action program as PIPs-C-13-03973, C-13-00996, C-13-03536 and C-13-03537. The deficiency will be mitigated by the operators use of flashlights until the deficiencies are corrected.
The licensee's failure to identify and correct deficiencies in the emergency light preventive maintenance program was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of protection against external events. Specifically, the high failure rate of emergency light testing resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that adequate lighting would be available during fire events.
Page 1 of 3
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors noted that operators were required to obtain and carry flashlights. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution area. P.1(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to inspect control room door seal
- Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications, 5.5.16, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the program. The seals on the control room doors were not being inspected and maintained as required.
The performancy deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the seals could continue to degrade and challenge the control room habitability envelope. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the lack of control room door seal inspections only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room. The cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting-aspect of providing complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the necessary procedures and work packages were inadequate to assure compliance with the licensees Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. H.2.c]
Inspection Report# : 2013003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports Page 2 of 3
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 30, 2014 Page 3 of 3
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 2Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program An NRC-identified NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.5, was identified for failing to adequately implement transient combustible controls. Transient combustible material stored adjacent to the B rod control motor generator (MG) set and in front of a manual hose station was not in an established housekeeping area, and was not evaluated for acceptability by the site fire protection engineer (FPE) as required by the FPP specified procedure, Nuclear System Directive NSD-313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The failure to control transient combustibles in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern in that an electrical fault in the adjacent MG set panel could ignite the combustibles which could lead to additional damage to rod control wiring and a potential plant transient. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the combustibles did not meet the criteria requiring a phase 2 or 3 analysis as described in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 2. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the Resources component of the area of Human Performance because the personnel involved were not adequately trained in the procedural requirements of NSD-313 (H.2(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 1 of 2
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 29, 2014 Page 2 of 2
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 3Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Control Transient Combustible Materials in Accordance with the Fire Protection Program An NRC-identified NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) required by 10 CFR 50.48 and License Condition 2.C.5, was identified for failing to adequately implement transient combustible controls. Transient combustible material stored adjacent to the B rod control motor generator (MG) set and in front of a manual hose station was not in an established housekeeping area, and was not evaluated for acceptability by the site fire protection engineer (FPE) as required by the FPP specified procedure, Nuclear System Directive NSD-313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material.
The failure to control transient combustibles in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern in that an electrical fault in the adjacent MG set panel could ignite the combustibles which could lead to additional damage to rod control wiring and a potential plant transient. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as the combustibles did not meet the criteria requiring a phase 2 or 3 analysis as described in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 2. This finding had a cross cutting aspect in the Resources component of the area of Human Performance because the personnel involved were not adequately trained in the procedural requirements of NSD-313 (H.2(b)).
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Impairment Requirements for a Degraded Committed Fire Barrier Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified a degraded committed fire barrier that was not evaluated as a fire impairment.
The inspectors determined the failure to perform the required fire impairment actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the degraded fire barrier would fulfill its designed 3-hour fire rating. The inspectors determined the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a fully functioning automatic suppression system on either side of the barrier was in place. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of identification Page 1 of 2
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 (P.1), as described in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to enter the damaged fire barrier into their corrective action program which prevented the appropriate fire protection program reviews and compensatory actions.
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 26, 2014 Page 2 of 2
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Impairment Requirements for a Degraded Committed Fire Barrier Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified a degraded committed fire barrier that was not evaluated as a fire impairment.
The inspectors determined the failure to perform the required fire impairment actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the degraded fire barrier would fulfill its designed 3-hour fire rating. The inspectors determined the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a fully functioning automatic suppression system on either side of the barrier was in place. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of identification (P.1), as described in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to enter the damaged fire barrier into their corrective action program which prevented the appropriate fire protection program reviews and compensatory actions.
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Page 1 of 2
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 26, 2015 Page 2 of 2
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 1Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Impairment Requirements for a Degraded Committed Fire Barrier Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified a degraded committed fire barrier that was not evaluated as a fire impairment.
The inspectors determined the failure to perform the required fire impairment actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the degraded fire barrier would fulfill its designed 3-hour fire rating. The inspectors determined the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a fully functioning automatic suppression system on either side of the barrier was in place. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of identification (P.1), as described in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to enter the damaged fire barrier into their corrective action program which prevented the appropriate fire protection program reviews and compensatory actions.
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Page 1 of 2
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 16, 2015 Page 2 of 2
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 2Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Analyze the Spurious Operation of Control Room Area Ventilation Valves and the Adverse Impact on Control Room Habitability Green: The NRC identified an NCV of the Unit 1 and 2 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS)
Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to analyze the spurious operation of two motor operated valves (MOVs) in the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) and the adverse impact on control room habitability. The licensee entered the issue in its correction action program as action request (AR) 01930126 and a continuous fire watch was already in place due to deficiencies identified during the sites ongoing NFPA 805 licensing activities.
The failure to analyze the spurious operation of two MOVs in the CRAVS and the adverse impact on control room habitability was a performance deficiency (PD). The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (i.e. Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event based on smoke migration into the control room that could challenge control room habitability and lead to an evacuation of the control room. This PD was the result of degraded defense-in-depth features that limit the effects of a fire to one fire area. The finding was screened as Green because the reactors would be able to reach and maintain safe shutdown utilizing the standby shutdown facility. No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Fire Protection Program Change did not meet CNS License Condition Requirement 2.C.5 for Units 1 and 2.
Green: The NRC identified a non-cited Severity Level IV violation of the Unit 1 and 2 CNS Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the licensee made a change to the approved FPP which involved the de-rating of a credited three hour Page 1 of 3
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) to only a pressure and smoke barrier. The licensee entered the issue in its corrective action program as AR 01932211 and it was added to existing fire watches for the area.
The failure to comply with the CNS Operating License Condition 2.C.5 for a change to the approved FPP involving the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e. Fire.) The performance deficiency negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that the change to the FPP had the potential to adversely affect the availability of the control room to achieve and maintain stable plant conditions due to the increased likelihood of control room abandonment in the event of a fire in the cable spreading rooms. The licensees failure to submit the FPP change to the NRC was determined to impede the regulatory process because the FPP change required NRC review and approval prior to implementation.
The finding was screened as Green because based upon inspection of the affected barriers, the inspectors determined that the barriers would provide a 1-hour or greater fire endurance rating. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the associated finding was evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (i.e.,
Green finding). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Impairment Requirements for a Degraded Committed Fire Barrier Green: An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The inspectors identified a degraded committed fire barrier that was not evaluated as a fire impairment.
The inspectors determined the failure to perform the required fire impairment actions was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of Protection against External Factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the degraded fire barrier would fulfill its designed 3-hour fire rating. The inspectors determined the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a fully functioning automatic suppression system on either side of the barrier was in place. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of identification (P.1), as described in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to enter the damaged fire barrier into their corrective action program which prevented the appropriate fire protection program reviews and compensatory actions.
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Page 2 of 3
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 07, 2015 Page 3 of 3
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 3Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Analyze the Spurious Operation of Control Room Area Ventilation Valves and the Adverse Impact on Control Room Habitability Green: The NRC identified an NCV of the Unit 1 and 2 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS)
Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to analyze the spurious operation of two motor operated valves (MOVs) in the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) and the adverse impact on control room habitability. The licensee entered the issue in its correction action program as action request (AR) 01930126 and a continuous fire watch was already in place due to deficiencies identified during the sites ongoing NFPA 805 licensing activities.
The failure to analyze the spurious operation of two MOVs in the CRAVS and the adverse impact on control room habitability was a performance deficiency (PD). The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (i.e. Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event based on smoke migration into the control room that could challenge control room habitability and lead to an evacuation of the control room. This PD was the result of degraded defense-in-depth features that limit the effects of a fire to one fire area. The finding was screened as Green because the reactors would be able to reach and maintain safe shutdown utilizing the standby shutdown facility. No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Promptly Replace a Frequently Operated Sliding Link
- Green: An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions to replace a frequently operated sliding link associated with the 2A train auxiliary feedwater (CA) control circuitry. As a result, the sliding link failed prior to replacement which affected the function to automatically swap from the normal source to the Page 1 of 3
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 assured source (nuclear service water) on low suction pressure to the 2A motor driven CA pump. The licensee replaced the failed sliding link and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions for a previously identified vulnerability with frequently operated sliding link E-12 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed sliding link resulted in the inoperability of the 2A train of CA. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the multiple sources of water available to the CA pump before the assured source was needed, and the short duration that the steam generator injection lines valves were closed. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution (P.3), as described in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to replace sliding link E-12 in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Fire Protection Program Change did not meet CNS License Condition Requirement 2.C.5 for Units 1 and 2.
Green: The NRC identified a non-cited Severity Level IV violation of the Unit 1 and 2 CNS Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the licensee made a change to the approved FPP which involved the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) to only a pressure and smoke barrier. The licensee entered the issue in its corrective action program as AR 01932211 and it was added to existing fire watches for the area.
The failure to comply with the CNS Operating License Condition 2.C.5 for a change to the approved FPP involving the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e. Fire.) The performance deficiency negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that the change to the FPP had the potential to adversely affect the availability of the control room to achieve and maintain stable plant conditions due to the increased likelihood of control room abandonment in the event of a fire in the cable spreading rooms. The licensees failure to submit the FPP change to the NRC was determined to impede the regulatory process because the FPP change required NRC review and approval prior to implementation.
The finding was screened as Green because based upon inspection of the affected barriers, the inspectors determined that the barriers would provide a 1-hour or greater fire endurance rating. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the associated finding was evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (i.e.,
Green finding). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Page 2 of 3
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 15, 2015 Page 3 of 3
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Analyze the Spurious Operation of Control Room Area Ventilation Valves and the Adverse Impact on Control Room Habitability Green: The NRC identified an NCV of the Unit 1 and 2 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS)
Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to analyze the spurious operation of two motor operated valves (MOVs) in the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) and the adverse impact on control room habitability. The licensee entered the issue in its correction action program as action request (AR) 01930126 and a continuous fire watch was already in place due to deficiencies identified during the sites ongoing NFPA 805 licensing activities.
The failure to analyze the spurious operation of two MOVs in the CRAVS and the adverse impact on control room habitability was a performance deficiency (PD). The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (i.e. Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event based on smoke migration into the control room that could challenge control room habitability and lead to an evacuation of the control room. This PD was the result of degraded defense-in-depth features that limit the effects of a fire to one fire area. The finding was screened as Green because the reactors would be able to reach and maintain safe shutdown utilizing the standby shutdown facility. No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Promptly Replace a Frequently Operated Sliding Link
- Green: An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions to replace a frequently operated sliding link associated with the 2A train auxiliary feedwater (CA) control circuitry. As a result, the sliding link failed prior to replacement which affected the function to automatically swap from the normal source to the Page 1 of 3
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 assured source (nuclear service water) on low suction pressure to the 2A motor driven CA pump. The licensee replaced the failed sliding link and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions for a previously identified vulnerability with frequently operated sliding link E-12 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed sliding link resulted in the inoperability of the 2A train of CA. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the multiple sources of water available to the CA pump before the assured source was needed, and the short duration that the steam generator injection lines valves were closed. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution (P.3), as described in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to replace sliding link E-12 in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Fire Protection Program Change did not meet CNS License Condition Requirement 2.C.5 for Units 1 and 2.
Green: The NRC identified a non-cited Severity Level IV violation of the Unit 1 and 2 CNS Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the licensee made a change to the approved FPP which involved the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) to only a pressure and smoke barrier. The licensee entered the issue in its corrective action program as AR 01932211 and it was added to existing fire watches for the area.
The failure to comply with the CNS Operating License Condition 2.C.5 for a change to the approved FPP involving the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e. Fire.) The performance deficiency negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that the change to the FPP had the potential to adversely affect the availability of the control room to achieve and maintain stable plant conditions due to the increased likelihood of control room abandonment in the event of a fire in the cable spreading rooms. The licensees failure to submit the FPP change to the NRC was determined to impede the regulatory process because the FPP change required NRC review and approval prior to implementation.
The finding was screened as Green because based upon inspection of the affected barriers, the inspectors determined that the barriers would provide a 1-hour or greater fire endurance rating. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the associated finding was evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (i.e.,
Green finding). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Page 2 of 3
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2016 Page 3 of 3
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 1Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Analyze the Spurious Operation of Control Room Area Ventilation Valves and the Adverse Impact on Control Room Habitability Green: The NRC identified an NCV of the Unit 1 and 2 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS)
Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to analyze the spurious operation of two motor operated valves (MOVs) in the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) and the adverse impact on control room habitability. The licensee entered the issue in its correction action program as action request (AR) 01930126 and a continuous fire watch was already in place due to deficiencies identified during the sites ongoing NFPA 805 licensing activities.
The failure to analyze the spurious operation of two MOVs in the CRAVS and the adverse impact on control room habitability was a performance deficiency (PD). The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (i.e. Fire) attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event based on smoke migration into the control room that could challenge control room habitability and lead to an evacuation of the control room. This PD was the result of degraded defense-in-depth features that limit the effects of a fire to one fire area. The finding was screened as Green because the reactors would be able to reach and maintain safe shutdown utilizing the standby shutdown facility. No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Promptly Replace a Frequently Operated Sliding Link
- Green: An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions to replace a frequently operated sliding link associated with the 2A train auxiliary feedwater (CA) control circuitry. As a result, the sliding link failed prior to replacement which affected the function to automatically swap from the normal source to the Page 1 of 3
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 assured source (nuclear service water) on low suction pressure to the 2A motor driven CA pump. The licensee replaced the failed sliding link and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions for a previously identified vulnerability with frequently operated sliding link E-12 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed sliding link resulted in the inoperability of the 2A train of CA. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the multiple sources of water available to the CA pump before the assured source was needed, and the short duration that the steam generator injection lines valves were closed. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution (P.3), as described in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to replace sliding link E-12 in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 19, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Fire Protection Program Change did not meet CNS License Condition Requirement 2.C.5 for Units 1 and 2.
Green: The NRC identified a non-cited Severity Level IV violation of the Unit 1 and 2 CNS Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.5, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the licensee made a change to the approved FPP which involved the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) to only a pressure and smoke barrier. The licensee entered the issue in its corrective action program as AR 01932211 and it was added to existing fire watches for the area.
The failure to comply with the CNS Operating License Condition 2.C.5 for a change to the approved FPP involving the de-rating of a credited three hour fire barrier between the control room and the cable spreading room(s) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e. Fire.) The performance deficiency negatively affected the cornerstone objective in that the change to the FPP had the potential to adversely affect the availability of the control room to achieve and maintain stable plant conditions due to the increased likelihood of control room abandonment in the event of a fire in the cable spreading rooms. The licensees failure to submit the FPP change to the NRC was determined to impede the regulatory process because the FPP change required NRC review and approval prior to implementation.
The finding was screened as Green because based upon inspection of the affected barriers, the inspectors determined that the barriers would provide a 1-hour or greater fire endurance rating. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the associated finding was evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (i.e.,
Green finding). No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015012 (pdf)
Page 2 of 3
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : July 11, 2016 Page 3 of 3
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Promptly Replace a Frequently Operated Sliding Link
- Green: An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions to replace a frequently operated sliding link associated with the 2A train auxiliary feedwater (CA) control circuitry. As a result, the sliding link failed prior to replacement which affected the function to automatically swap from the normal source to the assured source (nuclear service water) on low suction pressure to the 2A motor driven CA pump. The licensee replaced the failed sliding link and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions for a previously identified vulnerability with frequently operated sliding link E-12 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed sliding link resulted in the inoperability of the 2A train of CA. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the multiple sources of water available to the CA pump before the assured source was needed, and the short duration that the steam generator injection lines valves were closed. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution (P.3), as described in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to replace sliding link E-12 in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 1 of 2
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 29, 2016 Page 2 of 2
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 3Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 08, 2016 Page 1 of 1
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 Catawba 2 4Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related Page 1 of 2
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Catawba 2 information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 01, 2017 Page 2 of 2
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries > Catawba 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to follow lockout relay testing procedure.
Green: A self-revealing Green non cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for the licensee's failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086, "2ETA 4160V Switchgear Lockout Relays,"
during relay testing, resulting in inadvertently tripping the "A" control room area chilled water system (CRACWS) compressor. Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in tripping the "A" CRACWS compressor and entering TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS)." As corrective actions, the licensee started the "B" CRACWS chiller, completed the testing on the "A" CRACWS chiller and returned it to operable. The licensee entered this issue as condition report (CR) 2062216.
The inspectors determined the failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure adherence attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the "A" train of CRACWS. Using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of safety system function for a single train for greater than TS allowed outage time, did not result in a loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance because the licensee Page 1 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings failed to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 during lockout relay testing. (H.8) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2016004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Feb 03, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements into Operating Procedures for NW System Green: The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate the limiting high pressure design requirement of the containment valve injection water (NW) system surge chamber into station procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the NW surge chamber high pressure design limit of 85 psig from calculation CNC-1223.19-00-0004, "NW system setpoint calculation," Rev. 7, into procedure OP/1/A/6200/019, "Containment Valve Injection Water System," Rev. 36, to ensure the NW system could perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request 02096392, reviewed the issue for current and past operability, and issued an operations guide to limit the NW surge chamber pressures to 80 psig.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to translate the 85 psig NW surge chamber pressure limit into procedures resulted in exceeding the NW surge chamber high pressure limit, which could result in an inability of the safety related nuclear service water system to provide makeup water to the NW surge chamber and result in entrainment of nitrogen gas in the surge chamber outlet. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution Area because the finding was indicative of present licensee performance, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue identified in ARs 01912139 and 01912453 after the revision to the calculation was completed to ensure that the correct high pressure NW surge chamber design requirement would have been translated into procedures [P.2].
(Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Page 2 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : August 03, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 10, 2016 Page 3 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 1 of 3 Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Catawba 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to follow lockout relay testing procedure.
Green: A self-revealing Green non cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for the licensee's failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086, "2ETA 4160V Switchgear Lockout Relays,"
during relay testing, resulting in inadvertently tripping the "A" control room area chilled water system (CRACWS) compressor. Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in tripping the "A" CRACWS compressor and entering TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS)." As corrective actions, the licensee started the "B" CRACWS chiller, completed the testing on the "A" CRACWS chiller and returned it to operable. The licensee entered this issue as condition report (CR) 2062216.
The inspectors determined the failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure adherence attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the "A" train of CRACWS. Using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of safety system function for a single train for greater than TS allowed outage time, did not result in a loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance because the licensee https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 10/19/2017
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 2 of 3 failed to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 during lockout relay testing. (H.8) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2016004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Feb 03, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements into Operating Procedures for NW System Green: The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate the limiting high pressure design requirement of the containment valve injection water (NW) system surge chamber into station procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the NW surge chamber high pressure design limit of 85 psig from calculation CNC-1223.19-00-0004, "NW system setpoint calculation," Rev. 7, into procedure OP/1/A/6200/019, "Containment Valve Injection Water System," Rev. 36, to ensure the NW system could perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request 02096392, reviewed the issue for current and past operability, and issued an operations guide to limit the NW surge chamber pressures to 80 psig.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to translate the 85 psig NW surge chamber pressure limit into procedures resulted in exceeding the NW surge chamber high pressure limit, which could result in an inability of the safety related nuclear service water system to provide makeup water to the NW surge chamber and result in entrainment of nitrogen gas in the surge chamber outlet. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution Area because the finding was indicative of present licensee performance, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue identified in ARs 01912139 and 01912453 after the revision to the calculation was completed to ensure that the correct high pressure NW surge chamber design requirement would have been translated into procedures [P.2].
(Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 10/19/2017
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 3 of 3 Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : September 05, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 10/19/2017
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Catawba 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 3Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: TBD Jul 12, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to adequately establish and adjust preventive maintenance for emergency diesel generator excitation system diodes.
The inspectors identified an AV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, "Procedures," for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust the preventive maintenance strategy for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) excitation system in accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1202, "Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration." The inspectors also identified an associated AV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with elevated operating temperatures of EDG excitation system diodes. This resulted in the failure of an EDG excitation system diode and overcurrent trip of the 2A emergency diesel output breaker during a surveillance test performed on April 11, 2017.
The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2116069. The 2A EDG was returned to service on April 14, 2017 following replacement of the excitation system diodes.
The failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1202, thus allowing a condition adverse to quality to remain uncorrected, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems and components that respond to initiating events to preclude undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, failure to adjust the preventive maintenance activities for the EDG excitation system by incorporating operating experience, corrective maintenance history, and structures, systems, and components (SSC) performance history led to the failure of diode CR4 in the EDG excitation system and caused the 2A EDG output breaker to trip open on April 11, 2017. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the issue affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Page 1 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power,"
dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the issue required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represents an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2017011 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2017012 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to follow lockout relay testing procedure.
Green: A self-revealing Green non cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for the licensee's failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086, "2ETA 4160V Switchgear Lockout Relays,"
during relay testing, resulting in inadvertently tripping the "A" control room area chilled water system (CRACWS) compressor. Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in tripping the "A" CRACWS compressor and entering TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS)." As corrective actions, the licensee started the "B" CRACWS chiller, completed the testing on the "A" CRACWS chiller and returned it to operable. The licensee entered this issue as condition report (CR) 2062216.
The inspectors determined the failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure adherence attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the "A" train of CRACWS. Using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of safety system function for a single train for greater than TS allowed outage time, did not result in a loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance because the licensee failed to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 during lockout relay testing. (H.8) (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2016004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Feb 03, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements into Operating Procedures for NW System Green: The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate the limiting high pressure design requirement of the containment valve injection water (NW) system surge chamber into station procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the NW surge chamber high pressure design limit of 85 psig from calculation CNC-1223.19-00-0004, "NW system setpoint calculation," Rev. 7, into procedure OP/1/A/6200/019, "Containment Valve Injection Water System," Rev. 36, to ensure the Page 2 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings NW system could perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request 02096392, reviewed the issue for current and past operability, and issued an operations guide to limit the NW surge chamber pressures to 80 psig.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to translate the 85 psig NW surge chamber pressure limit into procedures resulted in exceeding the NW surge chamber high pressure limit, which could result in an inability of the safety related nuclear service water system to provide makeup water to the NW surge chamber and result in entrainment of nitrogen gas in the surge chamber outlet. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution Area because the finding was indicative of present licensee performance, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue identified in ARs 01912139 and 01912453 after the revision to the calculation was completed to ensure that the correct high pressure NW surge chamber design requirement would have been translated into procedures [P.2].
(Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : November 29, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 Page 3 of 3
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 1 of 3 Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Catawba 2 >
Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 4Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 12, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: TE Traditional Enforcement w/o associated F Failure to adequately establish and adjust preventive maintenance for emergency diesel generator excitation system diodes.
The inspectors identified an AV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, "Procedures," for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust the preventive maintenance strategy for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) excitation system in accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1202, "Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration." The inspectors also identified an associated AV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with elevated operating temperatures of EDG excitation system diodes. This resulted in the failure of an EDG excitation system diode and overcurrent trip of the 2A emergency diesel output breaker during a surveillance test performed on April 11, 2017.
The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2116069. The 2A EDG was returned to service on April 14, 2017 following replacement of the excitation system diodes.
The failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1202, thus allowing a condition adverse to quality to remain uncorrected, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems and components that respond to initiating events to preclude undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, failure to adjust the preventive maintenance activities for the EDG excitation system by incorporating operating https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 04/19/2018
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 2 of 3 experience, corrective maintenance history, and structures, systems, and components (SSC) performance history led to the failure of diode CR4 in the EDG excitation system and caused the 2A EDG output breaker to trip open on April 11, 2017. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the issue affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power,"
dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the issue required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represents an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2017013 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2017012 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2017011 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Feb 03, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Translate Design Requirements into Operating Procedures for NW System Green: The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to translate the limiting high pressure design requirement of the containment valve injection water (NW) system surge chamber into station procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the NW surge chamber high pressure design limit of 85 psig from calculation CNC-1223.19-00-0004, "NW system setpoint calculation," Rev. 7, into procedure OP/1/A/6200/019, "Containment Valve Injection Water System," Rev. 36, to ensure the NW system could perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request 02096392, reviewed the issue for current and past operability, and issued an operations guide to limit the NW surge chamber pressures to 80 psig.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to translate the 85 psig NW surge chamber pressure limit into procedures resulted in exceeding the NW surge chamber high pressure limit, which could result in an inability of the safety related nuclear service water system to provide makeup water to the NW surge chamber and result in entrainment of nitrogen gas in the surge chamber outlet. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution Area because the finding was indicative of present licensee performance, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue identified in ARs 01912139 and 01912453 after the revision to the calculation was completed to ensure that the correct high pressure NW surge chamber design requirement would have been translated into procedures [P.2].
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 04/19/2018
NRC: Catawba 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 3 of 3 (Section 1R17)
Inspection Report# : 2017007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : February 01, 2018 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/cat2/cat2-pim.html 04/19/2018