ML20206E303

Summary of 881110 Meeting W/Util in Rockville,Md Re Design Criteria & Safety Aspects of Alternate DHR Sys.Attendance List & Viewgraphs Encl

ML20206E303
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/15/1988
From:	Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8811180041
Download: ML20206E303 (41)

Text

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November 15, 1988 DISTRIBUTION 5ee attached sheet Docket No. 50-416 LICENSEE: System Energy Resources, Inc.

FACILITY: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1

SUMMARY

OF NOVEMBER 10, 1988 MEETING REGARDING THE ALTERNATEDECAYHEATREMOVALSYSTEM(ADHRS)

The NRC staff met with the licensee at the NRC Rockvil10 Offices to discuss design criteria and safety aspects of the ADHR$ to be installed during the refueling outage. Enclosure 1 is a list of attendtes. Enclosure 2 is a handout prepared by the licensee.

The licensee presented an overview of the safety critt.ria and analysis for the ADHRS and answered questions received in preparation for the meeting (see Enclosure 2). Additional information needs raised by the staff reviewers during the meeting included:

The criteria for seismic design of non-Seismic I components when their failure during an earthquake could damage equipment important to safety.

• Justification for the use of portions of ASME Code editions and addenda different from those used in the licensing basis and approved by the staff during the operating Itcense review.

Components to be included in the IST prograr.

The design of motor-operated isolation valves which are used to isolate the system during Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3 and to operate the ADHns during Operational Conditions 4 and 5.

Hew automatic isolation of certain valves will be accomplished to prevent draining of the reactor if loss of offsite pcser is not considered for these events.

' how administrative restrictions required for acceptable ADHRS operation (Pages P-85 through P-87) will be impler.ented and the training to be given to operations personnel for safe ADHRS operation.

With regard to the proposed response to structural questions (pages 32 through 36), the staff indicated the actual floor response spectra at the supports of the ADHRS were requested - not just a staterent of how they were calculated.

Also, if the UFSAR sectiona referenced to describe loading cor.binations and u

8811100041 ss1115 gDR ADockosocg6 5{

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methods are different than those used in the licensing basis for the facility, the differences should be identified and discussed. Since the assigned NRC reviewer was not present in the meeting, a telephone call will be arranged the l week of November 14, 1988 to discuss the intent of the requests. [

The NRC staff said that requests for additional information as discussed in  !

the meeting would be issued prior to November 30, 1988. 7

\6\ l Lester L. Kintnar, Senior Project Manager  !

Project Directorate 11 1 f Division of Reactor Projects I/II l l

Enclosures:

i As stated l l'

cc w/ enclosures:

See next page t

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l (GRAND GULF MTG SUtTARY 11/14) t \ /  ;

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NAME :LK itner:ch :fddensam  :  :  :  :  : ('

.....:............:......f..... ............:............:............:............:...........

DATE :  : 11/p /88  :  :  :  :  :

11/[/83

, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I

f DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING

SUMMARY

DATED: November 15, 1988 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear !:tation, Unit 1

' Docket File .

NRC PDR Local PDR PDII-1 Reading E. Adensam P. Anderson L. Kintner OGC E. Jordan (HNBB3302)

B. Grimes (9A2)

D. Verrelli,)Rll S. Sun (8E23 O. Chopra 8020)

D. Notley BH7)

F. Litton 9H15)

R. Giardina (11F23)

Y. Li (9H3)(8022)

R. Rothman C. Tan (8D22) 8.Marcus(7E12)

R. Suel (8D1)

J. Lee (801)

ACRS(10)

R.Dorchardt(17019) cc: Licensee / Applicant Service List

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Mr. W. T. Cottle  :

System Energy Resources, Inc. GrandGulfNuclearStation(GGNS) cc:

Mr. T. H. Cloninger Hr. C. R. Hutchtnson Vice President. Nuclear Engineering GGNS General Manager t and Support System Energy Resources, Inc. '

System Energy Resources, Inc. Post Office Box 756 P. O. Box 23054 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 '

Jackson, Mississippi 39205 ,

Robert B. McGehee Esquire The Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.

Wise, Carter, Child, Steen ar.d Attorney General l Caraway Department of Justice -

P. O. Box 651 State of Louisiana '

Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Office of the Governor ,

Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell State of Mississippi  !

and Reynolds Jackson, Mississippi 39201 1400 L Street, N.W.  ;

Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Attorney General i Gartin Building  :

Mr. Ralph T. Lally Jackson, Mississippi 39205 {

Manager of Quality Assurance  ;

Middle South Utilities System Hr. Jack McMillan, Directov l Services, Inc. Division of Solid Waste Management  :

639 Loyola Avenue, 3rd Floor Mississippi Department of Natural  :

New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Resources  !

Post Office Box 10385  !

Mr. John G. Cesare Jackson, Mississippi 39209 i Director, Nuclear Licensin>; i System Energy Resources, Inc. Alton B. Cobb, M.D. [

P. O. Box 23054 State Health Officer '

Jackson, Mississippt 39205 State Board of Health  !

P.O. Box 1700 i Mr. C. B. Hogg, Project M/, nager Jackson, Mississippi 39205 l Bechtel Power Corporatio', ,

P. O. Box 2166 President  !

Houston, lexas 772F2-2166 Claiborne County Board of Supervisors !

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 l Mr. H. O. Cl<rist<nsen i Senior Resident inspector Regional Administratur, Region !!  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission  ;

Route 2. Box 399 101 Marietta Street i

! Port Gibson, Mississippt 39150 Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323  ;

l l

ENCLOSllRE I NOVE!!BER 10. 1988 NRC SERI Bechtel D. Verre111 J. Wright G. Duncan L. Xintner N. Crawford S. Sun F. Titus

0. Chopra D. Jones D. Notley R. Dubey F. Litton W. Hughey R. Giardina Y. C. Li R. Rothman C. Tan B. Hercus R. Goel J. Lee l

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ENCLOSURE 2 j g

SERI/NRC MEETING ON ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM NOVEMEER 10, 1988 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND J12 MISC 88110702 - 1

-- - - - - - - -- a

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AGENDA

1. INTRODUCTION 8:30 - 8:45 M. L. CRAWFORD

11. SYSTEM DESIGN /0PERATION 8:45 - 9:00 F. W. TITUS OVERVIEW A) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION B) MODES OF OPERATION III. DESIGN REVIEW / SYSTEM 9:00 - 9:45 F. W. TITus INTERACTION EVALVATION A) FUNCTIONAL INTERACTION EVALUATION B) PHYSICAL INTERACTIONS EVALUATION BREAK IV. RESPONSE TO PREVIOUS 10:00 - 10:30 F. W. TITUS STAFF QUESTIONS V. OPEN DISCUSSION 10:30 - 12:00 l

J12 MISC 88110702 - 2 J

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INTRODUCTION

! O TECHillCAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.9 BASIS:

REFUEllflG RF.SIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL METh0DS i o PREVIOUS ALTERNATIVE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL METHODS:

1 REACTOP PATER CLEANUP l -

FUEL POOL COOLING AflD CLEANUP 1

1 -

CRD SYSTEM 1

o PROBLEM AREAS LIf11TED CAPACITY l

OPERATitlG FLEXIBillTY 1

l 0 SOLUTION: Ntw PLANT SYSTEM 1

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1 l 'A J10 MISC 88110901 - 1

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II. SYSTEM DESIGN /0PERATION OVERVIEY l

a J14 MISC 88110901 '

4 ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REPOVAL SYSTEM i 0 DESIGit OBJECTIVES ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY AVAILABLE SY THE END OF OUTAGE DAY l AS If1DEPEfiDEllT AS POSSIBLE FROM OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS .

t 0 DESIGN RE0VIREMEf4TS MAlf4TAlfl!NG TEftPERATURE LIMITS It1 TECHNICAL SPECI F IC AT ION TAF','. 1.2

[

1. 200F DURhiG MODE 4

2. 140F DURif1G MODE 5 OPERAT10flAL !!! MODES 4 Af1D 5 ONLY NO SAFETY FUNCTIOft RELATED To:

1. SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY

2. ACCIDEtiT M!TIGAT!0N NO ADVERSE IllTERACT10N WITH ExlST!?iG PLAtlT I"^' EMS

- PRESSURE BOUNDARY - ASME SECTIOil 111 class 3, SEISMIC CATEGORY l l OPERATED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM  ;

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.. i SYSTEN DESCRIPTION e

O PRIMARY FLOWPATH:

. SUCTION PATHS

1. RHR COMMON SUCTION

2. SPEteT FUEL POOL TWO PUMPS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS DISCHARGE PATH: RHR "C" SYSTEM INTERFACE

0. SECONDARY FLOWPATH:

PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM l RADIATION MONITOR ON EFFLUENT

,' 0 ELECTRICAL POWER:

NON-CLASS IE ,

ExCEPT10fl: SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE f

0 CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: [

FLOW CONTROL V/.;VE f

TEMPERATURE lilDICATION i l

PUMP CONTROLS AND INDICAT!0t!

O HVAC: l AIR HANDLING UftlT [

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0. RPV T0.RPV COOLING NORMAL COOLING LINEUP COMMON SUCTION TO LPCI "C" FLOWPATH 0 SPENT FUEL POOL TO RPV COOLING US2D WHEN "COMMON-SUCTION" LINE UNAVAILABLc 1

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J1f4 MISC 88110901 - 6 / 2-

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, DESIGN REVIEWS AND 3YSTEM INTERACTION EVALUATION i I

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0: GENERAL CRITERIA AVolD ADVERSE EFFECTS Ott:

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1. Ex1 STING SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND RELATED PLANT SAFETY FUNCT10tlS

2. PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF ADHRS ,

3. EXISTING OR ADDED EQUIPMENT REGARDLESS OF

' SAFETY FUNCTION AVOID UtlACCEPTABLE OFFSITE EFFECTS O CONDUCTED !!! TWO PARTS FUNCT10tl INTERACT 10tlS PHYSICAL litTERACT10tlS ,

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E f FUNCTIONAL INTERACTION EVALUATION O MAINTAltillG TPE OPERABILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND q FUNCTIONS IDEllTIFY SAFETY-REl.ATED SYSTEMS WITH FUNCTI0llAl - I RELATIONSHIP WITH ADHRS REVIEW OPERABILITY FROM A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE t

0 OPERATING MODES AND COMBillATIONS OF OPERATING MODES IDEllTIFY THE MODES OF litTERC0flNECTING SYSTEMS WHICH MAY BE USED, FROM A FUNCTI0llAL STANDPolflT, WITH ADHRS IMPLEMENTED

^

0 POTENTIAL FOR IflADVERTEllT DRAlflAGE ,

O C0tlTROLS AtlD OPER/.TIONAL INTERACT!0tlS J14 MISC 88110901 - 8 /4'

POTENTIAL FOR INADVERTENT DRAINAGE O EVALUAT10fl CRITERIA SINGLE ACTIVE COMPONEllT FAILURE SlflGLE OPERATOR ERROR 0 EVALUATI0ff REVIEW DRAlfi PATHS OVER 1 INCH REVIEW OPERATING MODE COMBif1AT10f1S 0 RESULTS FEEDBACK If1TO DESIGN CHANGE CLARIFIED ADMitllSTRATIVE/ PROCEDURAL C0f1TR0ls REQUIREMEf1TS 0 C0flCLUS10ft ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PRESEf4TS fl0 GREATER POTEllTI AL FOR If1ADVERTEllT DRAIN!f1G thall EXISTING SYSTEMS

( J1tinlSC88110901 - 9 /('

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ADHRS INADVERTENT VESSEL DRAIN EVALUATION EXAMPLE (TABLE 1, PAGE 88 0F 9/23/30 SUBMITTAL)

DRAIN PATH CASE NO. DESCRIPTION VIA 8 RPV TO SUPPRESS!cN P001 ADHRS DISCHARGE PATH To RHR C (18"-GBB-50) SUCT10ft:

E12F029C (LOCKED OPEtl)

E12F031C (CLC5ED)

E12F004C TO POOL ACCEPTABILITY /RESOLUT10fl NOT ACCEPTABLE -

ONE EQUIPMENT FAILURE (STUCK OPEN CHECK VALVE E12F031) CREATES DRAlfi PATH RESOLUTION -

PROCEDURALLY REQUIRE E12F004C TO BE CLOSED. OflE Fall.URE Af1D ONE OPERATOR ERROR WOULD Th BE REQUIRED TO CT<EATE DRAIN PATH. A ,0, ADD AN IflTERLOCK BETWEEN SUCTI0f VALVE E12F004C AflD RHR C PUMP. THIS WILL PREVEf!T DAf'AGF.

TO THE RHR C PUMP IF IT IS STARTED WITH E12F004C IN THE CLOSED POSITION, J14 MISC 88110901 - 10 /6

rn; -

e CONTROLS /0PERATIONAL INTERACTION EVALUATION 0 EVALUATION CRITERIA PREVENT ADVERSE litPACT ON SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS-ASSUME SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE SINGLE OPERATOR ERROR 0 EVALUATION IDENTIFY POTENTIAL FUNCTIONAL INTERFACES CONSIDER OPERATING MODE COMBINATIONS CONSIDER DESIGN BASIS EVENTS / ACCIDENTS DEVELOPED CONTROL INTERACTION MATRIX o CONCLUSION ALTERNATE DECAY HFAT REMOVAL SYSTEM INTRODUCES NO ADVERSE CONTROL /0PERATIONAL INTERACTIONS l

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i J14 MISC 88110901 - 11 / J'

P- /o2

i. TABLE 5 CASE 3 EVALUATIONS (ADHRS in Vessel-to-Vessel Cooling with a LOCA) i

1. Case 3.1 Evaluation:

Initial Conditions: ADHAS operating in vessel to vessel cooling via E12F006A/E12F066A with postulated LOCA event E12F004A closed E12F008 and E12F009 open l E12F006A open E12F066A open E12F064A closed E12F064C closed E12F021 closed Sequence of Events: .

1. Vessel drainage commences.

f l

l 2. Vessel level decreases to Level 3, E12F008 and E12F009 automatically close, i

l 3. ADHRS pumps trip on low suction pressure. ,

4. Vessel level decreases to Level 1, RHR 'A' and LPCS pump receive auto f initiation signal f or vessel injection. -

l Fermissive for RHR 'A' pump prevents pump start as valve E12F004A is closed, and pump trip bypass switch for valve E12F066A is armed.

5. Operator closes valve E12F006A (to clear interlock with valve E12F004A).

l Valve E12F066A closed to isolate ASME III/ Class 3 portion of ADHRS.

ADHRS secured.

1 Valve E121004A opened. RHR 'A' pump is started remote sanually.

Evaluation:

Initiation of Safety Functior.s o No inhibitions of initiating isolation er pump activation functions are identified.

o RHR A LPCI flow path can be established:

E12F004A can be opened remote manually.

E12F048A opens automatically on LPCI signal.

T5 - 1

= ._ -. . - . . --

P-lov i E12F027A opens automatically on LPCI signal. I E12F064A opens automatically on RHR A pump start.

E12F042A opens automatically on LPCI signal.

(J: Other parts are isolated (e.g., containment spray (E12F028A), return to upper pool (E12F037A), condensate discharge to pool (E12F011A),

etc.). None of the above have any functional relationship to any ADHRS control function or valves involved in the ADHRS unique system lineup (e.g., E12F066A).

o No LPCI flow bypasses are indicated. ADHRS interface with RER A is on the suction side. Taking suction from the vessel via the ADERS/RHR C .

flow path via valve E127066A is precluded by 3 check valves (E12F041C, E12F416, and E12F412A or B) ir series. ,

o No fneerference with RHR A support functions is indicated - there are no interactions with pump cooling or room ventilation systems (including SSW supply) or electrical power sources.

t Operability of ECCS while in Standby:

f o K2ep fill function maintained as discussed in Section II.D.2.g.3.

o Non-LPCI mode lineup (requiring remote manu*,1 realignment of valves E12F004A, E12F006A and E12F066A) acceptable per GGNS Technical Specifications 3/4.5.2.

i o Alignment of RRR A loop for ADHRS operation does not interfere with y minimum flow function of RHR A. l Minimum flows No interference with E12F064A function indicated on RHR 'A'  !

pump startup.

Inadvertent Drainage:

I o See Table 1 for initial lineup.

E o Potential for drainage during incorrect system realignment discussed l below under single failure / operator error.

ADHRS pressure integrity: No interface between high pressure source (i.e.,

RHR 'A' discharge pressura) and ADHRS exists.

Single Failure / Operator Errors o Failure of E12F066A to close (or be closed by the operator) - This I defeats the establishment of an ASME III/ Class 2 pressure boundary for .

ECCS but otherwise has no functional effect as the piping beyond E12F066A is safety-related, seismic Category I, and designed for the process conditions that would occur in the LPCI mode (the potential i for backflow is discussed above). As the valve and its motor operator are safety-related, its failure forecloses the assumption that another  ;

failure occurs that would defeat the redundant LPCS system.

I T5 - 2 If,i

p-tos o Failure of valve E12F004A or E12F006A to change porition would defeat the LPCI function but would not imply wny additional deleterious consequences due to ADHRS because of its lineup (i.e. , position of E12F066A). Valve E12F066A should be closed in any event to ensure that ADRRS does not continue to operate (although there is no obvious adverse consequences if it did in this case). Further details are provided in Case 3.2 below.

[ o If the E12F066A pump start permissive bypass switch failed or was not i

positioned properly, the RHR 'A' pump could start without a suctfon source if E12F008 and E12F009 were closed automatically on level 3.

However, as this is a safety-related component, its failure or aisposition (procedural error) would mean that a single failure in the redundatit LPCS system need not be considered. In such a case the RHR

'A' pump may continue to run and be damaged, however, this is not a safety concern and, relative to a component failure, is no more probable that other failures in the permissive circuitry, o If the operator intervenes as level is decreasing and shuts E12F008, E12F009 or E12F006A but fails to open E12F004A and the E12F066A permissive bypass f ails, the same lack of pump suction situstion occurs as described above. However, this would involve an operator error and j single failure, which need not be postulated. .

o If the operator intervenes and starts RHR Pump A before level 3 isolation of E12F008 and E12F009 occurs (if operable), and does not realign the suction for LPCI, suction would occur on the vessel. In this case some drainage of the reactor vessel to the suppression pool would occur through the minimum flow bypass line (valve E12F064A) until flow increases and E12F064A closes. This may occur regardless of the use of ADHRS. Continue pumpdown of the vessel would occur if E12F064C fails to close or if the operator fails to open the LPCI injection valve. However, this vould involve a second single failure /operatwr error and need not be postulated.

Significant equipment damage As indicated above, with multiple f ailures the RHR pump could start without a suction path which could result in damage to the pump if it is not stopped expeditio'isly.

Conclusion:

This case is acceptable.

2. Case 3.2 EvrTuation Initial conditions: ADHRS in vessel to vessel cooling via E12F006A/E12F066A with LOCA event E12F004A closed E12F008 and E12F009 open E12F006A open E12F066A open T5 - 3 M

~

PHYSICAL INTERACTIONS EVALUATION ,

0 EFFECTS ON PLANT AMBIENT CONDITIONS (TEMPERATURE, CHEMISTRY, ETC.)  !

t 0 IMPOSED LOADINGS (NORMAL, TRANSIENT, SEISMIC, ETC. LOADS)  ;

O HAZARDS CONDITIONS (LINE BREAKS, FLOODING / SPRAY, MISSILES, ,

FIRE, ETC.) l 0 PROCESS CONDITIONS (EFFECTS ON REACTOR WATER FL0w, i' TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, ETC.)

. O RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS -

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J14 MISC 88110901 - 12 EI E

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IV. RESP 0flSE TO PREVIOUS STAFF QUESTIONS l

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1.

1. QUESTION:

l IS THE ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REf10 VAL SYSTEM DESIGNED AS SEISMIC CATEGORY I?

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l RESPONSE:

l 0 ADDED ADHRS PIPING HANDLING REACTOR COOLANT IS DESIGNATED AS SAFETY-RELATED, ASME SECTION lil, l

CLASS 2 OR CLASS 3, AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1.

O PSW PIPING INSIDE THE RHR C PUMP ROOM AND tlP TO THE

! ISOLATION VALVES AT THE EXISTING SUPPLY AND RETURN HEADERS AND AIR HAtlDLING UNIT IS DESIGNATED AS SAFETY-L RELATED, ASME SECTION lil, CLASS 3, At4D SEISMIC CATEGORY 1.

! 0 OTHER PIPING IS ANSI B31.1 AllD DESIGNED FOR SSE LOADS.

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l J14 MISC 881.50901 - 14 JL3

2. QUESTION:

WHAT OUAllTY GROUP CLASSIFICATION WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE j ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM?

REFPONSF.:

O PIPING AtlD ISOLAT10fl VALVE IllTERFACING WITH LPCI-C f PIPING IS QUALITY GROUP B.

O pipit!G AND C0fiPONENTS HANDLING REACTOR COOLANT UP TO INTERFACE WITH LPCI-C PIPING IS QUALITY GROUP C.

O PSW PIPING INSIDE RHR C PUMP ROOM UP TO AND litCLUDING 1SOLAT10ll VALVES 1S OUALITY GROUP C.

O PSW PIPING OUTSIDE OF RHR C PUMP ROOM AND THE AIR CONDITIONING Ull!T ARE QUAllTY GROUP D.

l J14MISCF8110J01 - 15 L/ J

3. QUESTION: ,

DOES THE ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM DESIGN INCORPORATE UFSAR PIPE BREAK CRITERIA?

RESPONSE:  !

l 0 UFSAR PIPE BREAK CRITERIA WAS APPLIED TO THE ADHRS  !

DESIGN O NO HIGH ENERGY PIPING INSTALLED.

O MODERATE ENERGY LINE CRACKS NOT REQUIRED TO BE  !

POSTULATED IN REACTOR MODES 4 AND 5 (UFSAR l SECTION 3.64.1.1.C.1 AND 3.6.2). i o HOWEVER, CONSEQUENCES OF MODERATE ENERGY CRACKS WERE ,

EVALUATED AND ARE BOUNDED BY EXISTING UFSAR ANALYSIS.

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4. QUESTION:

IS THE YEAR AND ADDENDA 0F THE ASME CODE APPLIED TO THE ADHRS DESIGN THE SAME AS FOR THE PEST OF THE RHR SYSTEM 7

RESPONSE

THE RHR AND ADHRS PIPING SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESIGN SPECIFICATION 9645-M-220.0, DESIGN l

SPECIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR PIPING SYSTEMS, WHICH COMPLIES WITH ASME SECTION 111, 1974 EDITION THROUGH THE 1975

, SUMMER ADDENDA WITH CODE CASES AND PORTIONS OF LATER CODES

! AS IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN SPECIFICATION AND TABLE 3.2-4 l OF THE UFSAR.

1 COMPONENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADHRS PIPING SYSTEM ARC IN i COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR INDIVIDUAL DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS AND ARE lti COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODES LISTED BELOW:

BUTTERFLY VALVES DESIGtt SPECIFICATION M-258.0, ASME SECTION !!!, 1971 EDITION i

THROUGH THE SUMMER 1973 ADDENDA l VALVES > 2 1/2" DESIGN SPECIFICATION M-242.0, 1

ASME SECTIOfl 111., 1971 EDITION THROUGH THE WINTER 1972 ADDENDAl WITH ANSI B16.34, 1977 FOR CLASS RATINGS FLOW CONTROL VALVE DESIGt4 SPECIFICATION 21A9457, ASME SECTION Ill, 1971 EDITION THROUGH THE W!f4TER 1973 ADDENDA PUMP DESIGN SPECIFICATION 21A9460,

, - t7 ASME SECTION 111, 1974 EDITION THROUGH 1HE WINTER 1974 ADDENDA)

' WITH ANSI BIG.5, 1977 FOR FLANGE RATINGS

. HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN SPECIFICATION 21A9520, e ' i' ,' ASME SECTION !!!, 1974 EDITION THROUGH THE WINTER 1974 ADDENDA)

WITH ANSI B16.5 1977 FOR FLANGE RATINGS

, COMPONENT SUPPORTS DESIGN SPECIFICATION M-300.2, ASME SECTION !!!, SUBSECTION NF, 1974 EDITION, NO ADDENDA; WITH PARAGRAPH NF 3392.1 0F THE 1980 EDITION 2g l J14 MISC 88110901 - 17

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5. QUESTION:

WHAT WILL THE CHANGE IN RADIATION ZONE CLASSIFICATION BE FOR THE RHR C AND LPCS ROOM BE?

RESPONSE

0 RHR C PUMP ROOM IS PRESENTLY ZONE D 0 ZONE D DURING FIRST DAY UF SHUTDOWN WITH ADHRS OPERATING (56.6 MR/HR) 0 ZONE C AFTER 7 DAYS OF SHUTDOWN WITH ADHRS OPERATING 0 ZONE B AFTER REACTOR CAVITY / UPPER CONTAINMENT POOL IS FLOODED AND REACTOR COOLANT DILUTED J14 MISC 881]O901 - 18 L7

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6. QUESTION:

WHAT CONTRCLS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PREVENT UNACCEPTABLE RADIATION EXPOSURE TO PERSONNEL DUE TO THE INCREASED RADIATION ACTIVITY IN THE RHR C PUMP ROOM?

RESPONSE

O CONTROL OF SYSTEM OPERATION FROM MAIN CONTROL ROOM 0 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE OF ROOM IS PART OF CURRENT PROGRAM 0 SURVEILLANCE IS PERFORMED PRIOR TO WORK AUTHORIZATION 0 SIMILAR CONTROLS ARE PRESENTLY USED TO CONTROL ACCESS TO RHR A8B PUMP ROOMS J14 MISC 88110901 - 19 2-[

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7. QUESTION:

ON PAGE 74 0F THE If1TERACT10N EVALUATION A SYSTEM OPERATING DOSE RATE OF 30 RAD /HR IS REPORTED. WHY IS THIS DIFFERENT THAN THE VALUE REFEREf4CFD IN UFSAR SECTION 3.11-2.

RESPONSE

0 THE SYSTEM OPERATING DOSE RATE 13 0,03 RAD /HR AS REPORTED IN UFSAR SECTION 3.11-2, l

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8. QUESTION:

EXPLAlti THE LAST SEf1TEllCE Of! PAGE 74 0F THE lilTERACTIOff EVALUATI0f!.

RESPONSE

0 DOSE RATE Irl RHR Af1D LPCS ROOMS DUR!f1G SYSTEti OPERAT10fl CURREilTLY GIVEf1 AS .030 RAD /HR If1 UFSAR TABLE 3.11-2.

O MAXIMUM DOSE RATE DURiflG ADHR OPERAT10fl WOULD BE GREATER THAtl .030 RAD /HR (ABOUT .057 RAD /HR).

O AVERAGE DOSE RATE DURiflG ADHRS OPERAT10f4 WOULD BE LESS THAtl .030 RAD /HR.

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9, QUESTION:

WHAT WILL THE TOTAL MAN-REM BE FOR INSTALLING THE ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM?

RESPONSE

0 80.559 MAN-REM TOTAL ESTIMATED 0 54730 MAN-HOURS ESTIMATED 0 ALARA COMMITTEE PEVIEWING OPTIONS FOR REDUCING EXPOSURE LEVELS l

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10A. QUESTION:

PROVIDE FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA AT THE SUPPORTS OF ADHRS.

RESPONSE

O SUPPORTS AT A PARTICULAR FLOOR ELEVATION ARE DESIGNED i

USING THE RRS FOR THAT FLOOR. SUPPORTS AT ELEVATIONS BETWEEN FLOORS ARE DESIGNED USING AN ENVELOPE OF RRS FOR FLOORS ABOVE AND BELOW THE SUPPORT LOCATIONS.

I O THE SPECTRA IS CONTAINED IN SPECIFICATION 9645-C-196.0 FOR SELECTED MASS POINTS IN THE BUILDING MATH MODEL.

A GROUND TIME HISTORY WAS APPLIED TO THE MODELS AND FLOOR RRS WERE DEVELOPED PER RG'S 1.61 AND 1.122. THE METHODOLOGY IS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR 3.7.2.5.

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108 QUESTION: l l

MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ADHRS SH0n!NG LOCATION AND WEIGHT MASS POINTS, SUPPORT AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS, STIFFNESS AND DAMPING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM, AND GEOMETRICAL .

DIMENSIONS.  ;

RESPONSE: i THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS USED FOR THE ADHRS IS DESCRIBED IN l SECTIONS 3.7.3.8.1.2 0F UFSAR.

THE PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN PERFORMED UTILIZING  !

COMPUTER CODE ME101, WHICH IS A FINITE ELEMENT COMPUTER  ;

PROGRAM WHICH PERFORMS LINEAR ELASTIC ANALYSIS OF P! PING -  ;

SYSTEMS AND IS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR SECTION 3.7.3.8.1.3.2. f e'  !

THE PROCEDURE USED FOR MODELING IS DESCRIBED IN SECTION  ;

3.7.3.3 0F THE UFSAR. r I

LOADING COMBINATIONS USED ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.9.3.1.2 AND IN TABLE 3.9-17 0F THE UFSAR. STRESS LIMITS USED ARE '

f' DESCRIBED IN TABLES 3.9-20 THROUGH 3.9-24 0F THE UFSAR.

DAMP!NG RATIOS USED ARE PER REGULATORY GUIDE 3.61 AS DESCRIBED in SECTION 3.7.3.8.1.4 WHERE MULTIPLE PESPONSE I

SPECTRA (INDEPENDENT SUPPORT MOTION) ANALYSIS WAS '

PERFORf tED. THE DAMPING RATIOS FROM CODE CASE N-411, FROM

! UFSAR TABLE 3.9-28, HAS BEEN USED FOR THE ENVELOPED  !

l RESPONSE SPECTRA ANALYSIS.

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i THE SUPPOR1 ST!FFNESS HAS BEEN UTILf?.ED IN THE STRESS

. ANALYSIS MODELS.  !

i i COMPONENT SUPPORTS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED F ' 'T!0N 3.9.3.4  !

? 0F THE UFSAR. [

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10C, QUESTION:

METHOD OF ANALYSIS TO CALCULATE DYNAMIC RESPONSES TO INPUT MOTION: RESPONSE SPECTRUM METHODS OR TIME HISTORY METHOD.

RESPONSE

RESPONSE SPECTRA METHOD HAS BEEN UTILIZED TO CALCULATE DYNAMIC RESPONSES AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.7.3.8.1.2.4 0F THE UFSAR.

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9 10D. QUESTION:

CALCULATED RESULTS INCLtIDING NATURAL FREQUENCIES OF ADHRS, MAXIMUM ACCELERATION AT MASS POINTS, STRESSES IN COMr0f;ENTS AND CONNECTIONS.

RESPONSE

ALL MODAL FREQUENCIES IN THE RANGE OF 0.25 AND 33 HZ ARE CONSIDERED IN THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED 19 SECTION 3.7.3.4 0F THE UFSAR.

ALL CALCULATED STRESSES ARE WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLE LIMITS AS DESCRIBED IN TABLES 3.9-20 THROUGH 3.9-24 0F THE UFSAR.

ALL CALCULATED VALVE ACCELERATIONS ARE WITHIN THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN SECTION 3.9.3.1.2 0F THE UFSAR OR THE SUBJECT VALVE DYNAMIC OUALIFICATION REPORTS.

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r 10E, OUESTION:  ;

PROVIDE SE!SMIC LOADS IMPOSED ON WALLS, BEAMS, AND OTHER STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING.

RESPONSE

1 0 THE AUXILIARY BUILDING STRUCTURE WAS EVALUATED FOR THE  ;

NEW LOADINGS IMPOSED BY THE ADHRS SYSTEM. NEW HANGER q LOADS FROM EXISTING, MODIFIED, OR NEW PIPE HANGERS r WERE EVALUATED AT EACH HANGER LOCATION. EQUIPMENT SUPPORT LOADS AND CONDUlT/ CABLE TRAY LOADS WERE ALSO [

EVALUATED.

O IN ALL CASES, THE EVALUATION WAS CONDUCTED TO ENSURE i THAT STPESSES IN THE STRUCTURE WERE WITHIN THOSE .

SPECIFIED IN UFSAR SECTION 3.8.6.2 AND 3.8.6.3 WHEN i ANALYZED PER ACI 318-71 AND AISC. 1969 AS STATED IN  ;

UFSAR SECTION 3.8.4.2.

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