ML20151H632

From kanterella
Revision as of 09:50, 25 October 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Discusses AEOD/E309, Potential for Water Hammer Damage During Restart of RHR Pumps at BWR Nuclear Power Plants. Recommendations Provided Do Not Extend Beyond Procedural Development & Operator Awareness
ML20151H632
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1983
From: Heltemes C
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To: Eisenhut D, Speis T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151H635 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-01, REF-GTECI-PI, TASK-A-01, TASK-A-1, TASK-OR AEOD-E309, NUDOCS 8305040730
Download: ML20151H632 (1)


Text

= . _

4 Distribution /

o- .

hRC PDR4 "

AE0D Chron File AE0D Reading File SRubin APR 2 21983 KSeyfrit CJHeltemes tid 10RANDUM FOR: Darrell Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation Thenis Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FR0rl: C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

ENGINEERING EVALUATION REPORT REGARDING THE POTEllTIAL FOR WATER HAffiER DA!! AGE DURING THE RESTART OF RHR PUriPS AT B'lR HUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The substantial quantity of water hanner operating experience involving Boiling Water Reactors prompted the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data ( AEOD) to study certain additional water hanmer scenarios which have not been heretofore postulated or observed. For the nost part the scenarios we considered relate to well established design basis loss of coolant accident nitigation sequences. As such they would be of possible concern only during such an occurrence. AEOD's final engineering evaluation report for this study contains a detailed discussion of the postulated event sequences. Our report also includes an analysis and evaluation of the potential consequences associated with the events together with our findings, ,

conclusions and a few recmraendations. The reco:nendations provided do not extend beyond procedural development and operator awareness. Although we are now forwarding our report to you both for your infomation and for possible input to the Unresolved Safety Issue, A-1, task (Water Hanner), no response is necessary.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this natter, I would be pleased to nahe the appropriate AE00 staff members available at your request.

originai signed by.

n$$ma. c. J. He!temes Jr.

C. J. Heltenes, Jr. , Director o Office for Analysis and Evaluation c'l

@:: of Operational Data -

-], V[], 1 e ca cc: Harold Denton t~' r i

@< Robert Bernero  ; - L' gg Richard Vollner g h-m a.cn Richard Clark U -H Aleck Serkiz hfq rM $ t. ) :

ueori e LdOIA .

f y-

  1. ^

OFFICE) . .. . . ... . ... . .M.CL d'.La D3............. .. . b.@.. ...t . . h.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$URNAME) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..hbh.f0. d.. ..bh Ikk.. .. ..G j.).h.N.$.. . . . .. .......h.........

om) .................... ....................... .SffB.3......... ..eMhe.3........ .4A.ll#.3... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

me ronu sia tio.ao3 nacu o24o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usoyo _us-oeo