ML20129J632

Submits Questions Re Facility Event & Failure of Util Personnel to Supply Pertinent Info to NRC

ML20129J632
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/08/1980
From:	Myers H NRC
To:	Stello V NRC
Shared Package
ML20127A105	List: IA-84-311, Recommends That V Stello Be Requested to Give Yes or No Answer to Listed Question Re Util Playing Down Seriousness of Facility Incident in Initial Dealings W/Commonwealth of PA ML20127A102 ML20129J493 ML20129J501 ML20129J517 ML20129J526 ML20129J535 ML20129J621 ML20129J632 ML20129J644 ML20129J659 ML20129J669 ML20129J681
References
FOIA-84-311 NUDOCS 8507230182
Download: ML20129J632 (2)

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pf October 8, 1980 To: Vic Stello From: Henry Myers The following are comments and questions based on recent interviews:

'l. ltn a conversation with Reading at approximately

" J 9:30 a.m., Miller said something to the effect that:

"See the situation we're in is a delicate

.one because we actually have plant integrity.

(Reading then interjects an "O.K." which is not on the transcript) . If we had a leak, we'd be all right. (Reading then says something like "I understand" which does not appear on the transcript;)

Does this mean Gary Miller understood that he was cooling by the feed and bleed mode which was not provided for in the emergency, procedures, and which he could not be certain was doing the job? Such an inference from Miller's comments to Reading on March 28 would be consistent with comments he 4  : subsequently made to the effect the plant was in i- a condition not anticipated in its design or operating procedures. (E.g. Miller, 9/5/80, p. 31,

p. 43, p. 133.)

i' , 2. . ^I did not note discussion regarding the closing of

" - the block valve at about 3:10 p.m., an act which appears to have terminated.the depressurization f

strategyk Since this action represented-a major L_ change in. strategy, was it discussed with Miller, and if not.who ordered.and/or concurred in it?

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Was this action a consequence of Chwastyk having

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convinced Miller on the basis.of.Chwastyk's concern

[j, .QfA 'resulting from his (Chwastyk's) recognition that p;W '" ,

the pressure pulse was a manifestation of the

-. hydrogen burn?

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^* 3. While it would seem obvious that the strategy employed in gaining stability would depend upon what had happened previously, and upon the' condition of the core, Miller has appeared adamant in denying this, saying that what had happened prior

.to his arrival was not something that need concern 8507230182 850506 PDR FOIA DORDSHOO4-311 PDR 1

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. .- .him. EHe said his primary concern was in establishing la stable: cooling condition, and that he did not focus *

on the. circumstances that had brought the reactor to

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, s 4 its damaged state. - (E .g. Miller, 9/5/80, p. 19,

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' pp.- 33-35.) The basic ~ thrust of Miller's assertions I (i.e.' that, prior conditions were not relevant to his

' ' current concerns) seems:to.be contradicted by Arnold, who appears to be saying that it might have been fortuitous *that his recommendation to start the RCP's was in fact appropriate. (E.g. Arnold, 9/5/80,

p. 40,.where he'said that under other circumstances

' .he'could have.. understood where following such advice might have brought about a worsening of the situation.) Is it the case that prior conditions (i.e. open PORV, throttling HPI, and open letdown) were in fact irrelevant to the strategy employed

'" thereafter in bringing about a stable cooling situation?

4. PNO-79-67 issued on March 28 states that " Safety injection was secured manually approximately 5 minutes after actuation." Is PNO-79-67 an accurate reflection of the extent of information provided by Met-Ed to the NRC as of the time it was-drafted?

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