ML20133F430

Application for Amend to License DPR-36,consisting of Proposed Change 114,Suppl 1,changing Tech Spec Pages 3.11-2 & 3.11-5 Re Containment Isolation Valves Under Administrative Controls

ML20133F430
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	10/07/1985
From:	Randazza J Maine Yankee
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
Shared Package
ML20133F433	List: ML20133F430 ML20133F434
References
6173L-SDE, MN-85-170, NUDOCS 8510110031
Download: ML20133F430 (3)

Text

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EDISON DRIVE MAME HARHEE 'Al0ml0 POWER 00MPARSe nuousrx. ualnE oasas g (207) 623-3521 O

October 7, 1985 MN-85-170 ,

Proposed Change No. 114 Supplement 1 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

References:

(a) License No. EPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)

(b) MYAPCo Letter to USNRC dated April 23,1985 (MN-85-76) -

Proposed Change No.114

Subject:

Containment Isolation Valves Under Adninistrative Controls Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company proposes to modify Appendix A of the operating license as shown in the enclosed pages.

This proposed change supplements Reference (b) in two ways: (1)'it adds blowdown and body vent valves on instrumentation lines to the list of manual containment isolation valves that may be repositioned under administrative control without prior compensatory measures, and (2) it incorporates an inadvertent omission of manual containment isolation valves from the remedial action statement for containment integrity.

The specific change is as follows: replace pages 3.11-2 and 3.11-5 of the Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages 3.11-2 and 3.11-5. Changes associated with Reference (b) are noted by a single bracket in the right-hand margin and those associated with this supplement are indicated by a double bracket.

The proposed change would modify Technical Specification 3.11.B to include blowdown and body vent valves on instrumentation lines to the list of manual containment isolation valves that may be repositioned under administrative  !

control without compensatory measures to isolate the penet. ration. Written l procedures have been established that address the operrtion and manipulation j of these valves during maintenance and calibration.

8510110031 851007 0 9\ )

PDR ADOCK 05000309 g\g 6173L-SDE PDR P

\ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Two Attention: Document Control Desk MN-85-170 Occasional manipulation of instrument vent and blowdown valves is necessary during surveillance testing and maintenance. Such testing and maintenance for instruments are necessary to meet the requirements of the

' Maine Yankee Technical Specifications and to ensure the instruments are operable in accordance with assumptions made in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Otring normal calibration, when the calibration tester is attached to the blowdown valve and the valve is open, the isolation valve of the instrumentation line maintains the containment boundary conditions. The body vent or blowdown valve is opened for only brief periods of time with the associated instrument isolation valves open. The technician conducting the maintenance or calibration could rapidly shut the valves in the event it was necessary. Additionally, the probability of a design basis accident during the brief period the valves are open is remote.

The proposed change does affect the margin of safety in that one of two containment integrity barriers are being breached. However, as noted above, the period that the valves are open is very short, the size of the opening is very small- (0.25 - 0.5 inch IO), and a technician in close proximity could quickly' shut the valve if required. Also, an additional containment isolation barrier (valve or membrane) is available and only one barrier is required to effect the isolation of containment. Therefore, the margin of safety is not significantly affected by the proposed change.

Even if a design basis accidant occurs with the valves open, and the technician were to fail to close the valves, the effects would be minimal because of the small size of the lines and the fact that the valves are '

normally only fully opened for very brief periods to blow down the associated lines.

This proposed change does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated. As indicated above, the proposed change would, at most, have minimal affect on the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new kind of accident.

For the reasons stated above, we have determined that the proposed change does

! rot involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

This change has been reviewed and approved by the Plant Operation Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee has reviewed this proposed change.

6173L-SDE

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Three Attention: Document Control Desk H4-85-170 A State of Maine representative is being notified of this proposed change by a copy of this letter.

Very truly yours, MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COWANY We :gv 0 John B. Randazza Executive Vice President t

JBR/bjp

Enclosure:

! cc: Mr. Edward J. Butcher, Jr.

Dr. Thomas E. Murley Mr. Cornelius F. Holden

.Mr. Clough Toppan

, -STATE OF MAINE Then personally appeated before me, John B. Randazza, who being duly sworn did state that he is Executive Vice President of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing submittal l -in the name and on behalf of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, and that the l . statements therein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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Notary Public NY COMMt X T R 19,1991

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