ML20134B535

Event Tracking Sheet Re 930414 Event Involving Relay Failures

ML20134B535
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/17/1994
From:	Eric Benner Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20134B255	List: L-93-112, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Jan-Mar 1993.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) L-93-181, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period of Apr-June 1993.Entries Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) L-93-265, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period Jul-Sept 1993.Log Withheld L-94-016, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Fourth Quarter 1993.Log Does Not Contain Safeguards Info as Defined by 10CFR73.21 L-94-095, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period Jan-Mar 1994.Log Entries Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 L-94-186, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period Apr-June 1994.Encl Withheld L-94-269, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period Jul-Sept 1994.Encl Does Not Contain Safeguards Info Per 10CFR73.21 L-95-121, Forwards Safeguards Event Log Entries for Period of Jan-Mar 1995,per 10CFR73.71(c)(2) L-96-296, LER 96-S02-00:on 961011,failed to Terminate Access of Temporary Licensee Employee.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Security Unassigned Card Key & Plant Administrative Procedure 0010509 Revised ML20134B253 ML20134B260 ML20134B469 ML20134B502 ML20134B509 ML20134B516 ML20134B520 ML20134B535 ML20134B538 ML20134B541 ML20134B549 ML20134B561 ML20134B566 ML20134B624 ML20134B629 ML20134B742 ML20134B796 ML20134B826 ML20134E919 ML20134H152 ML20134K088
References
FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9412230186
Download: ML20134B535 (2)

Text

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cP go n5 OEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET No Sort Specified QUERY > "BENNER" $ Assigned To & Asrigned Date >- 06/09/94 & Assigned Date <- 06/09/94 1

Plcats SAINT LUCIE Unit: b Engineer: BENNER E.

Evcatt .3 Norning Report: Briefing:

50.72#3 0 LER#: 050000009400000 PN#:

Other Notification: UPESE # 40418II.6

CyOtems Component

OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE 01-Oeration P

z - Startup 4 - Reactor Protection System B - Safety Related Cooling System 3 - Hot Standby C - Fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown D - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary

, 5 - Cold Shutdown - Containment l Plant Power j 6 - Refueling -

7 - Other - Unexpected Plant Performance i H - Other

CAUSE EVENT TYPE 1 Equipment Failure SIG - Significant Event

- Design or Installation Error E01 - Event of Interest

3 - Operating Error T - To Be Determined i 4 - Maintenance Error TH Other 5 - External 6 - Other i

POTENTIAL AO: Ah Criterion:

Pr: posed By: BENNER E. g j a jglt/

En ineer /

Approved: C~ l& 1  !

Section Leader A. Chaffee I

Branch Chief EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening: fu a:O' a

significance

Description:

RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).

2-n-97 R fMN3AL3D N+ a Mit TJ WiEil COPY JJ " l ETS-02 "

Page .: 1 06/17/94f

.. m,y rs 3rd ,

1 DOCUMENT LOCATION & NAME: G:\EJBl\UPRSE_28.EFR ,

1 I

PSE:UPR EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SHEET ASSIGNMENT DATE: 06/09/94 ASSIGNED T0: BENNER E PLANT & UNIT: . SAINT LUCIE EVENT DATE:

50.72 REPORT NO:

l .

DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:

0THER REPORT: UPRSE #94041811.6 EVENT

SUMMARY

AND SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).

DETERMINE DETAILS, PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS (IF ANY), RISK SIGNIFICANCE (If PRACTICAL), PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT DISPOSITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.

PROPOSED EVENT CLASSIFICATION AND EVALUATE THE NEED FOR GENERIC COMMUNICATION.

INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT ON THIS ASSIGNMENT IN THE CLOSEOUT.

l CIRCLE THE APPLICA8LE CASE:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH YES E01 NO SIG NO A0 NO l

1 GENERIC CONCERN STATUS: YES IN #94-78 BUL # GL#

OR BRIEF: N0 #

l l CLOSE0VT j While calibration testing was being performed on overcurrent protective relays, a non-safety related ABB/ Westinghouse protective relay of Type C0-9 failed to operate the instantaneous trip function. An inspection of the l

l malfunctioning relay revealed the normally open contacts were coated with a green substance. This substance was determined to have dripped onto the contacts from the terminal lugs on the end of the relay internal cabinet  ;

wiring. The green substance, which was identified as polyvinyl chloride l (PVC), had leached out of the insulation on the wiring. The analysis of this event is of interest because the same type of relay is used in numerous safety-related applications at St. Lucie.

A risk analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Battelle) ,

indicated that the calculated core damage frequency is insensitive to failures of the overcurrent relays. This is due to the passive function of these l relays, which are rarely called upon. Because of redundancy in design, the direct consequence of a malfunction of an overcurrent relay is a reduction in redundancy, not the defeat of a safety function.

This event is classified as an OTHER. Information Notice 94-78 was issued to 1

1 alert the industry to this issue. Four staff hours were spent on this event, in addition to the risk assessment performed by Battelle.

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