ML20134B624

From kanterella
Revision as of 02:30, 3 July 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Event Tracking & Follow Up Assignment Sheet of 950802 Event Re Ue Declaration Resulting from Two Stages of Reactor Rc Pump Seal Failures w/2 Gpm Identified Leakage
ML20134B624
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/09/1995
From: Thomas Koshy
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20134B255 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 29153, NUDOCS 9508300278
Download: ML20134B624 (3)


Text

-m . __. _

, g)..,-

CEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET EWE r >= 29153 & Event Ntaber <= 29153 l

l Plant! SAINT LUCIE Unit: Engineer: KOSHY T.

l l EvCnt: 08/02/95 Morning Report: Briefing:

50.72# 29153 LER#: 050000009500000 PN#:

1 Othcr Notification:

System: Component:

OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE

- Operation A - Reactor Protection System 2 Startup B - Safety-Related Cooling System Hot Stan@y C - fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown @-ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary 5 Cold Shutdown E Containment 6 - Refueling F - Plant Power 7 - Other G Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other:

CAUSE EVENT E 25 h Equipment Failure $1G - Significant Event 2 Design or Installation Error EDI - Event of Interest 3 - Operating Error TBD - To Be Determined 4 - Maintenance Error 5 External h other 6 - Other POTENTIAL AO: Criterion:

Preptsed By: roswy T.

Engineer -

3h Apprcved: f # 5 Section Leader A. Chaffee Branch Chief {

EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:

/(s16 significance

Description:

UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant ptmp seat feitures with 2gpm identified leakage.

A 3 >[ @(

[3 d'k'AA Y -

Page:1 08/09/95 ETS 02 F~' ' t B!!B COPY A

. 1 i

G:\0ECB\ETS I

EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SMEET I

PSE - _ YES _x NO l I  !

ASSIGNMENT DATE: 8-2-95 l ASSIGNED T0: T Koshy 4 PLANT & UNIT: Saint Lucie l 2

EVENT DATE: 8-2-95 l 50.72 REPORT NO: 29153 i MR NO: .

OTHER REPORT: l SPECIALTY CODE:

EVENT

SUMMARY

1 UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant pump seal failures 4 with 2gpm identified leaktge.

l SPECIFIC F0LLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT

]

DETERMINE DETAILS, EVALUATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS. IN j ADDITION, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC CONCERNS:

e ASSIGNMENT OPTIONS

  • IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES FROM INITIAL EVENT INFORMATION: _ YES _ N0 _ N/A
  • PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT: _ YES _ NO _ N/A i

ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY: _ YES _ NO _ N/A

  • COMPARE WITH PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: _ YES _ N0 _ N/A PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
  • RELATE TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: _ YES _ NO _ N/A j 1

PREPARE TO BRIEF: _ YES _ NO

  • TARGET CLOSE00T SCHEDULE:

I

.I l

I

'9 l

! l l m , l l '

  • INITIAL SCREENING PANEL '

EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E0I _ SIG _ A0 i

  • REMAINING OR ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP ITEMS:

1 l

  • FINAL PANEL ASSESSMENT EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E01 _ SIG _ A0 i
  • BASIS: _ RISK _ PROGRAMMATIC _ MARGIN _ N/A
  • GENERIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION RECOMMENDED: _ YES _ N0 _ PRIORITY (1,2,3,4)'

_ IN _ BUL _ GL CLOSE0VT During the plant restart following the hurricane warning, the operator noticed the first stage seal failure. The licensee attempted to " restage the seal" using a previously successful method. The process involved transfering the full pressure to stage two and relieving pressure in stage 3.

The attempt was not successful this time and it is believed to have caused the second stage of RCP seal failure. Such " restaging seal" was not attempted when the plant conditions were 370F and 530 psi. The higher temperature and pressure could be the cause for the second stage seal failure. The licensee plans to perform further failure analysis.

The station black out analysis assumes 25gpm. The failures were within the analyzed bases. No further follow up is required. Classified as other.

FILE: G:\T Wr 4 %'r s s c_

BRIEF #

GENERIC RESPONSE: IN # BUL # GL #

1. Priority endnote:

PRIORITY 1: Innediate assignment of resources (e.g., for highly risk-significant saf ety concerns)

PRIORITY 2: Wear -term action (e.g., significant safety issues not warranting inmediate action)

PRIORITY 3: Long-term action (e.g., issues of moderate to low safety significance)

PRIORITY 4: Resource dependent action (e.g., items that can be deferred)

_ _ _,