ML20077E156

Proposed TS Page 3/4 1-20,reflecting Rev of SLCS Relief Valve Setpoint to Show Influence of Back Pressure & Rev of Bases Page B3/4 5-2 to Show That Hpsc Sys Designed to Supply 517 Gpm Flow Rate at 1,200 (Instead of 1,175) Psid

ML20077E156
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/02/1994
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19311B557	List: ML20077E144 ML20077E156
References
NUDOCS 9412120143
Download: ML20077E156 (3)

Text

.

.' 1

- l ATTACHMENT C I NIAOARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION l LICENSE NO. NPF-69 DOCKET NO. 50-410 l l

l Prooosed Chanaes to Enclosure 2 Replace the existing pages with the pages listed below. Each page has been retyped in its entirety with marginal markings to indicate revisions to the text. l Paae Descrintion ,f Char . I i

3/4 1-20 The SLCS relief valve setpoint has been revised to show the influence of the l back pressure, j B3/4 6-2 Revised to show that the HPCS system is designed to supply the 517 gpm flow rate at 1200 (instead of 1175) psid.

l i

I l

I l

l 1

1 i

l

)

l 9412120143 941202 PDR ADOCK 05000410 P PDR

~ '

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LlOUlD CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.5 (Continued)

b. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.

2. Determining that the available weight of sodium pentaborate is greater than or equal to 5500 lb and the concentration of boron in solution is within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-1 by chemical analysis.*

3. Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c, Demonstrating that, when tested pursuent to Specification 4.0.5, the minimum flow requirement of 41.2 gpm per pump at a pressure of greater than or aqual to 1235 psig is l met,

d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by;

i. Initiating one of the standby liquid control system loops, including an explosive valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactor pressure vessel is available by pumping demineralized water into the reactor vessel. The replace-ment charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. Both injection loops shall be teta iin 36 months.

Demonstrating that the pump relief valve setpoint is less than or equal to 1394** l 2.

psig and verifying that the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.

• This test shall also be performed arytime water or boron is added to the solution or when the solution temperature drops below 70 F.

• • Bench tested setpoint value.

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 1-20 Amendment No.

5

! 1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES l ECCS - OPERATING AND SHUTDOWN 3/4.5.1 & 3/4.5.2 (Continued)

The capacity of the system is selected to provide the required core cooling. The HPCS pump is designed to deliver greater than or equal to 517/1550/6350 gpm at differential pressures of 1200/1130/200 psi, respectively. Initially, water from the condensate storage tank is used instead of water injected from the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit is taken in the safety analyses 1or the condensate storage tank water.

With the HPCS system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the LPCS and LPCI systems. In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup water at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The HPCS out of service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low-pressure core cooling systems.

The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCS system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vesselinjection requires the reactor to be shut down. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage.

Upon failure of the HPCS system to function properly after a small-break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that floiv from the low-pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel claddirig temperature to less than 2200 F. ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psig.

This pressure is substantially below that for which the low-pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

1 ADS automatically controls seven selected safety / relief valves although the safety analysis only l takes credit for five valves. It is, therefore, appropriate to permit two valves to be out of service l for up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability.

l 1

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 83/4 5 2 Amendment No.

$t

w -- . - . , _ -nu.,---__.~_.-_.- _ - - . - -

1 =

p i

ATTACHMENT D -

N!AGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION LICENSE NO. NPF-69 DOCKET NO. 50-410 Proposed Chanaes to Enclosure 3 Replace the existing pages with the pages listed below. Each page has been retyped in its entirety with marginal markings to indicate changes to the text. Proprietary information is marked by a single solid line in the margin. Revisions are marked by a double solid line in the margin. i Eaga pescriotion of Changg xiii/xiv Revised title of Figure 51 on the List of Illustrations.

1 j 2-2 Editorial change to Section 2.3. Section 2.2.2, MAPLHGR was previously revised in response to an NRC requests for additionalinformation. See

. NMPC letter dated October 6,1994 (NMP2L 1500).

I i 3-4 Revised description of Reactor Vessol integrity for feedwater nozzle loads.

k 5-1 Editorial change to Section 5.1.1.

[i 4

[ 5-7,5 9/5-10 Several changes have been incorporated into Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 to l more accurately match setpoints for uprated operation. These changes have

! been reviewed against the latest setpoint calculations, the reload analyses, the Unit 2 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR), and the Technical Specifications.

9-2 & 9-3 Corrected peak pressure typographic errors for various transients.

J 97 Revised the capacity requirements of the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) s during the 4-hour Station Blackout Event. The revision results in an even j greater quantity of CST make-up (125,000 gallons) required for uprated j conditions.

! 98 Revised description of Sec, tion 9.4.3, Two SRVs Out of Service. Section 9 A.4, Single Recirculation Pump Operation, was previously revised in response to an NRC request for additionalinformation. See NMPC letter dated October 6,1994 (NMP2L 1500).

11-21 Editorial change. )

i 11-29 New calculations of the main steam line high flow setpoints have resulted in l l minor revisions to the normal and allowable equivalent flow rates, i 11-34 Revised Table 11-1 for higher HPCS pump design capacity.

i