ML17059C791

Proposed Tech Specs Re Rev B to Conversion of Unit 2 Current TS to ITS

ML17059C791
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Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	09/30/1999
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Definitions1.11.1DefinitionsDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131(continued)EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEM(ECCS)RESPONSETIMEENDOFCYCLERECIRCULATIONPUMPTRIP(EOC-RPT)SYSTEMRESPONSETIMEISOLATIONSYSTEMRESPONSETINELEAKAGERegulatoryGuide1.109,Rev.1,NRC,1977;orICRP30,SupplementtoPart1,page192-212,Tabletitled,"CommittedDoseEquivalentinTargetOrgansorTissuesperIntakeofUnitActivity."TheECCSRESPONSETIMEshallbethattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsECCSinitiationsetpointatthechannelsensoruntiltheECCSequipmentiscapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(i.e.,thevalvestraveltotheirrequiredpositions,pumpdischargepressuresreachtheirrequiredvalues,etc.).Timesshallincludedieselgeneratorstartingandsequenceloadingdelays,whereapplicable.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.TheEOC-RPTSYSTEMRESPONSETIMEshallbethattimeintervalfrominitialmovementoftheassociatedturbinestopvalvesorturbinecontrolvalvestocompletesuppressionoftheelectricarcbetweenthefullyopencontactsoftherecirculationpumpcircuitbreaker.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.TheISOLATIONSYSTEMRESPONSETIMEshallbethattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsisolationinitiationsetpointatthechannelsensoruntiltheisolationvalvestraveltotheirrequiredpositions.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.LEAKAGEshallbe:a.IdentifiedLEAKAGE1.LEAKAGEintothedrywellsuchasthatfrompumpsealsorvalvepacking,thatiscapturedandconductedtoasumporcollectingtank;orcontinuedNMP21.1-3RevisionR99iOi20307990930PDRADQCK050004iOPPDRQ

OEFINITIOH5EMERGENCYCORrCOOLINGSYSTEReTIHE("Co+inuePea~odischargepressuresreachtheirrequiredvalues,etc.imesshallincludedieselgeneratorstartfngandequenceloadingdelay,ereapplfeeble.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbanyseriesofsequeial,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimesmeasured.Foe-R&TENYCLERECIRCULATIONPUHPTRYSTEHSPOHSETIMEC,Q?'gPTheSYSTEHRESPONSETIHEshallbeChattimesntervacoetesuppress>onotheelectricarchefullopencontactsoerecrcuat>onrcutbreaerfrominiCiaovemenoeassocateurbinestopvalveurint1vlvTheresponsetimemaybemeasuredbynyesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.RAFLIHITGPOWOEHp.eTheCTHLPlshallbetheARexstingatagivenlocationdividedbythespe>>edGimitoratbundletype.ONFRATEDTHL1.15heFRACTIONOFTEDTHERHALPOWER(F)shallbeemeasuredRMALPOWEdividedbytheTRREOUEHHOTATIO1.16heFREQUENCYNATIONspecvffedforheperformanceofSurillanceReqrementsshallcresondtotheintalsdefinedfnTable.1.ATETREATHEHTSYSTEHl.17AEOUSRADWASTETREATHESYSTEHshallbeanystemdesignedanstalltoreduceradioactiveseouseffluentsbycolctingoffgasesfrothemaicondenserevacuationsysemandprovidingfordayorholdupfortpur-oeofreducinthtotaldioactivitriortoreasetotheenviroenLEAKAGEQ,tbNLEAKAGEshall,be:~'Acl'ry~><WM$n~LRp8ecinsem,suchasumpseavalvepackingthatiscapturedanconouctadcoasumporcollectingtankgorAa~,gy(c~4;)RiltikeNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT21-3gj25gac7g~s~~~>a~F~n:,p5pc(Xi

(cry)1.1Oefinitions0<<initionsl.}(1YAPDOSESOU!VALENTj-33!(continued)cI.JZEHERGENCYCORECOOLINGiSYSTEH(ECCS)RESPONSETIMEIlg)ENDOFCYCLERECIRCULATIONPUHPTRIP(EOC-RPT)SYSTEMRESPONSETIHEISOLATIONS~'ESPONSETINKconversionfactorsusedforthiscalculationshallbethoselistedinableIIIofTI0-14844,AECionofOistrsforowerandTestReactor>eo1ist'nleE-ofRegulatoryGuide1.109,Rev.NRC,1977orICRP30,SupplementtoPartI,page192-212,abletitled,"CaaeittedOoseEquivalentinTargetOrgansorTissuesperIntakeofUnitActivity~TheECCSRESPONSETINEshallbethattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsECCSinitiationsetpointatthechannelsensoruntiltheECCSequipmentiscapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(i.e.,thevalvestraveltotheirrequiredpositions,pumpdischargepressuresreachtheirrequiredvalues,etc.).Timesshallincludedieselgeneratorstartingandsequenceloadingdelays,whqreapplicable.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.Ao~e~eDifoPM[ASEA5~TheEOC-RPTSYSTEHRESPONSIHEshallbetatimeintervalfrominitial>gnagera>eassocaurestopvalvelitswitchofrwhentheturbineontrolvalvehyaulicoil'cont1oilpressurswintocompletesuppressionoftheelectricarcbetweenthefullyopencontactsoftherecirculationpumpcircuitbreaker.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapp1ng,ortotalstepsthattheensetimeismeasure~feeptortbreakerarcsupprsssonchisnotasuredtisvalatedtoconformtthemanufcturer'sesivae.TheISOLATIONSYSTEHRESPONSETINEshallbethattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsisolationinitiationsetpointatthechannelsensorunt11theisolives.traveltotheirrequiredositionsmessancudeeerarsandsequenceloin+ho~~ocE'ed'uriCeCAAELSQf'OAiVo(ves(continued)BMR/6STS1.1-3RevI,04/07/95

Chapter2.0

ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1,B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)B2.F1ReactorCoreSLsBASESBACKGROUNDGDC10(Ref.1)requires,andSLsensure,thatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).ThefuelcladdingintegritySLissetsuchthatnosignificantfueldamageiscalculatedtooccurifthelimitisnotviolated,Becausefueldamageisnotdirectlyobservable,astepbackapproachisusedtoestablishanSL,suchthattheMCPRisnotlessthanthelimitspecifiedinSpecification2.1.1.2.MCPRgreaterthanthespecifiedlimitrepresentsaconservativemarginrelativetotheconditionsrequiredtomaintainfuelcladdingintegrity.Thefuelcladdingisoneofthephysicalbarriersthatseparatetheradioactivematerialsfromtheenvirons.Theintegrityofthiscladdingbarrierisrelatedtoitsrelativefreedomfromperforationsorcracking.Althoughsomecorrosionoruserelatedcrackingmayoccurduringthelifeofthecladding,fissionproductmigrationfromthissourceisincrementallycumulativeandcontinuouslymeasurable.Fuelcladdingperforations,however,canresultfromthermalstresses,whichoccurfromreactoroperationsignificantlyabovedesignconditions.Whilefissionproductmigrationfromcladdingperforationisjustasmeasurableasthatfromuserelatedcracking,thethermallycausedcladdingperforationssignalathresholdbeyondwhichstillgreaterthermalstressesmaycausegross,ratherthanincremental,claddingdeterioration.Therefore,thefuelcladdingSLisdefinedwithamargintotheconditionsthatwouldproduceonsetoftransitionboiling(i.e.,MCPR=1.00).Theseconditionsrepresentasignificantdeparturefromtheconditionintendedbydesignforplannedoperation.TheMCPRfuelcladdingintegritySLensuresthatduringnormaloperationandduringAOOs,atleast99.9Xofthefuelrodsinthecoredonotexperiencetransitionboiling.OperationabovetheboundaryofthenucleateboilingregimecouldresultinexcessivecladdingtemperaturebecauseoftheonsetoftransitionboilingandtheresultantsharpcontinuedNMP2B2.0-1Revision%+/

ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES2.1.1.1FuelCladdinInterit(continued)datatakenatpressuresfrom14.7psiato800psiaindicatethatthefuelassemblycriticalpoweratthisflowisapproximately3.35MWt.Withthedesignpeakingfactors,thiscorrespondstoaTHERMALPOWER)50%RTP.Thus,aTHERMALPOWERlimitof25%RTPforreactorpressure<785psigisconservative.2.1.1.2MCPRThefuelcladdingintegritySLissetsuchthatnosignificantfueldamageiscalculatedtooccurifthelimitisnotviolated.Sincetheparametersthatresultinfueldamagearenotdirectlyobservableduringreactoroperation,thethermalandhydraulicconditionsthatresultintheonsetoftransitionboilinghavebeenusedtomarkthebeginningoftheregioninwhichfueldamagecouldoccur.AlthoughitisrecognizedthattheonsetoftransitionboilingwouldnotresultindamagetoBWRfuelrods,thecriticalpoweratwhichboilingtransitioniscalculatedtooccurhasbeenadoptedasaconvenientlimit.However,theuncertaintiesinmonitoringthecoreoperatingstateandintheproceduresusedtocalculatethecriticalpowerresult'nanuncertaintyinthevalueofthecriticalpower.Therefore,thefuelcladdingintegritySLisdefinedasthecriticalpowerratiointhelimitingfuelassemblyforwhichmore.than99.9%ofthefuelrodsinthecoreareexpectedtoavoidboilingtransition,consideringthepowerdistributionwithinthecoreandalluncertainties.TheMCPRSLisdeterminedusingastatisticalmodelthatcombinesalltheuncertaintiesinoperatingparametersandtheproceduresusedtocalculatecriticalpower.TheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofboilingtransitionisdeterminedusingtheapprovedGeneralElectricCriticalPowercorrelations.DetailsofthefuelcladdingintegritySLcalculationaregiveninReferences3and4.Reference3alsoincludesatabulationoftheuncertaintiesusedinthedeterminationoftheMCPRSLandReference4alsoprovidesthenominalvaluesoftheparametersusedintheMCPRSLstatisticalanalysis.continuedNMP2B2.0-3RevisionP'Q 0

RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS2.2(continued)rodsandrestorecompliancewiththeSLwithin2hours.The2hourCompletionTimeensuresthattheoperatorstakepromptremedialactionandalsoassuresthattheprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringduringthisperiodisminimal.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC14andGDC15.2.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,ArticleNB-7000.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,ArticleIWA-5000.4.10CFR100.5.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,1971Edition,Addenda,winterof1972.6.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,1977Edition,Addenda,summerof1977.NMP2B2.0-8RevisionRQ

ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1B2.0SAFETYL'IMITS(SLs)B2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsBASESBACKGROUNDGDC10(Ref.1)requires,andSLsensure,thatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).ThefuelcladdingintegritySLissetsuchthatnosignificantfueldamageiscalculatedtooccurifthelimitisnotviolated.Becausefueldamageisnotdirectlyobservable,astepbackapproachisusedtoestablishanSL,suchthattheMCPRisnotlessthanthelimitspecifiedinSecification2.1.1.or[bthGeneraeompananvancedNuclearFuelRgreaterthanespecifiedlimitrepresentsaconservativemarginrelativetotheconditionsrequiredtomaintainfuelcladdingintegrity.Thefuelcladdingisoneofthephysicalbarriersthatseparatetheradioactivematerialsfromtheenvirons.Theintegrityofthiscladdingbarrierisrelatedtoitsrelativefreedomfromperforationsorcracking.Althoughsomecorrosicnoruserelatedcrackingmayoccurduringthelifeofthe.ladding,fissionproductmigrationfromthissourceisincrementallycumulativeandcontinuouslymeasurable.Fuelcladdingperforations,however,canresultfromthermalstresses,whichoccurfromreactoroperationsignificantlyabovedesignconditions.Mhilefissionproductmigrationfromcladdingperforationis.justasmeasurableasthatfromuserelatedcracking,thethermallycausedcladdingperforationssignalathresholdbeyondwhichstillgreaterthermalstressesmaycausegross,ratherthanincremental,cladding'deterioration.Therefore,thefuelcladdingSLisdefinedwithamargintotheconditionsthatwouldproduceonsetoftransitionboiling(i.e.,MCPR1.00).Theseconditionsrepresentasignificantdeparturefromtheconditionintendedbydesignforplannedoperation.TheMCPRfuelcladdingintegritySLensuresthatduringnormaloperationandduringAOOs,atleast99.9Xof.thefuelrodsinthecoredonotexperiencetransitionboiling.(continued)BMR/6STSB2.0-1~Rev1,04/07/95

ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYNALYSES(continued)ThefuelcladdingintegritySLissetsuchthatnosignificantfueldamageiscalculatedtooccurifthelimitisnotviolated.Sincetheparametersthatresultinfueldamagearenotdirectlyobservableduringreactoroperation,thethermalandhydraulicconditionsthatresultintheonsetoftransitionboilinghavebeenusedtomarkthebeginningoftheregioninwhichfueldamagecouldoccur.AlthoughitisrecognizedthattheonsetoftransitionboilingwouldnotresultindamagetoBWRfuelrods,thecriticalpoweratwhichboilingtransitioniscalculatedtooccurhasbeenadoptedasaconvenientlimit.However,theuncertaintiesinmonitoringthecoreoperatingstateandintheproceduresusedtocalculatethecriticalpowerresultinanuncertaintyinthevalueofthecriticalpower.Therefore,thefuelcladdingintegritySLisdefinedasthecriticalpowerratiointhelimitingfuelassemblyforwhichmorethan99.9Xofthefuelrodsinthecoreareexpectedtoavoidboilingtransition,consideringthepowerdistributionwithinthecoreandalluncertainties.TheHCPRSLisdeterminedusingastatisticalmodelthatcombinesalltheuncertaintiesinoperatingparametersandtheproceduresusedtocalculatecriticalpower.Theprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofboilingtransitionisdeterminedusing.theapprovedGeneralElectricCriticalPowercorrelations.Detailsofthef1ciair'e~d9SLcalculationaregiveninReferenceferencealsoincludesatabulationoftheuncertaintiesusedinthedeterminationoftheHCPRSLandthenominalvaluesoftheparametersusedintheHCPRSLstatisticalanalysis.cRvcmi-oJgorovicJA$CPFuel]TheHCPRSLsuressufficientcoervatismintheoperatin9HCPRlimitat,intheeventofnAOOfromthelimitingconditionfoperation,atleas99.9Xofthefuelrodsithecoreouldbeexpectedtovoidboilingtransition.Themarginetweencalculatedbo'ngtransition(i.e.,HCPR1.00)andtheHCPRSisbasedonadetailedstatticalprocedurethatonsiderstheuncertaint'inmon'ringthecoreoperatngstate.OnespecifiuncrtaintyincludedinteSListheuncertaintyinherent(continued)BWR/6STS.B2.0-4Rev1,04/07/95

'rwBASES(continued)REFERENCESRCSPressureSLB2.1.2l.10CFR00,AppendixA,GOClgGOClgn48K35.~2.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,ArticleNB-7000.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselArticleI50~4.10CFR100.5.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselZAddenda,'/winterof1922$6.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVessel7.10CFR5.72.8.10CFR0.73.Code,SectionXI,Coo%0~M,Code,'$1971Edition/,Code,gl9EditlonLh)p~)J25~fpz+rr+f9~7$7(-05BWR/6STS82.0-11Rev1,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:CHAPTER2.0-SAFETYLIMITSNotused.2.3.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.AdescriptionofthereactorvesselwaterlevelSLhasbeenadded,consistentwiththebackgrounddescriptionoftheotherSLs.4.NMP2doesnotuseANFfuel.Asaresult,theBasesdiscussionsforANFfuelSafetyLimitshavebeendeletedandtherequirementshavebeenrenumberedtoreflectthischange.5.Editorialchangemadeforclarity.6.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.7.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.NMP2Revision+Qg

Section3.0

SRApplicability83.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASESSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3,0.4establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsinSections3.1through3.10andapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.SR3.0.1SR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespecifiedintheindividualSRs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutesafailuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecification,however,istobeconstruedasimplyingthatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknowntobenotmetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformances'urveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheunitisinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithaSpecialOperationsLCOareonlyapplicablewhentheSpecialOperationsLCOisusedasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.Unplannedeventsmaysatisfytherequirements(includingapplicableacceptancecriteria)foragivenSR.Inthiscase,theunplannedeventmaybecreditedasfulfillingtheperformanceoftheSR.Surveillances,includingSurveillancesinvokedbyRequiredActions,donothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentbecausetheACTIONSdefinetheremedialmeasuresthatapply.SurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.NMP2B3.0-10continuedRevision++8

'i.nSR34ii4.0.1onditiA,w4'c,4,'I;shallbemetunngtheoriviualc~5OT'~0bf'INorotherunlessotherwisestatedI.G5s).o.~4.0.2EachSilenceequirementIIbepeormewithispecifiedtimeiervaw'mumallowse'ottoexcd26%oftheciliaeinterval.Ster~~6'scv5+~~~,g4.0.Failuretoperformaurveianceequirementwithintheallowedsurveillanceinterval,efinedbySpecification4.0.2,shallconstitute'nmeimttsACTIONrequirementsareappicaertisienieurveillanceRequirementnotbeenperformed.TheACTIONruirementsmaybedelayedforto24hourstopermitthecationofthesufvelllallowablments'IourveianceeuirentQpSA~4.0.4intoanOPERATIONALCOorrsfiedapplicaonditionahanmadeulesstheSurveillanceRequirem(a)associatedwiththeLimitingitionforOperationebeenperformedwithintheapicablesurveillanceintervaloraaherwiaeipacified.ThiovisionshallnotpreventpaethroughortoOPERATIONALNDITIONSasrequiredtocornCTIONrequirements4.0.5SurveillanceRequirementsforinserviceinspectionandtestingofASMECodeClass1,2.snd3componentsshallbeapplicableasfollows:InservicetestingofASMECodeClass1,'2,and3pumpsandvalvesshallbeperformedinaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableaddendaasrequiredby10CFRS0.55a(f),exceptwherespecificwrittenreliefhasbeengrantedbytheCommissionpursuantto10CFR60.56a(f)(6)(i).InserviceinspectionofASMECodeClass1;2,and3componentsshallbeperformedinaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableaddendaasrequiredby10CFR50.56a(g),exceptwherespecificwrittdnreliefhasbeengrantedbytheCommissionpursuantto10CFR50.66a(g)(6)(i).b.SurveillanceintervalsspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableaddendafortheinserviceinspectionandtestingactivitiesrequiredbytheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableaddendashallbeapplicableasfollowsintheseTechnicalSpecifications:-IlMove/45~'g>~).gNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/40-2AmendinentNo.6,6,4484Ig

SRAoplicabi':.tyB3.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREgUIRENENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASKSSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3.0.4establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationandapplatalltimesunlessotherwisestated.IAp~g/fQp/pSR3.0.1X<ser+ggQ.cledISR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespecifiedintheindividualSRs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutesafailuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecificat1on,however,istobeconstruedasimplyingthatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknowntobenotmetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformancesSurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheunitisinaIO)KorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithaSpecialOperat1onsLCOareonlyapplicablewhentheSpecialOperationsLCOisusedasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.Surveillances,includingSurveillancesinvokedbyRequiredAct1ons,donothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentbecausetheACTIONSdefinetheremedialmeasuresthatapply.SurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)BIIR/6STSB3;0-11RevI,04/OT/95

Unplannedeventsmaysatisfytherequirements(includingapplicableacceptancecriteria)foragivenSR.Inthiscase,theunplannedeventmaybecreditedasfulfillintherformanceoftheSR.ThiswanceincuestoswhosepeormeisnormallyprecluinagivenMODEorothifiedcondition.InsertPageB3.0-11

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:SECTION3.0-LCOANDSRAPPLICABILITYTheLCOandSRApplicabilityonlyapplytoSpecificationsinSections3.1through3.10;theydonotapplytoSpecificationsinChapters4.0and5.0.Therefore,thisstatementhasbeenaddedforclarity.2.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.3.ThecorrectLCOnumberorplantspecificnomenclature,asappropriate,hasbeenprovided.ThecorrectLCOtitleandfuelpooldescriptionhasbeenprovided.TheNMP2SpentFuelStoragePooldesignissimilartothatdescribedintheBWR/4ImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1433,Revision1;thusthewordshavebeenchangedtobeconsistentwiththewordinginNUREG-1433,Revision1.5.Theparagraphhasbeenmoved,consistentwithchangepackageBWR-26,C.l.ThischangewasinadvertentlyleftoutwhenNUREG-1434,Revision1waspromulgated.Thebracketed"Reviewer'sNote"hasbeendeleted.ThisinformationisfortheNRCreviewertobekeyedintowhatisneededtomeetthisrequirement.Thisisnotmeanttoberetainedinthefinalversionoftheplantspecificsubmittal.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.8.Thesewordshavebeenaddedforclarity.FailingtoperformtheSurveillance(s)withinthespecifiedFrequencydoesnotresultinanSR3.0.4restrictiononlyiftheequipmentisalreadyinoperable.9.TheoriginalwordingoftheBasesofLCO3.0.2isconfusinginthatitbeginstodiscussinoperabilityofredundantequipmentwithoutintroducingthistopic.ThistopicofinoperableredundantequipmentseemstobemoreappropriatefortheBasesofLCO3.0.3,butanappropriatediscussionisalreadyprovidedthere.TheproposedwordingretainstheintentwhilepresentingthematerialintheappropriatecontextofLCO3.0.2.ThischangeisalsobeingproposedinTSTF-122.10.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthesechangesmadetotheSpecificationsinSection3.6.TSTF-8addsaclarificationtotheBasesofSR3.0.1thatallowscredittobetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfySurveillances.ThisclarificationalsostatesthatthisallowancealsoincludesthoseSRswhoseperformanceisprecludedinagivenMODEorotherspecifiedcondition.ThisportionoftheTSTFhasnotbeenadopted.AsdocumentedinthePart9900oftheNRCInspectionManual,TechnicalGuidance-LicenseeTechnicalSpecificationsInterpretations,andintheITSBasesControlNMP2Revisiongpss'

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:SECTION3.0-LCOANDSRAPPLICABILITY11.(continued)Program(ITS5.5.10),neithertheTechnicalSpecificationBasesnorLicenseegeneratedinterpretationscanbeusedtochangetheTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Thus,iftheTechnicalSpecificationsprecludeperformanceofanSRincertainMODES(asisthecaseforsomeSRsinITSSection3.8),theBasescannotchangetheTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementandallowtheSRtobecreditedforbeingperformedintherestrictedMODES,eveniftheperformanceisunplanned.Therefore,onlythefirstpartoftheTSTF-8changetoSR3.0.1hasbeenadopted.NMP2RevisionPC'

Volume2Sections3.1and3.2

~~~X Section3.1

SLCSystemB3.1.7,BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.1.7.7DemonstratingeachSLCSystempumpdevelopsaflowrate>41.2gpmatadischargepressure>1235psigensuresthatpumpperformancehasnotdegradedduringthefuelcycle.Thisminimumpumpflowraterequirementensuresthat,whencombinedwiththesodiumpentaboratesolutionconcentrationrequirements,therateofnegativereactivityinsertionfromtheSLCSystemwilladequatelycompensateforthepositivereactivityeffectsencounteredduringpowerreduction,cooldownofthemoderator,andxenondecay.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurve,andisindicativeofoverallperformance.SuchinservicetestsconfirmcomponentOPERABILITYanddetectincipientfailuresbyindicatingabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.1.7.8andSR3.1.7.9TheseSurveillancesensurethatthereisafunctioningflowpathfromtheboronsolutionstoragetanktotheRPV,includingthefiringofanexplosivevalve.Thereplacementchargefortheexplosivevalveshallbefromthesamemanufacturedbatchastheonefiredorfromanotherbatchthathasbeencertifiedbyhavingoneofthatbatchsuccessfullyfired.Thepumpandexplosivevalvetestedshouldbealternatedsuchthatbothcompleteflowpathsaretestedevery48months,atalternating24monthintervals.TheSurveillancemaybeperformedinseparatestepstopreventinjectingboronintotheRPV.AnacceptablemethodforverifyingflowfromthepumptotheRPVistopumpdemineralizedwaterfromatesttankthroughoneSLCsubsystemandintotheRPV.WhiletheseSurveillancescanbeperformedwiththereactoratpower,operatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency,whichisbasedontherefuelingcycle.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.DemonstratingthatallheattracedpipingbetweentheboronsolutionstoragetankandthesuctionvalvetotheinjectionpumpsisunblockedensuresthatthereisafunctioningflowcontinuedNHP2B3.1-42RevisionP'Qg

SLCSystemB3.1.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~SR3..7.7(continued)'des'CsneconfirmcornonentOPERABILITYneec.1nclplena1uresbyindicatinganormalperformance.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisfinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramgj?J(~~s.SR3..7.8andSR3..7.9TheseSurveillancesensurethatthereisafunctioningflowpathfromtheboronsolutionstoragetanktotheRPV,includingthefiringofanexplosivevalve.ThereplacementchargefortheexplosivevalveshallbefromthesamemanufacturedbatchastheonefiredorfromanotherbatchthathasbeencertifiedbyhavingoneofthatbatchsuccessfullyAred.Thepumpandexplosivevalvetestedshouldbealternatedsuchthatbothcompleteflowpathsareteseeverymonths,atalternatingmonthintervals.TheSurveillancemaybeperformedinseparaesepstopreventinjectingboronintotheRPV.AnacceptablemethodforverifyingflowfromthepumptotheRPVistopumpdemineralizedwaterfromatesttankthrouhoneSLCsubsystemandinto.theRPV.emonrequencyisbase1oneeerormsSurveillancendertheconditsnsthatapplydursaplantoutagandthe>k.;(gQ<><otent'arani11anperformedwiththereactoratpower~gperating~iexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallassSurveil1ancC~QwhenperformedattheonthFrequency!rem.~r;~>+erefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.yp(q3QpccpEh+5VCE'sDdtlDemonstratingthatallheattracedpipingtweentheboronv~imsolutionstoragetankandthesuction~etotheinjectionpumpsisunblockedensuresthatthereisafunctioningflowpathforinjectingthesodiumpentaboratesolution.Anacceptablemethodforverifyingthatthesuctionpipingisunblockedistopumpfromthestoragetanktothetesttank.emonthFrequencyisacceptablesincethereisalowprobabilitythatthesubjectpipingwillbeblockedduetoprecipitationoftheboronfromsolutionintheheattracedpiping.ThisisespeciallytrueinlightofthedailytemperatureverificationofthispipingrequiredbySR3.1.7.3.However,if,inperformingSR3.1.7.3,itisBMR/6STSB3.1-44(continued)Rev1,04/07/95gpostdcimp4W)er)o$+3>su<dssASeu+s'oa,0~t.@vmss'etc.+s+wld33'dod'uggegd.qzg<Pudtpgcecft~u&fe4a+aPod"pseRC)d3g&45(b<Lrar~JdndFfcesIteJu(Htg<<~<rqff~iis~ef-k~+~ce.

Section3.2

APRMGainandSetpoint3.2.4.3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.4AveragePowerRangeMonitor(APRH)GainandSetpointLCO3.2.4a~b.C.MFLPDshallbelessthanorequaltoFractionofRTP(FRTP);orEachrequiredAPRMFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueshallbemodifiedby<FRTP/HFLPD;orl~EachrequiredAPRHgainshallbeadjustedsuchthattheAPRMreadingsare>100%timesHFLPD.APPLICABILITY:THERMALPOWER>25%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREIOUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Requirementsofthe~~LCOnotmet.A.1SatisfytherequirementsoftheLCO.6hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<25%RTP.4hoursNMP23.2-5Revision+~+

APRHGainandSetpoint3.2.4.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.4.1NOTE-NotrequiredtobemetifSR3.2.4.2issatisfiedforLCO3.2.4.borLCO3.2.4.crequirements.VerifyHFLPDiswithinlimits.Oncewithin12hoursafter25%RTPAND24hoursthereafterSR3.2.4.2-NOTE-NotrequiredtobemetifSR3.2.4.1issatisfiedforLCO3.2.4.arequirements.Verifyeachrequired:a.APRHFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueismodifiedby<FRTP/HFLPD;orb.APRHgainisadjustedsuchthattheAPRHreadingis>lOONtimesHFLPD.12hoursNHP23.2-6RevisionP'Q~

HCPRB3.2.2.BASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.2.2.2Becausethetransientanalysistakescreditforconservatisminthescramspeedperformance,itmustbedemonstratedthatthespecificscramspeeddistributionisconsistentwiththatusedinthetransientanalysis.SR3.2.2.2determinesthevalueofv,whichisameasureoftheactualscramspeeddistributioncomparedwiththeassumeddistribution.TheHCPRoperatinglimitisthendeterminedbasedonaninterpolationbetweentheapplicablelimitsforOptionA(scramtimesofLCO3.1.4,"ControlRodScramTimes")andOptionB(realisticscramtimes)analyses.Theparametervmustbedeterminedoncewithin72hoursaftereachsetofscramtimetestsrequiredbySR3.1.4.1,SR3.1.4.2,andSR3.1.4.4becausetheeffectivescramspeeddistributionmaychangeduringthecycleoraftermaintenancethatcouldaffectscramtimes'he72hourCompletionTimeisacceptableduetotherelativelyminorchangesinvexpectedduringthefuelcycle.REFERENCES1.NUREG-0562,June1979.2.NEDE-24011-P-A,"GEStandardApplicationforReactorFuel,"(revisionspecifiedintheCOLR).3.SupplementalReloadLicensingReportforNineHilePointNuclearStationUnit2,(revisionspecifiedintheCOLR).4.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).5,"BWR/6GenericRodWithdrawalErrorAnalysis,"GeneralElectricStandardSafetyAnalysisReport,GESSAR-II,Appendix15B.NHP283.2-7RevisionA'g

APRNGainandSetpointB3.2.4.BASESLCO(continued)C.FunctionAllowableValuebytheratioofFRTPtotheIpsecorelimitingvalueofHFLPD;orIncreasingtheAPRHgainstocausetheAPRMtoreadgreaterthan100(X)timesHFLPD.ThisConditionistoaccountforthereductioninmargintothefuelcladdingintegritySLandthefuelcladding1Xplasticstrainlimit.NFLPDistheratioofthelimitingLHGRtotheLHGR1imitforthespecificbundletype.Aspowerisreduced,ifthedesignpowerdistributionismaintained,HFLPDisreducedinproportiontothereductioninpower.However,ifpowerpeakingincreasesabovethedesignvalue,theHFLPDisnot'educedinproportiontothereductioninpower.Undertheseconditions,theAPRNgainisadjustedupwardortheAPRNFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueisreducedaccordingly.Whenthereactorisoperatingwithpeakinglessthanthedesignvalue,iti'snotnecessarytomodifytheAPRNFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValue.AdjustingtheAPRMgainormodifyingtheAPRNFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValueisequivalenttomaintainingMFLPDlessthanorequaltoFRTP,asstatedintheLCO.ForcompliancewithLCOItemb(APRNFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValuemodification)orItemc(APRHgainadjustment),onlyAPRHsrequiredtobeOPERABLEperLCO3.3.1.1,Function2.b,arerequiredtobemodifiedoradjusted.Inaddition,eachAPRHmaybeallowedtohaveitsgainadjustedorAllowableValuemodifiedindependentlyofotherAPRNsthatarehavingtheirgainadjustedorAllowableValuemodified.APPLICABILITYTheHFLPDlimit,APRHgainadjustment,orAPRHFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunctionAllowableValuemodificationisprovidedtoensurethatthefuelcladdingintegritySLandthefuelcladding1Xplasticstrainlimitarenotviolatedduringdesignbasistransients.AsdiscussedintheBasesforLCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,andLCO3.2.3,sufficientmargintotheselimitsexistsbelow25%RTPand,therefore,theserequirementsareonlynecessarywhentheplantisoperatingat>25XRTP.(continued)NMP2B3~2-14RevisionP'@

ITIFTlNLCo9,P.9,>gaybl(oog/V,(~e.i"oiFeb4FRTPhlL3,2.2TheAvereaeIAPRMIliow~simulatedthermalpowersIescfaQlshaNI'toOspeciIhlLIS+SKEIKZfTlNACOITIWhenTHERMALPOWERiagreaterthanOrIto25%ofRATEDTHMALhG25l5:WiththeAPRMflow.biasedsimulatedthermalpower~pscalescramtripsetpcintlessconservativethanIhevalueshownintheAllowableValuecolumnforS,aaabovedeterminedofiA.rpQf/oA'8acnw5m'usttocuaLstantwiththehoursorrMALPOWERtolessthan25%ofRATEDTHERRIRwithin6POWERwithintheA44'ije,t4.2.2TheFRACTIONOFRATEDTHERMALPOWERIFRTPIandtheCOREMAXIMUMFRACTIONOFUMITINQPOWERDENSTY(CMFLPO)ANbedetermined,thevalueofT~~calculated.andthemostrecentactualAPRMfiow+iasedsimulatedthermalpower~pscalescramtripsetpointverifiedtobewithintheabovelimitoradjusted.asretired:a,Athestonce.per24hours.vd5'gb,Within12hot@aafterTHERMALPOWER,and1ofRATEDc.IneaNyandatleastonceper12batswhenthereactorisoperatiogwithCMFLPOgreater~orequaltoFRTP.L.(d.T?e4;0.4not~WithC~LpQgreeterthentheFRTpratherthenadjuringtheApRMsett,'ioints,theApRMgain~beedjLNtedsothatAPRMorcAPRMdoesna100%ofERMALWERandapanelofTisetheCORELIR.gqNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/42-2AmendmentNo.~=.'

APRMGainandSetpoin~sf3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.QAveragePowerRangeHonitor(APRH)GainandSetpoin0ialptialFETORa.HFLPDshallbelessthanorequaltoFractionofIRTP;orb.EachreuiredAPRMeeappcaeor>ntseiedinheLsha1c.EachrequiredAPRHgainshallbeadjustedsuchthattheAPRHreadingsare>100KtimesMFLPD.Apgl.)APPLICABILITY:THERHALPOWER>25KRTP.ACTIONS7.X.1Ac.tCONDITIONA.RequirementsoftheLCOnotmet.RE(VIREOACTIONA.lSatisfytherequirementsoftheLCO.COHPLETIONTIHE6hours")B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletion~Timenotmet.B.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<25%RTP.4hoursBWR/6STS3.2-4Rev1,04/07/95

gczySURVEILLANCEREOUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEAPRHGainandSetpoin+3.2+FREQUENCYSR3.2.4.14,w.x.a)QR.>.i.4)NOTE-NotrequiredtobemetifsatisfiedforLCO3.g.requirements.3.2.4.2isorcVerifyMFLPOiswithinlimits.ica$.2.I.Oncewithin12hoursafter>25KRTPANO24hoursthereafterSR3.2.$.2OTE-----------NNotrequiredtobemeti3.2.4..1issatisfiedforLCO3.2..4requirements.VeriAHsetointsorg>nsaadjusteorthcalcultedMFLPO.12hoursr(a.,Ws,v].~jeP~~c.h~At4~~kle@~i"i~iswoLFirgky4FkTpy~popo;~i.Ipppp~(~(g~J~ggJs~cK/y<'y~+~~gfFLPOSWR/6STS3.2-5Rev1,04/07/95

!~~

~R222Becausethetransientanalysistakescreditforconservatisminthescramspeedperformance,itmustbedemonstratedthatthespecificscramspeeddistributionisconsistentwiththatusedinthetransientanalysis.SR3.2.2.2determinesthevalueof~,whichisameasureoftheactualscramspeeddistributioncomparedwiththeassumeddistribution.TheMCPRoperatinglimitisthendeterminedbasedonaninterpolationbetweentheapplicablelimitsforOptionA(scramtimesofLCO3.1.4,"ControlRodScramTimes")andOptionB(realisticscramtimes)analyses.Theparameter~mustbedeterminedoncewithin72hoursaftereachsetofscramtimetestsrequiredbySR3.1.4.1,SR3.1.4.2,andSR3.1.4.4becausetheeffectivescramspeeddistributionmaychangeduringthecycleoraftermaintenancethatcouldaffectscramtimes.The72hourCompletionTimeisacceptableduetotherelativelyminorchangesinrexpectedduringthefuelcycle.)INERTREFEREN2.NEDE-24011-P-A,"GEStandardApplicationforReactorFuel,"(revisionspecifiedintheCOLR).3;SupplementalReloadLicensingReportforNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit2,.(revisionspecifiedintheCOLR).InsertPageB3.2-8

APRHGainandSetpoinB3.2.4APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)p)~$&5Icc~QJgpJ~+gi+pfQAqiana~~u~(~t)c4Rwrrw~C/iCLk'SAtotheoperatinglimits(APLHGHCPoccurs.LCO3.2.1,'AVERAGEPLANARLINERHEATGENERATIONRATE(APLHGR),"CjjjglLCO3.2,2,"HINIMUMCRITICALPOWERRATIOMCPR),"limittheinitialmarginstotheseoperatinglimitsaaconditionssothatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsaremetduringtransientsinitiatedfromratedconditions.Atinitialpowerlevelslessthanratedlevelsthemargindegradationofhce+theAPLHGtheMCPRduringatransientcanbegreaterthanatCKeratedŽconditionevent.Thisgreatermargindegradationduringthetransientisprimarilyoffsetbythelargerinitialmargintolimitsatthelowerthanratedpowerlevels.However,powerdistributionscanbehypothesizedthatwouldresultinreducedmarginstothepretransientoperatinglimit.Whencombinedwiththeincreasedseverityofcertaintransientsatotherthanratedconditions,theSLscouldbeapproached.Atsubstantiallyreducedpowerlevels,highlypeakedpowerdistributionscouldbeobtainedthatcouldreducethermalmarginstotheminimumlevelsrequiredfortransientevents.Topreventormitigatesuchsituations,eithertheAPRHgainisadusteduwartecorelimitingHFLPDotheTP,orthewAPRHisrequiredtobereducedbytheratioofFRTPtotecorelimitingHFLPD.EitheroftheseadjustmentseffectivelycounterstheincreasedseverityofsomeeventsatotherthanratedconditionsbyproportionallyincreasingtheAPRHgainorproportionallyloweringthewsAPRMnsdependentontheincreasedpeasngtatmaybeencountere.TheAPRHgainandsetpoinsatisfyCriteria2and3ofNLCOHeetinganyoneofthefollowingconditionsensuresacceptableoperatingmarginsforeventsdescribedabove:a.Limitingexcesspowerpeaking;b.ReducingtheAPRHflowiasuscatheratioofFRTPthecorelimitingalueofHFLPD;or(continued)BWR/6STS83.2-14RevI,04/07/95

Volume3Section3.3;ITS,'Bases,andCTSMarkup/DOCs

SRMInstrumentationB3.3.1.2.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.2.1andSR3.3.1.2.3(continued)includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthattheinstrumenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyofonceevery12hoursforSR3.3.1.2.1isbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.WhileinNODES3and4,reactivitychangesarenotexpected;therefore,the12hourFrequencyisrelaxedto24hoursforSR3.3.1.2.3.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththechannelsrequiredbytheLCO.SR3.3.1.2.2ToprovideadequatecoverageofpotentialreactivitychangesinthecorewhenthefueledregionencompassesmorethanoneSRM,oneSRNisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinthequadrantwhereCOREALTERATIONSarebeingperformed,andtheotherOPERABLESRNmustbeinanadjacentquadrantcontainingfuel.Note1statesthatthisSRisrequiredtobemetonlyduringCOREALTERATIONS.ItisnotrequiredtobemetatothertimesinMODE5sincecorereactivitychangesarenotoccurring.ThisSurveillanceconsistsofareviewofplantlogstoensurethatSRNsrequiredtobeOPERABLEforgivenCOREALTERATIONSare,infact,OPERABLE.IntheeventthatonlyoneSRNisrequiredtobeOPERABLE(whenthefueledregionencompassesonlyoneSRN),perTable3.3.1.2-1,footnote(b),onlythea.portionofthisSRisrequired.Note2clarifiesthatmorethanoneofthethreerequirementscanbemetbythesameOPERABLESRM.The12hourFrequencyisbaseduponoperatingexperienceandsupplementsoperationalcontrolsoverrefuelingactivities,whichincludestepstoensurethattheSRNsrequiredbytheLCOareintheproperquadrant.SR3.3.1.2.4ThisSurveillanceconsistsofaverificationoftheSRMinstrumentreadouttoensurethattheSRMreadingisgreaterthanaspecifiedminimumcountrate.Thisensuresthatthe(Qdetectorsareindicatingcountratesindicativeofneutronfluxlevelswithinthecore.WithfewfuelassembliescontiuedB3.3-39RevisionA'Q8

SRHInstrumentationB3.3.1.2.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.2.4(continued)loaded,theSRNswillnothaveahighenoughcountratetosatisfytheSR.Therefore,allowancesaremadeforloadingsufficient"source"material,intheformofirradiatedfuelassemblies,toestablishtheminimumcountrate.Toaccomplishthis,theSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatthecountrateisnotrequiredtobemetonanSRHthathaslessthanorequaltofourfuelassembliesadjacenttotheSRHandnootherfuelassembliesareintheassociatedcorequadrant.WithfourorlessfuelassembliesloadedaroundeachSRNandnootherfuelassembliesintheassociatedquadrant,evenwithacontrolrodwithdrawntheconfigurationwillnotbecritical.TheFrequencyisbaseduponchannelredundancyandotherinformationavailableinthecontrolroom,andensuresthattherequiredchannelsarefrequentlymonitoredwhilecorereactivitychangesareoccurring.Whennoreactivitychangesareinprogress,theFrequencyisrelaxedfrom12hoursto24hours.SR3.3.1;2.5andSR3.3.1.2.6PerformanceofaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTdemonstratestheassociatedchannelwillfunctionproperly.SR3.3.1.2.5isrequiredinNODE5,andthe7dayFrequencyensuresthatthechannelsareOPERABLEwhilecorereactivitychangescouldbeinprogress.This7dayFrequencyisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceandonotherSurveillances(suchasaCHANNELCHECK)thatensureproperfunctioningbetweenCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTS.SR3.3.1.2.6isrequiredinNODE2withIRMsonRange2orbelowandinNODES3and4.SincecorereactivitychangesdonotnormallytakeplaceinNODES3and4andcorereactivitychangesaredueonlytocontrolrodmovementinNODE2,theFrequencyhasbeenextendedfrom7daysto31days.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandonotherSurveillances(suchasCHANNELCHECK)thatensureproperfunctioningbetweenCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTS.continuedB3.3-40RevisionA

PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.d.RCICTurbineExhaustDiahramPressure-Hih(continued)thepotentialforriskduetopossiblefailureoftheinstrumentspreventingRCICinitiations.Therefore,theymeetCriterion4ofReference4.TheRCICTurbineExhaustDiaphragmPressure-HighsignalsareinitiatedfromfourpressuretransmittersthatareconnectedtotheareabetweentherupturediaphragmsontheRCICturbineexhaustline.FourchannelsofRCICTurbineExhaustDiaphragmPressure-HighFunctionareavailableandarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatnosingleinstrumentfailurecanprecludetheisolationfunction.TheAllowableValueisselectedtobelowenoughtopreventdamagetotheRCICturbine.ThisFunctionisolatestheGroup10valves.3.e3.f3.3.h3.i.AreaTemerature-HihAreaTemperaturesareprovidedtodetectaleakfromtheRCICsteampiping.Theisolationoccurswhenaverysmallleakhasoccurredandisdiversetothehighflowinstrumentation.Ifthesmallleakisallowedtocontinuewithoutisolation,offsitedoselimitsmaybereached.TheseFunctionsarenotassumedinanyUSARtransientoraccidentanalysis,sinceboundinganalysesareperformedforlargebreakssuchasrecirculationorHSLbreaks.AreaTemperature-Highsignalsareinitiatedfromthermocouplesthatarelocatedintheareathatisbeingmonitored.TwoinstrumentsforeachFunctionmonitoreacharea.TwochannelsforeachareamonitoredbytheTemperature-HighFunctionsareavailableandarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatnosingleinstrumentfailurecanprecludetheisolationfunction.TherearetwochannelsfortheRCICequipmentroomarea,twochannelsfortheRCICsteamlinetunnelarea,andfourchannelsfortheRHRequipmentroomareas(twoperarea),eightchannelsforthereactorbuildingpipechaseareas(twoperarea),and10channelsforthereactorbuildinggeneralareas(twoperarea).continuedB3.3-169RevisionpQQ

PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6.1.BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLCO,andAPPLICABILITY4.h.ManualInitiation(continued)ThisFunctionisolatestheGroup6and7valves.5.RHRShutdownCoolinSstemIsolation5.a5.d5.e.AreaTemerature-HihAreaTemperature-HighisprovidedtodetectaleakfromtheRHRSDCSystempiping.Theisolationoccurswhenaverysmallleakhasoccurredandisdiversetothehighflowinstrumentation.Ifthesmallleakisallowedtocontinuewithoutisolation,offsitedoselimitsmaybereached.TheseFunctionsarenotassumedinanyUSARtransientoraccidentanalysis,sinceboundinganalysesareperformedforlargebreakssuchasHSLBs.AreaTemperature-Highsignalsareinitiatedfromthermocouplesthatarelocatedintheareathatisbeingmonitored.TwoinstrumentsforeachFunctionmonitoreacharea/room.Twenty-twochannelsforAreaTemperature-HighFunctionsareavailableandarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatnosingleinstrumentfailurecanprecludetheisolationfunction.TherearefourchannelsfortheRHRequipmentroomareas(twoperarea),eightchannelsfortheQ6reactorbuildingpipechaseareas(twoperarea),and10channelsforthereactorbuildinggeneralareas(twoperarea).TheAreaTemperature-HighFunctionsareonlyrequiredtobe.OPERABLEinNODE3.InMODES1and2,theReactorVesselPressure-HighFunctionandotheradministrativecontrolsensurethatthisflowpathremainsisolatedtopreventunexpectedlossofinventoryviathisflowpath.TheAllowableValuesaresetlowenoughtodetectaleakequivalentto25gpm.ThisFunctionisolatestheGroup5valves.5.b.ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLevel3LowRPVwaterlevelindicatesthecapabilitytocoolthefuelmaybethreatened.ShouldRPVwaterleveldecreasetoofar,fueldamagecouldresult.Therefore,isolationofsomecontinuedB3.3-176Revision+Qg

RPSElectricPowerHonitoring-LogicB3.3.8.2.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.8.2.1ACHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTisperformedoneachovervoltage,undervoltage,andunderfrequencychanneltoensurethatthechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.Anysetpointadjustmentshallbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.AsnotedintheSurveillance,theCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhiletheplantisinaconditioninwhichthelossoftheRPSlogicbuswillnotjeopardizesteadystatepoweroperation.The24hoursisintendedtoindicateanoutageofsufficientdurationtoallowforschedulingandproperperformanceoftheSurveillance.The184dayFrequencyandtheNoteintheSurveillancearebasedonguidanceprovidedinGenericLetter91-09(Ref.3).SR3.3.8.2.2CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloopandthesensor.Thistestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstothemeasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.CHANNELCALIBRATIONleavesthechanneladjustedtoaccountforinstrumentdriftsbetweensuccessivecalibrationsconsistentwiththeplantspecificsetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyisbasedupontheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.SR3.3.8.2.3Performanceofasystemfunctionaltestdemonstratesthat,witharequiredsystemactuation(simulatedoractual)signal,thelogicofthesystemwillautomaticallytripopentheassociatedpowermonitoringassemblycircuitbreaker.Onlyonesignalperpowermonitoringassemblyisrequiredtobetested.ThisSurveillanceoverlapswiththeCHANNELCALIBRATIONtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.ThesystemfunctionaltestoftheClassIEcircuitbreakersisincludedaspartofthistesttoprovidecontinuedB3.3-233RevisionA'

RPSElectricPowerMonitoring-ScramSolenoidsB3.3.8.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.8.3.2(continued)TheFrequencyisbasedupontheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.SR3.3.8.3.3Performanceofasystemfunctionaltestdemonstratesthat,witharequiredsystemactuation(simulatedoractual)signal,thelogicofthesystemwillautomaticallytripopentheassociatedpowermonitoringassemblycircuitbreaker.Onlyonesignalperpowermonitoringassemblyisrequiredtobetested.ThisSurveillanceoverlapswiththeCHANNELCALIBRATIONtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.ThesystemfunctionaltestoftheClassIEcircuitbreakersisincludedaspartofthistesttoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.Ifthebreakersareincapableofoperating,theassociatedelectricpowermonitoringassemblywouldbeinoperable.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.REFERENCES1.USAR,Section8.3.1.1.3.2.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).3.NRCGenericLetter91-09,"ModificationofSurveillanceIntervalfortheElectricProtectiveAssembliesinPowerSuppliesfortheReactor'rotectionSystem."B3.3-241RevisionPQA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIV(continued)LA.2DetailsofthemethodsforperformingCTS4.3.1.1,theIRMandAPRMCHANNELCHECK(CTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(b)),theLPRMCHANNELCALIBRATION(CTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(e)),theAPRMFlow-BiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleCHANNELCALIBRATION(CTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(f)),theAPRMFlow-BiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(CTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(h)),andCTS4.3.1.2,theLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST,areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.Furthermore,theBasesalsodescribesthattheflowunitsareanintegralpartoftheAPRMFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunction.ThusaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTandaCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillancewouldhavetoincludetheflowunits(asrequiredbytheirassociateddefinitionsinITSSection1.1),ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheRPSInstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.1.1andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretheRPSinstrumentationaremaintainedOPERABLE.Specifically,theSRscontinuetorequireSRM/IRMandIRM/APRMoverlaptobeverified,theLPRMstobecalibrated,aCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONto.beperformedontheAPRM.FlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunction,andLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTStobeperformed.Assuch",theserelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.3RequirementsfortheremovalofRPSshortinglinksinCTSTable3.3.1-1Note(b)(includingCTSTable3.3.1-1footnote*)areproposedtoberelocatedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.TheshortinglinksarerequiredtoberemovedwithanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblieswhenSHUTDOWNMARGINhasnotbeendemonstratedandiftheRefuelpositionone-rod-outinterlockisnotOPERABLE.TheprimaryreactivitycontrolfunctionsduringrefuelingaretherefuelinginterlocksandSHUTDOWNMARGIN.TherefuelinginterlocksarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbyITS3;9.1andITS3.9.2.AlthoughSHUTDOWNMARGINmaynotyethavebeendemonstrateduntilafterCOREALTERATIONSarecompletedinMODE5,SHUTDOWNMARGINcalculationsperformedpriortoalteringthecore,alongwithproceduralcomplianceforanyCOREALTERATIONS,providesindicationthatadequateSHUTDOWNMARGINisavailable,InadditiontoSRMOPERABILITYwithshortinglinksremoved,.IRMOPERABILITYwillcontinuetoprovidebackupforthecreditedfunctionsforanysignificantreactivityexcursions.SincetheSRMchannelhighfluxscram(withshortinglinksremoved)providesonlyanuncreditedbackupinNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LESSRTRITIVELA.3(cont'd)MODE5,therelocationoftheshortinglinkremovalrequirementdoesnotsignificantlyaffectsafety.DetailsforcontrolofshortinglinkremovalwillberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.4TheLPRMinputsforOPERABILITYoftheAPRMareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TheBasesstatesthatifsufficientLPRMsarenotavailable(thesamenumberasinCTSTable3.3.1-1,Note(c)),thentheassociatedAPRMisinoperable.Assuch,thesedetailsarenotnecessaryintheRPSInstrumentationTable3.3.1.1-1.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.Inaddition,CTSTable3.3.1-1Note(i)statesthattheTurbineStopValve-ClosureandtheTurbineControlValveFastClosure,ValveTripSystemOilPressure-LowFunctionsareautomaticallybypassedbasedonturbinefirststagepressurewhenTHERMALPOWERislessthan30%ofRATEDTHERMALPOWER.ThissystemdesigndetailisproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThisisadesigndetailthatisnotnecessarytoincludeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheRPSInstrumentation,sincetheOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.3.1.1andproposedSR3.3.1.1.15.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.5CTSTable3.3.1-1Note(e)statestheMainSteamIsolationValve-ClosureFunctionshallbeautomaticallybypassedwhenthereactormodeswitchisnotintheRunposition,CTSTable3.3.1-1Note(g)statesthattheDrywellPressure-HighFunctionalsoactuatestheStandbyGasTreatmentSystem,CTSTable3.3.1-1Note(j)statesthatTurbineStopValve-ClosureandtheTurbineStopValveFastClosure,ValveTripSystemOilPressure-LowFunctionsalsoactuatetheEOC-RPTSystem,CTSTable3.3.1-1Action6statesthecorrespondingturbinefirststagepressureassociatedwith30%RTP,andCTSTable2.2.1-1Function4describestheAllowableValueintermsofinches"aboveinstrumentzero."ThesesystemdesigndetailsareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.ThesearedesigndetailsthatarenotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheRPSinstrumentationsinceOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.3.1.1.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Inaddition,theApplicabilitiesfortheTurbineStopValve-ClosureandtheNMP2RevisionA E~

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.5(cont'd)TurbineControlValveFastClosure,TripOilPressure-LowFunctionshavebeenmodifiedinITSTable3.3.1.1-1tobeR30%RTP,consistentwiththedesignandCTSTable3.3.1-1Note(i).LA.6CTSTable2.2.1-1Note(a)statesthattheAPRMFlow-BiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscalescramAllowableValuevariesasafunctionofrecirculationloopdriveflow(W).ThisdetailofsystemdescriptionisproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ITS3.3.1.1andassociatedSRswillensurethattheAllowableValueismaintainedproperly.ThisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheAllowableValueismaintainedproperly.Assuch,thisrelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LD.1TheFrequenciesforperformingtheRPSLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT)ofCTS4.3.1.2forallFunctionsexcept2.a,2.b,2.c,2.d,and2.e(proposedSR3.3.1.1.13)andtheRPSRESPONSETIMETESTofCTS4.3.1.3(proposedSR3.3.1.1.16)havebeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheseSRsensurethatRPSlogicwillfunctionasdesignedinresponsetoananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.ExtendingtheSurveillanceTestintervalfortheRPSLSFTandRESPONSETIMETESTisacceptablebecausetheRPSisverifiedtobeoperatingproperlythroughouttheoperatingcyclebytheperformanceofCHANNELCHECKSand,insomecases,CHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTS.ThistestingensuresthatasignificantportionoftheRPScircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.AdditionaljustificationforextendingtheSurveillanceTestintervalisthattheRPSnetwork,includingtheactuatinglogic,isdesignedtobqsinglefailureproofandtherefore,ishighlyreliable.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONLHAN-LRTRITIVELD.1(cont'd)Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LD.2TheFrequencyforperformingtheCTS4.3.1.1CHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTforCTSTable4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnit11,ReactorModeSwitch-ShutdownPositionFunction(proposedSR3.3.1.1.12)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18to24months.TheReactorModeSwitchShutdownPositionprovidesmanualtripcapabilityoftheReactorProtectionSystemthatisredundanttotheautomaticprotectiveinstrumentationchannelsandtotheManualScrampushbuttons.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextenditsSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshowrithatthistestnormallypassesitsSurveillanceatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.ExtendingtheSurveillanceTestintervalfortheReactorModeSwitch-ShutdownPositionisacceptableduetothesystemredundancyandbecausetheRPSSystemisverifiedtobeoperatingproperlythroughouttheoperatingcyclebytheperformanceofCHANNELCHECKSandCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTSontheothertripfunctions.ThistestingensuresthatasignificantportionoftheRPScircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.AdditionaljustificationforextendingtheSurveillanceTestintervalisthattheRPSnetwork,includingtheactuatinglogic,isdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposedNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESRESTRICTIVELD.2(cont'd)24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCTS4.3.1.1CHANNELCALIBRATIONforCTSTable4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnitsl.a,3,4,5,7,8.b,9,and10(proposedSR3.3.1.1.13forFunctionsl.a,3,4,5,6,7.b,8,and.9)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ThesubjectSRensuresthattheRPSSystemwillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheRPSsystemalongwiththeRPSinitiationlogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandthereforeishighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedRPSinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinthedesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation.Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSFunctionalUnitnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:FunctionalUnit1.a,IntermediateRangeMonitor(IRM)NeutronFlux-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyafissionchamber,voltagepreamplifier,andameansquarevoltage-widerangemonitor.TheequipmentissuppliedbyGeneralElectric.ItisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and5withanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassembliestominimizetheconsequencesofacontrolrodwithdrawalerror.Duringthesemodesofoperationothersurveillancesareperformedmorefrequentlywhichwilldetectmajordeviationinthesystem.Theequipmentdriftwasevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis.Theresultsofthisanalysissupport24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP210RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)FunctionalUnit3,ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB9TransmittersandRosemount510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.FunctionalUnit4,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4TransmittersandRosemount510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremain'unchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.FunctionalUnit5,MainSteamIsolationValve-ClosureThisfunctionisperformedbyNAMCOEA740limitswitches.Limitswitchesaremechanicaldevicesthatrequiremechanicaladjustmentonly;driftisnotapplicabletothesedevices.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffectlimitswitcheswithrespecttodrift.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)FunctionalUnit7,DrywellPressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB5TransmittersandRosemount510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.FunctionalUnit8.b,ScramDischargeVolumeWaterLevel-High,FloatSwitchThisfunctionisperformedbyModel751floatswitchesmanufacturedbyMagnetrol.Thesedevicesaremechanicaldevicesthatrequiremechanicalsettingattheproperlevelonly;driftisnotapplicabletothesedevices.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervalstoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffectthelevelswitcheswithrespecttodrift.FunctionalUnit9,TurbineStopValve-ClosureThisfunctionisperformedbyNAMCOEA170limitswitches.Limitswitchesaremechanicaldevicesthatrequiremechanicaladjustmentonly;driftisnotapplicabletothesedevices.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffectlimitswitcheswithrespecttodrift.FunctionalUnit10,TurbineControlValveFastClosure,TripOilPressure-LowThisfunctionisperformedbyStatic-0-RingPressureSwitches9TA-BB5-NX-C1A-JXITX7.TheStatic-0-RingPressureSwitcheswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP212RevisionA El DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION'TEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.2TheFrequencyforperformingtheCTS4.3.1.1CHANNELCALIBRATIONforCTSTable4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnits2.a,2.b,and2.c(proposedSR3.3.1.1.13)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThesubjectSRensuresthattheAPRMswillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheAPRMsaredesignedtobesinglefailureproofandthereforearehighlyreliable.TheextensionoftheFrequencyto24monthsisconsistentwiththeGeneralElectricLicensingTopicalReport,.NEDC-32410P-A,"NuclearMeasurementAnalysisandControl'PowerRangeNeutronMonitor(NUMAC-PRNM)RetrofitPlusOptionIIIStabilityTripFunction,"datedOctober1995(approvalbytheNRCwasdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedSeptember5,1995).AsindicatedinNEDC-32410P-A,Section8.3.4.3.3,calibrationintervalisgenerallydeterminedbydriftofanalogcomponents,thenumberofwhichwassignificantlyreducedbythereplacementoftheAPRMswiththeNUMAC-PRNM.IntheNUMAC-PRNM,theonlyanalogcomponentsthatremainforthemainsignalprocessingareinputisolationamplifiers,asample-and-holdcircuit,andanA/Dconverter.Theseanalogcomponentsarehighlyreliableandverystablewithvirtuallynodrift.Inaddition,thesample-and-holdcircuitandA/Dconvertersaretestedaspartoftheautomaticself-test.TheNUMAC-PRNMreplacedallanalogprocessinghardware,includingthatusedforflowprocessing,withdigitalprocessingthathasnodrift.Anydigitalfailureswillbeidentifiedbytheautomaticself-test,ChannelChecks,orinveryrarecasesbytheChannelFunctionalTest.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthisGEanalysisasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedinthe.NRCSERdatedMarch31,1998,(includingthecorrectiondatedApril15,1998).TheSERNMP213RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVELE.2(cont'd)concludedthattheGEanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2.TheSERallowedNMP2toextenditsoldCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceFrequencyfrom184daysto18months,since18monthsisthecurrentrefuelingcycle.Therefore,sincetheGEanalysissupportsa24monthCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceFrequency,thischangeisconsideredacceptable."Specific"L.lDuringnormaloperationinMODES3and4,allcontrolrodsarefullyinsertedandtheReactorModeSwitchShutdownpositioncontrolrodwithdrawalblock(ITS3.3.2.1)doesnotallowanycontrolrodtobewithdrawn.Undertheseconditions,theRPSfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE;thereforetheIRM,ReactorModeSwitchShutdownPosition;andManualScramrequirementsforMODES3and4(CTSTables3.3.1-1and4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnits1,11,and12)havebeendeleted.TheActionsassociatedwiththeseFunctionsforMODES3and4arealsodeleted(CTSTable3.3.1-1Actions2,7,and8).SpecialOperationsLCO3.10.3andLCO3.10.4willallowasinglecontrolrodtobewithdrawninMODES3or4byallowingtheReactorModeSwitchtobeintheRefuelposition.Therefore,theIRMMODES3and4RPSrequirementshavebeenincludedinLCO3.10.3andLCO3.10.4.L.2CTSTables3.3.1-1and4.3.1.1-1requireFunctionalUnits1.a,1.b,11,and12(IRMNeutronFlux-High,IRMInoperative,ReactorModeSwitch-ShutdownPosition,andManualScram)tobeOPERABLEinMODE5.ITS3.3.1.1onlyrequirestheseFunctionstobeOPERABLEinMODE5whenacontrolrodiswithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies(ITSTable3.3.1.1-1Note(a)).ControlrodswithdrawnfromorinsertedintoacorecellcontainingnofuelassemblieshaveanegligibleimpactonthereactivityofthecoreandthereforearenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEwiththecapabilitytoscram.Providedallrodsotherwiseremaininserted,theRPSFunctionsservenopurposeandarenotrequired.InthisconditiontherequiredSHUTDOWNMARGIN(ITS3.1.1)andtherequiredone-rod-outinterlock(ITS3.9.2)ensurenoeventrequiringRPSwilloccur.ThischangeisalsosimilartotheallowanceprovidedinCTSTable3.3.1-1Note(h)andCTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(m)forFunctionalUnits8.aand8.b(RefertoDiscussionofChangeL.5belowforfurtherdiscussion).Inaddition,CTSTable3.3.1-1Actions3and9,astheyapplytoFunctionalUnitsl.a,l.b,11,and12,havealsobeenmodifiedinITS3.3.1.1ACTIONHtobeconsistentwiththenewApplicability.Currently,CoreAlterationsarerequiredtobesuspendedand.allinsertablecontrolrodsmustbeinserted.Sinceallcontrolrodsarerequiredtobefullyinsertedduringfuelmovement(enforcedbyITS3.9.1),theproposedNMP214RevisionA

i.

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)Applicabilitycannotbeenteredwhilemovingfuel.Thus,theonlypossibleCoreAlterationiscontrolrodwithdrawal,whichisadequatelyaddressedinITS3.3.1.1ACTIONH.Furthermore,CTSTable3.3.1-1Action9alsorequiresthereactormodeswitchtobelockedinShutdown.ThisActionhasalsobeendeletedsincetheproposedApplicabilityonlyrequiresthecontrolrodstobeinserted(i.e.,oncethecontrolrodsareinserted,theRPSFunctionsarenolongerrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thusthereisnoneedtoplacethereactormodeswitchinShutdown).ThisisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.L.3TripsetpointslistedinCTSTable2.2.1-1,(includingfootnote*)andCTSTable3.3.1-1Action6,footnote*,arenotincludedintheITSandalltreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS2.2.1andCTS3.3.1aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.1.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.NMP215Revision~3

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVE(continued)L.4TheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighRPSFunction(CTSTables2.2.1-1,3.3.1-1,and4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnit6,'ncludingTable3.3.1-1Note(d)andTable4.3.1.1-1Note(j))anditsassociatedAction(CTSTable3.3.1-1Action5)andSurveillanceRequirementsisproposedtobedeleted.Inaddition,theMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunctionforCTS3.3.2,IsolationActuationInstrumentation,isproposedtobedeletedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.ThisisdescribedinDiscussionofChangeL.6forITS3.3.6.1.ThisproposeddeletionofthescramfunctionisbasedontheBWROwners'roupLicensingTopicalReportNEDO-31400AdatedJuly9,1987,theNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)forthatdocument,andtheinformationprovidedinthisDiscussionOfChange.EliminatingtheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorautomaticreactorshutdownfeatureandMainSteamIsolationValve(MSIV)isolationwillresultinthereducedpotentialforunnecessaryplanttransientscausedbyspuriousMainSteamLineRadiationMonitor(MSLRM)actuationtripsandwillincreaseplantoperationalflexibility.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoringSystemconsistsoffourredundantradiationmonitorslocatedabovethemainsteamlinesinthemainsteamtunnel.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoringSystemwasdesignedtoprovideanearlyindicationofgrossfuelfailures.TheoriginalintentionwastomitigatethereleaseofactivityduetoafuelfailurebyprovidingascramsignaltoterminatetheinitiatingeventandaMSIVclosuresignaltoassurecontainmentoftherelease.However,nocreditistakenforthesesignalsinanydesignbasiseventforterminatingtheinitiatingeventorassuringthereleaseremainswithinacceptedlimits.TheonlydesignbasisaccidentinwhicheithertheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoringSystemscramorMSIVisolationfunctionsarementionedisthecontrolroddropaccident.TobeconsistentwiththerequirementsofSection15.4.9oftheStandardReviewPlan,allofthepostulatedradioactivityreleasedfromthisaccidentisassumedtobereleasedtotheturbineandcondenserbeforetheisolationoccurs.Hence,theisolationresultingfromtheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorsprovidesnobenefit.TheNRCstaffhasconcludedthatremovaloftheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoringSystemtripsthatautomaticallyshutdownthereactorandclosetheMSIVsisacceptableandthatLicensingTopicalReport,NEDO-31400Amaybereferencedinsupportofanamendmentrequestprovidedthat:a.)Theapplicantdemonstratesthattheassumptionswithregardtoinputvalues(includingpowerperassemblyandX/Q,anddecaytimes)thataremadeinthegenericanalysisoftheLicensingTopicalReportboundthosefortheplant.16RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNICALCHANGES-LRESTRITIVEL.4(cont'd)Table1ofthisDiscussionofChangeprovidesacomparisonofkeyinputparametersandTable2comparesthedoseassessmentbetweentheNMP2UpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportandtheNEDO-31400Aanalysisassumptions.ThehigherpowerlevelforNMP2isusedtodeterminethesourceterm.OtherconsiderationsenterintothefinaltwohourExclusionAreaBoundaryDose,suchastheatmosphericdispersionfactor,X/Q.InthiscasetheX/QisapproximatelyafactoroftenlessthantheNEDO-31400AvalueswhichmorethanoffsetsthehigherpowerlevelforNMP2.AllotherparametersarethesameormoreconservativethantheNEDO-31400Avalues.Tables1and2demonstratesthatthegenericanalysisoftheLicensingTopicalReportisboundingforNMP2.b.)Theapplicantincludessufficientevidence(implementedorproposedoperatingprocedures,orequivalentcommitments)toprovidereasonableassurancethatsignificantlyincreasedradioactivitylevelsinthemainsteamlineswillbecontrolledexpeditiouslytolimitbothoccupationalandenvironmentalreleases.NMP2has,inplace,proceduresthatensurethatanysignificantincreaseinthelevelsofradioactivityinthemainsteamlinesispromptlycontrolledtolimitenvironmentalreleasesandon-siteoccupationalexposures.NMP2plantprocedureswillbeenhancedtoincorporatetheconsiderationsofthisTechnicalSpecificationAmendment.c.)TheapplicantstandardizestheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorandoffgasradiationmonitorsetpointsat1.5timestheNitrogen-16backgrounddoserateatthemonitorlocations,andcommitstopromptlysamplethereactorcoolantforpossiblecontaminationiftheMSLRMand/ortheoffgasradiationmonitorsexceedtheiralarmsetpoint.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoralarmsetpointis1.5timestheNitrogen-16backgroundatthemonitorlocation.Thatalarmwilltriggerentryintoaprocedurewhichwillrequireareactorcoolantsampletobeobtainedandanalyzed.Theoffgaspretreatmentmonitoralarm/tripissetinaccordancewiththeOffsiteDoseCalculationManualtosatisfyCTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4).TheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforthesetpointisthat,restrictingthegrossactivityrateofnoblegasesfromthemaincondenseroffgasprovidesreasonableassurancethattheNMP217RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3,1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LRESTRITIVEL.4(cont'd)totalbodyexposuretoanindividualattheexclusionareaboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthelimitsof10CFR100intheeventthiseffluentisinadvertentlydischargeddirectlytotheenvironmentwithouttreatment.CTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4)implementstherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria60and64ofAppendixAto10CFR50.Reasonableassurance'isprovidedintheplantresponsetoincreasedradiationlevelsasdetectedbytheoffgaspretreatmentmonitor.ThepretreatmentmonitorismoresensitivetodetectingnoblegasactivitythantheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorbecausetheNitrogen-16source,dominatingtheradiationpresentattheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitor,hasdecayedpriortothepretreatmentmonitor.Theoffgaspretreatmentradiationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointisbasedonCTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4).AsrequiredbyCTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4),alevelof350,000pCi/secasmeasureddownstreamoftherecombinerwillrequirerestoringtheradioactivityratetowithinits.limitwithin72hoursor,withinthenext12hours,beinatleastHOTSHUTDOWN.Theresponsetothemoresensitivepretreatmentmonitorwillensurethatactionsaretakentolimitoccupationaldosesandenvironmentalreleases.TheeliminationofthescramfunctionassociatedwiththeMSLRMwillreducethelikelihoodofaninadvertentscram.Specifically,theplantisvulnerabletounnecessaryscramscausedbyNitrogen-16spikesorotherspurioussignalsthatcantripthiscircuit.Thisisespeciallytruewhenreactorscraminstrumentationcalibrationisinprogresssincethisworkinvolvesahalfscramsignal.Spurioussignalsaffectingtheremainingchannelcanresultinafullscramsignalwitharesultantreactortrip.Asnotedinthetopicalreport,eightscramsindustrywidehavebeenattributedtotheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorbetween1980and1987,representing162plantoperatingyears.Unnecessaryscramspresentaplantupsetthatchallengessafetyfunctions.Further,asreportedinthetopicalreport,thereductioninscramfrequencyhaseconomicalbenefitinavoidinganunnecessaryscramandtheassociatedplantrecoverylosttime.NEDO-31400Aresultsindicatethatremovingthescramandmainsteamlineisolationfunctionwillrepresentareductionintransientinitiatingeventswhichresultsina0.3%reductionincoredamagefrequencyprobability.TheNMP2IndividualPlantExamination(SAS-TR-92-001,Revision0)wasreferencedasacomparisontotheaboveNEDO-31400Aresults.TheNMP2resultsyieldedaNMP218RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.4(cont'd)0.2%reductionincoredamagefrequencyanda0.5%'eductioninearlyhighradionuclidereleasefrequency.Hence,thefinalresultisanetimprovementinsafety.Thereferencedtopicalreportalsoevaluatedtheimpactthatremovalof.thesefunctionswouldhaveonreactivitycontrolsystemfailurefrequency.Theresultswereanegligibleincrease(1.4E-09eventsperyear),whichisoffsetbytherelativelargereductionincoredamagefrequency.Hence,thefinalresultisanetimprovementtosafety.Basedontheaboveevaluation,theproposedchangesatisfiesthecriteriaofNEDO-31400AfordeletionoftheMSLRMscramfunction.Therefore,theproposedchangeisacceptable.19RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)TABLE1CONTROLRODDROPACCIDENTCOMPARISONOFKEYANALYSISINPUTVALUESNEDO-31400AVS.NMP2PARAMETERNumeroFaiFuelRodsoreAveragePower(MWt)RelativePowerLevelofFailedRods(fraction)PowerLeveoFaiRs(MWt)FissionPructReeaseromMetRodsMELTEDNON-MELTEDMassFractionofMeltedFuel%ofFissionProductsTransportedtoMainCondenseroAirorneoFissionProductsinMainCondenserMainCondenserLeakageHyrogenFowRatetoRecommer-(DesignCapability)Air/NobleGasOffgasFlowRateThyroidDoseConversionFactorBreatmgRatesWoeyDoseConversionFactor(Semi-InfiniteCloud)RadiologicalConsequencesEvaluationComputerCodeDispersionCoeicient,XQ0-2hourExclusionAreaBoundary~0-2hourExclusionAreaBoundary'harcoalBedHodupTimesNED0-31400AVALUE'.5100%NG/50%Iodines10%NG/10%Iodines0.0077100%NG10%IodmesoNG1oIines1%perdayscmsitespecificRegulatoryGuide1.109ReguatoryuieReguatoryuie1.CONAC032.5E-03sec/m'.0E-04sec/m'r=HoursXe=15daysNMP2UPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(~)1.5100%NG/50%lodines10%NG/10%Iodines30%IQ'-85(R.G.1.25)0.0077100oNG10olodmesoNoIines1operday40scmTID-14ReguatoryuieTID-DRAGONcode1.90E-04sec/m'.97E-05sec/m'r=.oursXe=20daysNMP220RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNIALHAN-LESSRESTRITIVETABLE1(continued)FOOTNOTES:Exceptasnotedin2and3below,valuesapplytotheControlRodDropAccident(CRDA)bothwithMSIVisolationandwithoutMSIVisolation.2.AppliesonlytoCRDAwithMSIVisolation.3.AppliesonlytoCRDAwithoutMSIVisolationand100%ofNobleGassourcetermprocessedthoughtheOffgasTreatmentSystem.4.ForaCRDAwithoutMSIVisolation,100%oftheNobleGasesare'held-upintheOffgasTreatmentsystemcharcoalbedsforatime;theIodinesareretainedindefinitelyinthecharcoalbeds.TABLE2CONTROLRODDROPACCIDENTDOSECOMPARISONNMP2DESIGNBASISVS.NEDO-31400ATwoHourExclusionAreaBoundaryWithMainSteamLine.IsolationUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportNEDO-31400AWithoutMainSteamIsolationUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportNEDO-31400ADose(Rem)Dose(Rem)Dose(Rem)Dose(Rem)WholeBody2.07E20.353.1E15.171.9E420.32S.SE19.17Thyroid3.34E-010.454.3E+005.73N/AN/AN/AN/AFOOTNOTE'ercentof25%of10CFR100(or6RemWholeBodyand75RemThyroid)21RevisionA 0,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)L.5TheApplicabilityofCTSTable3.3.1-1FunctionalUnits8.aand8.b,includingNote(h),andTable4.3.1.1-1FunctionalUnits8.aand8.b,includingNote(m),hasbeenmodifiedtoonlyrequireITSTable3.3.1.1-1RPSFunctions7.aand7.btobeOPERABLEinMODE5withanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.Inaddition,ITS3.3.1.1ACTIONHforMODE5onlyrequiresactiontobeinitiatedtofullyinsertcontrolrodsincorecellscontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.ControlrodswithdrawnfromorinsertedintoacorecellcontainingnofuelassemblieshaveanegligibleimpactonthereactivityofthecoreandthereforearenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEwiththecapabilitytoscram.Providedallrodsotherwiseremaininserted,theRPSFunctionsservenopurposeandarenotrequired.InthisconditiontherequiredSHUTDOWNMARGIN(ITS3.1.1)andtherequiredone-rod-outinterlock(ITS3.9.2)ensurenoeventrequiringRPSwilloccur.TheActionfortheseinoperableFunctionsinMODE5(CTSTable3.3.1-1Action3)isalsorevisedtobeconsistentwiththeproposedApplicability.Currently,CoreAlterationsarerequiredtobesuspendedandallinsertablecontrolrodsmustbeinserted.Sinceallcontrolrodsarerequiredtobefullyinsertedduringfuelmovement(enforcedbyITS3.9.1),theproposedApplicabilitycannotbeenteredwhilemovingfuel.TheonlypossibleCoreAlterationiscontrolrodwithdrawal,whichisadequatelyaddressedbyITS3.3.1.1ACTIONH.L.6TheCTSTable3.3.1-1Action6requirementtoinitiateareductioninTHERMALPOWERwithin15minuteshasbeendeleted.Immediatepowerreductionmaynotalwaysbetheconservativemethodtoassuresafety.ITS3.3.1.1RequiredActionE.1,whichrequirestheunittobe<30%RTPwithin4hours(seeDiscussionofChangeL.7below),ensurespromptactionistakentoexittheApplicabilityduetotheinoperabilityoftheassociatedRPSFunctions.L.7Thetimetoreach<30%RTPhasbeenextendedfrom2hours(CTSTable3.3.1-1Action6)to4hours(ITS3.3.1.1RequiredActionE.1).Thisextensionprovidesthenecessarytimetodecreasepowerinacontrolledandorderlymannerthatiswithinthecapabilitiesoftheunit,assumingtheminimumrequiredequipmentisOPERABLE.Thisextratimeisanacceptableexchangeinrisk;theriskofaneventduringtheadditionalperiodfortheunittobe<30%RTP,versusthepotentialriskofaunitupsetthatcouldchallengesafetysystemsresultingfromarapidpowerreduction.ThistimeisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.L.8ANotetoSR3.3.1.1.4andNote2toSR3.3.1.1.13arebeingaddedtoexempttheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequirementsofCTS4.3.1.1until12hoursafterenteringMODE2fromNMP222RevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.8(cont'd)MODE1.TheIRMNeutronFlux-UpscaleandInoperableFunctionsandtheAPRMNeutronFlux-Upscale,SetdownFunctionarerequiredinMODE2,butnotinMODE1,andtherequiredSurveillancescannotbeperformedinMODE1(priortoentryintheapplicableMODE2)withoututilizingjumpersorliftedleads.Useofthesedevicesisnotrecommendedsinceminorerrorsintheirusemaysignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofareactortransientoreventwhichisaprecursortoapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Therefore,timeisallowedtoconducttheSRsafterenteringtheapplicableMODE.Thisis'onsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.L.9ANoteisbeingaddedtotheAPRMheatbalancecalibration(CTSTable4.3.1.1-1Note(g),proposedSR3.3.1.1.3)thatstatestheSurveillanceisnotrequiredtobeperformeduntil12hoursafterTHERMALPOWER~25%RTP.ThisisallowedbecauseitisdifficulttoaccuratelydeterminecoreTHERMALPOWERfromaheatbalance(25%RTP.Atlowpowerlevels,ahighdegreeofaccuracyisunnecessarybecauseofthelargeinherentmargintothermallimits(MCPRandAPLHGR).L.10Note2hasbeenaddedtoCTS4.3.1.3(proposedSR3.3.1.1.16)thatexemptsthesensorsfortheReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-HighandReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3FunctionsfromresponsetimetestingandallowsthedesignsensorresponsetimetobeusedinthedeterminationoftheRPSRESPONSETIME.DeletionoftheresponsetimetestforthesesensorswasevaluatedinNEDO-32291"SystemAnalysisforEliminationofSelectedResponseTimeTestingRequirements,"January1994,andwasdeterminedtobeacceptableprovidedtheindividuallicenseerefe'rencingthisNEDOinaplantspecificlicenseamendmentrequestmetseveralconditionsstipulatedinthegenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291.TheevaluationprovidedbelowisconsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedintheStaff'sgenericSERforNED0-32291.NMPChasperformedareviewofNEDO-32291anddeterminedthattheNEDOgenericanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2.TheequipmentaffectedbytheproposedchangeintheTechnicalSpecificationsaretheRPSFunctionsidentifiedabove.Priortoinstallationofanewtransmitter/switchorfollowingrefurbishmentofatransmitter/switchahydraulicresponsetimetestwillbeperformedtodetermineaninitialsensorspecificresponsetimevalue.ApplicableNMP2procedureshavebeenrevised/written,asappropriate,tofulfillthisrecommendation.NMP2currentlydoesnotutilizeanytransmittersorswitchesthatusecapillarytubesinanyapplicationthatrequiresresponsetimetesting.Therefore,therecommendationthatcapillarytubetestingbeperformedafterinitialinstallationandafteranymaintenanceormodificationNMP223RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION5TECHNIALHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.10(cont'd)activitythatcoulddamagethelinesfortransmittersandswitchesthatusecapillarytubesisnotapplicabletoNMP2.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toincludestepstoinputafastramporastepchangetosystemcomponentsduringcalibrations.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toassurethattechniciansmonitorforresponsetimedegradation.Inaddition,technicianshavereceivedappropriatetrainingtomakethemawareoftheconsequencesofinstrumentresponsetimedegradation.Surveillancetestprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toensurecalibrationsandfunctionaltestsarebeingperformedinamannerthatallowssimultaneousmonitoringofboththeinputandoutputresponseofunitsundertest.NMP2'scompliancewiththeguidelinesofSupplement1toNRCBulletin90-01,"LossofFill-OilinTransmittersManufacturedbyRosemount,"wasreviewedanddocumentedinasafetyevaluationtransmittedtoNMPCbyNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1995.TheNRC'sevaluationconcludedthatNMP2'sresponsestoBulletin90-01andSupplement1conformtotherequestedactionsoftheBulletin.TheeliminationofresponsetimetestingdoesnotaffectNMPC'sresponsetotheBulletin.TheRPScomponentsforwhichresponsetimetestingisproposedto'beeliminatedhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableinNEDO-32291.NMPChasreviewedthevendorrecommendationsforthesecomponentsandconfirmedthattheydonotcontainperiodicresponsetimetestingrequirements.TheapplicationoftheproposedfootnotewillallowNMPCtousedesignresponsetimedataforthesensorinthedeterminationofthesystemresponsetime,andeliminatetherequirementforaseparatemeasurementofthesensorresponsetime.Theremainderofthechannelwillcontinuetobetestedforresponsetime.OtherTechnicalSpecificationtestingrequirementssuchasCHANNELCALIBRATION,CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST,CHANNELCHECK,ANDLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinconjunctionwithactionstakeninresponsetoNRCBulletin90-01aresufficient'toidentifyfailuremodesordegradationsininstrumentresponsetimesandassureoperationoftheanalyzedinstrumentloopswithinacceptablelimits.TheeliminationoftheresponsetimetestingoftheidentifiedsensorswillreducethepotentialforinadvertentactuationoftheRPS.Accordingly,thischangewillreducethelikelihoodofaplanttransientduetoaninadvertentscram.Accordingly,basedontheaboveevaluation,whichisconsistentwiththeguidelinesoftheStaff'sgenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291,theproposedeliminationofsensorresponsetimeisacceptable.TheabovechangeissimilartothatapprovedbytheNRCinLicenseAmendmentNo.184forBrunswickUnits1&2.NMP224RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.1-CONTROLRODBLOCKINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNICALHAN-LESSRESTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)theseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThesubjectSRensuresthattheRBMSystemwillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheRBMSystemisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandthereforeishighlyreliable.TheextensionoftheFrequencyto24monthsisconsistentwiththeGeneralElectricLicensingTopicalReport,NEDC-32410P-A,"NuclearMeasurementAnalysisandControlPowerRangeNeutronMonitor(NUMAC-PRNM)RetrofitPlusOptionIIIStabilityTripFunction,"datedOctober1995(approvalbytheNRCwasdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedSeptember5,1995).AsindicatedinNEDC32410P-A,Section8.5.4.3.3,calibrationintervalisgenerallydeterminedbydriftofanalogcomponents.IntheNUMAC-PRNM,allanalogprocessingislimitedtotheAPRM(LPRMandflowinputprocessing).TheRBMperformsallcalculationsdigitally,andthereforeisnotsubjecttodrift.ThesearealreadycoveredbyChannelFunctionalTestsandautomaticself-testintheAPRM.Further,anydriftintheLPRMsignalsisnulledoutaspartoftheRBMlogicwhichlooksonlyforchangeoverashortperiodoftime.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewoftheGEanalysisasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMarch31,1998,(includingthecorrectiondatedApril15,1998).TheSERconcludedthattheGEanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2.TheSERallowedNMP2toextenditsoldCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceFrequencyfrom92daysto18months,since18monthsisthecurrentrefuelingcycle.Therefore,sincetheGEanalysissupportsa24monthCHANNEL'ALIBRATIONSurveillanceFrequency,thischangeisconsideredacceptable."Specific"L.1TripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.6-2arenotincludedintheiTSandall[Qt3referencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.6andCTS3.3.6Actionaaredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.2.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,NMP2RevisionA'gP

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.1-CONTROLRODBLOCKINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNICALHANES-LRTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2AnotehasbeenaddedtotheCTSTable4.3.6-1CHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTSurveillanceforTripFunction6.a,theReactorModeSwitchShutdownPosition(proposedSR3.3.2.1.6),whichwillallowonehourtoperformtheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTafterplacingthereactormodeswitchintheshutdownposition.Performingthetestwiththereactormodeswitchinanotherpositionrequirestheuseofjumpers,liftedleads,ormovablelinks,whichcouldcauseanunplannedtransientatpowerifnotdonecorrectly.Thischangewilleliminatetheneedtoperformtheseoperationsduringconditionswheretherodblockisnotrequired(Modes1and2)andthereforeisconsideredsafer.ThischangewillpermitentryintoMODES3and4ifthe24monthFrequencyisnotmetperSR3.0.2,therefore,thechangeisconsideredlessrestrictive.ThisFrequencyisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.l.L.3TheCTS3.1.4.1(ITS3.3.2.1andTable3.3.2.1-1Function2)RWMlowpowersetpointhasbeenreducedfrom20%RTPto10%RTP.Amendment17toNEDE-24011-P-A(GESTAR-II)justifiedreductionofthepowerlevelatwhichtheRWMisbypassedfromitscurrentvalueof20%RTPto10%RTP.Thejustificationwasbasedonthefactthattheanalyticalbasisforthisbypasspowerlevelis10%RTP.TheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)forRevisionA

INSTRUMENTATION3/4.3.9cJ~g5'hee~f44(INTRUMEHTATIOHg~p,g>~~~.'nvrl~r,LIMITINGCOHOITIONFOROPERATIONLCo5.~~~3.3.9Thent3.3.9-shallbe0aluesownsnthAPPLICABILITY:ssp<pys~o~J~>hC.n~+:ACTION:eactuationinstrumentationchannelsshowninTableBLiesrpepconsentwserSeointcolnofTabl.3.9-2.rMn>nTe3..-~p~~~~Al.pw&E/f.~+7>4rYoR~P'.a.g,g~jc.Withatio.instrumentationchannelTripSetpointlessconservativethanthevalueshownintheAllowableValuescolumnofTable3.3.9-2,declarethechannelinoperableandtaketheactionrequiredbyTable3.3.9-1.p(g,opJSpspIL+~eel4rSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENT~~C.g,cQ('~~(-e.AC~o(Jrbi~aWithoneormorePlantSystemActuationInstrumentationchannelsinoperabletaketheACTIONrequiredbyTable3.3.9-1.AA4.3.9.I.E-hstctuationinstrumentationchannelshallbeqg2'.demonstrated0ERABLytheperformanceof'theCHANNELCHECK,CHANNEL'UNCTIONALTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONoperationsfortheOPERATIONALCONOITIONSandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.3.9.1-1.)g3$a4.3.9.2LOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTSandatedaomaticoetioofallchannelsshallbeperformedatleastoncepermonts.gg0.5,z.i.<2.QA5QB.Ll.iNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/43-104$r,r,(

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2TheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineInstrumentationrequirementsofCTS3.3.9,PlantSystemsActuationInstrumentationhasbeenplacedinITS3.3.2.2.TherequirementsofthePlantServiceWaterSystemisbeingaddressedinCTS3/4.3.9.Sincethisisonlyachangeinthepresentation,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.3TheCTS3.3.9Applicability,whichstatesthattheApplicabilityisasshowninCTSTable3.3.9-1,hasbeenchangedtospecificallystatetheApplicability,insteadofreferencingaTable.ThishasbeendonesinceaTableformathasnotbeenusedintheproposedSpecification.(SeeDiscussionofChangeL.2belowforthechangetotheactualApplicability).Sincethischangeisapresentationpreferenceonly,itisconsideredadministrative.A.4ThisproposedchangetotheCTS3.3.9ActionsprovidesmoreexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheActionsforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3,"CompletionTimes,"theITS3.3.2.2ACTIONSNote("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach...")providesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingActionsforaninoperablefeedwatersystem/mainturbinehighwaterlevelinstrumentationchannel.ItisintendedthateachinoperablechannelisallowedacertaintimetocompletetheRequiredActions.Sincethischangeonlyprovidesmoreexplicitdirectionofthecurrentinterpretationoftheexistingspecifications,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.5CTS4.3.9.2requiresperformanceof"simulatedautomaticoperation."Verificationofsimulatedautomaticoperationisnormallyconductedwiththesystemfunctionaltest.However,fortheFeedwaterSystemandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentation,theonlyautomaticoperationrequiredisopeningofthefeedwaterpumpbreakersandclosingofthemainturbinestopvalves.Sincenoseparatesystemfunctionaltestisspecified,theoperationofthesebreakersandvalvesisspecificallyidentifiedandincludedwiththeLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTofproposedSR3.3.2.2.4.Sincethisisonlyachangeinthepresentation,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.NMP2Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONRELCATEDPECIFIATINNoneTECHNIALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1ASurveillancehasbeenadded(proposedSR3.3.2.2.1)toperformaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursofthefeedwaterandmainturbinehighwaterleveltripinstrumentation.Thiswillensurethatagrossfailureoftheinstrumentationwillnotremainundetected.ThisisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUIT-1434,Rev.1,andisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.M.2TheallowableoutagetimespecifiedinCTSTable3.3.9-1Action140.bfortwoinoperablechannelshasbeendecreasedfrom72hoursto2hoursinITS3.3.2.2ACTIONB,consistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.This2hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwithITS3.2.2sincethisinstrumentation'spurposeistoprecludeaMCPRviolation.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.TEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTofCTS4.3.9.2(proposedSR3.3.2.2.4)hasbeenextendedfrom.18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThissurveillanceensurestheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineHighWaterLeveltripfunctionwilloperateproperlyduringthecorrespondingtransientsoftheUSARwherethisfunctionisrequiredsuchasaFeedwaterControllerFailure.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthistestnormallypassestheSurveillanceatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyNMP2RevisiongQ$

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVELD.1(cont'd)duetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.TheFeedwaterSystem/MainTu'rbineHighWaterLeveltripfunctionistestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewithaCHANNELCHECK(proposedSR3.3.2.2.1)andtheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSR3.3.2.2.2).Thesesurveillanceswilldetectsignificantfailuresofthecircuitry.Inaddition,sincethesewaterlevelchannelsprovideindicationtothecontrolroom(PanelH13-P603A),deviationswillbedetectedandrepairedduringplantoperation.BasedontheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineHighWaterLeveltripcircuitdesign,othersurveillancesperformedduringtheoperatingcycleandtheabilitytodetectdeviationsduringoperation,andthereviewofhistoricalandsurveillancedata,itisshownthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthischange.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceofCTS4.3.9.1andTable4.3.9.1-1TripFunctionl.a(proposedSR3.3.2.2.3)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.;amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceisperformedtoensurethatatapreviouslyevaluatedsetpointactuationtakesplacetoprovidetherequiredsafetyfunction.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheinstrumentationpurchasedforthesefunctionsarehighlyreliableandmeetthedesigncriteriaofsafetyrelatedequipment.Theinstrumentationisdesignedwithredundantandindependentchannelswhichprovidemeanstoverifyproperinstrumentationperformanceduringoperation,andadequateredundancytoensureahighconfidenceofsystemperformanceevenwiththefailureofasinglecomponent.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONTEHAL'AN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Furthermore,theimpactedFeedwaterSystemandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentationhavebeenevaluatedbasedonmanufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithintheassumeddesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation.ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4differentialpressuretransmitters,Bailey766SignalResistorUnits(SRUs),andBailey745bistableswitches.Thebistableswitchesarefunctionallychecked(proposedSR3.3.2.2.2)andsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheBaileybistableswitches'withrespecttodrift.TheBaileySRUsarenoncalibratabledevicesandwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationforthisinstrument.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationanddriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.1TheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemtripsetpointlistedinCTSTable3.3.9-2andreferencedinCTS3.3.9isnotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesetpointinCTS3.3.9aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.2.2reflectstheAllowableValueconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheAllowableValuehasbeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableRevisiongg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGH.WATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONRTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)Valuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointwilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2CTSTables3.3.9-1and4.3.9.1-1requiretheFeedwaterSystemandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentationtobeOPERABLEinMODE1.TheFeedwaterSystemandMainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentationisprovidedtoensurethatMCPRismaintainedabovetheSafetyLimithowever,MCPRisnotaconcernbelow25%RTPduetothelargeinherentmarginthatensurestheMCPRSafetyLimitisnotexceeded,evenifalimitingtransientoccurs.Therefore,theITS3.3.2.2ApplicabilityhasbeenmodifiedtorequiretheinstrumentationtobeOPERABLEwhenTHERMALPOWERis>25%RTP,andthecurrentshutdownactionspecifiedinTable3.3.9-1Actions140.aandbhavebeenchangedtoonlyrequirepowertobereducedto(25%RTP.Inaddition,thetimetoachievethispowerlevelhasbeenreducedfrom6hoursto4hours,whichisconsistentwiththetimeprovidedtoexittheApplicabilityinCTS3.2.2,MCPR,andNUREG-1434,Rev.1,andiswithintheabilityoftheplanttoachievethisconditioninasafemanner.L.3ThedetailsrelatingtotheInstrumentNumbersfortheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemInstrumentationinCTSTable3.3.9-1areproposedtobedeleted.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripInstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.TherequirementsofNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGH.WATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVEL.3(cont'd)ITS3.3.2.2(whichdescribestheinstrumentation)andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretherequiredinstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.TheBasesalsoprovidesadescriptionofthetypeofinstrumentationrequiredbytheSpecification.L.4TheCTSTable3.3.9-1Actions140.aand140.brequirementtorestoreaninoperableFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemchanneltoOPERABLEstatushasbeenchangedtoallowthechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedcondition(ITS3.3.2.2RequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionB.1)andtocontinueoperationswithoutarequirementtorestorethechannel(RequiredActionB.1,whichrequiresrestorationofthetripcapability,canbeperformedbyplacingachannelintrip,asdescribedintheBases).ThisallowanceforCTSTable3.3.9-1Action140.aessentiallychangesthecurrenttwo-out-of-threelogictoaone-out-of-twologic,andcontinuestoprovidesinglefailureprotection.ForCTSTable3.3.9-1,Action140.b,thisallowancerestorestripcapabilitysuchthattheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemFunctioncanbemetduringthetimeprovidedtotripthesecondinoperablechannel.Thisessentiallychangesthecurrentlyallowedtwo-out-of-twologic(whileonechannelisinoperableasallowedbyCTSTable3.3.9-1Action140.a)toaone-out-of-onelogic.Thiswillcontinuetoprovidethetripcapability.L.SCTSTable3.3.9-1Action140requiresreductioninThermalPoweriftheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentationisnotrestor'edtoOperablestatus.ThepurposeoftheinstrumentationistoensureMCPRlimitsarenotexceededduringafeedwatercontrollerfailure,maximumdemandevent.Thisisaccomplishedbytrippingthefeedwaterpumpsandmainturbine,withthemainturbinetripresultinginasubsequentreactorscram.Whentheinstrumentationisinoperablesolelyduetoaninoperablefeedwaterpumpbreaker,theunitcancontinuetooperatewiththefeedwaterpumpremovedfromservice(NMP2hasthree50%capacityfeedwaterpumps).Therefore,anadditionalRequiredActionisproposed,ITS3.3.2.2,RequiredActionC.1,toallowremovaloftheassociatedfeedwaterpump(s)fromserviceinlieuofreducingThermalPower.ThisRequiredActionwillonlybeusediftheinstrumentationisinoperablesolelyduetoaninoperablefeedwaterpumpbreaker,asstatedintheNotetoITS3.3.2.2RequiredActionC.1.SincethisRequiredActionaccomplishesthefunctionalpurposeoftheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineHighWaterLevelTripInstrumentation,enablescontinuedoperationinapreviouslyapprovedcondition,andstillensuresthataMCPRlimitwillnotbeexceeded(sincethereactorscramistheresultofaturbinetripsignal,whichisnotimpactedbythischange),thischangedoesnothaveasignificanteffectonsafeoperation.RevisionA Oi DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGH'ATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHAN-LRTRICTIVE(continued)L.6CTSTable3.3.9-1Action140doesnotprovideanyactionswhenallthreeFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemchannelsareinoperable.Therefore,aCTS3.0.3entrywouldberequired.ITS3.3.2.2ACTIONBwillallowallthreechannelstobeinoperable(ITS3.3.2.2ConditionBisenterediftwo"ormore"channelsareinoperable)forupto2hours.TheFeedwaterSystem/MainTurbineTripSystemInstrumentationisprovidedtoensurethatMCPRismaintainedabovetheSafetyLimit.Itisoverlyconservativetorequireanimmediateshutdownwhentheinstrumentationhaslosttripcapability,becausethisdoesnotnecessarilyresultinaMCPRlimitbeingviolatedduringafeedwatertransientevent.Inaddition,threechannelsinoperableisessentiallyequivalenttotwochannelsinoperable(thetripcapabilityislost)andtheCTSallowsalimitedtimetooperatewithtwochannelsinoperable.Therefore,theActionsforwhentripcapabilityislosthavebeenmadeconsistentwiththeActionsforwhentheMCPRlimitisnotbeingmetandwhentwochannelsareinoperable.RevisionA

Iudessensors;sensorcrisonshallbedoneilieuofsensorcalibration.*+Uangsamea.Onevolepercenthydrogen,balanceogen.b.Fourvoepercenthydrogen.balanceogen.Eg/e*+TheCHANELCALIBRATIONshallconsistpositionindicationverificeonusingthecriteriacified.fortheInserviceTestingogram.TheCNNELCALIBRATIONshallcons'fan~Iectroniccafibratiofthechannel,notinclngthedetector,forrangedecedsabove10R/hrandeone'ntcalibrationcheofthedetectorbelow10R/hraninstalledorportablemmasource.ttRe,GreenorotherindicationshallverifiedasIndicatingval.position.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/43-87AmendmantNo.I!If84(Q8Pa~e(op

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATION~ATRAA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2ThisproposedchangetoCTS3.3.7.5ActionaprovidesmoreexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheActionsforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3,"CompletionTimes,"theITS3.3.3.1ACTIONSNote("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach....")andthewordingforITS3.3.3.1ACTIONSAandC("oneormoreFunctionswith...")providesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingActionforaninoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannel.ItisintendedthateachFunctionisallowedcertaintimestocompletetheRequiredActions.Sincethischangeonlyprovidesmoreexplicitdirectionofthecurrentinterpretationoftheexistingspecifications,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.ThedetailsconcerningthetechnicalcontentoftheSpecialReportspecifiedinCTS3.3.7.5Actions80a,8la,and81barebeingmovedtoChapter5oftheITSinaccordancewiththeformatoftheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.l.AnytechnicalchangestothisrequirementareaddressedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:5.6.A.4TheformatforITS3.3.3.1includesanACTION(ITS3.3.3.1ACTIOND)thatdirectsentryintoappropriateConditionsreferencedinITSTable3.3.3.1-1whentwoormorechannelsinthesameFunctionareinoperableandtheCompletionTimeforrestorationofallbutonerequiredchannelhasexpired(i.e.,ITS3.3.3.1ACTIONC).Thischangerepresentsapresentationpreferenceonlyandis,therefore,consideredadministrative.A.5ThedetailsinCTSTable4.3.7.5-1footnote*relatedtohowtoperformtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthermocouplesisdeletedsinceitisduplicativeofthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONinChapter1oftheITS.Thischangeisconsideredadministrativesincethereisnochangeinthecalibrationmethod.NMP2Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONRELATEDPEIFICATINR.lSuppressionChamberAirTemperature(CTSTable3.3.7.5-1Function6)isnotcreditedasCategory1orTypeAvariableassummarizedintheTable7.5-2oftheUSAR.Further,thelossofthisinstrumentisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisFunctiondidnotsatisfytheNRCPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaasdocumentedintheApplicationofSelectionCriteriatotheNMP2TechnicalSpecificationsandhavebeenrelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.TEHNIALHANGES-MRERTRITIVEM.1CTS4.3.7.5andTable4.3.7.5-1requireaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthedrywelloxygenconcentrationanalyzers,Instrument9,onceper18months.ThecurrentmaintenancehistoryofthisFunctiondoesnotsupportan18monthCHANNELCALIBRATIONFrequency.Therefore,theITSwillrequiretheCHANNELCALIBRATIONFrequencyinproposedSR3.3.3.1.2forthedrywelloxygenconcentrationanalyzers(ITSTable3.3.3.1-1,Function10)tobeonceper92days.ThischangerepresentsanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationsandachievesconsistencywiththecalibrationFrequencysupportedbythemaintenancehistory.TEHNIALHANGES-LESSRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1DetailsofthemethodforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSspecifiedinCTSTable4.3.7.5-1footnotes**,***,andt,(fortheDrywellHydrogenConcentrationAnalyzers,PCIVPositionIndications,andDrywellRadiationMonitors,respectively)andtheCHANNELCHECKspecifiedintheCTSTable4.3.7.5-1footnotett(forthePCIVPositionIndications)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TheserequirementsproposedtoberelocatedareproceduraldetailsthatarenotnecessaryforassuringtheOPERABILITYoftheinstruments.TheSurveillanceRequirementsofITS3.3.3.1provideadequateassurancethespecifiedinstrumentsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.RevisiongQ

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillancesofCTS4.3.7.5(proposedSR3.3.3.1.3)andTable4.3.7.5-1forallFunctionsexceptforInstrument10(ITSTable3.3.3.1-1Function9)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecified'inCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceisperformedtoensurethattheindicationisaccuratetoprovidetherequiredsafetyfunction.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausethePAMinstrumentsaredesignedtobesinglefailureproofandhighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedPAMinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinacceptableallowancesasdeterminedbyquantitativeorqualitativeanalysis.Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSInstrumentnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:Instrument1,ReactorVesselPressureThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB9TransmittersandTracorWestronicD4GE-NSRRecorders.TheTracorWestronicsRecorderswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttr'ansmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument2,ReactorVesselWaterLevelThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmitters,Rosemount510DUMasterTripUnits,Bailey766SignalResistorUnits(SRUs),GEType180Indicators,TracorWestronicsD4GE-NSRRecorders,andaTracorWestronics54N-NSRRecorder.TheBaileySRUsarenoncalibratabledevices.TheBaileySRUs,GEType180Indicators,TracorWestronicsrecorders,andRosemounttripunitauxiliaryanalogoutputwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNICALHANG-LESRTRITIVELE.1,(cont'd)projected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument3,SuppressionPoolWaterLevelThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4Transmitters,Rosemount1153DB5Transmitters,GEType180Indicators,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,andaTracorWestronicsT4Nrecorder.TheGEType180indicatorsandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument4,SuppressionPoolWaterTemperatureThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco122-7039-01-314platinumRTDs(100ohm),Foxboro2AI-P2VOhm/EConverters,GEType180indicatorsandTracorWestronicsT4Nrecorders.TheRTDsarenoncalibratabledevices.ThePycoRTDs,GEType180indicatorsandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexcee'dthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument5,SuppressionChamberPressureThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB7Transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/EConverters,aGEType180Indicator,andaTracorWestronicsT4NRecorder.TheGEType180indicatorandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP2RevisionA 0,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Instrument7,DrywellPressureThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB7Transmitters,Rosemount1153GB5Transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/EConverters,GEType180Indicators,andTracorWestronicsT4NRecorders.TheGEType180indicatorsandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument8,DrywellAirTemperatureThisfunctionisperformedbyaPyco122-4030-04-2.7-6platinumRTDs(100ohm),Foxboro2AI-P2VOhm/EConverters,andTracorWestronicsT4NRecorders.TheRTDsarenoncalibratabledevices.ThePycoRTDsandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument11,DrywellRadiation(HighRange)ThisfunctionisperformedbyKamanKDIionchamberdetectors,KamanKMA-I1000iondetectorareamonitors,KamanKEM-ALocalMicroprocessors,KamanKERICRemoteIndicationandControlUnits,andTracorWestronicsD4NRecorders.TheKamanRadiationMonitoringInstrumentationandtheTracorWestronicsrecorderswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument12,PCIVPositionThisfunctionisperformedbylimitswitches.Limitswitchesaremechanicaldevicesthatrequiremechanicaladjustmentonly;driftisnotapplicabletothesedevices.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffectlimitswitcheswithrespecttodrift.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.1-POSTACCIDENTMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.3.7.5(ITS3.3.3.1Note2totheSurveillanceRequirements)toallowachanneltobeinoperableforupto6hourssolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillancesprovidedtheotherchannelintheassociatedFunctionisOPERABLE.The6hourtestingallowancehasbeengrantedbytheNRCinTSamendmentsforGeorgiaPowerCompany'sHatchUnit1(amendment185)andUnit2(amendment125)andWashingtonPublicPowerSupplySystem'sWNP-2(amendment149,theITSamendment).TheNRChasalsograntedthisallowanceinothertopicalreportsfortheReactorProtectionSystem,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem,andisolationequipment.The6hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilityofproperlymonitoringpost-accidentparameters,whennecessary,sincetheotherchannelmustbeOPERABLEforthisallowancetobeused.L.2CTSTable3.3.7.5-1Instrument12,footnote**requiresAction80btobeenteredifonePCIVindicationisinoperableinapenetrationflowpathwithonlyonePCIVindication.Action80brequiresthechanneltoberestoredtoOperablestatuswithin7daysortheunitmustbeshutdown.ITS3.3.3.1ACTIONAwillprovide30daystorestoretheinoperablechannel.Furthermore,attheexpirationofthe30days,ITS3.3.3.1ACTIONBwillrequireaspecialreporttobesubmittedperITS5.6.6,inlieuofrequiringaunitshutdown.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheinstrumentationandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsfordeterminingPCIVposition,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentrestorationtimes.Inaddition,thepipingitselfisabarriercreditedbytheNRCtoensureleakagedoesnotexist.Thischangeis.consistentwiththeBWR/6ISTS,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.NMP2RevisionA

INSTRUMENTATIONMONITORINGINSTRUMENTATIONREMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONANDCONTROLSLIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONg,co3~3.3.7.4Themoteshutdownsystemae...-an...-shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:OPERATIONALCONDITIONS1and2.nandcntrols"swiACTION:~~~g~QCVgo&Pa.WiththenumberofOPERABLEremoteshutdownsysteminstrumentation/.,/channelslessthanrequiredbyestorethesnopereAC.TZO<~channel(s)toOPERABLEstatuswithinaysobeinatleastHOTSHUT-p~y~6/J8w~nnexthoursgVb.WiththenumberofOPERABLEremoteuownsystemcontrolchannelslessthanrequiredbyrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatuswithinayseinatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthe>gexhours.c.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.4arenotapplicable..Z.8/os/4QcTZ'>aCSURVEILLANCEREUIRPMENTSa/Vep~scpAlofc4~Sv/'vc/4~accpvi~e~raCSSR~33.3,2ICQ,33,Ze3SRz,z.3.i.<4.3.7.4.1Eachoftheaboverequiredremoteshutdownmonitoringinstrumenta-tionchannelsshallbedemotatedOPERABLEberformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKandCHANNELCALIBRATIONoperalonsathefrequenceYdslC/.i~rt~~arse4.3.7.4.2EachoftheaboveremoteshutdowncontrolswitchesanconrcircuitsshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyverifyingitscapabilitytoperformitsintendedfunction(s)atleastoncepermonths.LC,1"Inludestransfer.swihesassociatedwithemoteshutdownsystcontrols.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/43-77

TABLE4.3.7.REMOTESHUTOOHNMOTORINGINSTRUMENTIONSURVEILEREIREMENTSINSTRUMENTsnZ,a,P2,ICHANNELCHECKl.ServiceHatrPumpOischargeFow2;ReactorVselPressure3.RXVesseHaterLevelHidenge4.RXVessHaterLevelNarroRange5.RCICTrbineSpeed6.SupprssionPoolHaterLel7.RHRoop"A"Flow8.RHRHt.Ex.ServiceHar"A"Flow9.5press1onPoolTemp10.RLoop"B"Flow11.HRHt.Ex.Serviceater"B"Flow12.Safety/ReliefValvPos1tion(4Valves)1.RCICFlowIndicat/ControllerMMMM,L3$4933k3CALIBRA-~TIONRRRRRREADOUTOCATIO2CES~L4052CESiNL4052CESPNL4052CEPNL4052CE'PNL4052C.PNL40525'PNL4052ES0PNL40ES'PNL45CES'PNL052CES'PN4052CES'P4052CES'405L&f'HALcalibrionisperfordperSpec1ficaon4.4.2."CHNELlibratiexcludessensors'ensorcomparisshallbenein1euofensorcibration.~A,sNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/43-80kamxhnent27L/

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEM~ADADEITIIATITEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.eEstheImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2A3ThisproposedchangetoCTS3.3.7.4ActionsaandbprovidesmoreexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheActionsforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3,"CompletionTimes,"theITS3.3.3.2ACTIONSNote("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach....")andthewordingforITS3.3.3.2ACTIONA("oneormorerequiredFunctions")providesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingActionsforaninoperableremoteshutdowninstrumentationchannel.ItisintendedthateachfunctionisallowedacertaintimetocompletetheRequiredActions.Sincethischangeonlyprovidesmoreexplicitdirectionofthecurrentinterpretationoftheexistingspecifications,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.ThespecificChannelChecksontheRCICTurbineSpeedandRCICFlowIndicators(CTSTable4.3.7.4-lInstruments5and13)havebeendeletedsinceQSthe18monthChannelCheckSurveillanceFrequencyisidenticaltotheChannelCalibrationSurveillanceFrequency.SincetheChannelCalibrationcompletelyverifiestheproperfunctioningofthechannelandencompassesaChannelCheckforthetwoinstruments,theChannelCheckisnotnecessaryandthedeletionofaduplicativerequirementisadministrativeinnature.A.4Footnote*toCTSTable4.3.7.4-1Instrument12,theS/RVPosition,statesthatthe18monthChannelCalibrationisperformedperSpecification4.4.2.TheS/RVPositioninstrumentrequiredbyCTSTable4.3.7.4-1istheacousticmonitor.CTS4.4.2istheSurveillanceRequirementfortheS/RVs.PrevioustoAmendment69,CTS4.4.2providedthesetpoint(noiselevel)atwhichtheacousticmonitorwasrequiredtoactuatetoindicateanopenS/RV.Thus,thefootnotewasessentiallyacrossreferencetoprovidethenoiselevelsetpointtowhichtheinstrumentiscalibrated.Amendment69totheNMP2CTS,issuedbytheNRConSeptember11,1995,deletedtheacousticmonitoringrequirementsfromCTS4.4.2.ItreplacedtheoldSurveillancewithastatementthattherewerenorequirementsotherthanthoserequiredbyCTS4,0.5.CTS4.0.5doesnotprovideanyrequirementsrelatedtoacousticmonitors.WhenAmendment69wasissued,itshouldhavealsodeletedtheCTSNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEM~ANIA.4Table4.3.7.4-1footnote*.ITS3.3.3.2willcontinuetorequireaChannel(cont'd)CalibrationoftheS/RVacousticmonitor.Therefore,thiscrossreferenceisbeingdeletedandisconsideredadministrative.A.5ThedetailsinCTSTable4.3.7.4-1footnote**relatedtohowtoperformtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftheInstrument9RTDsisdeletedsinceitisduplicativeofthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONinChapter1oftheITS.Thischangeisconsideredadministrativesincethereisnochangeinthecalibrationmethod.RELATEDPEIFIATINNoneTEHALHAN-MRERTRITIVENoneTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1TheCTS3.3.7.4,includingfootnote*,CTS3.3.7.4Actionaandb,CTSTable3.3.7.4-1,CTSTable3.3.7.4-2andCTSTable4.3.7.4-1detailsrelating.tosystemdesignandoperation(i.e.,thespecificinstrumentlistingsandthetransferswitchrequirements)areunnecessaryintheLCOandareproposedtoberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).ITS3.3.3.2requirestheRemoteShutdownSystemFunctionstobeOPERABLE.Inaddition,theproposedSurveillanceRequirementsensuretherequiredtransferswitchesandinstrumentsareproperlytested.TheserequirementsareadequateforensuringeachrequiredRemoteShutdownSystemFunctionismaintainedOPERABLE.TheBasesalsoidentifiesthattheinstrumentsandtransferswitchesarerequiredforOPERABILITYoftheRemoteShutdownSystemandarelistedintheTRM.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotherelocatedrequirementsintheTRMwillbecontrolledbythe.provisionsof10CFR50.59.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOF.CHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALHAN-LSRESTRITIVE(continued)LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingCTS4.3.7.4.2(proposedSR3.3.3.2.2)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.TheSRensuresthattheRemoteShutdownSystemtransferswitchesandcontrolcircuitswillperformtheintendedfunction.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximum'f22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.TheRemoteShutdownSystemisrequiredonlywhenthemaincontrolroomisinaccessiblewhennormalplantoperatingconditionsexist,i.e.,notransientsoraccidentsareoccurring.Also,nodesignbasisaccident(DBA)isconsideredfortheRemoteShutdownSystem(includingLOCA).Basedonthereviewofthehistoricaltestdataonthecontrolswitchesandcircuits,theneedforthisequipmentandtheimpact,ifany,ofthischangeoncomponentavailabilityissmall.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceofCTS4.3.7.4.1(proposedSR3.3.3.2.3)forCTSTable4.3.7.4-1Instruments1through13hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.TheSRensuresthattheRemoteShutdownSystemInstrumentationchannelsindicatecorrectly.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheinstrumentationaredesignedtobehighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedRemoteShutdownSystemInstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturer,andmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinacceptableallowancesasdeterminedbyquantitativeorqualitativeanalysis.ThefollowingparagraphslistedbycurrentRemoteShutdownSystemInstrumentNumber(CTSTable4.3.7.4-1),identifybymake,manufacturer,andmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:Instrument1,ServiceWaterPumpDischargeFlowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,Foxboro2AP+SQEsquarerootextractors,andGEType180Indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument2,ReactorVesselPressureThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB9transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument3,ReactorVesselWaterLevelWideRangeThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DBStransmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP2Revision++

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALCHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Instrument4,ReactorVesselWaterNarrowRangeThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument5,RCICTurbineSpeedThisfunctionisperformedbyaWoodwardElectro-MagneticPick-upandaGEType180indicator.Thepick-upisnotacalibratabledevice.TheWoodwardPick-upandtheGEType180indicatorwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument6,SuppressionPoolWaterLevelThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument7(10),RHRLoop"A"(B)FlowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5transmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,Foxboro2AP+SQEsquarerootextractors,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsafbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Instrument8(11),RHRHeatExchangerServiceWater"A"(B)FlowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DBStransmitters,Foxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverters,Foxboro2AP+SQEsquarerootextractors,andGEType180indicators.TheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmittersandtheFoxboroinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument9,SuppressionPoolTemperatureThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco122-4030-04-2.7-82.3platinumRTD(100ohm),Foxboro2AI-P2Vohms/Econverters,andGEType180indicators.TheRTDsarenon-calibratabledevices.ThePycoRTDsandtheGEType180indicatorswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e,engineeringjudgment).TheFoxboroconverterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonot'exceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument12,Safety/ReliefValvePosition(4Valves)ThisfunctionisperformedbyENDEVCO2273AM1accelerometersandTEC-504Achargeconverters.Theseinstrumentswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Instrument13,RCICFlowIndicator/ControllerThisfunctionisperformedbyaRosemount1153DBStransmitter,aFoxboro2AI-I3VI/Econverter,aFoxboro2AP+SQEsquarerootextractor,andaFoxboroN-250ControlDisplayStation.TheFoxboroControlDisplayStationwasevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemounttransmitters,theFoxboroconverter,andtheFoxborosquarerootextractorwereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.RevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTheallowedoutagetimeinCTS3.3.7.4ActionsaandbforinoperableRemoteShutdownSysteminstrumentationandcontrolsisextendedfrom7daysto30daysinITS3.3.3.2ACTIONA.TheRemoteShutdownSystemisnotrequiredtorespondtoanymechanisticdesignbasisaccidentevaluatedinthesafetyanalysis,butisprovidedtocomplywithGDC-19designcriteria.TheSpecificationisretainedonlyasasignificantcontributortoriskreduction,andextendingtheallowedoutagetimewhenaRemoteShutdownSysteminstrumentchannelorcontrol/transferswitchisinoperabledoesnothaveasignificantimpactonthatcontribution.L.2ANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.3.7.4.1(ITS3.3.3.2SurveillanceRequirementsNote)toallowachanneltobeinoperableforupto6hourssolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances.The6hourtestingallowancehasbeengrantedbytheNRCinTSamendmentsforGeorgiaPowerCompany'sHatchUnit1(amendment185)andUnit2(amendment125)andWashingtonPublicPowerSupplySystem'sWNP-2(amendment149,theITSamendment).TheNRChasalsograntedthisallowanceinothertopicalreportsfortheReactorProtectionSystem,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem,andisolationequipment.The6hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilityofproperlymonitoringRemoteShutdownSystemparameters,whennecessary.L.3CTS4.3.7.4.1requiresaChannelChecktobeperformedfortheinstrumentsinCTSTable4.3.7.4-1.CTSTable4.3.7.4-1,Instrument12isdeenergized(doesnotprovideproperindication)duringnormaloperation.NospecificacceptancecriteriawouldapplytotheChannelCheck(sincetheinstrumentwouldnotbeindicatingproperly).Therefore,thisSurveillanceRequirementinproposedSR3.3.3.2.1ismodifiedtoexcludetheChannelCheckrequirementRevisionA'Qg 0'

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVEL.3(cont'd)onthisdeenergizedchannel.ThischangeisconsideredacceptablesincethechannelsarenormallydeenergizedandanyChannelCheckrequirementwouldbeessentiallyequivalenttonorequirement,Inaddition,energizingthisinstrumentchannelrequiresoperationofatransferswitch,whichtransferscertainADSvalvecontrolsfromthecontrolroomtotheremoteshutdownpanel.Revisionp'

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.1-EOC-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHANES-LRESTRITIVELA.1(cont'd)toberelocatedtotheBases.ThisisadesigndetailthatisnotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheEOC-RPTInstrumentation,sinceOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.3.4.1andproposedSR3.3.4.1.4.Therefore,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LB.1TheallowedoutofservicetimeofCTS3.3.4.2Actionsbandc.1areextendedfrom12hoursto72hoursinITS3.3.4.1ACTIONA.Thisallowedoutofservicetimehasbeenshowntomaintainanacceptableriskinaccordancewithpreviouslyconductedreliabilityanalysis(GENE-770-06-1-A,December1992).ThelogicdesignoftheinstrumentationisboundedbythatanalyzedinthereliabilityanalysisandtheconclusionsoftheanalysisareapplicabletotheNMP2design.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthisgenericreliabilityanalysisasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2,andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalysis.LD.iTheFrequenciesforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTandEOC-RPTRESPONSETIMETEST(exceptthebreakerarcsuppressiontime)requirementsofCTS4.3.4.2.2and4.3.4.2.3(proposedSRs3.3.4.1.3and3.3.4.1.5)havebeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThisSRensuresthatEOC-RPTtriplogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ExtendingtheSRintervalforthisfunctionisacceptablebecausetheEOC-RPTlogicistestedevery92daysbytheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSR3.3.4.1,1).ThistestingoftheEOC-RPTlogicsystemensuresthatasignificantportionofthecircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectNMP2RevisionA'

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.1-EOC-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIAHNES-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Furthermore,theimpactedEOC-RPTinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinthedesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation.ThefollowingparagraphslistedbyCTSTripFunction,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationperformed.TripFunction1,TurbineStopValve-ClosureThisfunctionisperformedbyNAMCOEA170limitswitches.Limitswitchesaremechanicaldevicesthatrequiremechanicaladjustmentonly;driftisnotapplicabletothesedevices.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffectlimitswitcheswithrespecttodrift.TripFunction2,TurbineControlValve-FastClosureThisfunctionisperformedbyStatic-0-RingPressureSwitches9TA-BBS-NX-CIA-JJTTX7.TheStatic-0-Ringswitcheswereevaluatedbyqualitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationforthisinstrument.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,'demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.4.2-2andthesecondsentenceofCTSTable3.3.4.2-1footnote*"arenotincludedintheITSandallreferencesto[thesesetpointsinCTS3.3.4.2,includingActiona,aredeleted.TheRevisionA'@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.1-EOC-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHN-LRTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)AllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.4.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2CTS3.2.2ActioncessentiallyrequiresareductioninThermalPowerto(30%RTPiftheEOC-RPTinstrumentationisnotrestoredoriftheMCPRpenaltyisnotapplied.ThepurposeoftheEOC-RPTinstrumentationistoensureaMCPRSafetyLimitviolationwillnotoccurlateincorelifeduetoaturbinetriporgeneratorloadrejection.Thisisaccomplishedbytrippingthenormalsupplybreakerstotherecirculationpumps,whichremovethepumpsfromfastspeedoperation.Slowspeedoperation(energizedfromthelowfrequencymotorgenerator)isnotaffected,sinceitisnotnecessarytotriptheslowspeedbreakerstoprotectfromaMCPRSafetyLimitviolation.Therefore,anadditionalRequiredActionisproposed,ITS3.3.4.1RequiredActionC.1,toallowremovaloftheassociatedrecirculationpumpfastspeedbreakerfromserviceinlieuofreducingThermalPowerto(30%RTP.SincethisactionaccomplishesthefunctionalpurposeoftheEOC-RPTRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.4.1-2arenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.4.1,includingActiona,aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.4.2reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedNMP2Revision+

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNICALHAN-LESSTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)BasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2CTS3.3.4.1Actionc.2requirestheassociatedTripSystemtobedeclaredinoperablewhentworeactorvesselwaterlevelchannelsortworeactorvesselpressurechannelsinthesameTripSystemareinoperable.DeclaringtheTripSysteminoperablewouldrequirerestorationoftheinoperablechannels,asrequiredbyCTS3.3.4.1Actiond.Placingtheinoperablechannelsintripisnotallowedasanoption.ITS3.3.4.2RequiredActionA.1providesanoptiontoplaceallinoperablechannelsinthetrippedcondition.Thisconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperablestatus,restoresthesinglefailurecapabilityandprovidestherequiredinitiationcapabilityoftheinstrumentation.Therefore,providingthisoptiondoesnotimpactsafety.However,ifthisactionwouldresultinsystemactuation,thendeclaringthesysteminoperableisthepreferredaction.L.3CTS3.3.4.1ActiondrequiresthatwhenoneTripSystemisinoperable,72hoursareprovidedtorestoretheTripSystem.CTS3.3.4.1ActionerequiresthatwhenbothTripSystemsareinoperable,1hourisprovidedtorestoreoneTripSystem.AsdescribedinCTS3.3.4.1Actionc.2,aTripSystemisinoperablewhentwochannelsofthesameFunction(i.e.,reactorvesselwaterlevelorreactorvesselpressure)areinoperableintheTripSystem.ITS3.3.4.2ACTIONBaddressestripFunctioncapability,notTripSystemcapability.AtripFunctionismaintainedwhensufficientchannelsareOperableorintrip,suchthattheATWS-RPTSystemwillgenerateatripsignalfromthegivenFunctiononavalidsignalandbothrecirculationpumpscanbetripped.ThisrequirestwochannelsoftheFunction,inthesametripsystem,toeachbeOperableorintrip.ThefollowingisadescriptionofthemannerinwhichtheITSisapplied,relativetotheCTS.a)WhenasingleTripSystemisinoperableundertheCTSrequirements,eitherduetotwoinoperablereactorvesselwaterlevelchannelsortwoinoperablereactorvesselpressurechannels,orboth,theITSwillnothaveaninoperableFunction.Therefore,ITSACTIONAwouldapply,whichallows14daystorestorechannels.ThisisconsistentwiththeCTSActionbandActionc.1time,afterthechangedescribedinDiscussionofChangeLB.1above.Whileinthiscondition,theATWS-RPTSystemisstillcapableoftrippingbothrecirculationpumpsoneitherFunction.Inaddition,twosimilarchannels.inoperableisfunctionallyequivalenttoonechannelinoperable(whichtheCTSRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LSRTRITIVEL.3(cont'd)allowsinActionb);theTripSystemwillnotprovideatripsignalfromthegivenFunction.b)WhenbothTripSystemsareinoperableundertheCTSrequirementsduetotwochannelsofthesameFunctionbeinginoperableinbothTripSystems,1hourisallowedbyCTS3.3.4.1ActionetorestoreoneoftheTripSystems(byrestoringthechannelsintheTripSystem).IntheITS,whentwochannelsofthesameFunctionareinoperableinbothtripsystems,oneFunctionwillbeinoperable.Therefore,ITSACTIONBwouldapply,whichallows72hourstorestoretheinoperablechannels.Thisisacceptablesincewhileinthiscondition,theATWS-RPTSystemisstillcapableoftrippingbothrecirculationpumpsontheotherFunctionandoperatoractioncanstillbetakentotriptherecirculationpumpsduringthisbeyonddesignbasisevent.c)WhenbothTripSystemsareinoperableundertheCTSrequirementsduetotwochannelsofoneFunctionbeinginoperableinoneTripSystemandtwochannelsoftheotherFunctionbeinginoperableintheotherTripSystem,theITSwillnothaveaninoperableFunction.Therefore,ITSACTIONAwouldapply,whichallows14daystorestorechannels.TheCTSrequiresthechannelsinoneTripSystemtoberestoredwithin1hour.Thisisacceptablesincewhileinthiscondition,theATWS-RPTSystemisstillcapableoftrippingbothrecirculationpumpsoneitherFunction.Inaddition,whenonechannelisinoperable,theassociatedFunction(eitherDrywellPressure-HighorReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2)cannotactuatetheTripSystem,sincebothchannelsofaFunctionmusttriptoactuate~theTripSystem(i.e,,eachTrip'Systemisatwo-out-of-twologicforeachFunction).ThisconditioniscoveredbyCTS3.3.4.1Actionb.WhentwochannelsofthesameFunctionareinoperableinaTripSystem,thisconditionisfunctionallyequivalenttothatcoveredbyCTS3.3.4.1Actionb(i.e.,onechannelinoperable).Thatis,withbothchannelsofthesameFunctioninoperableinaTripSystem,theassociatedFunctioncannotactuatetheTripSystem,identicaltotheresultswhenonechannelisinoperableinaTripSystem.d)WhenbothTripSystemsareinoperableundertheCTSrequirementsduetoallchannelsofbothFunctionsinoperableinbothTripSystems,theITSwillhavetwoinoperableFunctions;Therefore,ITSACTIONCwouldapply,whichallows1hourtorestorechannels.ThisisconsistentwiththeCTSActionetime.NMP2RevisiongQg

DISCUSSIONOF.CHANGESITS:3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONHNIALHANRTRITIVE(continued)L.4CTS3.3.4.1ActionsdanderequiretheunittobeplacedinStartup(Mode2)within6hoursiftheATWS-RPTinstrumentationisnotrestoredwithintheallowedout-of-servicetimes.ThepurposeoftheATWS-RPTinstrumentationistotriptherecirculationpumps.Therefore,anadditionalRequiredActionisproposed,ITS3.3.4.2RequiredActionD.1,toallowremovaloftheassociatedrecirculationpumpbreaker(s)fromserviceinlieuofbeinginMODE2within6hours.SincethisactionaccomplishesthefunctionalpurposeoftheATWS-RPTinstrumentationandenablescontinuedoperationinapreviouslyapprovedcondition,thischangedoesnothaveasignificanteffectonsafeoperation.NMP2RevisionA

~~4aM~55]ABL..-1(Continued)INYEMATIITMATIONACTION32-Ac+~c,1~~g+PcTI~gACTION33-A<<IW8)AXEDo.hkproposalhah~Claudf,)WiththenuinberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABI.EChannelsperTripFunctionrequirement'in4hourdecareaCCSinoperableWiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripFunctionrequirement,placetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionwithin24hours.ACTION34-NotUsed.ACTION35-gc&oucWiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripFunctionrequirment,restoreeewithinhoursoecareiaevavCCSinoperae.WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthantheotaumeofChannels,declaretheassociatedemergencydieselgeneratorinoperableandtaketheACTIONrequiredbySpecification3.8.1.1or3.8.1.2,asappropriate.ACTION38-A.4eowii.t<I.eo33,.8,'IACTION39-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels,placetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionwithin1hour*;operationmaythencontinueuntilperformanceofthenextrequiredCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST.ACTION36-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripFunctionrequirement:o~p~ooz~g~irelhdo>~~a.Withonechannelinoperableplacetheinoperaeanneinthetrippedconditionwithin24hour*rdeclaretheHPCSAc.1Ig&ysteminoperae.IclgpraptTodt<fisrcchh&~pg.l~)$,3,I8Qb.WithmorethanonechannelinoperableeclaretheHPCSsysteminoperae.Ah.2.'ct'(owHashprooge$IIvice.L4hyaO.IACTION37-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheAc1'iwDMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripFunctionrequirement,placeatleastoneinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionwithin24hours'<,~H+ordeclaretheHPCSsysteminoperable.ebbrpropos~RQvirc,gAc~Q2,~*TheprovisnsofSpecificat3.0.4arenotlicable.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/43-34AMENOMENTNO.kke79)t,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATION~ADADA.5(cont'd)A.2.gandB.2.f(ITSTable3.3.5.1-1Functions4.fandS.g).Sincethechangeinvolvesnodesignchangebutisonlyadifferenceinnomenclature,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.6ThetechnicalcontentoftherequirementsofCTSTables3,3.3-1,3.3.3-2,and4.3.3.1-1,TripFunctionsDandE,includingCTSTable3.3.3-1Actions38and39,CTSTable3.3.3-2footnote**,andCTSTable4.3.3.1-1footnotef,arebeingmovedtoITS3.3.8.1,"LossofPowerInstrumentation,"inaccordancewiththeformatoftheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.AnytechnicalchangestotheserequirementsareaddressedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:3.3.8.1,inthisSection.A.7CTSTable3.3.3-1Actions30and32requiredeclaringtheassociatedsystemorADSTripSysteminoperablewhenthetimetorestorethechannel(24hours)hasexpired.WhentherestorationtimeprovidedintheseActionshaveexpiredfortheADSFunctions,theassociatedADSTripSystemisdeclaredinoperable,andtheactionprovidedinCTS3.3.3Actioncistaken,sincethisActionprovidestherequiredactionswhenanADSTripSystemisinoperable.Actioncprovides72hoursor7daystorestoretheADSTripSystem,dependinguponwhetherornotbothRCICandHPCSsystemsareOperable,andwhentherestorationtimeexpires,ashutdownisrequired.InITS3.3.5.1ACTIONSFandG,therequirementtodeclaretheassociatedsystem(i.e.,ADStripsystem)inoperablehasbeendeleted.Initsplace,thetotaltimetorestorethechannelhasbeenprovided.ThesefourCTSActionshaveessentiallybeencombinedintotwoproposedACTIONS,dependinguponwhetherornotthechannelisallowedtobetripped(ITS3.3.5.1ACTIONSFandG,respectively).Sincethetotaltimetorestorethechannel/tripsystemhasnotchanged,exceptasdiscussedinDiscussionofChangeL.5below,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.8TheallowanceintheCTS3.3.2ActionandCTSTable3.3.3-1Actions30.g,36.a,and37footnote*,whichstatestheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.4arenotapplicablehasbeendeletedsinceproposedLCO3.0.4providesthisallowance(i.e.,theallowancehasbeenmovedtoLCO3.0.4).Therefore,deletionofthisallowanceisadministrative.A.9CTSTable3.3.3-1Action37requiresplacingtheinoperablechannelintripwhenaHPCSPumpSuctionPressure-Low(Transfer)oraHPCSSuppressionPoolWaterLevel-Highchannelisinoperable.AnewRequiredActionhas~beenadded,ITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionD.2.2,toallowtheHPCSpumpsuctiontobealignedtothesuppressionpoolinlieuoftrippingthechannel,ifaPumpSuctionPressure-LoworSuppressionPoolWaterLevel-HighchannelNMP2Revision+Q

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESSTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTables3.3.2-2and3.3.3-2areriotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.3aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.5.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2CTS3.3.3ActioncrequiresrestorationofanADSTripSystemtoOperablestatuswhenitisinoperable;itdoesnotallowplacingtheinoperablechannelsintripandcontinuingtooperate.CTSTable3.3.3-1Action32requiresaninoperableADSReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3(Permissive)channel(TripFunctionsA.2.candB.2.c)toberestoredtoOperablestatus;itdoesnotallowplacingtheinoperablechannelintripandcontinuingtooperate.AnoptionisprovidedinITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionF.2toplaceallNMP216Revision/@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)inoperablechannelsinthetrippedcondition.Thisconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperablestatus,restoresthesinglefailurecapability,andprovidestherequiredinitiationcapabilityoftheinstrumentation.Therefore,providingthisoptiondoesnotimpactsafety.However,ifthisactionwouldresultinsystemactuation,thendeclaringthesysteminoperableisthepreferredaction.L.3L.4ThepressureatwhichADSisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,asspecifiedinCTSTable3.3.3-1footnote(c),CTSTable4.3.3.1-1footnote**,andCTS3.3.3Actionc,isincreasedfrom100psigto150psiginITS3.3.5.1toprovideconsistencyoftheOPERABILITYrequirementsforallECCSandRCICequipment.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentsatlowpressures(i.e.,between100psigand150psig)areboundedbyanalysisperformedathigherpressures.TheADSisrequiredtooperatetolowerthepressuresufficientlysothatthelowpressurecoolantinjection(LPCI)andlowpressurecorespray(LPCS)systemscanprovidemakeuptomitigatesuchaccidents.Sincethesesystemscanbegintoinjectwaterintothereactorpressurevesselatpressureswellabove150psig(225psid,steamdomepressuretodrywellpressure,andsteamdomepressure(225psigforLPCI;289psid,steamdomepressuretodrywellpressure,andsteamdomepressure<305psigforLPCS),thereisnosafetysignificanceintheADSnotbeingOPERABLEbetween100psigand150psig.CTSTables3.3.3-1and4.3.3.1-1(includingfootnote*)requireTripFunctionsC.l.d(PumpSuctionPressure-Low(Transfer))andC.l.e(SuppressionPoolWaterLevel-High)tobeOperableinModes1,2,and3,andinModes4and5whentheHPCSSystemisrequiredtobeOperableperSpecification3.5.2and3.5.3.TherequirementsforautomaticrestorationoftheHPCSwatersourcetothesuppressionpoolaredependentontheavailabilityofsourcesandtheneedtorealign.WiththeHPCSpre-alignedtothesuppressionpool,thereisnoneedtorequireautomaticrealignment.Whenshutdown(Modes4and5),anOPERABLECSTcanprovidesufficientwatertoadequatelyminimizetheconsequencesofavesseldraindowneventandautomaticrealignmenttotheSuppressionPoolisunnecessary.Inaddition,theSuppressionPoolWaterLevel-HighFunctionisprovidedtoensurethatthesuppressionpooldesignvaluesarenotexceededshouldtherebeablowdownofthereactorvesselpressurethroughtheS/RVs.SincethereactorisdepressurizedinModes4and5,ablowdowncannotoccurandthisautomatictransferfeatureisnotnecessary.OnlywithinsufficientwaterintheCSTisautomaticrealignmenttotheSuppressionPoolnecessaryintheshutdownModes.Therefore,1TSTable3.3.5.1-1Function3.d(PumpSuctionPressure-Low)isonlyrequiredtobeOperableinModes4and5whenHPCSisOperableforcompliancewithLCO3.5.2andalignedtotheCSTwhileCSTwaterlevelis.notwithintheNMP217RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALCHANGES-LSRESTRICTIVEL.4(cont'd)limitofSR3.5.2.2(asdescribedinfootnote(c)),andITSTable3.3.5.1-1Function3.f(SuppressionPoolWaterLevel-High)isnotrequiredtobeOperableinModes4and5.L.5CTSTable3.3.3-1Actions30.band36.brequiretheassociatedECCStobedeclaredinoperableimmediatelywhenmorethanonechannelofaTripFunctionisinoperable.TheseActionsapplytothefollowingCTSTable3.3.3-1TripFunctions:LPCS,LPCI,andADSReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Low,Low,Level1(TripFunctionsA.l.a,A.2.a,B.l.a,andB.2.a),HPCSReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Low,Level2(TripFunctionC.l.a),LPCS,LPCI,andHPCSDrywellPressure-High(TripFunctionsA.l.b,B.l.b,andC.l.b).ITS3.3.5.1ACTIONBwillallow24hoursandITS3.3.3.1ACTIONFwillallow96hoursor8days(dependinguponwhetherHPCSandRCICSystemsarebothOperable)toplaceinoperablechannelsintripwhentwochannelsofaFunctionareinoperable,priortodeclaringtheassociatedECCSinoperable,providedECCSinitiationcapabilityismaintained.ThechannelsforeachoftheindividualLPCS,LPCI,andADSFunctionsarecombinedinatwo-out-of-twologic;thuswhenoneorbothchannelsofanindividualTripFunctionareinoperable,theindividualTripFunctionwillnotperformitsintendedfunction.WhenoneofthetwochannelsareinoperableandtheassociatedFunctioncannotperformitsintendedfunction,CTSTable3.3.3-1Action30.acurrentlyallows24hourstotripachannel(i.e.;lossoftheTripFunctioniscurrentlyallowedfor24hours).ThechannelsfortheHPCSFunctionsarecombinedinaone-out-of-two-taken-twicelogic;thusif.onechannelineachtripsystemofaFunctionisinoperable,.theFunctioncanstillperformitsintendedfunction.ThisconditionisanalogoustotheFunctionsdescribedabove,sinceAction36.aallows24hourstotriptheinoperablechannelwhenonlyonechannelisinoperable.The24hour,96hour,and8dayoutofservicetimewasevaluatedandapprovedforuseatNMP2bytheNRCintheSafetyEvaluationReportdatedMay11,1993.Therefore,allowingtwochannelsofaLPCS,LPCI,andADSFunctiontobeinoperableisequivalenttoonechannelinoperable;inbothcases,theFunctioncannotperformitsintendedfunction.AllowingtwoHPCSchannels(onepertripsystem)ofaFunctiontobeinoperableisacceptablesincetheFunctioncanstillperformitsintendedfunction.However,this24hour,96f~ghour,or8daytime(providedinITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionsB.3.1andF.2)willonlybeallowediftheredundantECCS(inthecaseofLPCSandLPCI)ortripsystem(inthecaseofADSandHPCS)ismaintaininginitiationcapability(ITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andF.1).ThiswillensuretheoverallECCSfunctionismaintainedduringtheassociatedtimeperiod.Inaddition,/'NMP2RevisionAQB,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONHALHNTRITIVL.5(cont'd)allowingallchannelstobetrippedinlieuofrestoringthechannelsconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperablestatus,restoresthesinglefailurecapability,andprovidestherequiredinitiationcapabilityoftheinstrumentation.Therefore,providingthisoptiondoesnotimpactsafety.However,ifthisactionwouldresultinsystemactuation,thendeclaringthesysteminoperableisthepreferredaction.L.6CTSTable3.3.2-1Action20,whichrequiresaunitshutdown,isrequiredtobetakenwhenaReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3oraDrywellPressure-HighchannelisnotplacedintripasrequiredbyCTS3.3.2Actionsbandc.TheseFunctionsactuatetheGroup4valves,whicharenotPCIVs,aswellascertainPCIVscoveredbyITS3.3.6.1(ITS3.3.6.1willcontroltheinstrumentrequirementsforthePCIVs).TheGroup4valvesarevalvesthatneedtogoclosedtoensuretheLPCIAandBflowisnotdivertedfrominjectingintothecore.TheyaretheRHRBdischargetoradwastevalvesandtheRHRAandBheatexchangersamplevalves.ITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionB.3.2hasbeenaddedtoallowisolationoftheaffectedLPCIflowdiversionflowpath(s)inlieuofaunitshutdown.Isolationoftheaffectedflowdiversionflowpath(s)performsthesafetyfunctionoftheinstruments.Operationshouldbeallowedtocontinuesinceisolationoftheflowdiversionflowpath(s)alsodoesnotrendertheassociatedLPCIsubsysteminoperable;itactuallymaintainstheassociatedLPCIsubsystemOperable.TheCompletionTimetoisolatetheflowpath(s)willbethesameastheCompletionTimecurrentlyprovidedtotriptheinoperablechannel.Inaddition,iftheaffectedflowpath(s)arenotisolated,ITS3.3.5.1ACTIONHwillrequiretheassociatedLPCIsubsystemtobedeclaredinoperableimmediately.Allowingtheflowdiversionflowpath(s)toremainunisolatedifaninoperablechannelisnottrippedwillonlyaffectoneLPCIsubsystem.TheNRChaspreviouslyapprovedinCTS3.5.1(aswellasguidanceprovidedinthememorandumfromR.L.Baer(NRC)toV.Stello,Jr.(NRC),"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCO'sforECCSComponents,"datedDecember1,1975)anallowanceforoneLPCIsubsystemtobeinoperable(e.g.,whentheLPCIflowratedoesnotmeettheflowrateassumedintheaccidentanalysis)forupto7days.Inaddition,extendingtheshutdowntimefromimmediatelyto7days(theCompletionTimeforoneinoperableLPCIsubsystem)avoidsanunnecessaryplantshutdownwhenremainingECCSsubsystemsarecapableofprovidingadequateflowtomeetanalysisassumptions.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.ThisallowanceisalsoconsistentwithCTS3.3.3ACTIONSwhichrequiredeclaringtheassociatedECCSsubsysteminoperablewhenanactuationchannelisinoperableandnottrippedorrestored(e.g.,asinthecasewhenaDrywellPressure-Highchannel,whichinitiatestheassociatedECCSsubsystem,isinoperableanduntripped).NMP219RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESSRESTRITIVE(continued)L.7ThecompletiontimetorestorethemanualinitiationfunctionforallECCSfunctionshasbeenincreasedfrom8hoursinCTSTable3.3.3-1Action35to24hoursinITS3.3.5.1RequiredActionC.2.Thischangeisacceptablesincethemanualinitiationfunctionsarenotassumedinanyaccidentortransientanalysis.ThischangeisinaccordancewithTopicalReportNEDC-30936-P-A,December1988,andtheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthisgenericreliabilityanalysisas'itrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalysis.L.8TheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTofallManualInitiationFunctionsinCTSTable4.3.3.1-1footnote(a)isperformedatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown.TheproposedLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSR3.3.5.1.6)fortheseFunctions(seeDiscussionofChangeA.10aboveforchangestothistest)doesnotincludethisrestrictiononplantconditionsthatrequirestheSurveillancetobeperformedwhileshutdown.TheseSurveillancescanbeperformedwhileoperatingwithoutjeopardizingsafeplantoperations.ThecontrolofplantconditionsappropriatetoperformthetestisanissueforproceduresandschedulingandhasbeendeterminedbytheNRCStafftobeunnecessaryasaTechnicalSpecificationrestriction.AsindicatedinGenericLetter91-04,allowingthiscontrolisconsistentwiththevastmajorityofotherTechnicalSpecificationsSurveillancesthatdonotdictateplantconditionsfortheSurveillance.L.9CTSTable3.3.2-1requiresTripFunction1.a.3,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3,TripFunction1.b,DrywellPressure-High,toclosetheGroup4valves.CTSTable3.3.2-4specifiesthatGroup4valvesaretheRHRSampleandRadioactiveWastevalves.Thereareonlytwoin-seriesradwastevalvesandtheseareintheRHRBsubsystem.TherearefourRHRsamplevalves,twoin-seriesvalvesforbothRHRAandRHRBsubsystems.AsdescribedinDiscussionofChangeA.11above,thesevalvesare'notPCIVs,butareneededtocloseinordertoensureLPCIAandBflowisnotdivertedfrominjectingintothecore.However,onlyoneofthetwoin-seriesvalvesineachflowpathneedstoclosetoisolatetheflowpathandprecludeflowdiversionfromtheassociatedLPCIsubsystem.Inaddition,onlyoneofthetwovalvesineachflowpathreceivesallsignalsandmotivepowerfromitsowndivisionalizedpowersource.Thatis,oneofthetwovalvesintheRHRAflowpath(aDivision1subsystem)receivespowerandlogictoclosethevalvefromDivision2,eventhoughtheRHRApumpandLPCIinjectionvalvesarepoweredfromDivision1.Conversely,oneofthetwovalvesineachRHRBNMP220RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNICALHAN-LRESTRICTIVEL.9(cont'd)flowpath(aDivision2subsystem)receivespowerandlogictoclosethevalvesfromDivision1.ThevalvesonlyneedtobeclosediftheassociatedLPCIsubsystemisinitiated,andwithnopowertotheRHRpumporLCPIinjectionvalves,thereisnoreasontoclosethevalvereceivingpowerandlogicfromtheotherdivision.Inaddition,thereareotherLPCIflowdiversionpathwaysthataremuchlarger(hencewoulddivertmuchmoreflow)thathaveonlyonevalvethatautomaticallyclosesonanECCSinitiationsignal(e.g.,suppressionpoolcooling/testvalve).Therefore,theITSwillonlyrequireonevalveineachflowpathtobeOperable,andthevalvewillbetheassociateddivisionalizedvalve.ThisisidentifiedintheBasessincethevalvedescriptionshavebeenrelocatedtotheBases(seeDiscussionofChangeLA.2above).Thisisacceptablesince,ifarequiredvalvefailstocloseonaninitiationsignal,theremainingLPCIsubsystemswillcontinuetoprovideadequateflowtomeettheanalysisassumptions.L.10CTSTable3.3.2-1requiresTripFunctionl.m,ManualIsolationPushbutton,tobeOperablefortheGroup4valves.ThisTripFunction,alongwithallreferencestoitinCTS3/4.3.2,willnotbeincludedintheITStoclosetheGroup4valves.TheGroup4valvesarenotPCIVs,buttheyarevalvesthatneedtogoclosedtoensuretheLPCIAandBflowisnotdivertedfrominjectingintothecore.TheyaretheRHRBdischargetoradwastevalvesandtheRHRAandBheatexchangersamplevalves.Thesevalvesarenotroutinelyopenedduringpoweroperationoftheunit;theyarenormallyusedonlyinMODES3,4,and5.Whentheyareopened,aremotecontrolswitch,locatedonafrontpanelinthecontrolroom,isusedandaplantoperatornormallyremainsinthevicinityofthevalvecontrolswitchduringitsuse.Inaddition,theManualIsolationPushbuttonFunctionisnotassumedinanyaccidentortransientanalysis.TheECCSisassumedtoactuateautomatically.Also,theManualIsolationPushbuttonFunctionnotonlyclosestheGroup4valves,butalsoclosesthemainsteamlineisolationvalves,andotherautomaticPCIVs;thustheFunctionwillbemaintainedOperabletoclosethesePCIVsinITS3.3.6.1(ITSTable3.3.6.1Functionsl.h,2.d,3.m,4.h,andS.f).L.11ThischangerevisestheTechnicalSpecificationsetpointsforCTSTable3.3.3-2TripFunctionsA.l.j,B.l.h,andC.l.f(ITSTable3.3.5.-1,Functions1.1,2.j,and3.h)toreflectAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434.(WhiletheadditionofanupperAllowableValueforthethreeFunctionsappearsmorerestrictive,thenewupperAllowableValueislowerthantheAllowableValuecurrentlyintheCTS.)TheseAllowableValues(to-beincludedin.TechnicalSpecifications)havebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISAS67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,NMP221RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVEL.11(cont'd)dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValueselectionevaluationusedactualNMP2operatingandsurveillancetrendinformationtoensurethevalidityoftheevaluationinputdata.Allchangestosafetyanalysislimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereevaluatedandconfirmedasensuringsafetyanalysislicensingacceptancelimitsaremaintained.Alldesignlimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereconfirmedasensuringthatapplicabledesignrequirementsoftheassociatedsystemsaremaintained.TheproposedAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedfromeachdesignorsafetyanalysislimitbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheuseofthesemethodologiesforestablishingAllowableValuesensuresdesignorsafetyanalysislimitsarenotexceededintheeventoftransientsoraccidentsandaccountsforuncertaintiesandenvironmentalconditions.L.12CTSTable3.3.3-1Action35requiresdeclaringtheassociatedADSvalveinoperablewhenthetimetorestoretheinoperableADSmanualinitiationchannel(8hours)hasexpired(The8hourrestorationtimehasalsobeenchangedintheITSto24hoursasdescribedinDOCL.7above).EachADSmanualinitiationchannelaffectsalltheADSvalves,thusAction35effectivelyrequiresallADSvalvestobedeclaredinoperable.Withall.ADSvalvesinoperable,CTS3.5.1Actione.2requiresaunitshutdown.Inlieuofrequiringaunitshutdown,ITS3.3.5.1ACTIONGwillallowanadditional72hoursor7daystorestorethechannel,dependinguponwhetherornotbothHPCSandRCICSystemsareOperable.Attheexpirationofthisextendedtime,aunitshutdownwillberequiredifthechannelisnotrestoredtoOperablestatus.ThisadditionalrestorationtimeisconsistentwiththecurrentrestorationtimecurrentlyapprovedbytheNRC(inCTS3.3.3Actionc)whenotherrequiredADSautomaticchannelsareinoperable.Thischangeisconsidered.acceptablesincetheADSManualInitiationFunctionisnotassumedinanyaccidentortransientanalysis.NMP222RevisionQQg

ACTION50-Ac.~~<5pcP~~~gC7)dA/S8a~dEACTION51AC,nOuPperdu~ACTION52Pc(7odgWiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelserTripeyeteezequlzeeeet:,,~gg,,pgag.a.ForoneTripSstem,placetheinoperable'hannel(s)naeA.~trippedconditionwithin24hoursordeclaresysemnoperab.ForbothTripSystemswithmorethanonechannelinoperable,careeemoeraD,2WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelslessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTri<gyy~~>gJSystemrequirement,paceaeasoperaechannelinthetrippedconditionwithin24hour,orecl'aretheRCICsysteminoperable.QdnD>WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthanM.~requiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirement,restoretheinoperablechanneltoERABLEswithin24hoursordeclaretheCICsyseminoperable.<~~P'<po-e$ila$eie4A4'ieplZy~NINEMILEPOINTUNIT23(43-56AMENDMENTNO.

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATION~NIATA.5(cont'd)thisproposedactionresultsinthesameconditionasifachannelweretripped(trippingonechannelresultsinthesuctionbeingalignedtothesuppressionpool),thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.6CTSTable4.3.5.1-1requiresaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(CFT)ofFunctionalUnit4,theManualInitiationFunction,every92days.FootnotefmodifiesthisrequirementsuchthattheManualInitiationswitchesarerequiredtobetestedevery18months,whiletheremainingcircuitryassociatedwiththeManualInitiationFunctionisrequiredtoreceiveaCFTevery92daysaspartofthecircuitryrequiredtobetestedforautomaticsystemactuation.Theautomaticlogiccircuitrythatiscommonwiththemanuallogiccircuitryisnottestedevery92days.Theautomaticlogicisaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogic,thuswhenaCFTisperformedontheautomaticinitiationchannels,thelogicthatiscommontothemanuallogicisnotrequiredtobetested(thechannellosesidentitypriortotheinitiatingthelogicpartsthatarecommon).Therefore,the92dayCFTdoesnotactuallyrequireanytestingoftheManualInitiationlogic.Thelogicistestedcompletelywhentheswitchesaretested;every18months.CTS4.3.5.2andproposedSR3.3.5.2.5requireaLogicSystemFunctionalTest(LSFT)every18months(changedto24months-seeDiscussionofChangeLD.1below).SincetheLSFTisacompletetestofthelogic,includingtheManualInitiationswitches,thereisnoneedtorequireaCFT.Therefore,ITS3.3.5.2onlyrequiresanLSFT,andthischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.7CTSTable3.3.5-1Action50.arequirestheinoperablechanneland/ortheassociatedTripSystemtobeplacedintripwhenachannelisinoperable.ITS3.3.5.2ACTIONBdoesnotincludetheallowancestoplacethetripsystemintrip;onlytheinoperablechannelisallowedtobetripped.FortheRCICInstrumentation,thereisnomanualpushbuttonorswitchtoplaceonlytheassociatedtripsystemintrip.ThisdesignissimilartothatfortheECCSSystems.Therefore,themannerinwhichNMP2currentlycomplieswithCTSTable3.3.5-1Action50.aistoplacetheinoperablechannelintrip.Thus,deletionofthisallowanceisconsideredadministrative.RELATEDPEIFIATIONSNoneNMP2Revisiong

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONIITEHALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1CTSTable3.3.5-1Note(d)andTable4.3.5.1-1footnote**havebeendeleted.TheallowanceinthenotesspecifiesthattheManualInitiationFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEwiththeindicatedreactorwaterlevelonthewiderangeinstrumentsgreaterthantheLevel8setpointcoincidentwiththereactorpressurelessthan600psigbecauseofhotcalibration/coldoperationlevelerror.Withwaterlevelgreaterthan'heLevel8setpoint,theRCICsteamadmissionvalvewillreceiveaclosesignalandinturntheRCICinjectionvalvewillremainclosedduetoapositioninterlockwiththeRCICsteamadmissionvalvepositionsignal.Aninitiationsignal(manualorlowwaterlevel)inthisconditionwillnotstarttheRCICsystemsincetheHighWaterLevel8actuationoverridestheinitiationsignal.IfaLOCAweretooccurinthissituationorifanotherreactorleveltransientweretooccur,thereactorwaterlevelwilldecrease,theHighWaterLevel8willclear,andtheautomaticactuationatLevel2willfunctionasdesigned.Inaddition,ifoperationsdecidedtoinitiatethesystemmanually,itmaybeperformedwhentheHighWaterLevel8hascleared.SincetheManualInitiationFunctionremainsOPERABLEundertheseconditions,thenoteshavebeendeleted.Thisdeletionisconsideredmorerestrictiveonplantoperation.M.2AppropriateRequiredActionshavebeenadded(inITS3.3.5.2RequiredActionsB.1andD.1)toActions50and51ofCTSTable3.3.5-1forresponsetolossofRCICinitiationcapabilityofaFunction.TheseadditionalrequirementsprovidecleardirectionofthenecessaryActionswheninthiscondition.TheRequiredActionswillonlyallowcontinuedoperationsfor1hourifalossofRCICinitiationcapabilityofaFunctionoccurs.Thischangerepresentsanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationnecessarytoensuretheriskassociatedwithplantoperationinthisconditionisminimized.M.3AnadditionalFunctionhasbeenadded,ITSTable3.3.5.2-1Function4,toproviderequirementsfortheRCICPumpSuctionPressure-Timer.ThePumpSuctionPressure-LowFunction(CTSTable3.3.5-1FunctionalUnit3,ITSTable3.3.5.2-1Function3)istimedelayedtoprecludespuriousautomaticsuctionsourceswaps.Toensureproperoperationofthelogic,thetimedelayrelaymustfunction.AppropriateACTIONSandSurveillanceshavealsobeenadded.Thisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONHALHAN-LRTRITIV"Generic"LA.1ThedetailinCTS4.3.5.2relatingtomethods(simulatedautomaticoperation)forperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTSareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheRCICSystemInstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.5.2andproposedSR3.3.5.2.5areadequatetoensuretheRCICSysteminstrumentsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2SystemdesignandoperationdetailsspecifiedinCTSTable3.3.5-1,Note(c)and(e)(whichdescribethenumberoftripsystemsandthelogicdesignfortheManualInitiationandPumpSuctionPressure-Low(Transfer)FunctionalUnits)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.DetailsrelatingtosystemdesignandoperationareunnecessaryintheLCO.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheRCICSystemInstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.5.2andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretheRCICSysteminstrumentsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LB.1CTSTable3.3.5-1footnote(a),whichallowsadelayinenteringtheassociatedActionstatement,hasbeenclarifiedtoallowcurrentFunctionalUnit4(ITSTable3.3.5.2-1Function5),theManualInitiationFunction,tobeinoperableanddelayenteringtheassociatedACTIONSfor6hours,regardlessoftheremainingRCICinitiationcapabilityoftheManualInitiationFunction.ForthisFunction,lossofonechannelresultsinalossofRCICinitiationcapability.ThisconditionwasevaluatedinthereliabilityanalysisofGENE-770-06-2-A,December1992,andfoundtobeacceptable.Thisanalysisisthebasisforthecurrent6hourallowanceintheNote.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthisgenericreliabilityanalysisasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedinNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalysis.NMP2RevisionA

TEHNIDISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONLHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT)ofCTS4.3.5.2andtheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTfortheRCICManualInitiationFunctionspecifiedinCTSTable4.3.5.1-1FunctionalUnit4Note4(changedtoLSFTinDiscussionChangeA.6above)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.5.2.5tofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelingcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThisSRensuresthatRCIClogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthistestnormallypassestheSurveillanceatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.ThesystemfunctiontestingperformedinITS3.5.3overlapsthissurveillancetoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.TheRCICsystemistestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewithproposedSRs3.3.5.2.1,3.3.5.2.2,and3.3.5.2.3.ThistestingoftheRCICsystemensuresthatasignificantportionoftheRCICcircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.RCICsystemactuatinglogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Basedontheabovediscussion,theimpact,ifany,ofthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequenciesforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSofCTS4.3.5.1andCTSTable4.3.5.1-1forFunctionalUnits1,2,and3havebeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.5.2.4.The.proposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequencyRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheRCICinitiationlogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandthereforeishighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedRCICinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinthedesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation,ThefollowingparagraphslistedbyCTSTable4.3.5.1-1FunctionalUnitnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:FunctionalUnit1,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.FunctionalUnit2,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-High,Level8ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHANRTRITIVLE.1(cont'd)FunctionalUnit3,PumpSuctionPressure-Low(Transfer)ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments,Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.5-2arenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.5aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.5.2reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A;limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentRevision+(,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LESSTRICTIVEL.1(cont'd)uncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.Thetrip.setpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.(.L.2AnoptionisaddedtoCTSTable3.3.5-1Action50.bforwhenoneormoreinoperablechannelsexist.Thisoption(inITS3.3.5.2RequiredActionB.2)istoplaceallinoperablechannelsinthetrippedcondition.Thisconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperablestatus,restoresthesinglefailurecapabilitywithregardtosystemactuation,andprovidestherequiredinitiationcapabilityoftheinstrumentation.Therefore,providingthisoptiondoesnotimpactsafety.However,ifthisactionwouldresultinsystemactuation,thendeclaringthesysteminoperableisthepreferredaction.L.3TheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToftheRCICManualInitiationFunctionofCTSTable4.3.5.1-1footnotefisperformedatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown.TheproposedLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSR3.3.5.2.5)forthisFunction(seeDiscussionofChangeA.6aboveforchangestothistest)doesnotincludethisrestrictiononplantconditionsthatrequirestheSurveillancetobeperformedwhileshutdown.ThisSurveillancecanbeperformedwhileoperatingwithoutjeopardizingsafeplantoperations.ThecontrolofplantconditionsappropriatetoperformthetestisanissueforproceduresandschedulingandhasbeendeterminedbytheNRCStafftobeunnecessaryasaTechnicalSpecificationrestriction.AsindicatedinGenericLetter91-04,allowingthiscontrolisconsistentwiththevastmajorityofotherTechnicalSpecificationsSurveillancesthatdonotdictateplantconditionsfortheSurveillance.RevisionA

mWet)op8TRIPFUNCTION,A.IoPrimarContainmentIsolationSiCVALVEGPSOPERDBYSILaMINIMUMOPERABLECHANNELSPERTABLE3.3.2-1ISOLATIONACTUATIONINSTRUMENTATION~p&Cg(oSX<>IAPPLICABLEOPERATIONALCONOITIONACTION~3a.ReactorVesselWaterLevell~1.Low,Low,low,level1~qg2.Low,Low,Level2~c~~3.Low,Level3z6b.DrywellPressure-Highcc.MainSteamLine1.Rae2.Pressure-Low3.Flow-Highd.MainSteamLineTunnelc~~~~+C~2,3,6,7>8QpropcbMe4e(h>2mme,gg22/Line1,2,312,3and*r.5~al1,2,3Pl,i1,2,32Ob8Cgreup2/P,QPpZ(pro.]Q2Ofi23<219tg,I.Pe.1.Temperature-High2.temperature-High3.Temperature-HighMSLLeadEnclosureCondenserVacuum-LowerE?p~IQ1112,321P2,32192,3~k(cQ210nDSs-g.ReactorVesselPressure-High(RHRCut-inPermissive)g>c.f.RHREquipmentAreaTemperature-High(HXs/iCBPumpRooms)1,+rgf~5OQQ1,328f'3aAr'A

KF~~cgg6.C:Iz+c'-h.SGTSExhaust-HighRadiationi.RWCUSystemLR2VALVEGROUPSOPERATEDBY)IdtINIMUMOPERABLECHANNELSPERTRIPAPPUCABLE0PERATIONAI.1,2,3MC49,4.1)hFlow-High'kb2)hFIow-High,Timer3)StandbyUquldControl,SLCS,Iet)ationj.RWCUEquipmentArea'~c1)PumpRoomATemperature-HighA2)PumpRoomBTemperature-HighcIc.3)HXRoomTemperature-Highk.ReactorBuildingPipeChase*3,j,tjg,g1)zimuth1804UperTemperature-HlgK,3.I,Q.e,S.42)owTemrature-High3kqgA3)emperature-Highg3,<.5'.~I.ReactorBuildingTemperature-HighJO~j,4J,$m.ManualisolationPushbuttonINSSSS)'36,78;76i0,7{06,76,76,6,7,106,6.7,16,6.012,63,6,789~ac~3.$$1ak1.2,31,2,31,2.5@(e,fo~~).Ka%<1,2,31,2,"31,2,~231,2,31.2,31,2,31.2,31,2.3~P~Ž1,2,31.2,31,2,322622+22X'2F22p'2p22+22p22F22/262628~25,2UJyqc~oAAA+~N6

Cipvcl(Cm4evv5>2&iiACTION20AcTaubACTION21hc-'Qo<sfoINACTION22Q$s,$$,4thTABLE3.3.2-1(Continued)~4PnPoSehISOLATIONACTUATIONINSTRUMENTATIONR,fB)~y~QfIProP~seb~i.>ACTION+~TQNP~PfoPd~cL'f4~C3~btshc.>OfwiSIr80%5einatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithin12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext24hoursLS(2.atlwitthassociatedisolationvalvesclosedwithinowreinatleastNCTSNofoowNwithin12all/gssrPjhoursandinCOLOSHUTDOWNwithinthenext24hours.gigVI~J2~(Closetheaffectedsystemisolationvalveswithin1houdectheeseragc$2oNCACTION23-BeinatleastSTARTUPwithin6hours.L.gEstassNGINTEGRITYwiththestandbygtreatmentsstemoeraoftwithin1hourL.7Pcf'A)~FACTION28theaffectedsystemisolationvalvesclosedcessmsnera'Si,3~PP'hydrfQ)~JpdyACTION24-Notused.g~i,~~<<@gregpCTION25-estemanuasoat>ncionwithinhoursrbein'atleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthenext12hoursndinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing24hours.$(AiQ8.lOACTION26-ifdestetotionOPRABL~tatuswin[(6hsrclosetheaffectedsystemisolationvaveswstintheoursemps!0ACT)cHHCTION27LtiNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/4316

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONA.7(cont'd)OPERABILITY,theinstrumentswillbemovedtoITS3.3.5.1,ECCSInstrumentation.AnytechnicalchangestotheserequirementsareaddressedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS3,3.5.1.A.8EachofthecurrentIsolationInstrumentationManualInitiationswitchandpushbuttonchannelsinCTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction1.mactuallyprovidestwoinputstotheisolationlogic;oneinputactuatedbyrotatingacollarswitchandasecondinputbydepressingtheinnerpushbutton.Therefore,usingtheITSformatthateachinputisconsideredachannel,theminimumchannelsismoreappropriatelyspecifiedas"4"inITSTable3.3.6.1-1Functions1.h,2.d,4.h,andS.f.Sincethechangeinvolvesnodesignchangebutisonlyadifferenceinnomenclature,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.9Notused.A.10Anactionto"declaretheaffectedsysteminoperable,"aspresentedinCTSTable3.3.2-1Actions22,26,and28,isanunnecessaryreminderthatotherTechnicalSpecificationsmaybeaffected.Thisisessentiallya"crossreference"betweenTechnicalSpecificationsthathasbeendeterminedtobeadequatelyprovidedthroughtraining.Inaddition,thedefinitionof"OPERABILITYinITSSection1.1wouldalsoensurethattheaffectedsystemsrenderedinoperablebyisolationofanaffectedlinearedeclaredinoperable.Therefore,thisdeletionisadministrative.A.11CTSTable3.3.2-2Footnote*referstoBasesFigure3/4.3-1.ThisFigureisprovidinginformationastowhatreactorvesselwaterlevelthevariousreactorwaterinstrumentsactuate,incomparisontooneanother.ThisinformationisalreadyessentiallycontainedintheAllowableValuecolumnofthisTable.Therefore,thisreferenceisbeingdeletedandisconsideredadministrative.A.12CTSTable3.3.2-2Footnote***modifiestheAllowableValueforTripFunctionl.d.3),theMainSteamLineTunnelTemperature-HighMSLLeadEnclosure.ThefootnoterequiresthatpriortotheAllowableValueadjustment,theactualambienttemperaturereadingforallOperablechannelsintheleadenclosureareamustbegreaterthanorequaltotheambienttemperatureusedasthebasisfortheAllowableValue(partaofthefootnote),andaSurveillanceisimplementedinaccordancewithNotedofTable4.3.2.1-1(partcofthefootnote).ThesetworequirementshavebeendeletedsincetheyareduplicativeoftherequirementtoperformtheSurveillance.ProposedSR3.3.6.1.2istheSurveillancethatmeetstheCTSTable4.3.2.1-1Notedrequirement.CTS4.0.1andproposedSR3.0.1requireSurveillancestobemetintheModesorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability.SR3.3.6.1.2mustbemetRevisionPg,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION~AMINIA.12(cont'd)priortoimplementinganAllowableValuechange,sincetheNotetotheSR3.3.6.1.2requiresittobemetwhentheAllowableValueisadjusted.IftheSRisnotperformedpriortotheAllowableValueadjustment,thenassoonastheadjustmentismade,theaffectedchannelswouldbeinoperableasrequiredbyproposedSR3.0.1.Therefore,theCTSTable3.3.2-2Footnote***,partsaandcareunnecessaryandhavebeendeleted.A.13ThedetailsinTable4.3.2.1-1Note(b)relatedtohowtoperformtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthermocouplesisdeletedsinceitisduplicativeofthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONinSection1.1oftheITS.Thischangeisconsideredadministrativesincethereisnochangeinthecalibrationmethod.A.14TheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(CFT)requirementforCTSTable4.3.2.1-1TripFunctionl.i.3),SLCSInitiation,hasbeendeletedsinceitisredundanttotheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT).TheSLCSystemInitiationchannelshavenoadjustablesetpoints,butarebasedonswitchmanipulation.TheLSFT(proposedSR3.3.6.1.6),whichappliestoITSTable3.3.6.1-1Function4.g(SLCSystemInitiation),testsallcontactsandwillprovidepropertestingofthechannelstestedbyaCFT.Therefore,thisdeletionisconsideredadministrative.A.15CTSTable4.3.2.1-1requiresaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(CFT)ofTripFunctionsl.mand2.g,theManualInitiationFunctions,every92days.Note(c)modifiesthisrequirementsuchthattheManualInitiationswitchesarerequiredtobetestedevery18months,whiletheremainingcircuitryassociatedwiththeManualInitiationFunctionisrequiredtoreceiveaCFTevery92daysaspartofthecircuitryrequiredtobetestedforautomaticsystemactuation.Theautomaticlogiccircuitrythatiscommonwiththemanuallogiccircuitryisnottestedevery92days.TheautomaticlogicformostFunctionsiseitherone-out-of-oneortwo-out-of-twologic.However,whenaCFTisperformedontheautomaticinitiationchannels,thelogicthatiscommontothemanuallogicisnotrequiredtobetested(thechannellosesidentitypriortoinitiatingthelogicpartsthatarecommon).Therefore,the92dayCFTdoesnotactuallyrequireanytestingoftheManualInitiationlogic.Thelogicistestedcompletelywhentheswitchesaretested;every18months.CTS4.3.2.2andproposedSR3.3.6.1.6requireaLogicSystemFunctionalTest(LSFT)every18months(changedto24months-seeDiscussionofChangeLD.1below).SincetheLSFTisacompletetestofthelogic,includingtheManualInitiationswitches,thereisnoneedtorequireaCFT.Therefore,ITS3.3.6.1onlyrequiresanLSFT,andthischangeisconsideredadministrative.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONA.16ForcertainFunctionsinCTSTable3.3.2-1,thetotalnumberofchannelspertripsystemarelistedinlieuoflistingthenumberofchannelspertripsystemonanareaorroombasis.TheformatoftheITSistoprovidethenumberofchannelspertripsystemonanareaorroombasis.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththemannerinwhichthechannelsfortheMainSteamLineHighFlowFunction(CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionl.c.3,ITSTable3.3.6.1-1Function1.c)ispresented.Therefore,thefollowingchangeshavebeenmade:a)CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction1.d.3,theMainSteamLineTunnelLeadEnclosureTemperature-HighFunction,requires6totalchannelspertripsystem.Therearethreeareas(east,west,andcenter)monitoredforthisFunction,withtwochannelsperareaineachtripsystem.Therefore,inITSTable3.3.6.1-1Function1.g,therequiredchannelspertripsystemislistedas2perarea.ThenumberofareasandtotalchannelsarealsodescribedintheBasesfortheindividualFunction.b)CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionl.f,theRHREquipmentRoomAreaTemperature-HighFunction,requires2totalchannelspertripsystem.Therearetwoareas(heatexchangerandpump)monitoredforthisFunction,withonechannelperareaineachtripsystem.Therefore,inITSTable3.3.6.1-1Functions3.gandS.a,therequiredchannelspertripsystemislistedas1perarea.Thenumber.ofareasandtotalchannelsarealsodescribedintheBasesfortheindividualFunctions.c)CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionsl.j.1)and1.j.2),theRWCUPumpRoomsAandBTemperature-HighFunctions,require2totalchannelspertripsystem.Therearetwopumproomsmonitored,AandB,fortheseFunctions,withonechannelperroomineachtripsystem.Therefore,sincethetwoTripFunctionsmonitorthesameSystem,thesetwoTripFunctionshavebeencombinedintooneFunctioninITSTable3.3.6.1-1:Function4.d.Therequiredchannelspertripsystemislistedas1perroom.ThenumberofroomsandtotalchannelsarealsodescribedintheBasesfortheindividualFunction.d)CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctions1.k.1),1.k.2),and1.k.3),theReactorBuildingPipeChaseAreaTemperature-HighFunctions,require4totalchannelspertripsystem.Therearethreeazimuthalareasmonitored,180'pper,40',and180'ower,fortheseFunctions,withonechannelperareaineachtripsystemforthefirsttwoareasandtwochannelsineachtripsystemforthethirdarea.NMP2Revisiongg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONADMINISTRATIVEA.16(cont'd)Therefore,sincethethreeTripFunctionsmonitorthesameparameter,thesethreeTripFunctionshavebeencombinedintooneFunctionforeachofthethreeaffectedSystems(i.e.,RCIC,RWCU,andRHRSDCParameter)inITSTable3.3.6.1-1:Functions3.h,4.e,andS.d,respectively.Therequiredchannelspertripsystemislistedas1perarea.ThenumberofareasandtotalchannelsarealsodescribedintheBasesfortheindividualFunctions.Inaddition,forclarity,thechannelsaredescribedinITSTable3.3.6.1-1basedontheelevationinlieuoftheazimuth.e)CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction1.1,theReactorBuildingGeneralAreaTemperature-HighFunction,requires5totalchannelspertripsystem.TherearefiveareasmonitoredforthisFunction,withonechannelperareaineachtripsystem.Therefore,inITSTable3.3.6.1-1Functions3.iandS.e,therequiredchannelspertripsystemislistedas1perarea.ThenumberofareasandtotalchannelsarealsodescribedintheBasesfortheindividualFunctions.Describingthechannelsinthismannerdoesnottechnicallychangethecurrentrequirements;thetotalnumberofchannelsrequiredforeachoftheaffectedFunctionsremainsthesame.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.RELATEDPEIFIATINR.1TheRCICDrywellPressure-HighFunction(CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction2.h)isolatestheRCICturbineexhaustvacuumbreakerisolationvalves(2ICS~MOV148and2ICS*MOV164)coincidentwithaRCICSteamLinePressure-Lowsignal(CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction2.b).However,thesevalvesarenotassumedinanydesignbasisaccidentortransientanalysis.Further,theevaluationsummarizedinNEDO-31466determinedthelossofthisinstrumentationtobeanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisFunctiondidnotsatisfytheNRCPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaasdocumentedintheApplicationofSelectionCriteriatotheNMP2TechnicalSpecificationsandhasbeenrelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManuals(TRM).TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Revision+'QQ

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONN-MRRTRTIVM.1TheCTSTables3.3.2-1and4.3.2.1-1TripFunctionl.a.3ApplicabilityfortheReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3FunctionhasbeenchangedtoincludeMODES4and5.ThisFunctionisolatestheRHRShutdownCooling(SDC)Systemvalves(Group5)andthesenewApplicabilitieswillprotectagainstpotentialdrainingofthereactorvesselthroughtheRHRSDCsuctionlineduringshutdownconditions,whichiswhentheRHRSDCSystemisnormallyoperated.Inaddition,whenRHRSystemintegrityismaintainedinMODES4and5,onlyoneofthetwolowwaterlevelinstrumentationtripsystemswillberequired.ThisisprovidedinITSTable3.3.6.1-1Note(d).WiththepipingintactandnomaintenancebeingperformedthathasapotentialfordrainingthereactorvesselthroughtheRHRSystem,bothtripsystemsarenotrequiredsinceonetripsystemcanisolatethesuctionpiping(byclosingoneofthesuctionisolationvalves).AnappropriateACTION(ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONJ)hasalsobeenaddedforwhenthechannel(s)oftheFunctionisinoperableinMODES4and5.ThisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationsandisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.M.2ThenumberofrequiredchannelsfortheGroups3,6,and7PCIVManualInitiationFunction(CTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionl.m)hasbeenincreasedfrom"1"pertripsystemto"4"pertripsysteminITSTable3.3.6.1-1Functions2.dand4.h.ThedesignoftheGroups3,6,and7logicistwoswitchandpushbuttonspertripsystem,withbothbeingrequiredtoactuateatripsystem.Currently,onlyoneswitchandpushbuttonpertripsystemisrequired.Therefore,thispartofthechangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperationandwillensurethesegroupscanbemanuallyactuated.Inaddition,eachoftheswitchandpushbuttonchannelsprovidestwoinputstotheisolationlogic;oneinputactuatedbyrotatingacollarswitchandasecondinputbydepressingtheinnerpushbutton.Therefore,usingtheITSformatthateachinputisconsideredachannel,theminimumchannelsismoreappropriatelyspecifiedas"4."Sincethispartofthechangeinvolvesnodesignchangebutisonlyadifferenceinnomenclature,itisconsideredadministrative.M.3OneadditionalFunctionhasbeenadded,ITSTable3.3.6.1-1Function3.k.ThisFunctionisaTimerFunctionwhichdelaysinitiationoftheRHR/RCICSteamFlow-HighFunction.Currently,theRHR/RCICSteamFlow-HighFunctionisolatestheRCICPCIVsonlyafteratimedelay.TheactualtimedelayAllowableValueiscontrolledinplantprocedures.AppropriateACTIONSandSurveillanceRequirementshavealsobeenadded.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNIALHAN-MRERESTRITIVE(continued)M.4MSFootnote**toCTSTables3.3.2-1and4.3.2.1-1statesthatTripFunctionl.e,CondenserVacuum-Low,isonlyrequiredtobeOperableinModes2and3whenanymainturbinestopvalveis>90%openorwhenthekey-lockedcondenserlowvacuumbypassswitchisinthenormalposition.ITSTable3.3.6.1-1Note(a)requirestheCondenserVacuum-LowFunctiontobeOperableinModes2and3whenanyturbinestopvalveisnotclosed.Thecurrentfootnoteessentiallyallowsastopvalvetoopenupto90%beforerequiringaMSIVisolationonlowvacuum.TheITSwillensurethatwithalowvacuumcondition,anMSIVisolationwilloccurifanyturbinestopvalveisnotclosed.Thiswillensurethatthemaincondenserisnotoverpressurizedifaturbinestopvalveisinadvertentlyopenedwithmaincondenservacuumlow.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperation.Inaddition,thebypassswitchrequirementisredundanttotheturbinestopvalverequirement.ThereisnorequirementintheCTStoplacethebypassswitchesinnormal,thustheycanbemaintainedinthebypasspositionuntiltheunitisreadytoopentheturbinestopvalves.Thus,theCTSessentiallyonlyrequirestheFunctiontobeOperablebasedonturbinestopvalveposition.Therefore,thedeletionofthispartoftheCTSallowanceisconsideredadministrative.TheBaseshowever,willdescribethepurposeofthebypassswitchesandtheireffectonthelogic.AtimedelaysettingAllowableValuehasbeenaddedinproposedITSTable3.3.6.1-1forFunction2.c,theSGTSystemExhaustRadiation-HighFunction.Currently,nomaximumtimedelayisprovidedinCTSTable3.3.2-2,tripFunctionl.h.ThisFunctionhasanadjustabletimedelaysetting.ThenewAllowableValueisS18.5seconds.TheAllowableValueisbasedonthecurrentsetpointmethodologyandensuresthattheprimarycontainmentpurgevalves(group9valves)closeonhighSGTSystemexhaustradiationtokeepoffsitedosesbelow10CFR100limits.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.TEHHN-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailinCTS4.3.2.2relatingtomethods(simulatedautomaticoperations)forperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTSareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation.Therequirements.ofITS3.3.6.1andproposedSR3.3.6.1.6areadequatetoensuretheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideNMP2Revision+Qg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTECHNIALHAN-LRESTRICTIVLA.1(cont'd)adequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsinCTSTable3.3.2-1(theValueGroupsoperatedbysignalcolumnandthelogicdescriptioninNotesa,f,g,andh)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.DetailsrelatingtosystemdesignandoperationareunnecessaryintheLCO.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.6.1andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.3SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsinCTSTable3.3.2-4(PCIVsassociatedwitheachvalvegroupandtheassociatedisolationsignals)areproposedtorelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).DetailsrelatedtosystemdesignandoperationareunnecessaryintheLCO.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.6.1andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretheprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.Inaddition,theITSBasesspecifieswhichvalvegroupsareactuatedbyeachprimarycontainmentisolationinstrumentFunction(asdescribedinDiscussionofChangeLA.2above).Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LB.1CTS3.3.2Actionb.l.a)requiresthat,whenthenumberofOPERABLEchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirementforoneTripSystem,theinoperablechannel(s)mustbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hourfortripfunctionswithoutanOPERABLEchannel.CTS3.3.2ActionC.2.a)1)requiresthat,whenthenumberofOPERABLEchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirementforbothtripsystems,thenafterplacingtheinoperablechannel(s)inonetripsysteminthetrippedconditionin1hour,theinoperablechannel(s)intheremainingtripsystemmustbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hourfortripfunctionswithoutanOPERABLEchannel.ITS3.3.6.1doesnotincludetheserequirements.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVLB.1(cont'd)ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONAestablishestherequirementtoplacetheinoperablechannel(s)intripwithineither12or24hours,whichisconsistentwithCTS3.3.2Actionsb.l.b),b.l.c),c.2.a)2),andc.2.a)3),irrespectiveofthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripsystem.FormostFunctions,twochannelsarerequiredpertripsystemandarecombinedinatwo-out-of-twologic.Thus,whenonechannelisinoperable,thetripsystemwillnotactuatetoclosetheassociatedPCIV.Therefore,havingasecondchannelinoperableisessentiallythesameasonechannelinoperable,theassociatedvalvewillnotreceiveanisolationsignal.ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONBcontinuestoensurethattheisolationcapabilityofapenetrationisnotlostforgreaterthan1hour.Inaddition,forthosetripsystemsthathaveonlyonechannel,theCTSunnecessarilyrestrictstherestorationtimeto1hour(sincewhenonechannelisinoperable,thetripsystemhasnoOPERABLEchannels).Theseconditions(lossofallchannelsinatripsystem)wasevaluatedinthereliabilityanalysesofNEDC-30851-P-A,Supplement2,March1989andNEDC-31677-P-A,July1990,andfoundtobeacceptable.Theseanalysesarethebasisforthecurrent12hourand24hourrestorationtimesintheCTS3.3.2Actions.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthesegenericreliabilityanalysesasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysesareacceptabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERsacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalyses.LB.2CTSTable3.3.2-1Note(b),whichallowsadelayinenteringtheassociatedActionstatementduringperformanceofSurveillances,hasbeenclarifiedtoprovidedirectindicationoftheintentofthecurrentwording.Thecurrentwords"providedatleastoneotherOPERABLEchannelinthesametripsystemismonitoringthatparameter"areintendedtoensurethatthetripcapabilityoftheFunctionismaintained.However,itdoesnotprovidethisassuranceforalllogicsystemdesigns.Inaddition,forthosetripssystemsthathaveonlyonechannel,theCTSunnecessarilyrestrictstheplantfromusingthe6hourallowance,Therefore,theNotehasbeenmodifiedinITS3.3.6.1(Note2totheSurveillanceRequirements)tostate"providedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainsisolationcapability."ThisistheintentofthecurrentNoteandisbasedonpreviouslyconductedreliabilityanalyses(NEDC-31677-P-A,July1990,andNEDC-30851-P-A,Supplement2,March1989).TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthesegenericreliabilityanalysesasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysesareacceptabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERsacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalyses.NMP210RevisionA

~"

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNICALHANGES-LRESTRICTIVE(continued)LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT)ofCTS4.3.2.2(proposedSR3.3.6.1.6),theISOLATIONSYSTEMRESPONSETIMEtestofCTS4.3.2.3(proposedSR3.3.6.1.7),andtheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(CFT)fortheManualInitiationFunctionsspecifiedinCTSTable4.3.2.1-1Footnote(c)(changedtoLSFTinDiscussionofChangeA.15above)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintherefuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThisSRensuresthatIsolationActuationInstrumentationlogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillancefrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24-monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.Reviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirsurveillancesatthecurrentfrequency.AnevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdataandithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.MostinstrumentchannelsaretestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewithCTS4.3.2.1,theCFT.ThistestingoftheisolationinstrumentationensuresthatasignificantportionoftheIsolationActuationInstrumentationcircuitryisoperatingproperly,andwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.ThePCIVsincludingtheactuatinglogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceofcurrentSurveillance4.3.2.1andTable4.3.2.1-1(proposedSR3.3.6.1.5)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHNRTRITELE.1(cont'd)fortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThesubjectSRensuresthattheIsolationinstrumentswillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausethePrimaryContainmentIsolationSystemalongwiththeIsolationinitiationlogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofand,therefore,ishighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedIsolationinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinthedesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation.Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSTripFunctionnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:TripFunction1.a.1):ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLowLow,Level1ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DBSTransmittersand510DUMasterandSlaveTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunctionl.a.2):ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2.ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DBSTransmitter'sand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP212RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONHLHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)TripFunction1.a.3):ReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.b:DrywellPressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GBSTransmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.c.2):MainSteamLinePressure-LowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB9Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.13RevisionA 0'

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)TripFunction1.c.3):MainSteamLineFlow-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB7Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.d.1):MainSteamLineTunnelTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.d.2):MainSteamLineTunnelDifferentialTemperature-.HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-VTFF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.d.3):MainSteamLineTunnelLeadEnclosureTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheNMP214RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHANES-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)projected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.e:CondenserVacuum-LowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153AB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.f:RHREquipmentAreaTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.g:ReactorVesselPressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB9Transmittersand510DUMasterandSlaveTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRoserqountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP2,15RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVLE.1(cont'd)TripFunction1.h:StandbyGasTreatment(SGT)SystemExhaustRadiation-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyaKamanKDBRadiationDetector,KamanKMGGasProcessMonitor,KamanKEM-PLocalMicroprocessor,andaKamanKELIC-PRemoteIndicationandControlUnit.Theseinstrumentswereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.1.1):RWCUSystemDifferentialFlow-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB4Transmitters,Bailey766SignalResistorUnits(SRUs),Bailey766SquareRootExtractors,Bailey752Summers,andBailey745FlowSwitches.TheBaileySRUsarenoncalibratabledevicesandwereevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).TheRosemountTransmitters,BaileySquareRootExtractors,Bailey752Summers,andBailey745FlowSwitcheswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsofbothevaluationssupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.1.2):RWCUSystemDifferentialFlow-High,TimerThisfunctionisperformedbyEagleHP51A634timedelayrelays.TheEaglerelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunctions1.j.1)and1.j.2):RWCUPumpRoomTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP216RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)TripFunction1.j.3):RWCUHeatExchangerRoomAreaTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.k:ReactorBuildingPipeChaseTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.1:ReactorBuildingTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction2.a:RCICSteamLineFlow-TimerThisfunctionisperformedbyAgastatE7012seriesrelays.TheAgastatrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.NMP217RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)TripFunction2.b:RCICSteamSupplyPressure-LowThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153AB7Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction2.c:RCICSteamLineFlow-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction2.d:RCICTurbineExhaustDiaphragmPressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB6Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,an'ncreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.18RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION-LRTRITVLE.1(cont'd)TripFunction2.e:RCICEquipmentAreaTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction2.f:RCICSteamLineTunnelTemperature-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyPyco102-9039-08thermocouplesandRiley86-PTGF-EGtemperatureswitches.Thethermocouplesarenotrequiredtobecalibrated,therefore,nodriftevaluationwasperformed.TheRileyinstrumentswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction2.i:RCIC/RHRSteamFlow-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoa24monthsurveillanceNMP219RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)frequency.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.2-2arenotincludedintheITSandall~referencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.2aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.6.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2CTSTable3.3.2-1Action20,whichrequiresaunitshutdown,isrequiredtobetakenwhena.ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLowLow,Level1channelisnotplacedintripasrequiredbyCTS3.3.2Actionsbandc.ITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionD.1isproposedtobeaddedtoallowisolationoftheaffectedmainsteamlineinlieuofshuttingdowntheunit.SomeconditionsmayaffectNMP220RevisionP'g

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)L.3'L4theisolationlogicforonlysomeofthemainsteamlines.Inthesecases,itisnotnecessarytorequireashutdownoftheunit;rather,isolationoftheaffectedlinesreturnsthesystemtoastatuswhereitcanperformtheremainderofitsisolationfunction,andcontinuedoperationisallowed(althoughitmaybeatareducedpowerlevelinMODE2.)1CTSTable3.3.2-1Action20,whichrequiresaunitshutdown,isrequiredtobetakenwhenaReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2channelisnotplacedintripasrequiredbyCTS3.3.2Actionsbandc.ThisFunctionactuatesReactorWaterCleanup(RWCU)Systemvalvesaswellasotherprimarycontainmentisolationvalves.ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONFhasbeenaddedtoallowisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationinsteadofrequiringaunitshutdown,whenonlytheRWCUSystemvalvesareaffected.Isolationoftheaffectedpenetrationperformsthesafetyfunctionoftheinstruments.WhentheReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2Functionchannelsareinoperable,andonlytheRWCUSystem(Groups6and7)valvesareaffected,operationcancontinuewiththesevalvesisolated.Ifthepenetrationisnotisolatedwithin1hour(asprovidedinITS3.3.6.1ACTIONF),theplantmustbeplacedinMODES3and4inaccordancewithITS3.3.6.1ACTIONH.CTSTable3.3.2-1Action20,whichrequiresaunitshutdowntoMODE4,isrequiredtobetakenwhenaReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3channelisnotplacedintripasrequiredbyCTS3.3.2Actionsbandc.ThisFunctionactuatesRHRSDCSystemvalves.ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONJhasbeenaddedtoallowisolationoftheaffectedpenetration(ITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionJ.2)insteadofrequiringaunitshutdowntoMODE4(i.e.,theunitisallowedtoremaininMODE3).Isolationoftheaffectedpenetrationperformsthesafetyfunctionoftheinstruments.Inaddition,allowingtheunittoremaininMODE3providesmorealternativestoremovedecayheatthanwhentheunitisinMODE4.However,thisaction(isolatingtheaffectedpenetration)willresultinalossofshutdowncooling,andcouldinfact,resultinamoresignificantsafetyproblemthanifthevalveswereleftopenwithinoperablechannels.Therefore,anadditionalAction(ITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionJ.1)wouldrequireactiontobeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestorethechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatus.TheBasesdescribescircumstancesunderwhicheachRequiredActionistobetaken.ThesenewactionsensurethatSDCisnotinterruptedwhenneeded,yetalsoensuresactioniscontinuedtorestorethechannel(s)ifthisisthecase.L.STheMODE1and2ApplicabilityrequirementsforCTSTables3.3.2-1and4.3.2.1-1TripFunctionl.a.3),ReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3,TripFunctionl.f,RHREquipmentAreaTemperature-High,TripFunction1.k,ReactorBuildingPipeChaseTemperature-High,and'TripFunction1.1,NMP221RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRICTIVEL.S(cont'd)ReactorBuildingTemperature-HighhavebeendeletedfortheRHRSDCSystem(Group5)valves.TripFunction1.g(ITSTable3.3.6.1-1FunctionS.c),ReactorVesselPressure-High,ensuresthattheRHRSDCSystemvalvesareisolatedinMODE1andMODE2whenabovetheRHRcut-inpermissivepressuresetpoint,sincethisFunctionisolatesthevalveswhenabovethesetpoint.WheninMODE2belowthesetpoint,otherTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsessentiallyensurethatRHRShutdownCoolingisnotinservice(ITS3.5.1requiresallLPCItobeOPERABLEinMODE2,andwithRHRalignedtotheshutdowncoolingmode,LPCIwillbeinoperable).Inaddition,plantproceduresrequirethatRHRbealignedtotheLPCImode,andtherecirculationpumpstooperating(whichwouldnecessitatesecuringtheshutdowncoolingmode)priortoenteringMODE2.Therefore,theMODE1and2requirementsfortheseFunctionshavebeendeleted.L.6TheMainSteamLineRadiation-Highisolationofvalvegroups1(MSIVandMSLdrains)and2(RecirculationSystemsamplevalves)isproposedtobedeletedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.ThisproposeddeletioninvolvestheremovaloftheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighTripFunction1.c.1inCTSTable3.3.2-1,3.3.2-2(includingFootnote**),and4.3.2.1-1,andIsolationSignalCinCTSTable3.3.2-4.Inaddition,theMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunctionforCTS3.3.1,RPSInstrumentation,isproposedtobedeleted.ThisisdescribedinDiscussionofChangeL.4forITS3.3.1.1.CTSTable3.3.2-1Note(e),thetripandisolationoftheairremovalpumps,isbeingmovedtoITS3.3.7.2,asdescribedinDiscussionofChangeA.7above.ThisproposeddeletionoftheisolationfunctionisbasedontheBWROwners'roupLicensingTopicalReportNEDO-31400AdatedJuly9,1987,theNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)forthatdocument,andtheinformationprovidedinthisDiscussionOfChange.EliminatingtheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorautomaticreactorshutdownfeatureandMainSteamIsolationValve(MSIV)isolationwillresultinthereducedpotentialforunnecessaryplanttransientscausedbyspuriousMainSteamLineRadiationMonitor(MSLRM)actuationtripsandwillincreaseplantoperationalfiexibility.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorconsistsoffourredundantradiationmonitorslocatedabovethemainsteamlinesinthemainsteamtunnel.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorwasdesignedtoprovideanearlyindicationofgrossfuelfailures.TheoriginalintentionwastomitigatethereleaseofactivityduetoafuelfailurebyprovidingascramsignaltoterminatetheinitiatingeventandaMSIVclosuresignaltoassurecontainmentoftherelease.However,nocreditistakenforthesesignalsinanydesignbasiseventforterminatingtheinitiatingeventorassuringthereleaseremains.withinacceptedlimits.TheonlydesignbasisaccidentinwhicheithertheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorscramorMSIVisolationfunctionsarementionedistheNMP222RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVEL.6'(cont'd)controlroddropaccident.TobeconsistentwiththerequirementsofSection15.4.9oftheStandardReviewPlan,allofthepostulatedradioactivityreleasedfromthisaccidentisassumedtobereleasedtotheturbineandcondenserbeforetheisolationoccurs.Hence,theisolationresultingfromtheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorsprovidesnobenefit.TheRecirculationSystemsamplevalvesMSLRMhighradiationisolationisnotrequiredtoensure10CFR100and10CFR50AppendixAGDC19doseacceptancecriteriaaremet.Also,arearadiationmonitorsinthegeneralareaoftherecirculationsamplelineandsamplepanelwillalarmshoulddoseratesonthesamplelinesincreasesignificantly.ThealarmresponsetrainingwhichispartofthegeneralemployeetrainingprogramalongwiththeradiationprotectionprogramensuresthatoccupationalexposureswillbemaintainedinaccordancewithALARAprinciples.Therefore,removaloftheisolationsignalwillnothaveasignificantimpactonaccidentconsequences,environmentalreleases,oroccupationaldoses.TheNRCstaffhasconcludedthatremovaloftheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitortripsthatautomaticallyshutdownthereactorandclosetheMSIVsisacceptableandthatLicensingTopicalReport,NEDO-31400Amaybereferencedinsupportofanamendmentrequestprovidedthat:a.)Theapplicantdemonstratesthattheassumptionswithregardtoinputvalues(includingpowerperassemblyandX/Q,anddecaytimes)thataremadeinthegenericanalysisoftheLicensingTopicalReportboundthosefortheplant.Table1ofthisDiscussionofChangeprovidesacomparisonofkeyinputparametersandTable2comparesthedoseassessmentbetweentheNMP2UpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportandtheNEDO-31400Aanalysisassumptions.Thehigher.powerlevelforNMP2isusedtodeterminethesourceterm.OtherconsiderationsenterintothefinaltwohourExclusionAreaBoundaryDose,suchastheatmosphericdispersionfactor,X/Q.InthiscasetheX/QisapproximatelyafactoroftenlessthantheNEDO-31400AvalueswhichmorethanoffsetsthehigherpowerlevelforNMP2.AllotherparametersarethesameormoreconservativethantheNEDO-31400Avalues.Tables1and2demonstratesthatthegenericanalysisoftheLicensingTopicalReportisboundingforNMP2.NMP223RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRIVEL.6(cont'd)b.)Theapplicantincludessufficientevidence(implementedorproposedoperatingprocedures,orequivalentcommitments)toprovidereasonableassurancethatsignificantlyincreasedradioactivitylevelsinthemainsteamlineswillbecontrolledexpeditiouslytolimitbothoccupationalandenvironmentalreleases.NMP2has,inplace,proceduresthatensurethatanysignificantincreaseinthelevelsofradioactivityinthemainsteamlinesispromptlycontrolledtolimitenvironmentalreleasesandon-siteoccupationalexposures.NMP2plantprocedureswillbeenhancedtoincorporatetheconsiderationsofthisTechnicalSpecificationAmendment.c.)TheapplicantstandardizestheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorandoffgasradiationmonitorsetpointsat1.5timestheNitrogen-16backgrounddoserateatthemonitorlocations,andcommitstopromptlysamplethereactorcoolantforpossiblecontaminationiftheMSLRMand/ortheoffgasradiationmonitorsexceedtheiralarmsetpoint.TheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitoralarmsetpointis1.5timestheNitrogen-16backgroundatthemonitorlocation.Thatalarmwilltriggerentryintoaprocedurewhichwillrequireareactorcoolantsampletobeobtainedandanalyzed.Theoffgaspretreatmentmonitoralarm/tripissetinaccordancewiththeOff-siteDoseCalculationManualtosatisfyCTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4).TheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforthesetpointisthat,restrictingthegrossactivityrateofnoblegasesfromthemaincondenseroffgasprovidesreasonableassurancethatthetotalbodyexposuretoanindividualattheexclusionareaboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthelimitsof10CFR100intheeventthiseffluentisinadvertentlydischargeddirectlytotheenvironmentwithouttreatment.CTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4)implementstherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria60and64ofAppendixAto10CFR50.Reasonableassuranceisprovidedintheplantresponsetoincreasedradiationlevelsasdetectedbytheoffgaspretreatmentmonitor.ThepretreatmentmonitorismoresensitivetodetectingnoblegasactivitythantheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorbecausetheNitrogen-16source,dominatingtheradiationpresentattheMainSteamLineRadiationMonitor,hasdecayedpriortothepretreatmentmonitor.Theoffgaspretreatmentradiationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointisbasedonNMP224RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESRESTRITIVEL.6(cont'd)CTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4).AsrequiredbyCTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4),alevelof350,000pCi/secasmeasureddownstreamoftherecombinerwillrequirerestoringtheradioactivityratetowithinitslimitwithin72hoursor,withinthenext12hours,beinatleastHOTSHUTDOWN.Theresponsetothemoresensitivepretreatmentmonitorwillensurethatactionsaretakentolimitoccupationaldosesandenvironmentalreleases.InadditiontocausinganRPStrip,themainsteamlinehighradiationsignalprovidesanisolationsignaltotheMSIVs.Closureofthesevalvespreventsuseofthecondenserasaheatsinktofacilitatescramrecovery.Unnecessarylossofthecondenserchallengescontainmentandcanleadtoemergencycorecoolingsystemactuations.Byeliminatingthemainsteamlineisolationfunction,itispossibletoallowoperatorstheoptionofpermittingthereleaseofactivityviaacontrolledreleasepathusingtheOffgasSystem.Ifthevesselisisolatedandthemaincondenserairremovalpumpissecured,thereisnomeanstoremoveactivitytrappedinthecondenser.Itisreasonabletoassumethatthisactivitycouldthenleakdirectlytotheatmospherewithouttreatment.InanAnticipatedTransientWithoutScramsituation,theMSIVsmaybereopened,bybypassingtheMSIVisolationinterlockforlowreactorpressurevesselwaterlevel,tore-establishthemaincondenserasaheatsinkifthereisnoindicationofgrossfuelfailureorasteamlinebreak.If,afterre-establishingthemaincondenserasaheatsink,grossfuelfailureshouldoccur,theoperatorisdirectedbyemergencyoperatingprocedurestomanuallyinitiate,closureoftheMSIVs.NEDO-31400Aresultsindicatethatremovingthescramandmainsteamlineisolationfunctionwillrepresentareductionintransientinitiatingeventswhichresultsina0.3%reductionincoredamagefrequencyprobability.TheNMP2IndividualPlantExamination(SAS-TR-92-001,Revision0)wasreferencedasacomparisontotheaboveNEDO-31400Aresults.TheNMP2resultsyieldeda0.2%reductionincoredamagefrequencyanda0.5%reductioninearlyhighradionuclidereleasefrequency.Hence,thefinalresultisanetimprovementinsafety.Thereferencedtopicalreportalsoevaluatedtheimpactthatremovalofthesefunctionswouldhaveonreactivitycontrolsystemfailurefrequency.Theresultswereanegligibleincrease(1.4E-09eventsperyear),whichisoffsetbytherelativelargereductionincoredamagefrequency.Hence,thefinalresultisanetimprovementtosafety.NMP225RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LESRESTRITIVEL.6(cont'd)Tosummarize,themostsignificantoperationalimpactwiththeexistingMSLRMtripfunctionsistheunnecessaryscramandisolationofthereactorvessel.Subjectingthereactorsystemtounnecessaryvesselisolationsdiminishesplantreliability,complicatesscramrecoveryandiscontrarytotheconceptofmaximizingplantsafety.Maintainingthesteamjetairejectorsoperational(condenserunisolated)duringaneventpermitscontinueduseoftheOffgasSystemtoprocessradioactivityduringtransients.Thus,theoperatorisabletomaintaincontroloverthepathwayofapotentialrelease.Basedontheaboveevaluation,theproposedchangesatisfiesthecriteriaofNEDO-31400AfordeletionoftheMSLRMisolationfunction(excepttheairremovalpumpsandtheassociatedisolationvalve).Therefore,theproposedchangeisacceptable.NMP226RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVE(continued)TABLE1CONTROLRODDROPACCIDENTCOMPARISONOFKEYANALYSISINPUTVALUESNEDO-31400AVS.NMP2PARAMETERNumeroFaiFueRsoreAveragePower(MWt)RelativePowerLeveloFailedRods(fraction)PowerLeveoFaiRods(MWt)FissionPructReeaseromMetedRodsMELTEDNON-MELTEDMassFractionofMeltedFuel0oFissionProductsTransportedtoMainCondenser0AirorneoFissionProductsmMainCondenserMainCondenserLeakageHyrogenFowRatetoRecombmer-(DesignCapability)AirNobleGasOfgasFlowRateThyroidDoseConversionFactorBreatingRatesWoeyDoseonversionFactor(Semi-InfiniteCloud)RadiologicalConsequencesEvaluationComputerCodeDispersionoeicient,XQ0-2hourExclusionAreaBoundary'-2hourExclusionAreaBoundary'harcoBedHoupTimesNEDO-1400AVALUE'.5100%NG/50%Iodines10%NG/10%Iodines0.0077100%NG1%Iodmes1oN0Iodmes10perdayscmsitespeciicRegulatoryGuide1.109ReguatoryGuieReguatoryGuie.1CONAC032.5E-03sec/m'.0E-04sec/m'r=HoursXe=15daysNMP2UPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(0)1.5100%NG/50%Iodines10%NG/10%Iodines30%Kr-85(R.G.1.25)77100oNG100IodinesoNolmes10perday4scmTID-14844ReguatoryuieTID-444DRAGONcode1.90E-04sec/m'.97E-05sec/m'r=.oursXe=20days27RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LTRITIVEFOOTNOTES:TABLE1(continued)Exceptasnotedin2and3below,valuesapplytotheControlRodDropAccident(CRDA)bothwithMSIVisolationandwithoutMSIVisolation.2.AppliesonlytoCRDAwithMSIVisolation.3.AppliesonlytoCRDAwithoutMSIVisolationand100%ofNobleGassourcetermprocessedthoughtheOffgasTreatmentSystem.4.ForaCRDAwithoutMSIVisolation,100%oftheNobleGasesareheld-upintheOffgasTreatmentsystemcharcoalbedsforatime;theIodinesareretainedindefinitelyinthecharcoalbeds.TABLE2CONTROLRODDROPACCIDENTDOSECOMPARISONNMP2DESIGNBASISVS.NEDO-31400ATwoHourExclusionAreaBoundaryWithMainSteamLineIsolationUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportNEDO-31400AWithoutMainSteamIsolationUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReportNEDO-31400ADose(Rem)Dose(Rem)Dose(Rem)Dose(Rem)WholeBody2.07EA2Thyroid3.34E10.350.453.1EAI4.3E+005.175.731.9E%20.325.5E19.17N/AN/AN/AN/AFOOTNOTE:Percentof25%of10CFR100(or6RemWholeBodyand75RemThyroid)28RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONLHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)L.7CTSTable3.3.2-1Action27,theActionrequiredwhenTripFunctionl.hor1.mchannelsareinoperableandnottripped,requiresestablishmentoftheReactorBuildingIntegritywithStandbyGasTreatmentSystemoperatingwithin1hour.ThisActionhasbeendeletedsincethisdoesnotcompensateforinoperablecontainmentpurgeisolationchannels.-WiththisActiontaken,theunitisstillallowedtocontinuepurgingthecontainment.Initsplace,ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONFwillinsteadrequiretheisolationofthecontainmentpurgevalves(Group9valves)within1hourwithCTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionl.h(SGTSExhaust-High)inoperable.Withthemonitorinoperable,isolationofthevalvesisconsideredappropriatesincethefunctionofthemonitoristoisolatethesevalvesifitssetpointisexceeded.Therefore,thesafetyfunctionisaccomplishedandoperationinthecontainmentpurgemodeisnotpermitteduntilthemonitorisrepaired.Inaddition,iftheManualInitiationFunction(CTSTable3.3.2-1,TripFunctionl.m)associatedwiththeGroup8and9valvesisinoperable,thecurrentaction(ITSTable3.3.2-1Action27)toestablishReactorBuildingIntegrityisdeleted.TheGroup8valvesaremiscellaneousPCIVs,anddonotincludepurgesystemvalves.EstablishingReactorBuildingIntegritydoesnotcompensateforthelossoftheinstrumentation.ThecurrentrequirementsofGroup8valvesinCTSTable3.3.2-1Action25asmodifiedinDiscussionofChangeL.9below(ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONSGandH)areconsideredadequatesinceitrequirestheaffectedpenetrationtobeisolated(whichisthefunctionoftheinstrumentation)oraunitshutdownwillberequired(whichexitstheapplicabilityoftheinstrumentation).ForGroup9valves,theproposedrequirementistoisolatetheassociatedpenetration(ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONG),whichfulfillsthepostaccidentfunctionoftheisolationlogic.L.8CTSTable3.3.2-1Action21,whichrequirestheunittobeinSTARTUP(Mode2)withtheassociatedisolationvalvesclosedwithin6hours,isbeingchangedinITS3.3.6.1ACTIONDtoonlyrequireisolationoftheassociatedmainsteamlinewithin12hours.TherequirementtoisolatetheaffectedmainsteamlinesisasufficientactionwiththeMainSteamLineFlow-High,MainSteamLineTunnelTemperature-High,MainSteamLineTunnelDifferentialTemperature-High,MainSteamLineTunnelLeadEnclosureTemperature-High,andCondenserVacuum-LowFunctionsinoperableandwillnormallyrequirebeinginMODE2toavoidascram,TherequirementtobeinMODE2isthereforeimplicitandisdeletedfromITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionD.1.Inaddition,someconditionsmayaffecttheisolationlogicforonlyonemainsteamline.Inthesecases,itisnotnecessarytorequireashutdownoftheunit;rather,isolationoftheaffectedlinereturnsthesystemtoastatuswhereitcanperformtheremainderoftheisolationfunction,andcontinuedNMP229RevisionPg 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANGES-LSRTRITIVEL.8(cont'd)operationisallowed.ThetimeallowedtoisolatetheassociatedmainsteamlinesisextendedfromtheCTStimeof6hoursto12hoursinITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionD.1.Theadditionaltimeisprovidedtoallowformoreorderlypowerreduction.L.9L,10CTSTable3.3.2-1Action25;whichappliestoCTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunctionl.m(ManualIsolationPushbutton)fortheGroups1and8valves,requiresrestoration,oftheManualIsolationFunctionwithin48hours.ITS3.3.6.1ACTIONGwillallowtheisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationflowpathwithin24hoursinlieuofrestoringtheFunction.IfasmallnumberoftheGroup1or8valvesareaffectedbytheinoperabilityoftheManualIsolationFunction,itispossibletoisolatetheaffectedpenetrationandcontinuetooperate.IsolatingtheaffectedpenetrationflowpathconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperabilitysincethefunctionoftheManualIsolationPushbuttonsistoisolatetheassociatedpenetrationflowpath.Inaddition,thepenetrationisrequiredtobeisolatedwithin24hours,insteadofthecurrent48hourrequirement(i.e.,thepenetrationwillonlybeallowedtoremainunisolatedfor24hoursintheITS;theCTSallowsthepenetrationtoremainunisolatedfor48hours).However,ifisolatingthepenetrationcouldresultinareactorscram,thenshuttingdowntheplant,asallowedinITS3.3.6.1ACTIONH,isthepreferredaction.ThetimeallowedinCTSTable3.3.2-1Action26toisolatetheassociatedpenetrationifaManualIsolationFunctionisinoperablehasbeenextendedfrom9hours(8hourstorestorethechanneland1hourtoisolatethepenetration)to24hoursinITS3.3.6.1ACTIONG.ThecurrenttimeisconsideredoverlyconservativesincetheManualIsolationFunctionisnotassumedinanyaccidentortransientanalysisintheUSAR;automaticFunctionsaretheFunctionsassumedtoisolatethepenetration.Inadditions,othermeansexistinthecontrolroomforoperatorstoisolatetheaffectedpenetrations(e.g.,individualcontrolswitches).ThischangeisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.L.11CTSTable3.3.2-1Action28requireslockingtheaffectedsystemisolationvalvesclosedwhentheCTSTable3.3.2-1TripFunction1.f(RHREquipmentAreaTemperature-High)orTripFunction1.g(ReactorVesselPressure-High)isinoperable.ITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionF.1onlyrequiresclosureofthevalve;lockingisnotrequired.Therequirementtolockthevalveisanadditionaladministrativerequirementtoassistinensuringthevalveremainsisolated.ThisrequirementisnotnecessarytobeintheITStoensure~thevalveremainsclosed.ITSLCO3.0.2statesthatwhenanLCOisnotmet,theRequiredActionsmustbemet.Thus,whenthevalveis.closed(toisolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpath),thevalvemustremainclosedtocomplyNMP230RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LTRITIVEL.11(cont'd)withtheRequiredAction.Inaddition,inadvertentmovementofaclosedvalveisanunlikelyoccurrencesinceplantadministrativecontrolsareinplacethatgovernoperationofthesevalves.Plantpersonnelwouldonlyoperateaclosedvalveusingaplantprocedure,andtheseproceduresarecontrolledbyITS5.4.1.a.Therefore,theseprocedureswillalsohelpensureaclosedvalveisnotinadvertentlyopened.TheproposedITSACTIONisalsoconsistentwithCTSTable3.3.2-1Action22,whichrequiresthesamevalves(i.e.,Groups5and10valves)toonlybeclosed,notlockedclosed,whenCTSTripFunctionsl.k,1.1,2.a,2.b,2.c,2.d,2.e,2.f,and2.i,asapplicable,areinoperable.L.12TheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTofallManualInitiationFunctionsinCTSTable4.3.2.1-1Footnote(c)isperformedatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown.TheproposedLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSR3.3.6.1.6)fortheseFunctions(seeDiscussionofChangeA.15aboveforchangestothistest)doesnotincludethisrestrictiononplantconditionsthatrequirestheSurveillancetobeperformedwhileshutdown.TheseSurveillancescanbeperformedwhileoperatingwithoutjeopardizingsafeplantoperations.ThecontrolofplantconditionsappropriatetoperformthetestisanissueforproceduresandschedulingandhasbeendeterminedbytheNRCStafftobeunnecessaryasaTechnicalSpecificationrestriction.AsindicatedinGenericLetter91-04,allowingthiscontrolisconsistentwiththevastmajorityofotherTechnicalSpecificationsSurveillancesthatdonotdictateplantconditionsfortheSurveillance.L.13ANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.3.2.3(proposedSR3.3.6.1.7thatexemptsthesensorsfortheMainSteamLine(MSL)IsolationReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLowLow,Level1,MainSteamLinePressure-Low,andMainSteamLineFlow-HighFunctions(theonlythreeFunctionstowhichCTS4.3.2.3isapplicable-seeDiscussionofChangeA.4above)fromresponsetimetestingandallowsthedesignsensorresponsetimetobeusedinthedeterminationoftheISOLATIONSYSTEMRESPONSETIME.DeletionoftheresponsetimetestforthesesensorswasevaluatedinNEDO-32291"SystemAnalysisforEliminationofSelectedResponseTimeTestingRequirements,"January1994,andwasdeterminedtobeacceptableprovidedtheindividuallicenseereferencingthisNEDOinaplantspecificlicenseamendmentrequestmetseveralconditionsstipulatedinthegenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291.TheevaluationprovidedbelowisconsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedintheStaff'sgenericSERforNEDO-32291.NMPChasperformedareviewofNEDO-32291anddeterminedthattheNEDOgenericanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2.TheequipmentaffectedbytheproposedchangeintheTechnicalSpecificationsaretheIsolationFunctionsidentifiedabove.Priortoinstallationofanewtransmitter/switchorfollowingNMP231RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.13(cont'd)refurbishmentofatransmitter/switchahydraulicresponsetimetestwillbeperformedtodetermineaninitialsensorspecificresponsetimevalue.ApplicableNMP2procedureshavebeenrevised/written,asappropriate,tofulfillthisrecommendation.NMP2currentlydoesnotutilizeanytransmittersorswitchesthatusecapillarytubesinanyapplicationthatrequiresresponsetimetesting.Therefore,therecommendationthatcapillarytubetestingbeperformedafterinitialinstallationandafteranymaintenanceormodificationactivitythatcoulddamagethelinesfortransmittersandswitchesthatusecapillarytubesisnotapplicabletoNMP2.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toincludestepstoinputafastramporastepchangetosystemcomponentsduringcalibrations.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toassurethattechniciansmonitorforresponsetimedegradation.Inaddition,technicianshavereceivedappropriatetrainingtomakethemawareoftheconsequencesofinstrumentresponsetimedegradation.Surveillancetestprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toensurecalibrationsandfunctionaltestsarebeingperformedinamannerthatallowssimultaneousmonitoringofboththeinputandoutputresponseofunitsundertest.NMP2'scompliancewiththeguidelinesofSupplement1toNRCBulletin90-01,"LossofFill-OilinTransmittersManufacturedbyRosemount,"wasreviewedanddocumentedinasafetyevaluationtransmittedtoNMPCbyNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1995.TheNRC'sevaluationconcludedthatNMP2'sresponsestoBulletin90-01andSupplement1conformtotherequestedactionsoftheBulletin.TheeliminationofresponsetimetestingdoesnotaffectNMPC'sresponsetotheBulletin.TheisolationsysteminstrumentationcomponentsforwhichresponsetimetestingisproposedtobeeliminatedhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableinNEDO-32291.NMPChasreviewedthevendorrecommendationsforthesecomponentsandconfirmedthattheydonotcontainperiodicresponsetimetestingrequirements.TheapplicationoftheproposedfootnotewillallowNMPCtousedesignresponsetimedataforthesensorinthedeterminationoftheisolationsystemresponsetime,andeliminatetherequirementforaseparatemeasurementofthesensorresponsetime.Theremainderofthechannelwillcontinuetobetestedforresponsetime.OtherTechnicalSpecificationtestingrequirementssuchasCHANNELCALIBRATION,CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST,CHANNELCHECK,ANDLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinconjunctionwithactionstakeninresponsetoNRCBulletin90-01aresufficienttoidentifyfailuremodesordegradationsininstrumentresponsetimesandassureoperationoftheanalyzedinstrumentloopswithinacceptablelimits.Theeliminationoftheresponsetimetestingoftheidentifiedsensorswillreducethepotentialfor32RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALANRTRITIVEL.13.(cont'd)inadvertentactuationoftheisolationinstrumentation.Accordingly,thischangewillreducethelikelihoodofaplanttransientduetoaninadvertentisolationoftheprimarycontainment.Accordingly,basedontheaboveevaluation,whichisconsistentwiththeguidelinesoftheStaff'sgenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291,theproposedeliminationofsensorresponsetimeisacceptable.TheabovechangeissimilartothatapprovedbytheNRCinLicenseAmendmentNo.184forBrunswickUnits1&2.L.14ARequiredActionhasbeenaddedtoCTSTable3.3.2-1,Action22(ITS3.3.6.1RequiredActionI.l),whichallowstheassociatedSLCsubsystemtobedeclaredinoperableinlieuofisolatingtheRWCUSystem.ThepurposeoftheSLCSystemInitiationFunctionoftheRWCUSystem(ITSTable3.3.6.1-1Function4.g)istoensuretheSLCsubsystemsfunctionproperlyandtheinjectedboronisnotremovedfromtheReactorCoolantSystem.Therefore,iftheRWCUSystemisnotisolated,theSLCSystemcannotperformitsfunction.WiththeSLCSystemdeclaredinoperable,theActionsofCTS3.1.5(LCO3.1.7),whichhavebeenpreviouslyapprovedbytheNRC,wouldapply.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.NMP233Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONA~DMINITEATIEA.5(cont'd)listedinNotes(c)and(d),theSCIVsandSGTSystem,arenotpartofprimarycontainment.IntheITS,theSecondaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentationisinaseparateLCO(ITS3.3.6.2)fromthePrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation,therefore,thispartoftheNoteisunnecessaryandhasbeendeleted.A.6CTSTable3.3.2-1Action27hasbeenchangedbyreplacingtheuseofthetermREACTORBUILDINGINTEGRITYwiththeelementsofthetermSECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITY(theundefinedterm"REACTORBUILDINGINTEGRITY"issynonymouswiththedefinedterm"SECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITY")andclarifiestheneedtoisolateSCIVsandstarttheassociatedSGTsubsystem(s).ThechangeiseditorialinthatalltheindividualrequirementsarespecificallyaddressedbyITS3.3.6.2RequiredActionsC.l.1andC.2.1.ThereforethechangeisapresentationpreferenceadoptedbytheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.ReferalsototheDiscussionofChangesassociatedwiththeDefinitionsSectionwhichaddressesdeletionoftheSECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYdefinition.CTSTable3.3.2-2Footnote*referstoBasesFigure3/4.3-1.ThisFigureisprovidinginformationastowhatreactorvesselwaterlevelthevariousreactorwaterinstrumentsactuate,incomparisontooneanother.ThisinformationisalreadyessentiallycontainedintheAllowableValuecolumnofthisTable.Therefore,thisreferenceisbeingdeletedandisconsideredadministrative.A.8ThetechnicalcontentofCTS4.6.5.3.d.2wasdividedintotwoSurveillances.ThemajorityofthisSurveillanceisperformedasproposedSR3.3.6.2.5,aLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT).TheLSFTverifiesthateachautomaticsignalfunctionsproperly.TheactualsystemfunctionaltestportionisperformedintheITS3.6.4.3SurveillanceRequirements.Thiswillensurethattheentiresystemistestedwithproperoverlap.RELATEDPECIFIATINSNoneTEHNIALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1CTSTable4.3.2.1-1doesnotrequireaChannelCheckforTripFunctions3.aand3,b,theExhaustRadiation-HighFunctions.ArequirementtoperformaChannelCheckevery12hoursisbeingaddedforITS3.3.6.2Functions3RevisionISQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVEM.1(cont'd)and4.Thiswillensurethatagrossfailureoftheinstrumentchannelshasnotoccurred.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperations."Generic"LA.1ThedetailsinCTS4.3.2,2andCTS4.6.5.3.d.2.brelatingtomethodsforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(simulatedautomaticoperation)andthesystemfunctionaltestofSGTsystem(useofsimulatedsignals),respectively,areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYofthesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.6.2andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensurethesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA'.2SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsofcurrentTable3.3.2-1Notes(c)and(d)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.Detailsrelatingtosystemdesignandoperation(e.g.,specificvalvesandsystemsaffected)areunnecessaryintheLCO.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYofthesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.6.2andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensurethesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentsare.maintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LB.1CTS3.3.2Actionb.l.a)requiresthat,whenthenumberofOPERABLEchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirementforoneTripSystem,theinoperablechannel(s)mustbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hourfortripfunctionswithoutanOPERABLEchannel.CTS3.3.2ActionC.2.a)1)requiresthat,whenthenumberofOPERABLEchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirementforbothtripsystems,thenafterplacingtheinoperablechannel(s)inonetripsysteminthetrippedconditionin1hour,theinoperablechannel(s)intheremainingtripsystemmustbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hourfortripfunctionswithoutanOPERABLEchannel.ITS3.3.6.2doesnotincludetheserequirements.ITS3.3.6.2ACTIONAestablishestherequirementtoplacetheinoperableRevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELB.1(cont'd)channel(s)intripwithineither12or24hours,whichisconsistentwithCTS3.3.2ACTIONSb.l.b),b.l.c),c.2.a)2),andc.2.a)3),irrespectiveofthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripsystem.FormostFunctions,twochannelsarerequiredpertripsystemandarecombinedinatwo-out-of-twologic.Thus,whenonechannelisinoperable,thetripsystemwillnotactuatetoclosetheassociatedSCIVsandstarttheassociatedSGTsubsystem.Therefore,havingasecondchannelinoperableisessentiallythesameasonechannelinoperable,theassociatedvalvewillnotreceiveanisolationsignal.ITS3.3.6.2ACTIONBcontinuestoensurethattheisolationcapabilityofapenetrationisnotlostforgreaterthan1hour.Inaddition,forthosetripsystemsthathaveonlyonechannel,theCTSunnecessarilyrestrictstherestorationtimeto1hour(sincewhenonechannelisinoperable,thetripsystemhasnoOPERABLEchannels).Theseconditions(lossofallchannelsinatripsystem)wasevaluatedinthereliabilityanalysesofNEDC-30851-P-A,Supplement2,March1989andNEDC-31677-P-A,July1990,andfoundtobeacceptable.Theseanalysesarethebasisforthecurrent12hourand24hourrestorationtimesintheCTS3.3.2Actions.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthesegenericreliabilityanalysesasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysesareacceptabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERsacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalyses.Undertheseconditions,theotherTripSystemmaintainstheisolationcapability.LB.2CTSTable3.3.2-1Note(b),whichallowsadelayinenteringtheassociatedActionstatementduringperformanceofSurveillances,hasbeenclarifiedtoprovidedirectindicationoftheintentofthecurrentwording.Thecurrentwords"providedatleastoneotherOPERABLEchannelinthesametripsystemismonitoringthatparameter"areintendedtoensurethatthetripcapabilityoftheFunctionismaintained.However,itdoesnotprovidethisassuranceforalllogicsystemdesigns.Inaddition,forthosetripsystemsthathaveonlyonechannel,theCTSunnecessarilyrestrictstheplantfromusingthe6hourallowance.Therefore,theNotehasbeenmodifiedinITS3.3.6.2(Note2totheSurveillanceRequirements)tostate"providedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainsisolationcapability."ThisistheintentofthecurrentNoteandisbasedonpreviouslyconductedreliabilityanalyses(NEDC-31677-P-A,July1990,andNEDC-30851-P-A,Supplement2,March1989).TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthesegenericreliabilityanalysesasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysesareacceptabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERsacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalyses.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTofCTS4.3.2.2andCTS4.6.5.3.d.2(proposedSR3.3.6.2.5)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.TheseSRsensurethatSecondaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentationandStandbyGasTreatment(SGT)actuationlogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.TheSCIVsandSGTSystemincludingtheautomaticactuatinglogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproof,andtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Inaddition,majordeviationsintheinstrumentationduringtheoperatingcyclewillbedetectedsinceothersurveillancesareperformedsuchastheCHANNELCHECKandCHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST(proposedSRs3.3.6.2.1and3.3.6.2.2)atamorefrequentbasis.Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,from.thischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSofCTS4.3.2.1asspecifiedinCTSTable4.3.2.1-1(proposedSR3.3.6.2.4)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintheNMP2refuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThesubjectSRensuresthattheSecondaryContainmentisolationinstrumentationandStandbyGasActuationInstrumentationwillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequencyNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheisolationinitiationlogicisdesignedtobesinglefailureproof,andtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedisolationinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturer,andmodelnumbertodeterminethattheinstrumentation'sactualdriftfallswithinthedesignallowanceintheassociatedsetpointcalculation.Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSTripFunctionnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:TripFunctionI.a.2):ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2ThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153DB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits.TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnitswithrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.TripFunction1.b:DrywellPressure-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyRosemount1153GB5Transmittersand510DUMasterTripUnits,TheRosemountTripUnitsarefunctionallycheckedandsetpointverifiedmorefrequently,andifnecessary,recalibrated.Thesemorefrequenttestingrequirementsremainunchanged.Therefore,anincreaseinthesurveillanceintervaltoaccommodatea24monthfuelcycledoesnotaffecttheRosemountTripUnits'withrespecttodrift.TheRosemountTransmitterswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatethattheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedinthesetpointcalculationfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)TripFunctions3.a,3.b:ReactorBuildingAbove/BelowtheRefuelFloorExhaustRadiation-HighThisfunctionisperformedbyKamanKDBRadiationDetectors,KamanKMGGasProcessMonitors,KamanKEM-PLocalMicroprocessors,andKamanKERICRemoteIndicationandControlUnits.Theequipmentdriftwasevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.2-2arenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.2aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.6.2reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,'nstrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentalNMP2Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)effects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint,Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.L.2TherequirementtoshutdownwithinoperableReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2orDrywellPressure-HighFunctionsasrequiredbyCTSTable3.3.2-1Action20hasbeendeletedandalternativeactionshavebeenprovidedinITS3.3.6.2ACTIONCconsistentwithcurrentAction27(seeDiscussionofChangeL.4belowforchangesinthecurrentAction27).Therequirementtoshutdownhasbeendeletedsincethealternativeactionswillactivatetheassociatedequipmentrequiredtofunction,consistentwiththeactionsoftheinstrumentationiftheinstrumentationlogicwereinthetripcondition.Alternatively,theassociatedisolationvalvesorSGTSubsystemmaybedeclaredinoperable.Ifdeclaredinoperable,theproposedSecondaryContainmentIsolationValveSpecification(ITS3.6.4.2)andSGTSystemSpecification(ITS3.6.4.3)willprovideappropriateshutdownactionsconsistentwiththesecurrentshutdownactions,L.3CTSTables3.3.2-1and4.3.2.1-1TripFunctionl.a.2,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2,isrequiredtobeOperableduringCOREALTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvesselasstatedinNote*totheTable.AutomaticsecondarycontainmentisolationcapabilitiesonreactorvesselwaterleveldecreasesarenotnecessaryduringCOREALTERATIONS.COREALTERATIONSdonotresultinanyincreasedpotentialforvesseldraindown.Ifongoingactivitiesdoinvolveapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel,theApplicabilityofITSTable3.3.6.2-1Function1willstillrequiretheReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2FunctiontobeOperable.Therefore,theITSwillnotincludetheApplicabilityofCOREALTERATIONSforthisFunction.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.1-CREFSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lCTSTable3.3.7.1-1Action74.arequiresachanneltobeplacedintripwithin24hourswhenonemaincontrolroomventilationradiationmonitorinoneorbothtripsystemsisinoperable.Sincenoactionsareprovidedifthechannel(s)Q~arenottripped,CTS3.0.3,whichrequiresaunitshutdown,wouldberequiredtobeentered.Inlieuofrequiringaunitshutdown,ITS3.3.7.1ACTIONDwillallowtheassociatedCREFsubsystemtobeplacedinoperationwithin1hour(RequiredActionD.1)ordeclaredinoperablewithin1hour(RequiredActionD.2)whenachannelisnottrippedwithin24hours.Whentwomaincontrolroomventilationradiationmonitorsinonetripsystemareinoperable,CTSTable3.3.7.1-1Action74.brequiresplacingtheCREFSysteminoperationwithin6hoursifoneofthetwochannelsisnotrestoredwithin7days.WhentwomaincontrolroomventilationradiationmonitorsinbothQQtripsystemsareinoperable,CTSTable3.3.7.1-1Action74.crequiresplacingtheCREFSysteminoperationwithin1hour.SincenoactionsareprovidediftheCREFSystemisnotplacedinoperation,CTS3.0.3,whichrequiresaunitshutdown,wouldberequiredtobeentered.Inlieuofrequiringaunitshutdown,ITS3,3,7.1RequiredActionD.2willallowtheassociatedCREFsubsystemtobedeclaredinoperablewithin1hour.NMP2ThedeletionoftheunitshutdownrequiredbyCTS3.0.3isacceptablesincethealternativeactionsprovidedintheITSwillactivatetheassociatedCREFsubsystemthatisrequiredtofunction,consistentwiththeactionsoftheCREFSysteminstrumentationiftheCREFSysteminstrumentationlogicwereinthetripcondition.Alternately,itisacceptabletodeclaretheassociatedCREFsubsysteminoperablesincetheassociatedCREFSystemSpecification(ITS3.7.2)willprovideappropriateactionsthatareidenticaltoactionstakenwhenaCREFsubsystemisinoperableforreasonsotherthaninoperableRevisionX8

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.1-CREFSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVEL.l(cont'd)instrumentation.Thecurrentrequirementsareoverlyrestrictive,inthatifthe(g8associatedCREFsubsystemwasinoperableforotherreasons,amuchlongerrestorationtimeisprovided.L.2NMP2CTS4.7.3.e.2.(b)requiresthattheCREFSystemstartonaLOCAsignal,whichisgeneratedfromdrywellpressurehighsignalsandreactorvesselwaterlevellowsignals.Thus,thisSurveillanceRequirementrequiresthatallchannels,ofthedrywellpressurehighandreactorvesselwaterlevellowinstrumentationbeOperabletosupportOperabilityoftheCREFSystem.TheinstrumentationsectionoftheCTSdoesnothavespecificrequirementsfortheCREFSystemLOCAsignals;itonlyhasrequirementsforthehighradiationsignals.Therefore,sincetherearenospecificinstrumentationrequirementsfortheLOCAsignals(otherthanthisspecificSurveillanceRequirement),whenahighdrywellpressureorareactorvesselwaterlevellowchannelisinoperable,theassociatedCREFsubsystemmustbedeclaredinoperable.Inaddition,thetwosignalsarerequiredwhentheCREFSystemisrequiredtobeOperable;i.e.,inModes1,2,and3,whenirradiatedfuelisbeinghandledinthesecondarycontainment,duringCoreAlterations,andduringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel.ITSTable3.3.7.1-1providesrequirementsthattwochannelspertripsystembeOperableforeachofthetwoFunctions.ThisportionofthechangeisadministrativesincethecharinelsarecurrentlyrequiredintheCTS.However,theReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2Function(ITSTable3.3.7.1-1Function1)isonlyrequiredtobeOperableinModes1,2,and3,andduringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel,whiletheDrywellPressure-HighFunction(ITSTable3.3.7.1-1Function2)isonlyrequiredtobeOperableinModes1,2,and3.AutomaticCREFSysteminitiationonreactorvesselwaterleveldecreasesarenotnecessaryduringCoreAlterationsandhandlingofirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment.Thesetwoactivitiesdonotresultinanincreasedpotentialforvesseldraindown.Ifongoingactivitiesdoinvolveapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel,theApplicabilityofITSTable3.3.7.1-1Function1willstillrequiretheReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2FunctiontobeOperable.AutomaticCREFSysteminitiationondrywellpressureincreasesarenotnecessaryduringCoreAlterations,handlingofirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment,andduringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel.Duringtheseevolutions,theunitisnormallynotinMode1,2,or3;itisinMode4or5ordefueled(TheonlyevolutionthatcanbeperformedinModes1,2,and3ishandlingofirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment,andsincetheModes1,2,and3Applicabilityisstillrequired,theevolutioniscoveredintheseModes).IntheseModesorcondition,neithertheprimarycontainmentnoritssupportfunctions(primarycontainmentairlockandPCIVs)arerequiredtobeOperable.ThisallowstheprimarycontainmenttobebreachedortheairRevision+Qg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.1-CREFSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNICALHAN-LSTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)lockdoorstobeopen.Therefore,itisnotpossibletoreceiveahighdrywellpressuresignal,norisitpossibletoactuallypressurizetheprimarycontainment(sincethereactorisdepressurized).Assuch,requiringtheDrywellPressure-HighFunctiontobeOperabledoesnotprovideanyrealsafetybenefit.L.3CTS4.7.3.e.2.(b)requiresthattheCREFSystemstartonaLOCAsignal,whichisgeneratedfromdrywellpressurehighsignalsandreactorvesselwaterlevellowsignals.Thus,thisSurveillanceRequirementrequiresthatallchannelsofthedrywellpressurehighandreactorvesselwaterlevellowinstrumentationbeOperabletosupportOperabilityoftheCREFSystem.SincetherearenospecificActionswhentheinstrumentationisinoperable,whenahighdrywellpressureorareactorvesselwaterlevellowchannelisinoperable,theassociatedCREFsubsystemmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheassociatedCTS3.7.3Actionstaken.TheCTS3.7.3ActionsgenerallyrequirerestorationoftheinoperableCREFsubsystem.ITSRequiredActionD.2requiresdeclaringtheassociatedCREFsubsysteminoperablewhenaninoperablechannelisnotplacedintripwithin24hours(SeeDiscussionofChangeLB.2aboveforthediscussionofthe24hourallowance).Whendeclaredinoperable,theappropriateactionsofITS3.7.2,CREFSystem,arerequiredtobetaken,andtheseactionsareconsistentwiththeActionsofCTS3.7.3,asmodifiedbytheDiscussionofChangesforITS3.7.2.InlieuofdeclaringtheassociatedCREFsubsysteminoperable,ITSRequiredActionD.1hasbeenaddedtoallowplacingtheassociatedCREFsubsysteminthepressurizationmodeofoperation.PlacingtheassociatedCREFsubsysteminthepressurizationmodeistheactualfunctionoftheinstrumentation.Therefore,onceplacedinoperation,thefunctionoftheinstrumentationhasbeencompletedandoperationcancontinueforanunlimitedamountoftime.AsstatedintheBases,thesubsystemmustbeplacedinoperationinsuchamannerthatitwillreturntooperationupon'estorationofpowerfollowinglossofpowerevent,sincethisisalsopartofthedesignbasisoftheCREFSystem.ThiswillensurethattheCREFSystemcancontinuetomeetitsdesignfunction.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONADMINISTRATIVE(continued)A.6CTSTable3.3.2-1fortheIsolationActuationInstrumentation,containsarequirementfortwochannelspertripsystem(twotripsystems)fortheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunction.ITSLCO3.3.7.2presentstheCTSrequirementasrequiringfourtotalchannelstobeOPERABLE.TheCTSandITSrequirethesamenumberofchannelstobeOPERABLE.Therefore,thischangeisapresentationpreferenceandisconsideredtobeadministrative.A.7CTSTable3.3.2-2Footnote**allowstheAllowableValueandTripSetpointoftheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunctiontobeadjustedupwardtoaccountforahigherbackgroundlevelpriortothestartofahydrogeninjectiontest.ProposedSR3.3.7.2.3,whichprovidestheAllowableValue(theTripSetpointisdeletedasdescribedinDiscussionofChangeL.1below),willnotincludethisallowance;theAllowableValueforthisspecificFunctionwillnotbeallowedtoberaisedtoperformthetest.Whilethisappearstobeamorerestrictivechange,theFootnotestatesthattheallowancetoraisetheAllowableValueisonlyapplicableifreactorpoweris)20%RTP.Themechanicalvacuumpumpsarenotallowedtobeoperatedatthispowerlevel.Thisisenforcedbyarequirementinplantoperatingprocedures,whichprecludesoperatingthemechanicalvacuumpumpat)5%RTP.Therefore,atthepowerlevelnecessarytoperformthehydrogeninjectiontest,themechanicalvacuumpumpswouldnotbeinservice,thusITS3.3.7.2wouldnotbeapplicable.Duetothisrestriction,thisdeletionofFootnote**isconsideredadministrative.RELOCATEDPEIFICATIONSNoneTEHNIALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1Ifthemainsteamlineradiationchannel(s)areinoperableduetoabreakerthatwillnotopenoravalvethatwillnotclose,placingthechannelsinthetrippedcondition,asrequiredbyCTS3.3.2Actionsb.1,c.1,andc.2.a),willnotaccomplishtheintendedrestorationofthefunctionalcapability.Inordertoaddresstheseconcerns,ITS3.3.7.2RequiredActionA.1isaddedtospecifyrestorationoftheinoperablechannel(s)andaNoteisaddedtoRequiredActionA.2whichstatesthatplacingachannelintripisnotapplicableiftheinoperablechannelistheresultofaninoperableisolationvalveorvacuumpumpbreaker.Thus,ifthemainsteamlineradiationchannel(s)areinoperableduetoabreakerthatwillnotopenoravalvethatwillnotclose,theITS3.3.7.2RequiredActionA.2optionofplacingachannelintripcannotbeusedNMP2RevisionPQgs

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1(cont'd)sincetheNotetotheRequiredActionprecludesitsuseunderthiscondition.TheonlyremainingoptionleftinITS3.3.7.2ACTIONAistomeetRequiredActionA.1,whichrequiresthechannel,toberestored.Torestorethechannelundertheabovedescribedinoperability,thebreakerorvalvewillhavetoberestored.Currently,theCTSdoesnotrequirerestorationwhenthechannelisinoperableduetoaninoperablebreakerorvalve;itonlyrequirestrippingofthechannel.Therefore,thecombinationofproposedRequiredActionA.1andtheNotetoRequiredActionA.2willensurethatthefunctionalcapabilityofthemechanicalvacuumpumpisolationisrestoredwithintheallowedCompletionTimewhenachannelisinoperableduetoamechanicalvacuumpumpbreakerorisolationvalveisinoperable.Theadditionoftheserequirementsismorerestrictiveonplantoperation.TEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailsinNote(e)toCTSTable3.3.2-1,whichstatethatthemainsteamlineradiationhighfunctionalsotripsandisolatestheairremovalpumps,areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYofthemechanicalvacuumpumpisolationinstrumentation.TherequirementsofITS3.3.7.2andassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensurethemechanicalvacuumpumpisolationinstrumentationismaintainedOPERABLE.Therefore,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LB.1CTS3.3.2Actionc.1requiresplacingtheinoperablechannel(s)inonetripsysteminthetrippedconditionwithinonehourwhenthenumberofOPERABLEchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumOPERABLEChannelsperTripSystemrequirementforbothtripsystems.TheCTSactionisrequiredtobetakenifoneorbothchannelsareinoperableinthetripsystem,evenifthetripsystemisstillcapableofperformingitstripfunction.ThefourchannelsoftheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunctionarearrangedwithtwochannelsineachoftwotripsystems,inaone-out-of-twotakentwicetriplogic.Withonechannelinoperableinoneorbothtripsystems,tripcapabilityisstillmaintained,thustheCTSonehouractionallowanceinthissituationisoverlyrestrictive.Aslongasmechanicalvacuumpumpisolationcapabilityismaintained,ITS3.3.7.2ActionAallows12hourstoplacethechannel(s)intrip.Ifmorethanonechannelisinoperableinoneorbothtripsystems,thenNMP2RevisionPCQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELB.1(cont'd)isolationcapabilityisnotmaintainedandtheprovisionsofITS3.3.7.2ActionB,consistentwiththeCTS,allowsonly1hourtorestoremechanicalvacuumpumpisolationcapability.TheproposedchangeintheCTSactiontoallow12hours(aslongasisolationcapabilityismaintained)toplaceachannel(s)intripissupportedbythereliabilityanalysisofNEDC-30851-P-A,Supplement2,March1989.Thisanalysisisthebasisforthecurrent12hourrestorationtimeintheCTS3.3.2Actions.TheresultsoftheNRCreviewofthisgenericreliabilityanalysisasitrelatestoNMP2isdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedMay11,1993.TheSERconcludedthatthegenericreliabilityanalysisisacceptabletoNMP2andthatNMP2meetsallrequirementsoftheNRCSERacceptingthegenericreliabilityanalysis.LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST(LSFT)ofCTS4.3.2.2(proposedSR3.3.7.2.4),hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangeintherefuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.ThisSRensuresthatmechanicalvacuumpumpisolationactuationinstrumentationlogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextenditsSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillancefrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).Thisproposedchange,asassociatedwiththemainsteamlineradiationmonitors,wasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.Reviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirsurveillancesatthecurrentfrequency.AnevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdataandithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.MostinstrumentchannelsaretestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewithCTS4.3.2.1,theCFT.Thistestingofthemechanicalvacuumpumpisolationinstrumentationensuresthatasignificantportionofthecircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.Thecondenservacuumpumptriphasnotbeenhistoricallysurveilled.ThishasbeendulyaddressedviatheLERmechanism.Consequently,thesurveillancehistoryisnotavailabletobeevaluatedasperNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04.Conversely,thereliabilitywasassuredatthetimeoftheCTSnon-compliance.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELD.1(cont'd)Thoughthesurveillancehadneverbeenperformedinthelifeoftheplant,thetripfunctionwastestedsatisfactorily.Reviewoftheequipmenthistoryalsosubstantiatestheequipment'sreliability.Itisconsideredthatthisprovidesreasonableassurancethatthecondenservacuumpumptripisreliableandthesurveillanceextensionfrom18monthsto24monthsdoesnotpresentasignificantimpacttosafety.Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONSurveillanceofCTS4.3.2.1andTable4.3.2.1-1(proposedSR3.3.7.2.3)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThesubjectSRensuresthatthemechanicalvacuumpumpisolationinstrumentswillfunctionasdesignedduringananalyzedevent.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheisolationinitiationlogicisdesignedtosinglefailureproofand,therefore,ishighlyreliable.Furthermore,theimpactedIsolationinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumber.Itwasdeterminedthattheinstrumentdriftisnotsignificantinrelationtothemonitoredparameterandwillhaveanon-detectableimpactoninstrumentloopdriftvalueswhencombinedwiththelargeaccuracyvaluesfortheinstrumentation.TheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunctionisperformedbyGeneralElectric(GE)ionchamberdetectors,GENUMACLogRadMonitorsandGETripAuxiliaryUnits.TheGERadiationMonitoringInstrumentationwasevaluatedutilizingaqualitativeanalysis(i.e.,engineeringjudgment).Theresultsofthisanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.RevisionA O.

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHALHANES-LESSRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistorydemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoa24monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.1TripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.2-2arenotincludedintheITSandall[QgreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.2aredeleted,TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.7.2reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnical~Specificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.NMP2RevisionPC

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHAN-LSRESTRITIVE(continued)L.2CTSTables.3.3.2-1and4.3.2.1-1containanApplicabilityofMODES1,2,and3fortheMainSteamLineRadiation-HighFunction,ITS3.3.7.2onlyrequiresthisFunctiontobeOperableinMODES1and2withanymechanicalvacuumpumpinserviceandanymainsteamlinenotisolated.CTSTable3.3.2-1Action21requirestheplanttobe.inatleastStartupwiththeassociatedisolationvalvesclosedwithin6hoursorbeinatleastHotShutdownwithin12hoursandinColdShutdownwithinthenext24hours,iftheActionprovisionsofCTS3.3.2.borcarenotmet.ITS3.3.7.2ActionCisenterediftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimesofConditionsAorBarenotmet.ProposedACTIONCcontainsfouroptions:(1)Isolatethemechanicalvacuumpumpswithin12hours;(2)Removetheassociatedvacuumpumpbreaker(s)fromservice;(3)Isolatethemainsteamlineswithin12hours;or(4)BeinMODE3within12hours.TheCTSApplicabilityofMODES1,2,and3,isintendedtoaddressallthetripsthataregeneratedbytheMainSteamLine=Radiation-HighFunction,includingMSIVsandMSLdrainvalves,recirculationsamplevalves,andmechanicalvacuumpumps.AllthetripsexceptthemechanicalvacuumpumpsandassociatedisolationvalvehavebeenremovedfromtheCTS(seetheDiscussionofChangesforITS3.3.6.1).ThecurrentApplicabilityofMODES1,2,and3isoverlyrestrictivetodefineOperabilityrequirementsforonlythemechanicalvacuumpumpandassociatedisolationvalve.Theisolationandtripofthemechanicalvacuumpump(s)arenecessaryinMODES1and2whenanypumpisinserviceandanymainsteamlinenotisolated,tomitigatetheconsequencesofapostulatedcontrolroddropaccident.WhenthemechanicalvacuumpumpsarenotinserviceorallmainsteamlinesareisolatedinMODE1or2,fissionproductreleaseviathispathwaywillnotoccur..InMODE3theconsequencesofacontrolroddropareinsignificant,andarenotexpectedtoresultinanyfueldamageorfissionproductreleases.Therefore,theisolationandtripofthemechanicalvacuumpumpsarenotnecessaryintheseconditionsorMode.OneofthechangestoCTSTable3.3.2-1Action21removestherequirementtobeinatleastStartupwhenclosingtheassociatedisolationvalveandextendsthis.CompletionTimefrom6hoursto12hoursinITS3.3.7.2ActionC.AnotherchangetoAction21removesthereq'uirementtogotoColdShutdown.ITS3.3.7.2ActionCallows12hourstoeitherisolatethemechanicalvacuumpump,removetheassociatedvacuumpumpbreaker(s)fromservice,isolatethemainsteamlines,orbeinMODE3.ItisnotnecessarytospecifythattheplantbeinatleastStartupifthemechanicalvacuumpumpsareisolatedortripped,sincenoreleasesviathispathwaywilloccur.Also,ifthemainsteamlinesare'isolated,thereisnoneedtospecifygoingtoatleastStartup,sincetheisolationactioninandofitselfwillrequiretheplanttobeinatleastMODE2.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)TheproposedCompletionTimeof12hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditions,toremovethemechanicalvacuumpumpfromservice,ortoisolatethemainsteamlines,inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheCTSrequirementtogotoColdShutdownisnotnecessary,sincetheapplicabilityofproposedITS3.3.7.2isexitedbygoingtoMODE3.ITS3.3.7.2ACTIONCaddstheallowancetoremovetheassociatedvacuumpumpbreaker(s)fromserviceasanoptiontotheCTSrequirementtoclosetheassociatedisolationvalve.Thisoptionisacceptablesincewithoutavacuumpumprunning,releasesviathispathwaywillbestopped.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.1-LOSSOFPOWERINSTRUMENTATIONTEHNIALHANES-LSRTRITIVELE.1(cont'd)Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lTripsetpointslistedinCTSTable3.3.3-2arenotincludedintheiTSandall)QSreferencestothesesetpointsinCTS3.3.3aredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheNMP2ITS3.3.8.1reflectsAllowableValuesconsistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeInstrumentSetpointMethodologyusedatNMP2.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththisInstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thesetripsetpointsarenotrequiredtobeintheTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.RevisiongQP

EMETRICALPOrrERSYSTKTlllCAEIPHNTPROTTIVOEVICEg/c.Ace.ten>Z,gZ.PTTIONYTENELECTRICPOHERleNITORI(RPSLOGIC)L.coSsf~3.d.a.aTvaRPSUPS~lectrlc1rtectlansetraeraesrcsna1beOP1lesforeachPS/u~cL~L,l'c.kvSa.NlthoneRPS~lectrlcalpratectlonasserrrblyf'ranRPSgp77g~ginoperable~,restartthelnaperable~lectricalprotectionassetoOPERAbLEstatusvlthln72hourSrce]4vr.b.NlthbothRPSelectricalprotectlassesfaranRPSQCT/<Aiginaperable,restareatleasteectrlcalrotectlonasseabloOPERAbLEstatusvithlneaca~<~kpreoreJt~c.cKbpl@pongkAcT(OPSprcah.0Pro4pc4vtve,.aucw+Mr(g~~fA/rra.b.a.a~aeablleslnstrueentat)onshallbedeteralnedOPERAbLE:A,lIog),'~Ar/A.3L.3rrs.UndervoltadedusA:busd:voltsACWs~~~sl+4+~ccJvlW3.Underfrerluency~Hza.byperforaanceoi'CHANNELRNCTIONALTESTeachtlaetheplantlslnCOLOSHUTOOHNforaperiodofmrethan2ahours,unlessperforaedvlthlnthpreVlOuS6rwanthS.0lc>>gL8:1~~~~b.AtleastoncepereonthsbydeeonstratlnytheOPERAbILITYofaver-5RXS.8~~voltage,undervoltageandunderfrerluen~protectlvelnstrueentatlonby~rfaraanceofaCHANNELCALIbRATION/includingslmlatedautomaticactuatanoeprotectivereays,trippinglogicandoutputcircuit~~~~.Z.:gbreakersanderngthefallowlnsetpolnts.3jl'.%L.Il.OvervoltagebusA:cosdusd:<voltsAC~C9.f3.~.WNINENILEPOINTUNIT2ArrrenrhrantNo.113lad-32

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGICC'TEHNIALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1(cont'd)powersupply.ThisactionwilldeenergizetheassociatedRPSlogicbusandresultinahalfscram,anisolationofmostprimarycontainmentpenetrations,isolationsofthesecondarycontainmentpenetrations,andstartofoneSGTandCREFsubsystem.Sincetheunitcannotoperateforanylengthoftimeinthisconfiguration(mainlyduetotheprimarycontainmentisolation),themoreprudentaction,asdescribedintheISTSBases,istoleavetheRPSlogicbusenergizedandtoshutdowntheunit.Therefore,theallowancetoremainoperatingwiththeRPSUPSremovedfromservicehasbeendeletedandisconsideredmorerestrictiveonplantoperation.M.2Notused.M.3TimedelaysettingrequirementshavebeenaddedinproposedSR3.3.8.2.2fortheovervoltage,undervoltage,andunderfrequencyprotectivedevicesoftheRPSlogicelectricpowermonitoringassemblies.Currently,nomaximumsettingisprovidedinCTS4.8.4.4.b.Thesedeviceshaveadjustabletimedelaysettings.ThenewAllowableValueforallprotectivedevicesis~4seconds.TheAllowableValuesarebasedonthecurrentsetpointmethodologyandensuresthatthedevicestriptoprotecttheequipmentpoweredbytheassociatedRPSlogicbus.TheseAllowableValuesarealsoconsistentwiththecurrentsettingsofthedevices.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.M.4TheunderfrequencysetpointcurrentlyspecifiedinCTS4.8.4.4.b.3isactuallytheAnalyticalLimit.Thus,NMP2cancurrentlycontinuetocalltheunderfrequencytripOperableaslongastheactualsetpoint.isgreaterthanorequaltotheAnalyticalLimit.NMP2iscurrentlymaintainingtheactualsetpointinaccordancewiththemostrecentsetpointcalculation,toensuretheanalyticallimitisnotexceeded.ProposedSR3.3.8.2.2includestheAllowableValuefromthissetpointcalculation,nottheAnalyticalLimit.ThisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationsinceNMP2willnowberequiredtomaintaintheactualsetpointgreaterthanorequaltotheAllowableValue.ThiswillensuretheRPSlogicbusesareproviding)57Hztoallequipmentpoweredfromthebuses.TheBasesoftheITSalsoprovidesthisdescription.RevisionJCggL

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGICTECHNICALCHAN-LRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingthesystemfunctionaltestofCTS4.8.4.4.bhasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.8.2.3.ThisSRensuresthatRPSElectricPowerMonitoringInstrumentationlogicwillfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo,91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.Themonitoringlogichasbeenrecentlymodifiedtoimplementhighlyreliablesolidstatesensingrelays.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedataforthebalanceofthesystemhaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.RPSElectricPowerMonitoringchannelsarenormallytestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewithCTS4.8.4.4.a(proposedSR3.3.8.2.1).ThistestingoftheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentation,ifperformed,ensuresthatasignificantportionoftheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationcircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.Ifthistestingisnotperformed,thischangeisstillconsideredacceptablebasedonthehistoricaldata,andsincetheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationisdesignedtobesinglefailureproof,andtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Basedonthemodificationandtheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall:Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsinthepastlicensingbasis.LE.1TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequirementofCTS4.8.4.4.bhasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.8.2.2,ThesubjectSRensuresthattheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringSystemwilltripatthespecifiedAllowableValues.Theproposedchangewill.allowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromtheRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGIC'EHNIALHAN-LRESTRICTIVELE.1(cont'd)current18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationisdesignedtobehighlyreliable.FurthermoretheimpactedRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumberascomparedtosimilaroperatingequipmentwithsimilaroperatingcharacteristicstodeterminetheinstrumentation'sprojecteddriftvalues,Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSfunctionnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberanddriftevaluationsperformed:OvervoltageThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.411U6175-HF-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.2.UndervoltageThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.411U6175-HF-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.3.UnderfrequencyThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.422B1275-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthe.designallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension..NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGIC'EHNICALHANG-LSRESTRICTIVELE.1(cont'd)Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lCTS3.8.4.4requirestheRPSlogicbusEPAstobeOPERABLEatalltimes.TheApplicabilityofITS3.3.8.2isspecifiedasMODES1,2,and3,MODES4and5withbothRHRSDCsuctionisolationvalvesopen,MODE5withanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies,duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,duringCOREALTERATIONS,andduringOPDRVs.WithnocontrolrodswithdrawnfromcorecellscontainingfuelassembliesinMODE5andbothRHRSDCsuctionisolationvalvesnotopeninMODE4or5,thereisnoneedfortheRPSlogicorRHRSDCisolationtofunctionandtherefore,thereisnoneedtorequiretheirprotection.Withnomovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,noCOREALTERATIONS,andnoOPDRVstakingplace,thereisnoneedforthesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationandCREFSysteminstrumentationtofunctionandtherefore,thereisnoneedtorequiretheirprotection.Therefore,theApplicabilityofCTS3.8.4.4hasbeenchangedtoonlyincludeMODES1,2,and3andthoseMODESorConditionsotherthanMODES1,2,and3whentheRPS,RHRSDCisolation,secondarycontainmentisolation,orCREFSysteminitiationfunctions(whicharealltheTechnicalSpecificationrequiredequipmentpoweredfromtheRPSlogicbuses)arerequired.Inaddition,ITS3.10.1requiressecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationtobeOPERABLEduringsystemleakageandhydrostatictestinginMODE4,andITS3.10.4willallowasinglecontrolrodtobewithdrawninMODE4byallowingtheReactorModeSwitchtobeintheRefuelposition.Therefore,theRPSElectricPowerMonitoring-LogicrequirementshavebeenincludedinITS3.10.1andITS3.10.4.NMP2Revision+@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGICHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)L.2TheallowedoutofservicetimeofCTS3.8.4.4Actionbfortwoinoperableassembliesisextendedfrom30minutesto1hourinITS3.3.8.2RequiredActionB.1toprovidesufficienttimefortheplantpersonneltotakecorrectiveactions.Thetimeextensionfortwoinoperableassembliesisminimalbutnecessarytoallowconsiderationofplantconditions,availablepersonnel,andtheappropriateactions.L.3L4ThischangeproposestoaddaNotetotheSurveillanceRequirementsthatwillallowa6hourdelayfromenteringintotheassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsforachannelplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillancesprovidedtheotherRPSelectricpowermonitoringassemblyfortheassociatedRPSlogicbusmaintainstripcapability.Thelossofoneelectricpowermonitoringassemblyisacceptableinthiscasesinceonlyoneofthetwoassembliesisrequiredtotriptheassociatedpowersupplyifpowerisnotmaintainedwithinacceptablelimits.Theshortperiodoftime(6hours)inthisconditionwillhavenoappreciableimpactonrisk.Also,uponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe6hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionmustbeenteredandRequiredActionstaken.TheovervoltageandundervoltagesetpointsforCTS4.8.4.4.b.1and2areactuallytheTripSetpoints,nottheAllowableValues.ProposedSR3.3.8.2.2nowincludestheAllowableValues,consistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434.TheseAllowableValues(tobeincludedinTechnicalSpecifications)havebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValueselectionevaluationusedactualNMP2operatingandsurveillancetrendinformationtoensurethevalidityoftheevaluationinputdata.Allchangestosafetyanalysislimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereevaluatedandconfirmedasensuringsafetyanalysislicensingacceptancelimitsaremaintained.Alldesignlimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereconfirmedasensuringthatapplicabledesignrequirementsoftheassociatedsystemsaremaintained.TheproposedAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedfromeachdesignorsafetyanalysislimitbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheuseofthesemethodologiesforestablishingAllowableValuesensuresdesignorsafetyanalysislimitsarenotexceededintheeventoftransientsoraccidentsandaccountsforuncertaintiesandenvironmentalconditions.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGICTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)L.5CTS3.8.4.4doesnotprovideanyactionsiftheRPSEPAsarenotrestoredortheassociatedRPSUPSisnotremovedfromservice(whichde-energizestheassociatedRPSlogicbus),asrequiredbyActionsaandb.Thus,CTS3.0.3isrequiredtobeentered.However,sinceCTS3.0.3isnotapplicableinModes4and5,10CFR50.36(c)(2)requiresthatthelicenseenotifytheNRCifrequiredby10CFR50.72,andanLicenseeEventReport(LER)besubmittedtotheNRCasrequiredby10CFR50.73.Inlieuofthesetworequirements,threenewACTIONSareprovidediftheRequiredActionsofConditionAorBarenotmetinMODESotherthanMODES1,2,and3.ITS3.3.8.2ACTIONDrequiresactiontobeinitiatedtorestoreoneEPAtoOPERABLEstatusforeachRPSlogicbus(ITS3.3.8.2RequiredActionD.1)ortoisolatetheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)ShutdownCooling(SDC)System(ITS3.3.8.2RequiredActionD.2).ITS3.3.8.2ACTIONErequiresactiontobeinitiatedtofullyinsertallinsertablecontrolrodsincorecellscontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.ACTIONFrequiresactiontobetakentoisolatetheaffectedsecondarycontainmentpenetrationflowpathsandstarttheassociatedSGTandCREFsubsystems,ortodeclaretheassociatedSCIVs,SGTsubsystems,andCREFsubsystemsinoperable.TheseactionsplacethereactorintheleastreactiveconditionandensureseitherthesafetyfunctionoftheRPS,primarycontainmentisolationsystem,secondarycontainmentisolationsystem,andCREFSystemwillnotberequiredorisalreadymet.Theoption(RequiredActionD.1)isgiventocontinuetorestoreanassemblytoOPERABLEstatussincetheremaybeaneedforRHRSDCSystem.Alternately,RequiredActionsF.1.2,F.2.2,andF.3.2,whichrequiredeclaringtheassociatedSCIVs,SGTsubsystem(s),andCREFsubsystem(s)inoperable,areacceptablesincetheindividualSpecifications(ITS3.6.4.2,ITS3.6.4.3,andITS3.7.2,respectively)willprovideappropriateactionsthatareconsistentwithactionstakenwhenanSCIV,SGTsubsystem,orCREFsubsystemisinoperableforreasonsotherthaninoperableRPSEPAs.NMP2Revision+g

~.

TRCALKITERSYTA.t5pic>AcR.t)og3,ggyLEIPNENTPTTIVE0PTITE)SELECTRICPOHERNONTORI0ENOIOS)gg,g,5Sstoatrnasou~shabeRASLE.APPLICASILITY:AtalItimes.L,I~ATRPScromSalc~ailEve3.b.a.STvoRpSelectricalroteetlonass11(EpA)1'artachnservca.HSthontRPStlectriealprotectlanasgo)OA/8hrrt%Wtassociateraaservlctcrc~5y~ob.NlthbOthRPS~leCtrlCalPrateCaSSrralnoperabltreat~QPI/0vnrhtassactaedoakprowse~SLW~ozehhC.TIa~b.3>LbfvoSvfvIei14mCa.b..SThecdeteralnedOPERAbLE:ovr<geo~Zf4'stabllesshaL,J583,3.5.3,('.gg9.9$~SRXXL~<gev/4oeg(D-IbyperforaanceafaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTeachtintheplantlslnCOLOSHUTOOSSNforaperiodofmrethan2ihours.unlessperformedvlthlntheprtvlous6earths.Atleastonce.perQaethsbydtaestratlnytht.OPERAblLITYof.over-'oltage,undervoltTgeandunderfrecutneyprottctlveSnstr~ntatlanby~rfaraanceofaCHANNELCALIbRATIONncludlnSSslaulatedautomaticcuattaneproecve,Spplnylogicandoutputcircuitreakersandverifyingthefollovlnsttpalnts.L.'l3o.5~l.OvervoltagebusA:c.vosbusb:cvitsACI3I>7I'2.UndervoltagebusA:zvoltsAC~SR~74Oov4:>voK~SeCooc(s133.Underfrequency>Hz7,gPl,>NINENILEPOINT-UNIT2AmendmentNo.113/aI33

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONlTORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDSTEHNIALHAN-MRERESTRITIVEM.1Notused.M.2TimedelaysettingrequirementshavebeenaddedinproposedSR3.3.8.3.2fortheovervoltage,undervoltage,andunderfrequencyprotectivedevicesoftheRPSscramsolenoidelectricalprotectionassemblies.Currently,nomaximumsettingisprovidedinCTS4.8.4.5.b.Thesedeviceshaveadjustabletimedelaysettings.ThenewAllowableValueforallprotectivedevicesis~4seconds.TheAllowableValuesarebasedonthecurrentsetpointmethodologyandensurethatthedevicestriptoprotecttheRPSscramsolenoids.TheseAllowableValuesarealsoconsistentwiththecurrentsettingsofthedevices.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.M.3Theunderfrequencysetpointcurrentlyspecified,inCTS4.8.4.5.b.3isactuallytheAnalyticalLimit.Thus,NMP2cancurrentlycontinuetocalltheunderfrequencytripOperableaslongastheactualsetpointisgreaterthanorequaltotheAnalyticalLimit.NMP2iscurrentlymaintainingtheactualsetpointinaccordancewiththemostrecentsetpointcalculation,toensuretheanalyticallimitisnotexceeded.ProposedSR3.3.8.3.2includestheAllowableValuefromthissetpointcalculation,nottheAnalyticalLimit.ThisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationsinceNMP2willnowberequiredtomaintaintheactualsetpointgreaterthanorequaltotheAllowableValue.ThiswillensuretheRPSlogicbusesareproviding)57Hztoallequipmentpoweredfromthebuses.TheBasesoftheITSalsoprovidesthisdescription.TEHNICALHANES-LSRESTRITIVE"Generic"LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingthesystemfunctionaltestofCTS4.8.4.5.bhasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.8.3.3.ThisSRensuresthatRPSElectricPowerMonitoringInstrumentation(scramsolenoids)willfunctionasdesignedtoensureproperresponseduringananalyzedevent.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991;Themonitoring.logichasbeenrecentlymodifiedtoimplementhighlyreliablesolidstatesensingNMP2Revisiongg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDS'TEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELD.1(cont'd)LE.Irelays.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedataforthebalanceofthesystemhaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.RPSElectricPowerMonitoringchannelsmaybetestedonamorefrequentbasisduringtheoperatingcycleinaccordancewith(proposedSR3.3.8.3.1),ThetestingoftheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentation,ifperformed,ensuresthatasignificantportionoftheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationcircuitryisoperatingproperlyandwilldetectsignificantfailuresofthiscircuitry.Ifthistestingisnotperformed,thischangeisstillconsideredacceptablebasedonthehistoricaldataandsincetheRPSElectricMonitoringinstrumentationisdesignedtobesinglefailureproofandtherefore,ishighlyreliable.Basedonthemodificationandtheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.TheFrequencyforperformingtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequirementofCTS3.4.8.4.5.bhasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinproposedSR3.3.8.3.2.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ExtendingtheSRFrequencyisacceptablebecausetheRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationisdesignedtobehighlyreliable.FurthermoretheimpactedRPSElectricPowerMonitoringinstrumentationhasbeenevaluatedbasedonmake,manufacturerandmodelnumberascomparedtosimilaroperatingequipmentwithsimilaroperatingcharacteristicstodeterminetheinstrumentation'sprojecteddriftvalues.Thefollowingparagraphs,listedbyCTSfunctionnumber,identifybymake,manufacturerandmodelnumberthedriftevaluationsperformed:RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDSTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELE.11.Overvoltage(cont'd)ThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.411U6175-HF-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.2.UndervoltageThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.411U6175-HF-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.3.UnderfrequencyThisfunctionisperformedbyaNuclearLogisticsModelNo.422B1275-Lrelay.TheNuclearLogisticsrelayswereevaluatedbyquantitativeanalysisandtheresultsindicatetheprojected30monthdriftvaluesfortheinstrumentsdonotexceedthedesignallowanceprovidedfortheseinstruments.Theresultsoftheanalysissupporta24monthfuelcyclesurveillanceintervalextension.Basedonthedesignoftheinstrumentationandthedriftevaluations,itisconcludedthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityisminimalasaresultofthechangeinthesurveillancetestinterval.Areviewofthesurveillancetesthistorywasperformedtovalidatetheaboveconclusion.Thisreviewofthesurveillancetesthistory,demonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifanyonsystemavailabilityisminimalfromachangetoa24-monthsurveillancefrequency.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDS'TEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"L.lCTS3.8.4.5requirestheRPSscramsolenoidbusEPAstobeOPERABLEatalltimes.TheApplicabilityofITS3.3.8.3isspecifiedasMODE1and2,andMODE5withanycontrolwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.Withnocontrolrodswithdrawnfromcorecellscontainingfuelassemblies,thereisnoneedfortheRPSscramsolenoidstoperformtheirfunctionandtherefore,thereisnoneedtorequiretheirprotection.Therefore,theApplicabilityhasbeenchangedtoonlyincludethoseMODESorConditionswhentheRPSscramsolenoidsarerequired.Inaddition,ITS3.10.3andITS3.10.4willallowasinglecontrolrodtobewithdrawninMODES3and4,respectively,byallowingtheReactorModeSwitchtobeintheRefuelposition.Therefore,theRPSElectricPowerMonitoring-ScramSolenoidsrequirementshavebeenincludedinITS3.10.3andITS3.10.4.L.2L.3TheallowedoutofservicetimeofCTS3.8.4.5Actionbfortwoinoperableassembliesisextendedfrom30minutesto1hourinITS3.3.8.3RequiredActionB.1toprovidesufficienttimefortheplantpersonneltotakecorrectiveactions.Thetimeextensionfortwoinoperableassembliesisminimalbutnecessarytoallowconsiderationofplantconditions,availablepersonnel,andtheappropriateactions.ThischangeproposestoaddaNotetotheSurveillanceRequirementsthatwillallowa6hourdelayfromenteringintotheassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsforachannelplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillancesprovidedtheotherRPSelectricpowermonitoringassemblyfortheassociatedRPSscramsolenoidbusmaintainstripcapability.Thelossofoneelectricpowermonitoringassemblyisacceptableinthiscasesinceonlyone'ofthetwoassembliesisrequiredtotriptheassociatedpowersupplyifpowerisnotmaintainedwithinacceptablelimits.Theshortperiodoftime(6hours)inthisconditionwillhavenoappreciableimpactonrisk.Also,uponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe6hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionmustbeenteredandRequiredActionstaken.L.4TheovervoltageandundervoltagesetpointsforCTS4.8.4.5.b.1and2areactuallytheTripSetpoints,nottheAllowableValues.ProposedSR3.3.8.3.2nowincludestheAllowableValues,consistentwiththephilosophyofNUREG-1434.TheseAllowableValues(tobeincludedinTechnicalSpecifications)havebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDS'EHNICALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.4(cont'd)AllowableValueselectionevaluationusedactualNMP2operatingandsurveillancetrendinformationtoensurethevalidityoftheevaluationinputdata.Allchangestosafetyanalysislimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereevaluatedandconfirmedasensuringsafetyanalysislicensingacceptancelimitsaremaintained.Alldesignlimits,appliedinthemethodologies,wereconfirmedasensuringthatapplicabledesignrequirementsoftheassociatedsystemsaremaintained.TheproposedAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedfromeachdesignorsafetyanalysislimitbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheuseofthesemethodologiesforestablishingAllowableValuesensuresdesignorsafetyanalysislimitsarenotexceededintheeventoftransientsoraccidentsandaccountsforuncertaintiesandenvironmentalconditions.L.5CTS3.8.4.5doesnotprovideanyactionsiftheRPSEPAsarenotrestoredortheassociatedRPSMGSetoralternatepowersupplyisnotremovedfromservice(whichde-energizestheassociatedRPSscramsolenoidbus),asrequiredbyActionsaandb.Thus,CTS3.0.3isrequiredtobeentered.However,sinceCTS3.0.3isnotapplicableinMode5,10CFR50.36(c)(2)requiresthatthelicenseenotifytheNRCifrequiredby10CFR50.72,andanLicenseeEventReport(LER)besubmittedtotheNRCasrequiredby10CFR50.73.Inlieuofthesetworequirements,anewACTIONisprovidediftheRequiredActionsofConditionAorBarenotmetinMODE5withanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.ITS3.3.8.3ACTIONDrequiresactiontobeinitiatedtofullyinsertcontrolrodsincellscontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.ThisactionplacesthereactorintheleastreactiveconditionandensuresthesafetyfunctionoftheRPSinstrumentationwillnotberequired.NMP2Revision+QB,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:SECTION3.3-INSTRUMENTATIONBASES'heBasesofthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsforthissection(pagesB3/43-1throughB3/43-8)havebeencompletelyreplacedbyrevisedBasesthatreflecttheformatandapplicablecontentoftheNMP2ITSSection3.3,consistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecificationsNUREG-1433,Rev.1andNUREG-1434,Rev.1.TherevisedBasesareasshownintheNMP2ITSBases.Inaddition,pages3/43-6,3/43-20,3/43-21,3/43-39,3/43-74through3/43-76,3/43-85,and3/43-103,whichareblankpages,have(Qgbeenremoved.NMP2Revision/t(g

Volume4Section3.3;ISTS/JFDs,ISTSBases/JFDs,andNSHE

.JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATIONThebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.2.TheNMP2designdoesnotincludeadirectscramonhighreactorvesselwaterlevel.Therefore,thisFunction(ISTS3.3.1.1Function5)andassociatedACTIONandSurveillanceshavebeendeleted.Thefollowingrequirementshavebeenrenumbered,whereapplicable,toreflectthisdeletion.3.TheFrequencyforperformingSR3.3.1.1.3hasbeenextendedfrom7daysto184days,consistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasis.SincethisnewFrequencyisnowthesameasthecurrent184dayCHANNELFUNCTIONAL,TEST(CFT)FrequencyfortheAPRMFlowBiasedSimulatedThermalPower-UpscaleFunction,thisspecificSurveillancehasbeenincorporatedintothe184dayCFTSurveillance,alsoconsistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasis.(CurrentNMP2requirementstestthisfeatureaspartofaCFT).4.5.,TheFrequencyforcurrentNUREGSR3.3.1.1.8proposedSR3.3.1.1.7hasbeenchangedfrom1000MWD/Tto1000effectivefullpowerhoursconsistentwiththecurrentNMP2LicensingBasis.EditorialchangemadetobeconsistentwithothersimilarrequirementsintheITSorforclarity.TheproperNMP2plantspecificnomenclature/value/designrequirementshavebeenprovided.7.Note2hasbeenaddedtoISTSSR3.3.1.1.17(ITSSR3.3.1.1.16)toexemptmeasuringthesensorresponsetimesforFunctions3and4(ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-HighandReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3Functions).DeletionoftheresponsetimetestingforthesesensorswasevaluatedinNEDO-32291,"SystemAnalysesforEliminationofSelectedResponseTimeTestingRequirements,"January1994,andwasdeterminedacceptablesinceotherTechnicalSpecificationSurveillances(CHANNELCALIBRATION,CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST,CHANNELCHECK,andLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTEST)ensurethatinstrumentationresponsetimesarewithinacceptablelimits.Theseothertestsarenormallysufficienttoidentifyfailuremodesordegradationinsensorresponsetimeandassureoperationoftheanalyzedinstrumentloopswithinacceptablelimits.Furthermore,therearenoknownfailuremodesthatcanbedefectedbyresponsetimetestingthatcannotalsobedetectedbyotherTechnicalSpecificationSurveillances.Inaddition,theNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)fromB.A.Boger(NRC)toR.A.Pinelli(BWROG),datedDecember28,1994,requiredthattheutilitycommittocertainadditionalrequirementsandstatethisintheplantspecificlicenseamendment.RevisionAQg

~JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION(continued)NMPChasreviewedtheseadditionalrequirementsandisinfullcompliancewiththeseadditionalrequirements.ISTSSR3.3.1.1.17Note2hasbeenrenumberedduetotheadditionofthisproposedNote.Inaddition,thedefinitionofRPSResponseTimestatesthatthetimeismeasuredQffromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsRPStripsetpoint.ForITSTable3.3.1.1-1Function9,TurbineControlValveFastClosure,TripOilPressure-Low,theresponsetimeismeasuredfromthestartofturbinecontrolvalvefastclosure,notwhenthemonitoredparameter(theoiipressuresensor)exceedsitstripsetpoint.ThisisannotatedinUSARTable7.2-3.ThisallowancewasintheRPSResponseTimeTableinCTSpriortotheremovaloftheTablefromtheCTSandrelocationtotheUSAR.Therefore,Note4hasbeenaddedtoISTSSR3.3.1.1.17(ITSSR3.3.1.1.)6)totakeanexceptiontothedefinitionofRPSResponseTimeforFunction)Qft9andmaintainthecurrentallowance.8.TheproperLCOnumberhasbeenprovided.9.NMP2recentlyreplacedtheAPRMswithNUMAC-PowerRangeNeutronMonitors(PRNM).Therefore,ISTS3.3.1.1ACTIONBhasbeenmodified,ISTSSR3.3.1.1.5andISTSSR3.3.1.1.14havebeendeleted,ISTSSR3.3.1.1.11,ISTSSR3.3.1.1.13;andISTSSR3.3.1.1.17havebeenmodified,ITSSR3.3.1.1.2has,beenadded,andITSTable3.3.1.1-1Function2.ehasbeenaddedtoreflectthischange.Also,neitheraLogicSystemFunctionalTestnoranRPSResponseTimeTestisrequiredtobeperformedonanyAPRMFunctionsexceptFunction2.e.Therefore,ITSTable3.3.1.1-1hasbeenmodifiedaccordingly.ThesechangesareconsistentwiththeCurrentLicensingBasis.Inaddition,ISTSSR3.3.1.1.4originallywasfortheIRMsandAPRMs,andduetothischange,itisnowonlyapplicabletotheIRMs.Therefore,ISTSSR3.3.1.1.4andISTSSR3.3.1.1.5(whicharethesametestatthesameFrequency)havebeencombinedintooneSR,ITSSR3.3.1.1.4,andtheNotetothisSRismodifiedtostatethatitisonlyapplicabletoFunctions1.aand1.b(theIRMFunctions).TheremainingSRshavebeenrenumberedandTable3.3.1.1-1modifiedtoreflectthesechanges.10.TheFrequencyforISTSSR3.3.1.1.6hasbeenchangedfrom"PriortowithdrawingSRMsfromthefullyinsertedposition"to"PriortofullywithdrawingSRMs."ThecurrentlicensingbasisforNMP2onlyrequirestheSRM/IRMoverlaptobeverifiedduringareactorstartup.ItdoesnotrequiretheoverlapverificationpriortowithdrawingtheSRMsfromthefullyinsertedposition.ThecurrentpracticeofNMP2istomaintaintheSRMsbetween100cpsand10cps.Duringthereactorstartup,theoperatingstaffwillstarttowithdrawtheSRMspriortotheIRMscomingonrange.ThisreducestheburnupoftheSRMs.TheSRM/IRMoverlapisverifiedbeforetheSRMsarefullywithdrawn.Inaddition,areviewofoperatingdatahasshownthatitmaynotalwaysbepossibletoobtainproperoverlappriortoreachingNMP2RevisionAQ8

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION*10.(continued)theSRMrodblocksetpointwiththeSRMsfullyinserted.Therefore,ITSSR3.3.1.1.5hasbeenmodifiedtoreflectthecurrentpractice,andisconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis.11.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONFrequencyforTable3.3.1.1-1Function7.aisbeingmaintainedat18months,consistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis.SinceallotherCHANNELCALIBRATIONFrequenciesare24months;anew18monthCHANNELCALIBRATIONSRisbeingaddedITSSR3.3.1.1.11).NMP2RevisionA

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONEditorialchangemadetobeconsistentwithothersimilarrequirementsintheITSorforclarity.Function3.c,theHPCSReactorVesselWaterLevel-High,Level8logicisaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogic.Therefore,tousethe6hourallowanceofNote2totheSurveillanceRequirements,HPCSinitiationcapabilitymustbemaintained.Inaddition,theproperACTIONisACTIONB,sinceHPCScapabilitymustalsobemaintainedtousethe24hourallowedoutagetime,andplacingthechannelintripisacceptableinlieuofrestoringthechannel.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththeRCICSystemInstrumentationactionsintheCurrentTechnicalSpecifications.TwelvenewECCSFunctionshavebeenadded.1TSFunctionsl.a,l.d,2.a,and2.d(Q8areclosuresignalsfortheRHRAandBheatexchangersampleandRHRBdischargetoradwastevalves.ThesevalvesareclosedtoallowfullLPCIflowassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheseFunctionsaresimilartothoseFunctionsthatstarttheLPCIsubsystems,sincethestartsignalsalsoclosecertainRHRvalvesthatcandivertflowfromthereactorvessel.ACTIONBhasalsobeenmodifiedtoreflecttheproperactionsforthesefournewFunctions.1TSFunctionsl.e,I.f,I.g,2.e,2.f,and2.garetimedelayrelaysthatdelaystartingtQ8ofthelowpressureECCSpumpsfollowingaLOCAdependinguponwhetherornotoffsitepowerisavailable.TheseFunctionsaresimilartothoseFunctionsintheISTSthatdelaystartingECCSpumpsfollowingaLOCAwithoffsitepowernotavailable(ISTSFunctionsl.cand2.c,ITSFunctionsl.hand2.h).NMP2hasatotalofeightI8timedelayrelayFunctions,twoforeachlowpressureECCSpump.ThusthesixnewFunctionscombinedwiththetwointheISTS(asmodified)areconsistentwiththeNMP2currentlicensingbasis.Inaddition,ISTSFunction1.d,theReactorSteamDomePressure-Low,(InjectionPermissive)providesthesignaltoopentheDivision1ECCSpumpsinjectionvalves.TheNMP2designincludesseparateFunctionsfortheLPCSandLPCIinjectionvalves.Therefore,ITSFunction1.jhasbeenaddedfor'l4theLPCIinjectionvalveFunction.SincethesesevennewFunctionshavebeenadded,ITSNote2toRequiredActionC.1hasbeenmodifiedtoincludethesesevennewFunctions,consistentwiththeintentoftheISTSNote2toRequiredActionC.1.ITSFunction3.eisthetimedelayrelaythatdelaysshiftingtheHPCSsuctionfromtheCSTtothesuppressionpoolonlowCSTlevel.TheappropriateACTIONSandSurveillanceRequirementshavealsobeenadded.Inaddition,sincethelogicisone-out-of-one,the6hourallowance(withoutmaintainingECCSinitiationcapability)ofITSNote2totheSurveillanceRequirements,hasbeenmadeapplicabletothisFunction.I'naddition,theFunctionshavebeenrenumbered,whereapplicable,toreflecttheseadditions.RevisionAQg

~'

SRNInstrumentationB3.3.1.2SNVEILLANCEREgUIRENBiTS(continued)ThisSurveillanceconsistsofaverificationoftheSRNinstrumentreadouttoensurethattheSRNreadingisgreaterthanaspecifiedminimumcountrate.Thisensuresthatthedetectorsareindicatingcountratesindicativeofneutronfluxlevelswithinthecore.Mithfewfuelassembliesloaded,theSRNswillnothaveahighenoughcountratetosatisfytheSR.Therefore,allowancesaremadeforloadingsufficient'source'aterial,fntheformofirradiatedfuelassemblies,toestablishtheminimumcountrate.Toaccomplishthis,theSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthitthecountritefsnotrequiredtobemetonanSRNthathaslessthanorequaltofourfuelassembliesadjacenttotheSRNandnootherfuelassembliesareintheassociatedcorequadrant.MfthfourorlessfuelassembliesloadedaroundeachSRNandnootherfuelassembliesintheassocfatedquadrant,evenwithacontrolrodwithdrawntheconfigurationwillnotbecr1tical.TheFrequencyfsbaseduponchannelredundancyandotherinformationavailablefnthecontrolroom,andensuresthattherequiredchannelsarefrequentlymonitoredwhilecorereactivitychangesareoccurring.Mhennoreactivitychanges'areinprogress,theFrequencyisrelaxedfrom12hoursto24hours.>wMoOiS3~~4Kawe(coi'cfce,c.Eivi'4yC,ba.~yesaweoluwy~tp+pc,op+~~lr.Amoacme~4>>aloofXPerformanceofaCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTdemonstratestheassocfitedchannelwillfunctionproperly.SR3.3.1.2.5isrequiredinNOOE5,andthe7dayFrequencyensuresthatthechannelsareOPERABLEwhilecorereactivitychangescouldbefnprogress.Thfs7dayFrequencyfsreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceandonotherSurvefllances(suchasaCHANNELNECK)thatensureproperfunctioningbetweenCHANNELFNCTIONALTESTS.SR3.3.1.2.6isrequiredfnNODE2withIRNsonRange2orlowandinNSES3and4.SincecorereactivitychangesdononormaytapactheFrequencyhasbeenextendedfrom7daysto31days.e31dayFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandonotherSurveillances(suchasBMR/6STSB3.3-40(continued)RevI,04/07/95

e(ilcL..Qiu.4~-l4'ASESPriaaryContainaentIsolationInstruaentationB3.3.6.1hg.~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)G.~Gs-<<sa<4Foreaperaturesanprovidedtodetec~aleakfreetheteaang.e~/G-1solationoccursenaverysaaleakhasoccurredandisdiversetothehighflowinstruaentation.Ifthesmallleakisallowedtocontinuewithoutisolation,offsitedoselieigssaybereached.TheseFunct1onsarenotissuedinanASARtransientoraccidentanalysis,sincebounding~G-err.~>~-analysesareperforaedforlargebreakssuchasrecirculationorl6Lbreaks.Teaperatun-Highsignalsankhatisbe1ngaonitored.inruseeonitoreacharea.cannesoresssuvv-'oarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensuret%atnos1nleinstruaentfailurecanprecludeesolaonunction.TherearetfortheRCIfourforthe.RHR@niceJtPCr>>i+erearecoupthefortheRHRa)thatprovidein'otheAreaVentilat1oifferentialTrature-HighFction.Theouttofthesetheraouplesisusedtoterainethedierential.teaperatureEachchannelconistsofadiffentialaaperatuinstruaentthatceivesinputsfheraocouesthatarelocaintheinletndoutletofheareaoolingsysteafoatotalofs1(twofortRCI.00reavail1echannelsTheAllowableValuesansetlowenoughtodetectaleakequivalentto25gpe.lThIFFuutt1oP1solatglthaGroupgvalves.HuOtherFGy~aihhrseeQ~CMC&ckr""t'4s~p,'~C5CVal'eGheh(~V'thrOsea~<4lo+vteewgiS4c~e~~Q$e~cl4S(.PeCsente~),AIbientandDierent1alTeaperature-HighisprodedtodetectaleakintheRCPBandprovidesdiversitytothehighflowinsttation.Theisolationoccurswhaveryssallleaksoccurred.Ifthesaallleak1allowedtocontinuewhoutisolation,offsiteliaitsbereached.However,ed1tfortheseinstruaents1sntakeninany(continued)BN/6STSB3.3-156RevI,N/07/95

TherearefourchannelsfortheRHRequipmentroomareas(twoperarea),eightchannelsforthe~Q6,reactorbuildingpipechaseareas(twoperarea),and10channelsforthereactorbuildinggeneralareas(twoperarea).TheAreaTemperature-HighFunctionsareonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE3.InMODES1and2,theReactorVesselPressure-HighFunctionandotheradministrativecontrolsensurethatthisflowpathremainsisolatedtopreventunexpectedlossofinventoryviathisfiowpath.InsertPageB3.3-164

1-JRPSElectricPowerMonitoringB3.3.8.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIRBIENTSlTheFrequencyisbasedupontheassuaptionofQIaonthcilibritionintervalinthedeterainationoftheaagnitudeofequipeentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.Perforaanceofasysteafunctionaltestdeaonstratesroun<redsysteoactuatton(sSmlatedoractual)sesnal>/halogicofthesysteawillautoaaticallytripopentheassociatedpoweraonitoringasseeblyc1rcuitbreaker.Onlyonesignalperpowermonitoringassemblyisrequiredtobetested.Th1sSurveillanceoverlapsw1ththeCHANELCALIBRATIONtoprovidecoapletetestingofthesafetyfunction.ThesysteafunctionaltestoftheClass1Ec1rcuitbreakersisincludedaspartofthistesttoprovidecoapletetestingofthesafetyfunction.Ifthebreakersareincapableofoperating,theassociatedelectricpoweraeitoringassemblywouldbeinoperable.ThenthFrequency1sbasedontheneedtoperforathis..Surveilance.underthecondit1onsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforinunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperforaidwiththereactoratpower.Operat1ngexperiencehasshownthattheseconentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthemonthFrequency.2REFERENCES1.,Sectton$8.3.1.1+~~NRC6enericLetter91-09,'ModificationofSurveillanceIntervalfortheElectricProtectiveAsseIIblies1nPowerSuppliesfortheReactorProtectionSystoa.'N/6STS.B3.3-246Rev1,04/07/95

~o~SoIr~~ckRPSElectricPowerNonitorinB3.3esBASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS(continued)ITheFrequencyisbasedupontheassumptionofa5monthcalibrat1on1ntervalinthedeterminationofthemagn1tudeofequipeentdr1ftinthesetpointanalysis.~piPerformanceofasystemfunctionaltestdesenstratesarequiredsystenactuation(a)mistedoractual)s1gnalsjhalogicofthesystemwillautomaticallytripopentheassociatedpowermonitoringassemblycircuitbreaker.Onlyonesignalperpowermonitoringassemblyisrequiredtobetested.ThisSurveillanceoverlapswiththeCHANNELCALIBRATIONtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunct1on.ThesystemfunctionaltestoftheClasslEcircuitbreakersisincludedaspartofthistesttoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.Ifthebreakersareincapableofoperating,theassociatedelectr1cpowermonitoringassemblywouldbeinoperable.~QmothFrequencytshasadontheneedtoperfosuthistSurveillanceunderthecondit1onsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtrans1entiftheSurveillancewereperformedw1ththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecolmonentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedattheŽeonFrequency.REFERENCES1.,gectton~.3.1.1.~gNRC6enericLetter91-09,'NodificationofSurveillanceIntervalfortheElectricProtect1veAssembliesinPowerSuppliesfortheReactorProtect1onSystem.'.,yOCSRm.3d(d(ZCr'~)BN/6STS.B3.3-2I6.Rev1,04/07/95 0

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION~L.CHAGHInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsare(QQdeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavehotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostRevision

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS;3.3,1.1-RPSINSTRUMENTATION3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.2.1-CONTROLRODBLOCKINSTRUMENTATIONHANEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Tripsetpointsarenotincludedinthe1TSandallreferencestothesesetpointsaredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revisiongag

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.2.1-CONTROLRODBLOCKINSTRUMENTATION'~lCHANE3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONLlHANEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsareQfideleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheiTS.TheAllowableValueisthe,)QgrequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationRevision

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.2.2-FEEDWATERSYSTEMANDMAINTURBINEHIGHWATERLEVELTRIPINSTRUMENTATIONL~lH*NE3.(continued)uncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.Themostconservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.3.2-REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEM~L*NEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermiheditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThechangemodifiestheChannelCheckSurveillancetoexemptchannelsthatarenormallydeenergized.TheRemoteShutdownSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Inaddition,sincethechannelisnormallydeenergizedandisnotindicatingproperly,nospecificacceptancecriteriafortheChannelCheckapplies.Thatis,performanceoftheChannelCheckwiththeinstrumentdeenergizedisessentiallyequivalenttonotperformingtherequirement.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysincetheinstrumentsarenotrequiredtoprovideautomaticresponsetoanydesignbasisaccident.ThenonperformanceofaChannelCheckonadeenergizedinstrumentdoesnotsignificantlyaffectthecontributionoftheinstrumenttoriskreductionsincetheinstrumentisCalibratedproperlyanditsOPERABILITYverifiedduringthecalibration.RevisiongR

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.4.1-EOC-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONHANE~ilInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsare[QR.,deleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant,Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostRevisionPQQ

~l.,NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.4.1-EOC-RPTINSTRUMENTATION3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS;3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONLl~HANEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsare((dd,deleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistheIR,requiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95;TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revision+

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.4.2-ATWS-RPTINSTRUMENTATIONL~lCANE3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandth'etripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

'ANENOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheiTSandallreferencestothesesetpointsarelQQdeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichis'therequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revisiong

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATION~LlHAH3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONHANE~LInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThischangewillallowtwochannelsofaECCSInstrumentationFunctiontobeinoperableforupto24hours,96hours,or8days(dependingupontheFunction)priortoplacingtheminthetrippedconditionordeclaringtheassociatedECCSinoperable.ECCSactuationlogicisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechannelsfortheLPCS,LPCI,andADSFunctionsarecombinedinatwo-out-of-twologic;thuswhenoneorbothchannelsofaFunctionareinoperable,theFunctionwillnotperformitsintendedfunction.FortheHPCSFunctions,withonlyonechannelpertripsystemofaFunctioninoperable,theFunctioncanstillperformitsintendedfunction.TheproposedoutofservicetimehasalreadypreviouslybeenapprovedbytheNRCforuseatNMP2foronechannelinoperable.Therefore,allowingtwochannelsofaLPCS,LPCI,andADSFunctiontobeinoperableforthisproposedtimeisequivalenttoonechannelinoperable;inbothcases,theFunctioncannotperformitsintendedfunction.AllowingtwoHPCSchannels(onepertripsystem)ofaFunctionisacceptablesincetheFunctioncanstillperformitsintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?ThischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysincetheoverallECCSsafetyfunctioncontinuestoprovidetherequiredECCSactuationcapability.NMP2Revision++

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.1-ECCSINSTRUMENTATIONHAHEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThischangewillprovideadditionaltimetorestoretheManualInitiationFunctionoftheADSSystem.Manualinitiationlogicisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Also,thischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheADSSystemtoperformitsrequiredautomaticfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?ThischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysincetheManualInitiationoftheADSSystemisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Theadditionaltimeisminor,theabilitytoinitiateindividualADSvalvesoranotherECCSSystemispossibleifaneventoccurs,andisconsistentwiththetimeperiodallowedforotherequipmentthatisnotassumedtooperateformitigationofaDBA.15RevisionWQg 0

Ll~*ENOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsaredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?ETripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP21TS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revision@

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.5.2-RCICSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONL~liiE3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONHNInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsaredeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revisiongpss

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION'A~HAHE3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONL~14*Inaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThechangeprovidestheoptiontodeclaretheSLCSysteminoperableinsteadofisolatingtheRWCUSystem.TheSLCSystemInitiationFunctioninstrumentationisnotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent.TheroleoftheinstrumentationistoisolatetheRWCUSystemtoensuretheSLCSystemcanfunctionproperlyandtheinjectedboronisnotremovedfromtheReactorCoolantSystem.TheproposedchangetotheACTIONSwillnotallowcontinuousoperationsuchthattheSLCSystemcannotperformitsintendedfunction.Therefore,theproposedchangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?NosignificantreductioninamarginofsafetyisinvolvedwiththischangesincetheproposedalternativeactionsareidenticaltothoseassociatedwiththemechanicalSpecification(SLCSystem).SincetheinstrumentationactuatestoensuretheSLCSystemcanperformitsintendedfunction,theseactionsareappropriateandthemarginofsafetyismaintainedequivalentofthemarginofsafetywhentheSLCSystemisinoperable.NMP218RevisionP~Q8,

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONL~l*Inaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThechangeprovidestheoptiontodeclaretheSLCSysteminoperableinsteadofisolatingtheRWCUSystem.TheSLCSystemInitiationFunctioninstrumentationisnotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent.Theroleoftheinstrumentation[istoisolatetheRWCUSystemtoensuretheSLCSystemcanfunctionproperlyandtheinjectedboronisnotremovedfromtheReactorCoolantSystem.TheproposedchangetotheACTIONSwillnotallowcontinuousoperationsuchthattheSLCSystemcannotperformitsintendedfunction.Therefore,theproposedchangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromany:,accidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?NosignificantreductioninamarginofsafetyisinvolvedwiththischangesincetheproposedalternativeactionsareidenticaltothoseassociatedwiththemechanicalSpecification(SLCSystem).SincetheinstrumentationactuatestoensuretheSLCSystemcan'performitsintendedfunction,theseactionsareappropriateandthemarginofsafetyismaintainedequivalentofthemarginofsafetywhentheSLCSystemisinoperable.NMP218RevisionP'Q8

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION'~LlHNEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsareiQSdeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3..Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueisthefQfErequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67,04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2RevisionEtr'g

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.6.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION'~lCNlN3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATION~L.lHAHInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheITSandallreferencestothesesetpointsarelQtldeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?.Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.Thetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfrom.theAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift.ThemostNMP2Revision+g

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.7.2-MECHANICALVACUUMPUMPISOLATIONINSTRUMENTATIONANE3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained.TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

HANEL~lNOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.8.1-LOSSOFPOWERINSTRUMENTATIONInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TripsetpointsarenotincludedintheiTSandallreferencestothesesetpointsare(Qgdeleted.TheAllowableValueistherequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.Thesetripsetpointsarenotconsideredasinitiatorsforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thischangedoesnotimpactthecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincetheAllowableValue,whichistherequiredlimitation,isstillbeingmaintained.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?TripsetpointshavenotbeenincludedintheITS.TheAllowableValueisthe(Q(crequiredlimitationfortheassociatedFunctionandthisvalueisretainedintheNMP2ITS.TheseAllowableValueshavebeenestablishedconsistentwiththemethodsdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.105,Revision2,February1986,ISA-S67.04-1982,and/ortheGeneralElectricSetpointMethodologydescribedinNEDC-31336P-A,limitedbytheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,Revision1,dated11/6/95.TheAllowableValuesarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,andapplicableenvironmentaleffects.Thetripsetpointsarederivedfromtheanalyticallimitsbyaccountingforcalibrationuncertainty,processmeasurementuncertainty,primaryelementuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,applicableenvironmentaleffects,anddrift.ThetripsetpointsarealsoderivedfromtheAllowableValuesintheconservativedirectionbyconsideringcalibrationuncertainty,instrumentuncertainty,environmentaleffects,anddrift;ThemostNMP2Revision/'g

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.8.1-LOSSOFPOWERINSTRUMENTATION'~ICHANH3.(continued)conservativelyderivedtripsetpointsareused.Inaddition,boththeAllowableValuesandtripsetpointsmayhaveadditionalconservatisms.Plantcalibrationprocedureswillensurethattheassumptionsregardingcalibrationaccuracy,measurementandtestequipmentaccuracy,andsettingtolerancearemaintained,TheBasesfortheITSalsodescribestherelationshipbetweentheAllowableValueandthetripsetpoint.ThisdescriptionisconsistentwiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology.Thus,anychangestothetripsetpointswilleitherbeinaccordancewiththeNMP2InstrumentSetpointMethodology,orifnot,thenaBaseschange,whichiscontrolledbythe'rovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS,wouldberequiredpriortochangingthetripsetpoint.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.8.2-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-LOGIC~ANEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangeremovestherequirementtonotifytheNRCifrequiredby10CFR50.72andtosubmitaLicenseeEventReportasrequiredby10CFR50.73iftheRPSEPAsarenotrestoredtoOperablestatusortheRPSUPSisnotremovedfromserviceinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsotherthanMODES1,2,and3.ItreplacestheserequirementswithspecificactionsthatplacethereactorintheleastreactiveconditionandensureseitherthesafetyfunctionoftheRPS,primarycontainmentisolationsystem,secondarycontainmentisolationsystem,andCREFSystemwillnotberequiredorisalreadymet.AnoptionisalsogiventocontinuetorestoreanassemblytoOPERABLEstatusundercertainconditionssincetheremaybeaneedforRHRSDCSystem.Alternately,optionsarealsoprovidedundercertainconditionstodeclaretheaffectedcomponentsinoperableandtaketheACTIONSrequiredbytheindividualSpecifications.Therequiredreportsarenotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent.Therefore,thechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theconsequencesofanaccidentarenotaffectedbythedeletionofthesereportingrequirementssincetheydonotimpacttheassumptionsofanydesignbasisaccidentortransient.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Themarginofsafetyisnotreducedbyremovingtherequirementforthesubmittaloftheserequiredreports.Thisproposedchangehasnoeffectontheassumptionsofthedesignbasisaccident.ThischangealsohasnoimpactonthesafeoperationoftheplantbecauseadequateactionsareprovidediftheRPSEPAscannotberestoredandtheRPSUPScannotberemovedfromservice.Thischangedoesnotaffectanyplantequipmentorrequirementsformaintainingplantequipment.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionPCS

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.3.8.3-RPSELECTRICPOWERMONITORING-SCRAMSOLENOIDSL~*Inaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangeremovestherequirementtonotifytheNRCifrequiredby10CFR50.72andtosubmitaLicenseeEventReportasrequiredby10CFR50.73iftheRPSEPAsarenotrestoredtoOperablestatusortheRPSMGSetoralternatepowersupplyisnotremovedfromserviceinMODE5withanycontrolrodwithdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemblies.ItreplacestheserequirementswithspecificactionsthatplacethereactorintheleastreactiveconditionandensuresthesafetyfunctionoftheRPSinstrumentationwillnotberequired.Therequiredreportsarenotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent,Therefore,thechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theconsequencesofanaccidentarenotaffectedbythedeletionofthesereportingrequirementssincetheydonotimpacttheassumptionsofanydesignbasisaccidentortransient.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Themarginofsafetyisnotreducedbyremovingtherequirementforthesubmittaloftheserequiredreports.Thisproposedchangehasnoeffectontheassumptionsofthedesignbasisaccident.ThischangealsohasnoimpactonthesafeoperationoftheplantbecauseadequateactionsareprovidediftheRPSEPAscannotberestoredandtheRPSMGSetoralternatepowersupplycannotberemovedfromservice.Thischangedoesnotaffectanyplantequipmentorrequirementsformaintainingplantequipment.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.RevisionA@

Volume5Sections3.4and3.5

Section3.4

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.2-FLOWCONTROLVALVES(FCVs)~NI*IVHA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2CTS4.4.1.1.3providesSurveillanceRequirementsfortheflowcontrolvalves.SinceCTS4.4.1.1.3ispartoftheRecirculationLoopTechnicalSpecification,CTS3/4.4.1.1,itiscoveredbytheLCOofCTS3.4.1.1andtheApplicabilityofCTS3.4.1.1.TheITSprovidesaseparateLCOfortheflowcontrolvalves,thusanewLCOstatementandApplicabilitystatementareneeded.However,sincetheycontinuetorequireflowcontrolvalveOPERABILITYinthesameMODESasCTS3/4.4.1.1,theadditionofthenewLCOandApplicabilityareadministrative.ITS3.4.2ACTIONAallows4hourstolockuptheflowcontrolvalveifitisinoperable.ThistimeisconsistentwiththetimeinCTS3.4.1.1Actionawhenaloopisnotinoperation.Theactualproposedaction(lockuptheflowcontrolvalve)istheacceptancecriteriatowhichtheflowcontrolvalveistestedbythecurrentSurveillance(CTS4.4.1.1.3).Thusplacingtheflowcontrolvalveinthispositionperformsthesafetyfunctionoftheflowcontrolvalve.Theproposedchangewillprovideonlyadditionalclarificationofthecurrentrequirements,andisthereforeconsideredadministrative.RELATEDSPE.IFICATIONSNoneTEHNIALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVENoneTEHNIALHAN>ES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LD.1TheFrequenciesforperformingCTS4.4.1.1.3.aand4.4.1,1.3.b(proposedSRs3.4.2.1and3.4.2.2)havebeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months,TheseSRsensurethatFCVsfail"asis"onlossofhydraulicpressureatthehydrauliccontrolunitandthattheaveragerateofFCVmovementiswithintheNMP2Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.2-FLOWCONTROLVALVES(FCVs).TECHNICALCHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVELD.1(cont'd)specificlimit(~11%/sec).TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyissmall.Duringnormaloperation,theFCVsareslowlypositionedtoobtaintherequiredcoreflowandpowerconditions.IfanactualorfalsesignalispresentrequiringaMotionInhibit(positionsetpointdemandsignalexceedlimits,largevelocitycontrollerdeviationformorethanapresettime,andhighdrywellpressure),theassociatedFCVshouldlockup.Therefore,duringnormalplantoperations,thesystemisutilizedandmajordeviationswillnotgounnoticed.IfanyinconsistenciesareobservedduringFCVmovement,theflowcontrolsystemorthehydrauliccontrolunitsmaybetakeno'utofservicetoperformtherequiredmaintenance.Afterrepair,thesystemmaybetestedduringplantoperationtoensuretheFCVsfunctionproperly.IfaDBALOCAweretooccur,drywellpressurewillincrease.DrywellpressuresensorswilldetectthispressurizationandimmediatelydrophydraulicpressuretothepilotlinesofcheckvalvesontheFCVactuators.ThesepressuresensorsareenvironmentallyqualifiedforLOCAandpost-LOCAconditions.Withlossofpilotpressure,thecheckvalveswillcloseandlockuptheFCV.Untiltheseinterlocksarecleared,nocontrolsystemsignal(intentionalorinadvertent)cancauseFCVpositiontochange.FailureModesandEffectsAnalysishaveshownthat,givenaLOCAevent,nosinglefailureintheelectronic/hydrauliccontrolscancausetheFCVtoclose.Asaresultoftheseconsiderations,FCVclosureintheunbrokenloopisnotexpectedtooccurduringtheLOCAevent.EveniftheFCVsweresignaledtocloseforsomeunlikelyreason(LOCAplustwofailures:failureofdrywellhighpressuresignalsuchthatFCVlockupdoesnotoccur,andfailureofFCVcontrols),backupelectronicvelocitylimitersareincludedintherecirculationcontrolsystemtolimitFCVvelocityto11%/sec.AdditionalmultiplespeciticcomponentfailuresintheselimitersmustoccurtocausefullclosureoftheFCVatvelocitiesinexcessofthisvalue.ThecombinedprobabilityofoccurrenceofthesespecificfailuremodesduringaNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.2-FLOWCONTROLVALVES(FCVs)"TECHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVELD.I(cont'd)LOCAislessthanor10E-6peryear.Accordingly,theelectronicallylimitedrateoflessthanorequalto11%ofFCVactuatorstrokerateisconsideredarealisticyetconservativeclosurerate.ThevelocitylimitersarealsoavailabletominimizetheconsequencesoftheReactorRecirculationFlowRunoutandFlowControlFailure(decreasingflow)transientsensuringtheFCVseitheropenorcloseataratelessthanorequalto11%/secwhichisassumedintheanalysis.InthesetransientstheanalysisassumestheFCVsbothn>oveatavelocityof+11%/sec.TheprobabilityofthistypeoffailureisverysmallsinceNMP2normallypositionstheflowcontrollersinmanualandinthisconditionthecontrolsignalofeachloopisindependentofeachother.NowinthecaseoftransientsinvolvingthefailureofoneFCV,theanalysisassumesanFCVmovesatavelocityof30%/secintheopeningdirectionand60%/secintheclosingdirection.Inthesetransients,thevelocitylin>itersareavailabletolimittheFCVvelocityto+11%/secandinadditionthehydraulicsystemisdesignedtolimittheFCVvelocityto+30%/secand-60%/sec,whichiswithinthevaluesassumedinthetransientanalysis.BasedontheReactorRecirculationSystemdesignandtheabilitytodetectdeviationsduringoperation,itisshownthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthechange.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallfromachangetoCTS4.4.1.1.3.aand4.4.1.1.3.basimplementedinSRs3.4.2.1and3.4.2.2.Inaddition,theproposed24-monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months),doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"NoneNMP2RevisionA

WithoneormoreoftherequireinterocksshowninTable3.4.3.2-3inoperable,restore~~JtheinoperableinterlocktoOPERABLE.statuswithin7daysorisolatetheaffectedheatexchanger(s)fromtheRCICsteamsupplybyclosinganddeenergizinghestexchangervalves2RHS*MOV22Aand2RHS*MOV80Aor2RHS*MOV22Band2RHS*MOV80B,asappropriat~;qr.~(;~+A~f./Withanyreactorcoolantsystemeaksgegreaterthanthelimitin3.4.3.2.eabove,A<gga)8~identifythesourceofleakswithin4hoursorbeinatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinnext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDwithinthefollowing24hours.~W>",i5'I4A.3.2.1TheRCSleakageshallbedemonstratedtobewithineachoftheabovelim'toringtheprimarycinmentairbornepaulateradiosatleastonceper12hours,b.Monitohours,(~ordraintanndepmentdraintafillratetleastonceperC.Monitours.andacontainmentaornaaseousratleastonceper12L,Ld.Monitoringthereactorsselheadflangeleakdetectioystematleastonceper244.4.3.2.2EachRCSpressureisolationvalvespecifiedinTable3.4.3.2-1shalldemonstratedOPERABLEbyleektestingpursuanttoSpecification4.0.5,usingthemethodandacceptancecriteriaspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,andverifyingtheleakageofeachvalvetobewithinthespecifiedlimit:a.b.Atleastonceper18months,andBeforereturningthevalvetoservicefollowingmaintenance,repair,orreplacementworkonthevalve.TheprovisionsofSpecification4.0.4arenotapplicableforentryintoOPERATIONALCONDITION3.3%04</kog.tf.gNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-14AmelldmentNo.IQ<4[@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.5-RCSOPERATIONALLEAKAGETEHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRI.TIVE"Generic"LA.1DetailsoftheCTS4.4.3.2.1methodsforperformingthereactorcoolantsystemleakageSurveillance(bymonitoringtheprimarycontainmentairborneparticulateandgaseousradioactivityandbymonitoringthedrywellfloordraintankandequipmentdraintankfillrate)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TherequirementsofproposedSR3.4.5.1areadequatetodeterminereactorcoolantsystemleakageiswithinrequiredlimits.Asaresult,thedetailsrelocatedtotheBasesarenotnecessaryforensuringreactorcoolantsystemleakageisdeterminedanddonotneedtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS."Specific"L.lTheSurveillanceFrequencyforCTS4.4.3.2.1.b(proposedSR3.4.5.1),hasbeenchangedfrom8hoursto12hours,consistentwiththeallowanceinGenericLetter88-01,Supplement1.ThesupplementallowstheFrequencytobeextendedtooncepershift,nottoexceed12hours.NMP2currentlyhasa12houroperatingshift,thus,theFrequencyisadjustedtocoincidewiththis.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththeCTSFrequencyformonitoringtheairbornemonitors.L.2ThereactorvesselheadflangeleakdetectioninstrumentationinCTS4.4.3.2.1doesnotnecessarilyrelatedirectlytotheLEAKAGErequirements.Thereactorvesselheadleakdetectionsystemmonitorsthepressurebetweentheinnerandouterreactorvesselheadsealring.Iftheinnersealfails,theinstrumentationwillannunciateanalarm.Theplantcancontinuetooperatewiththeoutersealperformingtherequiredfunctionandtheinnersealcanberepairedatthenextrefuelingoutage.Ifbothsealsfail,thiscanbedetectedbytheLeakageDetectionSystemsrequiredbyCTS3.4.3.1andbyanincreaseindrywelltemperatureandpressure.Theinstrumentationdoesnotdetectnorquantifyleakagefrom'thereactortothecontainmentatmosphere;itdoesnotmonitoranyleakagecontrolledbyCTS3.4.3.2.Monitoringoverallunidentifiedleakageisperformedbythedrywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsystemandthedrywellatmosphericmonitoringsystem.NeithertheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Revision1,northecurrentNMP2TSspecifiesthisindicationtobeOPERABLEintheleakagedetectioninstrumentationSpecification(CTS3/4.4.3.1andITS3.4.7),thusitisnotneededtosupportthisSpecification.Controloftheavailabilityof,andnecessarycompensatoryactivitiesifnotavailable,forindicationsandmonitoringinstrumentsareaddressedbyplantoperationalproceduresandNMP2Revisiongpss,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.5-RCSOPERATIONALLEAKAGE'ECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.2(cont'd)policies.TherequirementtodemonstrateLEAKAGEiswithinlimitsisstillmaintainedinproposedSR3.4.5.1.Therefore,thisinstrumentation,alongwiththesupportingSurveillanceisproposedtobedeletedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.NMP2RevisionA

e.oneormoreoftherequirederlocksshowninTable3A.3.2-inoperable,restoretheiparableinterlocktoOPERAB.statuswithin7daysorisolateeaffectedheatexchar(s)fromtheRCICsteamsuybyclosinganddeenergizingatexchangervalves2*MOV22Aand2RHS*MOAor2RHS*MOV22Band2R*MOVBOB,asappropriate.LC,IWithanyreactorcoolantsystemleakagegreaterthanthelimitin3.4.3.2.eabove,identifythesourceofleakagewithin4hoursorbeinatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthenext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing24hours.4.4.3.2.1TheRCSleakageshallbedemonstratedtobewithineachoftheabovelimitsby:Monitoringtheprimarycontainmentairborneparticulateradioactivityatleastonceper12hours,b.Monitorinpthedrywallfloordraintankandequipmentdraintankfillrateatleastonceper8hours,C.Monitoringtheprimarycontainmentairbornegaseousradioactivityatleastonceper12hours,andd.Atleastonc18months,andmenance,repair,orrepmentworMonitorinpthereactorvesselheadflanpeleakdetectionsystematleastonceper24hours.N9.$.4fLA,~44.3.2.2EachRCSpressureisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyleaktestingpursuanttoSpecification4.0.5,usingthemethodandacceptancecriteriaspecifiedintheInierviceTestinpProgram.andverifyingtheleakageofeachvalvetobewithinthespecifiedlimit:~7a~~~'~~~TheprovisionsofSpecification4.0.4arenotapplicableforentryintoOPERATIONALCONDITIONQopi'.iS<ere~C<+0cg~:pq~'~gg*NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-14AmendmentNo.484

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.6-RCSPRESSUREISOLATIONVALVE(PIV)LEAKAGEADMINISTRATIVEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)),A.2TheITS3.4.6ACTIONSincludetwoNotesnotcurrentlyprovidedintheCTS.ThefirstNotetotheACTIONS("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachflowpath")providesexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheACTIONSforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3-"CompletionTimes,"thisNoteprovidesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingACTIONSforinoperablePIVs.ThesecondNotetotheACTIONS("EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyPIVs")facilitatestheuseandunderstandingoftheintenttoconsideranysystemaffectedbyinoperablePIVs,whichistohaveitsACTIONSalsoapplyifitisdeterminedtobeinoperable.WiththeITSLCO3.0.6,thisintentwouldnotnecessarilyapply.ThisclarificationisconsistentwiththeintentandinterpretationoftheexistingTechnicalSpecifications,andisthereforeconsideredanadministrativepresentationpreference.RELCATEDSPEIFICATIONSNoneTECHNIALCHANES-MORERESTRICTIVENoneTECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1NMP2Thelistofpressureisolationvalves(PIVs)inCTSTable3.4.3.2-1areproposedtoberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).ThelistingofvalveswhicharesubjecttotheRCSPIVLeakageSpecificationarerelatedtodesignandarenotnecessaryforensuringPIVleakageismaintainedwithinlimits.ITS3.4.6requirestheleakagefromeachRC5PIVtobewithinlimits.TheserequirementsareadequateforensuringPIVleakageismaintainedRevisionPQ6

DISCUS'SIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.6-RCSPRESSUREISOLATIONVALVE(PIV)LEAKAGE~TECHNICALCHAN~ES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.1(cont'd)withinlimitsfortherequiredvalves.Therefore,therelocatedlistisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithGenericLetter91-08,whichallowedlistsofcomponentstoberelocatedtoplantcontrolleddocuments.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheUSARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Inadditiontothisrelocation,allreferencestotheTableinCTS3.4.3.2.dand4.4.3.2.2havebeendeleted.TheBasesidentifiesthatthelistofPIVsarelocatedintheTRM.LA.2DetailsofthefirstFrequencyforperformingCTS4.4.3.2.2areproposedtoberelocatedtotheInserviceTesting(IST)Program(coveredbyCTS4.0.5),TherequirementtoleaktesteachPIV"Atleastonceper18months"isnotrequiredtobeinTechnicalSpecificationstoassurethePIVsareleaktestedatleastonceper18monthssincetheISTProgram,requiredby10CFR50.55a,provides18monthorlessleaktestrequirementsforthesevalves.Compliancewith10CFR50.55a,andasaresulttheISTProgram,isrequiredbytheNMP2OperatingLicense.ThesecontrolsareadequatetoensuretherequiredleakratetestingofPIVsisperforinedanddonotneedtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheISTProgramwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedISTPrograminChapter5oftheITS.LC.1TherequirementsofCTS3.4.3.2ACTIONSdande,4.4.3.2.3,and4.4.3.2.4concerninghigh/lowpressureinterfacevalveleakagepressuremonitorsandinterlocksdonotnecessarilyrelatedirectlytotheleakagelimitrequirementsoftheRCSPIVs.TheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1,doesnotspecifyindication-onlyoralarm-onlyequipmenttobeOPERABLEtosupportOPERABILITYofasystemorcomponent.Controloftheavailabilityof,andnecessarycompensatoryactivitiesifnotavailable,forindicationsandmonitoringinstrumentationareaddressedbyplantoperationalproceduresandpolicies.Inaddition,theleakagelimitrequirementsofITS3.4.6andtheleakagetestrequirementsofSR3.4.6.1willensurethatthelimitswillbemaintainedortheappropriateACTIONSwillbetaken.Assuch,therelocatedrequirementsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.Therefore,thisinstrumentation,alongwiththesupportingACTIONSandSurveillances,isproposedtoberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheUSARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.4NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.7-RCSLEAKAGEDETECTIONINSTRUMENTATION~TECHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE(continued)"Specific"L.lCTS3.4.3.1requiresthepriinarycontainmentatmosphericparticulateandgaseousradioactivitymonitoringsystems,andthedrywellfloorandequipmentdraintankfillratemonitoringsystems.TherequiredsystemsarerearrangedinITS3.4.7torequireonemethodwhichcanquantifytheunidentifiedLEAKAGEandadiversedetectionmethodwhichprovidesonlyindicationofincreasedleakage.ThedrywellequipmentdraintankfillratemonitoringsystemrequiredbyCTS3.4.3.1.dfunctionstoquantifyidentifliedleakage.SincethepurposeofITS3.4.7istoprovideearlyindicationofunidentifiedRCSleakage,thedrywellequipmentdraintanktillrateinonitoringsystemrequirementsspecifiedinCTS3.4.3.1.dandActionb,aswellasActiond,whichallowsboththeequipmentandfloordraintanktillratenionitoringsystemstobeinoperable,havebeendeleted.ITS3.4.5willcontinuetorequirethatidentifiedleakage(aspartofthetotalleakagelin>it)bequantified.However,theITSwillnotspecificallyplaceaTechnicalSpecificatiorequirementontheactualmethodusedtoquantifyidentifiedleakage.Adiversemethodtoquantifyincreasedleakageisstillprovidedbythedrywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsystem,andthisistheprimarymethodforquantifyingunidentifiedleakage.Inaddition,CTS4.4.3.1.bhasalsobeeninodifiedtoonlyrequirethe"drywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsystem"(proposedSR3.4.7.3)tobetestedtoreflectthesenewrequirements.ThedrywellatmosphericparticulateandgaseousmonitoringsysteminCTS3.4.3.l.aandbaregroupedsothatonlyoneofthetwoisrequiredinITSLCO3.4.7.b,insteadofthecurrentrequirementthatbothsystemsbeOPERABLE,sincetheyprovidethesainetypeofindication.Adiversemethodtoquantifyincreasedleakageisstillprovidedbythedrywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsystem,andthisisthepriinarymethodforquantifyingunidentifiedleakage.CTS3.4.3.1Actiona,whichallowsonlyoneofthetwoatmosphericmonitoringsystemstobeinoperable,hasbeenmodifiedinITS3.4,7ACTIONBtoallowthe"required"atmosphericmonitoringsystem,i.e.,bothparticulateandgaseousmonitors,tobeinoperablefor30days,consistentwiththenewrequirementinITSLCO3.4.7.bthatonlyoneofthesetwomonitorsbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,CTS4.4.3.1.ahasalsobeenmodifiedtoonlyrequirethe"required"drywellatmospheric'monitoringsystem(proposedSR3.4.7.1andSR3.4.7.2)andthe"required"leakagedetectioninstrumentation(proposedSR3.4.7.4)tobetestedtoreflectthesenewrequirements.NMP2Revisiong

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.7-RCSLEAKAGEDETECTIONINSTRUMENTATION'TEHNIALCHANES-LSRESTRICTIVEL.l(cont'd)Therefore,sincetwodiversemethodsarestillbeingmaintainedtodetectunidentifiedleakageandidentifiedandunidentifiedleakageisstillrequiredtobequantified,thischange,whichisconsistentwiththeBWR/6ISTS,isconsideredacceptable.L.2j--Currently,CTS3.0.4wouldprecludeachangeinMODESwithleakagedetectionmonitoringsysteminoperable.AstatementthatLCO3.0.4isnotapplicablefortheconditionofthedrywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsysteminoperableortherequireddrywellatmosphericmonitoringsysteminoperablehasbeenaddedasaNotetoITS3.4.7ACTIONAandACTIONB.Whenthisallowanceisused,eitherthedrywellfloordraintankfillratemonitoringsystemortherequireddrywellatmosphericmonitoringsystemremainsavailable,andthecompensatoryactionsfortheinoperablesystem(or,therequirementthatunidentitiedleakagebequantifiedinaccordancewithITS3.4.5)willprovideadequateindicationofRCSleakage.Since1)probabilitieshavedetermineda30dayallowedoutofservicetimeforoneleakagedetectionsystemisacceptable;2)aleakagedetectionsystemisstillOPERABLE;and3)compensatorymeasureswillstillensureleakageisbeingquantified,theLCO3.0.4exceptionisconsideredtoprovidenosignificantimpactonsafetyandisa'cceptable.ANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.4.3.l.a(NotetoITS3.4.7SurveillanceRequirements)toallowachanneltobeinoperableforupto6hourssolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillancesprovidedtheotherLeakageDetectionSystemchannelisOPERABLE.The6hourtestingallowancehasbeengrantedbytheNRCinTechnicalSpecificationamendmentsforGeorgiaPowerCompany'sHatchUnit1(Amendment185)andUnit2(Amendment125)andintheITSamendmentforWashingtonPublicPowerSupplySystemUnit2(Amendment149).TheNRChasalsograntedthisallowanceinothertopicalreportsfortheReactorProtectionSystem,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem,andIsolationSystemInstrumentation.The6hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilityofproperlymonitoringleakagesincetheotherchannelmustbeOPERABLEforthisallowancetobeused.NMP2RevisionPC

~,'(

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.8-RCSSPECIFICACTIVITYA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2CTS3.4.5Actioncrequiresincreasedsamplingundercertainconditions(asspecifiedinCTSTable4.4.5-1,Item4.b),whentheLCO3.4.5.alimitisexceeded.(AsdescribedinCTS3.0.1,theActionisonlyrequiredwhentheLCOisnotmet.)CTSTable4.4.5-1,Item4.brequiresthesamplingandanalysisoncebetween2and6hoursafterthespecialconditionsspecifiedinActioncaremet.However,CTS3.4.5Actionb(ITS3.4.8,RequiredActionsA.landB.1),whichisalsorequiredtobetakenwhentheLCO3.4.5.alimitisnotmet,alreadyrequiresthesamesamplingtobeperformedevery4hoursatalltimeswhentheLCO3.4.5.alimitisnotmet,notjustwhenthespecialconditionsspecifiedinActioncaremet.Thus,thesamplingandanalysisrequirementsofCTS3.4.5ActioncisredundanttothesamplingandanalysisrequirementsofCTS3.4.5Actionb.Therefore,CTS3.4.5Actionchasbeendeletedanditsdeletionisadininistrative.RELATEDSPECIFI.ATINSNoneTECHNICALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1ThisproposedchangemodifiesCTSTable4.4.5-1,Item2(proposedSR3.4.8.1),tochangetheFrequencyforisotopicanalysisfordoseequivalentI-131concentrationfroinatleastonceper31daystoatleastonceper7days.TheincreasedFrequencyprovidesacompensatorymeasureforensuringthatevenwithdeletionoftherequirementthatgrossspecificactivityremainlessthanorequalto100/E-barpCi/gram,offsitedoseswillremainwithinasmallfractionofthelimitsof10CFR100.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperations.NMP2RevisionAQ&

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.8-RCSSPECIFICACTIVITYTECHNICALCHANGES-LESRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1TheCTSTable4.4.5-1,Item5,requiresanisotopicanalysisofanoffgassample,includingquantitativemeasurementsforxenonandkrypton.TheoffgasisotopicanalysisforxenonandkryptonarenotdirectmeasurementsrelatedtothelimitsofITS3.4.8.Theseanalysesareusedtoroutinelymonitorandtrendcoolantactivityandareapplicabletoplantspecificcontrolsandadministrativelimitsonly.Therefore,thisSurveillanceisproposedtoberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TherequirementsofproposedSR3.4.8.1provideadequateassurancethatRCSspecificactivitywillbemaintainedwithinrequiredlimits.Asaresult,theadditionalanalysisrequirementsforxenonandkryptonarenotnecessaryforassuringRCSspecificactivityiswithinrequiredlimitsdonotneedtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheUSARatITSimplementation.ChangestoTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59."Specific"L.ITheCTSLCO3.4.5.brequirementtomaintainspecificactivityS100/E-barpCi/gmhasbeendeleted.ThecurrentBasesstatethattheintentoftherequirementtolimitthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantistoensurethatwholebodyandthyroiddosesatthesiteboundarywouldnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limits(i.e.,10%of25remand300rem,respectively)inthelimitingeventofamainsteamlinefailureoutsidecontainment.Toensurethatoffsitethyroiddosesdonotexceed30rem,reactorcoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131(DEI)islimitedtolessthanorequalto0.2pCi/gm.CurrentTechnicalSpecificationsalsolimitreactor'oolantgrossspecificactivitytolessthanorequalto100/E-barpCi/gmtoensurethatwholebodydosesdonotexceed2.5rem.CTS3.11.2.7(ITS3.7.4)associatedwithradioactiveeffluentsrequiresthatthegrossgammaradioactivityrateofthenoblegasesXe-133,Xe-135,Xe-138,Kr-85m,Kr-87,andKr-88measuredattheOffgasSystempretreatmentmonitorstationbelimitedtolessthanorequalto350mCi/second.ThecurrentBasesforCTS3.11.2.7statethatrestrictingthegrossradioactivityrateofnoblegasesfromthemaincondenserprovidesreasonableassurancethatthetotal-bodyexposuretoanindividualattheexclusionareaboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100lin>itsintheeventthiseffluentisinadvertentlydischargedwithouttreatmentdirectlytotheenvironment.TheOffgasSystem,asrequiredbyCTS3.11.2.7andITS3.7.4,providesreasonableassurancethereactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityismaintainedatNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.8-RCSSPECIFICACTIVITY'ECHNICALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.1(cont'd)-asufficientlylowleveltoprecludeoffsitedosesfromexceedinga.smallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsintheeventofamainsteamlinefailure.Therefore,CTS3.4.5.bisredundantandplacesanunnecessaryburdenonthelicenseewithoutacommensurateincreaseinthemarginofsafety.EliminationofCTS3.4.5.bwillallowplantpersonneltofocusattentiononefficient,safeoperationoftheplantwithouttheunnecessarydistractionoftheredundantSurveillanceRequirement.Additionalassurancethattheoffsitedoseswillnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsisprovidedbyincreasingthefrequencyofsamplingandanalysisofthereactorcoolantforDEIfromatleastonceper31daystoatleastonceper7days,(seecommentM.l).Since(1)thereactorcoolantlimitonDEIadequatelyassuresthatoffsitedoseswillnotexceedsmallfractionsofthe10CFR100limitsintheeventofamainsteamlinefailureoutsidecontainmentand(2)grossgammaradioactivityrateofthenoblegasesmeasuredattheOffgasSystempretreatmentmonitorstationislimitedbyITS3.7.4toavaluethatprovidesreasonableassurancethereactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityismaintainedatasufficientlylowleveltoprecludeoffsitedosesfromexceedingasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limits,therequirementsassociatedwithCTS3.4.5.bareunnecessary.TheassociatedACTIONSandSurveillanceRequirementsarealsobeingdeleted,consistentwiththeLCOrequirementdeletion.TheApplicabilityofCTS3.4.5(includingTable4.4.5-1measurement4)isOperatingConditions1,2,3,and4.InITS3.4.8,theApplicabilityisproposedtobelimitedtothoseconditionswhichrepresentapotentialforreleaseofsignificantquantitiesofradioactivecoolanttotheenvironment.MODE4isomittedsincethereactorisnotpressurizedandthepotentialforleakageissignificantlyreduced.InMODES2and3,with'hemainsteamlinesisolated,noescapepathexistsforsignificantreleasesandrequirementsforlimitingthespecificactivityarenotrequired.CTS3.4.5Actionsaandb(ITS3.4.8,ACTIONSAandB)arealsomodifiedtoreflectthenewApplicability,,andanoptionforexitingtheapplicableMODESisprovidedforcaseswhereisolationisnotdesired(ITS3.4.5RequiredActionsB.2.2.1andB.2.2.2).L.3Currently,MODEchangesareprecludedbyCTS3.0.4ifthelimitofCTS3.4.5.aisnotmet.ANoteisaddedtoCTS3.4.5Actiona(ITS3.4.8ACTIONA)toindicatethatLCO3.0.4isnotapplicableduringthefirst48hoursoffailuretonieettheLCOlimitprovidedthespecificactivityis~4.0pCi/gmDEI.EntryintotheapplicableMODESshouldnotberestrictedsincethemostlikelyresponsetotheconditionisrestorationofcompliancewithintheallowed48hours.Further,sincetheLCOlimitsassurethedoseduetoaMSLBwouldbeasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limits,operationduringtheallowedtin>eframewouldnotrepresentasignificantimpacttothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.NMP2RevisionA

Pccappy+~~~V3.4.9.1Two*shutdowncoolingmodeloopsoftheresidualheatremoval(RHR)systemshallbeOPERABLEand,unlessatleastonerecirculatmisinrationatleastoneshutdowncoolingmodeloopshallbeinoperation+*,onsiea.2.a.OneOPERABLERpump,and~0~to/b.OPERABLERstexchanger.eeeneEex:'e.:curnpermissivesea.d0~>yL./~r(s~~p,(T<>>p,a.WithlessthantheaboverequiredRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonsspossible.Within1hour~sffaaef,demonstratetheoperabilityofatleastonealternatemethodcapableofdecayheatremovalforeachinoperableRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloop.BeinstleastCOLDSHUTDOWNwithin24hours.~~~~~~id-C<(~/~b.WithnoRHR.shutdowncoolingmodelooinoperation,immediatelyinitiatecorrective~actiontoreturnatleastonelooptooperationassoonaspossible.Within1hour,establishreactorcoolantcirculationbyanalternatemethodandmonitorreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureatleastonceperhour."~<'>oSkS,q.Q.ire,'<<~A,~4.4.9.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolinmodeloopoftheresidualheatremovalsstemorshallbedeterminedtobeinoperationanatleastncaper12hours.A.z,l.CO~Ra&a.IOneRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopmaybeinoperableforsurveillancetestingaflThe.shutdowncoolingpumpmayberemovedfromoperationhourperiodfownrostaticandsmleaksetestinevef0ofmrae,iSHDOWNasrequiredbytACTION.maintainreactorcpracticbyuseofalternateheaemovalmethodupto2hoursforforupto2hoursper8-unng~o~ed4(QetoattainCOLanttemperatureaslowasNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-354AmendmentNe.Bee>Ith

~QWbo<LfaMs.Q~/fA)OneOPERABRHRpump,aneOPERABLEHRheatexchaer.a.b.:OPERATIONALCONDmON4.ECcPJi1~83.4.9.2Two*shutdowncoolingmodeloopsoftheresidualheatremovalIRHR)systemshallbeOPERABLEand.unlessatleastonerecirculatiom'ation,atlessoneshutdowncoolingmodeloopshallbeinoperation*+teaSQllQH:6p$AKYrc>A5f4t$4cYc&Ha.5K~bWithlessthantheaboverequiredRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopsOpERABLE,within1hourandatleastonceper24hoursthereafter,demonstratetheoperabilityofatleastonealternatemethodcapableofdecayheatremovalforeachinoperableRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloop.~~<ci'Ccu)ioa)'1WithnoRHRshutdowncoolingmodelooinoperation,within1hourestablishreactorcoolantcirculationbyanalternatemethodandmonitorreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureatleastonceperhour.SR$sI(bcl4.4.9.2AtleastoneshdowncoolinmodeIfthermcn:u44ow4A.<)removalsst41~cAc~$,iaethshallbedeterminedtobeinoperationnonceper12hours.0anatleastEA.xLcg~1'g~Wy4~fgaaIOneRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopmaybeinoperableforupto2hoursforsurveillancetestingcITheshutdowncoolingpumpmayberemovedfromoperationforupto2hoursevery8-hourperiod.2sutowncoingmakaetestinpmayremoveraionurinNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-36amendmentWo.6<4)@

I-cQh.R.(I*i<<li~I'~igA,i3.4.6.1Thereactorcoolantsystemtemperatureandpressureshallimitedinsecorancewithteiminesownonigure...1-1forhydrostaticorsystemleakagetesting.FigureI3.4.6.1-2forheatupbynon-nuclearmeans,Figure3.4.6.1-3forcooldownfollowinganuclearshutdownandlow-powerPHYSICSTESTS;andFigures3.4.6.1Aand3.4.6.1-5foroperationswithacriticalcoreotherthanlow-powerPHYSICSTESTS,with:a.Amaximumheatupof100oFineny1+ourperiod.~RS.H.ICICvAmaximumcooldownof100oFinany1~period,Amaximumtemperaturechangeoflessthanorequalto20oFinany1+ourperiodduringhydrostaticsndsystemleakagetesbngoperationsabavethahestvpsndIQ8cooldownIimltcurvessandThareactorvesselflangeandheadflangetemperaturegreaterthanorequalto70'Fwhenreactorvesselheadboltingstudsareundertension.:Atalltimes.AwC<OsbS~L,C.hQIIQHa4.hPrOPySe,8Cdy~lkO~SA'3Pc~kc4esWithanyoftheabovelimitsexceeded,restoretemperatureand/orpressuretowithinthelimitsmm;peormanengineenngevaluationtodeterminetheeffectsoftheout-of-limitconditiononthestructuralintegrityofthereactorcoolantsem;determinethatthereactorcoolantsystemremainsaccebleforco'operatibeinateaOWNwnours,aninLDSHUTDOWNwithinowing24hours.<<pal'.se~p~<,<<~~c+<">h.k.~upcL.~wacoZ;'ggAg4.4.6.1.1Duringsystemheatup,cooldown,andsystemleakageandhydrostatictestingoperations,thereactorcoolantsystemtemperatureandpressureshallbedeterminedtobewithintheaboverequiredheatupandcooldownlimitsoigures3.4.6.1-1,3.4.6.1-2,3.4.6.1-3.34.6.1%,and34.6.1-5asapplicable,atleastonceper30minutes.ilkNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-24AmendmentNo.fr(84(QOLqre(trit'Q

Fi'JI-Ie3,P,(lNINEMtEPOfNTUNIT2NOH-CRtTLCAL.HYDROTEST5400$200CS~1000mOg0ao800as8539a4600CO400312200NONCRITICALOPERATlONT%9vf%RATLRBRXlQOtTU?70I70100050100150200250300350DONNCOMERVtATERTENPERATVRQF3FIGURE3.4.6.1.1MINIMUMBELTLINEDOWNCOMERWATERTEMPERATUREFORPRESSURI2ATIONDURINGHYDROSTATICTESTINGANDSYSTEMLEAKAGETESTING(REACTORNOTCRITICAL)RU12.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/44-26AmendmentNa.kit84(@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.11-RCSPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE(P/T)LIMITSRELATEDSPECIFI.ATIONSNoneTEHNIALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1TheACTIONofCTS3.4.6.1doesnotspecifyaCompletionTimeforcompletionoftheengineeringevaluation.AspecificCompletionTimefortheengineeringevaluationanddeterminationintheCTS3.4.6.1ACTIONisprovidedinITS3.4.11RequiredActionsA.2andC.2.TheITS3.4.11RequiredActionA.2CompletionTimeof72hoursisconsideredreasonableforoperationinMODESI,2,and3becausetheP/Tlimitsarebasedonveryconservativeflawassumptionsandlargefactorsofsafety.InconditionsotherthanMODES1,2,and3,theITS3.4.11RequiredActionC.2CompletionTimeofpriortoenteringMODE2or3wouldprevententryintheoperatingMODESwhichisconsistentwiththecurrentLCO3.0.4.Thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.M.2TheCTS3.4.1.4ACTIONrequiredtobetakenwhenarecirculationpumpisstartedwithouthavingn>etthetemperaturerequirementshasbeenchanged.Currently,theCTS3.4.1.4ACTIONonlystatestosuspendthestartupofarecirculationloop.Thishowever,doesnotprovideanactioniftheloopisalreadyoperating.ITS3.4.11ACTIONSA,B,andCareaddedwhich,inthiscondition,wouldrequireanengineeringevaluationtobeperformedtoensurecontinuedoperationisacceptable.Thisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.TECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1NMP2ThespecificrequirementsinCTS4.4.6.1.1andCTS4.4.6.1.2thatoperationbetotherightofthelimitslinesofFigures3.4.6.1-1,3.4.6.1-2,3.4.6.1-3,3.4.6.1-4,and3.4.6.1-5areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.Inaddition,theallowanceinCTS4.4.6.1.2andFigures3.4.6.1-4and3.4.6.1-5thatwithreactorwaterlevelinthenormalpoweroperationrange,operationmaybeinthecross-hatchedregionofFigures3.4.6.1-4and3.4.6.1-5,andthestatementinFigures3.4.6.1-1,3.4.6.1-2,3.4.6.1-3,3.4.6.1-4,and3.4.6.1-5thattheFiguresareeffectiveupto12.8EFPYarealsoproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheP/Tlimitsaremet.TherequirementstomaintaintheP/TlimitsinaccordancewiththeFiguresarestill'aintainedinITS3.4.11,SR3.4.11.1,andSR3.4.11.2.Therefore,therelocatedrequirementsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbeRevisionPg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.4.11-RCSPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE(P/T)LIMITS.TECHNICALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.1(cont'd)controlledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2CTSTable4.4.6.1.3-1providesrequirementsforreactormaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimenlocation,leadfactor,andwithdrawaltime.Theserequirementsdescribethereactormaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimenprogramrequirementsestablishedby10CFR50AppendixH,andaretoberelocatedtotheUSAR.Con>pliancewith10CFR50AppendixHisrequiredbytheNMP2OperatingLicense.Asaresult,therelocatedrequirementsarenotnecessarytoensurethereactormaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimenprogramatNMP2ismaintainedanddonotneedtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.3LA.4Thedetailsrelatingtothebasist'ortheTHERMALPOWERandrecirculationflowlimitationsinCTS4.4.1.1.2footnote***(i.e.,finalvaluesweredeterminedduringStartupTestingbaseduponactualTHERMALPOWERandrecirculationloopflowwhichwillsweepthecoldwaterfromthevesselbottomheadpreventingstratification)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheSurveillanceRequirementisperformedwithintherequiredlimitationssincetheactuallimitsarestillbeingmaintainedintheproposedSurveillanceRequirements(SR3.4.11.5andSR3.4.11.6).Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsot'heproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.ThedetailsofCTS.3.4.1.4.b(anditsassociatedAction)andCTS4.4.1.4relatingtooperationallimits(maximumjetpumploopflow)duringareturntotworecirculationpumpoperationfromsinglerecirculationloopoperationareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.Thesingleloopflowrateisconsideredanoperationallimitsinceitisnotdirectlyrelatedtotheabilityofthesystemtoperforinitssafetyanalysisfunctions.Theflowrateislimitedonlytorestrictreactorvesselinternalsvibrationtowithinacceptablelimitsduringrestartofthesecondpump.TheserequirementsareorientedtowardmaintaininglongtermOPERABILITYoftherecirculationloopsanddonotnecessarilyhaveanimmediateimpactontheirOPERABILITY.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsofthe10CFR50.59."Specific"NoneNMP2RevisionA

Section3.5

ECCS-OperatingB3.5.1,BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.1.4TheperformancerequirementsoftheECCSpumpsaredeterminedthroughapplicationofthe10CFR50,AppendixK,criteria(Ref.8).ThisperiodicSurveillanceisperformed(inaccordancewiththeASMECode,SectionXI,requirementsfortheECCSpumps)toverifythattheECCSpumpswilldeveloptheflowratesrequiredbytherespectiveanalyses.TheECCSpumpflowratesensurethatadequatecorecoolingisprovidedtosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.10).ThepumpflowratesareverifiedagainstasystemheadthatisequivalenttotheRPVpressureexpectedduringaLOCA.Thetotaldevelopedheadisadequatetoovercomethe[gelevationheadpressurebetweenthepumpsuctionandthevesseldischarge,thepipingfrictionlosses,andRPVpressurepresentduringLOCAs.Thesevaluesmaybeestablishedduringpre-operationaltesting.A92dayFrequencyforthisSurveil.lanceisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramrequirements.SR3.5.1.5TheECCSsubsystemsarerequiredtoactuateautomaticallytoperformtheirdesignfunctions.ThisSurveillanceverifiesthat,witharequiredsysteminitiationsignal(actualorsimulated),theautomaticinitiationlogicofHPCS,LPCS,andLPCIwillcausethesystemsorsubsystemstooperateasdesigned,i.e.,actuationofthesystemthroughoutitsemergencyoperatingsequence,whichincludesautomaticpumpstartupandactuationofallautomaticvalves(includingtheLPCIflowdiversionvalvesclosedonaReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Level3oraDrywellPressure-High(BoundaryIsolation)signal)totheirrequiredpositions.ThisSurveillancealsoensuresthattheHPCSSystemwillautomaticallyrestart(i.e.,injectionvalvere-open)onanRPVlowwaterlevel(Level2)signalreceivedsubsequenttoanRPVhighwaterlevel(Level8)signalandthatthesuctionisautomaticallytransferredfromtheCSTtothesuppressionpool.TheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTperformedinLCO3.3.5.1overlapsthisSurveillancetoprovidecompletetestingoftheassumedsafetyfunction.continuedNMP2B3.5-11RevisionpQsR

ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.2.BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.2.1andSR3.5.2.2(continued)applicableMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalsuppressionpoolorCSTwaterlevelcondition.SR3.5.2.3SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.6andSR3.5.2.7TheBasesprovidedforSR3.5.1.1,SR3.5.1.4,SR3.5.1.5,andSR3.5.1e8areapplicabletoSR3.5.2.3,SR3.5.2.5,SR3.5.2.6,andSR3.5.2.7,respectively.SR3.5.2.4Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCS.flowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthat'arelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionsincethesevalveswereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesaninitiationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionintheproperstroketime.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperatedunderproceduralcontrolandtheprobabilityoftheirbeingmispositionedduringthistimeperiodislow.InMODES4and5,theRHRSystemmayberequiredtooperateintheshutdowncoolingmodetoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromthereactor.Therefore,thisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsoneLPCIsubsystemtobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheLPCImodeandnototherwiseinoperable.AlignmentandoperationfordecayheatremovalincludeswhentherequiredRHRpumpisnotoperatingorwhenthesystemisbeingrealignedfromortotheRHRshutdowncoolingmode.continuedNMP2B3.5-20RevisionP')

0 DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATINGADMINITRATIV(continued)A.5CTS4.5.1.b.1,2,and3requiretheECCSpumpstodevelopaspecifiedflowrateagainstatestlinepressuregreaterthanorequaltoaspecifiedgaugepressure(i.e,psig).ProposedSR3.5.1.4requirestheECCSpumpstodevelopthespecifiedflowratewithaspecifieddevelopedhead,inpsid.Totaldevelopedheadisabetterindicatorofpumpperformancethanspecifyingatestlinepressure,whichisessentiallypumpdischargepressure.Inaddition,thepumpdischargepressureisaffectedbysuppressionpoolwaterlevelandsuppressionchamberpressure,sincebothoftheseparametersaffectthesuctionpressure.Theoretically,amarginalpumpcanpasstheSurveillanceRequirementwhentheacceptancecriteriaisexpressedasapumpdischargepressureduetoeitherahighersuppressionpoolwaterlevelorahighersuppressionchamberpressure,eventhoughthepumpmaynotbeabletodeveloptherequiredheadtoinjecttherequiredflowintothereactorvesselattheassumedreactorvesselpressure.ASurveillanceRequirementwiththeacceptancecriteriaexpressedintermsof"totaldevelopedhead"willnotbeaffectedbyachangingsuppressionpoolwaterlevelorsuppressionchamberpressure,andisconsistentwiththeNMP2ASMESectionXIInserviceTestProgramacceptancecriteria.SincethedevelopedheadpressuresintheproposedSRareequivalenttothetestlinegaugepressureintheCTS,thischangeisonlyapresentationpreferenceandisconsideredadministrative.CTS4.5.1.e.2.b)footnote"'llowstheADSvalveactuationtesttobedeferreduntil12hoursafteradequatereactorsteampressureisavailable.Adequatepressuretoperformthetestalsoimpliesadequateflowmustbeavailabletoperformthetest.Assuch,thefootnotehasbeenmodified(proposedNotetoSR3.5.1.7)toallowdeferraluntiladequateflowisalsoavailable.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.7CTS4.3.3.3statestodemonstratetheresponsetimefor"each"requiredECCSSystem.TheresponsetimefortheADSSystemisnotassumedinanyaccidentanalysis,andtheirresponsetimeislistedas"N/A"(notapplicable)intheappropriateplantcontrolleddocument(USARTable7.3-18).Therefore,thisresponsetimetesthasbeendeleted(bynotreferencingtheADSSystemintheproposedresponsetimeSR),anditsdeletionisconsideredadministrative.RELATEDSPEIFICATINSNoneNMP2Revision+@@

~i DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATINGTEHNIALCHANES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1AnewrequirementtoverifytheADSnitrogenreceiverdischargeheaderpressureis)160psigandtoverifytheADSnitrogenreceivertanksis~334psighasbeenaddedasSR3.5.1.3.ThisSRisaddedtoensureadequatepneumaticpressureisavailableforADSoperation(i.e.,maintaintheADSvalveopen)for13.8hoursfollowingaLOCAanda5daysupplyofnitrogenisavailabletorechargetheADSaccumulators.Thisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.M.2CTS4.5.1.e.2.b)requireseachADSvalvetobemanuallyopenedevery18months.TheADSvalvehastwosolenoids,eachofwhichcanopentheADSvalve.Thus,thesamesolenoidvalvecanbeusedtoperformthisSRevery18months.ProposedSR3.5.1.7willnowrequirebothsolenoidstobeverifiedinthecourseof48months,asrepresentedbytheStaggeredTestBasisrequirementofthe24monthFrequency.ThiswillensureeachADSvalvesolenoidcanopentheADSvalve.Thisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.~TEHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRI.TIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailsofCTS3.5.1relatingtosystemOPERABILITY(inthiscasethattheECCSsubsystemsshallhaveflowpathscapableoftakingsuctionfromthesuppressionchamberandtransferringwatertothereactorvessel)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2ThedetailsofCTS4.5.1.a.1,4.5.1.c(includingfootnotef),4.5.1.d,and4.5.1.e.2.b)relatingtomethodsforperformingSurveillances(i.e.,ventingatthehighpointvent,verifyingactuationofthesystemthroughoutitsemergencyoperatingsequence,includingeachautomaticvalveactuatingtothecorrectposition,verifyingtheHPCSpumprestartsonlevel2,verifyingtheHPCSsuctionisautomaticallytransferredfromtheCSTtothesuppressionpoolonthepropersignals,andverifyingproperoperationoftheADSvalves)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheECCSsubsystems.TherequirementsofITS3.5.1,ECCS-Operating,andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsareadequatetoensuretheECCSsubsystemsaremaintainedOPERABLE.NlvIP2currentlyNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'ECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.2(cont'd)complieswithCTS4.5.l.cfootnote7byverifyingthattheHPCSpumpwillauto-restartonReactorVesselWaterLevel-LowLow,Level2afterbeingmanuallystoppedwithaLevel2signalsealedin.CompliancewiththewordingofthefootnotecanalsobesatisfiedbyverifyingtheHPCSpumpauto-restartsonaLevel2signalfromthestandbycondition,sinceinorderfortheHPCSpumptobeinthestandbycondition,itmusthavebeenmanuallystoppedattheconclusionofthepreviousSR(orthepreviousoperationofthepump).Therefore,CTS4.5.1.cfootnotefisinherentlyverifiedeverytimetheSRisperformedsincetheHPCSpumpisinstandbyatthestartoftheSR.Assuch,itisnotnecessarytospecificallyidentifythisrequirementintheBases.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.3ThedescriptioninCTS4.5.1.a.2footnote*ofwhat"correctposition"meansforanautomaticvalveisproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.Thisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheautomaticvalvesareintheirproperposition.TherequirementofproposedSR3.5.1.2areadequatetoensuretheautomaticvalvesareintheirproperpositionandtheECCSsubsystemsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Assuch,thisrelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.4CTS4.5.l.e.2.d)ande)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TheleaklimitsandassociatedtestingwillcontinuetoberequiredinorderfortheADStoperformitsrequiredsatetyfunctiontobeconsideredOPERABLE.ProposedSR3.5.1.3isadded(refertocomponentM.1)toaddresstheimportantcharacteristicofwhetherthereissufficientpneumaticpressureavailabletopermittheactuationoftheADSvalvesshouldanaccidentoccur.ThesurveillancebeingrelocatedwillcontinuetobeperformedandwillidentifydegradationoftheADSnitrogensystempressureretentioncapabilities.Inaddition,withtheleakageattheallowedleakratelimits,eachADSaccumulatorwillprovidesufficientnitrogenpressuretomaintaintherespectiveADSvalveopenforatleast13.8hoursandeachADSnitrogenreceivertankwillprovidesufficientnitrogenpressuretomaintaintherespectiveADSvalvesopenfor5days.Thisissufficienttimetomanuallyrechargetheaccumulator.Therefore,theserequireinentsarenotneededintheITStoensuretheADSismaintainedOPERABLE.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.Assuch,theserelocatedrequirementsarenotrequiredintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'ECHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)LD.1TheFrequenciesforperformingCTS4.5.1.c,4.5.1.d,4.5.1.e.2.a),4.5.1.e.2.b),and4.3.3.3(proposedSRs3.5.1.5,3.5.1.6,3.5.1.7,and3.5.1.8)havebeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.TheECCSsystemfunctionaltests,CTS4.5.1.c(proposedSR3.5.1.5)ensurethatasysteminitiationsignal(actualorsimulated)totheautomaticinitiationlogicofHPCS,LPCS,andLPCIwillcausethesubsystemstooperateasdesigned,includingactuationofthesystemthroughoutitsemergencyoperatingsequence,automaticpumpstartupandactuationofallautomaticvalvestotheirrequiredpositions.TheECCSresponsetest,CTS4.3.3.3(proposedSR3.5.1.8),ensuresthateachECCSinjection/spraysubsystemrespondsinamannerconsistentwiththevaluesassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheADSSystemfunctionaltest,CTS4.5.1.e.2.a)(proposedSR3.5.1.6),ensuresthemechanicalportionsoftheADSfunction(i.e.,solenoids)operateasdesignedwheninitiatedeitherbyanactualorsimulatedinitiationsignal.TheADSvalveactuatortest,CTS4.5.1.e.2.b)(proposedSR3.5.1.7),ensuresthevalveactuatorandsolenoidsoperateproperly.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedincurrentSpecification4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedincurrentSpecification4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.TheECCSnetworkhasbuilt-inredundancysothatnosinglefailurewillpreventthestartingoftheECCSsystem.EachoftheECCSinjection/spraysystemsaretestedeverythreemonthsaccordingtotheASMESectionXIinservicetestingprogram(proposedSR3.5.1.4)toensurethateachsubsystemcanprovidetheproperflowagainstaspecifiedtestpressure.ThistestwilldetectsignificantfailuresintheECCSsubsystemstoperformtheirsafetyfunction.Inaddition,SRs3.5.1.1,3.5.1.2,and3.5.1.3arealsoperformedevery31daystoensuretheECCSsubsystemsareavailabletoperformtheirrequiredfunctions.ExtendingthesurveillancerequirementontheADSfunctionaltestwillnothaveasignificantimpactonreliabilitybecauseADSisequippedwithtworedundanttripsystems.Additionally,theS/RVsassociatedwiththeADSareequippedwithremotemanualswitchessothattheentiresystemcanbeoperatedmanuallyaswellasautomatically.TheprimaryfunctionofADSistoserveasabackuptotheHPCSSystem.IfHPCSweretofail,ADSmustactivatetolowerreactorNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'ECHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVELD.1(cont'd)pressuresothatthelowpressureECCSspray/injectionsystemsmayoperate.Basedontheinherentsystemandcomponentreliabilityandthetestingperformedduringtheoperatingcycle,theimpact,ifany,fromthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Thereviewofhistoricalsurveillancedataalsodemonstratedthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatethisconclusion.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lThenumberofADSvalvesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinCTS3.5.l.aand3.5.1.bisproposedtobereducedfroniseventosix.CTS3.5.1Actionse.1ande.2,whichallowuptotwoofthesevenADSvalvestobeinoperableforaperiodoftimepriortorequiringashutdown,andCTS4.5.1.e.2.b),whichrequireseachADSvalvetobeopened,havealsobeenrevisedtoreflectthischange.ThischangeisbasedontheanalysissummarizedinChapter15CandinthereloadanalysisofAppendixAoftheUSAR.ThisanalysisdemonstratesadequatecorecoolingisprovidedduringasmallbreakLOCAandasimultaneousHPCSdieselgeneratorfailure(limitingLOCA)withtwoofthesevenADSvalvesout-of-service.ThischangereflectsthecreditprovidedthroughtheuseofNRCapprovedmethodsforcalculatingmorerealistic(yetconservative)peakcladdingtemperaturesduringaccidentsituations.Inaddition,thetwoADSvalvesoutofservicewasapprovedbytheNRCasdocumentedintheinitial"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheOperationofNMP2,"DocketNo.50-410,SupplementNo.4(NUREG-1047-SSER).L.2ThepressureatwhichADSisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,asspecifiedintheCTS3.5.1APPLICABILITYandACTIONSe.1ande.2,isincreasedfrom100psigINits3.5.1to150psigtoprovideconsistencyoftheOPERABILITYrequirementsforallECCSandRCICequipment.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentsatlowpressures(i.e.,between100psigand150psig)areboundedbyanalysesperformedathigherpressures.TheADSisrequiredtooperatetolowerthepressuresufficientlysothatthelowpressurecoolantinjection(LPCI)andlowpressurecorespray(LPCS)systemscanprovidemakeuptomitigatesuchaccidents.Sincethesesystemscanbegintoinjectwaterintothereactorpressurevesselatpressureswellabove150psig(225psid,steamdomepressuretodrywellpressure,andsteamdomepressure(225psigforLPCI;289psid,steamdomepressuretodrywellpressure,andsteamdomepressure(305psigforLPCS),thereisnosafetysignificanceintheADSnotbeingOPERABLEbetween100psigand150psig.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUS'SIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING~TECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE(continued)L.3TheCTS3.5.1ActionfrequirementtosubmitaSpecialReportforECCSactuationandinjectionisadequatelyaddressedby10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).ThisCFRsectionrequiresanLERtobesubmittedforanyeventorconditionthatresultedinmanualorautomaticECCS"actuation."Therefore,thisLERwillcoverany"actuationandinjection"asstipulatedbytheSpecialReport.ThisLERisrequiredtobesubn>ittedwithin30dayswhichalsomeetstheSpecialReportrequirementof90days.ThenecessaryactuationcycleinformationforNMP2willbecontrolledbyplantprocedures.Regulationsprovidesufficientcontroloftheseprovisions.fortheirremovalfromTechnicalSpecifications.L.4TwonewACTIONSareheingaddedtoITS3.5.1:(1)fortheconditionofoneADSvalveinoperablecoincidentwithonelowpressureECCSinjection/spraysystem(proposedACTIONF),and(2)fortheconditionofHPCSinoperablecoincidentwithonelowpressurecoolantinjectionsubsystem(coveredbyproposedACTIONC).'hecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsrequireentryintoLCO3.0.3fortheseconditions,iinplyingthattheplantisoutsidedesignbasis.Theanalysessumn>arizedinUSARSection6.3.3andAppendix15CdemonstratethatadequatecorecoolingisprovidedbytheOPERABLEHPCSorADSSystemandtheremainingOPERABLElowpressureinjection/spraysystems.Howeverinbothconditionstheredundancyhasbeenreducedsuchthatanothersinglefailuremaynotinaintaintheabilitytoprovideadequatecorecooling.ProposedACTIONSCandFrequirearestrictiveCompletionTimeof72hourssincebothahighpressure(ADSorHPCS)andalowpressuresubsystemareinoperable.ThisCompletionTimeisbasedonareliabilitystudy(MemorandumfromR.L.Baer(NRC)toV.Stello,Jr.(NRC),"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975)andhasbeenfoundtobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.L.5TheADSaccumulatorbackupcompressedgassystempressurealarminstrumentationChannelFunctionalTestandChannelCalibrationrequirementsinCTS4.5.1.e.Iand4.5.1.e.2.c)donotnecessarilyrelatedirectlytoADSOPERABILITY.TheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1,doesnotspecifyalarm-onlyequipmenttobeOPERABLEtosupportOPERABILITYotasystemorcoinponent.Controloftheavailabilityof,andnecessarycompensatoryactivitiesifnotavailable,foralarmsareaddressedbyplantoperationalproceduresandpolicies.ThisinstrumentationprovidesanalarmwhentheADSnitrogenreceiverdischargeheaderpressureislow.FailureofthealarmdoesnotresultintheADSbeingincapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.TherequirementtomaintaintheADSnitrogenreceiverdischargeheaderpressures)160psigandtheADSnitrogenreceivertanks)334psig(proposedSR3.5.1.3)willensuresufficientnitrogenpressureisNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'EHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.5(cont'd)availabletooperatetheADSvalves.Inaddition,10CFR50,AppendixB,PartXIIrequiresthatmeasuringdevicesusedinactivitiesaffectingqualityareproperlycontrolled,calibrated,andadjustedtomaintainaccuracywithinnecessarylimits.TheNMP2OperatingLicenserequirescompliancewith10CFR50,thusifthisinstrunientationisusedtocomplywithSR3.5.1.3,itwouldberequiredtomeetthe10CFR50,AppendixB,PartXIIrequirements.Therefore,thisinstruinentation,alongwiththesupportingSurveillances,areproposedtobedeleted.L.6Thephrase"actualor,"inreferencetotheautomaticinitiationsignal,hasbeenaddedtoCTS4.5.l.c(proposedSR3.5.1.5)and4.5.1.e.2.a(proposedSR3.5.1.6),theSurveillanceRequirementsthatverifyeachECCSsubsystemandADSactuatesona"siinulated"automaticinitiationsignal.Thisallowssatisfactory"actual"autoinaticsysteminitiationstobeusedtofulfilltheSurveillanceRequirements.OPERABILITYisadequatelydemonstratedineithercasesincetheECCSsubsystemandADSthemselvescannotdiscriminatebetween"actual"or"simulated"signals.',(L.7CTS4.5.l.e.2.b)requireseachADSvalvetobemanuallyopenedatpower.Specifically,anADSvalvediskisphysicallyliftedbyenergizationofaactuatorsolenoid,whichadmitsnitrogengastoapneumaticactuatorcylinder.Duringthistest,reactorvesselsteamispassedthroughthevalvebodytothesuppressionpool.ProposedSR3.5.1.7anditsBases'willpermittestingoftheADSvalvesusinganalternateapproach,describedbelow,wherebythediskisnotliftedoffitsseatatpower.EachADSactuatorcanbetestedusingeithermethod(thecurrentmethodorthisalternatemethod).CTS4.4.2andCTS4.0.5(proposedSR3.4.4.1andSpecification5.5.6,respectively)requireasamplepopulationoftheS/RVstoberemovedandbenchtestedforsafety-modeliftsetpointduringeachrefuelingoutagetosatisfyASMECode,SectionXItestingrequirements.Duringthisbenchtesting,theS/RVsarealsostrokedusingtherelief-modeactuator.Thesafety-modeandtherelief-modebenchtestingofthesamplepopulationdemonstratesthateachinstalledS/RVwillfunctionproperlyinthesafety-modeandintherelief-mode,andthattheactuatorofthecurrentlyinstalledS/RVswouldsuccessfullyfunction.AftereachADSvalveisreinstalledfollowingabenchtestandafterallcontrolsystemsarereconnected,proposedSR3.5.1.7requireseachADSvalveactuatortobeuncoupledt'romitsvalvestem,manuallyactuated,andthenre-coupledtothevalvestem.ThisproposedalternateapproachverifiesthattheADScontrolshavebeenproperlyinstalledpriortoplantstartup,withoutphysicallyliftingthediskoffitsseat.Inaddition,theremainingADSvalvesthathavenotbeenremovedforSectionXItestingduringarefuelingoutagewillbetestedinasimilarmanner.NMP2RevisionA

~y/

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING"TECHNICALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.7(cont'd)EachMainSteamSystemS/RVatNMP2isaDikkers8X10,direct-acting,spring-loaded,safetyvalvewithattachedpneumaticactuatorforrelief-modeoperation.Thevalveisdirectacting;thesingle,safetyvalvestemthatpenetratesthevalvebonnetandattachestothereliefcomponentsattachesdirectlytothevalvedisk.TheS/RVbonnetisdirectlymountedtothetopoftheS/RVbody,withmountingfacilitiesforthefunctionalpartsofthereliefcomponents.NMP2hasatotalof18S/RVsinstalledonthefourmainsteamlines.AllS/RVsareofthesamedesignwith18S/RVsperforminganoverpressureprotectionfunctionandsevenS/RVsperformingadepressurizationfunction(i.e.ADSfunction).Thesetwofunctionsaredescribedingreaterdetailbelow:Theoverpressureprotectionfunctionservestoprotectthenuclearsystemfromapressurizationtransientthatcouldleadtothefailureofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary.TheADSfunctionservestoprotecttheintegrityofthefuelcladdingforsmallandintermediatebreaksinthenuclearsystembyenablingtheoperationottheLPCIandLPCSSystemsfollowingmaloperationoftheHPCSSystem.Theoverpressureprotectionfunctionisprovidedbythe18S/RVsinthesafetymodeorreliefmodeofoperation.TheoverpressureprotectionanalysistakescreditonlyforthesafetymodeofoperationoftheS/RVs.TheADSfunctionofthesevenS/RVsisprovidedinthereliefmodeofoperation.Thesetwomodesofoperationarediscussedingreaterdetailbelow:Thesafetymodeofoperationconsistsofdirectactionofthereactorvesselstean>pressureagainstasingle,spring-loadeddisk.Thisdiskwillliftoffitsseatwhenthereactorvesselpressureexceedsthesumofspringandfrictionalforces,therebyallowingvesselsteamtoflowdirectlythroughtheseat-to-diskopeningtothedischargepipingandsuppressionpool.ThesafetyfunctionsetpressureofeachS/RVis.determinedbychangingthecompressedspringforce.Thereliefmodeofoperationisaccomplishedwhenanautomaticormanualcontrolcircuitsignalprovideselectricpowertotheactuatorsolenoids.Theactuatorsolenoidsreposition,admittingnitrogen,tothepneumaticactuatorcylinder.Thepneumaticactuatorpistonstrokesvertically,raisinganattachedlever,whichcontactsasetofrollerbearingscoupledtotheS/RVstem.TheS/RVstem,whichisdirectlyattachedtothedisk,strokesverticallyandliftsthediskoffoftheseat.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'ECHNIALHANGES-LESRESTRICTIVEL.7(cont'd)Therelief-modeofoperationcanactuateeachS/RVregardlessofreactorvesselpressure.Thepneumaticoperatorandlinkagearedesignedsothatanialfunctionofthislinkagewillnotinhibitthesafety-modeofoperation.EachS/RVhasthreeactuatorsolenoidstoenabletherelief-modeofoperation.Oneactuatorsolenoidoneachofthe18S/RVsisenergizedtoprovidetheoverpressureprotectionfunctioninthereliefmode.EitherofthetwootheractuatorsolenoidsareenergizedonsevenS/RVstoprovidetheADSrelieffunction.Therefore,thesevenS/RVsthatareADSdedicatedhaveeachoftheirthreesolenoidsconnectedtoplantpowersuppliessincethesesevenS/RVsprovideadualfunction(i.e.,overpressureprotectionandADS).Theremaining11non-ADSS/RVseachhaveonlyoneoftheirthreesolenoidsconnectedtoplantpowersuppliessincethese11S/RVsprovideonlyanoverpressureprotectionfunctioninthereliefmode.WhenasamplepopulationoftheS/RVsareremovedandbenchtestedeachrefuelingoutagetosatisfyASMECodeSectionXItestingrequirements,thesamplemayormaynotincludeanS/RV,whichalsofunctionsasanADSvalve.Thispracticeisacceptableforthefollowingreasons:AllS/RVsareidenticalindesign.AnS/RVwhichperformsanADSfunctionlosesitsADSfunctionaldesignationwhenitisremovedfromtheplantforbenchtesting.~WhenanS/RVisren>ovedtromtheplantandbenchtesteditisoperatedin.thereliefinode.Specifically,theactuatorand'thevalvediskareoperatedbyenergizationofeachofthreesolenoids,oneatatime.Therefore,thecompletetestingofallthreesolenoidsonabenchtestedS/RV,includingoperationoftheactuatorwiththeliftingofthevalvedisk,andtheidenticaldesignofthe18S/RVseliminatestheneedtorequiretheremovalofanADSvalveaspartofthesainplepopulationforbenchtestingduringarefuelingoutage.Accordingly,benchtestingofanS/RValsoteststheS/RVscapabilitytofunctionasanADSvalve.InpastrefuelingoutagesatNMP2,aportionofthe18S/RVsinstalledonthemainsteamlineswereremovedandbenchtestedforsafetysetpressureperSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode.Alsoincluded.wasrelief-modetestingwhichverifiedthecapabilityofeachofthethreesolenoidstoenabletherelief-n>odefunction.EachoftheremovedS/RVswasreplacedwithrecertifiedS/RVsthathadbeenverifiedtohaveseat-to-diskleakagebelowNMP2IORevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.l-ECCS-OPERATINGTECHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.7(cont'd)apre-establishedlimit.Afterthisreplacement,eachADSvalvewasstrokedatpowertosatisfyCTS4.5.l.e.2.b).ThisSurveillancerequiresphysicallyliftingthediskoffthevalveseatandpassingreactorvesselsteamthroughthevalvebody.FollowingthisSurveillance,NMPCoccasionallyexperiencedweepingvalvesfromwhatwasoriginallyavirtuallyleak-freepopulationofvalves.ThisweepingwasverifiedbytrendingS/RVtailpipetemperatures.EachweepingS/RVdirectsreactorvesselsteamflowthroughtheS/RVtailpipe,whichpassesthroughthesuppressionpoolchamberairspaceandintothesuppressionpoolwaterviaasubmergedT-quencher.DuringthisweepingprocesstheheatedtailpipetransfersheattothesuppressionchamberairspaceInaddition,theweepingprocesstransfersheattothesuppressionpoolwaterbycondensationofthesteamandmixingwiththesuppressionpoolcontents.Asaconsequence,oneoftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)subsystemsmustbeperiodicallyre-alignedfroinitsLPCImodeofoperationtoprovidecoolingofthesuppressionpoolwaterandairspace.ThisoperationoftheRHRSystemgeneratesadditionalwearandcyclingofsysteincomponents,andtherealignmentplacesthesysteininaconfigurationthatdiffersfromitsintendednormalaccidentresponseinodeofoperationwhichistheLPCImodeofoperation.Accordingly,theloopotRHRthatisrealignedisdeclaredinoperablewhenitiscoolingthesuppressionpoolwaterandairspace.Thetransferofheattothesuppressionpoolwaterandairspaceisalsoasourceofthermalheatlossfromthepowergenerationstean>cycle.Thelossofthermalheatresultsinareductionoftheelectricalgeneratingcapacityoftheunit.ThereactorvesselsteamthatleaksthrougheachS/RVprovidesanadditionalsourceofradioactivenuclides,whichbecomesapotentialsourceforpersonnelcontamination.Thiscontaininationisundesirableduringplantoutagesrequiringentryintothepriinarycontainment.OperationofanADSvalvewithreactorsteamchallengesanS/RVtocloseafterbeingopenedforSurveillancetesting.Accordingly,thecurrenttestinginofitselfcreatesthepotentialforastuck-openS/RVduringreactoroperation.TheproposedchangeperniitsalternatetestingwhicheliminatestheadversepotentialconsequencesassociatedwithoperationoftheADSvalvesatessentiallyratedplantconditions.Specifically,thischangeeliminatesachallengetoS/RVstocloseafterbeingopenedforSurveillancetesting.Accordingly,thisproposedchangereducesthelikelihoodofastuck-openS/RVduringreactoroperationandtherebyreducestheprobabilityofaLOCA.Thischangehastheaddedbenetitofreducingoccupationalradiationexposureintheprimarycontainmentbyeliminatingthedischargeofsteamtothesuppression.poolfromweepingS/RVs.AlsothischangewillreducewearonECCSNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING'ECHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRI.TIVEL.7(cont'd)equipmentwhichmustbeoperatedatperiodicintervalstomaintainacceptabletemperaturesforthesuppressionpoolwaterandairspaceinresponsetoweepingS/RVs.Finally,thischangereducesthenumberoftimestheRHRSystemmustberealignedfron>theLPCImodeofoperationtothesuppressionpoolcoolingmodeofoperationandtherebyimprovestheoperationalreadinessoftheRHRSystemtoperformitsautomaticfunctioninresponsetoaLOCA.ProposedSR3.5.1.7isrevisedtopermittestingoftheADSvalvesusinganalternateapproachwherebythediskisnotliftedoffitsseatatpower.Specifically,thisalternateapproachentailsmovingthestem-mountedrollerbearingassemblythatcouplesthevalvestemtothereliefmodeactuatorupwardandawayfromtheactuatorarintoallowanuncoupledactuationofthereliefmodeactuator(i.e.,thediskwouldthennotbecoupledtothereliefmodeactuatorandnotmovewhentheactuatorisoperated).Aspreviouslydiscussedthisreliefmodeactuatoristhes<<n>eactuatorthatfunctionstoenabletheS/RVtoperformitsADSfunction.Theactuatorwouldberemotelyoperatedfromthecontrolroon>byenergizationofoneofthetwoADSdedicatedsolenoids,andvisualverificatiowouldbeperformedforproperactuatorresponseandrangeofmotion.Afterproperactuatoroperationhasbeenverified,thestem-mountedrollerbearingasseniblywouldbereturnedtoitsoperatingstemlocation.Themanualmovementofthestem-niountedrollerbearingassemblywouldbeperformedunderaplantcontrolledprocedure.Thisprocedurerequiresindependentcheckingtoensurethatthestemmountedbearingassemblyhasbeenreturnedtoitsproperoperatingstemlocation.Accordingly,thestemmountedrollerbearingassemblywillbeproperlyrepositionedafteruncoupledactuationofthereliefniodeactuator.Duringremoval<<ndreinstallationprocessofanADSvalve,foreignmaterialsexclusioncontrolsareprocedurallyenforced.ThesecontrolsrequiretheplacementofaflangeprotectorwhichpreventstheintroductionofforeignmaterialintothedischargepipingofanADSvalveduringtheremovalandreinstallationprocess.Theinstallationandremovaloftheflangeprotectorwillbeindependentlychecked.Accordingly,foreignmaterialswillbepreventedfromenteringtheS/RVdischargepipingdiiringthetimeframethatanADSvalveisbeingremovedandreplaced.Basedontheaboveevaluation,NMPCconcludesthattheproposedrevisedtestingoftheADSvalves,whichden>onstratestheirdepressurizationfunctionwithouttheneedforactuallystrokingthevalvedisksoffthevalveseatswhiletheplantisatpower,is<<cceptable.ThisproposedchangetotheITSissimilarNMP212RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATING~TEHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.7(cont'd)toLicenseAmendmentNumber130,datedNovember18,1996,whichwasrequestedbyGrandGulfinitsletterdatedMay9,1996.L.8ANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.3.3.3(proposedSR3.5.1.8)thatexemptstheECCSinstrumentationassociatedwitheachECCSinjection/spraysubsystemfromresponsetimetestingandallowsthedesigninstrumentationresponsetimetobeusedinthedeterininationoftheECCSRESPONSETIME.DeletionoftheresponsetimetestforthisinstrumentationwasevaluatedinNEDO-32291"SystemAnalysisforEliininationofSelectedResponseTimeTestingRequirements,"January1994,andwasdeterminedtobeacceptableprovidedtheindividuallicenseereferencingthisNEDOinaplantspecificlicenseamendmentrequestmetseveralconditionsstipulatedinthegenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291.TheevaluationprovidedbelowisconsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedintheStaft"sgenericSERforNEDO-32291.NMPChasperformedareviewofNEDO-32291anddeterminedthattheNEDOgenericanalysisisapplicabletoNMP2.TheequipmentaffectedbytheproposedchangeintheTechnicalSpecificationsistheECCSinstrumentationassociatedwitheachECCSinjection/spraysubsystem.Priortoinstallationofanewtransmitter/switchorfollowingrefurbishmentofatransmitter/switchahydraulicresponsetimetestwillbeperformedtodetermineaninitialsensorspecificresponsetimevalue.ApplicableNMP2procedureshavebeenrevised/written,asappropriate,tofulfillthisrecommendation.NMP2currentlydoesnotutilizeanytransmittersorswitchesthatusecapillarytubesinanyapplicationthatrequiresresponsetimetesting.Therefore,therecommendationthatcapillarytubetestingbeperformedafterinitialinstallationandafteranymaintenanceormoditicationactivitythatcoulddamagethelinesfortransmittersandswitchesthatusecapillarytubesisnotapplicabletoNMP2.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toincludestepstoinputafastrainporastepchangetosystemcomponentsduringcalibrations.Applicablecalibrationprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toassurethattechniciansmonitorforresponsetimedegradation.Inaddition,technicianshavereceivedappropriatetrainingtomakethemawareoftheconsequencesofinstrumentresponsetimedegradation.Surveillancetestprocedureshavebeenrevised,asappropriate,toensurecalibrationsandfunctionaltestsarebeingperformedinamannerthatallowssimultaneousmonitoringofboththeinputandoutputresponseofunitsundertest.NMP2'scompliancewiththeguidelinesofSupplement1toNRCBulletin90-01,"LossofFill-OilinTransmittersManufacturedbyRosemount,"wasreviewedanddocumenteditiasafetyevaluationtransmittedtoNMPCbyNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1995.TheNRC'sevaluationconcludedthatNMP2'sresponsestoBulletin90-01andSupplement1conformtotherequestedactionsoftheBulletin.TheeliminationofresponsetimetestingdoesnotaffectNMPC'sNMP213RevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.5.1-ECCS-OPERATINGTEHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.8(cont'd)responsetotheBulletin.TheECCScomponentsforwhichresponsetimetestingisproposedtobeeliminatedhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableinNEDO-32291.NMPChasreviewedthevendorrecommendationsforthesecomponentsandcont>rmedthattheydonotcontainperiodicresponsetimetestingrequirements.TheapplicationoftheproposedNotewillallowNMPCtousedesignresponsetimedatafortheinstrumentationassociatedwitheachECCSinjection/spraysubsysteminthedeterminationofECCSresponsetime,andeliminatetherequirementforaseparatemeasurementoftheinstrumentationresponsetime.OtherTechnicalSpecificationtestingrequirementssuchasCHANNELCALIBRATION,CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST,CHANNELCHECK,ANDLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinconjunctionwithactionstakeninresponsetoNRCBulletin90-01aresufficienttoidentifyfailuremodesordegradationsininstruinentresponsetimesandassureoperationoftheanalyzedinstrumentloopswithinacceptablelimits.TheeliminationoftheresponsetimetestingoftheECCSinstrumentationassociatedwitheachECCSinjection/spraysubsystemwillreducethepotentialforinadvertentactuationoftheECCS.Accordingly,thischangewillreducethelikelihoodofaplanttransientduetoaninadvertentactuationoftheECCS.TheECCSresponsetin>esrequirementsrangefrom20to27secondsand,therefore,actualinstrumentresponsetimewhichisofamuchshorterdurationisnotimportanttomeetingthesetimes.ECCSinstrumentationcomponentsthatmayexperienceresponsetin>edegradationwillcontinuetorespondinthemicrosecond-to-millisecondrangepriortocompletefailure.Accordingly,theresponsetiinedegradationwouldhavenosignificantadverseeffectonsystemactuationandtheinstrumentationwouldcontinuetomeetoverallsystemrequirements.ForeachECCSinjection/spraysubsystem,onlytheinstrumentationiseliminatedfromtheresponsetimetesting.TheoverallECCSsystemresponsetimerequirementforeachECCSinjection/spraysubsystem,whichincludesdieselgenerator,injectionvalves,pumpsandothercomponents,stillapplies.ThedieselgeneratorandinjectionvalveTSresponsetimerequirementsarenoteliminated.Accordingly,basedontheaboveevaluation,whichisconsistentwiththeguidelinesoftheStaff'sgenericSERapprovingNEDO-32291,theproposedeliminationofECCSinstruinentationresponsetimetestingassociatedwitheachECCSinjection/spraysubsysteinisacceptable.TheabovechangeissimilartothatapprovedbytheNRCinLicenseAmendii>entNo.184forBrunswickUnitsI&2.NMP214RevisionA

gu4$05~gk~e~<cd:ei"~.~CSS'Or<iECCS-OperatingB3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREOUIREMBITS(continued)lboN4Qf?49l4dsqensfCd.Ofay~fonJKds,"fhaacr~rdnsr~kP5up+'oge~Wd'C,isfOs.Qsdk/hfCQviCorg~~d$0SCsnVtp(g~dsffffO~enfalaile'Qe+f'eckf,P~~~CCVM+dfllPJ.sAroevTheperforaancerequireaentsoftheECCSpuapsaredeterminedthroughapplicat1onofthe10CFR50,AppendixK,criteria(Ref.8).ThisperiodicSurveillance1sperformed(inaccordancewiththeASNECode,SectionXI,requireeentsfortheECCSpueps)toverifythattheECCSpuepswilldeveloptheflowratesrequired'bytherespectiveanalyses.TheECCSpuapflowratesensurethatadequatecorecool1ngisprovidedtosatisfytheacceptancecr1teriaofIOCFR50.46(Ref.10).ThepuapflowratesareverifiedagainstasysteaheadthatisequivalenttotheRPVpressurecteddur1ngaLOCA.Thetotalisadequatetoove~theeevat1onheadpressurebetweenthepuapsuct1onandthevesseldischarge,thepipingfrict1onlosses,andRPVpressurepresentduringLOCAs.Thesevalues~beestablishedduringpre-operationaltesting.A92dayFrequencyforthisSurveillance1sinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingPrograarequireeents.'E'~~4(5dto,d'erificationevery31daysthatADSreceiverpressureisps1gassuresadequatepressureforrel1ableADSoperaon.TheaccaulatoroneachADSvalveprov1despressureforvalveactuation.Thedesignedsupplypressurerequireeentsfortheaccuaulator~'<~aresuchthat,followingafailureofthe1totheaccilatoratleastvaveacuocanrryweaofdesgnpressure(Ref..TheECCSsafetyanalysisassmesonlyoneactuationtoacevettNdepressurizationrequiredforoperationofthelowressureECCS.Thisainiaa.requiressureofps1gADSI31dayrequensintoconsideratonadainstrative,'+9e~controloveroperat1onofthensandalarmsforlowpressure.Ivfflgege<g~CosA-'cei~rtA4TheECCSsubsysteesarerequiredtoactuateautoaaticallytoperfusetheirdesignfunctions.ThfsSurue<llnnce~~(continued)BN/6STSB3.5-10RevI,04/07/95

ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.2ACTIONSp~u.'>page(continued)The4hourC~letionTimtorestoreatleastoneECCSinjection/spraysubsystoatoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapac1tyortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinaconditionthat'ainiaizesanypotentialfissionproductreleasetotheenviroment.QlRVEILLAHCEREgUIRENEHTSJ95j>4:~pc'k&of/$5FOTheainiaawaterlevelof.requiredforthesuppressionpoolisperiodicayver1fiedtoensurethatthesuppressionpoolwillprov1deadequatenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)fortheECCSpumps,recirculationvolte,andvortexprevention.itiththesuppressionpool~aterlevellessthantherequiredliait,allECCSi+ection/spraysubsysteasare1noperableunlesstheyarealignedtoanOPERABLEe.ltheneuppressionlevelis.,theHPCSSysteaisnsideredRABLEonly1akesuctionroegQandgQwaterlevelissufficient4o.providetherequiredNPSHfortheHPCSpmp.Therefore,averiionthateitherthesuppressionpoolwate~levelis.6ortheHPCSSysteaisa1edtoakesucionftheCQcontainshonsowaer,equivaentpffft,ensuresaeSSysteacansupplyMkupwatertothe'RPV.XAs~tSgThe12hourFrequencyoftheseSRswasdevelopedconsideringoperatingexperiencerelatedtosuppressionpoolandCSTwaterlevelvariationsandinstrumentdriftduringtheapplicableHOOES.Furtheraore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicat1ons1nthecontrolrooa,includingalaras,toalerttheoperatortoanabnoraalsuppressionpoolorCSTwaterlevelcond1tion.g~g3g,$,7S3~00ThBasesrovidedforSR3.5.1.1,SR3.5.l.l,(ggOR3...areapplicabletoSR3.5.2.3,SR3.5.2.5,~SR3.5.2.6,respectively.A~5'(3.5,2..(continued)BN/6STS83.5-17Rev1,Ol/07/95

Volume6Section3.6;ITS,Bases,andCTSNarkup/DOCs

PCIVs3.6.1.3,ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB------NOTE---------OnlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswithtwoormorePCIVs.OneormorepenetrationflowpathswithtwoormorePCIVsinoperableexceptduetoleakagenotwithinlimit.B.1Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.1hourC------NOTE--------OnlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswithonlyonePCIV.OneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonePCIVinoperableexceptduetoleakagenotwithinlimit.C.1ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.4hoursexceptforexcessflowcheckvalves(EFCVs)andpenetrationswithaclosedsystemAND72hoursforEFCVsandpenetrationswithaclosedsystem(continued)NMP23.6-11Revision~QB

PCIVs3.6.1.3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCONPLETIONTINEC.(continued)C.2----NOTES----1.Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.2.Isolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31days(continued)NHP23.6-12RevisionA O(j PCIVs3.6.1.3.ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerate,MSIVleakagerate,orhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageratenotwithinlimit.0.1Restoreleakageratetowithinlimit.4hoursforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystemAND4hoursforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakageAND8hoursforMSIVleakageAND72hoursforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystemE.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithoneormorecontainmentpurgeexhaustvalvesnotwithinpurgevalveleakagelimits.E.1Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.24hoursAND(continued)NMP23.6-13Revision+'g

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PCIVs3.6.1.3Table3.6.1.3-1(page2of2)SecondaryContainmentBypass,LeakagePathsLeakageRateLimitsVALVENUMBERPERVALVELEAKRATE(SCFH)2CPS*SOV1192CPS*SOV1202CPS*SOV1212CPS*SOV1220.6252IAS*SOV1642IAS*V4482IAS*SOV1652IAS*V4492GSN*SOV1662GSN*V1702IAS*SOV1662IAS*SOV1842IAS*SOV1672IAS*SOV1852IAS*SOV1682IAS*SOV1802CPS*SOV1322CPS*V502CPS*SOV1332CPS*V510.93750.9375(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)(Qa(a)Thecombinedleakrateforthesepenetrationsshallbe<3.6SCFH.Theassignedleakageratethroughapenetrationshallbethatofthevalvewiththehighestleakagerateinthatpenetration.However,ifapenetrationisisolatedbyoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange,theleakagethroughthepenetrationshallbetheactualpathwayleakage.NMP23.6-21Revision~Qg

SuppressionChamber-to-DrywellVacuumBreakers3.6.1.7.3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1.7SuppressionChamber-to-DrywellVacuumBreakersLCO3.6.1.7Eachsuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onelinewithoneormoresuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakersinoperableforopening.A.1Restorethevacuumbreaker(s)toOPERABLEstatus.72hours------NOTE------BSeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachsuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerline.B.lClosetheopenvacuumbreaker.72hoursOneormorelineswithonesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakernotclosed.(continued)NMP23.6-26'evisionP'QQ

PrimaryContainmentHydrogenRecombiners3.6.3.13.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~~3.6.3.1PrimaryContainmentHydrogenRecombinersLCO3.6.3.1TwoprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinersshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinerinoperable.A.1----NOTE-----LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.,RestoreprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysB.Twoprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinersinoperable.B.1Verifybyadministrativemeansthatthehydrogenandoxygencontrolfunctionismaintained.1hourANDOnceper12hoursthereafterANDB.2RestoreoneprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.7days(continued)NMP23.6-37RevisionA

SecondaryContainment3.6.4.1.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.4.1.3Verifyonesecondarycontainmentaccessdoorineachaccessopeningisclosed.31daysSR3.6.4.1.4Verifythesecondarycontainmentcanbedrawndownto~0.25inchofvacuumwatergaugein<66.7secondsusingonestandbygastreatment(SGT)subsystem.24monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISforeachSGTsubsystemSR3.6.4.1.5Verifythesecondarycontainmentcanbemaintained>0.25inchofvacuumwatergaugefor1hourusingoneSGTsubsystemataflowrate<2670cfm.24monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISforeachSGTsubsystemNHP23.6-42RevisionP'g

PrimaryContainmentB3.6.1.1B3.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHSB3.6.1.1PrimaryContainmentBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheprimarycontainmentistoisolateandcontainfissionproductsreleasedfromtheReactorPrimarySystemfollowingadesignbasisLossofCoolantAccident(g(LOCA)andtoconfinethepostulatedreleaseofradioactivematerialtowithinlimits.Theprimarycontainmentconsistsofasteellined,reinforcedconcretevessel,whichsurroundstheReactorPrimarySystemandprovidesanessentiallyleaktightbarrieragainstanuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironment.Additionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentintheprimarycontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsintheprimarycontainmentboundaryareapartoftheprimarycontainmentleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarrier:a~Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:b.C.d.1.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.closedbymanualvalves,blindflanges,orde-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedpositions,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.1.3,"PrimaryContainmentIsolationValves(PCIVs)";PrimarycontainmentairlocksareOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.1.2,"PrimaryContainmentAirLocks";Allequipmenthatchesareclosedandsealed;andThesealingmechanismassociatedwitheachprimarycontainmentpenetration(e.g.,welds,bellows,or0-rings)isOPERABLE(i.e.,OPERABLEsuchthattheprimarycontainmentleakagelimitsaremet).continuedNHP2B3.6-1Revision+g

PrimaryContainmentB3.6.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisSpecificationensuresthattheperformanceoftheprimarycontainment,intheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),meetstheassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysesofReferences1and2.SR3.6.1.1.1leakageraterequirementsareinconformancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB(Ref.3),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetydesignbasisfortheprimarycontainmentisthatitmustwithstandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitingDBAwithoutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.TheDBAthatpostulatesthemaximumreleaseofradioactivematerialwithinprimarycontainmentisaLOCA.Intheanalysisofthisaccident,itisassumedthatprimarycontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofprimarycontainmentleakage.AnalyticalmethodsandassumptionsinvolvingtheprimarycontainmentarepresentedinReferences1and2.ThesafetyanalysesassumeanonmechanisticfissionproductreleasefollowingaDBA,whichformsthebasisfordeterminationofoffsitedoses.Thefissionproductreleaseis,inturn,basedonanassumedleakageratefromtheprimarycontainment.OPERABILITYoftheprimarycontainmentensuresthattheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysesisnotexceeded.Themaximumallowableleakageratefortheprimarycontainment(L)isl.IXbyweightofthecontainmentairper24hoursa$thedesignbasisLOCAmaximumpeakcontainmentpressure(P,)of39.75psig(Ref.4).PrimarycontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3ofReference5.LCOPrimarycontainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitingleakageto<1.0Lexceptpriortothefirststartupafterperformingarequired10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlanleakagetest.Atthistime,theapplicableleakagelimitsmustbemet.Inaddition,theleakagefromthedrywelltothesuppressionchambermustbelimitedtoensuretheprimarycontainmentpressuredoesnotexceeddesignlimits.CompliancewiththisLCOwillensureaprimarycontainmentconfiguration,includingequipmenthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleakagetothosecontinuedNNP2B3.6-2RevisionA

PrimaryContainmentB3.6.1.1.BASESLCO(continued)leakageratesassumedinthesafetyanalysis.IndividualleakageratesspecifiedfortheprimarycontainmentairlocksareaddressedinLCO3.6.1.2.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtoprimarycontainment.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,primarycontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4and5topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromprimarycontainment.ACTIONSA.1Intheeventthatprimarycontainmentisinoperable,primarycontainmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocorrecttheproblemthatiscommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintainingprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,and3.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofanaccident(requiringprimarycontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodswhereprimarycontainmentisinoperableisminimal.B.1andB.2IfprimarycontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within12hoursandtoMODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.1.1MaintainingtheprimarycontainmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualexaminationsandleakageratetestrequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.Failuretomeetairlockleakagelimit(SR3.6.1.2.1),secondarycontainmentbypass.leakagelimitcot'edNMP2B3.6-3RevisionA

PrimaryContainmentB3.6.1.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.1.1(continued)(SR3.6.1.3.11),resilientsealprimarycontainmentpurgevalveleakagelimit(SR3.6.1.3.6),ormainsteamisolationvalveleakagelimit(SR3.6.1.3.12)doesnotnecessarilyresultinafailureofthisSR.TheimpactofthefailuretomeettheseSRsmustbeevaluatedagainsttheTypeA,B,andCacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.Asleftleakagepriortothefirststartupafterperformingarequired10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlanleakagetestisrequiredtobe<0.6L,forcombinedTypeBandCleakage,and<0.75L,foroverallTypeAleakage.Atallothertimesbetweenrequiredleakageratetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakagelimitof<1.0L,.At<1.0L,theoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysis.TheFrequencyisrequiredbythe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.SR3.6.1.1.2andSR3.6.1.1.3Haintainingthepressuresuppressionfunctionoftheprimarycontainmentrequireslimitingtheleakagefromthedrywelltothesuppressionchamber.Thus,ifaneventweretooccurthatpressurizedthedrywell,thesteamwouldbedirectedthroughthedowncomersintothesuppressionpool.SR3.6.1.1.2measuresdrywell-to-suppressionchamberdifferentialpressuretoensurethattheleakagepathsthat.wouldbypassthesuppressionpoolarewithinallowablelimits.Thesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakersarethemostlikelysourceofpotentialbypassleakage,therefore,thesevalvesarenormallytestedonamorefrequentbasis.SatisfactoryperformanceofSR3.6.1.1.2canbeachievedbyestablishingaknowndifferentialpressure(~3.0psid)betweenthedrywellandthesuppressionchamberandverifyingthattheA/Kcalculatedfromthemeasuredbypassleakageisequivalenttothatthroughanarea~0.0054ft.TheleakagetestisperformedatthesameFrequencyastheTypeAtestingrequirementsofthe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.ThisFrequencywasdevelopedsincehistoricallytheleakageismuchlessthanthedesignvalueandthatthemostcrediblesourceofpotentialbypasscontinuedNMP283.6-4Revision+/

PrimaryContainmentB3.6.1.1.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.1.2andSR3.6.1.1.3(continued)leakage,thesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerswillnormallybetestedmorefrequentlyinaccordancewithSR3.6.1.1.3.Twoconsecutiveas-foundtestfailuresofSR3.6.1.1.2,however,wouldindicateunexpectedprimarycontainmentdegradation;inthisevent,astheNoteindicates,increasingtheFrequencytoonceevery24monthsisrequireduntilthesituationisremediatedasevidencedbypassingtwoconsecutivetests.ConservativetestcriteriawaschosenforSR3.6.1.1.3basedontheassumedbypassleakageintheLOCAanalysis.The24monthFrequencyspecifiedforSR3.6.1.1.3wasdevelopedconsideringitisprudentthatthisSurveillancebeperformedduringaunitoutage.ANotehasbeenaddedtoSR3.6.1.1.3whichprovidesanallowancenottoperformSR3.6.1.1.3whenSR3.6.1.1.2isrequiredtobeperformedsinceSR3.6.1.1.2willprovideadequateinformationonthecapacityofthepressuresuppressionfunctionoftheprimarycontainment.REFERENCES1.USAR,Section6.2.2.USAR,Section15.6.5.3.10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB.4.USAR,Section6.2.6.1.5.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).NHP2B3.6-5RevisionA

PrimaryContainmentAirLocksB3.6.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,and3,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtoprimarycontainment.InNODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Therefore,theprimarycontainmentairlockisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES4and5topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromprimarycontainment.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyNote1,whichallowsentryandexittoperformrepairsoftheaffectedairlockcomponent.Iftheouterdoorisinoperable,thenitmaybeeasilyaccessedformostrepairs.ItispreferredthattheairlockbeaccessedfrominsideprimarycontainmentbyenteringthroughtheotherOPERABLEairlock.However,ifthisisnotpracticable,orifrepairsoneitherdoormustbeperformedfromthebarrelsideofthedoor,thenitispermissibletoentertheairlockthroughtheOPERABLEdoor,whichmeansthereisashorttimeduringwhichtheprimarycontainmentboundaryisnotintact(duringaccessthroughtheOPERABLEdoor).TheallowancetoopentheOPERABLEdoor,evenifitmeanstheprimarycontainmentboundaryistemporarilynotintact,isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethe.primarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichtheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.TherequiredadministrativecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedindividualtoassureclosureoftheOPERABLEdoorexceptduringtheentryandexit,andtoassuretheOPERABLEdoorisrelockedaftercompletionofthecontainmententryandexit.Note2hasbeenincludedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.Thisisacceptable,sincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperableairlock.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andasubsequentinoperableairlockisgovernedbysubsequentCon'ditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions.TheACTIONSaremodifiedbyathirdNote,whichensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretakenwhennecessary,ifairlockleakageresultsinexceedingoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,ACTIONSarenotrequiredevenifprimarycontainmentleakagecontinuedNNP2B3.6-8RevisionJ(Q8

PCIVsB3.6.1.3,B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~~B3.6.1.3PrimaryContainmentIsolationValves(PCIVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionofthePCIVs,incombinationwithotheraccidentmitigationsystems,istolimitfissionproductreleaseduringandfollowingpostulatedDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)towithinlimits.PrimarycontainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedforthosePCIVsdesignedtocloseautomaticallyensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysesforaDBA.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforPCIVshelpensurethatanadequateprimarycontainmentboundaryismaintainedduringandafteranaccidentbyminimizingpotentialpaths'totheenvironment.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequirementsprovideassurancethattheprimarycontainmentfunctionassumedinthesafetyanalysiswillbemaintained.Theseisolationdevicesconsistofeitherpassivedevicesoractive(automatic)devices.Manualvalves,de-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedposition(includingcheckvalveswithflowthroughthevalvesecured),blindflanges(whichincludeplugsandcapsaslistedinReference1),andclosedsystemsareconsideredpassivedevices.Checkvalves,orotherautomaticvalvesdesignedtoclosewithoutoperatoractionfollowinganaccident,areconsideredactivedevices.Twobarriersinseriesareprovidedforeachpenetration,exceptforpenetrationsisolatedbyexcessflowcheckvalves,sothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresul,tinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedslimitsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Oneofthesebarriersmaybeaclosedsystem.The12and14inchprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesarePCIVsthatarequalifiedforuseduringalloperationalconditions..The12and14inchprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosedinMODES1,2,and3toensuretheprimarycontainmentboundaryismaintained.However,thepurgevalvesmaybeopenwhenbeingusedforpressurecontrol,inerting,de-inerting,ALARA,orairqualityconsiderationssincetheyarefullyqualified.AtwoinchbypasslineisprovidedwhentheprimarycontainmentfullflowlinetotheStandbyGasTreatment(SGT)Systemisisolated.(continued)NMP2B3.6-14RevisionP'QQ

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThePCIVsLCOwasderivedfromtheassumptionsrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventory,andestablishingtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringmajoraccidents.Aspartoftheprimarycontainmentboundary,PCIVOPERABILITYsupportsleaktightnessofprimarycontainment.Therefore,thesafetyanalysisofanyeventrequiringisolationofprimarycontainmentisapplicabletothisLCO.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialforwhichtheconsequencesaremitigatedbyPCIVsarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andamainsteamlinebreak(NSLB)(Refs.2and3).Intheanalysisforeachofthese(QGaccidents,itisassumedthatPCIVsareeitherclosedorfunctiontoclosewithintherequiredisolationtimefollowingeventinitiation.ThisensuresthatpotentialpathstotheenvironmentthroughPCIVs(includingprimarycontainmentpurgevalves)areminimized.OftheeventsanalyzedinReferences2and3,theLOCAisthemost)~8limitingeventduetoradiologicalconsequences.Theclosuretimeofthemainsteamisolationvalves(HSIVs)isa-significantvariablefromaradiologicalstandpoint.TheHSIVsarerequiredtoclosewithin3to5secondssincethe3secondclosuretimeisassumedintheHSIVclosure(themostsevereoverpressurizationtransient)analysis(Ref.4)and5secondclosuretimeisassumedintheHSLBanalysis(Ref.3).Likewise,itisassumedthattheprimarycontainmentisolatessuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolled.TheDBAanalysisassumesthatisolationoftheprimarycontainmentiscompleteandleakageterminated,exceptforthemaximumallowableleakage,Lpriortofueldamage.Thesinglefailurecriterionrequiredtobeimposedintheconductofunitsafetyanalyseswasconsideredintheoriginaldesignoftheprimarycontainmentpurgevalves.Twovalvesinseriesoneachpurgelineprovideassurancethatboththesupplyandexhaustlinescouldbeisolatedevenifasinglefailureoccurred.PCIVssatisfyCriterion3ofReference5.(continued)NHP2B3.6-15Revision@'Q6 0'I))

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASES(continued)LCOPCIVsformapartoftheprimarycontainmentboundary.ThePCIVsafetyfunctionisrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishingtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringaDBA.Thepoweroperated,automaticisolationvalvesarerequiredtohaveisolationtimeswithinlimitsandactuateonanautomaticisolationsignal.ThevalvescoveredbythisLCOarelistedwiththeirassociatedstroketimesinRef.l.)8ThenormallyclosedmanualPCIVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthevalvesareclosed,oropenunderadministrativecontrols.NormallyclosedautomaticPCIVs,whicharerequiredbydesign(e.g.,tomeet10CFR50AppendixRrequirements)tobede-activatedandclosed,areconsideredOPERABLEwhenthevalveisclosedandde-activated.ThesepassiveisolationvalvesanddevicesarethoselistedinReferencel.Purgevalveswithresilientseals,secondarycontainmentbypassvalves,HSIVs,andhydrostaticallytestedvalvesmustmeetadditionalleakageraterequirements.OtherPCIVleakageratesareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.1,"PrimaryContainment,"asTypeBorCtesting.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethatthePCIVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstominimizethelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringaccidents.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtoprimarycontainment.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,mostPCIVsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEandtheprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesarenotrequiredtobenormallyclosedinNODES4and5.CertainvalvesarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,however,topreventinadvertentreactorvesseldraindown.ThesevalvesarethosewhoseassociatedinstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLEaccordingtoLCO3.3.6.1,"PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation."(Thisdoesnotincludethevalvesthatisolatetheassociatedinstrumentation.)(continued)NMP2B3.6-16Revision>Qg

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyaNoteallowingpenetrationflowpath(s)tobeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.Thesecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperatoratthecontrolsofthevalve,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforprimarycontainmentisolationisindicated.AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthepurposeofthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.Thisisacceptable,sincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablePCIV.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andsubsequentinoperablePCIVsaregovernedbysubsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions.TheACTIONSaremodifiedbyNotes3and4.Note3ensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystem(s)arerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablePCIV(e.g.,anEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsubsystemisinoperableduetoafailedopentestreturnvalve).Note4ensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretakenwhentheprimarycontainmentleakagelimitsareexceeded.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theseACTIONSarenotrequiredevenwhentheassociatedLCOisnotmet.Therefore,Notes3and4areaddedtorequiretheproperactionsbetaken.A.landA.2WithoneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonePCIVinoperable,exceptforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerate,NSIVleakagerate,purgeexhaustvalveleakagerate,orhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageratenotwithinlimit,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,ablindflange,andacheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.ForpenetrationsisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1,thedeviceusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavailableonetotheprimarycontainment.TheRequiredActionmustbecompletedwithinthe4hourCompletionTime(8hoursforcontinuedNMP2B3.6-17RevisionEg

PCIVsB3.6.1.3.BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)mainsteamlines).Thespecifiedtimeperiodof4hoursisreasonableconsideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,and3.Formainsteamlines,an8hourCompletionTimeisallowed.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforthemainsteamlinesallowsaperiodoftimetorestoretheMSIVstoOPERABLEstatusgiventhefactthatHSIVclosurewillresultinisolationofthemainsteamline(s)andapotentialforplantshutdown.ForaffectedpenetrationsthathavebeenisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensurethatprimarycontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,andnolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosedevicesoutsidetheprimarycontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeforthisverificationof"onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsideprimarycontainment"isappropriatebecausethedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fordevicesinsidetheprimarycontainmentthespecifiedtimeperiodof"priortoenteringMODE2or3fromMODE4ifprimarycontainmentwasde-inertedwhileinMODE4,ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days,"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityofthedevicesandtheexistenceofotheradministrativecontrolsensuringthatdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.ConditionAismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletothosepenetrationflowpathswithtwoormorePCIVs.ForpenetrationflowpathswithonePCIV,ConditionCprovidesappropriateRequiredActions.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1appliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.AllowingverificationbyadministrativemeansiscontinuedNHP2B3.6-18RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3.BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)consideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Note2appliestoisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sincethefunctionoflocking,sealing,orsecuringcomponentsistoensurethatthesedevicesarenotinadvertentlyrepositioned.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignment,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.B.1WithoneormorepenetrationflowpathswithtwoormorePCIVsinoperable,exceptforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerate,HSIVleakagerate,purgeexhaustvalveleakagerate,orhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageratenotwithinlimit,eithertheinoperablePCIVsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.The1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1.1.ConditionBismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthisConditionisonlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswithtwoormorePCIVs.ForpenetrationflowpathswithonePCIV,ConditionCprovidestheappropriateRequiredActions.C.1andC.2WhenoneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonePCIVinoperable,exceptforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerate,HSIVleakagerate,purgeexhaustvalveleakagerate,orhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageratenotwithinlimit,theinoperablevalvemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuso}theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.ThemethodofisolationmustincludetheuseNHP2B3.6-19continuedRevisionpQR

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)ofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.Acheckvalvemaynotbeusedtoisolatetheaffectedpenetration.RequiredActionC.lmustbecompletedwithin4hoursexceptforexcessflowcheckvalves(EFCVs)andpenetrationswithaclosedsystemand72hoursforEFCVsandpenetrationswithaclosedsystem.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursforvalvesotherthanEFCVsandinpenetrationswithaclosedsystemisreasonableconsideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,and3.The72hourCompletionTimeforpenetrationswithaclosedsystemisreasonableconsideringtherelativestabilityoftheclosedsystempipingorwaterseal(hence,reliability)toactasapenetrationisolationboundaryandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,and3.TheclosedsystemmustmeettherequirementsofRef.6.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursforEFCVsisalsoreasonableconsideringthemitigatingeffectsofthesmallpipediameterandrestrictingorifice,andtheisolationboundaryprovidedbytheinstrument.IntheeventtheaffectedpenetrationisisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionC.1,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensurethatprimarycontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccidentareisolated.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosedevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31days"isappropriatebecausethedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.(Qsl4ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthisConditionisapplicableonlytothosepenetrationflowpathswithonlyonePCIV.Forpenetrationflowpathswithtwoormore(+8PCIVs,ConditionsAandBprovidetheappropriateRequiredActions.ThisNoteisnecessarysincethisConditioniswrittenspecifi,callytoaddressthosepenetrationswitha.singlePCIV.continuedNMP2B3.6-20RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3.BASESACTIONSC.landC.2(continued)RequiredActionC.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1appliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsidered"acceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Note2appliestoisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sincethefunctionoflocking,sealing,orsecuringcomponentsistoensurethatthesedevicesarenotinadvertentlyrepositioned.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignment,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.D.1Withthesecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerate(SR3.6.1.3.11),NSIVleakagerate(SR3.6.1.3.12),orhydrostaticallytestedlineleakagerate(SR3.6.1.'3.13)notwithinlimit,theassumptionsofthesafetyanalysismaynotbemet.Therefore,theleakageratemustberestoredtowithinlimitwithintheCompletionTimesappropriateforeachtypeofvalveleakage:a)hydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystemandsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagearerequiredtoberestoredwithin4hours;b)HSIVleakageisrequiredtoberestoredwithin8hours;andc)hydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosed(Qpsystemisrequiredtoberestoredwithin72hours.Restorationcanbeaccomplishedbyisolatingthepenetrationthatcausedthelimittobeexceededbyuseofoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.Whenapenetrationisisolated,theleakageratefortheisolatedpenetrationisassumedtobetheactualpathwayleakagethroughtheisolationdevice.Iftwoisolationdevicesareusedtoisolatethepenetration,theleakagerateisassumedtobethelesseractualpathwayleakageofthetwodevices.The4hourCompletionTimeforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystemandforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakageisreasonableconsideringthetimerequiredtorestoretheleakagebyisolatingthepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofcontinuedNMP2B3.6-21Revision~

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESACTIONSD.1(continued)secondarycontainmentbypassleakagetotheoverallcontainmentfunction.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforNSIVleakageallowsaperiodoftimetorestoretheNSIVleakageandisacceptablegiventhefactthatNSIVclosurewillresultinisolationofthemainsteamline(s)andapotentialforplantshutdown.The72hourCompletionTimeforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystemisacceptablebasedontheavailablewatersealexpectedtoremainasagaseousfissionproductboundaryduringtheaccidentand,inmanycases,theassociatedclosedsystem.TheclosedsystemmustmeettherequirementsofRef.6.E.1E.2andE.3Intheeventoneormorecontainmentpurgeexhaustvalvesarenotwithinthepurgevalveleakagelimits,purgeexhaustvalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimitsortheaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,andblindflange.IfapurgeexhaustvalvewithresilientsealsisutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionE.litmusthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.1.3.6.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatagrossbreachofcontainmentdoesnotexist.InaccordancewithRequiredActionE.2,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthoseisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentandpotentiallycapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringNODE2or3fromNODE4ifprimarycontainmentwasde-inertedwhileinNODE4,ifnotperformed,withinthecontinuedNNP2B3.6-22RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3,BASESACTIONSE.1E.2andE.3(continued)previous92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionE.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1appliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Note2appliestoisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sincethefunctionoflocking,sealing,orsecuringcomponentsistoensurethatthesedevicesarenotinadvertentlyrepositioned.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.ForthecontainmentpurgeexhaustvalvewithresilientsealthatisclosedinaccordancewithRequiredActionE.1,SR3.6.1.3.6mustbeperformedatleastonceevery92days.Thisprovidesassurancethatdegradationoftheresilientsealisdetectedandconfirmsthattheleakagerateofthecontainmentpurgeexhaustvalvedoesnotincreaseduringthetimethepenetrationisisolated.ThenormalFrequencyforSR3.6.1.3.6is184days.SincemorerelianceisplacedonasinglevalvewhileinthisCondition,itisprudenttoperformtheSRmoreoften.Therefore,aFrequencyofonceper92dayswaschosenandhasbeenshownacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.F.1andF.2IfanyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimecannotbemetinMODE1,2,or3,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within12hoursandtoNODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingcontinuedNNP2B3.6-23RevisionP'QQ

PCIVsB3.6.1.3.BASESACTIONSF.1andF.2(continued)experience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.G.landG.2IfanyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimecannotbemetforPCIV(s)requiredOPERABLEinNODE4or5,theplantmustbeplacedinaconditioninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtosuspendoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs)tominimizetheprobabilityofavesseldraindownandsubsequentpotentialforfissionproductrelease.ActionsmustcontinueuntilOPDRVsaresuspended.IfsuspendingtheOPDRVswouldresultinclosingtheresidualheatremoval(RHR)shutdowncoolingisolationvalves,analternativeRequiredActionisprovidedtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorethevalvestoOPERABLEstatus.ThisallowsRHRshutdowncoolingtoremaininservicewhileactionsarebeingtakentorestorethevalve.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.1.3.1ThisSRverifiesthatthe12inchand14inchprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesareclosedasrequiredor,ifopen,openedforanallowablereason.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthattheSRisnotrequiredtobemetwhenthepurgevalvesareopenforthestatedreasons.TheNotestatesthatthesevalvesmaybeopenedforinerting,de-inerting,pressurecontrol,ALARA,or'airqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,orforSurveillancesthatrequirethevalvestobeop'n,providedthateither:a)theSGTSystemisOPERABLE(i.e.,bothsubsystems);orb)theprimarycontainmentfullflowlinetotheSGTSystemisisolatedandoneSGTsubsystemisOPERABLE.TheseprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesarecapableofclosingintheenvironmentfollowingaLOCA.Therefore,thesevalvesareallowedtobeopenforlimitedperiodsoftime.TheallowanceisintendedtobalancetheoperationalneedsoftheunitwiththerequirementtoprecludearadiologicalreleasethroughthepurgeexhaustcontinuedNMP2B3.6-24RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.3.1(continued)lines.WiththeprimarycontainmentatmospherebeingexhaustedthroughthecontainmentfullflowlinetotheSGTSystem,apressuretransientcoulddamagetheoperatingSGTsubsystem.ThusbothsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwhenthefullflowlineisinservice.Thisensures.that,ifanaccidentoccursthatdamagestheoperatingSGTsubsystem,theremainingSGTsubsystemisstillavailabletoperformtheintendedSGTSystemsafetyfunction.Whenthefullflowlineisnotinservice(i.e.,thetwoinchbypassvalveisopen),thenonlyoneSGTsubsystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEsinceapressuretransientcannotdamagetheoperatingSGTsubsystem.The31dayFrequencyisconsistentwithotherprimarycontainmentisolationvalverequirementsdiscussedinSR3.6.1.3.2.SR3.6.1.3.2IThisSRverifiesthateachprimarycontainmentisolationmanualvalveandblindflangethatislocatedoutsideprimarycontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwise[Qg,.securedandisrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditions,isclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethat.postaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideoftheprimarycontainmentboundaryiswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosePCIVsoutside(Qdprimarycontainment,andcapableofbeingmispositioned,areinthecorrectposition.SinceverificationofpositionforPCIVsoutsideprimarycontainmentisrelativelyeasy,thegj31dayFrequencywaschosentoprovideaddedassurancethatthePCIVsareinthecorrectpositions.ThisSRdoesnot[8applytovalvesandblindflangesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintheclosedposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionuponlocking,sealing,orsecuring.aTwoNotesareaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNoteappliestovalvesandblindflangeslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.Allowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringNODES1,2,and3forALARAcontinuedB3.6-25RevisionA

PCIVs83.6.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.3.2(continued)reasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesePCIVs,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.AsecondNoteisincludedtoclarifythatPCIVsopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimethePCIVsareopen.Thesecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperatoratthecontrolsofthevalve,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforprimarycontainmentisolationisindicated.SR3.6.1.3.3ThisSRverifiesthateachprimarycontainmentmanualisolationvalveandblindflangelocatedinsideprimarycontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredandIQBrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditions,isclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsidetheprimarycontainmentboundaryiswithindesignlimits.ForPCIVsinsideprimaryI&containment,theFrequencyof"priortoenteringMODE2or3fromMODE4ifprimarycontainmentwasde-inertedwhileinMODE4,ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days,"isappropriatesincethesePCIVsareoperatedunderIU~administrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesandblindflangesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintheclosedposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionuponlocking,sealing,orsecuring.TwoNotesareaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNoteallowsvalvesandblindflangeslocatedinhighradiationareastobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.AllowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptablesincetheprimarycontainmentisinertedandaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringMODES1,2,and3forALARAandpersonnelsafety.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesePCIVs,)goncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheirproperposition,islow.AsecondNoteisincludedtoclarifythatPCIVsthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimethatthePCIVsareopen.continuedNMP2B3.6-26RevisionP'g

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.3.3(continued)Thesecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperatoratthecontrolsofthevalve,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforprimarycontainmentisolationisindicated.SR3.6.1.3.4Thetraversingincoreprobe(TIP)shearisolationvalvesareactuatedbyexplosivecharges.SurveillanceofexplosivechargecontinuityprovidesassurancethatTIPvalveswillactuatewhenrequired.Otheradministrativecontrols,suchasthosethatlimittheshelflifeandoperatinglife,asapplicable,oftheexplosivecharges,mustbefollowed.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethathasdemonstratedthereliabilityoftheexplosivechargecontinuity.SR3.6.1.3.5Verifyingtheisolationtimeofeachpoweroperated,automaticPCIViswithinlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.MSIVsmaybeexcludedfromthisSRsinceMSIVfullclosureisolationtimeisdemonstratedbySR3.6.1.3.7.Theisolationtimetestensuresthateachvalvewillisolateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalysis.TheFrequencyofthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.6.1.3.6Forprimarycontainmentpurgevalveswithresilientseals,additionalleakageratetestingbeyondthetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJOptionB(Ref.7),isrequiredto.ensureOPERABILITY.Theprimarycontainmentpurgesupplyvalves,whicharesecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathwayvalves,aretestedatapressureof40.0psigandtheprimarycontainmentpurgeexhaustvalves,whicharenotsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathwayvalves,aretestedatP39.75psig.Theleakagelimitforthe12inchsupplyandexhaustvalvesare3.75scfhwhilethe14inchsupplyandexhaustvalveleakagelimitis4.38scfh.continuedNMP2B3.6-27RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.3.6(continued)Operatingexperiencehasdemonstratedthatthistypeofsealhasthepotentialtodegradeinashortertimeperiodthandoothersealtypes.Basedonthisobservation,andtheimportanceofmaintainingthesepenetrationsleaktight(duetothedirectpathbetweenprimarycontainmentandtheenvironmentinsomecases),aFrequencyof184dayswasestablished.Additionally,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin92daysafteropeningthevalve.The92dayFrequencywaschosenrecognizingthatcyclingthevalvecouldintroduceadditionalsealdegradation(beyondthatwhichoccurstoavalvethathasnotbeenopened).Thus,decreasingtheinterval(from184days)isaprudentmeasureafteravalvehasbeenopened.SR3.6.1.3.7VerifyingthatthefullclosureisolationtimeofeachMSIViswithinthespecifiedlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.ThefullclosureisolationtimetestensuresthattheMSIVwillisolateinatimeperiodthatdoesnotexceedthetimesassumedintheDBAandtransientanalyses.TheFrequencyofthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.6.1.3.8AutomaticPCIVscloseonaprimarycontainmentisolationsignaltopreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromprimarycontainmentfollowingaDBA.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticPCIVwillactuatetoitsisolationpositiononaprimarycontainmentisolationsignal.TheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinLCO3.3.6.1,"PrimaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation,"overlapsthisSRtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.The24monthFrequencyis.basedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.continuedNMP2B3.6-28RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3,BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.1.3.9ThisSRrequiresademonstrationthateachEFCVisOPERABLEbyverifyingthatthevalveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedinstrumentlinebreakcondition.ThisSRprovidesassurancethattheinstrumentationlineEFCVswillperformasdesigned.SomehydraulicEFCVsaretestedbyprovidinganinstrumentlinebreaksignalwithreactorpressureabove600psig.Testingabovethispressurerangeprovidesahighdegreeofassurancethatthesevalveswillcloseduringaninstrumentlinebreakwhileatnormaloperatingpressure.TheremaininghydraulicEFCVsaretestedwithprocessfluidordeminwateratlowpressure.ThepneumaticEFCVsaretestedbyprovidinganinstrumentlinebreaksignalwithpressureatapproximately15psigto150psig.ThesetestpressuresareselectedtosimulatetheactualoperatingconditionstheEFCVsareexpectedtoexperienceduringinstrumentlinebreaksoutsidecontainment.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewh'enperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.6.1.3.10TheTIPshearisolationvalvesareactuatedbyexplosivecharges.Aninplacefunctionaltestisnotpossiblewiththisdesign.Theexplosivesquibisremovedandtestedtoprovideassurancethatthevalveswillactuatewhenrequired.Thereplacementchargefortheexplosivesquibshallbefromthesamemanufacturedbatchastheonefiredorfromanotherbatchthathasbeencertifiedbyhavingoneofthebatchsuccessfullyfired,andshallbeinstalledinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendations.Otheradministrativecontrols,suchasthosethatlimittheshelflifeandoperatinglife,asapplicable,oftheexplosivecharges,mustbefollowed.TheFrequencyof24monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisconsideredadequategiventheadministrativecontrolsonreplacementchargesandthefrequentchecksofcircuitcontinuity(SR3.6.1.3.4).continuedNMP2B3.6-29RevisionA

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.1.3.11ThisSRensuresthattheleakagerateofsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepaths(withtheexceptionoftheMSIVs,whicharetestedperSR3.6.1.3.12)islessthanorequaltothespecifiedleakagerate.WhiletheHSIVsarealsoclassifiedassecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathwayvalves,theyareevaluatedaccordingtoSR3.6.1.3.12,andifnotwithinlimits,actionsarerequiredtobetakeninaccordancewithACTIOND.This)QI3providesassurancethattheassumptionsintheradiologicalevaluationsthatformthebasisoftheUSAR(Ref.2)aremet.Theleakagerateofeachbypassleakagepathisassumedtobethemaximumpathwayleakage(leakagethroughtheworseofthetwoisolationvalves)unlessthepenetrationisisolatedbyuseofoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.Inthiscase,theleakagerateoftheisolatedbypassleakagepathisassumedtobetheactualpathwayleakagethroughtheisolationdevice.Ifbothisolationvalvesinthepenetrationareclosed,theactualleakagerateisthelesserleakagerateofthetwovalves.TheFrequencyisrequiredbythe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.BypassleakageisconsideredpartofL,.SR3.6.1.3.12TheanalysesinReference1arebasedonleakagethatislessthanthespecifiedleakagerate.LeakagethrougheachMSIVmustbe<24scfhwhentestedat40psig.ThisensuresthatHSIVleakageisproperlyaccountedforindeterminingtheoverallprimarycontainmentleakagerate.TheFrequencyisrequiredbythe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.MSIVleakageisconsideredpartofL,.continuedNHP2B3.6-30Revision+Qg

PCIVsB3.6.1.3~BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.1.3.13SurveillanceofhydrostaticallytestedlinesprovidesassurancethatthecalculationassumptionsofReference1aremet.ThecombinedleakageratesmustbedemonstratedinIQ8,accordancewiththeleakagetestFrequencyrequiredbythe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.REFERENCES1.TechnicalRequirementsManual.2.USAR,Section15.6.5.3.USAR,Section15.6.4.4.USAR,Section15.2.4.5.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).6.USAR,Section6.2.4.3.2.7.10CFR50,AppendixJOptionB.NMP2B3.6-31RevisionA@8

DrywellAirTemperatureB3.6.1.5.B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~~B3.6.1.5DrywellAirTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDHeatloadsfromthedrywell,aswellaspipingandequipment,addenergytotheairspaceandraiseairspacetemperature.Coolersincludedintheunitdesignremovethisenergyandmaintainanappropriateaveragetemperature.TheaverageairspacetemperatureaffectsthecalculatedresponsetopostulatedDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs).ThisdrywellairtemperaturelimitisaninitialconditioninputfortheReference1safetyanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESPrimarycontainmentperformancefortheDBAisevaluatedforaentirespectrumofbreaksizesforpostulatedlossofcoolantaccidents(LOCAs)insidecontainment(Ref.1).Amongtheinputstothedesignbasisanalysisistheinitialdrywellaverageairtemperature.Analysesassumeaninitialaveragedrywellairtemperatureof150F.MaintainingtheexpectedinitialconditionsensuresthatsafetyanalysesremainvalidandensuresthatthepeakLOCAdrywelltemperaturedoesnotexceedthemaximumallowabletemperatureof340'F(Ref.1).Exceedingthisdesigntemperaturemayresultinthedegradationoftheprimarycontainmentstructureunderaccidentloads.Equipmentinsideprimarycontainment,andneededtomitigatetheeffectsofaDBA,isdesignedtooperateandbecapableofoperatingunderenvironmentalconditionsexpectedfortheaccident.Inaddition,thedrywellaverageairtemperatureisthelimitinginitialconditionusedtodeterminethemaximumnegativedifferentialpressureacrosstheprimarycontainmentboundaryfollowinganinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation(Ref.1).DrywellairtemperaturesatisfiesCriterion2ofReference2.LCOWithaninitialdrywellaverageairtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperaturelimit,thepeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthedrywelldesigntemperatureandthedesignnegativedifferentialpressurecontinuedNMP2B3.6-35RevisiongQH

DrywellAirTemperatureB3.6.1.5BASESLCO(continued)acrosstheprimarycontainmentboundaryisnotexceeded.Asaresult,theabilityofprimarycontainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctionisensured.APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,and3,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtoprimarycontainment.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Therefore,maintainingdrywellaverageairtemperaturewithinthelimitisnotrequiredinNODE4or5.ACTIONSA.1WhendrywellaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,itmustberestoredwithin8hours.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsoftheprimarycontainmentanalysis.The8hourCompletionTimeisacceptable,consideringthesensitivityoftheanalysistovariationsinthisparameter,andprovidessufficienttimetocorrectminorproblems.B.1andB.2IfthedrywellaverageairtemperaturecannotberestoredtowithinthelimitwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within12hoursandtoNODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,based.onoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.1.5.1VerifyingthatthedrywellaverageairtemperatureiswithintheLCOlimitensuresthatoperationremainswithinthelimitsassumedfortheprimarycontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethedrywellaverageairtemperature,anarithmeticaverageiscalculated,usingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthedrywellselectedtoprovidearepresentativesampleoftheoveralldrywellatmosphere.continuedNHP2B3.6-36Revisionyipes

SuppressionPoolAverageTemperatureB3.6.2.1.B3.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHSB3.6.2.1SuppressionPoolAverageTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarycontainmentutilizesaHarkIIover/underpressuresuppressionconfiguration,withthesuppressionpoollocatedatthebottomoftheprimarycontainment.Thesuppressionpoolisdesignedtoabsorbthedecayheatandsensibleheatreleasedduringareactorblowdownfromsafety/reliefvalvedischargesorfromalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).ThesuppressionpoolmustalsocondensesteamfromtheReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystemturbineexhaustandprovidesthemainemergencywatersupplysourceforthereactorvessel.Thesuppressionpoolmustquenchallthesteamreleasedthroughthedowncomerlinesduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thisistheessentialmitigativefeatureofapressuresuppressioncontainmentthatensuresthatthepeakcontainmentpressureismaintainedbelowthedesignvalue(45psig).Suppression[QPpoolaveragetemperature(alongwithLCO3.6.2.2,"SuppressionPoolWaterLevel")isakeyindicationofthecapacityofthesuppressionpooltofulfilltheserequirements.Thetechnicalconcernsthatleadtothedevelopmentofsuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturelimitsareasfollows:a.Completesteamcondensation;b.Primarycontainmentpeakpressureandtemperature;c.Condensationoscillation(CO)loads;andd.Chuggingloads.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedDBAagainstwhichtheprimarycontainmentperformanceisevaluatedistheentirespectrumofpostulatedpipebreakswithintheprimarycontainment.Inputstothesafetyanalysesincludeinitialsuppressionpoolwatervolumeandsuppressionpooltemperature(Reference1forLOCAsandReference2forthesuppressionpooltemperatureanalysesrequiredbyReference3).Aninitialpooltemperatureof90FisassumedfortheReference1and2analyses.Reactorshutdownatapooltemperatureof110FandvesseldepressurizationatapoolB3.6-48continuedRevisionp

SuppressionPoolAverageTemperatureB3.6.2.1.BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.2.1.1Thesuppressionpoolaveragetemperatureisregularlymonitoredtoensurethattherequiredlimitsaresatisfied.AveragetemperatureisdeterminedbytakinganarithmeticaverageofatleastoneOPERABLEpostaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelineachsuppressionpoolquadrant.Alternatively,averagetemperaturecanbedeterminedbytakinganarithmeticaverageof10OPERABLEsuppressionpoolwatertemperaturechannels,whicharedistributedindifferentsuppressionpoolsectors.ThereisnodivisionalrequirementwithrespecttotheinstrumentchannelsforthisSR.The24hourFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.Whenheatisbeingaddedtothesuppressionpoolbytesting,however,itisnecessarytomonitorsuppressionpooltemperaturemorefrequently.The5minuteFrequencyduringtestingisjustifiedbytheratesatwhichtestingwillheatupthesuppressionpool,hasbeenshowntobeacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience,andprovidesassurancethatallowablepooltemperaturesarenotexceeded.TheFrequenciesarefurtherjustifiedinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalsuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturecondition.REFERENCESl.USAR,Section6.2.1.1.3.2.USAR,Appendix6A.10.1.3.NUREG-0783.4.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).NMP2B3.6-52Revisionp'Q8

PrimaryContainmentHydrogenRecombinersB3.6.3.1.BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)accumulationexceedingthislimit,andthelowprobabilityoffailureoftheOPERABLEprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombiner.RequiredActionA.1hasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0e4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenonerecombinerisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenandoxygeninamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimits,thelowprobabilityofthefailureoftheOPERABLErecombiner,andtheamountoftimeavailableafterapostulatedLOCAforoperatoractiontopreventexceedingtheflammabilitylimits.B.landB.2Withtwoprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinersinoperable,theabilitytoperformthehydrogenandoxygencontrolfunctionviaanalternatecapabilitymustbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithin1hour.ThealternatehydrogenandoxygencontrolcapabilityisprovidedbythePrimaryContainmentVent,Purge,andNitrogenSystemandoneRHRdrywellspraysubsystem.The1hourCompletionJQJTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetoverifythatalossofhydrogenandoxygencontrolfunctiondoesnotexist.fgInaddition,thealternatehydrogenandoxygencontrolsystemcapabilitymustbeverifiedonceper12hoursthereaftertoensureitscontinuedavailability.Boththeinitialverificationandallsubsequentverificationsmaybeperformedasanadministrativecheckbyexamininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabilityofthealternatehydrogenandoxygencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperformtheSurveillancesneededtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogenandoxygencontrolsystem.Iftheabilitytoperformthehydrogenandoxygencontrolfunctionismaintained,continuedoperationispermittedwithtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperableforupto7days.SevendaysisareasonabletimetoallowtwohydrogenrecombinerstobeinoperablebecausethehydrogenandoxygencontrolfunctionismaintainedandbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenandoxygenintheamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimits.continuedNMP2B3.6-67Revisionyi

PrimaryContainmentOxygenConcentrationB3.6.3.2.B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.3.2PrimaryContainmentOxygenConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarycontainmentisdesignedtowithstandeventsthatgeneratehydrogeneitherduetothezirconiummetalwaterreactioninthecoreorduetoradiolysis.Theprimarymethodtocontrolhydrogenistoinerttheprimarycontainment.Withtheprimarycontainmentinert,thatis,oxygenconcentration<4.0volumepercent(v/o),acombustiblemixturecannotbepresentintheprimarycontainmentforanyhydrogenconcentration.Thecapabilitytoinerttheprimarycontainmentandmaintainoxygen<4.0v/oworkstogetherwiththeHydrogenRecombinerSystem(LCO3.6.3.1,"PrimaryContainmentHydrogenRecombiners")andtheRHRDrywellSpraySystem(LCO3.6.1.6,"RHRDrywellSpray")toprovide.redundantanddiversemethodstomitigateeventsthatproducehydrogenandoxygen.Forexample,aneventthatrapidlygenerateshydrogenfromzirconiummetalwaterreactionwillresultinexcessivehydrogeninprimarycontainment,butoxygenconcentrationwillremain~5.0v/oandnocombustioncanoccur.Longtermgenerationofbothhydrogenandoxygenfromradiolyticdecompositionofwatermayeventuallyresultinacombustiblemixtureinprimarycontainment,exceptthatthehydrogenrecombinersremovehydrogenandoxygengasesfasterthantheycanbeproducedfromradiolysisandagainnocombustioncanoccur.ThisLCOensuresthatoxygenconcentrationdoesnotexceed4.0v/oduringoperationintheapplicableconditions.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheReferenceIcalculationsassumethattheprimarycontainmentisinertedwhenaDesignBasisAccidentlossofcoolantaccidentoccurs.Thus,thehydrogenassumedtobereleasedtotheprimarycontainmentasaresultofmetalwaterreactioninthereactorcorewillnotproducecombustiblegasmixturesintheprimarycontainment.Oxygen,whichissubsequentlygeneratedbyradiolyticdecompositionof.water,isrecombinedbythehydrogenrecombiners(LCO3.6.3.1)morerapidlythanitisproduced.PrimarycontainmentoxygenconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2ofReference2.(continued)NMP2B3.6-70Revision<Qg

SecondaryContainmentB3.6.4.1.BASESACTIONSC.1C.2andC.3(continued)wouldnotspecifyanyaction.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMode1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1.1ThisSRensuresthatthesecondarycontainmentboundaryissufficientlyleaktighttoprecludeexfiltration.The24hourFrequencyofthisSRwasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtosecondarycontainmentvacuumvariationsduringtheapplicableMODESandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringbetweensurveillances.Furthermore,the24hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalsecondarycontainmentvacuumcondition.SR3.6.4.1.2andSR3.6.4.1.3Verifyingthatsecondarycontainmentequipmenthatchesandoneaccessdoorineachaccessopeningareclosedensuresthattheinfiltrationofoutsideairofsuchamagnitudeastopreventmaintainingthedesirednegativepressuredoesnotoccur.Verifyingthatallsuchopeningsareclosedprovidesadequateassurancethatexfiltrationfromthesecondarycontainmentwillnotoccur.Inthisapplication,theterm"sealed"hasnoconnotationofleaktightness.MaintainingsecondarycontainmentOPERABILITYrequiresverifyingonedoorintheaccessopeningisclosed.Anaccessopeningcontainsoneinnerandoneouterdoor.Insomecases,asecondarycontainmentbarriercontainsmultipleinnerormultipleouterdoors.Forthesecases,theaccessopeningssharetheinnerdoorortheouterdoor,i.e.,theaccessopeningshaveacommoninnerdoororouterdoor..TheintentisnottobreachthesecondarycontainmentcontinuedNMP2B3.6-76RevisionQQIE

SecondaryContainmentB3.6.4.1.BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1.2andSR-3.6.4.1.3(continued)atanytimewhensecondarycontainmentisrequired.Thisisachievedbymaintainingtheinnerorouterportionofthebarrierclosedatalltimes;i.e.,allinnerdoorsclosedorQ~allouterdoorsclosed.Thus,eachaccessopeninghasonedoorclosed.Howeverallsecondarycontainmentaccessdoorsarenormallykeptclosed,exceptwhentheaccessopeningisbeingusedforentryandexitorwhenmaintenanceisbeingperformedonanaccessopening.The31dayFrequencyforIL~JtheseSRshasbeenshowntobeadequatebasedonoperatingexperience,andisconsideredadequateinviewoftheotherindicationsofdoorandhatchstatusthatareavailabletotheoperator.SR3.6.4.1.4andSR3.6.4.1.5TheSGTSystemexhauststhesecondarycontainmentatmospheretotheenvironmentthroughappropriatetreatmentequipment.Toensurethatallfissionproductsaretreated,SR3.6.4.1.4andSR3.6.4.1.5verifythatapressureinthesecondarycontainmentthatislessthanthelowestpostulatedpressureexternaltothesecondarycontainmentboundarycanrapidlybeestablishedandmaintained.Thiscannotbeaccomplishedifthesecondarycontainmentboundaryisnotintact.TheestablishmentofthispressureisconfirmedbySR3.6.4.1.4,whichdemonstratesthatthesecondarycontainmentcanbedrawndownto>0.25inchesofvacuumwatergaugein<66.7secondswiththeinitialsecondarycontainmentpressure>0psig,usingoneSGTsubsystem.SR3.6.4.1.5demonstratesthatthepressureinthesecondarycontainmentcanbemaintained>0.25inchesofvacuumwatergaugefor1hourusingoneSGTsubsystemataflowrate<2670cfm.Thisflowrateistheassumedsecondarycontainmentleakrateduringthedrawdownperiod.The1hourtestperiodallowssecondarycontainmenttobeinthermalequilibriumatsteadystateconditions.Therefore,thesetwotestsareusedtoensuresecondarycontainmentboundaryintegrity.ThedrawdowntestconditionsmustbeadjustedbasedonthemethodologyinReference5tocompensateforactualinleakageflowandinitialconditionsduringthetest.SincetheseSRsaresecondarycontainmentboundaryintegritytests,theyneednotbeperformedwitheachSGTsubsystem.TheSGTsubsystemusedfortheseSurveillancesisstaggeredtoensurethatinadditiontothecontinuedNMP2B3.6-77RevisionA'Qg

SecondaryContainmentB3.6.4.1.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1.4andSR3.6.4.1.5(continued)requirementsofLCO3.6.4.3,eitherSGTsubsystemwillperformthistest.However,sincetheseSurveillancesaresecondarycontainmentboundaryintegritytests,theinoperabilityoftheSGTSystemdoesnotconstituteafailureoftheseSurveillances.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecondarycontainmentboundaryusuallypassestheseSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.USAR,Section3.6A.2.1.5.2.USAR,Section15.6.5.3.USAR,Section15.7.4.4.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).5.USAR,Section6.2.3.4.NMP2B3.6-78RevisionA

SCIVsB3.6.4.2,B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~~B3.6.4.2SecondaryContainmentIsolationValves(SCIVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheSCIVs,incombinationwithotheraccidentmitigationsystems,istolimitfissionproductreleaseduringandfollowingpostulatedDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)(Refs.Iand2).SecondarycontainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedforthoseisolationvalvesdesignedtocloseautomaticallyensuresthatfissionproductsthatleakfromprimarycontainmentfollowingaDBA,thatarereleasedduringcertainoperationswhenprimarycontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE,orthattakeplaceoutsideprimarycontainment,aremaintainedwithinthesecondarycontainmentboundary.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforSCIVshelpensurethatanadequatesecondarycontainmentboundaryismaintainedduringandafteranaccidentbyminimizingpotentialpathstotheenvironment.Theseisolationdevicesareeitherpassiveoractive(automatic).Manualvalves,de-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedposition(includingcheckvalveswithflowthroughthevalvesecured),andblindflangesareconsideredpassivedevices.AutomaticSCIVs(i.e.,dampers)closeonasecondarycontainmentisolationsignaltoestablishaboundaryforuntreatedradioactivematerialwithinsecondarycontainmentfollowingaDBAorotheraccidents.Otherpenetrationsareisolatedbytheuseofvalvesintheclosedpositionorblindflanges(whichincludesplugsandcapsaslistedinReference3).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheSCIVsmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethesecondarycontainmentbarriertofissionproductreleasesisestablished.Theprincipalaccidentsforwhichthesecondarycontainmentboundaryisrequiredarealossofcoolantaccident(Ref.I)andafuelhandlingaccident(Ref.2).Thesecondarycontainmentperformsnoactivefunctioninresponsetoeachoftheselimitingevents,buttheboundaryestablishedbySCIVsisrequiredtoensurethatleakagefromtheprimarycontainmentisprocessedbytheStandbyGasTreatment(SGT)Systembeforebeingreleasedtotheenvironment.continuedNMP283.6-7gRevision+$8

SCIVsB3.6.4.2.BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES.(continued)MaintainingSCIVsOPERABLEwithisolationtimeswithinlimitsensuresthatfissionproductswillremaintrappedinsidesecondarycontainmentsothattheycanbetreatedbytheSGTSystempriortodischargetotheenvironment.SCIVssatisfyCriterion3ofReference4.LCOSCIVsformapartofthesecondarycontainmentboundary.TheSCIVsafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofoffsiteradiationreleasesresultingfromDBAs.Thepoweroperated,automaticisolationvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheirisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandthevalvesactuateonanautomaticisolationsignal.ThevalvescoveredbythisLCO,alongwiththeirassociatedstroketimes,arelistedinReference3.ThenormallyclosedmanualSCIVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthevalvesareclosed,oropenunderadministrativecontrols.ThesepassiveisolationvalvesordevicesarelistedinReference3.*APPLICABILITYInNODESI,2,and3,aDBAcouldleadtoafissionproductreleasetotheprimarycontainmentthatleakstothesecondarycontainment.Therefore,OPERABILITYofSCIVsisrequired.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetopressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingSCIVsOPERABLEisnotrequiredinNODE4or5,exceptforothersituationsunderwhichsignificantreleasesofradioactivematerialcanbepostulated,suchasduringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs),duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNoteallowspenetrationflowpathstobeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.Thesecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperator,whoiscontinuedNMP2B3.6-80RevisionAgg

SCIVsB3.6.4.2.BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)appropriatebecausetheisolationdevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthattheaffectedpenetrationremainsisolated.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.Allowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignment,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.B.1WithtwoSCIVsinoneormorepenetrationflowpathsinoperable,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin4hours.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandthelowprobabilityofaDBA,whichrequirestheSCIVstoclose,occurringduringthisshorttime.TheConditionhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatConditionBisonlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswithtwoisolationvalves.ThisclarifiesthatonlyConditionAisenteredifoneSCIVisinoperableineachoftwopenetrations.C.IandC.2IfanyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimecannotbemet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within12hoursandtoMODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarecontinuedNMP2B3.6-82RevisionAg

SCIVsB3.6.4.2BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.6.4.2.1(continued)manipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthoseSCIVsinsecondarycontainmentthatarecapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.SincetheseSCIVsarereadilyaccessibletopersonnelduringnormalunitoperationandverificationoftheirpositionisrelativelyeasy,the31dayFrequencywaschosentoprovideaddedassurancethattheSCIVsareinthecorrectpositions.TwoNoteshavebeenaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNoteappliestovalvesandblindflangeslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.Allowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringMODES1,2,and3forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseSCIVs,oncetheyhave(gbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,islow.AsecondNote'hasbeenincludedtoclarifythatSCIVsthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheSCIVsareopen.Thesecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperatoratthecontrolsofthevalve,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforsecondarycontainmentisolationisindicated.SR3.6.4.2.2Verifyingtheisolationtimeofeachpoweroperated,automaticSCIViswithinlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.TheisolationtimetestensuresthattheSCIVwillisolateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheFrequencyofthisSRis92days.SR3.6.4.2.3VerifyingthateachautomaticSCIVclosesonasecondarycontainmentisolationsignalisrequiredtopreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromsecondarycontainmentfollowingcontinuedNMP2B3.6-84RevisionAQ8

SCIVsB3.6.4.2.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.2.3(continued)aDBAorotheraccidents.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticSCIVwillactuatetotheisolationpositiononasecondarycontainmentisolationsignal.TheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinLCO3.3.6.2,"SecondaryContainmentIsolationInstrumentation,"overlapsthisSRtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.WhilethisSurveillancecanbeperformedwiththereactoratpower,operatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency,whichisbasedontherefuelingcycle.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCES1.USAR,Section15.6.5.2.USAR,Section15.7.4.3.TechnicalRequirementsManual.4.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).NMP2B3.6-85'evisionP'g

SGTSystemB3.6.4.3BASESACTIONSE.1E.2andE.3(continued)statingthatLCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODE4or5,LCO3.0.3wouldnotspecifyanyaction.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinNODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinHode1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.6.4.3.1Operating(fromthecontrolroomusingthemanualinitiationswitch)eachSBTsubsystemfor>10continuoushoursensuresthatbothsubsystemsareOPERABLEandthatallassociated(controlsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.Operationwiththeheaterson(automaticheatercyclingtomaintaintemperature)for>10continuoushoursevery31dayseliminatesmoistureontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedinconsiderationoftheknownreliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrolsandtheredundancyavailableinthesystem.SR3.6.4.3.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredSGTfiltertestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheSGTSystemfiltertestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.6).TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance,charcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).SpecifiedtestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.contiuedNHP2B3.6-90RevisionAQg

4.6.2.1(Continued)d.Atleastper18monthsbyconductiavisualinspection:ofthexposedaccessible'nteriorandeeriorsurfacesofthesuppre'onchambere.AtleasteveryoutagerequiringtheperformanceofaContainmentIntegratedLeakRateTest,asschedWedinconformancewiththecriteriaspecifiedinthe10CFR50AppendixJgg$.(.(./,2.TestingProgramPlandescribedInSection6.8.4.f,byconductingadrywall-to-suppressionchamberbypassleaktestataninitialdifferentialpressureof3psiandverifyingthattheA/vscalculatedfromthemeasuredleakageiswithinthespecifiedlimitof0.0054squarefeet.ell-to-suppressionmberbypassleaktfailstomeetspecifitestschedWeforbsequenttestsshallreviewedandprovedthe1.Ifanylimit,Co2.~~VsIftwoconsecutivetestsfailtomeetthespecifiedlimit.atestshallbeperformedatleasteachingguntiltwoconsecutivetestsmeetthespecifiedlimit,atwhichtimetheoriginatestschedulemayberesumed.roonsofrHad'l4ringeachieforwhiceryweil-to-suppression.chamberbypassleaktestinSpecification4,6.2,1.eisnotconducted.byconductingatestofthefourdrywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleakpathscontainingthesuppressionchambervacuumbreakersatadifferentialpressureofatleast3psiandverifyingthatthetotalleakageareaA/4Kcontributedbyallfourbypassleakpathsislessthanorequalto24%ofthespecifiedlimit,and2.theleakageareaforanyoneofthefourbypassleekpathsislessthanorequalto12%ofthespecifiedlimit.seachvacuureliefvalveandaociatedpiping.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-18AmendmentNo.7>

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENT..AADMATIVEA:7AdefinitionforL,inCTS3.6.1.2.aisalsocurrentlyincludedinthe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlaninCTS6.8.4.f.SincethisdefinitionwillremaininITS5.5.12,10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan,itsdeletioninCTS3.6.1.2.aisconsideredadministrative.Anytechnicalchangestotherequirements,ifany,willbediscussedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:5.5.A.8PrimarycontainmentstructuralintegrityrequirementsspecifiedinCTS3.6.1.4and4.6.1.4.1areproposedtobeasupportingSurveillanceforPrimaryContainmentOPERABILITY(proposedSR3.6.1.1.1);theessenceofanOPERABLEcontainmentisitsleak-tightness.TheexistingTechnicalSpecificationscontaindetailswhicharealsofoundin10CFR50AppendixJ:accessibleinteriorandexteriorsurfaces.Theseregulationsrequirelicenseecompliance,cannotberevisedbythelicensee,andareaddressedbydirectreferenceintheTechnicalSpecifications.ThedetailsoftheregulationswithintheTechnicalSpecificationsarerepetitiousandunnecessary.Therefore,retainingtherequirementtomeettherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions(asdescribedinthe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlaninSection5.5oftheITS),andeliminatingtheTechnicalSpecificationdetailsthatarefoundinAppendixJ,isconsideredapresentationpreference,whichisadministrative.A.9Thedrywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleakagerequirementofCTS3.6.2.l.bisproposedtobeasupportingSurveillanceforPrimaryContainmentOPERABILITY(proposedSR3.6.1.1.2);bypassleakagewithinlimitisessentialfortheprimarycontainmenttoperformitspressuresuppressionfunctionandtoensuretheprimarycontainmentdesignpressureisnotexceeded.Therefore,theactualLCOstatementisnotneededsinceitispartofPrimaryContainmentOPERABILITY(ITS3.6.1.1).Thischangeisconsideredapresentationpreference,whichisadministrative.A.10Notused.A.11CTS4.6.2.1.erequiresadrywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleaktesttobeperformedinaccordancewiththecriteriaspecifiedinthe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.CTS4.6.2.1.e.3,whichonlymodifiesCTS4.6.2.1.e(CTS4.6.2.l.e.1,2,and3allmodifytherequirementsofCTS~04.6.2.1.e-theyarenotstandalonerequirementsnordotheymodifyeachother),statesthattheprovisionsofCTS4.0.2donotapply.ThismodificationisunnecessarysinceCTS4.6.2.1.emustbeperformedonthesamefrequencyasthe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan.TheprovisionthatNMP2RevisionPQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENT~~ADMINIATIEA.11Specification4.0.2doesnotapplytothe10CFR50AppendixJTesting(cont'd)ProgramisspecifiedinCTS6.8.4.fandinherentiniTS5.5.i2,andtherefore,itsremovalisconsideredadministrative.RELOCATEDPEIFIATIONSNoneTEHNIALHAN-MRERTRIVEM.1InmovingtheprimarycontainmentstructuralintegrityrequirementstoITS3.6.1.1,thePrimaryContainmentOPERABILITYLCO(refertoDiscussionofChangeA.8above),theallowedCompletionTimeof1hourbecomesapplicableforstructuralconditionsnotincompliancewithrequirements.Thisallowedtimetorestorecompliancebeforerequiringaplantshutdownislessthanthecurrent24hoursasspecifiedintheCTS3.6,1,4Action.ThisconservativelybringstheallowedtimesforrestorationforalossofcontainmentstructuralintegrityintoagreementwithalossofprimarycontainmentOPERABILITY.Thepotentialconfusioninapplyingtheappropriaterestorationtimeistherebyeliminated.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperations.TEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LD.1TheFrequenciesforperformingCTS4.6.2.1.e.2and4.6.2.1.f(proposedSR3.6.1.1.2andSR3.6.1.1.3,respectively)havebeenextendedfromeachrefuelingoutage(currently18months)to24monthstofacilitateachangetotheNMP2refuelcyclefrom18monthsto24months.TheproposedchangewillallowthenormalSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.eEaamaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSpecification3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceNMP2Revision4

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENT'EHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELD.1(cont'd)andsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.lThespecialreportingrequirementsassociatedwithCTS4.6.1.4.2aredeleted.Instead,reportingwillbegovernedbytherequirementof10CFR50.73.CTS4.6.1.4.2definesspecialreportingrequirementswhenabnormaldegradationoftheprimarycontainmentstructureisdetectedduringvisualinspection(CTS4.6.1.4.1).TheITSimplements10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB,whichhasnospecialreportingrequirementsinthisinstance.ITS5.5.12,"10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan,"directlyreferencesRegulatoryGuide1.163whichprovidesguidanceonimplementingtherequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB.PerANSI/ANS56.8-1994(whichisreferencedinRegulatoryGuide1.163),theintentofthevisualinspectionistoidentifyevidenceofstructuraldeteriorationthatmightaffecteitherthecontainmentstructuralintegrityorleaktightnesspriortoaTypeAleakagetest.ANSI/ANS56.8furtherstatesthatfailureofanyTypeA,B,orCleakagetestmustbeassessedforreportingrequiredby10CFR50.72and10CFR50.73.Inessence,reportingwillnowonlyberequiredwhendegradationoftheprimarycontainmentstructureissignificantenoughtowarrantanLERper10CFR50.73.ThisisacceptablebecausethespecialreportingrequirementsofCTS4.6.1.4.2arenotnecessarytoassureoperationinasafemannerandthereisnorequirementfortheNRCtoapprovethereport.Therefore,thischangehasnoimpactonthesafeoperationoftheplant.Deletionoftheabovereportingrequirement(CTS4.6.1.4.2)reducestheadministrativeburdenontheplantandallowseffortstobeconcentratedonrestoringtheprimarycontainmentstructuralintegritytoacceptablelimits.L.2IntheITSpresentation(refertoDiscussionofChangeA.9above),drywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleakageoutsidelimits(proposedSR3,6.1.1.2)willresultindeclaringthePrimaryContainmentinoperable.ITS3.6.1.1ACTIONSfortheseconditionsrequirecommencingashutdowntoMODES3and4iftheleakageproblemisnotcorrectedwithin1hour.CTS3.6.2.1Actioneonlyrestrictsheatingupreactorcoolantabove200'F(i.e.,entryintoMODE3).Withthedrywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleakageoutsideoflimitsinNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENT~TEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)MODE1,2,or3,CTS3.6.2.1doesnotprovideactions.Sincedrywell-to-suppressionchamberleakageareattributesofmaintainingPrimaryContainmentIntegrity(inITSterminology,primarycontainmentOPERABILITY),a1hourallowedoutagetimeisprovidedforthisconditionconsistentwiththeprimarycontainmentisinoperable.ThischangewillprovideconsistencyinITSACTIONSforthevariousprimarycontainmentdegradations.WithprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYlost,theriskassociatedwithcontinuedoperationforashortperiodoftimecouldbelessthanthatassociatedwithanimmediateplantshutdown.ThischangetoCTS3.6.2.1isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizetheprimarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichcontinuedoperationisallowedandprimarycontainmentisinoperable.L.3CTS4.6.2.1.drequiresavisualinspectionoftheexposedaccessibleinteriorandexteriorsurfacesofthesuppressionchamberevery18months.Nospecificacceptancecriteriaarespecified.CTS4.6.1.4.1requiresthesameinspectionatascheduleinaccordancewiththe10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlan(i.e.,ataFrequencythatisnominally40months).CTS4.6.1.4.1doesspecifyacceptancecriteria.10CFR50AppendixJalsorequiresavisualinspectionpriortoperformingaTypeAtest,andifstructuraldeteriorationthatcouldaffectstructuralintegrityorleak-tightnessisfound,theTypeAtestshallnotbeperformeduntiltheproblemisrepaired.Therefore,thespecific18monthFrequencyinCTS4.6.2.1.dhasbeendeleted,whicheffectivelychangestheactualtestrequirementFrequencyfrom18monthstotheFrequencyspecifiedinCTS4.6.1.4.1and10CFR50AppendixJ.AnhistoricalreviewhasbeenperformedanddeterminedthatwhilethereisnospecificacceptancecriteriaforthisSurveillance,ithasneverfailedtheacceptancecriteriaofCTS4.6.1.4.1or10CFR50AppendixJ.Therefore,itisacceptabletoessentiallyextendtheFrequencyofthisspecificSurveillancetoaFrequencyalreadyapprovedbytheNRCintheCTSandinregulations.L;4TherequirementinCTS4.6.2.1.e.1fortheNRCtoreviewthetestscheduleforsubsequenttestsifanyleakratetestresultisnotwithintherequiredlimitshasbeendeletedsincetheNRChasalreadyapprovedthetestschedule.ThetestscheduleisnormallyeveryoutagerequiringaTypeAtest.Ifonetestfails,thecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsdonotrequirethetestfrequencytobechanged.Thetestfrequencyisonlyrequiredtobechangediftwoconsecutivetestshavefailed,asstatedinCTS4.6.2.1.e.2.SincethetestscheduleisalreadycoveredbytheTechnicalSpecifications,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRC,thereisnoreasontohavearequirementthattheNRCreviewthetestschedule(whichwillnotchangefromthecurrenttestschedule)NMP2Revision~/

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTTEHNIALHAN-LSRESTRITIVEL.4whenonetestfails.Inaddition,anhistoricalreviewhasshownthatthis(cont'd)Surveillancehasneverfailedsincefullpoweroperationhascommenced.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.Revision/LQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.2-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTAIRLOCKSTEHNICALHAN-LSRESTRICTIV(continued)L.3Inreferencetoimmediatelymaintaininganairlockdoorclosed,theword"maintain"inCTS3.6.1.3Actionsa.1andcischangedto"verify"and1hourisallowedtocompletetheverificationinITS3.6.1.2(RequiredActionsA.1andC.2).ThischangeisacceptablebecausethelevelofdegradationassociatedwiththeCTSActionsisnoworsethanthatallowedforPrimaryContainmentIntegrity(CTS3.6.1.1)notmaintained.CTS3.6.1.1(ITS3.6.1.1)allowstheprimarycontainmenttobeinoperablefor1hour.Also,theprimarycontainmentairlockdoorsarenormallyclosedexceptforentryandexit.Therefore,theprobabilitythattheOPERABLEairlockdoorisopenislowduringthe1hourperiod.L.4NoteshavebeenaddedtoITS3.6.1.2RequiredActionsA.3andB.3toallowadministrativemeanstobeusedtoverifylockedclosedOPERABLEairlockdoorsinhighradiationareasorareaswithlimitedaccessduetoinerting.Theairlocksareinitiallyverifiedtobeintheproperpositionandaccesstothemisrestrictedduringoperationduetothehighlevelsofradiationorsincethecontainmentisinerted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheairlocksareacceptablysmall.Eliminatingthephysicaldoorverificationinareasofhighradiationandinertingremovesarisktopersonnelsafety.Also,notrequiringaccesstoareasofhighradiationtoverifypropercontainmentairlockdooralignmentreducesexposuretoplantpersonnelandisconsistentwiththeAs-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable(ALARA)concept.L.5CTS4.6.1.3.a.1requiresverifyingtheairlockdoorsealleakagerateiswithinlimitonceper7dayswhentheairlockdoorisopenedformultipleentries.TheITSwillallowthistesttobeperformedevery30days(asdescribedinRegulatoryGuide1.163,whichisrequiredtobemetinITS5.5.12).ThisextensionwasrecommendedandapprovedbytheNRCinRegulatoryGuide1.163,September1995.Areviewofmaintenancehistoryhasalsoshownthatthistestnormallypassestheleakratetest.Therefore,thistestsimplyconfirmsOperability,andtheextensiondoesnotnegativelyimpactsafety.L.6TheFrequencyfortheairlockinterlocktest,CTS4.6.1.3.candFootnote4isproposedtobechangedfrompriortoperformingSR4.6.1.3.ato24monthsinproposedSR3.6.1.2.2.Typically,theinterlockisinstalledaftereachrefuelingoutage,verifiedOPERABLEwiththeSurveillance,andnotdisturbeduntilthenextrefuelingoutage.Iftheneedformaintenanceariseswhentheinterlockisrequired,theperformanceoftheinterlockSurveillancewouldberequiredfollowingthemaintenance.Inaddition,whenanairlockisopenedduringtimestheinterlockisrequired,theoperatorfirstverifiesthatonedooriscompletelyshutbeforeattemptingtoopentheotherdoor.Therefore,theNMP2Revision+@

CCI'ffSSI~IIH~~L,.l.'3CONTAIHMENTSYSTEMS3/4.6.3PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESLIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONLto9.0.l>3.6.3EachprimarycontainmentisolationvalveandreactorinstrumentationlineexcessflowcheckvalveshallbeOPERABLE"*.r5J2rIICJ'CAI~IA'PPLICABILITY:OPERATIONALCONDITIONS1,2,and3cJtfor~o>4Ao+*A(>o<sJgP~Qpc7podsACTION:a.Withoneormoreoftheprimarycontainmentisolationvalvesinoperable,naaeasnelsavlneQ"'lO~rtiisandwithinoursether:storthe'ereoRABstatuoL.jIsolateeachaffectedpenetrationbyuseofatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheisolatedposition,"orIsolateeachaffectedpenetrationbyuseofatleastoneclosedmanualvalveorblindflane."2.3.RefuiQRafaR.f~5L.5llSSCLgL%IINRSCSP4.TheprlslonsofScification0.4arenoapplicableovidedjthatithin4hourtheaffectepenetratiiinaccord-A,&n'IOH2ora3abvproeassoclaenoTE3yapplicable,andtheappropriatA3CTIatementsforthatsstemareerfoed.Otherwise,beinatleastHOTSHUTDOWwithinthenext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWwithinthefollowing24hours.~Plpre<'~.WithoneormoreofthractorinstrumentationlineexcessflowcheckpCf'IoNvalvesinocraborationmayclnueeleci'ca1provledthatwithinhourseither;ThenoeraeavLEtatu2.hinstrumentlineisisolatedensrumen+Tc~sgg~saFOtherwise,beinatleastHOTSHUTDOWwithinthenext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWwithinthefollowing24hours.eas]9&iH&~TErI"Isolationvalvesclosedtosatisfytheserequirementsmaybereopenedonanintermittentbasisundadministrativeco+sf<7E'fo""LoceorseaesevavesmayeopeneoSg3,t,fp~administrativecontrol.~~~>61.7.3NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-21slunerAmendmentNo.37

SKE'-"3/4.4.7ISISSTEANLINEISOLATIONVALVESLIHITINGCONOITIONSFOROPERATIONLCoS~<'.4.woeafnsteam1incisolationvalves(HSIVsereansteamlintshaPERA8~~cos1ngmaesgreatertnanoraquatoanoesstnanoraquatoseconds.sr'"~>7APPLICABILITY:OPERATIONALCONDITIONSI2and3.ACTTON:gyrSop/leg(P~sPgg[~Tlat~h3oNthoneorNoreHSIVsfnoperabe:]I~oatl.Hafntaat1~thandwithin@urs,either:crabeb)Isolatetheaffectedaansteaalinebyuseoanecosedposon.~F2.Otherrfse.befnatleastNOTSHUTDOWN~fthfnthenextU.hoursandfnCOLDSHUTDOWwfthfnthefollmfng24hours.gdP~visionsSecfffon3.4no~~SURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTS4.4.7EachoftheaboverequfredHSIVsshallbeCeeonstratetfOPERASLEbyggverffyfnyfullclosurebaton3and5seconds~ntestedpursuantto~,g.l,9.,7Specfffcatfon4.0.5.NINEHILEP0INT-UNIT2AmendmentNo.263/44-33

h(/4.NTAINMMTYTM41PRIMARYNTIPRIMARYNTIINTITYIMITINNDITINFRPRATIN5ggOlJcvsst4hgCL4&q4)gv~~4sl~rImr64fciarS5'C'cQy~r3.6.1.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYshallbemaintained.~AT~IN:WithoutPRIMARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITY,restorePRIMARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYwithin1hourorbeinatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthenext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing24hour.RVANINTr.,'vSWffPg<~l~g(erI'ecvrcL4.6.1.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYshallbedemonstrated:Ac4~gg~QlByverifyingthesuppressionchamberisincmlieneewiththerequirementSpecification3.6.2.1.HAJJ.~(g~5R~(,'(3.>yg5hJISco5$(ouoF+Pqqs~fi+fe)gWQgJcialTestExcetion3.10.1Exceptvalves,blindflanges,anddeactivatedautomaticvalveswhicharelocatedinsidethecontainment,andarlocked,seaed.orotherwisesecureintecosedposition.ThesepenetrationsshallbeverifiedclosedduringeachCOLDSHUTDOWNexceptsuchverificationneednotbeperformedwhentheprimarycontainmenthasnotbeende-inertedsincethelastverificationormoreoftenthanonceevery92days.a.ereachclosingofeachpenetrationsubjecttoTypeBtesting,excepttheprimarycontainmentairlocks.ifopenedfollowingTypeAorBtest,byleakratetestingthealsy5iordwiththe10CFR50A'nff~~Qb.Atleastonceper31daysbyverifyingthatallprimarycontainmentpenetrations**not~i'n'Lgggg~3~capableofbeingclosedbyOPERABLEcontainmentautomaticisolationvalvesnrequiredSt0"r..I.tobecoseunngaccientconitionsarecoseyvnoraciv(.5utomticvvessecu.exceptas.providedinSpeciication.6.3.gc.ig2o~~u<'~p/gs)Byverifyingeachprimarycontainmentairockisincompliancewithterequirementsofo.~Specification3.6.1.3.c.S"+'6~z.ohd.So',l.>~NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-1AmendmentNo.3)(74

3.6.1.2(Continued)iaCElQH:b.ThemeasuredcombinedleakagerateonaminimumpathwaybasisforallpenetrationsandallPrimaryContainmentIsolationValves,exceptformainsteamlineisolationvalves'ndvalveswhicharehydrostaticallyleaktested,sub'ecttoTeBandCtestsequalingorexceeding0.60La.orC.Themeasuredcombinedleakagerateforallcontainmentisolationvalvesinhydrostaticallyg+IVPI~P9testedlineswhichpenetratetheprimarycontainmentexceeding1gpmtimesthetotalnumberofsuchvaives,ord.~IThemeasuredleakageratethroughanyvalvethatispartofapotentialbypassleakage~/Epathwayexceedingthelimitspecifiedin.1.2-ILA.)Restore:~<<~sP~fya.Theoverallintegratedleakageratetolessthan1.0La,andIb.ThecombinedleakagerateonaminimumpathwaybasisforallpenetrationsandallPrimaryContainmentIsolationValves,exceptformainsteamlineisolationvalves'ndvalveswhicharehydrostaticallyleaktested,subjecttoTypeBandCteststolessthan0.60La,andRgv'~4~@caPlbt~ht'ITheleakageratetolessthanorequaltothatspecifiedinthatispartofapotentialbypassleakagepatLil'LThecombinedleakagerateforallcontainmentisolationvalvesinhydrostaticallytestedlineswhichpenetratetheprimarycontainmenttolessthanorequalto1gpmtimesthetotalnumberofsuchvalveandg.3foranyvalvePvSyi.Vterr~p()Q4(4oSQS'~gyf'~p'o~~<lore4~~~~46-Se.os>cups'u~ev)ggass4'o,pqe~&hopsor>~f04kaye,a~)g1.~arg<rfy>o5gCcI(~QFVrei<4C.opa,c.lose/sfsf5~Q,sr.ursr~irt2TS,+<4o~ilgI+ExemptiontoAppendixJto10CFR50NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-3AmendmentNo.51I274

3.6.1.7drywallandsuppressionchamber12~nohand1WnchpuresuIande$.(lp.1.~'valvesshallbeOPERABLEand:IThe12~noh(2CPS*AOV105,2CPS*AOV107,2CPS*AOV109,2CPS*AOV111)and14-inch(2CPS*AOV104,2CPS+AOV106,2CPS*AOV108,2CPS*AOV110)valvesinthepurgesystemsupplyandexhaustlinesmabeopenforupto135hoursper365dasfoIVENTINGorPURGING*b.Purgesstemvalves2CPS*V105(12~nch),2CPS*A107(12~nch).2CPS*OV109(12-inc),and2CPS*AOV10(14-inch)shallbeblocketolimittheopeningto04.Purgeystemvalve2CPS*OV11112~nchshallbeockelimittheoe'to60o.soars':L~seit'tcsw&feIb,,.t.hC29$:0$AcTropfSQ,4dIrrft~refQt'Tf~sa5a.WiththedrywallandsupressionAri)o&Aplyand/orexhaustisolationvalve(s)inoperableronororourrpreItr~6'r,cosetheopenvalve(s);otherwisisoatethepenetration(s)inursorflC+(fthjC~OWNwitinthenext12hoursaninOWNw'ithinthefollowing24hours.b.~Withadrywellandsuppressionchamberpurgea/exhaustisolationvalve(s)/ICTINl~withresilientmaterialsealshavingameasur'edleakagerateexceedingthelimitofSurveillanceRequirement4.6.1.7.2,within24hourinatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthenext12hoursandinCOLD,g(QOIJ~SHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing24hours.L.r<L17Ctlh/iropogeglisflsuse?.tp~)f.g2CPS*AOV110(1Wnch),or2CPS*AOV109(12~nch)and2CPS*AOV111(12~nch),forprimarycontainmentpressurecontrol,provided2GTS*AOV101isclosed.anditsinchbypasslineistheonlyflowpathtothestandbygastreatmentsystem~egg,gl,h.lNgs~Tha135hourlimitshallnotaPPlvtothausaofvalves2cos*Aovt08itoanohlandNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-13AmendmentNo.6,68J)0 0((

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESADMINITRATIVEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2ThisproposedchangetotheCTS3.6.3,CTS3.4.7,andCTS3.6.1.7ActionsprovidesmoreexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheActionsforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3,"CompletionTimes,"theITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote2("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath")providesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingActionsforinoperableisolationvalves.ItisintendedthateachinoperablepenetrationflowpathisallowedacertaintimetocompletetheRequiredActions.Sincethischangeonlyprovidesmoreexplicitdirectionofthecurrentinterpretationoftheexistingspecification,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.TheITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSincludeNotes3and4.TheseNotesfacilitatetheuseandunderstandingoftheintentforasystemmadeinoperablebyinoperablePCIVs,thattheapplicableACTIONSforthatsystemalsoapply.ThisrequirementiscurrentlylocatedinCTS3.6.3Actionsa.4andb.2,butitdoesnotcoverallsituations.Therefore,ITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote3hasbeenaddedtocoverallsituations.ITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote4clarifiesthatthese"systems"includetheprimarycontainment.WithITSLCO3.0.6,thisintentwouldnotnecessarilyapply.Inaddition,Note4hasbeenaddedtoCTS3.6.1.7toensuretheproperactionsaretakenifpurgevalveleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallTypeAleakagelimit.TheclarificationisconsistentwiththeintentandinterpretationoftheexistingTechnicalSpecifications,andisthereforeconsideredadministrative.A.4CTS3.6.3ActionaandCTS3.4.7Actiona.1donotspecifypenetrationswithoneortwoisolationvalves.However,ITS3.6.1.3ConditionAappliesiftheaffectedpenetrationhastwovalves,andonlyoneisinoperable.Thisinherentlyensuresmaintaining"atleastoneisolationvalveOPERABLE."Inthecaseofcontainmentpenetrationsdesignedwithonlyoneisolationvalve,thesystemboundaryisconsideredanadequatebarrierandthepenetrationisnotconsidered"open"whenthesingleisolationvalveisopen.Thischangeisapresentationpreferenceandisadministrativeinnature.RevisionPQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTEHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"L.lCTS3.6.3ActionarequiresaninoperablePCIVtoberestoredortheaffectedpenetrationisolatedin4hours.CTS3.4.7ActionaalsorequiresaninoperableMSIV(whichisaPCIV)toberestoredortheaffectedpenetrationisolatedin4hours.ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionA.1allows8hourstoisolatetheaffectedpenetrationwhenanMSIVisinoperable,andITSRequiredActionC.1(secondCompletionTime)allows72hourstoisolatetheaffectedpenetrationwhenaPCIVisinoperableinapenetrationwithaclosedsystemandonlyonePCIV.FortheMSIVs,theadditional4hoursprovidesmoretimetorestoretheinoperableMSIVgiventhefactthatMSIVclosurewillresultinisolationoftheaffectedmainsteamlineandpotentialforaplantshutdown.TheadditionaltimeisreasonablesincethepenetrationcanstillbeisolatedusingtheotherMSIVandthelowprobabilityofamainsteamlinebreak.ForPCIVsinapenetrationwithaclosedsystemandonlyonePCIV,theyareeitherinaclosedsystem,asspecificallydefinedinNUREG-0800(theStandardReviewPlan),section6.2.4,ortheyareinapenetrationwhosesystempipingcommunicateswiththesuppressionpoolandisexpectedtoremainsubmergedduringtheaccident(Le.,aclosedsystemasdefinedintheUSAR).TheNRChasallowed[@frthisdesignforNMP2andotherBWRsand,whilethereasonthesetypesofpenetrationsmeettherequirementsoftheGeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)isnotspecificallydescribedintheStandardReviewPlan,theymeettheGDCrequirementsforbeingclassifiedasaclosedsystemoutsidethecontainmentbecausetheysatisfy"otherdefinedbases"establishedbytheNRCtomeettheGDCrequirements.Theadditionaltimeisreasonablefortheclosedsystemvalvessincetheintactpipingorthewatersealactsasthepenetrationisolationbarrierandensuresthattheprimarycontainmentboundaryismaintainedintactuntilanotherbarriercanbeestablishedtoisolatethepenetration.ThisadditionaltimealsoavoidsthepotentialforaplantshutdownandprovidestimetorepairtheinoperablePCIVinlieuofisolatingthepenetration(whichcouldresultinaninoperableECCSsubsystem,sincethewatersealedPCIVsareonlyinECCSpenetrations).L.2CTS3.6.3Actiona,CTS3.4.7Actiona,andCTS4.6.1.1.blistsome,butnotall,ofthepossibleacceptableisolationdevicesthatmaybeusedtosatisfytheneedtoisolateapenetrationwithaninoperableisolationvalve.ITS3.6.1,3ACTIONSprovideacompletelistofacceptableisolationdevices.SincetheresultoftheACTIONScontinuestobeanacceptablyisolatedpenetrationforcontinuedoperation,theproposedchangedoesnotadverselyaffectsafeoperation.Manypenetrationsaredesignedwithcheckvalvesasacceptableisolationbarriers.Withforwardflowinthelinesecured,acheckvalveisessentiallyequivalenttoaclosedmanualvalve.Forthosepenetrationsdesignedwithcheckvalvesasacceptableisolationdevices,theITSprovidesanRevision/g

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTEHNIALHANES-LESRESTRITIVEL.2(cont'd)equivalentlevelofsafety.Forpenetrationsnotdesignedwithcheckvalvesforisolation,theITSdoesnotaffecttherequirementstoisolatewithacloseddeactivatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ITSACTIONSallowingclosedmanualvalvesorcheckvalveswithflowsecuredalsoapplytoisolatingmainsteamlines,eventhoughthedesigndoesnotprovideforthesetypeofisolationdevices.Thischangeissimplyaresultofsimplicityinprovidingaconsistentpresentationforallpenetrations.WhilethisapparentflexibilitydoesnotresultinanyactualtechnicalchangeintheTechnicalSpecifications,itislistedhereforcompleteness.L.3Intheeventtwoormorevalvesinapenetrationareinoperable,CTS3.6.3Actiona,whichrequiresmaintainingoneisolationvalveOPERABLE,wouldnotbemetandanimmediateshutdownwouldberequired.ITS3.6.1.3ACTIONBprovides1hourpriortocommencingarequiredshutdown.Thisproposed1hourperiodisconsistentwiththeexistingtimeallowedforconditionswhentheprimarycontainmentisinoperable.TheproposedchangewillprovideconsistencyinACTIONSforthesevariousprimarycontainmentdegradations.ThischangetoCTS3.6.3isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizetheprimarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichcontinuedoperationisallowedandthecapabilitytoisolateaprimarycontainmentpenetrationislost.L.4CTS3.6.3Actionballows4hourstoeitherrepairtheinoperableexcessflowcheckvalveorisolatetheassociatedinstrument.ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionC.1hasextendedthistimeto72hours.Inthisevent,alimitingeventwouldstillbeassumedtobewithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis(theexcessflowlinescontainorificesandareapproximatelyi/iinchindiameter.)Allowinganextendedrestorationtime,topotentiallyavoidaplanttransientcausedbytheforcedshutdown,isreasonablebasedontheprobabilityofaEFCVlinebreakeventanddoesnotrepresentasignificantdecreaseinsafety.L.5Anallowanceisproposedforintermittentlyopening,underadministrativecontrol,closedprimarycontainmentisolationvalves,otherthanthosecurrentlyallowedtobeopenedusingCTS3.6.3LCOFootnote**andActionFootnote*.TheallowanceispresentedinITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote1,andinNote2toSR3.6.1.3.2andSR3.6.1.3.3.Openingofprimarycontainmentpenetrationsonanintermittentbasisisrequiredforperformingsurveillances,repairs,routineevolutions,etc.IntermittentlyopeningclosedPCIVsisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizetheprimarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichthePCIVisopenandtheadministrativecontrolsestablishedtoensuretheaffectedpenetrationcanbeisolatedwhenaneedforprimarycontainmentisolationisindicated.NMP2Revision+$6

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTEHNIALCHAN-LRTRICTIVEL.11(cont'd)Inaddition,anallowanceisproposedtoallowverificationofisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredtoalsobeperformedusingadministrativemeans,TheallowanceispresentedinNote2toITSRequiredActionsA.2andC.2.Plantprocedurescontroltheoperationoflocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredisolationdevices;thusthepotentialforinadvertentmisalignmentofthesedevicesafterlocking,sealing,orotherwisesecuringislow.Inaddition,theisolationdeviceswereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orotherwisesecuring.L.12CTS3.6.1.2Action(Restore)canddrequiresrestorationoftheleakagetowithinlimits,butdoesnotprovideafiniteCompletionTime.However,sincetheleakageratefromthevalvesisconsideredinthecurrentdefinitionofPRIMARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITY(CTSDefinition1.31)therestorationtimeoftheCTS3.6.1.1Action,1hour,isapplicable.Inaddition,ifapurgesupplyvalvewithresilientsealsisthereasontheleakageisnotwithinlimits,CTS3.6.1.7Actionbisrequiredtobeentered,andprovides24hourstorestoretheleakagetowithinlimits(however,sinceCTS3.6.1.1Actionismorelimiting,itwillgovernthetotaltimetorestoreleakage).ThetimestorestoretheleakagehavebeenmodifiedintheITStobe4hoursforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystemandforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepaths(whichincludespurgesupplyvalveleakage),excludingMSIVs(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionD.1,1stand2ndCompletionQgTimes),8hoursforMSIVs(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionD.1,3rdCompletionTime),and72hoursforvalvesinhydrostaticallytestedlinesonaclosedsystem(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionD.1,4thCompletionTime).Inaddition,the4hourand8hourtimesareconsistentwiththeexistingtimesallowedforotherconditionswhenvalvesinhydrostaticallytestedlines,secondarycontainment,orMSIVsareinoperable.Withoneoftheleakagesnotwithinlimit,theriskassociatedwithcontinuedoperationforashortperiodoftimecouldbelessthanthatassociatedwithaplantshutdown,sincethechangeprovidesmoretimetorestoretheleakagetowithinlimits.Thischangeisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatwouldrequiretheleakagetobewithinlimitsduringtheshorttimeinwhichcontinuedoperationisallowedwithleakageoutsidethelimits.Inaddition,forthehydrostaticallytestedlinesonaclosedsystem,thevalvesareeitherinaclosedsystemasspecificallydefinedinNURRG-0800,section6.2.4,orarewatersealed,and'ouldnotbeexpectedtoleakaftertheaccident(i.e.,aclosedsystemasdefinedintheUSAR).ITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote4willalsorequireimmediatelytakingtheACTIONSofITS3.6.1.1(whichreducesthetimeallowedtorestoretheleakagetowithinlimitsto1hour)ifleakageresultsintheoverallprimarycontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteriabeingNMP210RevisionAQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTEHNIALCHANES-LESRESTRITIVEL.12(cont'd)exceeded.Therefore,assuranceisprovidedthatthecurrentlylistedleakagelimitswillnotadverselyimpactprimarycontainmentOperabilityduringtheextendedtimeallowedtorestoretheleakage.L.13ThedetailsrelatingtotheLineDescriptionandTerminationRegionforthepotentialbypassleakagepathsinCTSTable3.6.1.2-1areproposedtobedeleted.Thesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheleakageratesthroughthepotentialbypassleakagepathsarewithinlimits.TherequirementsofITS3.6.1.3(whichrequirethevalvestobeOperable),SR3.6.1.3.11andSR3.6.1.3.12(whichrequirestheleakageratestobeverifiedwithinlimits),andTable3.6.1.3-1(whichliststhespecificvalvesandtheleakageratelimits)areadequatetoensuretheleakageratesaremaintainedwithinlimits.Therefore,thesedetailshavenotbeenincludedinITSTable3.6.1.3-1.L.14CTSTable3.6.1.2-1footnote*statesthatforcertainvalvesinpotentialbypassleakagepaths,theleakagethrougheachpenetrationshallbethatofthevalvewiththehighestrateinthatpenetration.ITSTable3.6.1.3-1footnote(a)willallowtheleakagethroughthepenetrationtobetheactualpathwayleakage,providedthepenetrationisisolatedbyoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.Thereasonforassumingthepathwayismaximumpathwayleakageistoaccountforasinglefailurenotclosingoneofthetwovalvesinthepenetration.However,ifthepenetrationisalreadyisolatedbyoneofthemethodsdescribedabove,thenasinglefailurecannotoccur.Therefore,itisacceptabletoassumetheleakagethroughthepenetrationistheactualleakagethroughthevalvethatisisolatingthepenetration.IfthepenetrationisisolatedbybothPCIVs,thentheleakagethroughthepenetrationisthelesserleakagerateofthetwoPCIVs.ThisallowanceisprovidedintheISTSBasesforthesecondarycontainmentbypassleakageACTION(ITS3.6.1.3ACTIOND.1Bases)andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirement(proposedSR3.6.1.3.11).L.15CTS3.6.1.7limitsthetimethe12inchand14inchpurgevalvescanbeopento135hoursper365daysforPURGINGORVENTING.Footnote~toCTS3.6.1.7modifiestherestrictiontoallowthepurgevalvestobeopenforanunlimitedamountoftimeforprimarycontainmentpressurecontrol,provided2GTS*AOV101isclosed(whichisolatesthe20inchlinetotheSGTSystem)andthe2inchbypasslineistheonlyflowpathtotheSGTSystem.TheITSdoesnotincludethetimelimitations,andreplacesthemwithspecificcriteriaforopening,Thetimelimitswerebasedonengineeringjudgementand/orearlyplantoperatingexperience,andnotbasedonanyanalyticalrequirement.Theproposedlimitsonwhenthepurgevalvesarepermittedtobeopen,providedintheNotetoproposedSR3.6.1.3.1,willensureappropriateNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTECHNICALHANES-LRTRITIVEL.15(cont'd)controls.TheNotewillcontinuetoallowthepurgevalvestobeopenforinerting,deinerting,andpressurecontrol,andwillnowallowthepurgevalvestoalsobeopenforALARAorairqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,aswellasforSurveillancesthatrequirethepurgevalvestobeopen.Thus,useofthepurgevalveswillcontinuetobeminimizedandlimitedtosafetyrelatedreasons.Theoperatinghistoryindicatesthatthesevalvesareonlyopenedforthespecifiedreasonsandforcumulativeperiodsthataregenerallylessthanthecurrentallowedcumulativetimes.Inaddition,thesevalvesarefullyqualifiedtocloseintherequiredtimeunderaccidentconditionstoisolatetheaffectedpenetrations.L.16TherequirementinCTS3.6.1.7.bandCTS4.6.1.7.1toverifytheprimarycontainmentpurgevalveswithresilientsealsareblockedtolimittheiropeningto60'r70',asapplicable,hasbeendeleted.Thelimitsontheopeningensurethevalveswillcloseduringadesignbasisaccident(LOCA)tominimizetheradiologicalconsequencestowithinthelimitsof10CFR100.Theseblockingdevicesarepermanentlyinstalleddeviceslocatedontheactuatorandwillrequireadesignchangetoincreaseordecreasethecurrentlimits.TheNMPCDesignControlProcessandMaintenanceProgramwillensuretheblockingdevicesaresetproperly,andtherefore,arequirementintheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotnecessary.Thesesettingsarenotaffectedbydrift,andtherefore,ifsetproperlythereisnoreasontoexpectachangeinthesettings.Ifmaintenancewasperformedonthevalveandtheactuatorwasdisassembled,theinstallationinstructionswillrequiretheblockingdevicessettingstobeverified.L.17TherequirementinCTS3.6.1.7Actionbtorestoretheleakagerateoftheinoperablecontainmentpurgevalve(s)withresilientsealshasbeenchangedtoallowtheisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationandtocontinueoperationswithoutarequirementtorestoretheassociatedvalves(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionE.1).Theallowanceprovidedmustuseatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasinglefailuresuchasaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalveclosed,manualvalve,orblindflange.ThisensuresthatagrossbreachofthecontainmentdoesnotexistandisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.Thisflexibilityisprovidedaslongasthisisolationisverifiedevery31days(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionE.2)andthepurgevalveleakratetestisperformedevery92daysifapurgeexhaustvalvewitharesilientsealisusedtoperformtheisolation(ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionE.3).Theseactionsassurethatthepenetrationwillnotleakinexcessoflimitsshouldanaccidentoccurwhileoperating,andthisalleviatestheneedtoshutdownthefacility.ThisnewflexibilityisacceptablesincethevalvedesignallowsindividualleakagetestingNMP212RevisionA

~4 DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTECHNICALHANGES-LSRESTRITIVEL.17(cont'd)ofeachpurgevalvewithresilientseal(designpermitsimposingabackpressureontheoutboardpurgevalves)sothatthecontainmentpenetrationmaybeisolatedbyaqualifiedvalveascloseaspossibletothecontainment.Ifbothvalvesareleakinginexcessofthelimit,amanualvalveorblindflangemaybeused.Inaddition,inallcases,theactualleakagefromthepurgevalvesisalsoevaluatedinaccordancewithoverallleakagelimitasrequiredbyITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote4.Ifthelimitisexceededduetotheactualpurgevalveleakage,ITS3.6.1.1ACTIONAwillrequireleakagetoberestoredtowithinlimitswithinonehour.Therefore,theproposedactionswillensuretheactualleakageiswithinthelimitsofthesafetyanalysis.L.18ThesurveillancefrequencyofCTS4.6.1.7.2(theleakageratetestofprimary'ontainmentpurgevalveswithresilientseals)isproposedtobeextendedfrom92daysto184daysandoncewithin92daysafteropeningthevalveinproposedSR3.6.1.3.6.Thecurrent92dayfrequencywaschosenrecognizingthatcyclingthevalvecouldintroduceadditionalsealdegradation(beyondthatwhichoccurstoavalvethathasnotbeenopened)andsincethevalvesareopenedduringtheoperatingcycleforcontainmentpressurecontrolandtocomplywiththeInserviceTestProgram.Thesurveillancetesthistoryindicatesthatthevalvesnormallypasstheleakagelimitathecurrent92dayfrequency.Sincethefailuremechanismofthesealisaresultofcyclingthevalve,thereisnoadditionalneedtoperformthetestatthecurrentfrequencyifthevalvesarenotcycled.Therefore,basedonthesurveillancetesthistoryandthefailuremechanismoftheresilientseals,theproposedchangeisadequatetoensureleakageismaintainedwithinthelimit.L.19CTS3.6.5.3Actiona.1requiressuspensionofPURGINGandVENTING(exceptwhenthecontainmentpurgefullflowlinetotheSGTSystemisisolatedasallowedbyFootnote**)within30minuteswhenoneSGTsubsystemisinoperableandCTS3.6.5.3Actionb.1requiressuspensionofPURGING,VENTING,orpressurecontrol(withnotimespecifiedtosuspendtheoperations)whenbothSGTsubsystemsareinoperable.IntheITS,theNotetoproposedSR3.6.1.3.1,whichallowsthepurgevalvestobeopenundercertainconditions,willincludetheSGTrequirementsofCTS3.6.5.3Actionsa.1(includingFootnote**)andb.1~IfthepurgevalvesareopenwhennotallowedbytheNote,ITS3.6.1.3ACTIONBwillberequiredtobeenteredasthepurgevalveswouldbeconsideredinoperable.ACTIONBallows1hourtoisolatethepenetration.Thisproposed1hourperiodisconsistentwiththeexistingtimeallowedforconditionswhentheprimarycontainmentisinoperable.TheproposedchangewillprovideconsistencyinACTIONSforthesevariouscontainmentdegradations.ThisisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizetheprimarycontainmentduringtheNMP213RevisionA

,

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVEL.19(cont'd)shorttimeinwhichcontinuedoperationisallowedwiththeSGTSysteminoperable.Inaddition,theSGTSpecification(CTS3.6.5.3andITS3.6.4.3)wouldalsoberequiringtheunittobeshutdownwhenbothSGTsubsystemsareinoperable.NMP214RevisionA

5~~j$~$bj5(o,l7CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSUPPRESSIONCHAMBER/ORYWELLVACUUMBREAKERSSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSE.6,(./4.6.4achsuressionchSEX"IR~a.Verifiedclosedatleastb.OemonstratedOPERABLE:loofez.onceperdays.kshallbe:S.$.py,(/9A,s2.ILAtleastonceper31daysandwithinhoursafteranydischargeofsteamtothesuppressionchamberfromthesafety/reliefvalves,bycyclingeachvacuumbreake~throughatleastonecompletecycleoffulltravel.Atletonceper31daysbverifyingthepositnindicator)OPELEbyobservingexptedvalvemovementringthecyinteCAtleastonceperQmonthsby;g~~~~pga)Verifyingtheopeningsetpointhecloseosition,tobelessthanorequalto0.2psid,an)erifyingtheposionindicators0LEberfanceaCHANNELCALIBRAT*Observatioofexpectedvaemovementdungcyclingtestwilleaccom-plishedfthepurposesfthissurveiancebyobservingvaepositiindicainthecontroroom.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46-37

rDISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.7-SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER-TO-DRYWELLVACUUMBREAKERSA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational),Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1433,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2ThisproposedchangetoCTS3.6.4ActionbNoteprovidesmoreexplicitinstructionsforproperapplicationoftheActionsforTechnicalSpecificationcompliance.InconjunctionwiththeproposedSpecification1.3,"CompletionTimes,"theITS3.6.1.7ConditionsBandCNote("SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachsuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerline")providesdirectionconsistentwiththeintentoftheexistingActionsforaninoperablevacuumbreaker.ItisintendedthateachinoperablevacuumbreakerlineisallowedacertaintimetocompletetheRequiredActions.Sincethischangeonlyprovidesmoreexplicitdirectionofthecurrentinterpretationoftheexistingspecification,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.3CTS3.6.4Actionbrequiresthatwithonesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakeropen,theothervacuumbreakerinthelinemustbeverifiedclosedwithin2hours.Thisessentiallyallowsbothvacuumbreakersinalinetobeopenfortwohours.ITS3.6.1.7ActionChasbeenprovidedtospecificallyrequireonevacuumbreakertobeclosedwithin2hoursifbothvacuumbreakersinonelinearefoundtobeopen.Thecurrentrequirement,ifmet,willeffectivelyensureonevacuumbreakerinalineisclosedwithinthesame2hours.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.4ANotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.6.4.a,theSurveillancethatverifiesthevacuumbreakersareclosed.Note2toSR3.6.1.7.1hasbeenaddedtoclearlystatethatthevacuumbreakersdonothavetobeclosed,whentheyareperformingtheirintendedfunction,whichistoopentorelievevacuum.SinceitisobviousthatOPERABILITYisstillbeingmaintained,thisadditionisconsideredadministrative.RELOATEDSPECIFIATINNoneNMP2RevisionAQ8

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.1.7-SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER-TO-DRYWELLVACUUMBREAKERSTECHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVEL.3(cont'd)OPERABILITYofthevacuumbreakers).Inaddition,thischangeisrecommendedbytheNRCinGenericLetter93-05,item8.4.Therefore,thisextensionintheperformanceofthisfunctionaltestfollowinganSRVdischargeisnotsafetysignificant.L.4CTS4.6.4.arequiresthatthevacuumbreakersbeclosedatalltimes;withnoexplicitallowancetobeopenwhenperformingtheirintendedfunction(i.e.,whenrelievingvacuum),andnoallowanceforopeningduringperformanceofrequiredSurveillances.ITSSR3.6.1.7.1Note1statesthatthevacuumbreakerscanbeopenedwhenperformingrequiredSurveillances.ThisadditionprovidesspecificITSdirection,whichisconsistentwiththeintentofmaintaining"OPERABLE"vacuumbreakers.Thisallowancewillnotaffecttheabilityofthevacuumbreakertoperformitsintendedfunctionsofrelievingvacuumorofprovidinganisolatedcontainmentbarrierintheeventofpositiveprimarydrywellpressure.Therefore,thischangeintroducesnonegativeimpactonsafety.NMP24RevisionA'Qg

CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSDEPRESSURIZATIONSYSTEMSSUPPRESSIONPOOLSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSD)yccfszssvg(iits,u~,>C4;pooly~pmac/i4.6.2.1ThesuppressionpoolshallbedemonstratedOPERABLE:0R.~g,g,i,)a.b.Byverifyingthesuppressionpoolwatervolumetobewithinthelimitsatleastonceper24hours.Atleastonceper24hours~nOPTONALCONN1orbyverifyingthesuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperaturetobelesshanorequalto90F,except:1.Duringtestingthataddsheattothesuppressionpoolverifythesuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperaturetobelessthanorequalto105Fatleastonceper5minutes.2.p&fvl&~Pc+dAalWhensuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperatureisgreaterthanorequalto90F,verifyatleastonceperhourthat:a)Suppressionpoolaveragewatertemperatureislessthanorequalto110F,andb)THELPOWERislessanorequaltooTEDLPORaftersuppressinpoolaveragetertemperatehasd43.Followinascramveraewaterteratureverifysuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperauretobelessthanorequalto1204Fatleastonceper30minutes.c.Byverifyinatleast20suppreonpoolwatertemperateinstrumenta-tionchannes"OPERABLE'byperfanceofa:1.CHANLCHECK.atleastoeper24hours,2.CHANELFUNCTIONALTESTtleastonceper31da,and3.CHAELCALIBRATION~leastonceper18mons,withthwaterhightemperturealarmsetpoints<4Ffor10ofthem-perat'instrumentsand1104Ffor10oftheteeratureinstrums.L,3(gz"Atleaonepairineachof10suppressionpoolectorswiththelarmset-pointlternatingbetweeadjacentsectors.~~Calibtionexcludesseors;sensorscomparissshallbemadenlieuofcaliation.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/46"17

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.2.1-SUPPRESSIONPOOLAVERAGETEMPERATUREADMINISTRATIVEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2A.3CTS3.6.2.1.a.2appearstorequirethe90'Fand105'Flimits(showninCTS3.6.2.1.a.2and3.6.2.1.a.2.a))toapplyatalltimeswheninOperationalCondition1or2(ITSMODE1or2).However,thesetwolimitsactuallyQ5applywhenTHERMALPOWERis>1%RTP.ThisisshownbyCTS3.6.2.1.a.2.b),whichstatesthat110'Fisthelimitwhen~1%RTP.Therefore,theITSLCOforthesetwolimitshasbeenclarifiedtobeat>1%RTP(ITSLCOs3.6.2.1.aandb),andtheACTIONShavebeenmodifiedtoonlyrequirepowertobedecreasedtoM1%RTP(ITS3.6.2.1ACTIONB)inlieuoftheCTS3.6.2.1Actionsb,b.1,andb.2.a)toshutdowntheunittoMODE3andMODE4.OnceTHERMALPOWERis(1%RTP,theLCOismetifsuppressionpooltemperatureisC110'F,thus,ashutdowntoMODEQg3andMODE4isnotrequired,asstatedinCTSLCO3,0.2.Assuch,thischangeisconsideredapresentationpreference,whichisadministrative.Theserequirements(CTS3.6.2.1.b,CTS3.6.2.1Actione,andCTS4.6.2.1.d,e,andf),relatingtothedrywell-to-suppressionchamberbypassleakagelimit,havebeenmovedtoITS3.6.1.1,inaccordancewiththeformatoftheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1433,Rev.l.AnytechnicalchangestotheserequirementswillbeaddressedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:3.6.1.1.RELOCATEDSPECIFICATINSNoneTEHNICALCHAN-MRERESTRITIVEM.1CTS3.6.2.1.a.2.c)allowsthesuppressionpooltemperaturetobeincreasedto120'Fwiththemainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVs)closedfollowingascram.ITS3.6.2.1ACTIONE,whichrequiresreactorvesseldepressurizationto(200psigwhenpooltemperatureexceeds120'F,doesnotdependuponiftheMSIVsareopenorclosed.Ifpooltemperaturereaches120'F,significantheatNMP2Revision

~i DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.2.1-SUPPRESSIONPOOLAVERAGETEMPERATURETEHNIALHAN-MRERTRITIVEM.1(cont'd)couldstillbeaddedtothesuppressionpoolregardlessofMSIVpositionandtheRequiredActionisappropriate.EvenwithMSIVsopen,theremaybenoheatrejectionfromthecontainment,asinthecaseofalossofcondenservacuum.ApplyingtheACTIONSregardlessofthestatusoftheMSIVsdoesnotintroduceanyoperationthatisnotanalyzed.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperations.Inaddition,therequirementinCTS3.6.2.1.a.2.c)hasbeenremovedfromtheLCOandisnowonlyintheACTIONS.Thisisahumanfactorsconsideration.M.2TheCTSApplicabilityforthe110'Flimit(CTS3.6.2.1.a.2.b))isMODES1,2,and3withTHERMALPOWER61%RTP.TheCTSApplicabilityforthe120'Flimit(CTS3.6.2.1.a.2.c))isMODES1,2,and3.However,thecurrentACTIONSforwhentemperatureexceeds110'Frequirescrammingthereactor(CTS3.6.2.1Actionb.2.b)),andforwhentemperatureexceeds120'Fonlyrequiresadepressurizationto(200psig(CTS3.6.2.1Actionb.3),bothofwhicharestillMODE3.InITS3.6.2.1ACTIONSDandE,whentemperatureexceeds110'For120'F,theunitmustalsobeplacedinMODE4within36hours.ThisisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1,andisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationnecessarytoensurethereactorisplacedoutsidetheMODESandspecifiedconditionsofApplicabilitywhenthesesuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturelimitationsareexceeded,M.3CTS4.6.2.1.brequiresthesuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperaturetobeverifiedtobewithinlimitsonceper24hoursinOperationalCondition1or2(ITSMODE1or2).Asaresult;withtheplantinMODE3,verificationofsuppressionpoolaveragewatertemperatureisnotrequiredbytheCTS.ITSSR3.6.2.1.1requiressuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturetobeverifiedtobewithinapplicablelimitsonceper24hours.TheApplicabilityofITS3.6.2.1isMODES1,2,and3andITSSR3.0.1requiresSRstobemetduringMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityfortheindividualLCO.Therefore,ITSSR3.6.2.1.1isrequiredtobeverifiedinMODES1,2,and3.Expandingtheapplicabilityforperformanceofthesuppressionpoolaveragetemperatureverificationrepresentsanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationnecessarytohelpensurecontainmentconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysesaresatisfied.TEHNIALHNES-LRTRITIVE"G'eneric"NoneNMP2Revision>Qg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.2.1-SUPPRESSIGNPOOLAVERAGETEMPERATURETECHNIALHANES-LESSRESTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"L.1TheCTS3.6.2.1Actionb.2detailsofhowtoreducesuppressionpooltemperaturetowithinthelimits(byoperatingatleastoneresidualheatremovalloopinthesuppressionpoolcoolingmode)aretoberemovedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.Methodsforreducingsuppressionpooltemperaturetowithinlimitsarepartofacoordinatedresponsetoanunplannedeventgovernedbyplantprocedures.Thisdetailofhowtoreducesuppressionpooltemperaturetowithinlimitsisnotnecessarytoensurerestorationofsuppressionpooltemperatureinatimelymanner.TheRequiredActionsofConditionDofITS3.6.2.1ensuretheunitisplacedinanon-applicableMODEifthesuppressionpooltemperatureisnotreducedtowithinlimits.Inaddition,withtheunitinanon-applicableMODE,therequirementsofITSLCO3.0.4ensurethatsuppressionpooltemperatureisreduce'dtowithinlimitspriortoenteringanapplicableMODE.L.2ThesuppressionpooltemperatureinstrumentationspecifiedinCTS3.6.2.1Actionscandd,andCTS4.6.2.1.cdoesnotnecessarilyrelatedirectlytotheOPERABILITYofthesystem.TheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,doesnotspecifyindication-onlyequipmenttobeOPERABLEtosupportOPERABILITYofasystemorcomponent.Controloftheavailabilityof,andnecessarycompensatoryactivitiesifnotavailable,forindicationsandmonitoringinstrumentationsareaddressedbyplantoperationalproceduresandpolicies.SuppressionpooltemperatureinstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosatisfythesuppressionpooltemperatureverificationSurveillanceRequirement(proposedSR3.6.2.1.1).Ifthesuppressionpooltemperatureinstrumentationisinoperable,thentheSurveillanceRequirementcannotbesatisfiedandtheappropriateactionsmustbetakenforsuppressionpooltemperaturenotwithinlimitsinaccordancewiththeACTIONSofITS3.6.2.1.Asaresult,therequirementsforthesuppressionpooltemperatureinstrumentationareadequatelyaddressedbytherequirementsofITS3.6.2.1andSR3.6.2.1andareproposedtobedeletedfromTechnicalSpecifications.L.3Whensuppressionpooltemperatureis>90'Fand~110'F,andpoweris>1%RTP,ITSLCO3.6.2.1.aisnotbeingmet.ITS3.6.2.1RequiredActionA.1requiresverificationofsuppressionpooltemperatureonceperhourinthiscondition.Intheeventpoweris(1%RTP,theLCOisbeingmet(ITSLCO3.6.2.1.c)andproposedSR3.6.2.1.1verificationoftemperatureevery24hoursissufficient.Whenpoweris~1%RTP,theplantisessentiallyshutdown,whichistheactionrequiredshouldsuppressionpooltemperatureincreaseto>110'F.KnowledgeofcurrentpowerlevelisanNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.2.1-SUPPRESSIONPOOLAVERAGETEMPERATURETEHNILHAN-LRTRITIVL.3(cont'd)inherentrequirementfortheoperatoratalltimes.Therefore,thereisminimalsignificancetoremovingthe30minutesuppressionpoolverificationwhen>90'Fbut~110'F(inCTS4.6.2.1.b.3)andhourlypowerlevelverification(inCTS4.6.2.1.b.2.b))inthoseconditions.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.2.4-RHRSUPPRESSIONPOOLSPRAYA~DMINIA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheiTSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1433,Ifi:)Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2TheCTS3.6.2.2Actionb,footnote*requirementthatifunabletoattainColdShutdownwhentwoormoreRHRsubsystemsareinoperable,thenmaintainreactorcoolanttemperatureaslowaspracticalbyuseofalternateheatremovalmethodsisdeletedsinceitprovidesunnecessaryduplicationoftheACTIONS,containsnoadditionalrestrictionsontheoperationoftheplant,andinfact,couldbeinterpretedasarelaxationoftherequirementstoachieveMODE4.TheActiontobeinMODE4,whichismodifiedbythefootnote,adequatelyprescribestherequirementtomakeeffortsto"maintainreactorcoolanttemperatureaslowaspractical"(i.e.,theduplicativerequirementofthefootnote).IfconditionsaresuchthatMODE4cannotbeattained,theActionremainsineffect,essentiallyrequiringeffortstoreachMODE4tocontinue.Eliminationofthefootnotereflectsanadministrativepresentationpreference.CTS4.6.2.2.arequiresverificationthateachsuppressionpoolsprayvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinitscorrectposition.Thesuppressionpoolsprayfunctionismanuallyactuated(requiringrepositionofvalvesandstartingoftheRHRpumpbytheoperator).IntheCTS,thisisrecognizedandinterpretedthat"inthecorrectposition"allowsthevalvestobeinanon-accidentpositionprovidedtheycanberealignedtothecorrectposition.IntheITS,thewords"inthecorrectposition"meanthatthevalvesmustbeintheaccidentposition,unlesstheycanbeautomaticallyalignedonanaccidentsignal.Ifso,thentheycanbeinthenon-accidentposition,Thus,forRHRsuppressionpoolspraytheadditionalwords"orcanbealignedtothecorrectposition"havebeenaddedinproposedSR3.6.2.4.1toclarifythatitispermissibleforthissystems'alvestobeinthenon-accidentpositionandstillbeconsideredOPERABLE.Inaddition,sincetherearenoautomaticvalves,forthesuppressionpoolspraymode,thereferencetocheckautomaticvalveshasbeendeleted.Sincethesearethecurrentrequirements,thesechangesareconsideredadministrative.RELATEDPEIFIATINNoneNMP2Revision+Qg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.3.2-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTOXYGENCONCENTRATIONADMINISTRATIVEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomakethe1TSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1433,IQ13Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2CTS3.6.6.2Applicabilityfootnote*,whichprovidesacrossreferencetoCTS3.10.5,hasbeendeleted.TheformatoftheproposedTechnicalSpecificationsdoesnotincludeprovidingcrossreferences.ProposedLCO3.0.7adequatelyprescribestheuseoftheSpecialOperationsLCOswithoutsuchreferences.Therefore,theexistingreferenceintheCTS3.6.6.2Applicabilityfootnote*totheSpecialTestExceptionofCTS3.10.5servesnofunctionalpurpose,anditsremovalisanadministrativechange.Inaddition,theexceptionwasonlypermittedduringthestartuptestprogram,whichisnowcomplete.A.3TheCTS3.6.6.2ApplicabilityandtheActionforfailingtomeettheLCOarenotconsistent,ITS3.6.3.2revisesthepresentationoftheACTIONStobeconsistent.TheITS3.6.3.2ACTIONBonlyrequiresshutdownto15%RTP.Below15%RTP,theApplicabilityisexitedandtheACTIONSarenolongerrequired(inaccordancewithCTSandITSLCO3.0.1andLCO3.0.2).SincetheCTS3.6.6.2Actioncanalsobesuspendedat15%RTPforthesamereason,thechangeisconsideredadministrative.A.4CTS4.6.6.2requiresoxygenconcentrationinprimarycontainmenttobeverifiedwithinlimitpriortoenteringtheApplicabilityofCTS3.6.6.2(within24hoursafterTHERMALPOWERisgreaterthan15%ofRTP).Thisredundantrequirementisdeleted.CTS4.0.4andITSSR3.0.4requiresurveillancestobeperformedpriortoenteringtheApplicabilityofanLCO.Therefore,thisrequirementdoesnotneedtoberepeatedasaseparateSurveillanceFrequencyanditsdeletionisconsideredadministrative.RELOATEDPEIFIATINNoneTECHNIALHAN-MRERTRITIVENoneNMP2Revisionthg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.4.1-SECONDARYCONTAINMENT~ADMINIATIEA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2A3ThedefinitionofSECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYinCTS3.6.5.1hasnotbeenincludedintheITS.ItisreplacedwiththerequirementforsecondarycontainmenttobeOPERABLE.ThiswasdonebecauseoftheconfusionassociatedwiththesedefinitionscomparedtoitsuseintherespectiveLCO.Therefore,thereferencesinCTS3.6.5.1toSECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYarereplacedwiththerequirementforsecondarycontainmenttobeOPERABLE.ThechangeiseditorialinthatalltherequirementsofCTS3.6.5.1arespecificallyaddressedintheITSandassociatedBasesfortheSecondaryContainment(3.6.4.1),theSecondaryContainmentIsolationValves(3.6.4.2),andStandbyGasTreatmentSystem(3.6.4.3).Therefore,thechangeisapresentationpreferenceadoptedbytheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.TheCTS4.6.5.1.b.2requirementtoverifythatonedoorineachaccessisclosedhasbeenmodifiedtorequireonedoorineachaccessopeningtobeclosedinproposedSR3.6.4.1.3.TheNMP2designincludesmorethantwodoorsonsomeoftheaccesses.ThecurrentNMP2interpretationofthisrequirementisthatfortheseaccesses,therearemultipleaccessopenings,andeachaccessopeningmusthaveonedoorclosed.Therefore,thischangeisaclarificationofcurrentpractice,andassuch,isadministrativeinnature.A.4CTS4.6.5.1.b.3,relatingtothepositionofsecondarycontainmentisolationvalves,hasbeenmovedtoITS3.6.4.2,"SecondaryContainmentIsolationValves,"inaccordancewiththeformatoftheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.AnytechnicalchangestothisrequirementwillbediscussedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:3.6.4.2.RELATEDPEIFIATINNoneNMP2RevisionA'Qg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.4.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(SCIVs)HALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"L.1AnallowanceisproposedforintermittentlyopeningclosedsecondarycontainmentisolationvalvesunderadministrativecontrolasisallowedintheexistingprimarycontainmentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS3.6.3)andinITS3.6.1.3.Theadministrativecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedoperator,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom,atthecontrolsoftheisolationdevice.TheallowanceispresentedinITS3.6.4.2ACTIONSNote1andSR3.6.4.2.1Note2.Openingofsecondary'ontainmentpenetrationsonaintermittentbasisisrequiredformanyofthesamereasonsasprimarycontainmentpenetrationsandthepotentialimpactonconsequencesislesssignificant.TheproposedallowanceisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldreleaseradioactivitytothesecondarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichtheSCIVisopenandtheadministrativecontrolsestablishedtoensuretheaffectedpenetrationcanbeisolatedwhenaneedforsecondarycontainmentisolationisindicated.L.2Intheeventbothvalvesinapenetrationareinoperableinanopenpenetration,theCTS3.6.5.2Action,whichrequiresmaintainingoneisolationvalveOPERABLE,wouldnotbemetandanimmediateshutdownwouldberequired.ITS3.6.4.2ACTIONBprovides4hourspriortocommencingarequiredshutdown.Thisproposed4hourperiodisconsistentwiththeexistingtimeallowedforconditionswhenthesecondarycontainmentisinoperable.TheproposedchangewillprovideconsistencyinACTIONSforthesevarioussecondarycontainmentdegradations.ThischangetoCTS3.6.5.2isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringthesecondarycontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichcontinuedoperationisallowedandthecapabilitytoisolateasecondarycontainmentpenetrationislost.L.3CTS4.6.5.2.aisproposedtobedeleted.AnytimetheOPERABILITYofasystemorcomponenthasbeenaffectedbyrepair,maintenance,orreplacementofacomponent,postmaintenancetestingisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthesystemorcomponent.AfterrestorationofacomponentthatcausedarequiredSRtobefailed,ITSSR3.0.1requirestheappropriateSRs(inthiscaseSR3.6.4.2.2)tobeperformedtodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheaffectedcomponents.Therefore,explicitpostmaintenanceSurveillanceRequirementsinCTS4.6.5.2arenotrequiredandhavebeendeletedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.L.4TherequirementtoperformCTS4.6.5.2.bduringCOLDSHUTDOWNorREFUELINGhasnotbeenincludedinproposedSR3.6.4.2.3.TheproposedSurveillance(forafunctionaltestofeachsecondarycontainmentisolationvalve)doesnotincludetherestrictiononplantconditions.AllisolationvalvesNMP2Revisiongg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.6.4.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(SCIVs)TEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVEL.4(cont'd)canbeadequatelytestedinotherthanColdShutdownorRefueling,withoutjeopardizingsafeplantoperations.Thecontroloftheplantconditionsappropriatetoperformthetestisanissueforproceduresandscheduling,andhasbeendeterminedbytheNRCStafftobeunnecessaryasaTechnicalSpecificationrestriction.AsindicatedinGenericLetter91-04,allowingthiscontrolisconsistentwiththevastmajorityofotherTechnicalSpecificationSurveillancesthatdonotdictateplantconditionsfortheSurveillance.L.SThephrase"actualor,"inreferencetotheisolationtestsignalinCTS4.6.5.2.b,hasbeenaddedtoproposedSR3.6.4.2.3,whichverifiesthateachSCIVactuatesonanautomaticisolationsignal.ThisallowssatisfactoryautomaticSCIVisolationsforotherthanSurveillancepurposestobeusedtofulfilltheSurveillanceRequirement.OperabilityisadequatelydemonstratedineithercasesincetheSCIVitselfcannotdiscriminatebetween"actual"or"test"signals.L.6CTS4.6.5.1.b.3requiresverificationthatcertainsecondarycontainmentpenetrationsareisolated.Anallowanceisproposedtoallowtheverificationoftheisolationdevicesusedtoisolatethepenetrationsinhighradiationareastobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.TheallowanceispresentedinITS3.6.4.2RequiredActionA.2NoteandSR3.6.4.2.1Note1.Thisisacceptablesincetheisolationdevicesareinitiallyverifiedtobeintheproperpositionandaccesstothemisrestrictedduringoperationduetothehigh.levelsofradiationinthearea.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheisolationdevicesisacceptablysmall.Ifforsomereasonthesedevicesareopened(e.g.,maintenance),theassociatedprocedureorworkpackagewouldrequiretheirclosureafterworkiscompleted.TheRequiredActionorSurveillancemaybeperformedbyreviewingthatnoworkwasperformedintheassociatedradiationareasincetheisolationdevicewasclosedorifworkwasperformedinthatareathattheclosurewasverifieduponcompletionoftheworkifthevalvewasopened.NMP2RevisionA

Volume7Section3.6;ISTS/JFDs,ISTSBases/JFDs,andNSHE

(~yACTIONScontinuedCONOITIONRE()JIREDACTIONPCIVs3.6.1.3COHPLETIOHTINE(bacC,O)$.tI.)Acre)VC0N.-NOTE-OnlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswithtwoIVs.or~at.OneoraorepenetratfoflowpathswithtwoPCIVsinoperable)exceptd%bleakagenotwithinfait+E63Ar")C.~TE3A.3*c.WL)Onlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpaths~4.),l.L9withonlyonePCIV.(bOCLiII)OneoraorepenetratfonflowpathswithonePCIVinoperabl.B.lIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationfIowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautoaaticvalve,closedaanualvalve,orblfndflange.C.IIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-act1vatedautoaatfcvalve,closedaanualvalve,orblindflange.(C.2Q~-Isolat1ondev1cesfnhigh.radiationareasaaybeverffiedbyuseofadainistrativescans'hour7)-burtGrCOACT/Sc~dPe>eo<f<mCttg,<<~d'sf'~'T5TF-3aCLOctC)IEcuct}5)E~~/ifhour5KeepfekMss/>~<gIIaltt'scf.tCVE)<gpcs1cut+tc~fa~g~g~ccltct4toZcfJa(CI)<+N/cutcRy+LaVCECCloc.k<~,<Rtdoc).'or044m'oi~~V~LPaM6gIj~ilpg.g9&0+oct&rtuIS+gfIvcI<OPS.ONeoE~)CtNe~EEQ>g<~f)as~WVerifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpath1sisolated.Onceper31days~c6.lt'aACTC"OE'ER3d.t,xRc>d~</0.gacondarycontainaentbypassleakageratenotwithin11aft.4hoursQrSecrgWuiENI'INtefQ,afeact0.1Restoreleakageratetowithinlfait.(continued)PA~>Crt~(4RevI,04/07/957X4~Qrlybosfig~e48fief~QoyCfo<ekSg~~~3.6-11154cbrs@fk)4$ka+As>l'-ll)~eleqfgyq~of.~'4eSs),~~b,6,I.?4ct'ce&ata~Ps)alelEhor~EZ.g.IaAct4~s'rara/8/6)~efe,g)crate

PCIVs3.6.1.3StJRVEILLANCEREIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.&.1.3.1OnlyrequtobeaetfnNO1,2,and3.~rffyeachf3fnchpraarycontaf~ntpurgevalvefssealedosedexceptforonepurgevalvefnanetratfonflerpathbaflefnCond)onEofthfsLCO.31dSR3.6.1.3+l.yrequftobeaetnNOES2,and3.NotrequfredtobeaetDanthefnchaaryconamentvalvesareopenforressurecontrol,ALARAorafrqualftyconsfderatfonsforpersonnelentry,orSurvefllancesthatrequfrethevalvestoberovfrgu.exhausl'Finerhg~dc~Iaef4~~~VerffyeachfnchprfaarycontafMslltpurgevalvefgclosed.31daysI2jsJSsPl4QS'(contfnued)3.6-14Rev1,04/07/95

INSRTTABL3.6.1.3-1cot'dTable3.6.1.3-1(page2of2)SecondaryContainmentBypassLeakagePathsLeakageRateLimitsVALVENUMBERPERVALVELEAKRATE(SCFH)2CPS*SOV1192CPS*SOV1202CPS*SOV1212CPS*SOV1220.6252IAS*SOV1642IAS*V4482IAS*SOV1652IAS*V4492GSN*SOV1662GSN*V1702IAS*SOV1662IAS*SOV1842IAS*SOV1672IAS*SOV1852IAS*SOV1682IAS*SOV1802CPS*SOV1322CPS*V500.93750.9375(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)2CPS*SOV1332CPS*V51(a)(a)Thecombinedleakrateforthesepenetrationsshallbeg3.6SCFH.Theassignedleakageratethroughapenetrationshallbethatofthevalvewiththehighestleakagerateinthatpenetration.However,ifapenetrationisisolatedbyoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange,theleakagethroughthepenetrationshallbetheactualpathwayleakage.InsertPage3.6-18b

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESThisbracketedrequirementhasbeendeletedbecauseitisnotapplicabletoNMP2.Thefollowingrequirementshavebeenrenumbered,whereapplicable,toreflectthisdeletion.2.Thewords"inMODES1,2,and3"havebeendeletedfromITS3.6.1.3ACTIONNote4sincetherearenoPCIVleakagetestsrequiredinMODESotherthanMODES1,2,and3forNMP2(i.e.,therearenoPCIVsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODESotherthanMODES1,2,and3thathavespecificleakagelimits).Inaddition,ISTSSR3.6.1.3.2Note1,ISTSSR3.6.1.3.9Note1,ISTSSR3.6.1.3.11Note1,andtheISTSSR3.6.1.3.6Notehavebeendeletedforthesamereason.ThefollowingNoteshavebeenrenumbered,ifapplicable,duetotheseNotesdeletion.3.Thewordsinsidethebracketshavebeenmodifiedtoreflectthedifferenttypesofleakagecategories.Sincethereismorethanone,thegenericword"leakage"hasbeenusedinISTS3.6.1.3ConditionsA,B,andC.ThePCIVsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEsuchthattheyareintheaccidentconditionorcanbeautomaticallyrepositionedtotheaccidentcondition,andcertainPCIVshaveindividualleakagelimits.TheseleakagelimitsareinadditiontothetypeA,B,andClimitsrequiredbyLCO3.6.1.1,PrimaryContainmentOPERABILITY.IfatypeA,B,orClimitwereexceededduetoanindividualvalveexceedingitsspecificleakagelimit,ISTS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote4wouldrequiretheACTIONSofLCO3.6.1.1tobetaken(whichrequireprimarycontainmenttoberestoredwithin1hour).Thechangewasmadetoreflectthatdifferentcompensatoryactionsarerequireddependinguponthecauseoftheinoperability.IntheNMP2ITS,ACTIONAistakenifthePCIVisinoperableforreasonsotherthanleakage;ACTIONSDandEarerequirediftheSRsforindividualvalveleakagelimitsarenotmet.Currently(intheISTS),ConditionAwouldonlyexemptpurgevalveleakageandsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagerequirementsandConditionCdoesnotexemptanyleakagerequirements.IfaMSIVorahydrostaticallytestedvalvewasnotmeetingtheleakagelimits,ConditionAorC,asapplicable,wouldbeenteredandRequired.ActionA.1orC.1wouldberequired.TheseRequiredActionsallowthepenetrationtobeisolated.However,isolatingthepenetrationcanbeperformedbyusingtheleakingvalve.Thiswouldnotprovideadequatecompensatorymeasurestoallowcontinuedoperation.WhenaMSIVorhydrostaticallytestedvalveleakageisnotwithinlimits,ConditionDshouldbeentered.TheRequiredActionforthisConditionwouldrequiretheleakagetoberestoredwithinlimitin4hours,8hours,or72hours,Igasapplicable,consistentwiththetimeprovidedinRequiredActionsA.1andC.1toisolatethepenetration.AsdiscussedintheISTSBases,theleakagecanberestoredbyisolatingthepenetrationwithavalvenotexceedingtheleakagelimits.ThisismorerestrictivethanRequiredActionsA.1andC.1,whichallowsisolationusingtheleakingvalve.ConditionBhasalsobeenmodifiedtoexcludeleakage.ThisConditionisappropriateifthevalveisintheincorrectpositionorwillnotclose.Asdiscussedabove,theRequiredActionforConditionBwouldalsoallowtheNMP2Revision&'

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(continued)tpenetrationtobeisolatedusingtheleakingvalveifthebracketedphrasewerenotdeleted.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithproposedTSTF-207,Rev.3,exceptwhereplantspecificdifferencesapplyorconsistencyerrorswerenoted.4.TheNMP2designincludesthedrywellaspartoftheprimarycontainmentandtheprimarycontainmentisinertedwhileoperating,similartotheBWR/4design.Therefore,changeshavebeenmadetotherequirementswhichcheckproperpositionofisolationdevices,similartotheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433).5.TheNMP2designalsoincludesEFCVsandTIPs,similartotheBWR/4design.Therefore,ITS3.6.1.3RequiredActionC.1CompletionTimehasbeenmodifiedandITSSR3.6.1.3.4,SR3.6.1.3.9,andSR3.6.1.3.10havebeenadded,consistentwiththeBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433).Thefollowingrequirementshavebeenrenumbered,whereapplicable,toreflecttheadditions.Inaddition,theCompletionTimeshavebeenmodifiedtobeconsistentwithproposedTSTF-30,Rev.3,inlieuofQf<tapprovedTSTF-30,Rev.2,6.Notused.ThetimeprovidedinISTSACTIONDtorestoreMSIVleakageandhydrostaticallytestedline'leakageonaclosedsystemtowithinlimitshasbeenchanged.Thel<RequiredActionforthisconditionwouldrequiretheleakagetoberestoredwithinlimitin4hoursforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakage(nochange),4hoursforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystem(nochange),ghoursforMSIVleakage,and72hoursforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystem.Thenew8hourCompletionTimeforMSIVleakageisconsistentwiththetimeprovidedinRequiredActionA.1toisolatethemainsteamlinepenetrations.The72hourCompletionTimeforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystemisdeemedappropriatebasedinpartontheapprovedgenericchangeTSTF-30,Rev.1,whichprovidesa72hourCompletionTimeforsinglevalvepenetrationsinaclosedsystem.Someofthehydrostaticallytestedlinesareonaclosedsystem,whileI@othersarewatersealedandremainthatwayaftertheaccident.ThiswatersealeddesignwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,asdocumentedintheoriginalNMP2SERanditssupplements.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithproposedTSTF-207,Rev.3,exceptwhereplantspecificdifferencesapply.8.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.9.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.NMP2Revision+/It

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESThewordsinISTS3.6.1.3ConditionI(ITSConditionG),"orduringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs),"havebeendeleted.TherearenoPCIVsrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheNMP2ITSwhoseApplicabilityisonlyduringOPDRVs.TheonlyPCIVsrequiredwhennotinMODES1,2,and3aretheRHRshutdowncoolingisolationvalves,andtheirApplicabilityisMODES4and5.ThisConditionisstillapplicableinMODES4and5,whicharetheonlyMODESthatOPDRVscanbeperformed.Therefore,the"duringOPDRVs"ApplicabilityisduplicativeoftheMODES4and5Applicabilityandhasbeendeleted.Theacronym"OPDRVs"hasbeendefined,consistentwiththeformatoftheITS,sinceitisthefirstuseofthisterminthisSpecification.12.TheAppendixJtestingrequirementsandassociatedacceptancecriteria,orexemptionstoapplyingleakagetothatacceptancecriteria,isadequatelyaddressedinproposedSR3.6.1.1.1,ThedeletedNotes(ISTSSR3.6.1.3.9Note2andISTSSR3.6.1.3.11Note2)servenopurpose.Additionally,theITS3.6.1.3ACTIONSNote4("EnterapplicableConditions...resultsinexceedingoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria")providesappropriateandsufficientcontroltodirecttheproperACTIONSshouldexcessiveleakagebediscovered.Inaddition,theseNoteswereapprovedtobedeletedfromNUREG-1434,Rev.1perchangepackageBWR-14,C.3,butapparentlywerenotdeleted.TheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433)diddeletetheNoteforthehydrostaticallytestedlines(NUREG-1433SR3.6.1.3.14).TheNMP2secondarycontainmentbypassleakageanalysisdoesnotassumeatotalcombinedleakagerate,butassumesaleakageratethrougheachindividualleakagepath.Therefore,ITSSR3.6.1.3.11hasbeenmodifiedtoreflectthisanalysis.Inaddition,anewTable,ITSTable3.6.1.3-1hasbeenaddedtoprovidetheindividualleakagerates,consistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasis.ITSSR3.6.1.3.11providesareferencetotheTable,thusthisisconsistentwiththeintentoftheISTS(tospecifytheleakageratesintheTechnicalSpecifications).14.The10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramPlanhasbeenaddedtoSection5.5,similartoTSTF-52.TheProgramreferencestherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJandapprovedexemptions,therefore,theSurveillanceshavebeenmodifiedtoreferencetheProgram.ThisisconsistentwiththeCurrentLicensingBasisandTSTF-52.15.ThecurrentleakageratelimitfortheMSIVsisonapervalvebasisratherthanonatotalleakageratelimitthroughallfourmainsteamlines.ITSSR3.6.1.3.12reflectsthecurrentlicensingbasis.16.ISTSConditionEhasbeenmodifiedtoonlybeapplicabletothecontainmentpurgeexhaustvalves.Whilethecontainmentpurgesupplyvalvesalsohaveresilientseals,thesevalvesarealsosecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathvalves.Thustheyarenotcurrentlyalloweda24hourrestorationtimesimilartotheexhaustvalves;NMP2RevisionA

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES16.(continued)theymustberestoredin4hours,consistentwithothersecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathvalves.Inaddition,duetothischange,ISTSRequiredActionE.3hasalsobeenmodifiedtopertaintopurgeexhaustvalvesonly.17.ThewordsinISTSConditionsAandBNotesandthewordsinISTSConditionBhavebeenmodifiedtostate"twoormore"inlieuof"two."SomepenetrationflowpathsatNMP2havemorethantwoPCIVs.ThiswasrequiredbytheNRCforsomepenetrationswhoseoutsidePCIVwasnotcloseenoughtotheprimarycontainment.ThischangewillensureanLCO3.0.3entryisnotrequiredforthisdesignandtheappropriateactionsaretakenconsistentwithaplantwithonlytwoPCIVsperpenetrationflowpath.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithproposedTSTF-207,Rev.3gtisnotedthattheBWR/6ISTSmarkupprovidedinTSTF-207,Rev.3inadvertentlyleftoutthewords"ormore"inConditionB.TheBWR/4ISTSmarkupincludedthesewordsinConditionB.)NMP2Revision%'

(c~)8+</I55753f,./.'Q'KDSuppressionChaaber-to-DQhtellVacuumBreakers3.6.1n3.6CONTAIMENTSY~3.6.1.SuppressionChajober-to-OrywellVacuumBreakersC~~f,LCO3.6.1nsessionchamber-to-dwellvacuumbreakershallbe(Coos.g.V.)P~e].suppressionchr-to-4~11vacubreakersshallclosed,exceptperforsiingtheirtendedfunctionAPPLICABILITY:%DES1,2,and3.r~]ACTIONSkeRestorevacuabreaketoOPERABLEstatusos)Closetheopenvacuumbreaker.(5vSCC~gCTloalK~~Whc>~(>k.9Ad'$@.IBein%DE3.RequiredActionandassociatedCoapletionTiaenotset.4.2BeinNOEI.CNOITIONS.6'pAcr<<)O~eu.n;ii,A.Jbeg~~A.1press>onchr-to-drys.llvacuumbreakeinoperableforopening.(los&7risuo+8An%)~~rneo<<seg~i4O~S~~sg)8.OnesuppressionB.1chamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakernotclosed.GNPLETINTIHE72hourshours7$12hours36hoursAlouis5cualp'peciriiarr.u'>s~pygmypfgPgES~rCg>g~A~+5DfSlcsBN/ISTS3.6-26p~g4-zVRev1,OI/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.1.7-SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER-TO-DRYWELLVACUUMBREAKERSAnewSpecificationhasbeenadded,ITS3.6.1.7.ThisSpecificationisfromtheBWR/4ITS(NUREG-1433ISTS3.6.1.8),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtothevacuumbreakers.Therefore,theBWR/4LCOisusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ISTSarediscussed.2.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.3.ThedesigntowhichtheBWR/4ISTS3.6.1.8waswrittenrequiredallthesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerstobeclosed,butdidnotrequireallthesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerstobeOperable.Therefore,twoseparateLCOstatementswereprovided.TheNMP2currentlicensingbasisrequiresallthesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakerstobeOperableandclosed.TomorecloselymatchtheNMP2design,onlyasingleLCOstatementisneeded.ThisLCOstatementrequireseachsuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakertobeOperable,withtherequirementtobeclosedaspartoftheOperablerequirement.ThisisconsistentwiththeBWR/4ISTS3.6.1.7LCOstatement,whichrequireseachreactorbuilding-to-suppressionchambervacuumbreakertobeOperable(inthisLCOstatement,closedispartofOperable).Inaddition,sincethesecondpartofthedeletedLCOstatement("exceptwhenperformingtheirintendedfunction")isstillneededtobeincludedintheSpecification,asecondNotehasbeenincludedinSR3.6.1.7.1providingthisallowance.ThelocationoftheNoteisalsoconsistentwiththeBWR/4ISTSSR3.6.1.7.1.Also,ISTS3.6.1.8ConditionAandSRs3.6.1.8.2and3.6.1.8.3havebeenmodifiedtodeletetheword"required."4.TheNMP2designforthesuppressionchamber-to-drywellvacuumbreakershastwovacuumbreakersperline.Witheithervacuumbreakerclosed,theisolationcapabilityofthelineismaintained.Therefore,theISTS3.6.1.8ACTIONShavebeenmodifiedtoreflectthisdesignandthecurrentlicensingbasis.Thechangesareasfollows:a.ConditionAhasbeenmodifiedtoapplytooneorbothvacuumbreakersinoperableforopeninginthesameline.TheRequiredActionhasalsobeenmodifiedtorequiringrestoringbothvacuumbreakers(ifbothareinoperable)toOperablestatus.ThesechangesareconsistentwiththeNUREG-1433ISTS3.6.1.7,ACTIONC,whichallows72hourstorestoreallvacuumbreakersinonelinetoOperablestatus.b.ANoteisincludedinConditionBtoallowseparateentryonaperlinebasis.ThisNoteisconsistenttotheNoteprovidedinNUREG-1433ISTS3.6.1.7.C.ConditionBhasbeenmodifiedtoapplytomorethanonevacuumbreakerline,butonlyifoneofthetwovacuumbreakersisclosed(i.e.,onevacuumbreakerisnotclosedinoneormorevacuumbreakerlines).Thetimeallowedtoclosetheopenvacuumbreakerhasbeenchangedto72hours.WithoneofthetwoNMP2RevisionQQg

RHRSuppressionPoolCooling3.6.2.33.6CONTAINNENTSYSTENS3.6.2.3ResfdualHeatRemoval(RHR)SuppressionPoolCoolingLCO3.6.2.3TwoRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingsubsystemsshallbeg<O7.4.i3)OPEAABLEAPPLICABILITY:NOES1,2,and3.3.4.i.3$ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCONPLETIONTINEI3.6.2.3$c.'t<<)A.OneRHRsuppressionA.lpoolcoolingsubsysteminoperable.RestoreRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.7days3.6xi3P.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotme..1BetnNOE3.Q.2BefnNOE4.12hours36hoursAc.rgTwoRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingsubsystemsfnoperable.SilPea~+~~+~K8hoursUDp~shaimpoatcooti~,4OPERA8t.'Ks,ky.As.NR/6STS.3.6-33Rev1,04/07/95 0

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.2.3-RHRSUPPRESSIONPOOLCOOLING1.TheNMP2designdoesnotincludeanyautomaticallyactuatedRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingvalves.TheRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingmodeismanuallyactuated.Therefore,theword"automatic"inITSSR3.6.2.3.1hasbeendeleted.2.EditorialchangemadetobeconsistentwithothersimilarrequirementsintheITS.3.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.4.5.TheNMP2designonlyusestwoofthethreeRHRpumpsinthesuppressionpoolcoolingmode.Therefore,ISTSSR3.6.2.3.2hasbeenmodifiedtoonlyrequirethe"required"RHRpumpstobetested.Thischangeisconsistentwiththeuseoftheword"required"intheITS.AnewSpecificationhasbeenadded,ITS3.6.2.4.ThisSpecificationisfromtheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433ISTS3.6.2.4),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtoRHRsuppressionpoolspray.Therefore,theBWR/4LCOisusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ISTSarediscussedintheJustificationforDeviationsforITS:3.6.2.4.6.Thewords"ofConditionAorB"(asmodifiedbyTSTF-230)havebeendeletedtobeconsistentwithallothersimilarConditionsintheITS.TheformatoftheITSisnottousethe.term"ofConditionX"inaCondition,whentheConditionappliestoallConditionsprevioustoitanditisthelastConditionintheACTIONSTable.NMP2Revisionhg

PrisaryContainmcntHydrogenRecombiners3.6.3.13.6CNTAINENTSYSTEHS3.6.3.1PriaaryContainaentHydrogenRecoebinersIermenyintalecLCO3.6.3.1Twopriaarycontainaenthydrogenrecoebinersshallbe))OPEEAELE,APPLICABILITY:HOOES1and2.Appl3S.E.i),ACTIONSCNOITINRE/VIREOACTINCNPLETINTINE~~A.OneprimaryA~t)otoneennntehydrogenrecoabinerinoperable.boo.L.tA.1-NTE-LCO3.0.Iisnotapplicabl>>.RestoreprisarycontaitmenthydrogenrecoabinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysdPCL,Z)B.Tmpriaarycontainaenthydrogenrecoabinersinoperable..B.1Verifybyadainistrativescansthatthehydcontrolfunctiaaintained.1hourper12hoursthereafterB.2Restoreoneprfaary7dayscontainaenthydrogenreclebinertoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)BN/6STS3.6-37Rev1,04/07/g5

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.3.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTHYDROGENRECOMBINERSThisreviewer'stypeofnotehasbeendeleted.ThisinformationisfortheNRCreviewertobekeyedintowhatisneededtomeetthisrequirement.Thisisnotmeanttoberetainedinthefinalversionoftheplantspecificsubmittal.2.Theproperplantspecificinformation/nomenclature/valuehasbeenprovided.3.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.4.TheCurrentNMP2LicensingBasisdoesnotincludeISTSSR3.6.3.1.2,whichrequiresavisualexaminationofeachprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinerenclosureandverificationthatthereisnoevidenceofabnormalconditions.CTS4.6.6.l.a(ITSSR3.6.3.1.1)andCTS4.6.6.1.b.2(ITSSR3.6.3.1.2)requireaHydrogenRecombinersystemfunctionaltestandaheaterresistancetogroundtest,respectively.ThisCTStesting,whichismaintainedintheITS,providesadequateperiodicsurveillancetestingtoensuretheOperabilityoftheHydrogenRecombiners.AreviewofthehistoricalsurveillanceandmaintenancedatademonstratetherewerenofailuresoftheHydrogenRecombinerssincetheissuanceoftheoperatinglicense(i.e.,approximately12years)thatwouldwarranttheinclusionofvisualexaminationofeachprimarycontainmenthydrogenrecombinerenclosureonaperiodicbasistoensuretheOperabilityofthehydrogenrecombiner.Furthermore,areviewofthevendormanualsupportsthispositioninthattherearenovendorrecommendationstoperformsuchavisualexamination.Accordingly,NMPCconcludesthatrequiringavisualexaminationofeachprimarycontainmentrecombinerenclosureatperiodicintervalsisnotnecessaryandISTSSR3.6.3.1.2hasnotbeenincludedintheNMP2ITS.5.AnewSpecificationhasbeenadded,ITS3.6.2.2.ThisSpecificationisfromtheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433ISTS3.6.3.3),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtooxygenconcentrationrequirement(NMP2inertstheprimarycontainmentsincethecontainmentisaMarkII).Therefore,theBWR/4LCOisusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ISTSarediscussedintheJustificationforDeviationsforITS:3.6.3.2.6.Typographicalerrorcorrected.NMP2RevisionAQB

(cps)SURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE+SecondaryContainmentg3.6.4.1FREQUENCYHQVerify)fsecondarycontainmentFc'orisclosed,rentracle31days2.SR3.6.4.1.4VerifynSGTCeasedrau~do~~sucontainmentto~in5thee.25inchofvacuumecondu5I4c}o~can'4aintailvteraueforouratest~ougSR3.6.4..5Verifsuvincovacuumeseonarconacwrate5c~2b7omonthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIgV',monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISBN/6STS3.6-46Rev1,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.6.4.1-SECONDARY'ONTAINMENT1.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.2.TheallowanceintheCTSthatbothdoorscanbeopenduringentryandexithasbeendeleted.Thus,theallowanceintheITSisnotnecessary.ThisisconsistentwiththesameSRinNUREG-1433,Rev.1.TheNMP2designwithrespecttothenumberofdoorsinanaccessopeningisconsistentwiththeBWR/4design(2doorsperaccessopening),nottheBWR/6design(onedoorperaccessopening).3.ISTSSRs3.6.4.1.4and3.6.1.4.5areteststhatensuretheSecondaryContainmentisOperable;theleaktightnessoftheSecondaryContainmentboundaryiswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.However,theyarewritteninsuchamannerthattheyimplythatifaSGTsubsystemisinoperable,theSRsarefailed("Verifyeachstandbyastreatment(SGT)subsystemwill/can...").Asstatedabove,thisisnottheintentoftheSRs.Therefore,toensurethismisinterpretationcannotoccur,theSRshavebeenrephrasedtomoreclearlyconveytheoriginalintentoftheSRs,toverifytheSecondaryContainmentisOperable.Withthenewwording,ifaSGTsubsystemisinoperable,SRs3.6.4.1.4and3.6.4.1.5willstillbemetandonlytheSGTSystemSpecification,LCO3.6.4.3,willberequiredtobeentered.TheSRswillstillensureeachSGTsubsystemisused(onaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS)toperformtheSRs.NMP2RevisionQg

PriaaryContainaentB3.6.1.1B3.6CONTAIWENTSYSTENSB3.6.1.1PriaaryContainacnta4ThefunctionofthepriaarycontainsensosoateandcontainflsslonproductslansronthcRaactorprlnary~3Systeafollmtingapcsignasisccidentanconf1nethepostulatedreeaseofradioactiveaaterialtoLoch)withinliaits.Thepriaarycontairaentconsistsofasteelined,reinforcedconcretevessel,erichsurroundstheReactorPriaarySysteaandprovidesanessentiallyleaktightbarrieragainstinuncontrolledreleaseofrad1oactiveaaterialtotheenvironaent.Additionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfroethefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthepriaarycontainaentataospherefollowingaccidentcond1t1ons.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthepriaarycontainaentboundaryareapartoftheprimarycontainsentleaktightbarrier.Toaaintainthisleakt1ghtbarrier:a.Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentcond1t1onsaree1ther:1.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautoaaticcontainaentisolationsystea,or2.closedbyaanualvalves,blindflanges,orde-activatedautoaaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedpositions,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.1.3,'PriaaryContainaentIsolationValves(PCIVs)',b.PrimarycontaitaentairlocksareOPERABLE,.exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.1.2,'PriaaryContairaentAirOohdoeafpJc.Allequipeenthitchesareclose+andd.Thegg%Qgi~sealingatchanisaassociatedHth@netrationsOPERABoMCCOnp~<(~i-)~<>ibllsoori>i')NR/6STSB3.6-1Rev1,Ol/01/95

PrfaaryContafrmcntB3.6.1.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNafntainfngtheprfaarycontafnaentOPERABLErequirescliancewxamfntionsand1akagerateestrequresentsof10CFRnxFaureoaearlockpleakaQ(SR3.6.1.2.1econaryT<>"~~cntbleakae(SR3.6.1.3.,resilienseaprfaarycontermnpurgevalveleakagelhSR3.6.1.3.6,oraafnsteaaisolationvalveleakSR3.6.1.3doesnotnecessarilyresultfnafailureoffapactofthefailureto@acttheseSRsaustbeevaluatedagainsttheTypeA,Bcriteriaof10CAppendixJleftNod~hefirststartupafterpeoraingarequiredIOCFR5ndfxJleakagetestfsrequiredtobec0.6L.forcoabfnedypeZpandCleakagea0.75L,foroveraT1TypeAleakage.Atgallothertfaesberequiredleakageratetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakageliaitof51.0L,.At51.0L,theoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassuiaptfonsofthesafet7~g~I'~>rEE>"alsfs.TheFrequencyfsrequiredbyA>AppexfchleeFrequencextensionsdoesgp5gE~<gg.(I~ThestructualintegrityoftherfaarycontainaentensuredbyhesuccessfulcomptionofthePrfaaryContainTendonSurveillanPrograaandbyasciatedvisualfpectfonsofthest1linerandpenetrfonsforevfdencofdeteriorationobreachofintegrit.ThisensurethatthestructuraintegrityofthepfsarycontafntAllbeaafninedfnaccordanceththeprovifonsofthePrfaaContainmentTendonurveillancaN.TestingandFquencyareconsisttAththerecndatfonsofRegatory6ufde1.35(R.5).REFERl9R'.ESl.,Section26.2~l32.~,Section$15.6.5(continued)NR/6STSB3.&4Rev1,04/07/95

PrimaryContainmentAirLocksB3.6.1.2LCO(continued)sufficienttoprovidealeaktightbarr1erfollowingpostulatedevents.Nevertheless,bothdoorsarekeptclosedwhenthea1rlockfsnotbeingusedfornormalentryfntoandex1tfromprimarycontainment.APPLICABILITYInNOESI,2,and3,aOBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtoprimarycontainment.InNOES4and5,theprobabflftyandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelfmftatfonsoftheseNOES.Therefore,theprimarycontafnmentafrlockfsnotrequ1redtobeOPERABLEfnNOES4and5topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromprimarycontainment.ACTIOKS~~QQEECk4LAtoooUBagvgDAB}ootoo)loB'f~%5}+EIRE>$+I}cLEA43I~/go)EPIA(N'ASSTE'-c.)~5Mt-dOf/LEOPIE'LISLEd~Qy.cEE.P}.d~Ei~d}+We,e~4E~<uk~>b~auh4CE.St~re,SEOPCEhbuh~riSr~Q}EEhRe/Coo-p+QOPPootfhdoC'~echooEOoofodf4V%lgEh~de)iC,TheACTIOKSaremodifiedbyKoteI,whichallowsentryandex1ttoperformrepairsoftheaffectedafrlockcomponent.Iftheouterdoorfsinoperable,then1tmaybeeasilyaccessedformostrepaf~.It1spreferredthattheafrIElockbeaccessedfrominsideprimaryconta1nmentbyenter1ngthroughth>>otherOPERABLEafrlock.However,ffthisfsnotpracticable,orffrepairsoneitherdoormustbeperformedfromthebarrelsideofthedoor,then1tispermissibletoentertheafrlockthroughtheOPERABLEdoor,~whichmeanstherefsashorttimeduringwhichtheprimarycontainmentboundaryfsnotintact(duringaccessthroughthoOPERABLEdoor).ThoOEED~tooothoOPERABLEdoor.even1fftmeanstheprimarycontnmenunarystemporarilynotintact,fsacceptableduetothelowprobabilftyofaneventthatcouldpressurizetheprimarycontainmentduringtheshorttfmfnwhichtheOPERABLEdoorfsexpectedtobeon.oormusspedfateclosed.Kote2hasbeenincludedtoprovideclar1ffcatfonthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryfsallowedforeachafrlock.Thisfsacceptable,sincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperableafrlock.ComplyfngwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andasubsequentinoperableafrlockisgovernedbysubsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions;(continued)BN(6STSB3.&4RevI,04jOT/95 0

PrimaryContainmentAirLocksB3.6.1.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)Theseala1rskpressure1sverifitobeat2[90]s1gevery7daysensurethatthesealystearemainsviae.Itestbeeckedbecause1tcoulbleeddownduringfollowingcessthroughtheaitock,whichoccursregularlyThe7dayFrequencyasbeenshowntoacceptethroughoperatingrienceandiscoideredadequa1nviewoftheothindicationsavailletooperionspersonnelthattesealairflaskssureislow.~pt7nohorna,l(Theairlockinterlockmechanismisdes1gnedtopreventsimltaneousopeningofbothdoorsntheairlock.Sinceboththeinnerandouterdoorsofairlockaredesignedtowithstandtheaaxiaaedpostaccidentprimarycontainmentpressure(Ref.,cosureofe1therdoorwillsupportprimarycontainmentOPERABILITY.Thus,theinterlockfeaturesupportsprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYwhiletheairlockisbeingusedforpersonneltransitinandoutofthecontainment.Periodictestingofthisinterlockdemonstratesthattheinterlockwillfunctionasdesignedandthatsimltaneousinnerandouterdooropeningw111notinadvertentlyoccur.Duetothepurelymechanicalnatureofthisinterlock,andgiventhattheinterlockmensmchallengedwhentheprimarycontainmentdoor1dga9$5,thistestisonlyrequiredtobeperformedgaproc,1redthaTheQRZ+wrequencyisbasedonengineeringudgmentand1sconsideredadeuateasvsucjynohcAI/i"7cgun~~e~yf+A.4slocgAsealpneticsystemtesttonsurethatpssuredoesnotdecayarateequivalento>[2]psigoraperiodof[M]houfroman1nitialpsureof[90]sigisaneffectileakageratetestverifysystperformance.TheflmonthFrequencyisasedonthetoperformthisurveillanceundertcond1tionsttapplyduringaPs'-(7BN/6STSB3.6-13(continued)RevI,N/07/95

every24months.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage,andthepotentialforlossofprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.e2onuencorinerocisustiiedonenencoratingperience.Operatingexperiencehasshownthesecompo'nentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.InsertPageB3.6-13

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.1.2-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTAIRLOCKS1.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.2.Thisbracketedrequirement/informationhasbeendeletedbecauseitisnotapplicabletoNMPC.3.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.4.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.5.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.6.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.ThesewordshavebeendeletedsincetheprimarycontainmentmayneedtobeenteredforreasonsrelatedtoTSthatarenotspecificallyon"equipment."Thiscouldincludesamplingandinspections.TheintenthasnotchangedinthatitmuststillberelatedtoTS.8.ThechangehasbeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsofthegBases.NMP2Revision/r'g

~.

PCIVsB3.6.1.3B3.6CNTAINENTSYSTB5B3.6.1.3PrfaaryContafnaentIsolationValves(PCIVs)I~prnorConw(hlnOntbov~lCriSmairbtu.ThefunctionofthePCIVs,fncoabfnatfonwithotheraccidentaftfgatfonsysteas,fstolfaftffss1onproductreleaseduringandfollowingpostulatedDesignBas1sAccidents(DBAs)towithinlfafts.PrfaarycontafnaentisolationwithinthetieslfaftsspecifiedforthosePCIVsdesignedtocloseautaeatfcallyensuresthatthereleaseofradioactiveaaterfaltotheenvfrointwillbeconsistentwiththeassuiptfonsusedfntheanalysesforaDBA.TheOPERABILITYrequfreaentsforPCIVshelpensurethatanadequateprfaarycontainmentboundary1smaintainedduringandafteranaccidentbyafnfafzfngpotentialpathstotheenvfronaent.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequfreiaentsprovideassurancethattheprfaarycontainmentfunct1onassuaedfnthesafetyanalysiswillbeaafntained.Theseisolationdevicesconsistofeitherpass1vedevicesoract1ve(autoaatfc)devices.Nanualvalves,de-activatedautoeatfcvalvessecuredfntheirclosedposftfon(fncludfngcheckvalveswithflowthroughthevalvesecured),blindangeandclosedsysteasareconsideredpass1vedevices.Checkvalves,orotherautomaticvalvesdesignedtoclosewithoutoperatoractionfollowinganaccident,areconsideredactivedevices.Twobarriersfnseriesareprovidedforeachpenetratfosoanosngecefailureormalfunctionofanactiveconentcanresultfnoepalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedslfaftsassuaedinthesafetyanalysis.Oneofthesebarriersaaybeaclosedsystea.TheQQandgginchrfaarycontainmentpurgevalvesarePCIVsthatarealffforuseduringallorationalonons.andinchconalA$8npurgevalvesareoraallymaintaincosedfnNOES1,2,and3oensupurgevalvesghbewhen8Rbeingusedforressurecontrol,,orarlCXCCPP+<Ietc&<(ious'~(r.Q(~vot+oloweKrsannA~r>ck49&fP4utc~$lioral~r"~~~rio43<J.BN/6STSSwc+ca~/~(,B3.6-15(continued)Rev1,~/O7/gS

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLEThePCILCOwasderivedfromtheassumptionsrelatedSAFETYANALYSEStominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventory,andestablishingtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringmajoraccidents.Aspartoftheprimarycontainmentboundary,PCIVOPERABILITYsupportsleaktightnessofprimarycontainment.Therefore,thesafetyanalysisofanyeventrequiringisolationofprimarycontainmentisapplicabletothisLCO.e.g(TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialforwhichtheconsequencesaremitigatedbyPCIVsarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)amainsteamlinebreak(lSLBQ2a~k>5(R~.phadeCpi<or44<lA~.egfoaas<<n+i~iSsh$$vvS~jsa~&StVC(oatyrcCs'hc.PWOSi'rarp~OhrCrf~.+en//v'a+)ssralg5rS'(ar,v)<<4'nseclosteventse,tsassumedtaepnmarya~ndKBmAttadsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenviroracntiscontrolled.TheDBAanalsisassmesthat60sec~asoaonoprimarycontainment1scompleteaneaeterminated,exceptforthemaximumallowableeac,aoofsecondsincessignaldel,dieselgtorstart(forlossofffsitepower),ndPCIV.Jstetimes.singlefailurecriterionrequiredtobeimposedintheconductofunitsafetyanalyseswasconsideredintheoriginaldesignoftheprimaryconta1nmentpurgevalves..Twovalvesinseriesoneachpurgelineprovideassurancethatboththesupplyandexhaustlinescouldbeisolatedevenifasinglefailureoccurred.Ps.and.Intheanalysisforeachoftheseicee,1sassumedthatPCIVsareeitherclosedorfunctiontoclosewithintherequiredisolationtimefollowingeventinitiation.ThisensuresthatpotentialpathstothaanrironnantthroughPCIVs(inoludingprinarycontainmentpvalves)areminimized.Oftheeventn~erencthe55ksemlsmsngeventueroogcaconsequences.Theclosuretimeofthe~ainsteamisolationvalves(NSIVs)isasignificantvariablefromaradiologicalstandpoint.TheKSIVsareiredtoclosein3to5seconds,sincethesecondsuretneanalsis3Ss.'sar.BN/6STSB3.6-16(continued)Rev1,04/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)[Thepurgevavesmaybeunabletoclose1nthevironmentfollow1nga.Therefore,achofthepurgealvesisrequiredtoinsealedcloduringNOES,2,and3.Inthis,thesinglefairecriterioninsapplicabltotheprimarycotainaentpurgelveduetofailure1thecontrolcircitassociatedwheachvale.Aga1n,tprimarycontaintpurgevalveesignpreudesasinglfailurefromcisingtheprirycontaimentboundaaslongasthestemisoperatinacconcewithtisLCO.]PCIVssatisfyCriterion3of,g~~~5As)Qg~~<0CBPSrg~pJC+~gp~"~<<~re~e,~++cCa)gg,t<4g,'g'3ePc(gg~f~44~c4~rg~Lgg;q~(e/~~elg~(0~~~.4~eelP+~li),pg"ŽPCIVsformapartoftheprimarycontainmentboundary.ThePCIVsafetyfunctionisrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishingtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringaMA.Thepoweroperated,automaticisolationvalvesarerequiredtohaveisolationtimeswithinlia14andactuateonanautomaticisolationsignal.closeunderccid7cond1tonsestsealedorblocknitobeThevavescoveredbythisLCOare0stweirassociatedstroketimsin+8gQRD~Wf.4LQjv~~~ThenormallyclosPCconsideredOPERABLEwhenrrvalvesarecloseropenadainistrattfrecontrolcvavesree-acanercosedition,blinangesahesepivesolationvalvesanddevicesarethoselistedinerence(P.Purgevalveswithresilientseals,secondarybypassvalves,HSIVs,andhydrostaticallytestedvalvesmustmeetadditionalleakageraterequirements.OtherPCIVleakageratesareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.1,'PrimaryContainment,'sTypeBorCtesting.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethatthePCIVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstominimizethelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishtheprimarycontainmentboundaryduringaccidents.NR/6STSB3.6-17(continued)RevI,Ol/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASESACTIONS(continued)subsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions.TheACTIONSaremodifiedbyNotes3and4.Note3ensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystem(s)arerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablePCIV(e.g.,anFJeergencyCoreCool1ngSystemsubsystemfs1noperableduetoafailedopentestreturnvalve).Note4ensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretakenwhentheprimarycontainmentleakagelimitsareexceeded.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theseACTIONSarenotrequiredevenwhentheassociatedLCOisnotmet.Therefore,Notes3and4areaddedtorequiretheproperactionstaken.rale>HziVf<g,f~q~~~yP>ge,cr4w/-'4(ve(~p~~r<g<t>>>4f'~f(><<4g(;.,(~<)CMithoneormorepenetrationflowpathsw1thonePCIVinorablexceptforsecondarycontainmentypasseaagotwithinat,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathestbeisolated.Themethodof1solationaustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,ablindflange,andacheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.Forpenetrat1onsisolatedinaccordancew1th'equiredAct1onA.l.thedeviceusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavailableonetotheprimarycontainment.TheRequiredActionaustbecompletedwithinthe4hourCompletionTime(8hoursformainsteamlines).Thespecifiedtimperiodof4hoursisreasonableconsideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingprimarycontainmentOPERABILITYduringNOESI,2,and3.Formainsteamlines,an8hourCompletionTimeisallowed.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursfortheaainsteamlinesallowsaperiodoftimetorestoretheMSIVstoOPERABLEstatusgiventhefactthatNSIVclosurewillresulttn1solationof,themainsteamline(s)andapotentialforplantshutdown.Foraffectedpenetrationsthathavebeen1solatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathaustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.This1snecessarytoensurethatprimaryconta1nmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowingBN/6STSB3.6-19(continued)RevI,04/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3ACTIONS~Q$$0fhOI~g)kS5C-Ikr&gQi(g.inMOKfOemrejUS~)4,e[g~$gWF-~teLLindL2(continued)anaccident,andnolongercapableofbeingautoaaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosedevesidetherimarcontairuaennandcapeong~spositonarentecorreposition.TheCompletionTiaeforthisverificationof'onceper31daysforisolationdevicesou1riaacontairaenssappropraebecausetheevcesareoperaunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheiraisalignment1slow.Frdevicesins1detisacainmenscifiedtaeperoprortoenerngorromifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days,'sbasedoengineeringSudgaentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityofthedevicesandtheexistenceofotheradministrativecontrolsensuringthatdeviceaisaligneentisanunlikelypossibility.ConditionAiscodifiedbyaNateindicatingthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletothosepenetrationflowpathsPCIVs.ForpenetrationflowpathswithonePCIV,ConditionCprovidesappropriateRequiActions.&elRequiredActionA.2isaodifiedbyappestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativescans.Allowingverificationbyadwinistrativescansisconsideredaccetable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestr.Therefore,theprobabilityofwisalignment4Pproperposition,1slow.Kl0P'~rq)gNthoneorsorepenetrat1onflowpathswithtwoIVsre,eithertheinoperablePCIVsestberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathaustbeisolatedwithinIhour.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.(continued)BN/6STSB3.6-20RevI,N/07/95

T4@r.r~~O>G~cs4fhOtprtg'kr~"SSar~Q~IISC;ydseptppt~<~S@++~~~>>%FOCIIgAen~<Atsre44>>Lh~>(ccRsttC+p)Op~+~'4I'W~C4fStupor/'~~pCssvaB3.6.1.3MPI8>a.PY~durr+QoggBASESOrCeykQrgeCae~rq"~'"~t"I"gpssledCegtv'~err.~,p~ce>L.~3v4&'leekaye(+0orS~~shb~ll~4<icekcg~raQof~I%'~(FP.qpat~sS'eQctpkLf~t4~"O~ts(CFrVS)~dPQps84rgag~6.c,4<tds)$Tht.&~$~7i,to</~"i~fecfwvslsAscpaas~cf4Coals)teli'jV4.4kck<@<>>8goerprs*III~Isr8(continued)Isolationbarriersthateeetth1scriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautoaatfcvalve,aclosedaanualvalve,andablindflange.The1hourCoapletfonTfaefsconsistentwiththeACTIONSof.LCO3.6.1.1.CondftfonBfsaxlfffedbyaNotefndfcatfngthisCond1tfonisonlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathsw1thtwoPCIVs.ForponatratlonFloppathswithonaFCIV,CondltlonCQ7providestheappropriateRequiredActions.OCoaas~affectysingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthataeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-act1vatedautoeatfcvalveaclosedaanualvalve,andablindflange.Acheckvalvenotbeusedtoisolatetheaffectednetration.fredActionC.lestbecoapletedwithinourThereonsreasonable"Ih"<Nfip~s~'w4cr~d~Qsccaonsfderfngthereatfvestab1lftyofthecossysea.(hence,reliability)toactasapenetrationisolationboundaarelative1rtanceofsuortfngprimaryconanaentOPILurng,,aIntheeventtheaffectedpenetrationfsisolatedinaccwithRequiredActionC.l,theaffectedpenetrationflowpatT<ecbedgs~Mudweep'tentrtCvert~Ref,gestbeverifiedtobe1solatedonaperfod1cbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensunthatprfaarycontafraentpenetrationsrequiredtobe'solatedfollowinganaccidentan1solated.I~RZE%5saproprfatebecausethe~~areoperatedunderadafnfstravecontrolsandtherobabflftyoftheirafsalfgnaentfslow.vslFsConditionCfsaodfffbyaNotefnd1catfngthisConditionfsapplicableonlytothosepenetrationflowpathswithonlyonePCIV.ForpenetrationflowpathswithtPCIVs,ConditionsAandBprovidetheappropriateequfredActions.ThisNotefsnecessarysincethisConditioniswr1ttenQacontinued)noneorsorepenetrat1onflowpathswithonePCIVinoperetheinoperablevalveestberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathaustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationestincludetheuse>>TsypgpleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyNR/6STSB3.6-21Rev1,N/07/95/g,'/Ao~vssosrolsiro.onsks*g'.(<epncni/FC4(A,Ap,AafVcv'jInvalidlyvcrI~pr~~~~f~$4&tiescPsoir3)cCc-oFpoksAsllgroar.p,p,sa.gam~(o4Ford&or>'F>>.,

PCIVsB3.6.1.3BASES"'CTIONSjsly.ho~/CUD(~$~'~+~~5<<os(~3~.r.V"<g~ostcQ(I~fe>rcptlee4gr~>e.(se3.a.i,v.<s1>%.(a,<"QWsagg4sf+tgal+Jpgkpp~~p4-C.i>>~+S9sQ4+gad4)e-Se(~Vcr)~'4i>NMfbgpss4.,4>~(continued)specificjllytoaddressthosepenetrationswithaslePCIV.e/RequiredActionC.2isaodifiedbyNot&appliestolocated1nhighradiationareasandallowstheatobeverifiedbyuseofadainistrativescans.Allowingverificationbyadainistrativescansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofaisalignaent~cetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperpos1tioislow.XvsCtcij57pig6$lS<aw.e.i.3.ll)Nththesecondaryconinaentbypass.leakaaeratnotwithinliait,theassertionsofthesafetyanalsis~not,setreore,aiorationcanbeaccoap1shedbyisoat1ngthepenetrationthatcausedtheliaittobeexceededbyuseofoneclosedandde-activatedautoeaaticvalve,closedwanualvalve,orblindflange.@henapenetration1sisolated,theleakageratefortheisolatespenetrationisassmeedtobetheactualpathwayleakagethroughtheisolationdevice.Iftwoisolationdevicesareusedtoisolatethepenetration,theleakagerateisassuwedtobethelesseractualpathwayleakageofthetwodevices.ouretonisreasonableconsideringthetiaerequiredtorestoretheleakagebyisolatingthepenetrat1onandtherelativeimportanceofamndarycontaiwentbypassleakagetotheoverallcontaimaentfunction.IswZ6p~4esIntheeventoneormrecontaiwntpurgevalvesarenotwithinthepurgevalveleakageliaits,purgveleakageestberestoredtowithinliaitsortheaffectednetrationestbeisolated.Themethodofisolationaustbytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyas1ngleact1vefailure.Isolationbarriersthateeetthiscriterionarealosedand(continued)SN/6STSB3.6-22RevI,04/07/95

Note2appliestoisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sincethefunctionoflocking,sealing,orsecuringcomponentsistoensurethatthesedevicesarenotinadvertentlyrepositioned.Therefore,theleakageratemustberestoredtowithinlimitwithintheCompletionTimesappropriateforeachtypeofvalveleakage:a)hydrostaticallytestedlineleakagenotonaclosedsystemandsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagearerequiredtoberestoredwithin4hours;b)MSIVleakageisrequiredtoberestoredwithin8hours;andc)hydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystemisrequiredtoberestoredwithin72hours.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforMSIVleakageallowsaperiodoftimetorestoretheMSIVleakageandisacceptablegiventhefactthatMSIVclosurewillresultinisolationofthemainsteamline(s)andapotentialforplantshutdown.The72hourCompletionTimeforhydrostaticallytestedlineleakageonaclosedsystemisacceptablebasedontheavailablewatersealexpectedtoremainasagaseousfissionproductboundaryduringtheaccidentand,inmanycases,theassociatedclosedsystem.TheclosedsystemmustmeettherequirementsofRef.6.InsertPageB3.6-22

RequiredActionE.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1appliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthemtobeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Note2appliestoisolationdevicesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sincethefunctionoflocking,sealing,orsecuringcomponentsistoensurethatesedevicesarenotinadvertentlyresitioned.erefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentonceteyhavebeenverifitointheproperposition,islow.InsertPageB3.6-23

PCIVsB3.6.1.37$TF38~~)p//~o'tX'<ow~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(conued)1faftoffsitees.Primarycontainmentpurgalvesthataresealedcsedesthavemotivepowertoevalveoperatorved.Thiscanbeaccomplishbyde-energizingthesouofelectricpowerorreaovfheafrsupplytothevaeoperator.Inth1sapplfcatn,thetera'sealed'asconnotationofleaktfghtnes.The31diyFrequencyfsresultofanKRC1nft1atfvener1cIssueB-2if.5);relatedtoprimarycafnaentpurgevalveuse,duringunitoperations.ThisSRallowsavalvettfsopenunderadmfnfstratfvecontrolstonotmeettSRduringthetimethevalvefsopen.Openingapuvalveunderadafnistratfvecontrolsisrestrictedtoovalvefnapenetrationflowpathatagiventime(refetodiscussionforNoteIoftheACTIONS)fnordertoefctrepa1rstothatvalve.ThisallowsonepurgevalvebeopenedwithoutresultinginafailuretheSurvefanceandresultantentry1ntotheACTIONorthispuvalve,providedthestatedrestrictionremet.CondftEmustbeenteredduringthisallowa,andthevalvepenedonlyisnecessaryforeffectfnpairs.Eachpuvalvefnthepenetrat1onflowpathbealternatelyo<ned,providedoneremainssealedced,ffnecessary,tocompleterepairsonthepenetratioThe'SRfsaodfffedbyaNoteatfngthatprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesonlyrequfredtobesealedclosedfnNOOESI,2,a3.IfaLOCA1nsfdeprimarycontainmentoccursfneseNOES,thepurgevalvesmaynotbecapableofclosbeforethepressurepulseaffectssystemsdownstreofthepurgevalvesorthereleaseofradioactivemarialwillexceedlimitspriortothecngofthepurgealves.Atothertimeswhenthepurgevesarerequftobecapableofclosing(e.g.,durmovementoffrradtedfuelasseablfes),pressurfzatfooncernsarenotpreientandthepurgevalvesarealloweobeopen.CDI1ThfsSRverifiesthatthegRQ.inchprimarycontainmentpurgevalvesareclosedasreufredor,ffopen,oenforanallowablereason.evaveI?(continued)NR/6STSB3.6-25RevI,N/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3SURVEILLANCERQUIRENEHTSI(continued)thisSR,hevalve1ssideredinoperle.Ifheinaperevalveisotherwisekntohavexceiveleakagwhenclosed1tisnotconsieredtoave1kagefliaits.TheSR1sal0edbyaNate(NoteI)stingthatpriaaryconainaentpurgevvesareonlyuiredtobeclosed.inESI,2,and.IfaLOCA1ndeprimarycontainaeoccursintheNOES,thepuevalvessayotbecapablofclosingbefrethepressurepulseaffectsystemsawnstreaaoftpurgevalves,thereleaseofradioaiveaaterialwiexceedliaitsriortatheurgevalvesclosing.Atotrtiaeswhenthpurgevalvearerequitobecapableofclosing(e.g,duringaovntof1rratedfuelass1es)pressurizaionconcernsarenpresntandthepurgevalvesarealltobeope.TheSRisaodifiedbyaNotegott)statingthattheSRisnotrequiredtobesetwhenthepurgevalvesareopenforthestatedreasons.TheNot'estatesthatthesevalvesaaybeopenarpressurecontrol,ALARA,orairqual1tyconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,orfarSurveillancesthatrequirethevalvestobeopen,providr1eseprsaryconanaentpurgevalvesarecapeofclosingintheenvirataentfollowingaLOCA.Therefore,thesevalvesareallowedtbeoforliaitedriodsoftime.TheayrequencysconsstentwoterprmarcontainmentvalverequinaentsdiscussedinSR3.6.1.3Sut~g;Op4$~"~'~,sale),o~Wi~%c~Th1sSRverifiesthateachpriaarycontaineentisolationaanualvalveandb11ndflaethatislocatedoutsideiaacontaineeansrequocosurngaccenconttons,isclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsargasesouts1deofthepriaarycontainaentboundaryiswithindes1gnlioits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosePCIVsoutsidepriaary(continued)BN/6STSB3.6-26RevI,04/01/957<4k<A~.')4~Q7$s~fsOPW48Lt.5)'TSys~i>ko(rg)~g,~spy'f~i~~Pnaac.e..

~,0

'fsTF-~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSThc$ecrtolfcomsat~C,sbho:~)~d~4ioi<c"yfafa4u-4~++~4~+~Is~<(gggJhpjSshmcgacoyhnuoutConrunic~~>>,gl,+cc~~batrio~~~qhe'llca~>Wee.,~,rvCoo4~~~<<isIwer+c7gAtAcsoive$44ls(4t>~fgpss(~Q(~(.SP.7Sq'dol.ofAh~,gy<~;APCIVsB3.6.1.3~"~~~Pcs<hc,vu~vtcki~~)~~7~2.contafneent,andcapableofbeingafsposftfoned,are1nthecorrectposition.SinceverificationofvosftionforPCIVs.outsideprfaarycontafnaentfsrelatvelyeasy,the31dayFrequencywaschosentoprovideaddedassurancethatthePCIlbarefnthecorrectposft1ons.TmNotesareaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNoteapp11estovalvesandblindflingeslocatedfnhighradiationareasandallowstheatobeverifiedbyuseofadm1nfstratfvecontrols.Allyingverificationbyadainfstratfvecontrolsfsconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasfstypicallyrestrictedduringNODESI,2,and3forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofafsalfgnaentofthesePCIVs,ancetheyhivebeenverifiedtobefntheproperposftfan,fslow.A.secondNotefsincludedtoclar1fythatPCIVsopenunderadafnfstratfvecontrolsarenotrequiredtosecttheSRduringthetfaethePCIVsareopen.vsrr=-a>d>o4Ioc~edS,ec,lego~ia.Sec~rekThisSRverfffthateachprfaarycontanaenaanualisolationaveandblindflangelocatedinsiderfmarcontafraeneuanrequobeclosed'dur1ngaccidentcotfons,sclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidorgasesouts1detheprfaarycontafnaentboundaryfssfthfndesilfafts.ForPCIVsinsideprimarycontainment,oretheFrequencyof'priortoenteringNDDE2orffnotperformeedwithintheprevousdays,'sappropriatesincethesePCIVsareoperatedunderadafnfstratfvecontrolsandtheprobabf11tyaftheirafsalfgnaent1slow.TmNotesareaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNotealludesvalvesandblindflangeslocatedfnhighradiationareastobeverifiedby,useofadmafnfstratfvecontrols.All+ringverfffcat;fanbyadafnfstratfvecontrolsfsconsideredaccepenceaccesstotheseareasfstypfcallyrestr1cteddurfNDDESI2andTherefore,thepratyoessagnmeentosePCIVs,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobefntheirproperposition,1slm.AsecondNotefsincludedtoclarifythatPCIVsthatareopenSN/6STSB3.6-27(continued)RevI,N/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHEHTSC(e.g.,uringhandlingof1d1atedfuel,pressurizaonconcesarenotpresentthepurgeivesarenoreqredtomeetanyspficleakagertteria.VerifyingthatthefullclosureisolationtimeofeachNSIViswithinthespecifiedlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.Thefullclosureisolationt1metestensuresthattheNSIVwillisolateinatimeperiodthatdoesnotexceedthetimesassumedintheDBAnalyses.TheFrequencyofthisSRisinrdancewiththeInserviceTestingPrograma~qir~AutomaticPCIVscloseonaprimarycontainmentisolationsignaltopreventleakageofrad1oactivematerialfrompr1marycontainmentfollowingaDBA.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticPCIVwillactuatetoits1solationpositioni(.og.S~()onarimacontainment1solationsignal.TheLOGICSYSTBlCTIONALTn.overlapsthisStorovide$ri~<g'complete,testingofesaetyfunct1on.The~monFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformth1surveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandlPtohthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe+SPYmonrequeINS~(~<'Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeaccetablefromareliabilitystandpoint.<~~~~~e4~"~gK<mdivgg,l,g,4cl,ape4ec4.l~SR'I3I?)SELLERSore,{gThisSR.ensuresthattheleakagerateofseconda.containmentbypassleakagepaths1slessthanespecifiedleakaerate.Thisprovidesassurancethattheassumptions,leakagerateofeachbypassleakagepathisassumedothemaximumpathwayleakage(leakagethroughtheworseofSiF~~c.l,gang5/pub~~QSA[QD(continued)BN/6STSB3.6-29RevI,N/OT/g5

R.1ThisSRrequiresademonstrationthateachEFCVisOPERABLEbyverifyingthatthevalveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedinstrumentlinebreakcondition.ThisSRprovidesassurancethattheinstrumentationlineEFCVswillperformasdesigned.SomehydraulicEFCVsaretestedbyprovidinganinstrumentlinebreaksignalwithreactorpressureabove600psig.Testingabovethispressurerangeprovidesahighdegreeofassurancethatthesevalveswillcloseduringaninstrumentlinebreakwhileatnormaloperatingpressure.TheremaininghydraulicEFCVsaretestedwithprocessfluidordeminwateratlowpressure.ThepneumaticEFCVsaretestedbyprovidinganinstrumentlinebreaksignalwithpressureatapproximately15psigto150psig.ThesetestpressuresareselectedtosimulatetheactualoperatingconditionstheEFCVsareexpectedtoexperienceduringinstrumentlinebreaksoutsidecontainment.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint..6.+7IERTR11TheTIPshearisolationvalvesareactuatedbyexplosivecharges.Aninplacefunctionaltestisnotpossiblewiththisdesign.Theexplosivesquibisremovedandtestedtoprovideassurancethatthevalveswillactuatewhenrequired.Thereplacementchargefortheexplosivesquibshallbefromthesamemanufacturedbatchastheonefiredorfromanotherbatchthathasbeencertifiedbyhavingoneofthebatchsuccessfullyfired,andshallbeinstalledinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendations.Otheradministrativecontrols,suchasthosethatlimittheshelflifeandoperatinglife,asapplicable,oftheexplosivecharges;=mustbefollowed.TheFrequencyof24monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisconsideredadequategiventheadministrativecontrolsonreplacementchargesandthefrequentchecksofcircuitcontinuity(SR3.6.1.3.4).INERTR111WhiletheMSIVsarealsoclassifiedassecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathwayvalves,theyareevaluatedaccordingtoSR3.6.1.3.12,andifnotwithinlimits,actionsarerequiredtobetakeninaccordancewithACTIOND.InsertPageB3.6-29

PCIVsB3.6.1.3SURVEILLANCERElgIRENBITSI~((~-)thetmisolationvalves)unlessthepenetrationfsisolatedbyuseofoneclosedandde-act1vatedautomaticvalve,closedaanualvalve,orb11ndflange.Inthiscase,theleakagerateofthefsolatedbypassleakagepath1sassusedtobetheactualpat!wayleakagethroughtheisolationdevice.Ifbothisolationvalvesfnthepenetrationareclosed,theactualleakageratefsthelesserleakaerateofthetwovalves.084XRuepaeageisonlybeusedforthis(f.e.,Append1xaaxfaapathwayeakageliaftsantffaccordceefdixJ.TheFrequencyis10C5pendfx~fore,erencyextensionsSR3.2laaynotbe11nendCteanerNoteI1addedtothisAfchstateshatthesevesareonlrequ1redtothisleakagefaitinN00I,2,and3.Intheotherdft1ons,theactorCoolaSysteaisnopressurizedspecificprfrycontafnmeleakageilfafarenotrequf<esfi~gP(~Wn.c>kkeiOcd~Appcp4Qy,5~.,C+W~--R~rtopLPcisc~sderek(continued)/BypassleakagefsconsideredpartofL,.().7~'+StomaIITheanalyses1nReferencarebasedonleakagethatsessanthespecifiedleakagerate.Leakagethrough<<tiIZ3~NSIVestbegenespsfg'.0ittheleaetestrequfnsofrovedextons.s0ssacearelyrequftoeeetfsleakaelistfnESI,2,d3.Inthethercotions,ReictorlantSystfsnopressizedindleake1fast1ThisensuresthatNSIVleaagesproperyaccotedforfndetermafnfngtheoverallprimaryraentleakaerite.TheFrequenc1sre1redpex~.)isyarovBN/6STSB3.6-30RevI,N/07/95

PCIVsB3.6.1.3SURVEILLANCERE/UIREHBiTS(continued)exemptiothus,SR3.0.2(which1owsFrequencyextensionsoesnot'fluQcFR~Agorvhiy5Tmg~Pier.~P[4MSu'rveillanceofhydrostaticallestedlinesprovidesassurancethattcacuaonassuaptionsofReferencnareset.ecoabinedleakageratesmustbenstratedinaccordancewiththeleakaetestquencoeasapproveo.thusSR3..(whichallowseuencynsioggTF.3o3~p~q584cpf~o~8,syatethatstatesththesevavesareonlyrequiredmeetthecombinedleakarateinNSESI,2,and3incethisiswhentheRetorCoolantSystem1spressuzedandpriaarycontaintisrequired.Insoeeinstanc,thevalvesarerequftobecapableofautomaticallyosingduringNOESothethanNSESI,2,and3.Howevr,specificleakageliwisarenotapplicableintheseotr%DESorconditions.]Revir'sNote:ThisSRisoyrequiredforthoseplants:witurgevalveswithresilitsealsallowedtobeopen8dung[NmEI,2,or3]anhavingblockingdevicesonevsthattWnotpermantlyinstalled.Verifyingthateach[]chprimarycontainmentpevalveisblockedtorestr1ctningtog[SlS]isreredto'nsurethatthevalvesancloseunderOBAconionswithinthetimeliaitsassintheanalysesofRerences2and3oTheSRisaodifibyaNotestat1ngthathisSRfsonlyrequiredtobeinNOESI,2,and3.IfaLOCAinsideprimarycontaintoccursihtheseS,thepurgevalvesestclosetointaincontainmentleagewithinthevaluesassumedinthaccidentanalysis.Aothertimeswhenpurgevalvesareuiredtobecapableofclos1ng(e.g.,duringmovementofadiatedfuelassembls),pressurizationBN/6STSB3.6-31(coninued)RevI,N(07/S5

PCIVs83.6.1.3SURVEILLANCEREgUIRBtENTSantenued)concernsnotpresent,usthepurgevescanbeflyopen.e[18]aonthFquency1sappriatebecauseheblocdevicesareicallyreaovonlyduringael1ngoutage.5wglonREFERENCES.ue,3CESAR,Sect)ontaQd,~~8.>s.i.~,s.~Q.e6Ts,10CFR50,AppendixJ.Dbio+Iq5.]Dc@Ã50,3c&~X"~'.<~rF-Pochgg~~4fSfioad7ccAnicAg~puzA~An5~ha/uI,NR/6STSB3.6-32Rev1,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESThebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.2.ThischangewasapprovedtobemadeinNUREG-1434,Rev.1perchangepackageBWR-15,C.9,butapparentlywasnotmade.ThischangewasmadetotheBWR/4ITS,NUREG-1433,Rev.l.3.Changeshavebeenmade(additions;deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.4.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.5.d.ThisparagraphintheApplicableSafetyAnalysesSectionofBases3.6.1.3hasbeenmodifiedsinceitisincorrect;neithertheDBAanalysisnortheISTProgramhaveaspecificassumptionforclosuretimeofPCIVs.Theanalysisassumesthevalveswillclosepriortofueldamage,whichisnotexpectedforsometime.TheclosuretimesarecurrentlyspecifiedintheUSAR,andarebaseduponsuchfactorsasvalvesizeandvalveoperatorcapability.Inaddition,thewordsinSR3.6.1.3.5statingthattheisolationtimesareintheISTProgramhavealsobeendeletedsincethesetimesarealsolocatedintheUSAR.Thisbracketedrequirement/informationhasbeendeletedbecauseitisnotapplicabletoNMP2.'.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.8..ThischangewasapprovedtobemadeinNUREG-1434,Rev.1perchangepackageBWR-16,C.23,Rev.1,butapparentlywasnotmade.ThischangewasmadetotheBWR/4ITS,NUREG-1433,Rev.1.9.ThischangewasapprovedtobemadeinNUREG-1434,Rev.1perchangepackageBWR-15,C.5,butapparentlywasnotmade.AsimilarchangewasmadetoNUREG-1434,Rev.1,Bases3.6.4.2,RequiredActionsA.1andA.2:10.TheNMP2designincludesEFCVsandTIPs,similartotheBWR/4design.Therefore,theBasesforRequiredActionC.1andC.2hasbeenmodifiedandproposedBasesforSR3.6.1.3.4,SR3.6.1.3.9,andSR3.6.1.3.10havebeenadded,consistentwiththeBWR/4ITS(NUREG-1433,Rev.1).SomeoftheBaseschangesforTSTF-30,Rev.2havenotbeenadoptedsincethe[QQSRs/informationisnotapplicabletoNMP2.12.Thesechangeshavebeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsof,theBasesand/ortobeconsistentwiththeSpecification.NMP2Revision%'

0 JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES13.ThischangewasapprovedtobemadeinNUREG-1434,Rev.1perchangepackage~~BWR-15,C.4,butapparentlywasnotmade.Thischangewa'smadetotheBWR/4ITS,NUREG-1433,Rev.1.14.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.15.ChangeshavebeenmadetobeconsistentwiththeSpecification.ThesechangesarealsoconsistentwithproposedTSTF-207,Rev.3andproposedTSTF-30,Rev.3,exceptwhereplantspecificdifferencesapplyorwheretypographical/consistencyerrorsarenoted.16.ThediscussionintheLCOsectionaboutclosedvalvesismodified.Thiseditorialpreferenceisbasedonanincompleteandmisleadingdiscussionofthevalves.Thischangedoesnotmodifytherequirementsortheinterpretationoftherequirements.NMP2RevisionP

ConPressureB3.6.1.4B3.6'CONTAIQKHTSYSTENSB3.6.I;4PressureP>>)~))avhJ5U(Stp~)5Che.hu4'>>dg<<ta~Lc4~4>>ggtptprgSaaOfvlntcvMWtHfvw,vsanThe0pressure1sl)a)tedduringnormaloperat)ontopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforaDes1gnBasksAccident(DBA)orlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).j%e)at>onpr)marycon)nment[tosecoaryconta)nmentd)fferenkal]pressurehebeendevelobasedonoperaticexperience.auxiliarybukling,wh)chkspaofthesecondarycontaknt,completelysurroundsthe1rportkooftheprimaryconta)naent.fore,theprkycontatdesignmaldifferent)pressure,andconseuentlytheSpecficat)on1)akt,reestablishedrelakvetotheaux)karybuildingpssure.Theauliarybu11kngpressure1keptslightlyativerelativtotheaspher1cpresstopreventleagetotheatjaophereTransientevents,wh)chincludeinadvertentsprayin1tkatkon,canreducethepressure(lief.1).klthoutanror~~onthepressure,sgnmornegat)vepressureoQPpskdcouldbeexceeded.18Thelkm)tat)ononthecoacntapressureprovesaddedassurancetatthepeakLOCAareressuredoesnotexceedthedesignvalueof.45'sigf.kpfe0slabS3SgStanC.tretV~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESPr)marycontakraentpeH'ormancfortheDBAksevaluatedfortheentirespectrmofreas)zesforpostulatedLOCAsinsideconta)raent(Ref.Q.Iaongtheinputstothedeskbasisanalysisistheinitialnernalpressure.praM8ealpressuntresureTheinitialpressurelka)tat)onrequirementsensurethatpeakpr)sarycontainmentpressurefora08ALOCAdoesnotenneadthedesignvalueofps1gandthatpeaknegativepressureforaninadvertentpg(cont)nued)BN/6STS83.6-33RevI,N/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.1.4-DRYWELLANDSUPPRESSIONCHAMBERPRESSURE1.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthechangesmadetotheSpecification.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.3.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.4.ThisstatementisduplicativeofthefirstparagraphintheApplicableSafetyAnalysis(ASA)sectionandfirstparagraphoftheLCOsection.Sincethistypeofinformationg,ismoreappropriatefortheASAandLCOsections,ithasbeendeletedfromtheBackgroundsection.NMP2RevisionA

Inaddition,thedrywellaverageairtemperatureisthelimitinginitialconditionusedtodeterminethemaximumnegativedifferentialpressureacrosstheprimarycontainmentboundaryfollowinganinadvertentdrywellsprayactuation(Ref.1).~NEETLandthedesignnegativedifferentialpressureacrosstheprimarycontainmentboundaryisnotexceeded.InsertPageB3.6-36

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.1.7-SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER-TO-DRYWELLVACUUMBREAKERSAnewBaseshasbeenadded,ITSBases3.6.1.7.ThisBasesisfromBWR/4ISTS3.6.1.8(NUREG-1433),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtothevacuumbreakers.Therefore,theBWR/4BasesareusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ISTSarediscussedbelow.2.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.3.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.4.Thestatementhasbeenmodifiedsinceitisincorrect;thepressurecouldbepositiveornegativedependinguponthesituation.Also,thedesignbasisonlyassumesthepressureiswithinthelimits,notpositive.Therefore,thevacuumbreakersarerequiredtoremainclosedonly"until"thesuppressionpoolisatapositivepressurerelativetothedrywell.Atthistime,theymaybeopentoperformtheirdesignfunction(i.e.,relievepressure).5.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.Inadvertentactuationofaspraysystemisnotthemainconcernfordepressurizingthedrywell,aLOCAinsidethedrywellisthemainconcern.Therefore,thissectionhasbeenrewordedtoplaceproperemphasisontheproperreason.Inaddition,inadvertentactuationofsuppressionpoolsprayisnotaconcernatallrelativetocausinganexcessivenegativepressureevent;drywellsprayisthesystemthatcancausethisevent.ThereforetheBaseshavebeenchangedfromsuppressionpoolspraytodrywellspraywhendiscussingthisevent.7.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.8.ThesechangeshavebeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsoftheBasesand/ortobeconsistentwiththeSpecification.NMP2RevisionAQg

RTB21BKThesuppressionpoolmustquenchallthesteamreleasedthroughthedowncomerlinesduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thisistheessentialmitigativefeatureofapressuresuppressioncontainmentthatensuresthatthepeakcontainmentpressureismaintainedbelowthedesignvalue(45psig).Suppressionpoolaveragetemperature(alongwithLCO3.6.2.2,"SuppressionPoolWaterLevel")isakeyindicationofthecapacityofthesuppressionpooltofulfilltheserequirements.InsertPageB'3.6-56

SuppressionPoolAverageTeaperatureB3.6.2.1LCO(continued)'R<~37+g~Ac.P6QIEL4t0/gpj$selectedtoprovideaarginbelowthefll0g'Flimitatwhichreactorshutdownisrequired.@henstiends,teaperatureestberestoredtog.Fwithin24hoursaccordingtoRequiredActionA.2.Therefore,thetimperiodthattheteaperatureis>Fisshortenoughnottocauseasignificantincreasenplantr1sk.Ã-5TF'-uSAveraget~rature5/11'Fallsonsof1scsrequreeenensuresateplantwill~shownat>f110PF.Thepoolisdesignedtosodecayheatandsensibleheatbutcouldbeheatedbeyonddesignliaitsbythesteaagenerated1fthereactorisnotshutdown.Ad.T51F->ohNothat;25/40]divisioffullscaleonRange7isacoenienteeasureofthe7/'venttoAtspowerveheaaaeyeqnoraalsysteaheatosses.APPLICABILITYInNOES1,2,and3,aDBAcouldcausesignificantheatupofthesuppressionpool.InNOES4and5,theprobabil1tyandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandteaperatureliaitationsintheseNOES,Therefore,aaintainingsuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturewith1nliaitsisnotrequ1red1nNOE4or5.ACTIONSliethI/1ththesuppressionpoolaveragetaaperature,abovethespecifiedliaitwhennotperfonrlngtestingthataddsheattothesuppressionpoolandwhenabovethespec1fiedpowertheinitialconditionsexceedtheconditioassortheReference1andanayses.ver,priaarycontainmentcoolingilityst111exists,andthepriaarycontai~ntpressuresuppressionfunction<<111occuratt~ratureswellabovethatassuaedforsafetyanalyses.Therefore,continuedoperat1onisallowedforaliaitedtim.The24hourCoepletionTimisadequatetoallowthesuppressionpoolteeperaturetoberestoredtobelowthe1iait.Add1tionally,whenpooltemaperatureis>'F,0BIm/6STS83.6-58(continued)Rev1,04/07/95

SuppressfonPoolAverageTeaperature83.6.2.1ACTINS(contfnued)rates(provfdedpoolteaperaturereaafns5$120pF).3-Addftfonally,whenpoolteaperaturefs>fll~F,fncreasedaon1torfngofpoolteaperaturefsrequfredtoensurethatftreaafnsCQ120pF.Theonceper30afnuteCoaplet1onT1aefsadequate,basedonoperatfngexperfence.61venthehfghpoolteaperaturefnthfsgondftfon,theaonftor1ngFrequency1sfncreasedtotwfcethatofCond1tfonA.Furtheraore,the30afnuteCoepletfonTfaefsconsfderedadequatefnvfew,ofotherfndfcatfonsavaflablefnthecontrolrooa,fncludfngalaras,toalert.theoperatortoanabnoraalsuppressfonpoolaverageteaperaturecondftfon.~a~Ifsuppressfonpoolaveraget~raturecannotbeaafntafned120)'F,theplant.estbebroughttoaNOEfnwhfchtheLCOdoesnotl.Toach1evethfsstatus,thereactorssure%lsc2~psfgwfthfn12hoursandtheplantaustbebroughttoNOEiwfthfn36hours.TheallowedCoapletfonT1aesarereasonable,basedonoperatfngexperfence,toreachtherequfredplantcond1tfonsfroafullpowercondft1onsfnanorderlyaannerw1thoutchallengfngplantsystems.Cont1nu'edaddftfonofheattothesuppressfonpoolwfthpooltrature>fl2~Fcouldresult1nexceedfngthedesfgnsaaxaaallowablevaluesforprfaarycontafnaentteaperatureorpressure.Furthermore,ffablowdownweretowhenteaperaturewas>1~'F,theaaxfaaallowablebulocacouldbeexceededveryqufckly.SNVEILLANCEREgUIRENElAS<44~~ko~eThesuppressfonpoolaverageteaperaturefsregularlyaonftoredtoensurethattherequfredlfaftsaresatfsffed.Averaget~rturefsdeterafnedbytakfnganarfthaetfcveraThe2Frequencybeenshowntobeaccepeonoperatfngexperfence.Khonheatfsbefngaddedtothesuppressfonpoolbytest1ng,howev'er,1t(contfnued)83.6-60Rev1,N/07/95P'<cc(<fezfgi&0QtgfŽ9IMi@~&cApf~~~~~)'~opsgspWc4ut.Q(g~c."~2<~(0OPFAD4Lc:s~lICR~e~fSupp~,y,p+e

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.2.1-SUPPRESSIONPOOLAVERAGETEMPERATURE1.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.2.Thediscussionsofthefourdifferentconcernsthatleadtothedevelopmentofthesuppressionpoolaveragetemperaturelimitshavebeendeleted.TheappropriateanalysisisdescribedintheUSAR(References1and2)anddiscussionintheBasesisnotneededforunderstandingthisSpecification.3.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.4.5.6.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.Typographicalerrorcorrected.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.ThissentencehasbeendeletedsinceitisnotrelevanttotheLCOdiscussion.Itissimplystatingthat1%RTPisapproximatelyequaltonormalsystemheatlosses.Itdoesnotprovideanydetailastowhythisisacceptable.ThisinformationismoreappropriatefortheApplicableSafetyAnalysessection,whichisthesectionthatnormallyprovidesthistypeofinformation.TheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectiondescribesthatinitialpooltemperatureisanassumptionoftheanalysesofReferences1and2,andthatReference3requirescertainsuppressionpooltemperatureanalyses.Thisprovidesadequatedetailandreferencestothesuppressionpoolanalyses.Revision+@/

RHRSuppressionPoolCoolingB3.6.2.3ACTIONShJ.(continued)coolingcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEsubsystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.5l~aug,'~Tracy-z>>ygcPorg~5gf>gyCc~C.IfufredAction~ShiitCompletfonTimeannotbemetooarer~epanroughttoaNOEfnwhichoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastlfODE3within12hoursandtoNOE4wfth1n36hours.TheallowedC~letfonTimesarereasonable,basedonoperat1ngexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercond1tfons1nanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLNtCEREfIUIREMENTSVerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanualpoweroperat~velvetyfntheRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathexistsforsystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredfnposft1onsincethesevalveswereverifiedtobefnthecorrectpositionpriortobeinglocked,sealed,orsecured.Avalvefsalsoallowedtobefnthenonaccfdentposition,provfdedftcanbealignedtotheaccidentpositionw1thfnthetimeassumedfntheaccidentanalys1s.Thisfsacceptable,s1ncetheRHRsuppressionpoolcoolingmodefsmanually1nftfated.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,ftinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmfsposftfonedarefnthecorrectposition.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymfsalfgned,suchascheckvalves.TheFrequencyof31daysfsJustifiedbecausethevalvesareoperatedunderproceduralcontrol,impropervalvepositionwouldaffectonlyasinglesubsystem,theprobabfl1tyofaneventrequiringinitiationofthesystemfslow,andtheQSsystemfsamanually1nftfatedsystem.ThisFrequency(continued)BN/6STS83.6-67RevI,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.2.3-RHRSUPPRESSIONPOOLCOOLING1.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.2.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.3.Thespecificrequirementforthesubsystemstobepoweredfromtwosafetyrelatedindependentpowersupplieshasbeendeletedsincethedesignofthesystemalreadyreflectsthis.Thereareonlytwosubsystems,andeachispoweredfromaseparatepowersupply;thepowersuppliescannotbecross-connected.ThisstatementisnotusedinotherLCOBaseswherethesystemisdesignedwithindependentpowersupplies(e.g.,Bases3.6.1.6,"RHRDrywellSpray,"andBases3.6.3.1,"PrimaryContainmentHydrogenRecombiners").TheBWR/4BaseshasthisstatementsincesomeBWR/4shavetwopumpspersubsystem,withonlyonerequiredforthesubsystemtobeOperable(asdescribedintheBWR/4Bases),andduetotheelectricaldesignofthesystem,onepumpineachsubsystemispoweredfromthesameelectricaldivision.Thus,forthisdesign,thewordsintheNUREGarenecessary.However,asdescribedabove,NMP2doesnothavethisdesign.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.6.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.7.TheISTProgramatNMP2isnotrequiredtoprovideinformationfortrendpurposes.Therefore,thesewordshavebeendeleted.8.AnewBaseshasbeenadded,ITSBases3.6.2;4.ThisBasesisfromtheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433ISTSB3.6.2.4),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtoRHRsuppressionpoolspray.Therefore,theBWR/4BasesisusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ITSBasesarediscussedintheJustificationforDeviationsforITSBases:3.6.2.4.9.ThesechangeshavebeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsoftheBases.NMP2RevisionQ

.il<

PrimaryContafnaentHydrogenRecombfnersB3.6.3.1ACTINS(continued)lfaf,theletprobab111tyofthefailureoftheOPERABLErecoabfner,andtheasountoftfmavailableafterapostulatedLOCAforoperatoractiontopreventexceed1ngtheflaaaabflitylfaf.Revf'sNote:ThCondition1nlyallforunitsanalternaterogencontsysteaaptabletothe,+lljPf'iM+tyCoppe<~$VI2htiping<Sysltm@peo~g<HILhg~ellit,c.yzsh~Nth~prfaarycontafnmnthydrogrecaabfnersinoperable~,theabilitytoperformhydrogencontrolonvaalternatecapabflitmetbeverff1edbadafnfstratfvemans%thinIhour.aernaerognrocapyIhourCompletionmall+isareasonableperioftfmtoverffthatalossofhydrogencontrolfunctiondoesnotexistlWbenon-TechicalSpecif1tfonalternateydusffsnftf,thealternatehydrogencontrolsysteacapabilityaustbeverifiedonceper12hoursthereaftertoensure1tscontinuedavailability+/Both~the+nftfalpverfffcatfongandallsubsequentverification~say'1aperformdasanadefnfstratfvecheckbyexamfnfnglogsoeotherfnforaatfontodeterafnetheavailabilityofthealternatehydrogenconroysea.ItdoesnotmantoperforatheSurvefllancesneededdmmstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystee.Iftheabfl1tytoperforathehydrogenonrofunctionfsaafntafned,cont1nuedoperationfsperafttedAthbehydrogenrecoebfnersinoperableforupto7days.Sevendaysfsareasonabletfmtoallertmhyden.recoabfnerstobe1noperablebecausethehydrogecontrolfunctionfsaafntafnedandbecauseofthelowprobabf1itoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatweldgeneratehydrogenneamuntscapableofexceedingtheflaeabflftylfaft.(NR/6STSB3.6-7d(continued)Rev1,Ol/07/95

/j(

PrimaryContainmentOxygenConcentrationB3.6.3.B3.6CNTAINEKTSYSTDtSB3.6.3PrimaryContainmentOxygenConcentrationhr.na~BASES7/<ri'ma~gHa0~)~~llS5pwpf/'<g~t~lgaskdesignedtowithstandeventsthatgeneratehydrogeneitherduetothezirconiummetal..waterreact1oninthecoreorduetoradiolysis.The..'rimarymethodtocontrolhydrogenistoinerttheprimarycontainment.Niththeprimarycontainmentinert,thatis,oXygenconcentrationci.0volumepercent(v/o),acombustiblemixturecannotbepresentintheprimarycontainmentforanyhydrogenconcentration.Thecapabilityto1nerttheprimarycontainmentandmaintainoxygen<I.Ov/oworkstogetherwiththedenRecombinerSstem(LCO3.6.3.1,'PrimaryContainaenrogenenersandthes(LCO~~ys)toprovideundantandowing<<versemethodstomitigateeventsthatproducehydrogenForexample,aneventthatrapidlygenerateshydrogenfromzirconiummetalwaterreactionwillresultinexcessivehydrogeninprimarycontainment,butoxygenconcentrationnv/oindnocoebustioncanoccur.Longtermgenerationofbothhydrogenandoxygenfromradiolyticdecompositionofwatermayeventuallyresultinacombustiblemixtureinprimarycontainment,exceptghatthehydrogenrecombinersremovehydrogenandoxygengasesfasterthintheycanbeproducedfromradiolysisandagainnoccebustioncanoccur.ThisLCOensuresthatoxygenconcentrationdoesnotexceed4.0v/oduringoperationfntheapplicableconditions.APPLICABLETheReferenceIcalculationsassumethattheprimarySAFETYANLYSEScontainmentisinertedwhenaDesignBasisAccidentlossofcoolantaccidentoccurs.Thus,thehydrogenassumedtobereleasedtotheprimarycontainmentasaresultofmetalwaterreactioninthereactorcorewillnotproducecombustiblegasmixturesintheprimarycontairaent.OXygen,whichissubsequentlygeneratedbyradiolyticdecompositionofwater,isrecoabinedbythehydrogenrecoabiners(LCO3.6,3.1)mrerapidlythanitisproduced.PrimarycontainmentoxygenconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2of(continued)BN/ISTSB3.6-B9RevI,04/07/958~~~Z~~EAT~++~~~+/3~~A7Za~~yySpiczklcwl7du'ssWxybtHgpss7lb~p,+89gsn<-

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.3.2-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTOXYGENCONCENTRATIONAnewBaseshasbeenadded,ITSBases3.6.3.2.ThisBasesisfromtheBWR/4ISTS(NUREG-1433ISTSB3.6.3.3),sincetheNMP2designissimilartotheBWR/4designwithregardtotheinertingrequirementsoftheprimarycontainment.Therefore,theBWR/4BasesareusedandanydeviationsfromtheBWR/4ISTSarediscussedbelow.2.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.3.Notused.4.5.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.6.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.NMP2Revision+Q8

gSecondaryContainmen+MlB3.6,<.>~BASESACTIONSntorrasuf'treasontorequirewoudtbeareactorshutdownSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSThisSRensuresthatthe>(secondarycontainmentfboundaryissufficientlleaktihttorecludeexfiltrheZlorrequencyothiswasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedto>)secondarycontainaen+vacuuwvariat1onsdur1ngtheapplicableHOOESandthelowprobabil1tyofaDBAoccurringbetweensurveillances.Furthermore,the24hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolrooa,1ncludingalaras,toalerttheoperatortoanabnoraalsecondarycontairaanQvacuuwcond1tion.'TKF.-SfgC+CL('pgfD55lit~$R>4A,l~Verifyingthatsecondarycontaireenequipmenthatchesandaccessdooareclosedensuresthattheinfiltrat1onof'utsideairofsuchaaagnitudeastopreventaaintainingthedesirednegat1vepressuredoesnotoccur.Ver1fyingthatallsuchopeningsareclosedprov1desadequateassurancethatexfiltrationfroathe/secondarycontainmen,willnotoccur.Inthisapplication,thetars'sealed'asnoconnotationofleaktightness.Haintainineconharvcontainaentf,OPERABILITYquiresverifyingtPaccessopeningisclosed'xcepenessopenexitthrstlsnclTeayrequencyfortheseSRshasensadequatebasedonoperatingexperience,andisconsideredadequateinviewoftheotherindicationsofdoorT57F-f5andhatchstatusthatareavailabletotheoperator.T9F-'lgBN/6STSB3.6-95(continued)RevI,N/07/95

41Ts~-IIItfAnaccess'openingcontainsoneinnerandoneouterdoor.Insomecases,(secondarycontainmentesarnnmnbarriermultipleinnerormultipleouterdoors.Theintentisnottobreachthe~n~containmentatanyumewengsecondarygcontainmentisrequired.ThisisachievedbymaintainingtheinnerorouterportionofthebarrierclosedatalltimHoweverall~ondary};containmentaccessdoorsarenormallykeptclosed,exceptwhentheaccessopeningisbeingusedforentryandexitorwhenmaintenanceisbeingperformedonanaccessopening.Forthesecases,theaccessopeningssharetheinnerdoorortheouterdoor,i.e.,theaccessopeningshaveacommoninnerdoororouterdoor.;i.e.,allinnerdoorsclosedorallouterdoorsclosed.Thus,eachaccessopeninghasoneQdoorclosed.InsertPageB3.6.95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.4.1-SECONDARYCONTAINMENT1.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.2.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.3.ThesechangeshavebeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsoftheBasesand/ortobeconsistentwiththeSpecification.4.ChangeshavebeenmadetoreflectthosechangesmadetotheSpecification.5.ISTSSRs3.6.4.1.4and3.6.4.1.5areteststhatensuretheSecondaryContainmentisOPERABLE;theleaktightnessoftheSecondaryContainmentboundaryiswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.However,theyarewritteninsuchamannerthattheyimplythatifaSGTsubsystemisinoperable,theSRsarefailed("Verifyeachstandbygastreatment(SGT)subsystemwill/can...").Asstatedabove,thisisnottheintentoftheSRs.Therefore,toensurethismisinterpretationcannotoccur,theSRsandthisBasesdescriptionhavebeenrephrasedtomoreclearlyconveytheoriginalintentoftheSRs,toverifytheSecondaryContainmentisOPERABLE.Withthenewwording,ifaSGTsubsystemisinoperable,SRs3.6.4.1.4and3.6.4.1.5willstillbemetandonlytheSGTSystemSpecification,LCO3.6.4.3,willberequiredtobeentered.ThisisclearlyidentifiedintheBases.6.TheBaseshavebeenmodifiedtoprovideadditionalclaritywhendescribingthedesignofanaccessopening.NMP2RevisionPQP

SCIVs83.6.4.2B3,6CNTAIHNERTSYSTEMSB3.6.4.2SecondaryContainmentIsolationValves(SCIVs)BASESBACKGROUNDIanThefunctionoftheSCIVs,fncoabfnatfonwithotheraccidentwftfgatfonsysteas,fstolfmftf1ssionproductreleasedurfnandfollowingpostulatedDesignBasksAccfens~..Secondarycontainment1solatfonwithneeefmftsspec1ffedforthose1solatfonvalvesdesignedtocloseautosatfcallyensuresthatfissionproductsthatleakfroeprfaarycontainmentfollowingaOBA,thatarereleaseddur1ngcerta1noperationswhenprimarycontafnwent1snotrequ1redtobeOPERABLE,orthattakeplaceouts1deprimarycontainment,aremaintainedw1thfn.thesecondarycontafnaentboundary.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforSCIVshelpensurethatanadequatesecondarycontafnaentboundary1saafntafnedduringandafteranacc1dentbyafnfmfzfngpotentialpathstothe~nvfronaant.These1solationdevicesareeitherpassiveoract1ve(autoerotic).Nanualvalves,de-act1vatedautomaticvalvessecured1nthe1rclosedpos1t1on(1ncludtngcheckvalveswithflowthroughthevalvesecured).andblindflangesarecons1deredessivedevices.ecvaveesgnocw1thooperaactionollowancfdentarecoideredtivedce~IsolionrfortheeneationadfRefnce,ci.ed<<per>>AutoaatfcSCIVscloseonasecondarycontafnaentisolation~sfgnaltoestablishaboundaryforuntreatedradfoact1ve~aterfalwithinsecondarycontainmentfollowingaDBAorotheraccidents.Otherpenetratfonsareisolatedbytheuseofvalvesfnthclosedpositionorblindflange.(ek;.I,.r~~plps~~,ape4.CfiAPPLICABLESAFETYNWLYSESTheSCIVsan'tbeOPERABLEtoensurethesecondarycontafraentbarriertofissionproductreleasesfsestablished.Theprincipalaccidentsforwhichthesecondarycontafnaantboundaryfsrequiredarealosscoolantaccident(Ref.1$afuelhandl1ngaccident1e(continued)BN/6STSB3.6-97RevI,N/07/95

SCIVs83.6.4.2BASES2.APPLICABLEprarycontainentRef.anafuelndlingaccenSAFETYANALYSESineauxiliaruin.4.eseconary(continued)containmentperormsnoacivenctioninresponsetoeachoftheselimitingevents,buttheboundaryestablishedbySCIVsisrequiredtoensurethatleakagefromtheprimarycontainmentisprocessedbytheStandbyGasTreatment(SGT)Systembeforebeingreleasedtotheenvironment.HaintainingSCIVsOPERABLEwithisolationtimeswithinlimitsensuresthatfissionproductswillremaintrappedinsidesecondarycontainmentsothattheycanbetreatedbytheSGTSystempriortodischargetotheenvironment.SCIVssatisfyCriterion3ofhe@~eweatemen.[QaLCOSCIVsformapartofthesecondarycontainmentboundary.TheSCIVsafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofoffsiteradiationreleasesresultingfromDBAs.Theautomaticowerocrate@isolationvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheirsoaontimesarewithinlimitsandthevalvesactuateonanautomaticisolationsignal.ThevalvescoveredbythisLCO,alongwiththeir.associatedstroketimes,arelisted'nReferencemaevelSCILThenormallclosedcons>eredEautomaosit'olationvalvesorsoonvavearewevavesarecloseoropen~dmaadministrativecontrol~8-ac1ehesepassivedevicesarelistedinReferenceAPPLICABILITY'nNODESI,2,and3,aDBAcouldleadtoafissionproductreleasetotheprimarycontainmentthatleakstothesecondarycontainment.Therefore,OPERABILITYofSCIVsisrequired.InHOOES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetopressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseHODES.Therefore,maintainingSCIVsOPERABLEisnotrequiredinNODE4or5,exceptforotherBWR/6STSB3.6-98(continued)Rev.I,04/07/95

SCIVsB3.6.4.2BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued))h44St(on4')~~Ohg0situationsunderwhichsignificantreleasesofradioactivematerialcanbepostulated,suchasduringoperationswithapotent1alfordrain1ngther'eactorvessel(OPDRVs),duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuel~oIpraaorsecorycontainnt]sayaloccurACTIONSTheACTIONSareaodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNoteallowspenetrat1onflowpathstobeun1solatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.Thesecontrol~consistofstationingadedicatedoperator,whois1ncontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolrooa,atthecontrolsofthe1solationdevice.Inth1sway,thepenetrationcanberap1dlyisolatedwhentheneedfor+secondarycontaineen@isolat1onis1ndicatedThesecondNoteprovidesclarificat1onthatforthepurposeofthisLseparateCondit1onentryisallowedforeachpenetraonflowpath.This1sacceptable,sincetheRequiredAct1onsforeachConditionprovideappropr1atecompensatoryact1onsforeach1noperableSCIV.Complyingw1ththeRequ1redAct1onsmayallowforcont1nuedoperation,andsubsequentinoperableSCIVsaregoverned.bysubsequentConditionentryandappl1cationoiassociatedRequiredActions.ThethirdNoteensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystea(s)arerenderedinoperablebyaninoperableSCIV.Intheeventthatthereareoneormrepenetrationflowpathsw1thoneSCIV1noperable,theaffectedpenetrationflowpath(s)estbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmust1ncludetheuseofatleastoneisolat1onbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefa1lure.Isolationbarriersthataeatth1scriteriaareaclosedandde-activatedautoaaticSCIV.aclosedaanualvalve,andablindflange.Forpenetrat1onsisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.I,thedeviceusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavailabledevicetoNR/6STSB3.6-99(continued)RevI,04/07/95

SCIVsB3.6.I.2ACTIONSTJ,.('~~I~ho.~>'pyda)>5<pgrs(~44-iSvla4>8<<<<~oJeffll'6QQg'vAlnir~~~(oW~t~kaidhi~b.hi,~~(pg5(llin(continued)secondarycontainment.Th1sRequiredActionmustbecompletedwithinthe8hourCompletionTime.Thespecifiedtiaeperiodisreasonableconsideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationand.thelowprobabil1tyofa08A.whichrequirestheSCIVstoclose,occurr1ngduringthisshorttiae.ForaffectedpenetrationsthathavebeenisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l,theaffectedpenetrationantbever1fiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensurethatsecondarycontainwentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,butnolongercapableofbeingautoaaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolat1onposit1onshouldaneventcur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytest1ngordeviceaanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthattheaffectedpenetrationremainsisolated.RequiredActionA.2iscodifiedbyaNotethatappliestodeviceslocated1nhighradiationareasandallowstheatobever1fiedbyuseofadainistrativecontrols.Allowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofNiseiignwent,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,..islow.NthtwoSCIVsinoneorsorepenetrationflowpathsinoperable.theaffectedpenetrationflowpathaustbe1solatedw1thinihours.Theaethodofisolation'mustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthateeetthiscr1terionareaclosedandde-activatedautoeaticvalve,aclosedsanualvalve,andablindflange.The4hourCoapletionTiaeisreasonable,consideringthetiaerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandthelowprobabilityofaMA,whichrequirestheSCIVstoclose,occurringduringthisshorttim.TheConditionhasbeenaodifiedbyaNotestat1ngthatConditionB1sonlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathsa.t.a,(continued}BN/6STSB3.6-100RevI,04/07/95

SCIVs83.6.4.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREgUIRENEHTSThisSRverifieseachsecondarycontainmentisolationmanualvalveandblindflangethatisrequiredtobecloseddur1ngacc1dentconditionsisclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsidethesecondarycontainaentjboundaryiswith1ndesignlies.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalveation.Rather,itinvolvesverificat1onthatthoseSCIVsinecondarycontainaentpthatarecapableofbeingaispositionedareinthecorrectposition.SincetheseSCIVsarereadilyaccess1bletopersonnelduringnormalunitoperat1onandverificationoftheirpositionisrelat1velyeasy,the31dayFrequencywaschosentoprov1deaddedassurancethattheSCIVsare1nthecorrectpositions.TwoNoteshavebeenaddedtothisSR.ThefirstNoteappliestovalvesandblindflangeslocated1nhighradiationareasandallowstheatobeverifiedbyuseofadainistrativecontrols.Allowingverificationbyadministrativecontrolsisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringNSESI,2,and3forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofaisaliyaaentoftheseSCIVs,oncetheyhavebeenver1fiedtobeintheproperpos1tion,isTow.AsecondNotehasbeenincludedtoclarifythatSCIVsthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomettheSRduringthetimtheSCIVsareopen.~RS(Cz.I8SMBt'l~autoaaticSCIV1swithinliaitsisrequ1redtodeaNstrateOPERABILITY.TheisolationtimetestensuresthattheSCIVwillisolat~1natimeper1odlessthanorequaltothatasstaed1nthesafetyanalses.TheFofthis42mancewense92days).iSBN/6STSB3.6-102(continued)RevI,O4/07/95

SCIVsB3.6.4.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHEHTS(continued)L(o9,5.<.z,Q(oviIQ,T)Co@hi'nieceS'soh.-bison"Ver1fyingthateachautoaaticSCIVclosesona'/secondarycontainaent+isolationsignal1srequiredtopreventleakage.ofrad1oactivematerialfroa/secondarycontainmentyfollowingaOBAorotheraccidents.ThisSRensuresthateachautoeaticSCIVwillactuatetotheisolat1onpos1tiononaecondacontainaant>isolations1gnal.TheLOGICEHnoverlapstSRtorovidecletetestiofthesafetyfunction.ThenrequencsontneoperorathisSurvlanceunderthendit1onsthatapplduringaplantoutagethepotentilannedtraient1uperforwedwithtereactorapowe~rat1ngexperiencehasshownthesec~nentsusuaypasstheSurveillancewhenperforaedatthe$aonthFrequenc,Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefroareliabil1tystandpoint.2V4ic<(sactho~WaItggfi~i-c[gREFERENCES1.EAR,Section$15.6.ctn~on~4.~,Section$1574'...ctiI5)perg,sQ74(~)tz)ct~IicAw~<~>Rig~~<<MAJ+Jnn<~uaIrl(KidhBN/6STSB3.6-103Rev1,Ol/07/95.

• JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITSBASES:3.6.4.2-SECONDARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(SCIVs)1.Changeshavebeenmade(additions,deletions,and/orchangestotheNUREG)toreflecttheplantspecificnomenclature,number,reference,systemdescription,oranalysisdescription.2.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.3.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.4.ThesechangeshavebeenmadeforconsistencywithsimilarphrasesinotherpartsoftheBasesand/ortobeconsistentwiththeSpecification.5.Editorialchangemadeforenhancedclarity.6.ThewordsinSR3.6.4.2.2,statingthattheisolationtimesareintheISTProgramhavebeendeleted.TheISTProgramdoesnotincludethetimesfortheSCIVs.TheyarelocatedintheTechnicalRequirementsManual.7.ThediscussionintheLCOsectionaboutclosedvalvesismodified.Thiseditorialpreferenceisbasedonanincompleteandmisleadingdiscussionofthevalves.Thischangedoesnotmodifytherequirementsortheinterpretationoftherequirements.Revision+$8

SGTSystemB3.6.4.3BASESACTIONSLA)S~0o~tseepd7~p'licog~vti)q('~4DVQ4oc4i+~tb~~jSince,'r~h'a0e46<><55amhl~>ua+t:u4's'yOt:t'at'pyAd+(y2,ar5,W~Scu-96.1,6'.2(continued)suspended.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposttton.Also,tfapplicable,acttonjllmustbetassedtate1y)~finitiatedtosuspendOPORVstominimizetheprobabilityofavesseldraindownandsubsequentpotentialforfissionproductrelease.ActionmustcontinueuntilOPORVsaresuspended.RequiredActionE.IhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatLCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODE4or5,LCO3.0.3wouldnotspecifyanyaction.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHOOE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindeendentofreactoroperations.ereor,necase,nayosuspenvemenoadiatedfuelassembeswouldnotbeuffentreasoatshutdoSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSomph'itoe'a<i~eaa/ting""'"'""'"-re%,,,.ensuresthatbothsubsystemsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.Operation/withtheheaterson(automaticheatercyclingtomaintaintemperature)gforh5POQcontinuoushoursevery31dayseliminatesmoistureontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedinconsiderationoftheknownreliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrolsandtheredundancyavailableinthesystem.ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredSGTfiltetestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheSGTSystemfiltertestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref..TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance,charcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).SpecifiedtestfrequenciesB'NR/6STSB3.6-108(continued)Rev1,04/07/95

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENT~LANHInaccordancewiththe'criteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThischangeextendstheFrequencyforperformingavisualinspectionofthesuppressionchambertoaFrequencyalreadyapprovedinanotherSurveillanceand10CFR50AppendixJ.ThisFrequencyhasbeendeterminedtobeadequatesincenofailureshavebeendetectedinthisSurveillance.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.AnincreaseintheSurveillanceintervalwillnotaffectthecapabilityofthesuppressionchambertoperformitsfunctionnoraltertheassumptionsrelativetothemitigationofanaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?.Thischangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninama@inofsafety?ThischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysinceexperiencehasshownthatthesuppressionchamberpassestheSurveillancewhenperformedattheproposedFrequency.NMP2RevisionPC

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.1-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThischangedeletestherequirementassociatedwithCFS4.6.2.1.e.1toobtainanNRCreviewofthetestscheduleforsubsequenttestsifanyleakratetestresultisnotwithintherequiredlimits.ThesubsequenttestschedulehasalreadybeenapprovedbytheNRCintheTechnicalSpecifications.Iftwoconsecutivetestsfail,thenthetestmustbeperformedateveryrefuelingoutageuntiltwoconsecutivetestspass.TherequirementtoobtainNRCconcurrencewiththetestscheduleisnotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedeventanddoesnotimpactassumptionsofanydesignbasisaccident.Additionally,theconcurrenceisnotrequiredorassumedforthemitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thisproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thischangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodificationtotheplant.ThischangedeletesarequirementtoobtainNRCconcurrenceforaleakratetestschedulethatisalreadyapprovedbytheNRC.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?ThischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysincetheincreasedtestscheduleisalreadyapprovedbytheNRCandsinceexperiencehasshownthattheSurveillancenormallymeetsitsacceptancecriterionwhenperformedatthenormalFrequency.RevisionpQg

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESL.iInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thischangerelaxestheallowedrestorationtimestoisolatetheaffectedpenetration(s)ifonevalveisinoperablefrom4hoursto8hoursforMSIVsandfrom4hoursto72hoursforPCIVsinpenetrationswithaclosedsystemandonlyonePCIV.Theproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccident.Thetimeallowedtoisolatethepenetrationbyuseofde-activatedautomaticvalve,blindfiange,etc.isnotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent.TheMSIVsandotherPCIVsisolatetocontrolleakagefromtheprimarycontainmentduringaccidents.AllowingtheadditionaltimetoisolatetheMSIVsandotherPCIVswillnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theconsequenceswillbethesamefortheproposedtimesasforthecurrenttimes.Theadditionaltimes,however,willallowmoretimetorepairtheinoperableMSIVorotherPCIVandpossiblyavoidashutdown.Shuttingdowntheplantisatransientwhichputsthermalstressoncomponentswhichcouldincreasethechancesofchallengingsafetysystems.Inaddition,theclosedsystempipingorwatersealwillensureprimarycontainmentintegrityismaintained.Thischangewillnotalterassumptionsrelativetothemitigationofanaccidentortransientevent.Therefore,thischangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thischangewillnotresultinanychangestoequipmentdesignorcapabilitiesortheoperationoftheplant.TheproposedchangewillstillrequiretheMSIVsandotherPCIVstoberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Therefore,thischangewillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Thischangerelaxestheallowedrestorationtimeforisolatingtheaffectedpenetration(s)ifonevalveisinoperablefrom4hoursto8hoursforMSIVsandfrom4hoursto72hoursforPCIVsinpenetrationswithaclosedsystemandonlyonePCIV.Themarginofsafetyisnotsignificantlyreducedbecause,forMSIVpenetrations,anotherMSIVinthepenetrationQowpathremainsOperableandNMP2Revision~Q$

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESL~INANE3.(continued)capableofisolatingthepenetrations,andfortheotherPCIVs,theclosedsystempipingorthewatersealactsasaprimarycontainmentisolationbarrier.Also,thetimeallowedtoisolatepenetrationsisnotassumedinanysafetyanalysisandcurrentsafetyanalysisassumptionswillbemaintained.TheaddedtimealsoallowsmoretimetoisolatetheMSIVandotherPCIVs.IsolatingtheMSIVpenetrationswillrequireareductioninpowerandhasthepotentialfortrippingtheplant.Areductioninpoweroraplanttripisconsideredatransientduetothethermaleffectsithasonplantequipment.Duringtheadditionaltimeallowed,alimitingeventwouldstillbeassumedtobewithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis,assumingnosingleactivefailure.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2RevisionA

L.12~HANENOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.3-PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thischangerelaxestheallowedrestorationtimestorestoreleakageofhydrostaticallytestedvalvesandsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepathwayvalves.Theextensionisfromthecurrent1hourto4hoursforvalvesinhydrostaticallytestedlinesnotonaclosedsystemandforsecondarycontainmentbypassleakagepaths,8hoursforMSIVs,and72hoursforvalvesinhydrostaticallytestedlinesonaclosedsystem.ThePCIVleakageisnotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanyanalyzedevent.Therefore,thischangewillnotinvolveinanincreaseintheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Allowingadditionaltimetorestoreleakagewillnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theconsequenceswillbethesamefortheproposedtimesasforthecurrenttimes.Theadditionaltimes,however,willallowmoretimetorepairtheinoperablevalvesandpossiblyavoidashutdown.Shuttingdowntheplantisatransientwhichputsthermalstressoncomponentswhichcouldincreasethechancesofchallengingsafetysystems.Therefore,thischangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thischangewillnotresultinanychangestoequipmentdesignorcapabilitiesortheoperationoftheplant.Theproposedchangewillstillrequiretheleakagevaluestoberestoredtowithinlimits.Therefore,thischangewillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Thischangerelaxestheallowedrestorationtimeforrestoringtheleakagetowithinlimits.ThemarginofsafetyisnotsignificantlyreducedbecauseanotherOperablevalveremainstoisolatetheflowpath,thesystemisaclosedsystem,orthelineishydrostaticallysealed.Theadditionaltimes,however,willallowmoretimetorepairtheinoperablevalvesandpossiblyavoidashutdown,Shuttingdowntheplantisatransientwhichputsthermalstressoncomponentswhichcouldincreasethechancesofchallengingsafetysystems.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP214Revision+@/

~Ii, NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.6.1.7-SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER-10-DRYWELLVACUUMBREAKERS~LH*NEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThischangeprovidesanexceptionallowingthevacuumbreakerstobeopenwhenperformingrequiredSurveillances(theexceptionistotheSurveillancethatwould.otherwiserequirethevacuumbreakerstobeclosedatalltimes).Thevacuumbreakersarenotassumedtobeaninitiatorofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thesurveillanceexceptionismadeonlyforcircumstanceswherethevacuumbreakerisundertheimmediatecontrolofanoperator(manuallyopeningtoconfirmoperability).Assuch,thevacuumbreakerisexpectedtocontinuetoperformitsintendedandassumedsafetyfunction,andthereforethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromany~EEaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?ThechangewillnotresultinasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetybecausethevacuumbreakersarestillrequiredtobeOperable.Theexceptionismadeonlyforcircumstanceswherethevacuumbreakerisundertheimmediatecontrolofanoperator(manuallyopeningtoconfirmoperability).Assuch,thevacuum'reakerisexpectedtocontinuetoperformitsintendedandassumedsafetyfunction,andthereforethischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.NMP2Revision+QQ

Volume8Section3.7

SWSystemandUHSB3'.1BASESACTIONSG.1andG.2(continued)within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.4.9,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)ShutdownCoolingSystem-HotShutdown,"beenteredandtheRequiredActionstakeniftheinoperableSWSystemorUHSresultsinaninoperableRHRshutdowncoolingsubsystem.ThisisinaccordancewithLCO3.0.6andensurestheproperactionsaretakenfortheRHRShutdownCoolingSystem,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1Verificationthatthewatertemperatureoftheintaketunnelsis>38Fensuresthatfrazilice,whichcanblocktheintaketunnels,cannotform.Thisensuresthattheintaketunnelscanperformtheirintendedfunction.ThisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobemetwhenSR3.7.1.5andSR3.7.1.8arenotsatisfi,ed.WiththeIntakeDeicerHeaterSystemOPERABLE(andSR3.7.1.5andSR3.7.1.8met),frazilicecannotformevenwiththeintaketunnelswatertemperature(38'F.The12hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.SR3.7.1.2ThisSRverifiesthewaterlevelintheSWpumpintakebaytobesufficientfortheproperoperationoftheSWpumps(netpositivesuctionheadandpumpvortexingareconsideredindeterminingthislimit).Thewaterlevellimit,233.1ft,isreferencedtomeansealevel.The24hourgFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.continuedNMP2B3.7-8RevisionA'Q~

SWSystemandUHSB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.1.3VerificationofeachSWsubsystemsupplyheadertemperatureensuresthattheheatremovalcapabilityoftheSWSystemiswithintheassumptionsoftheDBAanalysis.The24hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.However,ifaSWsubsystemsupplyheaderwatertemperatureis>75'F,theSurveillancemustbeperformedmorefrequently(every4hoursif>75Fandevery2hoursif>79F),sincetheconditionisclosertothemaximumwatertemperaturelimit.SR3.7.1.4VerificationthateachrequiredSWpumpisinoperationensuresthatanadequatenumberofSWpumpsareoperatingtoperformthelongtermcontainmentcoolingfunctionduringaLOCA.The24hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheoperator'sinherentknowledgeofplantstatus,includingchangesinSWpumpoperatingstatus.SR3.7.1.5ThecurrentforeachrequiredheaterfeedercableisrequiredtobecheckedtoensurethepropernumberofheatersareOPERABLEforeachintakedeicerheaterdivision,TheSurveillanceisperformedbyverifying,atthemotorcontrolcenters,thatthecurrentis>20amps(totalforallthreephaseswhenadjustedtodegradedvoltageconditions,i,e.,518volts)ineachintakestructureforeachdivision.Thecurrentlimitisbaseduponensuring14heatersareOPERABLE(whichincludesinoperation)inanintakestructure.ThisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobemetwhenSR3.7.1.1isnotsatisfied,sincewiththeintaketunnelswatertemperature>38F(i.e.,SR3.7.1.1met),frazilicecannotformevenwiththeintakedeicerheatersinoperable.The7dayFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthisFrequency.continuedNHP2B3,7-9RevisionA

SWSystemandUHSB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.1.6Verifyingthecorrectalignmentforeachmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveineachSWsubsystemflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforSWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesevalveswereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalveisalsoallowedtobeinthenonaccidentpositionandyetconsideredinthecorrectposition,provideditcanbeautomaticallyrealignedtoitsaccidentpositionwithintherequiredtime.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatisolationoftheassociatedSWsubsystemtocomponentsorsystemsmayrenderthosecomponentsorsystemsinoperable,butdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheSWsubsystem.Assuch,whenallSWpumps,valves,andpipingareOPERABLE,butabranchconnectionoffthemainheaderisisolated,theSWsubsystemisstillOPERABLE.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3.7.1.7ThisSRverifiesthattheautomaticisolationvalves(i.e.,SWisolationvalvesservicingnon-safetyrelatedequipment,SWsupplyheadercrossconnectvalves,andSWpumpdischargevalvesofnon-operatingSWpumps)oftheSWSystemwillautomaticallyswitchtothesafetyoremergencypositiontoprovidecoolingwaterexclusivelytothesafetyrelatedequipmentduringatransientevent(i.e.,LOOP).Thisisdemonstratedbyuseofanactualorsimulatedinitiationsignal.ThisSRalsoverifiestheautomaticstartcapabilityoftheSWpump(andassociatedpumpdischargevalveopeningcapability)ineachsubsystem.continuedNHP2B3.7-10RevisionA

SWSystemandUHSB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.1.7(continued)OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedonthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.1.8TheresistanceofeachrequiredheaterfeedercableandassociatedheaterelementsisrequiredtobecheckedtoensuretherequiredheatersareOPERABLEforeachintakedeicerheaterdivision.TheSurveillanceisperformedbyverifyingthattheresistanceis>28ohmsforeachrequiredheaterfeedercableandassociatedheaterelement.TheminimumresistanceisbasedonensuringtheintakestructurebarracksareheatedsufficientlysuchthattheSWflowassumedtosafelyshutdowntheunitcanbeachievedthroughtheintakestructures.ThisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobemetwhenSR3'.1.1isnotsatisfied,sincewiththeintaketunnelswatertemperature>38F(i.e.,SR3.7.1.1met),frazilicecannotformevenwiththeintakedeicerheatersinoperable.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthisFrequency.REFERENCES2.3.5.6.7.8.9.10.RegulatoryGuide1.27,Revision2,January1976.USAR,Section9.2.1.USAR,Section9.2.5.USAR,Tables9.2-1and9.2-1A.USAR,Section6.2.USAR,Section6.3.USAR,Chapter15.USAR,AppendixA.USAR,Section6.2.2.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).NMP2B3.7-11RevisionA

CREFSystemB3.7.2B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.2ControlRoomEnvelopeFiltration(CREF)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheCREFSystemprovidesaradiologicallycontrolledenvironmentfromwhichtheunitcanbesafelyoperatedfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontrolroomenvelopeconsistsofallroomsandareaslocatedinthemaincontrolroomandrelayroomofthecontrolbuilding.Includedintheenvelopearethemaincontrolroom,relayroom,instrumentshop,trainingroom,shiftsupervisor'soffice,lunchroom,toilets,corridors,workreleaseroom,andHVACequipmentrooms(Ref.'1).ThesafetyrelatedfunctionoftheCREFSystemusedtocontrolradiationexposureconsistsoftwoindependentandredundanthighefficiencyairfiltrationsubsystemsfortreatmentofrecirculatedairandoutsidesupplyair.Eachsubsystemincludesacontrolroomoutdoorairspecialfiltertrain(CROASFT),whichconsistsofanelectricheater,aprefilter,ahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filter,anactivatedcharcoaladsorbersection,asecondHEPAfilter,afilterboosterfan,andtheassociatedductworkanddampers.Theelectricheaterisusedtolimittherelativehumidityoftheairenteringthefiltertrain.PrefiltersandHEPAfiltersremoveparticulatematterthatmayberadioactive.Thecharcoaladsorbersprovideaholdupperiodforgaseousiodine,allowingtimefordecay.Eachsubsystemalsoincludesthenecessaryoutsideairintake(s)andtwoairconditioningunits(fanportiononly),oneforthecontrolroomandonefortherelayroom.Eachoutside8airintakeiscapableofproviding100/oofthenecessarymakeupflow.Therefore,normallyonlyoneoutsideairgintakeisnecessary.However,whentheunitisinMODE1,2,or3withMSIVleakage)15scfhforanyMSIV,bothoutsideairintakes,includingthecapabilitytoisolatetheintakes,arenecessary.Bothoutsideairintakes'rerequiredintheseconditionssincetheaccidentanalysisiQ>assumesthemostcontaminatedoutsideairintakeisisolated8hoursaftertheaccidenttoensurethedosetocontrolroomenvelopepersonneldoesnotexceedthelimit.TheQooutsideairintakethatisnotisolatedcontinuestobecapableofproviding100%ofthenecessarymakeupflow.Thetworequiredoutsideairintakesareallowedtobecommontobothsubsystems(sincethereareonlytwooutsideairintakesfortheCREFSystem).Alternatel'y,ifMSIVleakagecontinuedNHP2B3.7-12RevisionA'Q8

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)is>15scfhforanyHSIV,anadditionalanal'ysismaybeperformedtodeterminethe"effective"HSIVleakage.The"effective"HSIVleakageistheindividualHSIVleakratewhenallfourmainsteamlinesareassumedtoleakatthesamerate,andthedosesinthecontrolroomenvelopeareequivalenttothosewhentheindividual"as-left"valveleakratesareused.Ifthe"effective"HSIVleakageis<15scfh,thenonlyoneoutsideairintakeisnecessary.TheCROASFTportionofthesafetyrelatedCREFSystemisnormallyinstandby,buttheremainingportionsoftheCREFSystem(theoutsideairintakesandfanportionoftheairconditioningunits)areoperatedtomaintainthecontrolroomenvelopeenvironmentduringnormaloperation.Uponreceiptoftheinitiationsignal(s)(indicativeofconditionsthatcouldresultinradiationexposuretocontrolroomenvelopepersonnel),theCREFSystemautomaticallyswitchestotheemergencypressurizationmodeofoperationtopreventinfiltrationofcontaminatedairintothecontrolroomenvelope.AsystemofvalvesanddampersredirectsallcontrolroomenvelopeoutsideairflowthroughthetwoCROASFTs.Inaddition,aportionofthecontrolroomairisrecirculatedthroughtheCROASFTs.Theairconditioningunits(fanportiononly)maintaintheI/8inchpositivepressure;theCROASFTboosterfanonlyprovidesthemotiveforcetoovercometheaddedresistanceoftheCROASFTbeinginservice.TheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainthecontrolroomenvelopeenvironmentfora30daycontinuousoccupancy(i.e.,consideringtheoccupancyfactorsofNUREG-0800,Table6.4-1,Ref.2)afteraDBA,whilelimitingthedosagetopersonneltonotmorethan5remwholebodyoritsequivalenttoanypartofthebody.CREFSystemoperationinmaintainingthecontrolroomenvelopehabitabilityisdiscussedintheUSAR,Sections6.4.1and9.4.I(Refs.3and4,respectively).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheabilityoftheCREFSystemtomaintainthehabitabilityofthecontrolroomenvelopeisanexplicitassumptionforthesafetyanalysespresentedintheUSAR,Chapters6and15(Refs.6and6,respectively).Theemergencypressurization]QBmodeoftheCREFSystemisassumedtooperatefollowingalossofcoolantaccident,mainsteamlinebreak,fuelhandlingaccident,andcontrolroddropaccident.TheradiologicaldosestocontrolroomenvelopepersonnelasaresultofthevariousDBAsaresummarizedinReference6.IQB(continued)NHP283.7-13RevisionP'Q

BASESCREFSystemB3.7.2APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Nosingleactivefailurewillcausethelossofoutsideorrecirculatedairfromthecontrolroomenvelope.TheCREFSystemsatisfiesCriterion3ofReference7.LCOTworedundantsubsystemsoftheCREFSystemarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatatleastoneisavailable,assumingasinglefailuredisablestheothersubsystem.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultinexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorsintheeventofaDBA.TheCREFSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytocontroloperatorexposureareOPERABLEinbothsubsystems.AsubsystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitsassociated:a.CROASFTisOPERABLE;b.Airconditioningunits(fanportiononly)areOPERABLE(,(oneforthecontrolroomandonefortherelayroom),includingtheductwork,tomaintainaircirculationtoandfromthecontrolroomenvelope;andC.Necessaryoutsideairintake(s)areOPERABLE.WhentheunitisnotinNODES1,2,and3,orwhentheunitisinMODE1,2,or3withHSIVleakage<15scfhforeachHSIV,onlyoneoutsideairintakeisnecessary.WhentheunitisinMODE1,2,or3withMSIVleakage>15scfhforanyHSIV,bothoutsideairintakes,includingthecapabilitytoisolatetheintakes,arenecessaryandareallowedtobecommontobothsubsystems.Alternately,ifHSIVleakageis>15scfhforanyHSIV,anadditionalanalysismaybeperformedtodeterminethe"effective"HSIVleakage.Ifthe"effective"HSIVleakageis<15scfh,thenonlyoneoutsideairintakeisnecessary.ACROASFTisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitsassociatedfilterboosterfanisOPERABLE;HEPAfilterandcharcoaladsorberarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflowandarecapableofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andheater,ductwork,valves,anddampersareOPERABLE,andaircirculationthroughthefiltertraincanbemaintained.Inaddition,thecontrolroomenvelopeboundarymustbemaintained,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdoors,suchthatthe(continued)NHP2B3.7-14RevisionPj@

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESLCO(continued)pressurizationlimitofSR3.7.2.4canbemet.However,itisacceptableforaccessdoorstobeopenfornormalcontrolroomenvelopeentryandexitandnotconsiderittobeafailuretomeettheLCO.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theCREFSystemmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDBA,sincetheDBAcouldleadtoafissionproductrelease.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesofaDBAarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingtheCREFSystemOPERABLEisnotrequiredinMODE4or5,exceptforthefollowingsituationsunderwhichsignificantradioactivereleasescanbepostulated:'a~Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment;b.DuringCOREALTERATIONS;andC.Duringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs).ACTIONSA.1WithoneCREFsubsysteminoperable,orwithbothCREFsubsystemsinoperablebuttheCREFSystemsafetyfunctionmaintained,theinoperableCREFsubsystem(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCREFSystemsafetyfunctionismaintainedwhentheCREFSystemcomponentsequivalenttooneCREFsubsystemareOPERABLE.Withtheunitinthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLECREFsubsystem(orOPERABLEcomponentsinbothsubsystems)isadequatetoperformthecontrolroomenveloperadiationprotectionfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLEsubsystem(orremainingOPERABLEportionsofthesubsystems,asapplicable)couldresultinlossofCREFSystemfunction.The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod,andthattheremainingsubsystem(orcomponentsinbothsubsystems)canprovidetherequiredcapabilities.continuedNMP2B3.7-15RevisionA

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2InMODE1,2,or3,iftheinoperableCREFsubsystem(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theunitmustbeplacedinaMODEthatminimizesrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within12hoursandinMODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.C.lC.2.1C.2.2andC.2.3LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablewhileinMODE4or5.However,sinceirradiatedfuelassemblymovementcanoccurinMODE1,2,or3,theRequiredActionsofConditionCaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapply.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringOPDRVs,iftheinoperableCREFsubsystem(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,the'PERABLEcomponentsoftheCREFsubsystem(s)equivalenttoasingleCREFsubsystem(e.g.,theCROASFTandfanportionoftheairconditioningunitsdonothavetobe1~>poweredfromthesameelectricaldivision)maybeplacedintheemergencypressurizationmode.Thisactionensuresthattheremainingsubsystem(orcomponentsinbothsubsystemsequivalenttoasingleCREFsubsystem)isOPERABLE,thatnofailuresthatwouldpreventautomaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailurewillbereadilydetected.Analternative,toRequiredActionC.1istoimmediatelysuspendactivitiesthatpresentapotentialforreleasingradioactivitythatmightrequireisolationofthecontrolroomenvelope.Thisplacestheunitinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.continued~NMP2B3~7-16RevisionK

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESACTIONSC.1C.2.1C.2.2andC.2.3(continued)Ifapplicable,COREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainmentmustbesuspendedimmediately.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.Also,ifapplicable,actionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytosuspendOPDRVstominimizetheprobabilityofavesseldraindownandsubsequentpotentialforfissionproductrelease.ActionmustcontinueuntiltheOPDRVsaresuspended.D.1IfbothCREFsubsystemsareinoperablewiththeCREFSystemsafetyfunctionnotmaintainedinMODE1,2,or3,theCREFSystemmaynotbecapableofperformingtheintendedfunctionandtheunitisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses.Therefore,LCO3.0,3mustbeenteredimmediately.'E.lE.2andE.3LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablewhileinMODE4or5.However,sinceirradiatedfuelassemblymovementcanoccurinMODE1,2,or3,theRequiredActionsofConditionEaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapply.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringOPDRVs,withtwoCREFsubsystemsinoperablewiththeCREFSystemsafetyfunctionnotmaintained,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthatpresentapotentialforreleasingradioactivitythatmightrequireisolationofthecontrolroomenvelope.Thisplacestheunitinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.continuedNHP2B3.7-17RevisionA

~~

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESACTIONSE.1E.2andE.3(continued)Ifapplicable,COREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainmentmustbesuspendedimmediately.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.Ifapplicable,actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytosuspendOPDRVstominimizetheprobabilityofavesseldraindownandsubsequentpotentialforfissionproductrelease.ActionsmustcontinueuntiltheOPDRVsaresuspended.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.2.1Operating(fromthecontrolroom)eachCREFsubsystemfor>10continuoushoursensuresthatbothsubsystemsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,filterboosterorairconditioningunitfanormotorfailure,orexcessive)gvibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.Operationwiththeheaterson(automaticheatercyclingtomaintainhumidity,asnecessary)for>10continuoushoursevery'1daysreducesmoistureontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.Inaddition,itisnotnecessarytooperateallcomponentsofasinglesubsystemsimultaneouslyforthe10hourperiod.Itisacceptabletooperatethefanportionoftheairconditioningunit(s)ofonesubsystemwiththeCROASFToftheothersubsystem,suchthatthe,CROASFTsandfanportionoftheairconditioningunitsareeachoperatedfor10continuoushours.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedinconsiderationoftheknownreliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrolsandtheredundancyavailableinthesystem.SR3.7.2.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCROASFTtestingisperformedinaccordancewithSpecification5.5.7,"VentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)."TheCROASFTfiltertestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.8).TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance,charcoaladsorberefficiency,systemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.continuedNNP2B3.7-18RevisionP4

CREFSystemB3.7.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.2.3ThisSRverifiesthateachCREFsubsystemstartsandoperatesonanactualorsimulatedinitiationsignal.ThisSRalsoincludesensuringtheairconditioningunits(fanportiononly)startonalowflowsignalaftertheappropriatetimedelay.TheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTinLCO3.3.7.1,"ControlRoomEnvelopeFiltration(CREF)SystemInstrumentation,"overlapsthisSRtoprovidecompletetestingofthesafetyfunction.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsnormallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasfoundtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.2.4ThisSRverifiestheintegrityofthecontrolroomenvelopeandtheassumedinleakageratesofpotentiallycontaminatedair.Thecontrolroomenvelopepositivepressure,withrespecttopotentiallycontaminatedadjacentareas,isperiodicallytestedtoverifyproperfunctionoftheCREFSystem.TheSRrequiresallcombinationsoftheCREFSystemtobeverified.Thiscanbemetbydetermining(bytest)theworstcombinationoftheairconditioningunits(fanportiononly),thentestingtheworstcombinationoftheairconditioningunits(fanportiononly)witheachCROASFT.Duringtheemergencypressurizationmodeofoperation,theCREFSystemisdesignedtoslightlypressurizethecontrolroomenvelopeto>0.125incheswatergaugepositivepressurewithrespecttooutsideatmospheretopreventunfilteredinleakage.TheCREFSystemisdesignedtomaintainthispositivepressureatanoutsideairintakeflowrateof(1500cfmtothecontrolroomenvelopeintheemergencypressurizationmode.CompliancewiththisSRisdemonstratedbymeasurementofthepressureinthecontrolroomandrelayroom,whicharerepresentativeofadequatepositivepressureinbothelevationsofthecontrolroomenvelope.TheFrequencyof24monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisconsistentwithindustrypracticeandotherfiltrationsystemSRs.REFERENCES1.USAR,Section6.4.2.1.2..NUREG-0800,Table6.4-1.continuedNMP2B3.7-19RevisionAQg

BASESCREFSystemB3.

7.2REFERENCES

(continued)3.USAR,Section6.4.1.4.USAR,Section9.4.1.5.USAR,Chapter6.6.USAR,Chapter15.7.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).8.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2,March1978.IQslhhIQeNHP2B3.7-20RevisionPQP'

ControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemB3.7.3B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.3ControlRoomEnvelopeAirConditioning(AC)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDThecontrolroomenvelopeACportionoftheControlBuildingHeating,Ventilation,andAirConditioning(HVAC)System(hereafterreferredtoastheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystem)providestemperaturecontrolforthecontrolroomenvelopefollowingisolationofthecontrolroomenvelope.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemconsistsoftwoindependent,redundantsubsystemsthatprovidecoolingofrecirculatedandoutsideairmakeupcontrolroomenvelopeair.Eachsubsystemconsistsoftwoairconditioningunits(oneforthecontrolroomandonefortherelayroom),onecontrolbuildingchilledwatersubsystem(whichprovidescoolingwatertothecoolingcoilsofthetwoairconditioningunits),ductwork,dampers,andinstrumentationandcontrolstoprovideforcontrolroomenvelopetemperaturecontrol.Eachairconditioningunitincludesanairfilterassembly,coolingcoil,andfan.Eachcontrolbuildingchilledwatersubsystemincludesahermeticcentrifugalwaterchiller,chilledwaterpump,expansiontank,controls,piping,andvalves.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemisdesignedtoprovideacontrolledenvironmentunderbothnormalandaccidentconditions.Asinglesubsystemprovidestherequiredtemperaturecontroltomaintainasuitablecontrolroomenvelopeenvironmentforasustainedoccupancyof37persons.Thedesignconditionsforthecontrolroomenvelopeenvironmentare75'Fand50%relativehumidity.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemoperationinmaintainingthecontrolroomenvelopetemperatureisdiscussedintheUSAR,Sections6.4and9.4.I(Refs.1and2,respectively).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemistomaintainthecontrolroomenvelopetemperaturefora30daycontinuousoccupancyfollowingisolationofthecontrolroomenvelope.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemcomponentsarearrangedinredundantsafetyrelatedsubsystems.Duringemergencyoperation,theControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemmaintainsahabitableenvironmentandensurestheOPERABILITYofNMP2B3.7-21continuedRevisionP'Qg

ControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemB3.7.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)componentsinthecontrolroomenvelope.AsingleactivefailureofacomponentoftheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystem,assumingalossofoffsitepower,doesnotimpairtheabilityofthesystemtoperformitsdesignfunction.Redundantdetectorsandcontrolsareprovidedforcontrolroomenvelopetemperaturecontrol.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemisdesignedinaccordancewithSeismicCategoryIrequirements.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemiscapableofremovingsensibleandlatentheatloadsfromthecontrolroomenvelope,includingconsiderationofequipmentheatloadsandpersonneloccupancyrequirementstoensureequipmentOPERABILITY.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemsatisfiesCriterion3ofReference3.LCOTwoindependentandredundantsubsystemsoftheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatatleastoneisavailable,assumingasinglefailuredisablestheothersubsystem.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultintheequipmentoperatingtemperatureexceedinglimits.TheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytomaintainthecontrolroomenvelopetemperatureareOPERABLEinbothsubsystems.Thesecomponentsincludethecontrolroomandrelayroomairconditioningunits(coolingcoilsandfansonly),thecontrolbuildingchilledwater,subsystems,ductwork,dampers,andassociatedinstrumentationandcontrols.Inaddition,duringconditionsinMODESotherthanMODESI,2,and3whentheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE(e.g.,duringCOREALTERATIONS),thenecessaryportionsoftheSWSystemandUltimateHeatSinkcapableofprovidingcoolingtothehermeticcentrifugalwaterchillersarepartoftheOPERABILITYrequirementscoveredbythisLCO.APPLICABILITYInMODEI,2,or3,theControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethatthecontrolroomenvelopetemperaturewillnotexceedequipmentOPERABILITYlimitsfollowingcontrolroomenvelopeisolation.InMODES4and5,theprobabilityandconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccidentarereducedduetothepressureandNMP2B3.7-22continuedRevisionA'Qg

ControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemB3.7.3BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)temperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingtheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemOPERABLEisnotrequiredinMODE4or5,exceptforthefollowingsituationsunderwhichsignificantradioactivereleasescanbepostulated:Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment;b.DuringCOREALTERATIONS;andC.Duringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs).ACTIONSA.lWithonecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsysteminoperable,orwithbothcontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemsinoperablebuttheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionmaintained,theinoperablecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.TheControlRoomenvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionismaintainedwhentheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemcomponentsequivalenttoonecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemareOPERABLE.Withtheunitinthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLEcontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(orOPERABLEcomponentsinbothsubsystems)isadequatetoperformthecontrolroomenvelopeairconditioningfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLEsubsystem(orremainingOPERABLEportionsofthesubsystems,asapplicable)couldresultinlossofthecontrolroomenvelopeairconditioningfunction.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringrequiringcontrolroomenvelopeisolation,theconsiderationthattheremainingsubsystem(orcomponentsinbothsubsystems)canprovidetherequiredprotection,andtheavailabilityofalternatecoolingmethods.B.landB.2InMODEI,2,or3,iftheinoperablecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theunitmustbeplacedinaMODEthatminimizesrisk.ToachievethisstatustheunitcontinuedNMP2B3.7-23RevisionA

ControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemB3.7.3BASESACTIONSB.1and8.2(continued)mustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within12hoursandinMODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.C.lC.2.1C.2.2andC.2.3LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablewhileinMODE4or5.However,sinceirradiatedfuelassemblymovementcanoccurinMODE1,2,or3,theRequiredActionsofConditionCaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapply.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringOPDRVs,ifRequiredActionA.1cannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theOPERABLEcomponentsofthecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(s)equivalenttoasinglecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(e.g.,the.controlbuildingchilledwatersubsystemandairconditioningunitsdonothavetobepoweredfromthesameelectricaldivision)maybeplacedimmediatelyinoperation.Thisactionensuresthattheremainingsubsystem(orcomponentsinbothsubsystemsequivalenttoasinglecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem)isOPERABLE,thatnofailuresthatwouldpreventactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailure'illbereadilydetected.AnalternativetoRequiredActionC.1istoimmediatelysuspendactivitiesthatpresentapotentialforreleasingradioactivitythatmightrequireisolationofthecontrolroomenvelope.Thisplacestheunitinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.continuedNMP2B3.7-24RevisionAgg

ControlRoomEnvelopeACSystem83.7.3BASESACTIONSC.1C.2.1C.2.2andC.2.3(continued)Ifapplicable,COREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainmentmustbesuspendedimmediately.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.Also,ifapplicable,actionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytosuspendOPDRVstominimizetheprobabilityofavesseldraindownandsubsequentpotentialforfissionproductrelease.ActionmustcontinueuntiltheOPDRVsaresuspended.D.lIfbothcontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemsareinoperablewiththeControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionnotmaintainedinMODE1,2,or3,theControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemmaynotbecapableofperformingtheintendedfunction.Therefore,LCO3,0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.E.1E.2andE.3LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablewhileinMODE4or5.However,sinceirradiatedfuelassemblymovementcanoccurinMODE1,2,or3,theRequiredActionsofConditionEaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapply.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,duringCOREALTERATIONS,orduringOPDRVswithtwocontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemsinoperablewiththeControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionnotmaintained,actionmustbetakentoimmediatelysuspendactivitiesthatpresentapotentialforreleasingradioactivitythatmightrequireisolationofthecontrol.room.envelope.Thisplacestheunitinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.continuedNMP2B3.7-25RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.7.2-CONTROLROOMENVELOPEFILTRATION(CREF)SYSTEMTEHNIALHAN-LRESTRITIVELA.2(cont'd)such,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingCTS4.7.3.e.2'(proposedSR3.7.2.3andSR3.7.2.4)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.ThisSRensuresthateachCROASFTiscapableofautomaticinitiationandthatthemechanicalcomponentsoperateasdesignedonsystemactuation(e.g.,fansstart,valvesanddampersopenorcloseasrequired)(seeDiscussionofChangeM.1foradditionalsignaltestedinproposedSR3.7.2.3),andthatthecontrolroomenvelopeboundaryleakageiswithinthecapacityoftheCREFSystembydemonstratingthatcontrolroomenvelopecanbemaintainedatapositivepressurewithrespecttooutsideatmospherewhenintheemergencypressurizationmodeofoperation.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24-monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSpecification3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.Reviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthistestnormally.passestheSurveillanceatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.TheCREFSystemwillbetestedevery31daysaccordingtoproposedSR3.7.2.1,therefore,anysignificantmechanicalcomponentfailureswillbedetectedandrepairedduringplantoperation.Thismorefrequenttesting,althoughitdoesnottesttheactualinitiationsignal,verifiestheOPERABILITYofthemajorityoftheCREFSystemcircuitry.Furthermore,asstatedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(datedAugust2,1993)relatedtoextensionofthePeachBottomAtomicPowerStation,UnitNumbers2and3,surveillanceintervalsfrom18to24months:"Industryreliabilitystudiesforboilingwaterreactors(BWRs),preparedbytheBWROwnersGroup(NEDC-30936P)showthattheoverallsafetysyste'ms'eliabilitiesarenotdominatedbythereliabilitiesofthelogicsystem,butbythatofthemechanicalcomponents,(e.g.,pumpsandvalves),whichareconsequentlytestedonamorefrequent4Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.7.2-CONTROLROOMENVELOPEFILTRATION(CREF)SYSTEMTEHNICALCHAN-LSRESTRICTIVELD.1(cont'd)basis.Sincetheprobabilityofarelayorcontactfailureissmallrelativetotheprobabilityofmechanicalcomponentfailure,increasingthelogicsystemfunctionaltestintervalrepresentsnosignificantchangeintheoverallsafetysystemunavailability."ExtendingthesurveillanceintervalfortheverificationofcontrolroomenvelopeiQQboundaryintegrityisacceptablebecausethecontrolroomenvelopeboundaryismaintainedatapositivepressureduringnormaloperation.Therefore,anysubstantialdegradationoftheboundarythatwouldpreventmaintainingthecontrolroomenvelopeattherequiredpressureduringanaccidentwillbeevidentpriortothescheduledperformanceofthesetests.Basedontheabovediscussionandonresultsofthereviewofthehistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedata,theimpact,ifany,ofthischangeonsystemavailabilityissmall.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis."Specific"L.1NMP2CTS3.7.3Actionsaandb.1providesa7dayrestorationtimewhenoneCREFsubsystemisinoperable.TheCTSdoesnotprovidearestorationtimewhenbothCREFsubsystemsareinoperable;eitherLCO3.0.3mustbeentered(ifinMODE1,2,or3)ortheCTS3.7.3Actionb.2mustbetaken(duringCoreAlterations,handlingirradiatedfuel,orOPDRVs).ITS3.7.2ACTIONAwillallowa7dayrestorationtimewhenbothCREFsubsystemsareinoperable,providedtheCREFSystemsafetyfunctionismaintained.ITS3.7.2ACTIONDwillrequireentryinto3.0.3(ifinMODE1,2;or3)andITS3.7.2ACTIONEwillrequiretheunittosuspendCoreAlterations,handlingirradiatedfuel,andOPDRVs(ifperformingoneoftheseevolutions),ifbothCREFsubsystemsareinoperableandCREFSystemsafetyfunctionisnotmaintained.TheNMP2CREFSystemdesignincludestwofiltertrainsandfourairhandlingunitfans.Thefiltertrainsprovidesthemeansoffilteringthecontrolroomenveloperecirculatedandoutsideairmakeup.Thefiltertrainboosterfans,whichareconsideredpartofthefiltertrains,takeasuctiononthefiltertrainandprovidesufficientheadtoovercomethedifferentialpressurelossasaresultofthefiltertrainsbeinginservice.Thefiltertrainboosterfansdischargeintoacommonheader.Theairhandlingunit'fanstakeasuctiononthecommonheaderandprovidethenecessaryheadtopressurizethecontrolroomenvelopeto1/8inchpositivepressure.Twoairhandlingunitfansarenecessarytoprovidethe1/8inchpositivepressure;oneforthecontrolroomareaandonefortherelayroom.ThusfortheCREFSystemtoperformitsRevisionJCQ8

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.7.2-CONTROLROOMENVELOPEFILTRATION(CREF)SYSTEMTEHNICALCHANG-LRTRICTIVEL.l(cont'd)designfunction,onefiltertrainandtwoairhandlingunitfansarerequired.TwoCREFsubsystemsareprovided,witheachsubsystemconsistingofonefiltertrainandtwoairhandlingunitfans,allfromthesameelectricalpowerdivision.Duetothisdesign,whenbothsubsystemsareinoperable,thecapabilityfortheCREFSystemtoperformitsdesignfunctionmaystillexist.Forexample,iftheDivision1filtertrainandtheDivision2relayroomairhandlingunitfanareinoperable,sufficientcomponentsareOPERABLEfortheCREFSystemtomeetitssafetyfunction(usingtheDivision2filtertrain,theDivision1relayroomairhandlingunitfan,andeithertheDivision1or2controlroomareaairhandlingunitfan).Therefore,sincethisalignmentisequivalenttohavingoneCREFsubsystemfullyOPERABLE,the7dayrestorationtimeisacceptable,providedtheCREFSystemsafetyfunctionismaintained.The7dayrestorationtimeisidenticaltothatalreadyallowedintheCTSwhenoneCREFsubsystemisinoperable.InthecurrentconditionallowedbytheCTS,theremainingOPERABLEsubsystemwillperformtheCREFSystemsafetyfunction,assumingnoadditionalsinglefailure.TheproposedconditionwillstillensuretheremainingOPERABLEcomponentsofthetwosubsystemscanperformtheCREFsafetyfunction,assumingnoadditionalsinglefailure.IftheremainingcomponentsoftheCREFsubsystemscannotmaintaintheCREFSystemsafetyfunction,thentheunitwillberequiredtoenterLCO3.0.3(ifinMODE1,2,or3),ortheunitmustsuspendCoreAlterations,handlingirradiatedfuel,andOPDRVs(ifperformingoneoftheseevolutions),consistentwiththecurrentrequirements.Inaddition,thisconceptisconsistentwiththeECCSSpecificationinNUREG-1430,NUREG-1431,andNUREG-1432,whichallowmultipleECCStrainstobeinoperableforthesamelengthoftimeasiscurrentlyallowedforonetrainonly,provided100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleECCStrainisavailable.Duetothischange,CTS3.7.3Actionb.1(ITS3.7.2RequiredActionC.1)hasbeenrevisedtorequiretheOperablecomponentsofCREFsubsystem(s)equivalenttoasingleCREFsubsystemtobeplacedinoperationinlieuofplacingtheOperablesubsysteminoperation.ThepurposeofthecurrentActiontoplacethesubsysteminoperation,istoensurethattheremainingsubsystemisOperable,thatnofailuresthatwouldpreventautomaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailurewillbereadilydetected,SincethischangedoesnotimpactthepurposeoftheAction(thethreelistedreasonsremainvalid),thisportionofthechangeisacceptable,L.2CTS3.7.3Actionb.1providestheappropriateactionswhenoneCREFsubsystemisinoperableduringmovementofirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment,CoreAlterations,andOPDRVs.TheActionrequirestheCREFsubsystemtoberestoredin7days,ortheOperableCREFsubsystemmustbeplacedandmaintainedintheemergencypressurizationmodeofoperation.ItfurtherexemptstherequirementsofLCO3.0.4providedoneOperableCREFNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.7.2-CONTROLROOMENVELOPEFILTRATION(CREF)SYSTEMTECHNIALHANES-LESRESTRICTIVEL.2(cont'd)subsystemisinoperation.ThisallowanceprecludesstartingoftheabovelistedevolutionswhenaCREFsubsystemisinoperableunlesstheOperablesubsystemisinoperation;theevolutionscannotbestartedusingthe7dayrestorationtimeprovidedintheAction.ThisrequirementhasbeendeletedinITS3.7.2.Thiswillallowtheevolutionstobestartedandcontinuedforupto7daysbeforerequiringtheOperableCREFsubsystemtobeplacedinoperation.Whenthisisdone,thereisstillanOperableCREFsubsystemthatwillautomaticallystartwhenrequired.Thischangeisconsidertobeacceptablesince1)ithasbeendeterminedthata7dayallowedoutofservicetimeforoneCREFsubsystemisacceptable,and2)oneCREFsubsystemisstillOPERABLE.Therefore,thedeletionoftheITSLCO3.0.4'exceptionisconsideredtoprovidenosignificantimpactonsafety.L.3CTS4.7.3.brequirestheCREFSystemtobeoperatedevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.ProposedSR3.7.2.1doesnotincludetheSTAGGEREDTESTBASISrequirement.Theintent.ofarequirementforstaggeredtestingistoincreasereliabilityofthecomponent/systembeingtested.Anumberofreviews/evaluationshavebeenperformedwhichhavedemonstratedthatstaggeredtestinghasnegligibleimpactoncomponentreliability.Asaresult,ithasbeendeterminedthatstaggeredtesting1)isoperationallydifficult,2)hasnegligibleimpactoncomponentreliability,3)isnotassignificantasinitiallythought,and4)hasnoimpactonfailurefrequency.Therefore,theCREFstaggeredtestingrequirementshavebeendeleted.'incetheFrequencyisnotaffected,i.e.,bothCTSandITSrequiremonthlytestingforeachsubsystem,andstaggeredtestinghasanegligiblei'mpactoncomponentreliability,thisrequirementhasbeendeleted.L.4Thephrase"actualor,"inreferencetotheactuationtestsignal'inCTS4.7.3.e.2,hasbeenaddedtoproposedSR3.7.2.3,whichverifiesthateachCREFsubsystemactuatesonanactuationtestsignal(seeDiscussionofChangeM.1foradditionalsignaltestedinproposedSR3.7.2.3).ThisallowssatisfactoryautomaticCREFSysteminitiationsforotherthansurveillancepurposestobeusedtofulfilltheSurveillanceRequirement..OperabilityisadequatelydemonstratedineithercasesincetheCROASFTsubsystemitselfcannotdiscriminatebetween"actual"or"test"signals.NMP2~RevisionA

~~p~PPc+PPAJQm@slipsystaaandggHs@lQB3.7.1BASESACTIONS(continued)o<CL4~A,g>CD,E,oC~o~~f~gigp4/8~pgcgpagRo%v(re,>Ai~o8statusI[SsusternresassocaeComionorbothWgsussemsareinoperaefforreasonsotherthanono,ortheggJHSQisinoperableforba%DEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustbeplacedinatleast%DE3within12hoursandin%DE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS5gp)c+gg57'l'lThSRensuresadequateongterm(30days)clingcanbemainined.Withthe[UHSwatersourcebelowtminimumlevel,heaffected[SSW]ssystemmustbedeclainoperab.The24hourFreqncyisbasedonoperaingexperienceelatedtotrendingftheparametervariaonsdurintheileNODES.+~e~~>>~~5>svbyy4~"PP~9h44'hatt'o~"I'~~"'e'~zT~'F4LeQ~'ifla~cg~)ggpccContbworeg<fataCKvtl'yQLo+<510p7+F<<d4vccg~Livesi02vSF),s~(gag~~*~'lgC(~~Wc(~~4)4'ar~<~pecW-~lie"$,m4E<~+heThisSRverifiestheaterlevelingSWpumpeoobesufficientortheproperoperationoftheQSWpumps(netpositivesuctionheadandpumpvortexingareconsideredindeterminingthis'limit).The24hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicable%DES.2~LLXp~f)<~1~Verificationoftemperatureensuresthattheheatremovalcapabilityoftheg5ysemiswithintheassumptionsoftheDBAanaTysis.The24hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicableHODES.5Q~~lcvt.)(~"~e~~g~cowse~~cog((continued)BWR/6STS83.7-5Rev1,04/07/95

eggSystenB3.7B3.7PLANTSYST95SvtiBloPeI-If4<dt}l>dd(~B3.7./ControlRoomrsPSystemBASESCI2E'FBACKGROUND%serf5Ccgl.TheeIcc.fs'fleo~IS'VS'nIs~iCt4CfteIssfsPcbc~skiIelQ~C~s~e~fcI'WC~bcflgcv/~el~Th<MA$FTP+cQQDof~>eorm(~f,~~~<>~g~byf.fh<E<~rnQ/de+(gesteoCC~yfcert(9W+rkJe44stsw4yQgqy~g+~P>~4eavof%fit.Zs'gda4iaJI~~etagegas'heSystemprov1desaradfologfcallycontrolledenv1ntfroewhichtheunitcanbesafelyoperatedfollowfnaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ThesafetyrelatedfunctionoftheSystemusedtocontrolradiationexposureconsistsotwoindependentandredundanthighefficiencya1rf1ltratfonsubsystemsforrenofrecirculatedairoutsesupp.acsubsystememanelectricheater,aprefflter,ahighefficiencypafculateafr(HEPA)filter,anactivatedcharcoaladsorbersect1onasecondHEPA<rg,~filter,aan,aneassocauctworanaapers.srPre1tersandHEPAfiltersremovepartfculatematterthataayberadfoactfve.Thecharcoaladsorbersprovideaholduperiodforgaseousiodine,alltimefordecayGasE'F~Ithesafetyrea~~earp~O.mancourngnormaloperaon.'onreceptofthefnftfnsfnalsME'F(indicativeofcondft1onshatcouresultratfoexposuretocontrolroompersonnel),theSysez+~eh/AtoneQautomaticallyswitchestotheaeoorationtoreventfnffltrat1onofcontamnatafrnoecoroAsystemofaapersontrolroomafrflowthroughthetwosashIDMSg4ILI.3ysteasesignedtomaintainthetroroenvtnantfora30day.continuousoccancafteran~IQgexcen5reawholebodortseuvaenoanypaoebody.ysemoperaonncAEaafntafningthecontrolroomaedfnthe,Sectionsg6.1$and$9.i.lj(Refs.andIspectfvely).Q(~>q8wvsdo~~"IIe((aIgu~g~8AH<l'hs~O~M>re~al'4~i+%V4CCvfgPe.4e-%rectf/OtIpfg~gg0~gJRe4~)(connueBlIR/6STSB3.7-12Rev1,Oi/07/95 0'

Thecontrolroomenvelopeconsistsofallroomsandareaslocatedinthemaincontrolroomandrelayroomofthecontrolbuilding.Includedintheenvelopearethemaincontrolroom,relayroom,instrumentshop,trainingroom,shiftsupervisor'soffice,lunchroom,toilets,corridors,workreleaseroom,andHVACequipmentrooms(Ref.1).-2includesacontrolroomoutdoorairspecialtiltertrain(CROASFT),whichconsistsofK-Eachsubsystemalsoincludesthenecessaryoutsideairintake(s)andtwoairconditioningunits(fanportiononly),oneforthecontrolroomandonefortherelayroom.Eachoutsideairintakeiscapableofproviding100%ofthenecessarymakeupflow.Therefore,normallyonlyoneoutsideairintakeisnecessary.However,whentheunitisinMODE1,2,or3withMSIVleakage)15scfhforanyMSIV,bothoutsideairintakes,includingthecapabilitytoisolatetheintakes,arenecessary.Bothoutsideairintakesarerequiredintheseconditionssincetheaccidentanalysisassumesthemostcontaminatedoutsideairintakeisisolated8hoursaftertheaccidenttoensurethedosetocontrolroomenvelopepersonneldoesnotexceedthelimit.Theoutsideairintakethatisnotisolatedcontinuestobecapableofproviding100%ofthenecessarymakeupflow.Thetworequiredoutsideairintakesareallowedtobecommontobothsubsystems(sincethereareonlytwo.outsideairintakesfortheCREFSystem).Alternately,ifMSIVleakageis>15scfliforanyMSIV,anadditionalanalysismaybeperformedtodeterminethe"effective"MSIVleakage.The"et'fective"MSIVleakageistheindividualMSIVleakratewhenallfourmainsteamlinesareassumedtoleakatthesamerate,andthedosesinthecontrolroomenvelopeareequivalenttothosewhentheindividual"as-left"valveleakratesareused.Ifthe"effective"MSIVleakageis<15scfh,thenonlyoneoutsideairintakeisnecessary.3INSERTBACK-4CROASFTs.Inaddition,aportionofthecontrolroomairisrecirculatedthroughtheCROASFTs.Theairconditioningunits(fanportiononly)maintaintheI/8inchpositive)6pressure;theCROASFTboostert'anonlyprovidesthemotiveforcetoovercometheaddedresistanceoftheCROASFTbeinginservice.InsertPageB3.7-12 0

SystemB3.7BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES;'3C+pW~ksSystemtomaintainthe1roomisanexplicitassumption~~esentedintheR,Chapters(ATheabilityofthehabitabilityofthecorthesfety~nalysesgrnd1(Ref~andgiga.espectfvely).Theneseemesis~~I<otheSystemisassumedtooperatefollowingaossyn~B,u<<~g;~ocoolantaccident,mainsteamlinebreal@fuelhandling~accident,andcontrolroddropaccident.Theradiological~~osesoconroroompersonnelasaresultofthevariousDBAsaresuaearfzedinReferenceosingleactive~failurewillcausethelossofous>et,-recrculatedairfromthecontrolroTheSystemsatisfiesCrfterfon3ofc~<fCf'CnPC~3cILCO&$01+~Q~+!AO.gt.E!a64esaphCfS!AhSp.ggenes/P'pr)j+OP)A3.7.2.~AIC~~bymE'<.HOEncVOnqiCeSsE+MpCALIginnerSf6ssP!Bee+O+NOR~(Connie(POeM&eel~e~hr)owg~igaAgASeeCCo~geftnut6hgOnf~e<unC+ipC~tCCTworedundantsubsystemsoftheCSystemarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatatesoneisavailable,assumingasinglefailuredisablestheothersubsystem.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultfnexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorsintheeventofaDBA..TheSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytocontroloperator'exposureareOPERABLEfnbothsubsystems.AsubsystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhenftsassociated:!BanisOPERABLE;+!1<e~Reste~HEPAfilterandcharcoaladsorberarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflowandarecapableofperformingtheir(filtrationfunctions;andkt,ra.yk<laQ'l4Hl~getter,~h~hZ<ductwork,al'ves,anampersareOPERABLE,andafrcirculatiocanbemaintained.eAPABEneInaddition,thecontrolroomstbemaintained,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdooAPPLICABILITYCREF'InNEES1,2,and3,theystemmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureurngandfollowingaDBA,sincetheDBAcouldleadtoaffssion.productrelease.(continued)BN/6STSB3.7-13Rev1,Ol/07/95

Q~INSERTATINIEnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODEl,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.7INSERTACTION1(s)equivalenttoasingleCREFsubsystem(e.g.,theCROASFTandfanportionoftheairconditioningunitsdonothavetobepoweredfromthesameelectricaldivision)INSERTACTIONIc(orcomponentsinbothsubsystemsequivalenttoasingleCREFsubsystem)InsertPageB3.7-15

ISERTl2andE3EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.INSERTR37.2.1Operating(fromthecontrolroom)eachCREFsubsystemfor~10continuoushoursensuresthatbothsubsystemsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.italsoensuresthatblockage,filterboosterorairconditioningunitfanormotorfailure,or~8excessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.Operationwiththeheaterson(automaticheatercyclingtomaintainhumidity,asnecessary)for~10continuoushoursevery31daysreducesmoistureontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.Inaddition,itisnotnecessarytooperateallcomponentsofasinglesubsystemsimultaneouslyforthe10hourperiod.Itisacceptabletooperatethefanponionottheairconditioningunit(s)ofonesubsystemwiththeQgCROASFToftheothersubsystem,suchthattheCROASFTsandfanportionoftheairconditioningunitsareeachoperatedfor10continuoushours.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedinconsiderationoftheknownreliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrolsandtheredundancyavailableinthesystem.InsertPageB3.7-16

FSystemB3.7SURVEILLNCERE)UIREHENTSOioc>44iu)cidQch)c~s'l)CS~dr)r~++hCSCcensest)aanrfgaopf)adsfrg/stjjDltdrjadri)C~~n+ChcgunO~ACps)C)ra)tTi)C)ci0C)74ICFnC)mercy)A+4E'e)tdcs)accced&et~ie(nenC,rcl)'ad)/4sagaiMfOaiuE.,pneSgvntpadtiou24(coinued)eachsubsystemnceeverymontpvidesanadequecheckonthissyst.Honthlyheatererationdriesutanymoistureacclatedinthechaoalfromhumityintheambientair,[Systemswithheersmustbeoratedfor~10contiuoushourswiththheatersenergied.Systemswithoutatersneedonlybeoperatedfor25minutestodemonsttethefunctionofthesystem.]Frthermore,the31dayrequencyisbasedntheknownreabilityoftheequintandthetwosustemredundanavailable.5PecsAc.)oA7ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCtestingisperformedinaccordancewitVentilationFilterTestinProgram(VFTP)g."TheCfilessarelnaccoancewRulatorGuide1.52Ref..TheQVFTP3;includestestingHEAterpeormance,carcoaladsorberefficiency,systemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactfvatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).Specifictestfrequenciesandadditionallnfornationace'discnssedindetailinthefVFTPg@iIC4.Co2.3,'>,i~k'T)'SR~ho.)wc.l~bCeit'HSM()HQ+Set.def~g;g.ta)o,4.a(gCavd(oThisSRverifiestheintegriofthecontrolroandtheassumedinleakagatesofpotentiallycontaminatedair.Thecontrolroomositivepressure,withrespectto<<<>potentiallycontaminatedadjacentareas,iseriodicallytestedtoverifroerfunctionoftheysem.urngtheemergencymodeofoperation,teSystemisdeignedtoslightlypressurizethecontrolroomto~7@<$0.incheswatergaugepositivepressurewithespecartopreventunfilteredinleakage.Th0vt)Sfc.cz.ntoSdokentn~~udkPQ3continued)ThisSRverifiesthateachubsystemstartsandto~bio~operatesonanactualorsimuaedinitiationsignal.Thes)y)~l~RefOGICSYCTIOHALTESTinoverlasthisEtc.Stoprovidecompeteestneyuncton.apl'~/'""nreuneeren+~cjetBN/6STS7-17Rev1,Ol/07/95fh;5Q>5roberes~l'lcc4iobb4c~gQ~gf'yChas~s~~--)4~f-~-,-...C~'+he,torson<fi~<<a,ggAgo~~p<<>t),0.<<yporgyoNI))+I<ldftaiso$<<',:9Kviol')siSeahichgpeai.rO,dfr',bLec,LggdSgg~T

pti'.c~4(~Six<R,;g)~*~(~~<p(CSSCa&1~+kt+>I64da~st~I.i')ay.r~e~rap'~sep+~4+ggA've4~SfuCCken\fa~~e(h,PPpBASESCREERFSystem83.7SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS(continuedOV/SteideCLs'>Ld<+'o'-~e,4]SystanlsdestgnedtnalntatnthisposttlvepressersataXfit+ateoffatothecontrolrooantheTheFrequencyofgggmonthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisconsistentwithTnn'ustrypracticeandotheremc~ywcyfiltrationsysteaSRs.pI'CfSWI'9aO,EsoalREEERENCESi~~SAEi<~~pg,p,g)~)~>8u7~5(<gqyQs4,Sectton661).QiAR,Sectton$9S1.'9.Qi.3,Chapter$6jr.+i,Chapter$15$.Regu1atoryGuide1.52,Revision2,Harch1978.7iOCr-'8,gCp.ggQggft.gpii),BN/6STSB3.7-18Rev1,04/07/95

ekede/ControlRoomAC/SystemB3.78'~efoipThe@on.omCSystemprovidestemperaturecontrolrconroroollowingisolationofthecontrole~~etdPe~c4p43~4o>~redundantsubsystemsthatprovfdoolfngEN~oThe/ControlRoomAQyconsistoftwoindependent,nati-controlroomar.achsubsstemconsistsofBACKRB3.7PLANTSTB6I~C3B3.7./ConrolRoomAirConditioning.AC)+System3pcprv+S'OeOfe.Gevao+dacefSridSOddruJH4&iag'Aa+'++r48r'rAriafr~~'~g(HireC)S"cpfcre(hrreCst,g+Cw/CfrrevsoJgsa~~e/Edge~gambC.C.<~<<g><cif4'cI'ug""<4QeMtl+~WfIaan>>ad)nveQ~~~~4.>>~)yone,co~W(ft;(gapc,h;>lack~~5aJQ~YH<~gu4cftPghes~(;++~~)~ot4~<h~~a,'r~"44+~g~gt,lg)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESCll~i<gedg'444+cc4~~~dtdt~e<<ebseCOeerscssr'uctwor,dampers,andinsrnaonanconrostoprovideforcontrolrooneraturecontrol.~so~Bd.na)~l~~ebpd4'nsvdLepQ,TheQControCj,Systensdesgnedtoprovidea~Jcontrolledenvironmentunderbothnormalandaccidentconditions.A,singlesubsystemprovidestherequired~d.temperaturecontroltomaintainasuitablcontrolroomenvironmentforasustainedoccuancofersons.esgnconroronvronmentareOFFand5'elativehumfdft.The/ControlRoomsemoperatonnmantanngeroomtemperaturesdiscussedfntheAR,Sections$6.4Pand@.4.1$(Refs;1and2,respectivelEat~sdgOCThedesignbasisoftheQControAC)Systemfstomaintainthecontrolroomteraturefora30daycontinuousoccupanc.e>~e~ThecontrolRoAC/Systemcomponentsarearrangedinundantsafetrelatedsubsystems.'uringemergencyoperaton,eonroRoA&3:SystemmaintainsahabftableenvironmentandensuresILITYc~nentsfnthecontrolro.Asfnleacve.failureofacomponentofthecontrolkoysem,ngaossofoffsftepower,doesnotimpairtheabilityofthesystemtoperformitsdesignfunction.Redundantdetectorsad~eg~controlsareprovidedforcontroleraturecontro.The)ControlRoomystemfsdesgnnaccoancewSeismicCategoryIrequirements.ThecontrolRoomSystemiscapableofremovingsensibleandlatentheatloadsfromthecontrolroincludingconsiderationofequipmenteuae,4pe(continued)BN/6STSB3.7-19Rev1,04/07/95

~~Eachairconditioningunitincludesanairfilterassembly,coolingcoil,andfan.Eachcontrolbuildingchilledwatersubsystemincludesahermeticcentrifugalwaterchiller,chilledwaterpump,expansiontank,controls,piping,andvalves.InsertPageB3.7-I9

5<(EPecontrolRoomAC/SystemIB3.7BASESAPPLICABLEheatloadsandpersonneloccupancyrequirementstoensureSAFETYANALYSESequfpaentOPERABILI3Rs.feyC~s:~>(continued)mild>ThecontrolRoomAysteasatisfiesCriterion3ofLCOTwofndependentandredundantsubsystemsofthe/ControloaACjSysteaarerequfredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatatleastoneisavailable,assuaingasinglefailuredisablestheothersubsystea.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultfntheequipmentoperatingtemperatureexceedinglimits.3TheQContro1RamAC/Systen1scons1deredOPERABLEwhenthe,~~.MES.g>eindividualcomponentsnecessarytoaaintainthecontrolrooae'ratureareOPERABLEfnbothsubsystems.Thesec;~~4My'"9~"'~coaponensncecoolingcoilfans,CgP%RS,~~.;<~~+,'"~ductwork,daapers,andassociae~~f~$+55nstruaentationandcontrols.gpwr9LcO~AyAPPLICABILITYInNOEI,.2,or3,thentrolRooaAC)SystemaustbeOPERABLEtoensurethatthecontrolroeraurenotexceedequipmentOPERABILITYlfaftsfollowingcontrolroomisolation.e~~4~eInNODES4and5,theprobabilityandconseq'uencesofaDesignBasisAccidentarereducedduetothepressureantemperaturelfaftationsinthTherefE~,el~~~ntntntntngtheEContro1.EoACESysten0LE1snotrequiredfnNOE4or5,exceptforthefollowingsftuationsunderwhichsignificantradioactivereleasescanbepostulated:Duringoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel(OPDRVs)g.b.DuringCOREALTERATIONS;andDuringaoveaentofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthe0.secondarycontafnmen+>BN/6STSB3.7-20(continued)RevI,04/07/95

Inaddition,duringconditionsinMODESotherthanMODES1,2,and3whentheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE(e.g.,duringCOREALTERATIONS),thenecessaryportionsoftheSWSystemandUltimateHeatSinkcapableofprovidingcoolingtothehermeticcentrifugalwaterchillersarepartoftheOPERABILITYrequirementscoveredbythisLCO.InsertPageB3.7-20

7ERTACTIorwithbothcontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemsinoperablebuttheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionmaintained,INRTATINA1TheControlRoomenvelopeACSystemsafetyfunctionismaintainedwhentheControlRoomEnvelopeACSystemcomponentsequivalenttoonecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystemareOPERABLE.7INERTATlA1(orOPERABLEcomponentsinbothsubsystems)(orcomponentsinbothsubsystems)INSERTACTION.1EnteringLCO3.02while.inMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequireimmediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.INSERTA.TIN.1(s)equivalenttoasinglecontrolroomenvelopeACsubsystem(e.g.,thecontrolbuildingchilledwatersubsystemandairconditioningunitsdonothavetobepoweredfromthesameelectricaldivision)InsertPageB3.7-21

Volume9Section3.8

ACSources-Operating3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.2-NOTEAllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.VerifyeachrequiredDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachieves:a~b.In<10seconds,voltage>3950VforDivision1and2DGsand>3820VforDivision3DG,andfrequency>58.8HzforDivision1and2DGsand>58.0HzforDivision3DG;andSteadystatevoltage>3950Vand<4370Vandfrequency>58.8Hzand<61.2Hz.31days(continued)NHP23.8-6Revision+QD

ACSources-Operating3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.92.-NOTESAllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.sThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,or3.However,creditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.Verifyonanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignal:24monthsa~b.De-energizationofemergencybuses;LoadsheddingfromemergencybusesforDivisions1and2only;andC.DGauto-startsfromstandbyconditionand:1.energizespermanentlyconnectedloadsin<13.20seconds,2.energizesauto-connectedshutdownloadsforDivision1and2DGsonly,3.maintainssteadystatevoltage>3950Vand<4370V,4.maintainssteadystatefrequency>58.8Hz'and<61.2Hz,and5.suppliespermanentlyconnectedandauto-connectedshutdownloadsfor>5minutesforDivision1and2DGsandsuppliespermanentlyconnectedshutdownloadsfor>5minutesforDivision3DG.(continued)NMP23.8-10RevisionP'@

BatteryCellParameters3.8.6Table3.8.6-1(page1of1)BatteryCellParameterRequirementsPARAMETERCATEGORYA:LIMITSFOREACHDESIGNATEDPILOTCELLCATEGORYB:LIMITSFOREACHCONNECTEDCELLCATEGORYC:LIMITSFOREACHCONNECTEDCELLElectrolyteLevel>Minimumlevelindicationmark,and<',inchabovemaximumleve)indicationmark(a)>Hinimumlevelindicationmark,and<',inchabovemaximumlevelindicationmark()Abovetopofplates,andnotoverflowingFloatVoltage>2.13V>2.13V>2.07VSpecifigGravity(")()>1,200>1.195ANDAverageofallconnectedcells>1.205Notmorethan0.020belowaverageofallconnectedcellsANDAverageofallconnectedcells>1.195(a)Itisacceptablefortheelectrolyteleveltotemporarilyincreaseabovethespecifiedmaximumlevelduringandfollowingequalizingchargesprovideditisnotoverflowing.(b)Correctedforelectrolytetemperatureandlevel.(c)Abatterychargingcurrentof<2ampswhenonfloatchargeisacceptableformeetingspecificgravitylimitsfollowingabatteryrecharge,foramaximumof7days.Whenchargingcurrentisusedtosatisfyspecificgravityrequirements,specificgravityofeachconnectedcellshallbemeasuredpriortoexpirationofthe7dayallowance.NMP23.8-35RevisionAQ8

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsitepowerorallonsiteACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ACsourcessatisfytherequirementsofCriterion3ofReference7.1LCOTwoqualifiedcircuitsbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClasslEDistributionSystem,andthreeseparateandindependentDGs,ensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.gualifiedoffsitecircuitsarethosethataredescribedintheUSARandarepartofthelicensingbasisfortheunit.Eachoffsitecircuitfromthe345kV/115kVScribaSubstationmustbecapableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe4.16kVemergencybuses.Eachoffsitecircuitconsistsoftheincomingbreakeranddisconnecttotherespectivereservestationservicetransformers2RTX-XSRIAand2RTX-XSRlBandauxiliaryboilertransformer2ABS-X1,therespective2RTX-XSRlA,2RTX-XSRlB,and2ABS-Xltransformers,andtherespectivecircuitpathincludingfeederbreakerstothe4.16kVemergencybuses.Inaddition,propersequencingofloadsisarequiredfunctionforoffsitecircuitOPERABILITY.EachDGmustbecapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespectiveESFbuson.detectionofbusundervoltage.Thissequencemustbeaccomplishedwithin13.20seconds.The13.20secondstarttimeincludestheLossofVoltage-TimeDelayFunctionAllowableValuespecifiedinLCO3.3.8.1.EachDGmustalsobecapableofacceptingrequiredloadswithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervals,andmustcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothe4.16kVemergencybuses.ThesecapabilitiesarerequiredtobemetfromavarietyofinitialconditionssuchasDGinstandbywithenginehotandDGinstandbywithengineatambientconditions.AdditionalDGcapabilitiesmustbedemonstratedtomeetrequiredSurveillances,e.g.,capabilityoftheDGtoreverttostandbystatusonanECCSsignalwhileNMP2B3.8-4continuedRevision8QP 0>

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.2(continued)requiredfeature.Additionally,the4hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.B.3.1andB.3.2RequiredActionB.3.1providesanallowancetoavoidunnecessarytestingofOPERABLEDGs.IfitcanbedeterminedthatthecauseoftheinoperableDGdoesnotexistontheOPERABLEDG(s),SR3.8.1.2doesnothavetobeperformed.IfthecauseofinoperabilityexistsonotherDGs,theotherDGsaredeclaredinoperableupondiscovery,andConditionEorGofLCO3.8.1isentered,asapplicable.Oncethefailureisrepaired,andthecommoncausefailurenolongerexists,RequiredActionB.3.1issatisfied,IfthecauseoftheinitialinoperableDGcannotbeconfirmednottoexistontheremainingDG(s),performanceofSR3.8.1.2sufficestoprovideassuranceofcontinuedOPERABILITYofthoseDG(s).IntheeventtheinoperableDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspriortocompletingeitherB.3.1orB.3.2,theDeficiencyEventReportProgramwillcontinuetoevaluatethecommoncausepossibility.Thiscontinuedevaluation,however,isnolongerunderthe24hourconstraintimposedwhileinConditionB.AccordingtoGenericLetter84-15(Ref.9),24hoursisreasonabletimetoconfirmthattheOPERABLEDG(s)arenotaffectedbythesameproblemastheinoperableDG.B.4AccordingtoRegulatoryGuide1.93(Ref.8),operationmaycontinueinConditionBforaperiodthatshouldnotexceed72hours.Inthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLEDGsand(~8offsitecircuitsareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem.The72hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonable.timeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.NNP2B3.8-10continuedRevision8

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)WheretheSRsdiscussedhereinspecifyvoltageandfrequencytolerances,thefollowingsummaryisapplicable.Theminimumsteadystateoutputvoltageof3950Vis.approximately95Mofthenominal4160Voutputvoltage.Thisvalue,whichisspecifiedinANSIC84.1(Ref.14),allowsforvoltagedroptotheterminalsof4000Vmotorswhoseminimumoperatingvoltageisspecifiedas90X,or3600V.Italsoallowsforvoltagedropstomotorsandotherequipmentdownthroughthe120Vlevelwhereminimumoperatingvoltageisalsousuallyspecifiedas90Xofnameplaterating.Thespecifiedmaximumsteadystateoutputvoltageof4370Visequaltothemaximumoperatingvoltagespecifiedfor4000Vmotors.Itensuresthatfor'alightlyloadeddistributionsystem,thevoltageattheterminalsof4000Vmotorsisnomorethanthemaximumratedoperatingvoltages.ThespecifiedminimumandmaximumfrequenciesoftheDGare58.8Hzand61.2Hz,respectively.Thesevaluesareequalto22Nofthe60HznominalfrequencyandarederivedfromtherecommendationsgiveninRegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.11).SR3.8.1.1ThisSRensurespropercircuitcontinuityfortheoffsiteACelectricalpowersupplytotheonsitedistributionnetworkandavailabilityofoffsiteACelectricalpower.Thebreakeralignmentverifiesthateachbreakerisinitscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloadsareconnectedtotheirpreferredpowersourceandthatappropriateindependenceofoffsitecircuitsismaintained.The7dayFrequencyisadequatesincebreakerpositionisnotlikelytochangewithouttheoperatorbeingawareofitandbecauseitsstatusisdisplayedinthecontrolroom.SR3.8.1.2ThisSRhelpstoensuretheavailabilityofthestandbyelectricalpowersupplytomitigateDBAsandtransientsandmaintaintheunitinasafeshutdowncondition.Tominimizethewearonmovingpartsthatdonotgetlubricatedwhentheengineisnotrunning,thisSRhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethat,allDGstartsforthisl~Surveillancemaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.IncontinedNMP2B3.8-16RevisionPgg

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.2(continued)addition,tominimizewearandtearontheDG,theNotealsoallowsallDGstartstobefollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.Forthepurposesofthistesting,theDGsarestartedfromstandbyconditions.StandbyconditionsforaDGmeanthatthedieselenginecoolant(Division1and2DGsonly)andlubeoilarebeingcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperatureisbeingmaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendations.SR3.8.1.2requiresthattheDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesrequiredvoltageandfrequencywithin10seconds.The10secondstartrequirementsupportstheassumptionsinthedesignbasisLOCAanalysis(Ref.15).Inaddition,theDGisrequiredtomaintainpropervoltageandfrequencylimitsaftersteadystateisachieved.Thevoltageandfrequencylimitsarenormallyachievedwithin13secondsfortheDivision1and2DGsandwithin15secondsfortheDivision3DG.ThetimefortheDGtoreachsteadystateoperationisperiodicallymonitoredandthetrendevaluatedtoidentifydegradationofgovernorandvoltageregulatorperformance.The31dayFrequencyforSR3.8.1.2isconsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.11).ThisFrequencyprovidesadequateassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.SR3.8.1.3ThisSurveillancedemonstratesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronizingandacceptingaloadapproximatelyequivalenttothatcorrespondingtothecontinuousrating'.Aminimumruntimeof60minutesisrequiredtostabilizeenginetemperatures,whileminimizingthetimethattheDGisconnectedtotheoffsitesource.AlthoughnopowerfactorrequirementsareestablishedbythisSR,theDGisnormallyoperatedatapowerfactorbetween0.8laggingand1.0whenrunningsynchronizedwiththegrid.The0.8powerfactorvalueisthedesignratingofthemachineataparticularKVA.The1.0powerfactorvalueisanoperationalconditionwherethereactivepowercontinuedNNP2B3.8-17RevisionRQP

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.9(continued)TheDGauto-startandenergizationofpermanentlyconnectedloadstimeof13.20secondsisderivedfromthe3.20secondLossofVoltage-TimeDelayFunctionAllowableValue(LCO3.3.8.1)andtherequirementsoftheaccidentanalysisforrespondingtoadesignbasislargebreakLOCA(Ref.14).TheSurveillanceshouldbecontinuedforaminimumof5minutesinordertodemonstratethatallstartingtransientshavedecayedandstabilityhasbeenachieved.Therequirementtoverifytheconnectionandpowersupplyofpermanentlyconnectedloadsandauto-connectedloads(Division1and2only)isintendedtosatisfactorilyshowtherelationshipoftheseloadstotheDGloadinglogic.Incertaincircumstances,manyoftheseloadscannotactuallybeconnectedorloadedwithoutunduehardshiporpotentialforundesiredoperation.Forinstance,ECCSinjectionvalvesarenotdesiredtobestrokedopen,systemsarenotcapableofbeingoperatedatfullflow,orRHRsystemsperformingadecayheatremovalfunctionarenotdesiredtoberealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationoftheconnectionandloadingoftheseloads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthstakesintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonforNote1istominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginecoolant(Division1and2DGsonly)andlubeoilbeingcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendations.ThereasonforNote2isthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,perturbtheelectricaldistributionsystem,andchallengeplantsafetysystems.CreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.continuedNHP2B3.8-23RevisionPg

ACSources-OperatingB3.8,1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.10ConsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.11),paragraphC.2.2.5,thisSurveillancedemonstratesthattheDGautomaticallystartsandachievestherequiredvoltageandfrequencywithinthespecifiedtime(10seconds)fromthedesignbasisactuationsignal(LOCAsignal).Inaddition,theDGisrequiredtomaintainpropervoltageandfrequencylimitsaftersteadystateisachieved.Thevoltageandfrequencylimitsarenormallyachievedwithin13secondsfortheDivision1and2DGsandwithin15secondsfortheDivision3DG.TheDGisrequiredtooperatefor>5minutes.The5minuteperiodprovidessufficienttimetodemonstratestability.SR3.8.1.10.dandSR3.8.1.10.eensurethatpermanentlyconnectedloadsandemergencyloadsareenergizedfromtheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemonanECCSsignalwithoutlossofoffsitepower(forDivisions1and2only).Therequirementtoverifytheconnectionandpowersupplyofpermanentandautoconnectedloadsisintendedtosatisfactorilyshowtherelationshipoftheseloadstotheloadinglogicforloadingontooffsitepower.ThisisonlyrequiredforDivisions1and2becausetheloadinglogicisdifferentbasedonthepowersource.Incertaincircumstances,manyoftheseloadscannotactuallybeconnectedorloadedwithoutunduehardshiporpotentialforundesiredoperation.Forinstance,ECCSinjectionvalvesarenotdesiredtobestrokedopen,systemsarenotcapableofbeingoperatedatfullflow,orRHRsystemsperformingadecayheatremovalfunctionarenotdesiredtoberealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationoftheconnectionandloadingoftheseloads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheACelectricalpowersystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeany,seriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthstakesintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwiththeexpectedfuelcyclelengths.continuedNMP2838-24Revision4'

ACSources-ShutdownB3.8.2BASESLCO(continued)as'eparateoffsitecircuittotheDivision3ClasslEonsiteelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,oranOPERABLEDivision3DG,ensuresanadditionalsourceofpowerfortheHPCS.ThisadditionalsourceforDivision3isnotnecessarilyrequiredtobeconnectedtobeOPERABLE.EitherthecircuitrequiredbyLCOItema.,oracircuitrequiredtomeetLCOItemc.maybeconnected,withthesecondsourceavailableforconnection.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredoffsitecircuit(s)andDG(s)ensuretheavailabilityofsufficientACsourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents,reactorvesseldraindown).Thequalifiedoffsitecircuit(s)mustbecapableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltagewhileconnectedtotheirrespectiveemergencybus(es),andofacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident.gualifiedoffsitecircuitsarethosethataredescribedintheUSARandarepartofthelicensingbasisfortheplant.Theoffsitecircuitfromthe345kV/115kVScribaSubstationconsistsoftheincomingbreakeranddisconnecttotherespectivereservestationservicetransformers2RTX-XSRIAand2RTX-XSRlBandauxiliaryboilertransformer2ABS-X1,therespective2RTX-XSR1A,2RTX-XSRIB,and2ABS-Xltransformers,andtherespectivecircuitpathincludingfeederbreakerstoall4.16kVemergencybusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.9.The.requiredDGmustbecapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespectiveemergencybusondetectionofbusundervoltage,andacceptingrequiredloads.Thissequencemustbeaccomplishedwithin13.20seconds.Thestarttimeincludesthe3.20secondLossofVoltage-TimeDelayFunctionAllowableValuespecifiedinLCO3.3.8.1,"LossofPower(LOP)Instrumentation."EachDGmustalsobecapableofacceptingrequiredloadswithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervals,andmustcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtotheemergencybuses.Thesecapabilitiesarerequiredtobemetfromavarietyofinitialconditionssuchas:DGinstandbywiththeenginehotandDGinstandbywiththeengineatambientconditions.AdditionalDGcapabilitiesmustbedemonstratedtomeetrequiredSurveillances,e.g.,capabilityoftheDGtoreverttostandbystatusonanECCSsignalwhileoperatinginparalleltestmode.continuedNHP2B3.8-34Revisiongg

ACSources-ShutdownB3.8.2.BASESLCO(continued)Propersequencingofloads,includingtrippingofnonessentialloads,isarequiredfunctionforDGOPERABILITY.ThenecessaryportionsoftheServiceWaterSystemandUltimateHeatSinkcapableofprovidingcoolingtotherequiredDG(s)arealsorequired.Inaddition,propersequencingofloadsisarequiredfunctionforoffsitecircuitOPERABILITY.Itisacceptablefordivisionstobecrosstiedduringshutdownconditions,permittingasingleoffsitepowercircuittosupplyallrequireddivisions.APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4and5andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainmentprovideassurancethat:a.Systemstoprovideadequatecoolantinventorymakeupareavailablefortheirradiatedfuelinthecoreincaseofaninadvertentdraindownofthereactorvessel;b.C.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andd.Instrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheunitinacold'shutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,and3arecoveredinLCO3.8.1.ACTIONSLCO3.0.3isnotapplicablewhileinMODE4or5.However,sinceirradiatedfuelassemblymovementcanoccurinMODE1,2,or3,theACTIONShavebeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatLCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE4or5,LCO3.0.3wouldnotspecifyanyaction.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,or3,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.EnteringLCO3.0.3whileinMODE1,2,or3wouldrequiretheunittobeshutdown,butwouldnotrequirecontinuedNMP2B3.8-35RevisionAQ8

ACSources-Shutdown83.8.2.BASESACTIONS(continued)immediatesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheNotetotheACTIONS,"LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable,"ensuresthattheactionsforimmediatesuspensionofirradiatedfuelassemblymovementarenotpostponedduetoentryintoLCO3.0.3.A.lAnoffsitecircuitisconsideredinoperableifitisnotavailabletoonerequired4.16kVemergencybus.Iftwoormore4.16kVemergencybusesarerequiredperLCO3.8.9,division(s)withoffsitepoweravailablemaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,fuelmovement,andoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel.Bytheallowanceoftheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablethatarenotpoweredfromoffsitepower,appropriaterestrictionscanbeimplementedinaccordancewiththerequiredfeature(s)LCOs'CTIONS.Requiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaqualifiedoffsitecircuit,evenifthatcircuitisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4B.18.28.3and8.4Withtheoffsitecircuitnotavailabletoallrequireddivisions,theoptionstillexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.WiththerequiredDGinoperable,theminimumrequireddiversityofACpowersourcesisnotavailable.Itis,therefore,requiredtosuspendCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,andactivitiesthatcouldpotentiallyresultininadvertentdrainingofthereactorvessel.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecludecompletionofactionstoestablishasafeconservativecondition.Theseactionsminimizeprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofpostulatedevents.ItisfurtherrequiredtoinitiateactionimmediatelytorestoretherequiredACsourcesandtocontinued83.8-36RevisionA

ACSources-ShutdownB3.8.2,BASESACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4B.1B.2B.3andB.4(continued)continuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredACelectricalpowersourcesshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystemACTIONSarenotenteredevenifallACsourcestoitareinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAhavebeenmodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethatwhenConditionAisenteredwithnoACpowertoanyrequiredemergencybus,ACTIONSforLCO3.8.9mustbeimmediatelyentered.ThisNoteallowsConditionAtoproviderequirementsforthelossoftheoffsitecircuitwhetherornotadivisionisde-energized.LCO3.8.9providestheappropriaterestrictionsforthesituationinvolvingade-energizeddivision.C.1WhentheHPCSSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,andtheadditionalrequiredDivision3ACsourceisinoperable,therequireddiversityofACpowersourcestotheHPCSSystemisnotavailable.SincethesesourcesonlyaffecttheHPCSSystem,theHPCSSystemisdeclaredinoperableandtheRequiredActionsofLCO3.5.2,"EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems-Shutdown"entered.IntheeventallsourcesofpowertoDivision3arelost,ConditionAwillalsobeenteredanddirectthattheACTIONSofLCO3.8.9betaken.IfonlytheDivision3additionalrequiredACsourceisinoperable,andpowerisstillsuppliedtoHPCS,72hoursisallowedtorestoretheadditionalrequiredACsourcetoOPERABLE.ThisisreasonableconsideringHPCSSystemwillstillperformitsfunction,absentanadditionalsinglefailure.(continued)NMP2B3.8-37RevisionA

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DieselFuelOil,LubeOil,andStartingAirB3.8.3.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.3.1(continued)sufficienttimetoplacetheunitinasafeshutdownconditionandtobringinreplenishmentfuelfromanoffsitelocation.The31dayFrequencyisadequatetoensurethatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sincelowlevelalarmsareprovidedandunitoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.SR3.8.3.2ThisSurveillanceensuresthatsufficientlubeoilinventory(abovethemanufacturersminimumrecommendedlevel)is(+6availabletosupportatleast7daysoffullloadoperationforeachDG.The99gallonrequirementfortheDivision1and2DGsandthe168gallonrequirementfortheDivision3DGarebasedontheDGmanufacturer'sconsumptionvaluesfortheruntimeoftheDG.The7dayinventorycanbeintheengineoilsumporacombinationoftheengineoilsumpandremotestoragelocation.ImplicitinthisSRistherequirementtoverifythecapabilitytotransferthelubeoilfromitsstoragelocationtotheDGwhentheDGlubeoilsumpsdonotholdadequateinventoryfor7daysoffullloadoperationwithoutthelevelreachingthemanufacturer'srecommendedminimumlevel.A31dayFrequencyisadequatetoensurethatasufficientlubeoilsupplyisonsite,sinceDGstartsandruntimesarecloselymonitoredbytheplantstaff.SR3.8.3.3Thetestsofnewfueloilpriortoadditiontothestoragetanksareameansofdeterminingwhethernewfuel'ilisoftheappropriategradeandhasnotbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatwouldhaveanimmediatedetrimentalimpactondieselenginecombustionandoperation.Ifresultsfromthesetestsarewithinacceptablelimits,thefueloilmaybeaddedtothestoragetankswithoutconcernforcontaminatingtheentirevolumeoffueloilinthestoragetanks.Thesetestsaretobeconductedpriortoaddingthenewfueltothestoragetank(s).continuedNHP2B3.8-44Revision

DCSources-OperatingB3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.4.8Abatteryperformancedischargetestisatestofconstantcurrentcapacityofabattery,normallydoneintheasfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacitydeterminedbytheacceptancetest.Thetestisintendedtodetermineoverallbatterydegradationduetoageandusage.Abatterymodifiedperformancedischargetestisasimulateddutycyclenormallyconsistingofjusttworates;theoneminuteratepublishedforthebatteryorthelargestcurrentloadofthedutycycle,followedbythetestrateemployedfortheperformancedischargetest,bothofwhichenvelopethedutycycleoftheservicetest.(ThetestcanconsistofasinglerateifthetestrateemployedfortheGperformancedischargetestexceedsthe1minuterate.)Sincetheampere-hoursremovedbyaratedoneminutedischargerepresentsaverysmallportionofthebatterycapacity,thetestratecanbechangedtothatfortheperformancetestwithoutcompromisingtheresultsoftheperformancedischargetest.Thebatteryterminalvoltageforthemodifiedperformancedischargetestshouldremainabovetheminimumbatteryterminalvoltagespecifiedinthebatteryperformancedischargetestforthedurationoftimeequaltothatoftheperformancedischargetest.Amodifieddischargetestisatestofthebatterycapacityanditsabilitytoprovideahighrate,shortdurationload(usuallythehighestrateofthedutycycle).Thiswilloftenconfirmthebattery'sabilitytomeetthecriticalperiodoftheloaddutycycle,inadditiontodeterminingitspercentageofratedcapacity.Initialconditionsforthemodifiedperformancedischargetestshouldbeidenticaltothosespecifiedforaperformancedischargetest.EitherthebatteryperFormancedischargetestorthemodifiedperformancedischargetestisacceptableforsatisfyingSR3.8.4.8;however,onlythemodifiedperformancedischargetestmaybe.usedtosatisfySR3.8.4.8whilesatisfyingtherequirementsofSR3.8.4.7atthesametime.TheacceptancecriteriaforthisSurveillanceisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.9)andIEEE-485(Ref.11).Thesereferencesrecommendthatthebatterybereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80%ofthemanufacturersrating,since.IEEE-485(Ref.11)recommendsusinganagingfactorof125%continuedNHP2B3.8-55RevisionA'QB

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTable3.8.6-1(continued)specifiedforspecificgravityforeachconnectedcellis>1.195(0.020belowthemanufacturersfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity)withtheaverageofallconnectedcells>1.205(0.010belowthemanufacturersfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Thesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturersrecommendations.Theminimumspecificgravityvaluerequiredforeachcellensuresthatacellwithamarginalorunacceptablespecificgravityisnotmaskedbyaveragingwithcellshavinghigherspecificgravities.CategoryCdefinesthelimitforeachconnectedcell.Thesevalues,althoughreduced,provideassurancethatsufficientcapacityexiststoperformtheintendedfunctionandmaintainamarginofsafety.WhenanybatteryparameterisoutsidetheCategoryClimit,theassuranceofsufficientcapacitydescribedabovenolongerexists,andthebatterymustbedeclaredinoperable.TheCategoryClimitspecifiedforelectrolytelevel(abovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing)ensuresthattheplatessuffernophysicaldamageandmaintainadequateelectrontransfercapability.TheCategoryClimitforfloatvoltageisbasedonIEEE-450,AppendixC(Ref.4),whichstatesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelow,underfloatconditionsandnotcausedbyelevatedtemperatureofthecell,indicatesinternalcellproblemsandmayrequirecellreplacement.TheCategoryClimitofaveragespecificgravity(>1.195),isbasedonmanufacturersrecommendations(0.020belowthemanufacturersrecommendedfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Inadditiontothatlimit,itisrequiredthatthespecificgravityforeachconnectedcellmustbenomorethan0.020belowtheaverageofallconnectedcells.Thislimitensuresthatacellwithamarginalorunacceptablespecificgravityisnotmaskedbyaveragingwithcellshavinghigherspecificgravities.ThefootnotestoTable3.8.6-1thatapplytospecificgravityareapplicabletoCategoryA,B,andCspecificgravity.Footnotebrequirestheabovementionedcorrectionforelectrolytelevelandtemperature.IRcontinuedNHP2B3.8-67Revisiongpss

BatteryCellParametersB3.8,6.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTable3.8.6-1(continued)Becauseofspecificgravitygradientsthatareproducedduringtherechargingprocess,delaysofseveraldaysmayoccurwhilewaitingforthespecificgravitytostabilize.Astabilizedchargingcurrentisanacceptablealternativetospecificgravitymeasurementfordeterminingthestateofcharge.ThisphenomenonisdiscussedinIEEE-450(Ref.4).Footnotecallowsthefloatchargecurrenttobeusedasanalternatetospecificgravityforupto7daysfollowingabatteryrecharge.Within7dayseachconnectedcell'sspecificgravitymustbemeasuredtoconfirmthestateofcharge.Followingaminorbatteryrecharge(suchasequalizingchargethatdoesnotfollowadeepdischarge)specificgravitygradientsarenotsignificant,andconfirmingmeasurementsmaybemadeinlessthan7days.REFERENCES2.3.USAR,Chapter6.USAR,Chapter15andAppendixA.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).IEEEStandard450,1980.NHP2B3.8-68Revisiongag

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident.(DBA)andtransientanalysesintheUSAR,Chapter6(Ref.1)andChapter15andAppendixA(Ref.2),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemsareOPERABLE.TheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsystemsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,PowerDistributionLimits;Section3.5,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)andReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)System;andSection3.6,ContainmentSystems.TheOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsystemsisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingtheACandDCelectricalpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionsintheeventof;a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteoronsiteACelectricalpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.TheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsystemssatisfyCriterion3afReference3.LCOTherequiredAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptiblepowerdistributionsubsystemslistedinTableB3.8.8-1ensuretheavailabilityofAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerforthesystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.TheDivision1,2,and3ACandDC,andDivision1and2120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerprimarydistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.AsnotedinTable83.8.8-1(Footnotea),eachdivisionoftheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsystemsisasubsystem.MaintainingtheDivision1,2,and3ACandDC,andDivision1and2120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerNMP2B3.8-74continuedRevisionRQg

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESLCO(continued)distributionsubsystemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFisnotdefeated.AnytwoofthethreedivisionsofthedistributionsystemarecapableofprovidingthenecessaryelectricalpowertotheassociatedESFcomponents.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithintheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsdoesnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.OPERABLEACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbusestobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.OPERABLEDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbusestobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltagefromeithertheassociatedbatteryorcharger.OPERABLE120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbusestobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltagefromtheassociatedemergencyUPSinverterviainvertedDCvoltage,inverterusinginternalrectifiedACsource,orClass1Eregulatingtransformer.BasedonthenumberofsafetysignificantelectricalloadsassociatedwitheachbuslistedinTableB3.8.8-1,ifoneormoreofthebusesbecomesinoperable,entryintotheappropriateACTIONSofLCO3.8.8isrequired.Somebuses,suchasdistributionpanels,whichhelpcomprisetheACandDCdistributionsystemsarenotlistedinTableB3.8.8-1.Thelossofelectricalloadsassociatedwiththesebusesmaynotresultinacompletelossofaredundantsafetyfunctionnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafecondition.Therefore,shouldoneormoreofthesebusesbecomeinoperableduetoafailurenotaffectingtheOPERABILITYofabuslistedinTableB3.8.8-1(e.g.,abreakersupplyingasingledistributionpanelfailsopen),theindividualloadsonthebuswouldbeconsideredinoperable,andtheappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOsgoverningtheindividualloadswouldbeentered.However,ifoneormoreofthesebusesisinoperableduetoafailurealsoaffectingtheOPERABILITYofabuslistedinTableB3.8.8-1(e.g.,lossofa4.16kVemergencybus,whichresultsinde-energizationofallbusespoweredfromthe4.16kVemergencybus),thenalthoughtheindividualloadsarestillconsideredinoperable,theConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOfortheindividualloadsarenotrequiredtobeentered,sincecontinuedNNP2B3.8-75RevisionA

~X DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESLCO(continued)LCO3.0.6allowsthisexception(i.e.,theloadsareinoperableduetotheinoperabilityofasupportsystemgovernedbyaTechnicalSpecification;the4.16kVemergencybus).Inaddition,tiebreakersbetweenDivision1andDivision2iQSsafetyrelatedACpowerdistributionsubsystemsmustbeopen.Thispreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowerdistributionsubsystemfrompropagatingtotheredundantsubsystem,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsystemandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanytiebreakersareclosed,theelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsthatarenotbeingpoweredfromtheirnormalsource(i.e.,theyarebeingpoweredfromtheirredundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems)areconsideredinoperable.Thisappliestotheonsite,safetyrelated,redundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.Itdoesnot,however,precluderedundantClass1E4.16kVemergencybusesfrombeingpoweredfromthesameoffsitecircuit.APPLICABILITYTheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintained,intheeventofapostulatedDBA.ElectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequirementsforMODES4and5andotherconditionsinwhichAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredarecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-Shutdown."ACTIONSA.1WithoneormoreDivision1and2requiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,ordistributionpanels(except120VACuninterruptiblepanels)inoperableandalossoffunctionhasnotyetoccurred,theremainingACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarecapableofcontinuedNMP2B3.8-76Revision+@/'

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)supportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition,assumingnosinglefailure.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingpowerdistributionsubsystemscouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.TheConditionAworstscenarioisonedivisionwithoutACpower(i.e.,nooffsitepowertothedivisionandtheassociatedDGinoperable).InthisCondition,theunitismorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower.Itis,therefore,imperativethattheunitoperators'ttentionbefocusedonminimizingthepotentialforlossofpowertotheremainingdivisionbystabilizingtheunitandrestoringpowertotheaffecteddivision.The8hourtimelimitbeforerequiringaunitshutdowninthisConditionisacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyiftheunitoperators'ttentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessarytorestorepowertotheaffecteddivisiontotheactionsassociatedwithtakingtheunittoshutdownwithinthistimelimit.b.ThelowpotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentinthedivisionwithACpower.(TheredundantcomponentisverifiedOPERABLEinaccordancewithSpecification5.5.ll,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP).")ThesecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lestablishesalimitonthemaximumtimeallowedforanycombination.ofrequireddistributionsubsystemstobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc.IfConditionAisenteredwhile,forinstance,aDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisinoperableandsubsequentlyreturnedOPERABLE,LCO3.8.8.a,b,orcmayalreadyhavebeennotmetforupto2hours.Thissituationcouldleadtoatotaldurationof10hours,sinceinitialfailureofLCO3.8'.a,b,orc,torestoretheACelectricalpowercontinuedNMP2B3.8-77RevisionA

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)distributionsystem.Atthistime,aDCbuscouldagainbecomeinoperable,andtheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcouldberestoredOPERABLE.Thiscouldcontinueindefinitely.ThisCompletionTimeallowsforanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."Thisresultsinestablishingthe"timezero"atthetimeLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcwasinitiallynotmet,insteadofatthetimeConditionAwasentered.The16hourCompletionTimeisanacceptablelimitationonthispotentialtofailtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcindefinitely.B.lWithoneormoreDivision1and2120VACuninterruptiblepanelsinoperableandalossoffunctionhasnotyetoccurred,theremaining120VACuninterruptiblepanelsarecapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownandmaintaintheunitinthesafeshutdowncondition.Overallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseanadditionalsinglefailurecouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,the120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hoursbypoweringthebusfromtheassociatedemergency.UPSinverterviainvertedDC,inverterusinginternalACsource/rectifier,orClass1Eregulatingtransformer'.ConditionBworstscenarioisone120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemwithoutpower;potentiallyboththeDCsourceandtheassociatedACsourcenonfunctioning.Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofalluninterruptiblepower.Itis,therefore,imperativethattheoperator'sattentionfocusonstabilizingtheplant,minimizingthepotentialforlossofpowertotheremaining120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,andrestoringpowertotheaffected120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem(s).This8hourlimitismoreconservativethanCompletionTimesallowedforthemajorityofcomponentsthatarewithoutadequate120VACuninterruptiblepower.TakingexceptiontocontinuedNMP2B3.8-78RevisionA

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONSB.1(continued)LCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequate120VACuninterruptiblepower,thatwouldhaveRequiredActionCompletionTimesshorterthan8hoursifdeclaredinoperable,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetywhenrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)whilenotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetywhenrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutadequate120VACuninterruptiblepower,whilenotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionstorestorepowertotheaffecteddivision;c.Thepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponent.The8hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheimportancetosafetyofrestoringthe120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstoOPERABLEstatus,theredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheremaining120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.ThesecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.1establishesalimitonthemaximumtimeallowedforanycombinationofrequireddistributionsubsystemstobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc.IfConditionBisenteredwhile,forinstance,anACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisinoperableandsubsequentlyreturnedOPERABLE,LCO3.8.8.a,b,orcmayalreadyhavebeennotmetforupto8hours.Thissituationcouldleadtoatotaldurationof16hours,sinceinitialfailureofLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc,forrestoringthe120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.Atthistime,anACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcouldagainbecomeinoperable,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcouldberest'oredtoOPERABLE.Thiscouldcontinueindefinitely.continuedNNP2B3.8-79RevisionA

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONSB.1(continued)ThisCompletionTimeallowsforanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."Thisallowanceresultsinestablishingthe"timezero"atthetimeLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcwasinitiallynotmet,insteadofatthetimethatConditionBwasentered.The16hourCompletionTimeisanacceptablelimitationonthispotentialoffailingtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcindefinitely.C.1WithoneormoreDivision1and2DCbusesinoperableandalossoffunctionhasnotyetoccurred,theremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarecapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition,assumingnosinglefailure.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemscouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hoursbypoweringthebusfromtheassociatedbatteryorcharger.ConditionCworstscenarioisonedivisionwithoutadequateDCpower,potentiallywithboththebatterysignificantlydegradedandtheassociatedchargernonfunctioning.Inthis.situation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallDCpower.Itis,therefore,imperativethattheoperator'sattentionfocusonstabilizingtheplant,minimizingthepotentialforlossofpowertotheremainingdivision,andrestoringpowertotheaffecteddivision(s).This2hourlimitismoreconservativethanCompletionTimesallowedforthemajorityofcomponentsthatcouldbewithoutpower.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequateDCpower,thatwouldhaveRequiredActionCompletionTimesshorterthan2hours,isacceptablebecauseof:continuedNMP2B3.8-80RevisionA

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetywhenrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)whilenotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetywhenrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutDCpowerwhilenotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffecteddivision;andc.Thepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponent.The2hourCompletionTimeforDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsisconsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.93(Ref.4).ThesecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.1establishesalimitonthemaximumtimeallowedforanycombinationofrequireddistributionsubsystemstobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc.IfConditionCisenteredwhile,forinstance,anACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisinoperableandsubsequentlyreturnedOPERABLE,LCO3.8.8.a,b,orcmayalreadyhavebeennotmetforupto8hours.Thissituationcouldleadtoatotaldurationof10hours,sinceinitialfailureofLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc,torestoretheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsystem.Atthistime,anACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcouldagainbecomeinoperable,andDCelectricalpowerdistributioncouldberestoredOPERABLE.Thiscouldcontinueindefinitely.ThisCompletionTimeallowsforanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."Thisallowanceresultsinestablishingthe"timezero"atthetimeLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcwasinitiallynotmet,insteadofthetimeConditionCwasentered.The16hourCompletionTimeisanacceptablelimitationonthispotentialoffailingtomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orcindefinitely.continuedNHP2B3.8-81RevisionA

DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheinoperableelectricalpowerdistributionsystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within12hoursandtoHODE4within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1WiththeDivision3electricalpowerdistributionsysteminoperable(i.e.,oneorbothDivision3ACandDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsinoperable),theDivision3poweredsystemsarenotcapableofperformingtheirintendedfunctions.ImmediatelydeclaringtheHighPressureCoreSpraySysteminoperableallowstheACTIONSofLCO3.5.1,"ECCS-Operating,"toapplyappropriatelimitationsoncontinuedreactoroperation.F.lConditionFcorrespondstoalevelofdegradationintheelectricalpowerdistributionsystemthatcausesarequiredsafetyfunctiontobelost(singledivisionsystemsarenotincluded,althoughforthisACTION,Division3isconsideredredundanttoDivision1and2ECCS).Whentwoormoreinoperableelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsresultinthelossofarequiredfunction,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,noadditionaltimeisjustifiedforcontinuedoperation.LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediatelytocommenceacontrolledshutdown.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.8.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsystemsarefunctioningproperly,withthecorrectcircuitbreakeralignment.ThecorrectbreakeralignmentensuresthecontinuedNHP2B3.8-82RevisionAgg

~i DistributionSystems-OperatingB3.8.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.8.1(continued)appropriateseparationandindependenceoftheelectricaldivisionsismaintained,andpowerisavailabletoeachrequiredbus.Theverificationofenergizationofthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.ThisisnormallyperformedbyverifyingcorrectvoltagefortheACandDCswitchgearandbyverifyingthatnoinoperabilitystatusindicatorlights(thatindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftherequiredloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters(MCCs),ordistributionpanels)arelitinthecontrolroom.Alternately,whenthenormalmethodisnotavailable,(8verificationthataloadpoweredfromtheassociatedbusisenergizedisalsoacceptable.The7dayFrequencytakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCES2.3.4.USAR,Chapter6.USAR,Chapter15andAppendixA.RegulatoryGuide1.93,Revision0,December1974.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).NHP2B3.8-83RevisionAQg

DistributionSystems-ShutdownB3.8.9BASESACTIONSA.1A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5(continued)NotwithstandingperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval-shutdowncooling(RHR-SDC)subsystemmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1throughA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHR-SDCACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5isprovidedtodirectdeclaringRHR-SDCinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHR-SDCACTIONS.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.9.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC,DC,and120VACuninterruptibleelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarefunctioningproperly,withthecorrectbreakeralignment.Thecorrectbreakeralignmentensurespowerisavailabletoeachrequiredbus.Theverificationofenergizationofthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.ThisisnormallyperformedbyverifyingcorrectvoltagefortheACandDCswitchgearandbyverifyingthatnoinoperabilitystatusindicatorlights(thatindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftherequiredloadcenters,HCCs,ordistributionpanels)arelitinthecontrolroom.Alternately,whenthenormalmethodisg~notavailable,verificationthataloadpoweredfromtheassociatedbusisenergizedisalsoacceptable.The7dayFrequencytakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,aswellasotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCES1.USAR,Chapter6.2.USAR,Chapter15andAppendixA.3.10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).B3.8-88RevisionP'Q$

l.4(A~gallonsotfuelforEDG*lLI.t-ivisionIII)lxa58(Aob.Threeserdieselgenerators,eachwith:1.SeparatedayfuetancontainingaminimumoI*DivisionIIand282all/I,33.8.1.1Asaminimum,thefollowinACelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:'eTwocaiencircuitsbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,and2.Aseparatefuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumof47,547gallonsoffuelfor<4<~EDG*1(DivisionI)andEDG*3(DivisionII),and35,342gallonsforEDG*2{HPCS-ivisionIIiso>53AIofuelransferpps.4.$PIe.Qcgf~pcreu8SKJCML-:<<"*Ot.&L.pr<~rie~TAKIN:nbkpl~4g+id~~.AROAM(~$Pcc.WithoneoffsitecircuitoftheaboverequiredACelectricalernperable,TingdemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheremainingACsourcesbyperformingSurveillanceRequirements4.8.1.1.1within1hourandatleastonce8RL.ItheoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hourIneeastW~TAJFwitineeuWwithinthefollowing24hours.g,Ž~g~~PY~~b.Witheitherdiesel'generatorEDG*1orEDG*3inoperable,demonstratetheOPERABLoftheaboverequiredACoffsitesourcesbyperformingSurveillanceRequirement4.8.1.1.1within1hourandatleastonceevery8hoursthereafter.Ifthedieselgeneratorbecameinoperablefrom'anycauseotherthanpreplannedmaintenanceortesting,within24hours,foreachOPERABLEdieselgeneratorseparately,eitherverifythatthecauseofthedieselgeneratorbeinginoperabledoesnotimpacttheOPERABILITYoftheOPERABLEdieselgeneratororperformSurveillanceRequirement4.8.1.1.2.astoreteinoperabledieselgeneratortoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hourrbeinatleastHOTOWNwitinteneoursandinCHWNwithinthefollowing24"Ihours.0$$PAPosclPc@v<w)~~yg,q~~Pleio~Thi'srequiredtobecompletedardlessofwhentheinopeledieselgeneratorirestortoOPERABLEstatus.TheovisionsofSpecification3.2arenotapplicableNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/48-1AmendmentNo.6/0

P4.8.1.1.2.a{Continued)SRE-II.I.&3Verifyingeachfueltransferpumpstartsandtransfersfuelfromthestoragesystetothedayfueltanevergzd5'R3,.S.I.24.Verifyingthatonestartfromambientconditions:2.O7a)ThatdieselenginesG*1andDGcceleratetoatleastinlessthanoraquato10seconds.*egeneratorvoltageandfrequencyshallbe4160voltsand60Hzwithin10secondsand4160avoltsand60a1.2Hreb)ThatdieselengineEDG*2acceleratestoatleast870rpmandatleastvoltsinlessthanorequalto10secon*eneratorvoltageandzi~frequencyshallbe4160evoltsand60e1.2HzessignaEachdieselgeneratorshallbestarteforthistestby'usingoneofthefollowingsignals:8Manual.2)Simulatedlossofoffsitepowerbyitsel.SRS-S.(55.3)Siulatedlossofoffsitepowerinconjunctitestnal.nESFactetsinalbitself.Verifyingthatafterthedieseleneratorisschrorequalt00KWfordieseleneratorsED*equalt2600KWfordieselgeneratorEDG*2andoperateswiththeseloadsforatleast60minutes.withanESFactuationz.L,'te40~4e4Qisloadedtoreatertha3%6om*reaterthanor6.rifyingthedieselgeneraisalignedtoprovidestandbypowerotheassociate4ioemencybuses.LLI<kj8'U->3WtL+>0c2-qa59AAlldieselgeneratorstartsforthepurposeofthissurveillancetestmaybeprecededbanengineprelubeperiod.Further,allsurveillancetestsn84g~toywarmupproceuresndmayalsoincludegradualloadingmeneytemanuurersottemechanicalstressandwearonthedieselengineisminimized.pokefNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/48-5AmendmentNo.E670j~~-~ra 0

5PCC,~fCA<'wWZ8,I"'~ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSACSOURCESACSOURCES-OPERATINGSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.1.2(Continued)e.Atleastoncepermonths,urinshut)by-L.raARSR3.8~I.72.espeedand(0~'Iess4A(P)<APPJ~QPeEcZ,+SR3<SII.Verifyingthedieselgeneratorcapabilitytorejectaloadof4400kM5cZ3.8.f<3~fordieselgeneratorsEDG"1andEDG"3and2600EDG"2withouttripping.TheeneratorvotavoltsforEDG"1andEDG"3,an5824votsorfollowintoadrejection.bcEus)I>IkMfordieselgeneratoresanoexceed4576during,aA.ug)4+optfgt+~4AII$4.Simulasngaossofoffsitepowerbyitself,and:a)ForDivisionsIandII:L.I1)Verifyingdeenergizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses.2)Verifyingthedieselgeneratorstarts~ontheautostart.LI>signel,energizestheeeengenbuseswithenssnentl,te<(Qgconnectedloadswithinsecons,enezeseauto-connected(shutdown)loadsandYl47operatesforgreaterthanorequato5minuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwiththeshutdownloads.Afterener-gization,thesteady-statevoltageandfrequenoftheemergencybusesshallbemaintainedat4160kvoltsand60t1.2Hzduringthistest.o"",0Subjectithedeseoannspeonnaccordacetproceresprepareinconjunctionwiitsmanufacturer'secomsendationforthiscassofstandbsaplgAPOSCNUg)4>><+5'r~3,S.l.7lb.5Verifyingthedieseleneratorctoreectaloadofreaterthanoreualtoordiesratorreaterthanequaltor)eseandreater'r<~itstooreselgeneratorEDG"2whilemaintaninggsnespecquaoeecweennominalveinalw'riore5se,edieseI'eoraac0eue5atst5@55.(.QC",*"Alldieselgeneratorstartsforthepuoseofthissurveillance'testmabeprecededbaneninerelubeeriod.u,aselancetes,wepsonooncepers,mayalsobeprecedewarmupproce-duresdmayalsoincludegraduloadingasrecoamendedthemanufacturer5di~~~tFrominitiationoflossofoffsitepower.3.P.l'1NINENILEPOINT-UNIT23/48-7

ELECTRICALPOSERSYSTEMSACSOURCESACSOURCES-OPERATINGSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4(Continued)b)ForDivisionIII:5g3.8,l,lO5.'1)Verifyingdeenergizationoftheemergencybus.g..lS2)Verifyingthedieselgeneratorstarts"ontheautostartsignal,energizestheemrenbuswiththeermanentlr32-oconnectedloadswithinseconsandoperaesorgreaterthanorequalto5minuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwiththeshbtdownloads.Afterenergization,thesteady-statevoltageandfrequencyoftheemerbusshallbemaintainedat4160avotsand60e1.zduringthistest.ZRf~<+~~IarVerifyingthatonanECCSactuatioestsignal,withoutlossofoffsitepower.H7(.2-~'IOa)ThatdieselgeneratorsEDG"1anEOG"3start~ontheautostartsignalandoperateonstandbforgreaterthanorequalto5minutes.'hegeneratorotageandfrequencyshallbe4160>W7voltsand60n10seond*vosand60t1.2Hzthesteadystategeneratorvoltageandfrequencyshallbemain-tainedwithintheselimitsduringthistest.aprop~a,<lS.r.rodc~Lb}Thatdieselgenerato~EDG"2starts*ontheautostartsignaland'0operatesonstandbyforgreaterthanor~qualto5'inutes.Thegeneratorvoltaeandfrequencyshallbe41600ta60k1.2Hz5thesteadystategeneratorvoltageandfrequencyshallbemantainedwithintheselimitsduringthistest.h3"Alldieselgeneratorstartsforthepuoeofthisurveillancetestmabe5'P35(.(orecdadbanengineprelubeurthermoreasurveysanceess,exceonceperdays,mayalsobepededbywarmuprocedureandmayalsoincludegualloadingasrecodedbythemanu-acturersohatthemechanicalsttheienineisinimiz585-p.(.q""Frominitiationoflossofoffsitepower.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/48-8pgopIz.

4.8.1.1.2.eIContinued)SRE.g,lIg12,VerifyingthattheautomaticloadtimerrelaysareOPERABLEwiththeintervalbetweeneachloadblockwithina10%ofitsdesignintervalfordieselgeneratorsEDG*1andEDG*3.Verifyingthatthefollowing'esalgeneratorlockoutfeanefatofstartingonlywhenequlfed;preventdieselehLfW~eh,W4cLa)For'onsIandII.turninggeengagedandemergencystop.b)ForDivisiIII,engineinthemaintJ.D,Iggg,t4444(3L,S)384)Y<IO'CW4L'A4~Q.5Qr~egI~~h.X'fAtleastoncepermverifyeachdieselgeneratorstartsandacceleratestoatleastwn10secondsforEDG*1andED*and870RPMwithin1ZJOsecondsforEDG*2Thegeneratorvo)taefrancfor'EDG+1Ig~7be416voltsand6.Hzwithin10secondsand410a0e1.2HtSaarnaThaenafatofv~arequencyor+160aa60m1.2A,Histestshallbepeormedwithin5minutesofshuttingdownthez<</A.'idieselgeneratorafterthedieselgeneratorhasoratedforatleast2hoursatWormoreforEDG*1and.EDG*3andW'ormoreforiesadieselmbeloaemar'tions+oMomentarytransientsduetochangingbusloadsshallnotinvalidatethistest.COWh8>4.&5/3tleastonceper1eabystartingallthreedieselgeneratorssimultaneously,andverifyingthatalldieselgeneratorsEDG*1andEDG*3acceleratetoatleastandEDG~2acceleratestoatleast870rpminlessthanorequalto10seconds8gAtleastonceper10yearsby:<~h.P<oWmkv~H~qI48,q~1.Drainingeachfueloilstoragetank.removingtheaccumulatedsedimentandcleaningthetankusingasodiumhypochloritesolution.and2.PerformingapressuretestofthoseportionsofthedieselfueloilsystemdesignedtoSectionIII,subsectionNDoftheASMECodeinaccordancewithASMECodeSectioIArticleIWD-6~vega/c~gI8iQ<4.8.1.1.3IIdieselgeneratorfailures,vidornon-valid.shallbaratotheCommission~2.Ipursuanttocification6.9.2.within30ays.ReportsofdieselgenetorfailuresshallincludetheinformationecommendedinPositionC..bofRG1.108,Revision1,ugust1977.Ifthenumberoffailureinthelast100validtests,apernuclearunitbasis.isreaterthanorequalto7,thereportbesupplementedtoincludtheadditionalinformationrommendedinPositionC.3.bofRG.108,Revision1,Auust17.NINEMILEPOINT-VNIT23/48-11AmendmentNe.Ilk84)Qi'eeI<okrZ

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGIADMINISTRATIVEA.IIntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.I(i.e,theImprovedStandardTechnicalSpecifications(ISTS)).A.2ThedetailsrelatingtotherequireddaytanklevelinCTS3.8.1.1.b.1havebeenmovedtoproposedSR3.8.1.4.Notechnicalchangesarebeingmade;therefore,thischangeisconsideredadministrativeinnature.A.3ThetechnicalcontentofCTS3.8.1.1.b.2,3.8.1.1Actionsj,k,and1,4.8.1.1.2.a.2,4.8.1.1.2.a.7,4.8.1.1.2.a.8,4.8.1.1.2.b.2,4.8.1.1.2.c,and4.8.1.1.2.hisheinginovedtoITS3.8.3.ThisisinaccordancewiththeformatoftheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.I.AnytechnicalchangestotheserequirenientsareaddressedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS:3.8.3.'heITSApplicabilityincludesaNotewhich,intheeventtheHPCSSystemisinoperable,allowstheDivision3DGtonotberequiredtobeOPERABLE.TheeffectistocontinuetoallowtheACTIONStobeappliedtootherACsourcesinoperabilities,withoutthecomplexityofalsohavingtheACSourcesSpecificationaddressconcurrentHPCSDGinoperability.TheformatandimplementationrulesfortheITSwoulddictateseveraladditionalACl'IONSoraseparateLCOfortheDivision3DG,toaddresseachHPCSDGinoperabilityincombinationwitheachoftheotherrequiredACsourcesinordertoprovideACTIONSsimilartothoseinthecurrentNMP2TS.Theactualimplementationot'heApplicabilityNoteisconsistentwiththeintentofCTS3.8.1.l,whichseparatesActiottsforDivisionsiand2DGsfromActionsforDivision3DG.Therefore,thisadditionisanadministrativechange.A.5ACSourcesinCIS3.8.1.1(ITS3.8.1)areconsideredasupportsystemtotheDistributionSysteminCTS3.8.3.1(ITS3.8.8).IntheeventACSourcesareinoperablesuchthatadistributionsubsystemwereinoperable,ITSLCO3.0.6wouldallowtakingonlytheACSourcesACTIONS;takingexceptiontocomplyingwiththeACDistributionSystemACTIONS.SincetheACSourcesACTIONSmaynotbesufiicientlyconservativeinthisevent(anentiredivisionmaybewithoutpower),specificdirectiontotakeappropriateACTIONSfortheDistributionSystemisadded(ITS3.8.1,NotetoACI'IOND)whenthereisnopowertoradivision.ThistormatandconstructionimplementstheexistingtreatmentofthisconditionwithintheframeworkoftheNMP2ImprovedTechnicalSpecificationmethods.NMP2RevisionPQ8

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING~NIHA.6CTS3.8.1.1ActiondrequirestheHPCSSystemtobedeclaredinoperableandtotaketheActionrequiredbySpecification3.5.1whentheDivision3DGisinoperable.CTS3.8.1.1Actionerequiresthatwhenaredundantsystem,subsystem,train,component,ordeviceisinoperable,theredundantsystems,subsystems,trains,components,anddevicesservedbytheinoperableDGmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheActionsrequiredbytheassociatedSpecification(s)forbothinoperabledivisionalsystems,subsystems,trains,components,anddevicestaken.TheformatoftheITSdoesnotincludeproviding"crossreferences".TheindividualSpecificationsadequatelyprescribetheRequiredActionsforinoperablesystems,subsystems,trains,components,anddeviceswithoutsuchreferences.Therefore,thecurrentNMP2TSreferencesto"taketheACTIONrequiredby..."inCIS3.8.1.1Actionsdandeservenofunctionalpurpose,andtheirdeletionisanadministrativepresentationpreference.A.7TheformatoftheITSallowsmultipleConditionstobesimultaneouslyentered.WiththreeormoreACsourcesinoperable(e.g.,twooffsitecircuitsandoneDG),ACTIONSwouldbetakeninaccordancewithHS3.8.1,andITSLCO3.0.3entryconditionswouldnotbemet.However,CTS3,8.1.1doesnotprovideActionsfortheseconditions.Therefore,aCTS3.0.3entrywouldberequired.TopreservetheexistingintentforCTS3.0.3entry,ITS3.8.1ACI'IONGisaddedtodirectentryintoITSLCO3.0.3.A.8CIS4.8.1.1.2.a.4.c)requirestheDGtobestartedforthenormal31daySurveillancetestusingthemanualsignal,simulatedlossofoffsitepowersignal,ESFactuationtestsignal,orsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanESFactuationtestsignal.TheITSdoesnotincludethisrequirement.'ThesesignalsaretheonlysignalsthatcanbeusedtostarttheDGsandaredescribedintheUSAR.Therefore,thereisnoreasontodescribethesefoursignalsintheI'IS,sincetherearenoothersignalsavailable;noothersignalsotherthanthesecanbeused.Assuch,thisdeletionisconsideredadministrative.A.9TheCIS4.8.1.1.2.eexistinglimitationon18-monthSurveillancestoperformthem"duringshutdown"ismorespecificallypresentedintheproposedSurveillances.EachproposedSRcontainsaspecificNotelimitingtheperformanceincertainMODES.WhiletheselimitationsvaryfromSRtoSR,eachisconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1presentation(orbracketedoptionallowedbasedonplantspecificjustification)whichdefinestheintentof"duringshutdown"foreachSR,andwiththeguidanceofGenericLetter91-04.Additionally,theITSNoteclearlypresentstheallowanceofthecurrentpracticeoftakingcreditforunplannedevents,providedthenecessarydataisobtained.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESHS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING~ADNl(A.10CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.2requirestheDGtorejectthesinglelargestloadwhilemaintainingtheenginespeedincrease(75%ofthedifferencebetweennominalspeedandtheoverspeedtripsetpointor(15%ofthenominalspeed,whicheverisless.ThesetwopossiblevaluesfortheoverspeedtrippointarefixedbythedesignoftheDGunit.Theappropriatevalue(i.e.,themostlimiting,whichis64.5HzforDivision1and2DGsand66.75HzforDivision3DG)ispresentedinproposedSR3.8.1.7.ThispresentationeliminatesthebasisfortheacceptedvaluefromtheTechnicalSpecifications,movingittotheBases.Sincethereisnodifferenceintherequirement,thisisaneditorialpresentationpreferenceonly.A.11CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.3footnote**allowsthat,duringthefullloadrejecttest,momentarytransientsofthebusloadwillnotinvalidatethetest.Thisallowanceprovidesforminordeviationsfromthesingularfixedloadvalueofthesurveillance.ProposedSR3.8.1.8hasprovidedforthisdeviationbyrequiringtheloadtobeequaltoorgreaterthantheratedloadcapacity.Therefore,thedeletionofthisfootnoteisconsideredtobeanadministrativechange.A.12CIS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)footnote*'*,CIS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.b)footnote~,CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.5footnote*,andCIS4.8.1.1.2.e.6footnote*allowcertainteststobeprecededbyDGwarmupproceduresandtoallowstheDGtobegraduallyloadedtominimizemechanicalstressandwear.TheseallowancesarenotincludedintheITS.CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb)andCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.6verifyproperDGresponsewheninitiatedbyastartsignalthatincludesalossofpowersignal.ThesetestsrequiretheDGtobeautomaticallyloaded.Therefore,tomeettheacceptancecriteriaofthetests,theallowancesoftheassociatedfootnotescannotbeused.CIS4.8.1.1.2.e.5verifiesproperDGresponsewheninitiatedbyanECCSactuationsignalonly.ThistestdoesnotincludeaverificationofDGloading;onlyaDGstartandunloadedrunisrequired.Therefore,theassociatedfootnotedoesnotprovideanyneededallowance.Assuch,thedeletionofthesefootnotesisconsideredadministrative.RELOTEDPECIFICATINSNoneNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTEHNICALCHANES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.8(cont'd)SRbeimmediatelyprecededbyasuccessfulperformanceofSR3.8.1.2(theDGstartSurveillance).ThiswillensuretheDGloadcarryingcapabilityistestedsubsequenttoasuccessfulDGstarttest.WhiletheseNotesclearlyrepresentcurrentNMP2practice,theyaremorerestrictivethantheCTSsincetheSRcouldcurrentlybeperformedwithouttheserestrictions.M.9LimitationsontheoperatingpowerfactorareaddedtoCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.2,thesingleloadrejectiontest(proposedNote2toSR3.8.1.7),CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.3,thefullloadrejectiontest(proposedSR3.8.1.8,includingNote2),andCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.8,the24-hourrunSurveillance(proposedSR3.8.1.12,includingNote3).TheselimitationsensuretheDGisconservativelytestedatasclosetoaccidentconditionsasreasonable,providedthepowerfactorcanbeattained.TheactualpowerfactorvalueshavebeenaddedtotheBases.ANotehasbeenalsoaddedtoCIS4.8.1.1.2.e.8(proposedSR3.8.1.12Note1)toensureamomentarytransientthatresultsinthepowerfactornotbeingmetdoesnotinvalidatethe24hourrun.Thesechangesaremorerestrictiveonplantoperation.M.10CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.5.a)requirestheDivision1and2DGsaccelerateto57Hz(60Hz-3.0Hz)within10seconds.CIS4.8.1.1.2.e.5.b)doesnotprovideanyminimumvoltageorfrequencytheDivision3DGmustmeetwithinthe10secondDGstarttimeassumedintheaccidentanalysis.ProposedSR3.8.1.10requirestheminimumfrequencyforDivision1and2DGstobe58.8HzandrequirestheininimumvoltageandfrequencyfortheDivision3DGtobe3820Vand58.0Hz,respectively.ThefrequencyforDivision1and2DGsisconsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.9,Rev.3andwiththesteadystatefrequencylimittheDGsarecurrentlyrequiredtomaintain.ThefrequencyforDivision3DGisconsistentwithCTS4.8.1.1.2.a.4.b).Thevoltageensuresthatcomponentspoweredbytheassociatedbuswillhavesufficientvoltagetoperfornitheirrequiredfunction.Theseareadditionalrestrictionsonplantoperation.M.I1TwonewrequirementshavebeenaddedtoCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.5.a).SR3.8.1.10.dandSR3.8.1.10.eensurethatDivision1and2permanentlyconnectedloadsremainenergizedfromtheoffsitepowersystemandthatDivision1and2emergencyloadsareautoconnectedtotheoffsitepowersystem.ThisisrequiredsinceseparateloadtimersareusedtoautoconnectsomeoftheDivision1and2emergencyloadstotheoffsitepowersystem,andiftheproperloadtimerdoesnotoperate,anoffsitecircuitcouldbeimpacted.Thisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.NMP2RevisionA'g)

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNICALCHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.9(cont'd)Inaddition,aNotehasbeenaddedtoCTS4.8.1.1.2.a.5(proposedSR3.8.1.3Note2)statingthatmomentarytransientsoutsidetheloadrangedonotinvalidatetheSurveillance.Thisistoaccountformomentarilychangingbusloadsandprecludesre-performanceoftheSurveillancesolelyduetotheloadbeingoutsidetheloadrangeasaresultofamomentarytransient.DemonstrationoftheloadcarryingcapabilityandtheensuranceoftheDGatproperoperatingtemperaturescontinuetobeadequatelytestedbecausemomentarytransientsareofshortdurationcomparedtotheSurveillancetestduration.ThisNoteisalsoconsistentwithsimilarallowancesofCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.8and4.8.1.1.2.f.L.10TheCTS4.8.1.1.2.a.590-secondlimitationonthetimetoreachfullDGloadfromamanualsynchronization,requiredtobeperformedevery184daysasstatedinfootnote"'oCTS4.8.1.1.2.a.5,aswellastherestrictiontowarminguptheDGpriortoloading,areproposedtobedeleted.DGwarmupandloadingshouldbedoneinaccordancewithmanufacturer'srecommendationstominimizewearontheengine.Additionally,placingatimelimitationontheoperatortoaccomplishthisloadingresultsinanincreasedpotentialforerrorandsubsequentunavailabilityoftheDG.Thestarting,loading,subsequentfullloadoperation,andautomaticstartandloadingtestingrequiredbyotherITS3.8.1SurveillanceRequirementsisadequatetoconfirmtheDG'scapabilitywithoutthewarmuprestrictionand90-secondloadingrequirement.(L.11CTS4.8.1.1.2.a.6requiresverificationthateachDGisalignedtoprovidestandbypowertotheassociatedemergencybuses.TherequirementsofITS3.8.1,whichrequiretheDGs.tobeOPERABLE,andtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsfortheDGsareadequatetoensuretheDGsaremaintainedOPERABLE.Inaddition,thedefinitionofOPERABILITYandproceduralcontrolsonDGstandbyalignmentaresufficienttoensuretheDGremainsalignedtoprovidestandbypower.Ingeneral,thistypeofrequirementisaddressedbyplantspecificprocesseswhichcontinuouslymonitorplantconditionstoensurethatchangesinthestatusofplantequipmentthatrequireentryintoACTIONS(asaresultoffailuretomaintainequipmentOPERABLE)areidentifiedinatimelymanner.ThisverificationisanimplicitpartofusingTechnicalSpecificationsanddeterminingtheappropriateConditionstoenterandActionstotakeintheeventofinoperabilityofTechnicalSpecificationequipment.Inaddition,plantandequipmentstatusiscontinuouslymonitoredbycontrolroompersonnel.Theresultsofthismonitoringprocessaredocumentedinrecords/logsmaintainedbycontrolroompersonnel,asrequired.Thecontinuousmonitoringprocessincludesre-evaluatingthestatusofcompliancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirementswhenTechnicalSpecificationequipmentbecomesinoperableusingthecontrolroomNMP215RevisionQQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTEHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.ll(cont'd)records/logsasaids.Therefore,theexplicitrequirementtoperiodicallyverifythateachDGisalignedtoprovidestandbypowertotheassociatedemergencybusesisconsideredtobeunnecessaryforensuringcompliancewiththeapplicableTechnicalSpecificationOPERABILITYrequirementsandistoberemovedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.L.12CIS4.8.1.1.2.b.1requirescheckingforandremovingaccumulatedwaterfromtheDGdaytanksevery31daysand"aftereachoccasionwhenthedieselisoperatedformorethan1hour."ProposedSR3.8.1.5onlyrequiresthecheckevery31days;thefrequencyof"aftereachoccasionwhenthedieselisoperatedformorethan1hour"hasbeendeleted.Watercondensationwithinthefueloiltanksisatimedependentprocess,notaprocessdependentonthetransferoffueloilduringDGoperation.Furthermore,thefueloilstoragetankissimilarlymaintainedfreeofaccumulatedwater(CIS4.8.1.1.2.b.2andproposedSR3.8.3.5).IntheeventtheDGisnotoperatedexceptforthenominalmonthlyOPERABILITYtests(whichistheexpectation),noincreasedFrequencyisapplied.L.13CIS4.8.1.1.2.efootnote"andCTS4.8.1.1.2.frequirethedieseltobeoperatedwithaloadinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationsanytimethedieselisstartedtoperformtheSurveillancesofCIS4.8.1.1.2.eandCTS4.8.1.1.2.f.TheITSdoesnotincludethisrequirement.Thisrequirementisessentiallyapreventativemaintenancetypeofrequirement.ThefailuretoperformthisrequirementdoesnotnecessarilyresultinaninoperableDG.ThisrequirementisorientedtowardlongtermDGOPERABILITYanddoesnothaveanimmediateimpactonDGOPERABILITY.IncaseswheretheDGisstartedandnotloaded,plantpracticeistorestarttheDGandrunitloadedforthemanufacturerrecommendedtime.Inthesecases,theDGnormallystartsproperly;i.e.,itisnotfoundinoperablejustbecauseitwasnotloadedafterastart.Inaddition,GenericLetter83-28requiredthatutilitiesensurethatvendorrecommendedpracticesinvendormanualsbeproperlyimplementedinplantprocedures.NMP2hascompliedwiththisGenericLetter(specificallyasitrelatestotheDGs).Therefore,thisrequirementisnotnecessarytobemaintainedintheITS.L.14Thephrase"actualor",inreferencetothelossofoffsitepowersignalortheECCSactuationsignal,asapplicable,hasbeenaddedtoCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4,4.8.1.1.2.e.5,4.8.1.1.2.e.6,4.8.1.1.2.e.7,and4.8.1.1.2.e.11(proposedSRs3.8.1.9,3.8.1.10,3.8.1.17,3.8.1.11,and3.8.1.15,respectively)forverifyingtheproperresponseoftheDG.ThisallowssatisfactorylossofoffsitepowerorECCSactuationsforotherthanSurveillancepurposestobeusedtofulfilltheSurveillanceRequirement.OPERABILITYisadequatelyNMP216RevisionA

DISCIJSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNIALHAN)ES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.14(cont'd)demonstratedineithercasesincetheDGcannotdiscriminatebetween"actual"or"simulated"signals.L.15CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)2)and4.8.1.1.2.e.4.b)2)requiretheDGstostartandenergizetheemergencybuseswithin13secondsofalossofoffsitepowersignal.ProposedSR3.8.1.9willallowtheDGstostartandenergizetheemergencybuseswithin13.20seconds.ThisproposedtimeisthesummationofthecurrentDGstartthneof10seconds(fromvariousCTS4.8.1.1Surveillances)andtheDGlossof'oltagetimedelayAllowableValue(fromCISTable3.3.3-2TripFunctionsD.1andE.1,asmodifiedbyan"L"DiscussionofChangeinITS3.3.8.1).ThisisalsothetimeassumedintheaccidentanalysisfortheDGtostartwhenonlyalossofvoltageoccurs.ThecurrenttimeinCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)2)andb)2)isessentiallytheallowedDGstartandenergizationtin>eroundedtothenearestwholesecond.Therefore,thischangeiseffectivelymakingtheDGstartandenergizationtimeofCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)2andb)2)consistentwiththecurrentallowedtimesinotherportionsoftheCTS(asmo(lifiedbyanappropriateDiscussionofChangeinITS3.3.8.1).L.16ThemannerinwhichtheDGisstartedf'rCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.8(i.e.,thattheDGmustbewithinthepropervoltageandfrequencywithinacertaintimelimitafterthestartsignal)hasnotbeenincludedinproposedSR3.8.1.12.Whilethistestcanbeperformetlonlyafterafaststart,thetnannerinwhichtheDGisstarteddoesnotaffectthetest.Inaddition,maintainingvoltageandfrequency(asrequiredbyCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.8)isroutineforthistesttoensuretheloadsaremaintainedwithinthenecessarylimits,anddoesnotneedtobespecified.OtherSurveillanceRequirementsbeingmaintainedintheITS(e.g.,CTS4.8.1.1.2.a.4,proposedSR3.8.1.2)continuetorequireverifyingtheDGstarttimeandvoltageandfrequencylimits.IftheselimitsarefoundnottobemetduringtheperformanceofproposedSR3.8.1.12,thentheDGwouldbedeclaredinoperable.Asaresult,theserequirementsarenotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensurethedieselgeneratorsaremaintainedOPERABLE.L.17CTS4.8.1.1.2.e.13,whichverifiestheDGlockoutfeaturespreventDGstartingonlywhenrequired,isproposedtobedeleted.IfaDGlockoutfeaturepreventstheDGfronioperuin<duringanaccident,thiswillstillbeidentifiedduringtheLOCA,LOOP.andLOCA/LOOPDGSurveillances(proposedSRs3.8.1.9,3.8.1.10,<<nd3.8.1.17),whicharecurrentlyperformedatthesameperiodicityasthisSurveillance.Itwillalsobeidentifiedduringthenormal31daytest,proposedSR3.8.1.2.FailureofalockoutfeaturetoproperlylockoutaDGisnotaconcernasitrelatestomeetingaccidentanalysisNMP217Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNICALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.17(cont'd)assumptions,sincetheDGwouldalreadybeassumednottobefunctioning(thelockoutfeaturesareusedtopreventtheDGfromstartingonanaccidentsignal).Therefore,removalofthisSurveillancefromtheTechnicalSpecificationswillhavenoeffectonDGOPERABILITY.L.18ANotetoCTS4.8.1.1.2.tand4.8.1.1.2.g(proposedSR3.8.1.13andSR3.8.1.18)hasbeenaddedtoallowaprelubepriortostartingtheDG.DGstartswithoutpriorengineprelubecreateunnecessaryenginewear,therebyreducingoverallreliability.Theengineprelubedoesnotresultinanenhancedstartperformancethatcouldmasktheengine'sinabilitytostartinaccidentconditionswithoutaprelube.ThisNoteisalsoconsistentwiththeallowanceprovidedinallotherDGstartsrequiredbytheCTS.L.19Explicitpostn>aint'enanceSurveillanceRequirementsasrequiredbyCTS4.8.1.1.2.g(i.e.,afteranymodificationswhichcouldaffectDGinterdependence)havebeendeleted.AnytimetheOPERABILITYofasystemorcomponenthasbeenaffectedbyrepair,maintenance,orreplacementofacomponent,postmaintenancetestingisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthesystemorcoinpnnent.AfterrestorationofacomponentthatcausedarequiredSRtobefailed,ITSSR3.0.1requirestheappropriateSRs(inthiscase,SR3.8.1.18)toheperformedtodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheaffectedcomponents.Therefore,explicitpostmaintenanceSurveillanceRequirementsarenotrepairedandhavebeendeletedfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.L.20TherequirementtoperformCTS4.8.1.1.2.gduringshutdownhasnotbeenincludedinproposedSR3.8.1.18.TheproposedSurveillance(tosimultaneouslystartallthreeDGs)doesnotincludetherestrictiononplantconditions.TheSurveillancecanbeadequatelytestedintheoperatingconditionswithoutjeopardizingsafeplantoperations,sincetheSurveillancedoesnotrequiretheDGstobeconnectedtotheirrespectivebuses;theSurveillanceonlyrequiresastartoftheDGs.ThecontrolofplantconditionsappropriatetoperformtheSurveillanceisanissueforproceduresandscheduling,andhasbeendeterminedbytheNRCStafftobeunnecessaryasaTechnicalSpecificationrestriction.AsindicatedinGenericLetter91-04,allowingthiscontrolisconsistentwiththevastmajorityofotherTechnicalSpecificationSurveillancesthatdonotdictateplantconditionsfortheSurveillance.L.21CTS4.8.1.1.3,whichrequiresthatallDGfailuresbereportedtotheNRCinaspecialreportpursuanttoCTS6.9.2,isproposedtobedeleted.Thisrequirementisproposedtoberen>ovedfromTechnicalSpecificationsinaccordancewiththeguidanceofGenericLetter94-01.GL94-01allowsDGNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNICALCHANGES-LESRESTRICTIVEL.21(cont'd)failurereportingrequirementstoberemoved,butlicenseesmustcontinuetocomplywithreportingrequirementsof10CFR50.72and50.73,whichmayrequirenotifyingandreportingDGfailurestotheNRC.Also,thischangedoesnotimpactthesafeoperationoftheplantbecausethereportissubmittedaftertheDGfailurehasoccurredanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,thisrequirementisbeingremovedfromtheTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwiththeguidanceofGL94-01.L.22IfanoffsitecircuitisinoperableonlyduetoitsinabilitytoprovidepowertheDivision3electricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,CIS3.8.1.1ActionawouldrequireaunitshutdowniftheoffsitecircuitisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.ITS3.8.1providesanApplicabilityNotewhich,intheeventtheHPCSSystemisinoperable,allowstheDivision3offsitecircuitstonotberequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thus,attheendofthecurrent72hourrestorationtime,theITSNotewouldallowHPCStobedeclaredinoperable,andtheACI'IONSinITS3.5.1wouldbetakenforaninoperableHPCSSystem.TheACI'IONSinITS3.5.1allow14daystorestoreHPCStoOPERABLEstatus.Theoveralleffectofthischangeistoallowanadditional14daystorestorethecircuittoOPERABLEstatus,sincethatistheonlywaytorestoretheHPCSSystemtoOPERABLEstatusunderthiscondition.The14dayallowanceisconsistentwiththeallowancealreadyprovidedinCTS3.8.1.1ActiondforwhentheHPCSDGisinoperable.Thetwoconditions(i.e.,lossoftheoffsitecircuitandlossofDG)areessentiallythesame;theHPCSSystemcanstillperformitsintendedfunction,however,itonlyhasonesourceofpower.Inaddition,theCTS3.5.1currentlyallowstheHPCSSystemtobeinoperableforupto14daysforotherreasonsthatwillprecludeitfromperformingitsintendedfunction.SincetheNRChaspreviouslyapprovedthe14dayallowanceforwhentheHPCSDGisinoperable,aswellaswhentheHPCSSystemisinoperableforotherreasons,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.Inaddition,this14daytimeforwhenHPCSisinoperableisalsoconsistentwiththeMemorandumfromR.L.Baer(NRC)toV.Stello,Jr.(NRC),"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCO'sforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.NMP219Revisionf6@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.2-ACSOURCES-SHUTDOWNTECHNIALCHANES-MRERESTRIIVEM.2(cont'd)moresystems,subsystems,orcomponentsrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ThisaddedrestrictionenforcesalevelofTechnicalSpecificationcontrolwhichcurrentlyisenforcedonlyviaadministrativeprocedures.M.3CIS3.8.1.2Actionarequiresthat,wheninMODE5withthewaterlevellessthan22feetabovetheRPVflange,actionistobeinitiatedtorestoretherequiredACpowersourcestoOPERABLEstatus.ITS3.8.2RequiredActionsA.2.4andB.4implementarequirementtoinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredpowersourcestoOPERABLEstatusinMODES4and5andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment.ThiswillensureactionsaretakenatalltimeswhenanACSourceisinoperable,notjustinMODE5withwaterlevellessthan22feetabovetheRPVflange.Therefore,thischangeisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.TECHNIALHAN-LESSRESTRIIVE"Generic"LA.1TheCIS3.8.1.2.b.3detailrelatingtosystemdesignandOPERABILITY(i.e.,thateachDGhastwofueloiltransferpumps)isproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.ThedesigndetailsarenotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheDGssinceOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.8.2,"ACSources-Shutdown."Assuch,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2CTS3.8.1.2ActionarequiressupervisionofcraneoperationsoverthespentfuelstoragepoolwhenanACSourceisinoperable.Craneoperationisnotdirectlyaffectedbythelossofsafetyrelatedpowersources.Therefore,CIS3.8.1.2ActionaassociatedwithcraneoperationfollowingalossofACpowersourcesisproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.Movementofloadsotherthanfuelassembliesisadministrativelycontrolledbasedonheavyloadsanalyses.TheboundingdesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentassumesanirradiatedfuelassemblyisdroppedontoanarrayofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedwithintheRPV.Themovementofotherloadsoverirradiatedfuelassembliesisadministrativelycontrolledbasedonavailableanalysisfortheindividualload.Inaddition,NMP2isconsistentwiththerequirementsof[ftNMP2Revision8'@

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.2-ACSOURCES-SHUTDOWNTEHNIALHAN-LSRTRIIVELA.2(cont'd)GenericLetter80-113andNUREG-0612,asdocumentedintheUSAR,Appendix9C.Therefore,therelocatedrequirementisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59."Specific"L.1CIS3.8.1.2.brequirestheDivision3DGtobeOPERABLEwhentheHPCSSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ITSLCO3.8.2.cwillallowaqualifiedoffsitecircuit,otherthanthecircuitrequiredtoprovidepowertoDivision1and2,tosubstitutefortheDG.TheproposedallowancewillcontinuetoensureadequatepowerisavailabletosupplytheHPCSSystemduringashutdowncondition.ThiscircuitmustbeseparatefromthatrequiredtopowerDivision1and2,thusasinglefailureofoneoffsitecircuitwillnotresultinlossofalloffsitepower.Inaddition,thereliabilityoftheoffsitecircuitisgenerallygreaterthantheDG.L.2ManyofthecurrentlyrequiredSurveillancesspecifiedinCTS4.8.1.2involveteststhatwouldrequiretheDGtobeparalleledtooffsitepower.Thiscondition(theonlyrequiredDGandtheonlyrequiredoffsitecircuitconnected)presentsasignificantriskofasinglefaultresultinginastationblackout.TheNRChaspreviouslyrecognizedthisintheexceptionstatedinCIS4.8.1.2andprovidedsurveillanceexceptionstoavoidthiscondition.InanefforttoconsistentlyaddressthisconcernandtoavoidpotentialconflictingTechnicalSpecifications,theSurveillancesthatwouldrequiretheDGtobeconnectedtotheoffsitesourceareexceptedfromperformancerequirements,TheexceptiondoesnottakeexceptiontotherequirementfortheDGtobecapableofperformingtheparticularfunction;justtotherequirementtodemonstrateitwhilethatsourceofpowerisbeingreliedontosupportmeetingtheLCO.TheexceptionisbeingpresentedintheformofaNotetoproposedSR3.8.2.1.L.3CIS4.8.1.1.3,whichrequiresthatallDGfailuresbereportedtotheNRCinaspecialreportpursuanttoCTS6.9.1,isproposedtobedeleted.ThisrequirementisbeingremovedfromTechnicalSpecificationsinaccordancewiththeguidanceofGenericLetter94-01.GL94-01allowsDGfailurereportingrequirementstoberemoved,butlicenseesmustcontinuetocomplywithreportingrequirementsof10CFR50.72and50.73,whichmayrequirenotifyingandreportingDGfailurestotheNRC.Also,thischangedoesnotimpactthesafeoperationoftheplantbecausethereportissubmittedaftertheDGfailurehasoccurredanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,thisNMP2Revision+g

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.2-ACSOURCES-SHUTDOWNTECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVEL.3requirementisbeingremovedfromtheTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwith(cont'd)theguidanceofGL94-01.L.4CIS4.8.1.2,whichprovidestheSurveillanceRequirementsfortheACSourceswhileinModes4and5andduringhandlingofirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment,requirestheSurveillancesofCTS4.8.1.1.2tobeperformed.TwooftheSurveillancesofCTS4.8.1.1.2aretheDGstartonanECCSinitiationsignalandtheDGstartandloadonanECCSinitiationsignalconcurrentwithalossofoffsitepowersignal.ProposedNote2toSR3.8.2.1willexemptthesetwoSurveillanceswhentheassociatedECCSsubsystem(s)arenotrequiredtobeOperable.TheCTSandITSdonotrequiretheECCSsubsystem(s)tobeOperableinMode5whenthespentfuelstoragepoolgatesareremovedandwaterlevelis)22ft3inchesoverthetopofthereactorpressurevesselflange.TheCTSandITSalsodonotrequiretheECCSsubsystem(s)tobeOperablewhendefueled.TheDGsarerequiredtosupporttheequipmentpoweredfromtheemergencybuses.However,whentheECCSsubsystem(s)arenotrequiredtobeOperable,thenthereisnoreasontorequiretheDGstoautostartonanECCSinitiationsignal.Inaddition,theECCSinitiationsignalisonlyananticipatorystartsignal;theDGsareonlyneededduringaLOCAifalossofoffsitepoweroccursconcurrently.TheDGsarealsorequiredtoautostartifalossofoffsitepoweroccurs.TherequirementtoautostarttherequiredDG(s)onalossofoffsitepowersignalisbeingmaintainedintheITS(proposedSR3.8.1.9).Thus,whenintheseconditions(associatedECCSsubsystem(s)notrequiredtobeOperable),thereisnoreasontorequiretheDGstobecapableofautomaticallystartingonanECCSactuationsignal(eitherbyitselforconcurrentwithalossofoffsitepowersignal).NMP2RevisionA

4.8.1.1.2.e(Continued)12.VerifyingthattheautomaticloadtimerrelaysereOPERABLEwiththeintervalbetweeneachloadblockwithina10%ofitsdesignintervalfordieselgeneratorsEDG*1andEDG*3.13.Verifyingthatthefollowingdieselgeneratorlockoutfeaturespreventdieselgeneratorstartingonlywhenrequired:a)ForDivisionsIandII.turninggearengagedandemergencystop.b)ForDivisionIII,engineinthemaintenancemodeanddieselgeneratorlockout.Atleastonceper18monthsverifyeachdieselgeneratorstartsandacceleratestoatleast600RPMwithin10secondsforEDG*1andEDG~3,and870RPMwithin10secondsforEDG*2.ThegeneratorvoltageandfrequencyforEDG~1endEDG*3shall4m4160a416voltsand60a3.0Hzwithin10secondsand4160a416voltsand60a1.2Hzwithin13secondsafterthestartsignal.ThegeneratorvoltageandfrequencyforEDG*2shallbe4160a416voltsand60a1.2Hzwithin15secondsafterthestartsignal.Thistestshallbeperformedwithin5minutesofshuttingdownthedieselgeneratorafterthedieselgeneratorhasoperatedforatleast2hoursat4400kWormoreforEDG*1andEDG*3and2600kWormoreforEDG*2.Foranystartofaidiesel,thedieselmustbeloadedinaccordancewithmanufacturer'srecommendations.Momentarytransientsduetochangingbusloadsshallnotinvalidatethistest.g.Atleastonceper10yearsorafteranymodificationswhichcouldaffectdieselgeneratorinterdependencebystartingallthreedieselgeneratorssimultaneously,duringshutdown,andverifyingthatalldieselgeneratorsEDG+1andEDG*3acceleratetoatleast600rpmandEDG*2ccelroatleast870minlessthanorequalto10seconds.h.leastonceper10yearsby:1.Diningeachfueloilstoragetank,movingtheaccumulatedsedimeandcleaningthenkusingasodiumhypochloriteolution,and2.PerformapressuretestofthoseponsofthedieselfueloilsystemdsignedtoSectionII,ubsectionNDoftheASMECeinaccordancewithASMECSectioXIArticleI-5000.,(A4.8.1.1.3Alldieselgeneratoraiures,vaior55h=VSli,reportedtotheCommissionpursuanttoSpecification6.9.2,within30days.ReportsofdieselgeneratorfailuresshallincludetheinformationrecommendedinPositionC.3.bofRG1.108,Revision1,August1977.Ifthenumberoffailuresinthelast100validtests,onapernuclearunitbasis,isgreaterthanorequalto7,thereportshallbesupplementedtoincludetheadditionalinformationrecommendedinPositionC.3.bofRG1.108visionAuust1977.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/48-11O~~SS(d46CQ~gQ~1AmandmentNa.684(Qg4e<f/',

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.3-DIESELFUELOIL,LUBEOIL,andSTARTINGAIRLHAN-LRTRIIVEL.1(cont'd)levelsofdegradationinairstartreceiverpressurearejustifiedtoextendtheallowancesforrestoration(presentedasITS3.8.3ACTIONSEandFandACI'IONSNote).Duringtheextendedrestorationperiodsforthisparameter,theDGwouldstillbecapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.IIS3.8.3ACTIONE,whichisenteredonaperDGbasis(asallowedbytheACI'IONSN(ÃE),allows48hourstorestorestartingairpressurepriortodeclaringtheDGinoperable,providedaonestartcapacityremains.ITS3.8.3ACTIONFisprovidedtodeclaretheDGinoperableifthepreviousACTIONisnotmet.Duringtheproposedextendedperiodsforrestorationofthisparameter,theDGwouldstillbecapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.L,2TheSurveillanceFrequencyofCTS4.8.1.1.2.ahasbeenchangedfrom"frequencyspecifiedinTable4.8.1.1.2-1"(theDGtestscheduletable)to"31days."ThisisbecauseDGfailuresthatresultinamorefrequentDGtestfrequencyhavenoimpactonthefueloilstoragetanklevelorthestartingairsystemsabilitytoperformitsintendedfunction.Thereforethe31dayfrequencyisacceptable.L.3CIS4.8.1.1.2.arequiresthefueloilstoragetanklevelandthestartingairpressureofeachDGtobeverifiedonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.ProposedSR3.8.3.1andSR3.8.3.4donotincludethisrequirement.Theintentofarequirementforstaggeredtestingistoincreasereliabilityofthecomponent/systembeingtested.Anumberofreviews/evaluationshavebeenperformedwhichhavedemonstratedthatstaggeredtestinghasnegligibleimpactoncomponentreliability.Asaresult,ithasbeendeterminedthatstaggeredtesting1)isoperationallydifficult,2)hasnegligibleimpactoncomponentreliability,3)isnotassignificantasinitiallythought,and4)hasnoimpactonfailurefrequency.Therefore,thestaggeredtestingrequirementsfordieselfueloillevelandstartingairpressureverificationhavebeendeleted.L.4The10yearSurveillancesofCIS4.8.1.1.2.htodrain,removesediment,andcleaneachfueloiltank,andtoperformapressuretestontheDGfueloilsystempipingareproposedtobedeleted.TheseSurveillancesarepreventivemaintenancetyperequirements.Sedimentinthetank,orfailuretoperformtheseSurveillances,donotnecessarilyresultinaninoperablestoragetank.PerformanceofproposedSR3.8.3.3(fueloiltesting)andthelimitsoftheDieselFuelOilTestingProgramhelpensuretanksedimentisminimized.PerformanceofproposedSR3.8.3.1(fueloilvolumeverification)onceper31daysensuresthatanydegradationofthetankwallsurfacethatresults,inafueloilvolumereductionisdetectedandcorrectedinatimelymanner.ThepressuretestofthefueloilsystemisalreadycoveredbyASMECodeSectionXIArticleIWD-5000.ThisiscurrentlyimplementedintheNMp2)QisRevisionAQ

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.3-DIESELFUELOIL,LUBEOIL,andSTARTINGAIRTEHNIALHAN-LRTRIIVEL.4(cont'd)PressureTestingProgramprocedures.Inaddition,anothergovernmentagencyprovidesregulationsforthemaintenanceofbelowgroundfueloiltanks.Asaresult,adequatecontrolsexistsuchthattheserequirementsareunnecessarytomaintainintheTechnicalSpecifications.NMP2Revision~0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.4-DCSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNIALCHANGES-MORERESTRICI'IVEM.1Arequirementtoensurethatthebatterycelltocellandterminalconnectionsarecoatedwithanti-corrosionmaterialhasbeenaddedtoCTS4.8.2.1.c.2(proposedSR3.8.4.4)consistentwithIEEE-450recommendationsandtheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1.Thiswillhelpensurethatcorrosionoftheconnectionswillnotoccur,thusassistinginmaintainingresistancevalueswithinlimits.Thischangeismorerestrictiveonplantoperation.M.2The18monthFrequencyforcurrentSurveillance4.8.2.1.f(proposedSR3.8.4.8)isbeingchangedto12months,consistentwiththerecommendationsofIEEE-450-1995.ThisisanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperationsandwillensurethebatteryOperabilityischeckedmorefrequentlywhendegradationisdetectedorthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsservicelife,whenthebatterycapacityis~100%.TECHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.lLCO3.8.4hasbeenwrittentorequiretheDivision1,2and3DCelectricalpowersubsystemstobeOPERABLEandthedetailsrelatingtosystemOPERABILITY(whatconstitutesaDCSourcedivision)inLCO3.8.2.1areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TheactualbatteryidentificationnumbersareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TheBaseswillincludeanQSadequatedescriptionofthebatteriestoproperlyidentifythem.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.Assuch,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.2Thedetailforthebasisoftheresistancereadingsinfootnote*ofCTS4.8.2.1.c.3(IEEE450-1980)isproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThisdetailisnotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYofthebatteries.TherequirementsofproposedSR3.8.4.5areadequatetoensurethebatteriesaremaintainedOPERABLEandtheresistancevaluesareproperlydetermined.Assuch,therelocateddetailisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.NMP2RevisionAQg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.4-DCSOURCES-OPERATINGTECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE(continued)L.5AnallowancetoperformamodifiedperformancedischargetestinlieuofaperformancedischargetesthasbeenaddedtoCTS4.8.2.1.eandf(proposedSR3.8.4.8).Themodifiedperformancedischargetestisasimulateddutycycleconsistingofjusttworates:the1minuteratepublishedforthebatteryorthelargestcurrentloadofthedutycycle,followedbythetestrateemployedfortheperformancetest.Sincetheampere-hoursremovedbyarated1minutedischargerepresentaverysmallportionofthebatterycapacity,thetestratecanbechangedtothatfortheperformancetestwithoutcompromisingtheresultsoftheperformancedischargetest.L.6CIS4.8.2.1.frequiresabatteryperformancedischargetestevery18monthswhenthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsservicelife.Abatterycanbeat85%Qttorgreaterofexpectedlife,andstillbewithintherequiredcapacitytomeetOPERABILITYrequirements.Inthisevent,aFrequencylessrestrictivethanthe18monthFrequencyisjustified.ProposedSR3.8.4.8willnowberequiredtobeperformedevery24ntonthswhenabatteryhasreached85%ofexpected(Qitlifewithbatterycapacity)100%ofmanufacturer'srating.ThisnewFrequencyisalsoconsistentwiththeBWR/6STS,NUREG-1434,Rev.l.NMP2RevisionAQUA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.5-DCSOURCES-SHUTDOWNTECHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1TherequirementsforOPERABLEDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarecontainedinITS3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-Shutdown."Thus,ITSLCO3.8.5hasbeenwrittentorequiretheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem(s)requiredtosupporttheelectricaldistributionsubsystem(s)requiredbyLCO3.8.9(seeDiscussionofChangeM.Iabove),andthedetailsrelatingtosystemOPERABILITYinCTS3.8.2.2(whatconstitutesarequiredDCelectricalpowersource)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TheactualbatteryidentificationnumbersareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TheBaseswillincludeanadequatedescriptionofthebatteriestoproperlyidentifythem.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledby10CFR50.59."Specific"L.lIIThreeoftheDCsourcesSurveillancesrequiredtobeperformedbyCTS4.8.2.2(CTS4.8.2.l.d,4.8.2.1.e,and4.8.2.l.f)involveteststhatwouldcausetheonlyrequiredOPERABLEbatterytoberenderedinoperable.Thisconditionpresentsasignificantriskifaneventweretooccurduringthetest.TheNRChaspreviouslyprovidedSurveillanceexceptionsintheNMP2CIStoavoidasimilarconditionfortheACsources,buttheexceptionshavenotbeenappliedtoDCsources.Inanefforttoconsistentlyaddressthisconcern,proposedSR3.8.5.1hasaNotethatexcludesperformancerequirementsofSurveillancesthatwouldrequiretherequiredOPERABLEbattery(s)toberenderedinoperable.Thisallowancedoesnottakeexceptiontotherequirementforthebatterytobecapableofperformingtheparticularfunction-justtotherequirementtodemonstratethatcapabilitywhilethatsourceofpowerisbeingreliedontosupportmeetingtheLCO.NMP2Revision+$8 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.7-INVERTERS-OPERATINGTECHNIALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1(cont'd)requiredtosupportotherTechnicalSpecificationequipmentsuchasRCIC.Sincethewordsoffootnotei'TheUPSshallbeenergizedfromtheirnormalACsupplyortheirbackupDCsupply"doesnotspecificallyrequiretheuninterruptiblepowersupply(i.e.,eithertheACortheDCsupplycanbeusedtoenergizetheUPS),thisisconsideredmorerestrictiveonplantoperation.Inaddition,thisrequirementisbeingrelocatedtotheBasesasdescribedinDiscussionofChangeLA.1below.M.2CTS4.8.3.1.1requiresthateachrequiredpowerdistributionsystemdivisionbedeterminedenergizedbyverifyingcorrectsupplybreakeralignment.SinceCTS3.8.3.l.a.l.c)andCTS3.8.3.1.a,2.c)requiretherequireddistributionpanelstobepoweredfromtheinverters,andfootnotefrequirestheinvertertobeenergizedfromoneoftwosources,CTS4.8.3.1.1alsocoversthebreakeralignmentcheckoftheinverterpowersupply.ProposedSR3.8.7.1includesnotonlythealignmentcheck,butalsorequiresverificationofproperinvertervoltageandfrequencyevery7days.Thiswillensuretheinverterscanperformtheirassumedfunction;i.e.,providingadequatevoltageandfrequencytotheECCSinstrumentation.Thisrequirementisconsideredmorerestrictiveonplantoperation.TEHNIALHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailsofCTS3.8.3.1,includingfootnotef,concerningtheOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheinvertersareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.TheactualinverteridentificationnumbersareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TheBaseswillincludeanadequatedescriptionoftheinverterstoproperlyidentifythem.TherequirementsofITS3.8.7andSR3.8.7.1areadequatetoensuretheDivision1and2invertersareOPERABLE.Forclarity,anameidentifier,"emergencyuninterruptiblepowersupply(UPS)inverter"hasbeenusedsincetheequipmentidentificationnumberhasbeenrelocatedtotheUSAR.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasescontrolprogramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsot10CFR50.59.Inaddition,changestotheOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheinvertersisdiscussedinDiscussionofChangeM.1above.NMP2RevisionEQ$

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.7-INVERTERS-OPERATINGTECHNIALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE(continued)"Specific"L.lCIS3.8.3.1Actiona.1allows8hourstoreenergizeaninoperableDivision1or2120-voltACdistributionpanelbyitsassociatedDivision1or2inverter.TherequirementstoinaintainthesedistributionpanelsenergizediscontinuedinITS3.8.8(asrequiredbyproposedITS3.8.7RequiredActionA.1Note).Ifthe120-voltACdistributionpanelisde-energized,ITS3.8.8ACTIONBwillrequireittobere-energizedwithin8hours,consistentwiththetimerequiredinCTS3.8.3.1Actiona.l.ITSLCO3.8.7onlyaddressestheOPERABILITYoftheDivision1and2invertersandextendstherestorationtimefromthecurrent8hoursto24hours(ITS3.8.7RequiredActionA.1).Experiencehasshownthata24hourrestorationtimeforaninoperableinverterisappropriate,sincethedistributionpanel,viaanACsupply,iscapableofbeingenergizedfromaclass1Econstanttransformedsource.Duringthisadditional16hours,the120-voltACdistributionpanelisenergizedandcanperformitsdesignfunctionduringaLOCAevent,assumingnolossofof(sitepower.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.NMP2Revision+@

0 DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.8-DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMS-OPERATINGTECHNICALCHANES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1(cont'd)subsystemcouldagainbecomeinoperable,andtheDCdistributionrestoredOPERABLE.Thiscouldcontinueindefinitely.Therefore,toprecludethissituationandplaceanappropriaterestrictiononanysuchunusualsituation,theadditionalCompletionTimeof"16hoursfromdiscoveryoffailuretomeetLCO3.8.8.a,b,orc"isproposed.M.2CIS3.8.3.1Actiona.1allows8hourstorestoreoneinoperableACsubsystemandActionb.1allows2hourstorestoreoneinoperableDCsubsystem.CertaincombinationsofinoperableACandDCsubsystemswillresultinalossofsafetyfunction(e.g.,aninoperableDivision1ACsubsystemincombinationwithaninoperableDivision2DCsubsystem).ITS3.8.8addsACTIONF,whichrequiresentryintoITS3.0.3ifthelossoftwoormoreelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsresultsinalossofsafetyfunction.ITS3.8.8RequiredActionF.1preservestheintentofITS3.0.3andreflectsanadditionalrestrictiononplantoperation.TECHNICALHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailsofCTS3.8.3.1relatingtosystemdesignandOPERABILITYareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.ThedesigndetailsarenotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheDistributionSystemssinceOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.8.8,"DistributionSystems-Operating."Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2DetailsofthemethodsforperformingCTS4.8.3.1.1and4.8.3.1.2(ontheswitchgear,loadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanels)toverifytherequiredDistributionSystemsareOPERABLEareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThesedetailsarenotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheDistributionSystems.TherequirementsofITS3.8.8andproposedSR3.8.8.1areadequatetoensuretherequiredDistributionSystemsaremaintainedOPERABLE.SincethemethodstoverifytheOperabilityoftheswitchgear,loadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanelsaredifferent(theswitchgearrequiresthevoltagetobeverifiedandtheloadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanelsrequireverificationthatnoinoperabilitystatusindicatorlightsinthecontrolroomarelitthatwouldindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftheNMP2Revision

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.8-DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMS-OPERATINGTEHNIALCHAN~ES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.2(cont'd)requiredloadcenters,MCCs,ordistributionpanels),thetermpoweravailabilityhasbeenusedtoreplacevoltageandinoperabilitystatusindicatorlights.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS."Specific"L.lCTS3.8.3.1Actiona.lallows8hourstorestoreoneinoperableACsubsystemandActionb.lallows2hourstorestoreoneinoperableDCsubsystem.NotimeisprovidedifbusesareinoperableinDivisionland2ACsubsystemsconcurrentlyorinDivisionIand2DCsubsystemsconcurrently.ThusaCTS3.0.3entryisrequired.ITS3.8.8ACTIONSA,B,andC,allowsone"ormore"AC,120VACuninterruptible,andDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeconcurrentlyinoperable,withoutrequiringanITS3.0.3entry;either8hoursor2hours(8hoursforACand2hoursforDC)willbeallowedtorestoretheinoperabilities.However,ITS3.8.8ACTIONFisalsoaddedtorequirethatiftwoormoreelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsareinoperableandresultinalossoffunction,thenITS3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThusifbothDivisionlandDivision2ACsubsystemshavesimilarbusesinoperable,whichresultinalossoffunction,ITS3.8.8ACTIONFwillensureITS3.0.3isentered,consistentwiththeCTS.Thiswillensurethattheproperactionsaretakenifalossoffunctionoccurs.Assumingalossoffunctionhasnotoccurred,theadditionofthewords"ormore"areacceptablesince,duringthistin>esu5cientACandDCbusesareOperabletomeetaccidentanalysis(assumingnoadditionalsinglefailure).Inaddition,ifanACsubsystemanda120VACuninterruptiblesubsystemareinoperable,atotalof8hoursisprovidedinCTS3.8.3.1Actiona.ItorestorebothtoOPERABLEstatus.ITS3.8.8ACTIONSAandBwillalloweachinoperabilitytobetrackedseparately,allowingamaximumof16hourstorestorebothsubsystems(ittheACsubsystemandl20VACuninterruptiblesubsysteminoperabilitiesareseparatedby8hours).However,ITS3.8.8ACTIONFwillalsoensurethatifthisresultsinalossoffunction,thenIISLCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.Thisadditionaltimeisacceptablesinceduringthisadditional8hours,theunitcanstillmeetaccidentanalysisassumptions.Therefore,thesechangeswillhavenegligibleimpactonplantsafety.NMP2RevisionPQg

DISCI.JSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.9-DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMS-SHUTDOWNTEHNIALHANsES-MRERESTRI~IVE(continued)M.3InlieuofdeclaringtheHPCSSysteminoperableandtakingtheACI'IONSoftheappropriateLCOasrequiredbyCTS3.8.3.2Actionsa.2andb.2,newRequiredActionshavebeenprovidedforwhentheDivision3ACorDCdistributionsubsystemisinoperable,consistentwiththecurrentactionsforinoperableDivision1andDivision2ACandDCdistributionsubsystems(CTS3.8.3.2Actionsa.1andb.1).ITS3.8.9RequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2andA.2.3requiresuspensionot'OREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesecondarycontainment,andOPDRVs.TheseRequiredActionsareinorerestrictivethancurrentlyrequired,sinceCTS3.5.2ActionaonlyrequiresOPDRVstobesuspended(anditallows4hourstostartthisaction),andensureproperactionsaretakentocompensateforaninoperableHPCSSysten>.TECHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailsofCTS3.8.3.2relatingtosystemdesignandOPERABILITYareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.ThedetailsforsystemOPERABILITYarenotnecessaryintheLCO.ThedefinitionofOPERABILITYsuffices.ThedesigndetailsarenotnecessarytnbeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensuretheOPERABILITYottheDistributionSystemssinceOPERABILITYrequirementsareadequatelyaddressedinITS3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-Shutdown."lnaddition,thesourceofpowerforthe120-voltACdistributionpanelsisnotrequiredsincethecurrentdesignprovidesonlythosesourcesspecified(inverteroralternatesupply).Therefore,the.relocateddetailsarenotrequiredtoheintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlPrograindescribedinChapter5oftheITS.LA.2DetailsoftheinethodsforperformingCTS4.8.3.2.1and4.8.3.2.2(ontheswitchgear,loadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanels)toverifytherequiredDistributionSysten>sareOPERABLEareproposedtoberelocatedtotheBases.Thesedetails<<renotnecessarytoensuretheOPERABILITYoftheDistributionSystems.TherequireinentsofSpecification3.8.9andSR3.8.9.1areadequatetoensuretherequiredDistributionSystemsaremaintainedOPERABLE.SincetheniethodstoverifytheOperabilityofswitchgear,loadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanelsaredifferent(theswitchgearrequiresthevoltagetobeverifiedandtheloadcenters,MCCs,anddistributionpanelsrequireverificationthatnoinoperabilitystatusindicatorlightsinthecontrolroomarelitthatwouldindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftherequiredloadcenters,MCCs,ordistributionpanels),thetermpoweravailabilityhasNMP2RevisionsQii

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.8.9-DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMS-SHUTDOWNTEHNIALHANES-LESSRESTRICTIVELA.2(cont'd)beenusedtoreplacevoltageandinoperabilitystatusindicatorlights.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheBaseswillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsoftheproposedBasesControlProgramdescribedinChapter5oftheITS."Specific"NoneNMP2RevisionA

(c<)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEACSources-Operating3.8.1FREQUENCYSR3.8.1.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravaflab1lityforeach$requiredfoffeitecircuit7days$,it,i,i,q,>>,q)N3.S.1.2rg.l.lr>,<.y"+"AoMo+e.NOTsaiesPocisfAll06startsmaybeprecededbyan~ngfneprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.AmodifiedOGstartinvofngidlingandgradualaccelerfontosynchronousspeedmaybesedrthisSRasrecommendedbythmanufacturer.i(henmodif1staproceduresarenotusedetheti,voltage,andfrequencytoleranofSR3.8.1.7mustbemet.31kcggf'@geet'c4ZrJaClOVerifyeac06startsfromstandby~~ecffldfnondftionsandachfeveseTable.8.1voageVPfrequency2$58.HzRotor~'si~]+sa~L~>g~Ha~rbivisi~33Q~g(continued)376lIcubgge'?)v@ucg+~-$(.2.HSN/6STS3.8-6Rev1,N/07/95

ACSources-Operating3.8.ISURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYcO'.1.IE2.a,.'fPSR3.8.l.V.TE.E.(,a.e..qiN,++PSOONESTES1C.+f.)f.R..e.'LfAESXhPM'h8'.fI>.~.W"e"AR'SES&4't.2.e,'tFanomINOTES-l.AllOGstartsaaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperforaedfnNOEI,2,or3.However,creditNaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.Verifyonanactualorsieulatedlossofoffsftepowersignal:a.Oe-energfzatfonofeaergencybuses;b.Loadsheddingboaeaergencybuses;andc.OGauto-startsfromstandbyconditionand:ps'-gwkmonthsje$wOiu(:ioaSIa&~~EONfj)AQTA<S~O4r~g2.~a1l.energizesperaanentlyconnectedloadsfnSseconds,I3$02.enefzesauto-connectedshutdownoadaanc/3.aaintafnssteadystatevoltageVandSV,04.mintainsseadyfrequencyZ$58.8$HzandS$61.2$Hz,and5.supplfesperaanentlyconnectedandauto-connectedshutdownloadsfor~gQainute.(continued)RE'PNsssalgZ.@gal<(>~<~~~~<>Sa'~~)ester~<<'>E~3bQl7NR/6STS3.8-llRevI,OI/Ol/95

ACSources-Operating3.8.1SURVEILLNCEREIREHEHTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYHSR3.8.l.gPl.2.NOTESAll06startsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNSE1or2.However,creditsaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.AiuircIVerifyonanactualorsimlatedEmergencyCoreoolingSystem(ECCS)initiationgnaleacOGauto-startsfromstandbyconditionand:months'$<ouiauhb(gf~~g-'~~zova~'"<shod35+jd.ID<<<SrbaSle~>2owleopermanentlyconnectedloadsremainenergizedfroatheoffsitepowersyst'ndKOSGWpowersystn5l~secondsafterauto-stacavesvoageVand~i++~IF.<<b.nS'0sonserto-startsevesreuency~58.+HzandS$61.Hz;c.Operatesfor~Qminutes;Wre)v~~3-4cDrub$(0+f)Slbc)<(wG544)gl"~Vc,3%Bc)T/rr-Q58.5$H~k706s'cobDiu<si~Qgp(continued)BN/6STS3.8-12Rev1,Oi/07/95

z~)SURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTScontinuedISURVEILLANCEACSources-Operating3.8.1FREQUENCY+.c,j,<,~.uliSR3.8.1.NOTEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperfornedinNODE1,2,or3.,However,creditmaybetakenforunplannedeventatisfythisSR.isTFgga$~$ppQ$f'LVerify,witha06operatingfntestaodeandconnectedtoitsbus,anactualorsiaulatedECCSinitiationsignaloverridesthetestaodeby:Returning06toready-to-load0PH'lt108$;llld]t~~Autoaaticallyenergizingtheeiaergencyloadfroeoffsitepower.sonths$4S,l<x~r,i).lfsSR3.8.1.~TEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperfonaedin%DE1,2,or3.However,creditWaybetakenfn'annedeventsthat'satisfythisSR.~sTF-~erifyintervalbetweeneachsequencedloadblociswithinff10%ofdesigninterval/gforeachloadsequenceaonthsjCWM<cg,M'niede(qPcf<y(continued)BN/6STS3.8-16Rev1,Oi/07/95

Soul'cesOperating3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREUIREwENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.NOTESAll06startsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedfnNSEI,2,or3.However,creditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR./gal-gusf'gpp+gVerify,onanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsftepowersignalfnconjunctionwithanactualorsimulated.CCSinitiationsignal:months'b.ce6~4$ai>5Oe-energfzatfonofemergencybuses;Loadsheddingfroaemergencybuseand06auto-startsfromstandbycondftfonand+l.energizespermanentlyconnectedloadsfnS0$,seconds,'2.energizesauto-connectedemergencyloadse3.Q595&steadystatevoltageandSV,'f3%steadystarequency~$58.8j-Hzand~gl.2/Hz,and5.suppliespermanentlyconnectedandauto-connectedemergencyloadsfor2$5)minutes.Dt'4lS(~5fcdeaf2~~f(co'ntfnued)BN/6STS3.8-I7RevI,04/07/95 0

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGThisbracketedrequirementhasbeendeletedbecauseitisnotapplicabletoNMP2.Thefollowingrequirementshavebeenrenumbered,whereapplicable,toreflectthisdeletion.2.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.TheproperNMP2plantspecificnomenclature/valuehasbeenprovided.4.TheNMP2designissuchthatthelossofoneoffsitecircuitwillresultin,atmost,onlyDivisions1and3orDivisions2and3losingoffsitepower.WhenDivisions2and3arewithoutoffsitepower,theremainingdivision(DivisionI)hassufficientloadstomeettheaccidentconditions.Therefore,limitingthetimetorestoretheoffsitecircuitto24hoursisnotnecessary.Inaddition,thecurrentlicensingbasisdoesnotrequirethismorelimitingtiine.WhenanoffsitecircuitisinoperableanditresultsinthelossofoffsitepowertoDivisions1and3,thenbothHPCSandLPCSSystemsdonothaveoffsitepower.ThisconditionshouldbelimitedsincetheaccidentanalysisassumesatleastoneofthesetwosystemsisOperable.Therefore,theCompletionTimehasbeenn>odifliedtospecificallystatethatthe24hourtimeisapplicableonlywhenHPCSandLPCSSystemshavenooffsitepower.TheproperNMP2plantspecifiLCOnumberhasbeenprovided.ThewordinISTSSR3.8.1.19.c.3and4hasbeenchangedfrom"achieves"to"maintain"forconsistencywithISTSSR3.8.1.11.7.ISTSSR3.8.1.7requirestheDGstarttobetimedevery184days.AllotherDGstartsareallowedtobeperformedusingidlingandgradualaccelerationtosynchronousspeedasshowninISTSSR3.8.1.2Note3.TheNMP2DGvendordoesnotrecommendslowstartprocedures.AllDGstartsatNMP2involvestartingtheDGtosynchronousspeedwithinthetimeassumedintheaccidentanalysis.ThecurrentNMP2TechnicalSpecificationsreflectthisrequirement,inthatslowstartsarenotallowed.Therefore,thereisnoreasontomaintainaseparate184dayDGtestintheITS.ThusISTSSR3.8.1.7hasbeendeletedandthetimerequirementhasbeenaddedtoISTSSR3.8.1.2(ITSSR3.8.1.2).Duetothischange,Note3toISTSSR3.8.1.2isalsonotneededandhasnotbeenincludedinITSSR3.8.1.2,sincenoDGstartwillusemodifiestartprocedures.WhileISTSSR3.8.1.7didnotprovideawarmupallowanceduringthe184daytest,ISTSSR3.8.1.2Note2wasnotmodifiedtoprecludethewarmupperiodpriortoloadingonceper184daysbasedonanNRCRequestforAdditionalInformationcommentprovidedinanNRCletterdated5/10/99.Inaddition,TSTF-163modifiedthevoltageandfrequencyrangesthatmustbemetduringthe184daytest.SincethistestisnowessentiallyperformedinITSSR3.8.1.2,theTSTF-163changehasbeenadoptedinITSSR3.8.1.2.DuetothedeletionofISTSSR3.8.1.7,theremainingSRshavebeenrenumberedandISTSSR3.8.1.3Note4hasbeenmodifiedtodeletethereferencetoISTSSR3.8.1.7.NMP2RevisionPQB,

~JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATINGNote2toISTSSR3.8.1.14hasbeenrevisedtoperniitperformanceofthe24-hourloadtestinMODES1and2inaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheNMP2FacilityOperatingLicenseAmentlinentNo.64,datedMarch7,1995.ThisamendmentallowsperforinanceofthistestduringpoweroperationprovidedthattheotherremainingdieselgeneratorsareOperable.17.WhiletheNMP2designfortheDivision34.16kVemergencybusincludesaloadsheddingscheme,theloadsarere-energizedimmediatelyuponrestorationofpower;theloadsarenotsequencedbackontotheemergencybusesthroughloadtimers.Thus,eveniftheloadsarenotshed,theDGwillstilloperateandpickuploadswhenitre-energizestheemergencybus.Inaddition,theDivision3DGdoesnothaveanyauto-connectedshutdownloadsonalossofoffsitepower.Therefore,ISTSSR3.8.1.11,ISTSSR3.8.1.1,andISTSSR3.8.1.19havebeenmodifiedtoexcludetheserequirementsforDivision3.ThemaintainingofpermanentlyconnectedloadsenergizedfronitheoffsitecircuitisnotrequiredtobetestedfortheDivision34.16kVen>ergencybusduringtheLOCAtest.TheNMP2designfortheDivision34.16kVeinergencybusdoesnotincludeanyadditionalpermanentlyconnectedloadsthatarenotadequatelytestedbyITSSR3.8.1.9,theLOOPtest,andITSSR3.8.1.17,theLOCA/LOOPtest.Theconnectionoftheauto-connectedeniergency(LOCA)loadsontotheDivision34.16kVemergencybusisnotdependentuponthesourceofthepowersupplytothe4.16kVemergencybus.Theeinergencyloadsareconnectedinanidenticalinanner,regardlessofwhetherthepowersupplytothe4.16kVemergencybusistheDGoranoffsitecircuit.TheproperoperationoftheDivision3auto-connectedemergencyloadsisverifiedbyITSSR3.8.1.17,theLOCA/LOOPtest.Therefore,ISTSSR3.8.1.12hasbeeninodifiedtoexclu(letheserequirementsforDivision3.TheNMP2designfortheDivision34.16kVemergencybusonlyincludesonemajorloadblock,theHPCSpump.Therefore,ISTSSR3.8.1.18hasbeenmodifiedtoexcludethisrequirementforDivision3.Thesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis,whichdoesnotincludetheserequireinentsintheCTS.NMP2RevisionPCQQ

BatteryCellParaoeters3.8.6Table3.8.6-1(pageIofI)BatteryCellPara<<eterRequire<<antsCATEGORYA:LIMITSFOREACH~CAEGORYB:DESIGNATEDPILOTLIMITSFOREACCELLCONNECTEDCELLCATEGORYC:LIMITSEACHCONNECTEDCELLElectrolyteLevel>Miniaalevel>Minimalevelindication<<ark,indication<<ark,andg4inchand55inchabove<<axialabove<<axial1eve)indicationlevelindication<<ark(a)Abovetopofplates,andnotoverflowingFloatVoltageZ2.13VR2.13V>2.07VSpecificGravity<b)(c),2.60hQI.IAverageofallconnectedcells>@.2Notsottthan0.020be1owaverageofa11connectedcellshKAverageofallconnectedcellsh$1.1(a)Itisacceptablefortheelectrolyteleveltote<<porarilyincreaseabovethespecifiedaaxiaalevelduringequalizingchargesprovideditisnotoverflawing.'b)Correctedforelectroletratureandleveleveconnorecsca<<pswhenanflcharge.(c)Abatterychargingcurrentof<)2~swhenanfloatchargeisacceotablefar<<ectingspecificgravityli<<itsfollowingabatteryrecharge,fora<<axialof$7ays.Nenchargingcurrentisusedtosatisfyspecificgravityrequire<<ents,specificgravityofeachconnectedcellshallbe<<easuredpriortoexpirationofthe7$dayallowance.IBN/6STS3.8-36Rev1,N/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS3.8.6-BATTERYCELLPARAMETERSThebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformation/valuehasbeenprovided.2.Theword"values"inthethirdConditionofConditionBhasbeenchangedto"limits"tomorecloselymatchtheLCOdescription.Inaddition,theword"Allowable"inTable3.8.6-1hasbeendeletedtobeconsistentwiththemannerinwhichCategoryC"Limits"aredescribedintheACTIONS.Thiswillalsoavoidconfusionwiththeterm"AllowableValue"usedintheInstrun>entationSection.3.ThesecondandthirdFrequenciesofSR3.8.6.2havebeenn>odifiedtorequiretheparameterstobeveritiedwithin7daysafterthebatterydischarge/overchargeevent,inlieuoftheISTSrequirementsot24hoursafterthebatterydischarge/overchargeevent.IEEE-450(the1980,1987,and1995versions)onlyrequiretheverificationtobeperformed;itdoesnotstatethetiinelimitforperforiningtheverification.Therefore,thetimespecitiedintheNMP2CTSisbeingniaintained(i.e.,thistimeisconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis).4.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.5.Thewords"andfollowing"havebeenaddedtofootnote(a)toallowtheelectrolyteleveltobetemporarilyabovethelimitfollowingtheequalizechargeaswellasduringthecharge.AsstatedintheBasesforthisfootnote(inTable3.8.6-1description),IEEE-450recoininendsthatelectrolytelevelreadingsnotbetakenuntil72hoursaftertheequalizecharge.Thisallowstimet'ortheelectrolytetemperaturetostabilizeandthelevelreadingtobea"true"reading.Withouttheaddedwords,thelimitmaynotbemetuponcompletionot'hechargeandunnecessaryACTIONSwouldhavetobetaken.6.Theallowancetonotcorrectspeciticgravityforelectrolytelevelwhenchargingcurrentis(2ampswhenthebatteryisonfioatchargehasnotbeenadoptedintheITS.Thisisconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis,whichalwaysrequiresspecificgravitytobecorrectedforelectrolytelevel.NMP2RevisionjQI3

BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1<~edge-~Gc~Gi;~~~~.~,(p()~~+~<M4h4'(i~(Pc(c)~$e.w5Section3.,CS;andSection3.6,ContainmentSystems.TheOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheunit.ThisincludesmaintainingtheonsiteoroffsiteACsourcesOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionsintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsitepowerorallonsiteACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.Rcfereucz7ACsourcessatisfytherequirementsofCriterion3ofcyaemen.LCOTwoqualifiedcircuitsbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClasslEDistributionSstem,athreeseparateandindependentDGsan,ensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowerosuownereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(A00)orapostulatedDBA.qualifiedoffsitecircuitsarethosethataredescribedineARandarepartofthelicensingbasisfortheunit.Prow9ep5'k4/Ng'r'abc,Q'4$~Q~f'~gfvcsarbHddition,[onerequiredtomaticloadsequencerrESFbusallbeOPERABLE.Ineral,Division3doesnhaveadsequencersinceitsonlyonelargeload(i.e.,theighpressurecoresp(HPCS)pump).InsuchcasestheLChouldrefertotheision1and2sequencersonly.~I<kyEachoffsitecrcumustbecapableofmaintaininratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingreuroasurinanccident,whileconnectedtotheose'LCD-K%2lhcircuitconsolssoincomingbreakerdisIC7g)cbl8specveservicetransformersandtetransformers,andheresptivecircuitpatncudingfeederbreakerstothe4.16kVbuses."%r<<<r2.ABsy)'~Z,Sf'-gsqA,(continued)CH4f9gucyau)~SS-XIBW+6STSB3.8-3Iulk,Q~t~~~gu~cidg0((~)~~~<<~re.,'4Ol<PAai~g>Rev1,04/07/95

LCO(cont1nued)/loACSources-OperatingB3.8.1lt'tssnccnodso~a.~.T]e>e<~Fi>~-54stEachDGestbecapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnect1ngto1tsrespectiveESFbusondetectionofbusundacuoltaga.lssequenceestbeQBace~sensecondEachDGaustalsobecapableofaccept1ngrequ1redloadswithintheassuaedOff.fc'Jloadingsequenceintervals,andestcontinueooperateuntiloffsftepeercanberestoredtotheuses.escapabil1tiesarerequiredtobemtfroaavarietyof1n1tfalcond1tionssuchasDGfnstandbyefthenginehotandDGinstandbyeftheng1neatambientcond1tfons.AdditionalDGcapabf1ftfesestbedlaonstratedtoeeetrequiredSurvefllances,e.g.,capabilityoftheDGtoreverttostandbystatusonanECCSsignalwhileoperatingfnparallel~testaode.Propersequenc1ngofloads,includingtrippingofnonessentialloads,1sarequiredfunctionforDGOPERABILITY.TheACsourcesfnonedfvfsfonaustbeseparateandindependent(totheextentpossible)oftheACsourcesfntheotherd1vfsfon(s).FortheDGs,theseparat1onandindependencearecoeplete.FortheoffsiteACsources,theseparationandindependencearetotheextentpractical.APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesuenarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNXKSI,2,and3toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlflftsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylfaftsarenotexceededasaresultofADOsorabnoraaltransients;andb.AdequatecorecoolingfsprovidedandcontafnaentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunct1onsareaafntafnedfntheeventofapostulatedMA.ANotehasbeenaddedtakingexceptiontotheApplfcabf1ftyrequfreaantsforDivision3sources,providedtheHPCSSystemfsdeclaredinoperable.ThisexceptionfsintendedtoallowdeclaringoftheD1vfsfon31noperableeitherinlieuofdeclaringtheDivision3sourceinoperable,'oratanytfeesubsequenttoenteringACTIONSforan1noperableDfvfsfon3source.Thisexception1sacceptables1nce,~1ththe01vfsfon3inoperableandtheassociatedACTIONS(cont1nued)SN/6STSRevI,04/07/95

~((:

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1ACTIONS(continued)5iiver)cp(Qs+gvcf4hPci~k,.s4s6AccordingtoeguoryGuide1.93(Ref.,operationmaycont1nuefnCondition8foraper1odthatshouldnotexceed72hours.Igondftfong,thereaafnfngOPERABLEOGsandoffsftecfrcuftsareadequatetosupplyelectrfcalpowertotheonsfteClass1Edistributionsystea.'he72hourCeepletfonTfmtakesintoaccauntthecapacityandcapabilityofthereaafnfngACsources,reasonabletilneforrepairs,andlawprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod+ThesecondC~letfanTiaraforRequ1redAct1onB.i(establ1shedalfaftontheaaxfaatfaeallowedforanycoebfnatfonofrequiredACpowersourcestobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtoeiettheLCO.IfCondition8isenteredwhile,forinstance,anoffs1tecircuitfsfnaperableandthatc1rcuftfssubsequentlyrestoredOPERABLE,theLCOsayalreadyhavebeennotsetforupto72hours.Thissituationcouldleadtaatotalof144hours,sinceinitialfailuretoeeettheLCO,torestoretheDG.Atthistive,anoffsftecfrcu1tcouldagainbee~inoperable,theDGrestoredOPERABLE,andanadditional72hours(foratotalof9days)allowedpriortocoepleterestorationoftheLCO.The6.dayC~letfonTfmprovidesalfaftonthetfmallowed1naspecff1edcondft1onafterdiscoveryoffailuretoeeettheLCO.This1)aft.fsconsfderedreasonablefor.s1tuatfonsfnwhichConditionsAandBareenteredconcurrently.The'59'onnectorbetweenthe72hourand6dayCoapletfonTfaesscansthatbothCaepletfonTiesapplysimultaneously,andthemrerestr1ctfveCoapletfonTfaeestbemt.RequiredAct1on5.2,theCoepletfonTfmallowsforanexceptiontothenoraal'tfaezeroforbeginningtheallowedoutagetfae'clock.'hisexcept1onresultsfnestablishingthe'tfmzeroatthetfaatheLCOwasinitiallynoteat,insteadoftheticeConditionBwas~ntered.RequiredActionC.1addressesactionstobetakenfntheeventofconcurrentfailureofredundantrequiredfeatures.RequiredAct1onC.1reducesthevulnerabilitytoalossofBN/6STSB3.8-10(continued)Rev1,04/07/95

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1aprSURVEILLANCEREgUIRENEHTS(continued)NevetheSRsd1scussedhereinspecifyvoltageandfrequetolerances,thefollowingsugaryfsapplicable.The<<infaasteadystateoutputvoltageof'isofthenominal4160Vauutvoltage.Thisvaue,cispecnAHS.(Re.Q),allowsforvoltagedroptotheter<<fnalsof4000V<<atarswhose<<fnf<<uaoperatingvoltageisspec1ffedas$5,or3600V.Italsoallowsforvoltagedropsto<<otorsandotherequfp<<entdawnthroughthe120Vlovelwhere<<fnfaaoperatingvoltagefsa1sousuallyspecifiedas9%ofna<<eplaterating.Thespecified~370aaxfaasteadystateoutputvoltageofsequaltothe<<axfaaoperat1ngvoltagespecifiedor4000V<<otors.Itensuresthatfora11ghtlyloadeddfstr1but1onsyste<<,(thevoltageattheterminalsof4000V<<otorsfsno<<orethanthe<<axfaaratedaperatfngvoltages.Thespec1fied<<fnfaaand<<axialfrequenc1esoftheDGare58.8Hzand61.2Hz,respectively.Thesevaluesanequaltoi2%ofthe60Hzno<<fnalfrequencyandareder1vedfra<<thenc~ndatfonsgiven1nRegulatoryguide1.9(Ref.9).IiIThfsSRensurespropercircuitcontfnu1tyfortheoffsiteACelectricalpowersupplytotheonsftedistributionnetworkandavailabilityofoffsfteACelectricalpower.Thebreakeralign<<entver1f1esthateachbreaker1sfn1tscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloadsareconnectedtotheirpreferredpowersourceandthatappropriateindependenceofoffsftecircuits1saafntafned.TheTdayFnquencyfsadequatesincebreakerpositionisnotlikelytochangewithouttheoperatorbeingawareofftandbecauseftsstatusfsdisplayed1nthecontrolroae.Shghetoensuretheavaflabflftyofthestandbyelectricalpowersupplyto<<ftfgateDBAsandtransientsand~afntafntheunitfnasafeshutdowncondft1an.$STo<<fnf<<fzethewearon<<ovfngpartsthatdonogetlubrfcatedwhentheengitSbeen<<odfffedbNote@ftondfcateatallDQstartsfarthurs@,4(continued)NR(6STSB3.8-16RevI,04/Oj/95

><<~'ko~tNfhe~eo~CSources-Operatingearo~gf,~PG,+<~>g(B3.8.1<(0~'//4'g4~sgCeSURVEILLANCEREQUIRENENTS(continued)Survefllancegsaybeprecededbyanengfneprelubeperfo+<CPfollowedbyawarmupperiodriortoloadfn.D>vtgioiat.PG>>~Forthepurposesofthistesesarestartedroestandbycondft1ons.StandboitionsforaDGseanthatthed1eseleng1necoolantflarebeincontfnuouslcirculatedandteaperatureisaananconssentwithaanufacturerreconditions.ordertoreducessandwearondiesel~ines,soae.facturersrec~nditthestartingspeedDGsbelfa,thatwares'eaftedtothislowerspandthitbegraduallyaccecratedtosynchronousspepriortolod.ThesestartpeduresaretheintentofNotechfsonlyapplfclewhensuchproceduresirecommendedytheaanufactureSR3.8.1.requirestharectheD6stirtsboastandbycondfonsandach1evesrequredvoltageandfrequencywithin10seconds.The]0secondstartntsrtstheassinthedesfbasisanass..e14ssartrequrenenotoSR3.8.1.(seeNoteoSR3.8.1.2)whenaaodffiedstaprocedureasdes1bedabovefsu;Ifaaodfffedartfsnotused,e10secondstartrequfreaontoSR3.8.1.7app11.SinceSR3.8.1doesrequirea10secondstart,itaorerestrfivethanS3.8.1.,and1tlaybeoreadtnlieuof.8.1.2.1sureseenote5R,3&4>3.l.T~F453~31diyFrequencyforSR3.8.1.25consistentwithRegulato6ufde1.9(Ref..~iy~~~saFprovfadequateassuranceofDQOPERABILITY,l5whileafnefzfngdegradationresultingfroatesting.klLZJLLXTh1sSurveillancedmons8atesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronfzfngandacceptingeui(continued)BN/6STS83.8-17Rev1,04/07/95O.teogcpP<o)tna+c.fyerjviv~fea45a+44<~<A45poM~ug4+Q~4~<c~si~c+iwp.~

ACSources-OperatingB3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREgVIREtlENTS(cont1nued)b.PerformanceoftheSRF111notcauperturbationstooftheelectricaldistributionsteasthatcouldretinachallengetosteadystateerat1onortoplanafetysysteas;andc.PerformnoftheSR,orfa11ureoftheSR,F111notcause,orultin,anAOOQthattendantchlengetoplantsafssteas.C.Z.~,l0MC~Cv'$s~+loi>Pen~~c~gl+e~col'sAIaa.as(0f.lP)+4c$,XQsecs~~$V~CEaPc-P>~<~~,~~7+~~++Allowobfe~f~C.fico3,).l.t)nak~l~l~R"CSIl60lvlsfg~garah,th1sSurve1llancedeamstratestheasesgnoperat1onofthestandbypeersourcesduringlossoftheoffsitesource.Thistestverif1esallactionsoaJlpgencounteredfreethelossofoffs1ter,includishedd1ngofthenonessentialloadznoftheemergencybusesandrespect1ve1oadsfroetheOC.Itfurtherdeaestratesthecapab111tyoftheOCtoautoeaticallyach1evetherequ1redvoltageandfrequencye1th1nthespecif1edtice.L3e~'fTheOCauto-stat1mofsecondsisderivedfern1reaentsoftheccidentanalysis452%$855toaesign5TheSurve111anceshouldbe('csPa&continuedforaa1niaeof5ainutesinordertodeaonstratethatallstart1ngtransientshavedecayedandstabilityhasbeenach1eved.(o'~;>...(.~z-i)Therequ1toverifytheconnect1onpliersupplyofperaanenauto-connectedloadssntindedtosatisfactor1lyshe>therelat1onsh1poftheseloadstotheOCloadinglogic.Incerta1ncircumstances,aanyoftheseloadscannotactuallybeconnectedorloadedwithoutunduehardshiporpotent1alforundesiredoperat1on.For1nstance,ECCS1tgect1onvalvesarenotdesiredtobestrokedopen,systmsarenotcapableofbeingoperatedatfullflar,orR}Isystemsperformingadecayheatreaovalfunctionarenotdesiredtobe-.ea11gnedtotheECCSaodeofoperation.Inlieuofactualdeeonstrationoftheconnectionandloadingoftheselolh,testingthatadequatelysheethecapab111tyof)heOCsysteatoperforaNR/6STSS3.8-24(cont1nued)RevI,04/07/95

SVRVEILLNCEREgUIRBl9lTSAC~bc>'~)(~/ban~(cont1nued)ACSources-0perating1B3.8.f<+<~IP&fc~h~$eeI>+f4r4d+~~Mdowe@P~~s~~rceloadinglogicforloadingontooffs1tepower.Incertaincircumstances.aanyoftheseloadscannotactuallybeconnectedorloadedwithoutunduehardshiporpotentialforundes1redoperation.Forinstance,ECCSin)ectionvalvesarenotdesiredtobestrokedopen,systemsarenotcapableofbeingoperatedatfullflow,orRHRsystemsperformingadecayheatrivalfunctionarenotdesiredtoberealignedtotheECCSaodeofoperation.Inlieuofactualdeeonstrationoftheconnectionandloadingoftheseloads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapab111ty0systeatoperforathesefunctionsisacceptable.<Th1stesingaayincludeanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisveified.TheFrequencyofeonQtakesintoconsiderationplanconditionsrequiredtoperforatheSurveillanc~intendedtobeconsistentwiththeexpectedfueccl>>lengths.asateseuallypasstheSRperforaedattf18anth]requency.ThereforetheFrequencyocyvseoO+IaThisSRisaodffiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonorteNote1istoainiaizewearandtearontheQQsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theOCamatbestartedfrystandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginecoolantanoilbeingcontinuouslycirculatedandteeperatureaaintainedconsistentwithaanufacturerre~ndations.ThereasonforNote2isthatduringoperationwiththereactorcritical,perforateofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistr1butionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadystateoperat1onand,asaresult,plantsafetysysteas.Cred1tsaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.7sTF-bCp45)sgsg+~I6L~gulA$rryQv)Ag(,g(Rap,ft)pmrpre>NJC.,X,a.i>j/hisSurveillancedemonstratesthatDCnon-criticalprotectivefunctions(~.g.,high)acketwaterteeperature)arebypassedonalossofvoltagesignalconcurrentwithanECCS1nitiationtestsignalandcriticalprotectivefunctions(engineoveri~generatordifferentialcurrencLwaC(cont1nued)83.8-26Rev1,04/07/S5

ACSources-ShutdownB3.8.2PCfe,rsiC,SW+yo>8NErge~c~cLU)qlysbyy64isif/peyeessty2-ABS-xl)+4<Vmpcc.t'iqaRAT)f-VAIA~~RTx"XSRISpn~)'Xh85-XIgintervals,andestcontinuetoorateuntiloffsiteowerber9eccanberestoredtotheses~esecapesarerequiredtobesetfroaavarietyof1nitialconditionssuchis:06instandbywiththeenginehotandDGinstandbywiththeengineatambientconditions.Add1t1onal06capabilitiesaustbedeaonstratedtoaaetrequiredurveillances,e.g.,capabi11tyoftheDGtoreverttotandbystatusonanECCSsignalwhileoperatinginparalleltestlaode.+Ibq<~q'-sQr(4'~g'~~44~g~p,)'+<DCIyFuisy%ogA/lleyL4.VIfpW~LCOg3gpe-.Pb"+~C<OP)Znf7be~stab'pse.LCObusrequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8,ensuresadiverse(continued)powersourceisavailabletoprov1deelectricalpowersupport,assuaingalossoftheoffsitecircuit.Sialilarly,whenthehighpressurecorespray(HPCS)isrequiredtobeOPERABLE,aseparateoffsitecircuittotheD1vision3ClassIEonsiteelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,oranOPERABLEDivision3DG,ensuresanadditionalsourceofpowerfortheHPCS.ThisadditionalsourceforDivision3.isnotnecessarilyrequiredtobeconnectedtobeOPERABLE.EitherthecircuitrequiredbyLCOIteaa.,oracircuitrequ1redtosettLCOIteNc.saybeconnected,wjththesecondsourceavailableforconnection.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredoffsitecircu1t(s)and06(s)ensuretheavailabilityofsufficientACsourcestooperatetheplantinasafeaannerandtoaitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlinaccidents,reactorvesseldraindown).+.~.asSS4/Qqy'e,Ssy4SbaA'i)Thequalifiedoffsitecircuit(s)austbecapableofaaintaininratedfrequencyandvoltagewhileconnectedtoerrespecbus(es),andofacceptingrequ1redloadsdurianaccident.qualifiedoffsitecircuitsareosetatareescrneandarepartofthelicensinbasisfortheplant./Theoffsitecircuitconsofincaeingbreakerandsconnecttoe*.spect1vservicetransforaersandzRex.xSreiBtransforaers,andterespeivecircu)tpathincludingfeederbreakerstoallq.16kYbusessequibyLCO3.8..+QQSq~Therequiredcapableosarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespectivebusondetectionofbusundervoltage,andacceptingrequiredloads.ThissequenceestbeaccoaplishedwithinsecondEach06estalsobecapableofaccepting2.requoadswithintheassuaedloadinsequenceBN/6STSB3.8-37RevI,N/07/95

ACSources-Shutdown83.8.2LCOcontinued)~~<<<Warp~ryus5~~~<<vJaggg4-.~hOlg..fe0p~~4>fpl44tk>89bg-'~'")~9~re),,~g)re<(Sorea)LCfgggulWgvcQa4Propersequencingofos,ncngtrippingofnon1~1loads,sarequiredfunctionforRABILITY~Inddftion,properoisffsitec1rcuitOPERABILITYsartan1ntaiLEbLCO3-Itisacceptablefordivisionstobecrosstiedduringshutdownconditions,peraittingasingleoffsiteowerircu1ttosulyallrequireddivisions.[Hostranse'7capsres~sbeconsideredPERABLEescr1pceSafetyalyses,inteentofanaccidentringshutdown,thearedesignedmaintaintheplant1acondit1onsuchat,evenwithangleailuwillnotin1tAPPLICABILITYTheACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNOES4and5andduringmovementofirrad1atedfuelassembliesintheQ)~a~aE35iecondarygcontainmentprovideassurancethat:a.Systems'oprovideadequatecoolantinventorymakeupareavailableforthe1rradiatedfuelinthecoreincaseofaninadvertentdraindownofthereactorvessel;b.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;c.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamagedur1ngshutdownareavailable;andd.Instnaentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheunitinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.TheACpowerrequirementsforNOESI,2,and3arecoveredinLCO3.8.1.NR/6STSB3.8-38(continued)RevI,04/07/95

'01eselFuel011,LubeOil,andStartingA1r83.8.3SNVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS7hogj~e~gt&OilS~~POla.a+1s~a~of04ee~,'eo',l~~hve~oge>~~,loc~bp,(continued)providedandun1toperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloildur1ngthisperiod.W~0~Ptas~)tow(~6ovef~ThisSurveillanceensuresthatsufficientlubeoiinventorc-.4d.,~isavailabletosupportatleast7daysoffulloadPlI'ss'hub,operat1onforeachDQ.QgogiprequireaengPbasedon<,~~~e4'anufacturer'sconsumptionvaluesfortheruntimofthe06.Implicit1nthisSRistherequiremnttover1fyxRt5thecapabilitytotransferthelubeoilfloeitsstlocationtotheDGwhentheDQlubeoils~onotholdadequateinventoryfor7daysoffullloadoperationw1thoutthelevelreach1ngtheaanufacturer'srecoaaendedainiaualevel.A31dayFrequencyisadequatetoensurethatasufficientlubeo11supplyisonsite,sinceDCstartsandruntimsarecloselyaonitoredbytheplantstaff.o$n~bPo(/'-~"psssks~S'hetestajareamansofdeterainingwhethernewfueloilisoftheappropriategradeandhasnotbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatweldhaveanimmediatedetrimntali~acton.dieselenginecombustionandoperation.Ifresultsfreethesetestsarew1thinacceptableliaits,thefuelo11aaybeaddedtothestoragetankswithoutconcernforcontaainatingtheent1revolumoffueloilinthestoragetanks.Thesetestsaretobeconductedr1ortoaddingthenewfueltothetaegtanksnctweence1tnceests,liaits,andappcableASTIStandardsareasollows:b.5~lethenewfueloilinaccordancewithAS'4057-f3:Ref.);\Veifinrdaeththetestsspecifn7),+(Qthaseasanabsolutespeciicgravityat60/60'FofC0.83and50.89/or~anAPIgravityat60'Fof?2andS3(x)I(cont1nued)BN/6STSB3-8-47RevI04/07/95oFCond~~

DieselFuelOil,Lube011,andStartingAirB3.8.3SNVEILLANGKREOUIRBKlfTSWitLfh,7)day>+)I~;oddf't'o~d<Le~e~Sv~to>ltot)g.Qg,)Ofti~P~a+yg)l7(continued)kfneaatfcviscosityati0'Cofhls9centfstokesandS4.1centfstokes;.andaflashpointofh125'F;andc.VerifythatthenewfueloflhaslearandbrfhtappealanceroctesnaccoancenitsAtlnhol~p(nsf.t~gFailuretoeeetanyoftheabovelfaftsfscausefor~ectingthenewfueloil,butdoesnotrepresentafailuretoeeettheLNsfncethefueloilfsnotaddedtothestoragetanks.(Pollonlngthslnltlslnsnfooloilssnpls.thefueloilisanalyztoestablishthattheoherpropertfesspecifiedfnTableIofASTN097~(Ref.aeorfueloilwhentestedfnaccordancewithD97.$(Ref.5)exceptthattheanberforeadinccordancewithDl-$.orD25$(Ref.4).3ldayperfsacceptablebecausethefueloilfinterest,even1fnotwithinstatedlfafts,wounothaveanSfaeedfateeffectonDCoperation.ThisSurveillanceensurestheavailabilityofhigh'ualityfueloilforthe06s.Fueloildegradatfonduringlongtarestorageshowsupasan.increasefnpartfculate,aostlyduetooxfdat1on.Thepresenceofparticulatedoesnotmanthatthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyfnadieselengine.However,thepart1culatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueloilflectionequipment,whichcancauseeng1nefailure.78Particulateconcentrationsshoubeteined1naccordancewfthASTNDR27f4j,NethodA(Ref..Th1saethodinvolvesagravfeatrfcdeterafnatfonoftotaparticulateconcentration1nthefueloilandhasa1faitofl0ay/1.Itfsacceptabletoobtainafieldsaapleforsubsequentlaboratorytestffnlieuoffieldtesting.5ueoilfstafned1norsore1erconnectanktbeconsiandtest~grateTheFrequencyofthisSurveillancetakesintoconsfderat1onfueloildegradatfontrendsfndfcat1ngthatparticulate(continued)SN/5STS83.8-48RevI,04/07/95

(g~).],(Qi~Qe~ypf~e~q<gg,+DCSources-Operating83.8.iP+c~<Gschal-ge,+sf'e~~egs'Ke(~,'nues~gg,)SNVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSnor~~tIg<5Cd.ff<Ovhan~TE4dubs&+~"Oc.c~d&~eQctuS<o,r'oai6efp~r+'~'"y,~g~*s~~~~Qam~~~(continued)re5sillateddutycconssrae,neainuteratepushedforthebatteryorthelargestcurrentloadofthedutcycle,followedbythetestrateeaployedforthepeoraanctest,ichenvelothedutccleoftheservicetest.Sincetheashore-ourseoovyaraoneainutedischargerepresentsaverysaallport1onofthebatterycapacity,thetestratecanbechangedtothatfortheperforaancetestwithoutcoapraaisingtheresultsoftheperforaancedischargetest.Thebatteryterminalvoltagefortheaodifiedperforaancedischargetestshouldnaain(abovtheainiaabatteryterminalvoltagespecified1ntheatteMBBRatestforthedurat1onoftiaeequaltothato~ettatest.Acodifieddischargetestisatestofthebatterycapacityanditsabilitytoprovideahighrate,shortdurat1onload(usuallythehighestrateofthedutycycle).ThisAlloftenconfirathebattery'sabilitytoaeetthecriticalriodoftheloaddutcycle,inadd1tiontodeterainingtspercenage4apacity.Initialconditionsfortheaodifiedperfomancedischargetestshouldbeident1caltothosespecifiedforatesteThereasonforNote2isthatperforaingtheSurveillance'ouldreeovearequiredOCelectr1calparersubsysteafreeservice,perturbtheelectricaldistribut1onsystea,and~challeng~safetysystoes.Creditsaybetakenforunplanned~ventsthatsatisfytheSurveillance.X~LLJt'T~Q~4+<dopf~LAbatteryperforsancedischargetestisatestofconstantcunentcapacityofabattery,noraallydoneintheasfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacitydeterminedbytheacceptancetest.Thetestis1ntendedtodeteraineoverallbatterydegradatiollduetoageandusageAbattecodifiedperforaancedischargetest1s4QKKSHP0r...EitherthebatteryperforaancedischargetestorsodiedperforaancedischargetestisBN/6STS83.8-58(continued)RevI,N/07/95

BatteryCellParameters83.8.6(continued)SURVEILUSCEREtgIRENBiTSCategoryCdefinestheliaitforeachconnectedcell.Thesevalues,althoughreduced,prov1deassurancethatsuff1cientcapac1tyex1ststoperformtheintendedfunct1onandmfntainaaarginofsafety.i/henanybatteryparaseterisoutsidetheCategoryCliait,theassuranceofsuffic1entcapacitydescribedabovenolongerexists,andthebatteryestbedeclaredinoperable.TheCategoryCliaitspecifiedforelectrolytelevel(abovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing)ensuresthattheplatessuffernophysicaldaaageandaaintainadequateelerontransfercapab111ty.TheCategoryCforfloatvoltageisbasedonIEEE-450.cstaesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelow,underoatconditionsandnotcausedbyelevatedtaaperatureofthecell,indicatesinternalcellproblemandnayrequirecellreplac2TheCatryClsitofaveragespecificavity(h),'isbasedonaarefactureomendations(0.020beowthestnuficture+recedfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Inadditiontothat11Iit,itisthatthespecificgravityforeachconnectedcellerstbenothan0.020belowtheaverageofaconnectedcels.Thislieht~~ectof/agycaornewcdoesnotkoverdrabatoftbaeh~'+Snllli'C~(/,><~nh~&E'snEn,jERV<<~,"(re,/bK&PlFlotf'PJyCGflCE'l~she,~,i/g(lgh~v,.~ph7~Esho+i5~ThefootnotestoTable3.8.6-1thatapplytospecificgrav1tyare.applicabletoCategoryA,B,andCspecific&K""'"'4~'onnssndnsentionedcorrectirolelevelandtratuceponthatlelcorreconnorequwhenbattchargingcurrenisd.'2aapsonflocharge.Thiscurrenrovides,ingene1,an1ndicationooveralltterycondiBecauseofspecificgravitygradientsthatareproducedduringtherechargingprocess,delaysofseveraldaysNayoccurwhileforthespecificgravitytostabilize.szedchargcurrentisanacceptablealternativetospecificgravityaeasureeantfordetemintngthestateofchnsgn.Thisshoo~nonlsdlscnssndlnEEEE-l50(RfnI'onwjcsnDigE-(continued)NR/6STSB3.8-70RevI,04/07/95

Olstrlhot1onSystens-Operat1n@APPLlCABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ssg<Par.~s)lsd+fuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlfaftsarenotexceeded.Theselfaftsared1scussedinmorcdetailtntheBasesforSection3.2,PowerDistributionLfaits;on;andSection3.6,ContainmentSystems.I'~TheOPERABILITYOfsheAC,,OCannACe5XXlrOOPelestrlcalJpowerd1strfbutfonsystemfsconsistentw1ththeinftialassertionsoftheaccidentanalysesandfsbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasfsoftheplant.Thisincludes~afntatnfngtheACandDCelectricalpeersourcesandassociateddtstrtbutfonsysteesOPERABLEduringaccidentcondftfonsfntheeventof:(a.Anassuaedlassofalloffs1teoronstteACelectricalpeer;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.khfIITheAC,OC,andAC40giERhelectricalpowerdfstr1buttansystemssatisfyCriterion3of.nt.<rrv4sw~+3iOrerrff~88-((r.<-~.g+tag(gc'rsroaNgc'bc.,QAA~4V$Q"up/'g(~~"~Pow~4'sP;g5~STherequiredAC,,andACCRXKhtnpowerdistributionsubsystemslistedfnTableB3.81ensuretheavailabflitofAC,OC,and~~i@lectcapoweroresyseasfredtodawnthereaandaafntafnft1nasafecoonaranancpaoperationaloccurrenceAOO)0.v's:.-1araostulatedDBA.TheDtvfsfon1,2,and3AQ3~~z.electricalpeerprtaarydistributionsubsteesarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.NalntafnlnotheOlelslonI,3,aon3ACA~OC,ACtelectricalpowerdistr)buttonsubsysteasOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFtsnotdefeated.AnytwoofthethreedfvfsfonsofthedfstrfbuttonsystemarecapableofprovidingthenecessaryelectricalpowertatheassactatedESFcaeponents.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithintheelectrtcalpowerdtstrtbutfonsubsyst~doesnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.OPERABLEAC@electrfcalpeerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbusestobeenergizedtothe1rprooervoltages.OPERABLEOCelectricalpowerdistribution(continued)~8/6STSB3.8-B2Rev1,04/01/g5 7l~'~i DistributionSysteas-Operat1ng83.8,~~q~,~,~66g(y,pgg,N.SL<6pYaalunctoninanypaverdistributionsubsysteafroepropagatingtotheredundantsubsystea,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsysteaandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanytiebreakersareclosed,thePfgip~electricalrdistributionsubssteaspOINyareconsideredinoperable.Thisappl1estotheonsite,safetyrelated,redundantelectricalpeerd1stribut1onsubsysteas.Itdoes-not,heaver,precluderedundantClassIEi.16kVsesfrybeingpeeredfroethesaaeoffs1tecircuit.Chery~~~ftwttt8Qp~Hcsr'hot'WSou~(j~i+4.f~4<gjhs~t~(744%IV'gvdc4(sr~~z$h4h5441)>~LCOsubsysteasrequirethessoc1atedbusestobeenergizedto(cont1nved)theirpropervoltageroeeithertheassociatedbatteryorcharger.OPERABLECX~yelectricalpowerdistributionosubsysteasrequiretheassoc1atedbusestobeeneizedŽ~Pe"'>theirpropervoltagefrytheassociated'veervacv4,h~invertedDCvoltaeinverterusinginternalACsource,orClassIEnatransfonaaQ.Inaddition,tiebreakersbetweenaetyrelatedpeerdisronsubsysteas~aaopen".ThisreventsanelectricaTAPPLICABILITYrfHtfCnUilag~mal~kc~pc(M4t?oval<;~ccp4b(e.efacfm(pyupJ-Qy+jgatloPgibq~~gcre<~feb.TheelectricalpeardistributionsubsystoesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNOESI,2,and3toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignliaitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundaryliaitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnoraaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprov1ded,andconta1naentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsareaaintained,intheeventofapostulatedDBA.ElectricardistributionsubsysteerequirementsforNOES4andarecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.$,'Distribut1onSystcas-Shutdee.'NthoneoraareDivisionI'lid2requiredACbuses,loadcenters,aotorcontrolcenters,ordistributionpanelsIDElHSD)~r~v44(ao~hcSgaE~c.$~(continued)<s~fyetCvrggPSN/6STSB3.MQRevI,N/Q7/95

DistributionSystems-Operatingga.8&ACTIONS93oee<(do~(s/g4'rcd~M4seiW~5s)Aeau(continued)s~4~8Ceela'rlegtheAughgreaaeregarespraylneperahlealleeatheACTIONSofLCO3.5.1,'ECCS-Operating,'oapplyappropriate11aitationsoncontinuedreactoroperation.(<y~9leJtvis,+gpcrhal'a5++>saryshpfy>>ndit1onFcorrespondstoalevelofdegradationintheelectrcadistributionsystemthacausesareuiredsafety+'s~zfunctiontobelost.resultineosrureCapedy~function,tepantisinaconditionoutsidetheacc1dentred~gyanalysis.Therefore,noadd1tionaltiaeis)ustifiedfor<0'<,',~continuedoperat1on.LCO3.0.3austbeenteredimmediatelytocenceacontrolledshutdem.+w72S<3.88ISURVEILLANCEREgVIRENENTS,0s/hisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC,DC,andelectricalpeardistributionsystemsareILOY4C.Uhae~Ivy'<funct1oningproperly,Nththecorrectcircuitbreakeraliyaent.The'correctbreakeralignmentensurestheappropr1ateseparationandindendenceoftheeectricaldivisionsisaaintained,andtetsvailabletoeiredThonsesensuresthattherequiredisreadilyavailablefoteotiveaswellascontrolunconsforcriticalsystealoadsconnectedtbtheseses.The7dayFrequencytakesintoaccoutheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,OC,andelectrcapeery~;~c~s~~kIedistribut1onsubsystem,andother1nd1cationsavailableinthecontrolrooethatalertth<<operatortosubsystemaalfunctions.REFERENCES~I.,Chapterf6./'c.~U32.CESAR,Chaptergl.g/43.Regulatory6uide1.93,Deceaber1974.Pcuglgb>0,/>cz<s-~.~~(z,)Crd.BN/6STSB3.8-89RevI,04/07/95

INSERTSR3.IThisisnormallyperformedbyverifyingcorrectvoltagefortheACandDCswitchgearandbyverifyingthatno'inoperabilitystatusindicatorlights(thatindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftherequiredloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters(MCCs),ordistributionpanels)arelitinthecontrolroom.Alternately,whenthenormalmethodisnotavailableverificationthataloadpoweredfromtheassociatedbusisenergizedisalsoacceptablelkInsertPageB3.8-89

Q1~3ThisisnormallyperformedbyverifyingcorrectvoltagefortheACandDCswitchgearandbyverifyingthatnoinoperabilitystatusindicatorlights(thatindicatealossofpowertooneormoreoftherequiredloadcenters,MCCs,ordistributionpanels)arelitinthecontrolroom.Alternately,whenthenormalmethodisnotavailable,verificationthataload)8poweredfromtheassociatedbusisenergizedisalsoacceptable.InsertPageB3.8-94

~,

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING~DCEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thedieselgenerators(DGs)areusedtosupportmitigationoftheconsequencesofanaccident;however,theyarenotconsideredtheinitiatorofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Assuch,theeliminationofawarmuprestrictionandatimerequirementtoIQSloadtheDGduringsurveillancetestingwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheproposedSRcontinuestoprovideadequateassuranceofOPERABLEDGsandtherefore,doesnotinvolveanincreaseintheconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?;Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasigniticantreductioninamarginofsafety?,ThischangedoesnotinvolveasigniticantreductioninamarginofsafetysincethemanualloadingoftheDGsdoesnotimpactthecapabilityoftheDGstoperformtheirsafetyfunction.Inaddition,otherSRscontinuetoensuretheDGcanbeloadedproperlyduringaccidentconditions.NMP210Revision+Qg

~.

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING~L.5CNInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thecurrentsurveillancerequirementshavebeenchangedtoupdatethedieselgenerator(DG)startandenergizationtimeswhenalossofoffsitepoweronlyoccurs.TheproposedchangeincreasesthestartandenergizationtimefortheDivision1,2,and3DGsfrom13secondsto13.20seconds.ThechangetotheDGstartandj+8energizationtimeisbasedonthetiineassumedforthelossofoffsitepoweraccidentanalysis.TheDGsprovideemergencystandbyACelectricalpowertosupportmitigationoftheconsequencesofanaccident;however,theyarenotconsideredtheinitiatorofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangetotheDGstartandenergizationtiinedoesnotchangetheDGdesign,themodeofoperationormaintenance,andisnotaphysicaln>odificationtotheplant,nordoesthechangereducetheeffectivenessofthesurveillancerequirementstodemonstrateDGoperability,detectequipmentdegradation,orassurereliabilitysincetheSurveillanceRequirementscontinuetosatisfytherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.9,"Selection,Designs,Qualification,andTestingofEmergencyDiesel-GeneratorUnitsUsedasClasslEOnsiteElectricPowerSystemsatNuclearPowerPlants,"Revision2,Deceinber1979,andRegulatoryGuide1.108,"PeriodicTestingofDieselGeneratorUnitsUsedasOnsiteElectricPowerSystemsatNuclearPowerPlants,"Revision1,August1977,whicharethebasesforthecurrentSurveillanceRequirements.Moreover,theproposed.changewillnotaffectcurrentcommitmentsrelatedtoDGreliabilityandtheMaintenanceRule,whicharedesignedtoidentifyandcorrectequipmentdeficienciesanddegradationtomaintainDGoperabilityandreliability.Inaddition,thenewtimeisconsistentwiththecurrenttimeinthelossofoffsitepoweraccidentanalysis,andthistimeisidentifiedandisjustifiedinanotherNSHEinITS3.3.8.1.Therefore,theproposedchangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?ThechangedoesnotinvolveachangetotheDGdesign,themodeofoperationormaintenance,andisnotaphysicalmodificationtotheplant,nordoesthechangereducetheeffectivenessofthesurveillancerequirementstodemonstrateDGoperability,detectequipmentdegradation,orassurereliability.ThenewDGstartandenergizationtimeisconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthelossofoffsitepowerNMP216Revision+QD

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING2.(continued)analysis.Sinceplantdesign,operationalmethods,andequipmentresponsesareunchanged,nonewfailuremodesoraccidentswillbecreated.Therefore,theproposedchangewillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.CI3.Doesthischangeinvolveasigniticantreductioninamarginofsafety'?TheproposedchangeincreasesthestartandenergizationtimefortheDivision1,2,and3DGsfrom13secondsto13.20seconds.ThisproposedtimeisthesummationofthecurrentDGstarttimeot'0seconds(fromvariousCTS4.8.1.1Surveillances)andtheDGlossofvoltagetimedelayAllowableValue(fromCTSTable3.3.3-2TripFunctionsD.1andE.1,asmodifiedbyan"L"DiscussionofChangeinITS3.3.8.1).ThefirsttimehasbeenpreviouslyapprovedbytheNRCandthesecondtimeisjustifiedinanotherNSHE.ThisisalsothetimeassumedintheaccidentanalysisfortheDGtostartwhenonlyalossofvoltageoccurs.ThecurrenttimeinCTS4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)2)andb)2)isessentiallytheallowedDGstartandenergizationtimeroundedtothenearestwholesecond.Therefore,theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP217RevisionJC+8

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.8.1-ACSOURCES-OPERATING,Inaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.l.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheDivision3offsitepowersourcesareusedtosupportmitigationoftheconsequencesofanaccident;however,theyarenotconsideredtheinitiatorofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Assuch,additionaltimeforrepairofaninoperableDivision3offsitepowersourcewillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheITSACTIONScontinuestoprovideadequateassuranceofOPERABLEDivision3offsitepowersourcesandtheHPCSSystemandtherefore,doesnotinvolveanincreaseintheconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Therefore,itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthischangeinvolveasigniticantreductioninamarginofsafety?ThischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafetysincetheOPERABILITYoftheHPCSSystemcontinuestoberequired.Inaddition,theproposedrestorationtimeisconsistentwiththatpreviouslyapprovedbytheNRCforaninoperableHPCS.DGandaninoperableHPCSSystem.NMP224RevisionPQ$

Volume10Sections3.9and3.10

Section3.9

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.9.5-CONTROLRODOPERABILITY-REFUELINGADMINISTRATIVE(continued)A.6CTS4.1.3.5requireseachcontrolrodscramaccumulatortobeverifiedOPERABLEevery7days"unlessthecontrolrodisinsertedanddisarmedorscrammed."StatingtheconditionsforanexceptiontoperformanceoftheaccumulatorSurveillancethatareequivalenttotheApplicabilityoftheLCOisunnecessary.IftheaccumulatorisnotrequiredtobeOperable,CTS4.0.1(proposedSR3.0.1)statesthatSurveillancesarenotrequiredtobeperformed.Therefore,thesewordsinCTS4.1.3.5(unlessthecontrolrodisinsertedanddisarmedorscrammed)havebeendeletedandthisdeletionisadministrative.RELOCATEDSPECIFICATIONSNoneTECHNICALCHANGES-MORERESTRICTIVEM.1Anewrequiren>enthasbeenaddedforcontrolrodOPERABILITYduringrefueling,i.e.,eachwithdrawncontrolrodmustbecapableofinsertion(byscram).ThisnewrequirementwillbecoveredaspartofthecurrentrequirementforawithdrawncontrolrodtobeOPERABLE.ASurveillanceRequirement(proposedSR3.9.5.1)hasalsobeenadded.Thus,ifthenewSurveillanceRequirementisnotmet,thewithdrawncontrolrodwillbeinoperable.Inaddition,anappropriateACTION(ITS3.9.5ACTIONA)hasbeenaddedtoprovideproperactionsifthecontrolrodisinoperableduetothisnewreason.Thesechangesrepresentadditionalrestrictionsonplantoperationsnecessarytoensurethecontrolrodscramfunctionisavailableformitigationshouldapromptreactivityexcursionoccurduringrefueling.TEHNICALCHANGES-LESSRESTRICTIVE"Generic"NoneNMP2Revisiongg

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.9.5-CONTROLRODOPERABILITY-REFUELINGHA-LRTRITIV(continued)"Specific"L.lThescramaccumulatorleakdetectors,pressuredetectors,andassociatedalarminCTS4.1.3.5.bdonotnecessarilyrelatedirectlytoaccumulatorOPERABILITY.TheBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1,donottypicallyrequireindication-onlyortestequipmenttobeOPERABLEtosupportOPERABILITYofasystemorcomponent.Controloftheavailabilityof,andnecessarycompensatoryactivitiesifnotavailable,forindications,monitoringinstruments,alarms,andtestequipmentisanissueforplantoperationalproceduresandpolicies.TherequirementtoensurescramaccumulatorpressureisadequatetoperformthesafetyrelatedscramfunctionofthecontrolrodismaintainedasproposedSR3.9.5.2.Therefore,thecontrolrodaccumulatorleakdetectors,pressuredetectors,andalarmSurveillancesareproposedtobedeleted.NMP2Revision+

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:3.9.1-REFUELINGEQUIPMENTINTERLOCKSThecurrentwordingofISTS3.9.1andtheassociatedApplicabilitycouldimplythatalltherefuelingequipmentinterlocksarerequiredatalltimesduring.in-vesselfuelmovement.TheCurrentLicensingBasisonlyrequirestheinterlocksassociatedwiththerefuelposition,notthoseassociatedwithotherpositionsofthereactormodeswitch,andonlywhenthereactormodeswitchisintherefuelposition,notwhenitisintheshutdownposition.Therefore,toavoidconfusion,theLCOandApplicabilityhavebeenmodifiedtospecificallystatethattherefuelinginterlocksarethoseassociatedwiththerefuelposition,andthatitisapplicablewhenthereactormodeswitchisintherefuelposition.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithproposedTSTF-(ii232.2.ThecurrentlicensingbasisofNMP2refuelingequipmentinterlockshavebeenprovided.NMP2RevisionAgrg

BASES~RefuelingEquipmentInterlocksB3.9.1LCO(continued)blockstopreventoperationsthatcouldresultincriticalityduringrefuelingoperations.APPLICABILmISSheOhf4-~kg~~j$gsa+llCfC~paa'kyar,TACgsofarfe~art.Iah~Q>>~Eu~/I/~~~n4e~'~g;ESipt~Ski(Ip~(gp'nWa~/nlbloi~ZC.~~3,i.i>>~<'-~k.g~fig~~++pre)C,paEat~4'++iS4llEMahLCInNOOE5,apromptreactivityexcursioncouldcausefueldagoandsubsequentreleaseofradioact1vematerialtotheenvironment.TherefuelingequipmentinterlocksprotectagainstpromptreactivityexcursionsduringNODE5.TheinterlocksareonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEduring1n-vesselfuelmovementwithrefuelingequipmentassociatedwiththeinterloohs.InNOESI,2,3.and4,thereactorpressurevesselheadison,andnofuelloadingact1vitiesarepossible.Therefore,therefuelinginterlocksarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheseNOOES.SEddtu/6oadd~~'Itapt33p~iA4af~~ACTIONS'3A'.l,.ag.x~sM-2>>r~sMAr(~~A,)'Mithoneormoreoftherequiredrefuelingequipmentinterlocksinoperable,theunitmustbeplacedinacondit1oninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply',n-vesselfuelmovementwiththeaffectedrefuelingequipmentmustbeiaaediatelysuspended.Thisact1onensuresthatopirationsarenotperformedwithequipmentthatwouldpotentiallynotbeblockedfromunacceptableoperations(e.g.,loadingfuelintoacellwithacontrolrodwithdrawn).Suspensionofin-vesselfuelmovementshallnotpreclude.completionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepos1t1on.Z~smjPrar~g,igSURVEILLANCEREgUIREMENTSPerformanceofaCHANELRNCTIOHALTESTdemonstrateseachrequiredrefuelingequipmentinterlockwillfunctionproperlywhenasimulatedoractualsignalindicativeofarequiredconditionisigectedintothelogic.TheCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESTmaybeperformedbyanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechannelistested.BN/6STSB3.9-3(continued)RevI,Oa/01/95

NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONITS:3.9.5-CONTROLRODOPERABILITY-.REFUELINGL.1CHANGEInaccordancewiththecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92,NMPChasevaluatedthisproposedTechnicalSpecificationschangeanddetermineditdoesnotrepresentasignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefollowingisprovidedinsupportofthisconclusion.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thescramaccumulatorleakdetectors,pressuredetectors,andassociatedalarmarenotassumedintheinitiationofanyanalyzedevent.TherequirementsforthisinstrumentationdoesnotneedtobeexplicitlystatedintheTechnicalSpecifications.ThescramaccumulatorpressureisstillrequiredtobecheckedperSR3.9.5.2.OnemethodtoperforintheveriticationsrequiredforSR3.9.5.2wouldrequireinstrumentationtobeOperable.Asaresult,accidentconsequencesareunaffectedby(Qgthischange.Therefore,thischangewillnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Thepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedisnotcreatedbecausetheproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanewmodeofplantoperationanddoesnotinvolvephysicalmodificationtotheplant.Doesthischangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Theproposeddeletionofthescramaccumulatorleakdetectors,pressuredetectors,andassociatedalarmrequirenientsfroniTechnicalSpecificationsdoesnotimpactanymarginofsafety.TherequirementsforthisinstrumentationdoesnotneedtobeexplicitlystatedintheTechnicalSpecilications.ThescramaccumulatorpressureisstillrequiredtobecheckedperSR3.9.5.2.OnemethodtoperformtheverificationsrequiredforSR3.9.5.2wouldrequiretheinstrumentationtobeOperable.Asaresult,theOperabilityoftheinstrumentationwillnormallybemaintainedtosatisfySR3.9.5.2withouttheneedforexplicitinstrumentationrequirementsintheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NMP2Revision+Q8

Section3.10

Lctrlie(3.10.7whenoondootingsystemleakageorhydroststiotesting,theaveragereamersealantIQ+temperaturespecifiedinTable1.2forOPERATIONALCONDITION4maybeincreasedabove2004F,andoperationconsiderednottobeinOPERATIONALCONDITION3,toallowperformanceofasystemleakseorstaticteprovirrandthefollowingERATIONALCONDITION3LCO'saremet:MORO,f.~aICO),(y,f,b.Lc0~dfg,(.$cko5afo,f.ddd'.3.2,"IsolationActuationInstrumentation,Functionsl.a.2,.and3.aandbofTable3.3.2-1;ah8JCS.rO,(,g3.6.5.1,SecondaryContainmentIntegrity';3.6.5.2,"SecondaryContainmentAutomaticIsolationDampers;and3.6.5.3,"StandbyGasTreatmentSystem.:OPERATIONALCONDITION4,withaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureLI)>2004F.~44P">pSehA~rI~~smWadgprohG225:gc.'7(odWiththerequirementsoftheabovespecificationnotsatisfiedimmediatelyentertheapplicableconditionoftheaffectedspecificationorimmediatelysuspendactivitiesthatcouldincreasetheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureorpressureandreducetheaveragereactorcoolant'emperatureto+2004Fwithin24hours.CA~aIOai,I4.10.7VerifyapplicableOPERATIONALCONDITION3surveillancesforspecificationslistedin3.10.7aremet.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/410-7AmendmentNo.6ga[QBP<gg(8'~

3,4.9.1Two*shutdowncoolingmodeloopsoftheresidualheatremovalIRHR)systemshallbeOPERABLEand,unlessatleastonerecirculationpumpisinoperation,atleastoneshutdowncoolingmodeloopshallbeinoperation++,witheachloopconsieingofatleast:aib.OneOPERABLERHRpump,andOneOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.eeeieeeeout'npermissivesetpoint.hCZQ5:b.WithlessthantheaboverequiredRHRshutdowncodingmodeloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatusas'.soonaspossible.Within1hourandatleastonceper24hoursthereafter,demonstratetheoperabilityofatleastoneetternatemethodcapableofdecayheatremovalforeachinoperableRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloop.BeinatleastCOLDSHUTDOWNwithin24hours.ttWithnoRHR.shutdowncooling.modeloopin'operation.immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturnatleast'nelooptooperationassoonaspossible.Within1hour,establishreactorcoolantcirculationbyanalternatemethodendmonitorreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureatleastonceperhour.4.4.9.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolinginodeloopoftheresidualheatremovalsystemoralternativemethodshallbedeterminedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.OneRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopmaybeinoperableforupto2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheotherloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Theshutdowncoolingpumpmayberemovedfromoperationforupto2hoursper8-hourriodovidedtheotherlooBLEA.sIeaCOLDiopera~,iunaetoattainSHUTDOWNasrequiredbythisACTION,maintainreactorcoolanttemperatureaslowaspracticalbyuseofalternateheat~emovaimethods.NINEMlLEPOINT-UNIT23/44-35AmendmentNn.fkd4@F~e~oC'

b.34.9.2Two*shutdowncoolingmodeloopsoftheresidualheatremovalIRHR)systemshellbeOPERABLEand,unlessatleastonerecirculationpumpisinoperation,atleastoneshutdowncoolingmodeloopshallbeinoperation**twitheachloopconsistingofatleait:OneOPERABLERHRpump,andOneOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.'C0~~t0I:OPERATIONALCONDITION4.hQEIQH:a.MfithlessthantheaboverequiredRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopsOPERABLE,within1hourandatleastonceper24hoursthereafter,demonstratetheoperabilityofatleastonealternatemethodcapableofdecayheatremovalforeachinoperableRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloop.b.WithnoRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopinoperation,within1hourestablishreactorcoolantcirculationbyanalternatemethodandmonitorreactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureetleastonceperhour.4.4.9.2Atleastoneshutdowncoolingmodeloopoftheresidualheatremovalsystemoralternativemethodshallbedeterminedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.OneRHRshutdowncoolingmodeloopmeybeinoperableforupto2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheotherloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Theshutdowncoolingpumpmeyberemovedfromoperationforupto2hoursevery8-rlooisOPERAodTheshutdowncoolingmodeloopmayberemovedfromoperationduringhydrostaticandsystemleakagetesting.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/4436

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.10.1-SYSTEMLEAKAGEANDHYDROSTATICTESTINGOPERATION~MINIA.1IntheconversionoftheNineMilePointUnit2currentTechnicalSpecifications(CTS)totheproposedplantspecificImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),certainwordingpreferencesorconventionsareadoptedthatdonotresultintechnicalchanges(eitheractualorinterpretational).Editorialchanges,reformatting,andrevisednumberingareadoptedtomaketheITSconsistentwiththeBWRStandardTechnicalSpecifications,NUREG-1434,Rev.1(i.e.,theImprovedTechnicalSpecification(ISTS)).A.2Notused.A.3CTS3.8.4.4requirestheRPSelectricpowermonitoringassembliesforeachRPSlogicbustobeOperableatalltimes.InITS3.3.8.2,theApplicabilityhasbeenchangedtoonlyrequiretheassemblieswheninstrumentationpoweredbytheRPSlogicbusesarerequired(SeeDiscussionofChangeL.1forITS:3.3.8.2).ITS3.3.8.2doesnotrequiretheassembliestobeOperableatalltimeswheninMODE4,whichistheApplicabilityofthisLCO(ITS3.10.1).TheRPSlogicbusesprovidepowertothesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentation,thustheassembliesareneededforOperabilityoftheinstrumentation.Tomaintainconsistencywiththecurrentrequirements,ITS3.10.1willnowrequireITS3.3.8.2,"RPSElectricPowerMonitoring-Logic"tobeOperableduringasystemleakageorhydrostaticleaktest.ThiswillensurethesecondarycontainmentisolationinstrumentationthatisrequiredbyITS3.10.1canperformitsintendedfunction.ITS3.10.1ACTIONAalsorequirestheactionsofITS3.3.8.2tobetakenwhentheassembliesareinoperableandproposedSR3.10.1.1requirestheSRsoftheapplicableLCOstobeperformed.Sincethesenewrequirementsareconsistentwiththecurrentrequirements,exceptasdiscussedintheDiscussionofChangesforITS3.3.8.2,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.A.4TwonewNoteshavebeenaddedtotheCTS3.10.7Actionforclarity.TheITS3~10.1ACTIONSNotehasbeenaddedtoclarifythattheCTS3.10.7ActionrequirementtoentertheapplicableconditionoftheaffectedSpecificationappliesforeachoftheaffectedSpecifications(asshowninthecurrentLCO,therearefourpotentiallyaffectedSpecifications).ITS3.10.1RequiredActionA.1Notehasbeenaddedtoclarifythat,uponentryintotheACTIONSofanaffectedSpecificationasrequiredbytheCTS3.10.7Action,iftheaffectedSpecificationsACTIONSstatetobeinMODE4,thisincludesreducingaveragecoolanttemperatureto(200'F.ThisisconsistentwiththesecondpartoftheCTS3.10.7Action.SincetheseNoteshavebeenaddedforclarity,theyareconsideredadministrativechanges.NMP2RevisionP'Q8

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.10.1-SYSTEMLEAKAGEANDHYDROSTATICTESTINGOPERATIONDMITRATIVE(continued)A.S.CTS3.4.9.1,whichrequiresanRHRshutdowncoolinglooptobeinoperationinOperationalCondition3withthereactorvesselpressurelessthantheRHRcut-inpermissivepressure,ismodifiedbyfootnotei'xemptingtherequirementduringhydrostatictesting.TheunitisnotconsideredtobeinOperationalICondition3duringthehydrostatictest(orsystemleakagetesting).CTS3.10.7specificallystatesthattheunitisnotconsideredtobeinOperationalCondition3;itremainsinOperationalCondition4.Therefore,footnotej'oCTS3.4.9.1isnotneededanditsdeletionisconsideredadministrative.RELATEDPEIFIATINNoneTEHNIALHAN-MRERESTRICTIVENoneTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1Themaximumtemperatureallowedduringtheinserviceleak(systemleakage)orhydrostatictestspecifiedinCTS3.10.7(212'F)isproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.Systemleakageandhydrostatictestsareverycontrolledevolutionsinvolvingstrictproceduralcompliance.Asaresult,themaximumtemperaturelimitationisnotnecessarytobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensureasystemleakageorhydrostatictestisconductedinaccordancewithUSARandplantproceduralrequirementswhichincludethemaximumtemperaturelimitation.Therefore,therelocatedrequirementisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59."Specific"L.lCTS3.10.7.arequiresCTS3.3.2,"IsolationActuationInstrumentation,"Functionl.b,DrywellPressure-High,tobeOperableduringinserviceleak(systemleakage)andhydrostatictesting.ThisrequirementisnotincludedinITS3.10.7.Duringsystemleakageandhydrostatictesting,theunitisNMP2Revisionfr'QB

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:3.10.1-SYSTEMLEAKAGEANDHYDROSTATICTESTINGOPERATIONTECHNIALHANES-LESRESTRITIVEL.1(cont'd)consideredtobeinMode4.InthisMode,neithertheprimarycontainment,noritssupportfunctions(theprimarycontainmentairlockandtheprimarycontainmentisolationvalves)arerequiredtobeOperable;e.g.,theprimarycontainmentisnotrequiredtobeleaktight,noraretheairlockdoorsrequiredtobeclosed.Inordertoconductthevisualexaminationsassociatedwithsystemleakageandhydrostatictesting,theairlockdoorsarenormallyleftopenforeasyaccess.Therefore,itisnotpossibletoreceiveahighdrywellpressuresignalsincethereisnowaytopressurizetheprimarycontainment.Assuch,requiringtheDrywellPressure-HighFunctiontobeOperabledo'esnotprovideanyrealsafetybenefit.Inaddition,theaccidentanalysisassumesCTS3.3.2,Functionl.a.2,ReactorVesselWaterLevel-Low,Low,Level2,(ITS3.3.6.2,Function1providesthesignaltoisolatethesecondarycontainmentandstarttheSGTSystem.ThisFunction,currentlyrequiredbyCTS3.10.7.a,isbeingmaintainedinITSLCO3.10.7.a.NMP2RevisionA

VolumellChapters4.0and5.0

Chapter4.0

120heatupandcooldowncycles80stepchangecycles198reactortripcycles$30hydrostaticandsystemleakagetests70Fto565'Fto70'FLossoffeedwaterheaters100%to0%ofRATEDTHERMALPOWERPressurizedtoa930psiganda1260psig)~o~gQ5PP'c(4p~QpNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT259AmendmsntNo.84(QQ4gef49(f

Chapter5.0

Organization5.25.2Organization5.2.2UnitStaff(continued)shutdownforrefueling,majormaintenance,ormajorplantmodification,onatemporarybasisthefollowingguidelinesshallbefollowed:1.Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursstraight,excludingshiftturnovertime;2.Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursinany24hourperiod,normorethan24hoursinany48hourperiod,normorethan72hoursinany7dayperiod,allexcludingshiftturnovertime;3.Abreakofatleast8hoursshouldbeallowedbetweenworkperiods,includingshiftturnovertime;and4.Exceptduringextendedshutdownperiods,theuseofovertimeshouldbeconsideredonanindividualbasisandnotfortheentirestaffonashift.Anydeviationfromtheaboveguidelinesshallbeauthorizedinadvancebytheplantmanageroradesignee,inaccordancewithapprovedadministrativeprocedures,orbyhigherlevelsofmanagement,inaccordancewithestablishedproceduresandwithdocumentationofthebasisforgrantingthedeviation.Controlsshallbeincludedintheproceduressuchthatindividualovertimeshallbereviewedmonthlybyaspecifiedcorporateofficeroradesigneetoensurethatexcessivehourshavenotbeenassigned.Routinedeviationfromtheaboveguidelinesisnotauthorized.f.TheoperationssupervisorsshallholdanSROlicense.g.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheshiftsupervisionintheareasofthermalhydraulics,reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationoftheunit.Inaddition,theSTAshallmeetthequalificationsspeci,fiedbytheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift,NHP25O-4RevisionP'j

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProramThisprogramconformsto10CFR50.36aforthecontrolofradioactiveeffluentsandformaintainingthedosestomembersofthepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonablyachievable.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheODCM,shallbeimplementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsareexceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a.'imitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCM;b.Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingtotentimestheconcentrationvaluesinAppendix8,Table2,Column2to10CFR20.1001-20.2402;c.Monitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.1302andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCM;d.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromeachunittounrestrictedareas,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;e.'eterminationofcumulativeandprojecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCMatleastevery31days;f.Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiodof31dayswouldexceed2%oftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;g.Limitationsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromthesitetoareasatorbeyondthesiteboundary,shallbeinaccordancewiththefollowing:continuedNMP25.0-9RevisionP'$

ProgramsandNanuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProram(continued)2.Fornoblegases:adoserate<500mrems/yrtothewholebodyandadoserate<3000mrems/yrtotheskin,andForiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesi'nparticulateformwithhalflivesgreaterthan8days:adoserate51500mrems/yrtoanyIQSorgan;h.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesresultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromeachunittoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromeachunittoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;j.Limitationsontheannualdoseordosecommitmenttoany,memberofthepublic,beyondthesiteboundary,duetoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190;andk.LimitationsonventingandpurgingoftheprimarycontainmentthroughtheStandbyGasTreatmentSystemtomaintainreleasesaslowasreasonablyachievable.5.5.5TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramsurveillancefrequencies.ComonentCclicorTransientLimitThisprogramprovidescontrolstotracktheUSAR,Table3.98-1Note5,cyclicandtransientoccurrencestoensurethatcomponentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.5.5.6InserviceTestinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforinservicetestingofASHECodeClass1,2,and3pumpsandvalves.continuedNNP25.0-10RevisionA'D

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.7VentilationFilterTestinProramVFTP(continued)ESFVentilationSystemPenetrationRHSGTSystemCREFSystem0.1750.1759595d.DemonstrateforeachoftheESFsystemsthatthepressuredropacrossthecombinedHEPAfiltersandthecharcoaladsorbersislessthanthevaluespecifiedbelowwhentestedatthesystemflowratespecifiedbelow:ESFVentilationSystem'eltaP'lowrate(incheswg)(cfm)SGTSystemCREFSystem<5.5<5.53600to44002025to2475e.DemonstratethattheheatersforeachoftheESFsystemsdissipatethevaluespecifiedbelow,adjustedtodegradedvoltageconditions,whentestedinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980:ESFVentilationSystemSGTSystemCREFSystemWattage(kW)14.0to17.1>7.955.5.8ExlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivitHonitorinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforpotentiallyexplosivegasmixturescontainedintheHainCondenserOffgasTreatmentSystemandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinunprotectedoutdoorliquidstoragetanks.Theprogramshallinclude:'a~b.ThelimitsforconcentrationsofhydrogenintheHainCondenserOffgasTreatmentSystemandasurveillanceprogramtoensurethelimitsaremaintained.Suchlimitsshallbeappropriatetothesystem'sdesigncriteria(i.e.,whetherornotthesystemisdesignedtowithstandahydrogenexplosion);andAsurveillanceprogramtoensurethatthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinalloutsidetemp'oraryliquidNMP25.0-13continuedRevisionP'Qg

ProgramsandNanuals5.55.5ProgramsandNanuals5.5.8ExlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactiveHonitorinProram(continued)radwastetanksthatarenotsurroundedbyliners,dikes,orwalls,capableofholdingthetanks'ontentsandthatdonothavetankoverflowsandsurroundingareadrainsconnectedtotheLiquidRadwasteTreatmentSystemisg10Ci,excludingtritiumand.dissolvedorentrainednoblegases.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityNonitoringProgramSurveillanceFrequencies.5.5.9DieselFuelOilTestinProramAdieselfueloiltestingprogramshallestablishtherequiredtestingofbothnewfueloilandstoredfueloil.Theprogramshallincludesamplingandtestingrequirements,andacceptancecriteria,allinaccordancewithapplicableASTNStandards.Thepurposeoftheprogramistoestablishthefollowing:a.Acceptabilityofnewfueloilforusepriortoadditiontostoragetanksbydeterminingthatthefueloilhas:l.AnAPIgravity,aspecificgravity,oranabsolutespecificgravitywithinlimits,2.AflashpointandkinematicviscositywithinlimitsforASTHfueloil,3.Aclearandbrightappearance;b.C.Within31daysfollowingadditionofthenewfueloiltostoragetanks,verifythatthepropertiesofthenewfueloil,otherthanthoseaddressedin5.5.9.aabove,arewithinlimitsforASTHfueloil;and'otalparticulateconcentrationofthefueloilinthestoragetanksis<10mg/1whentestedevery31daysin.accordancewithASTHD-2276,HethodA.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheDieselFuel.OilTestingProgramtestfrequencies.continuedNHP25.0-14RevisionA

TABLE6.2.2-HINIMUNSHIFTCRBICONOSITIONab)OPERATIONALCONDITIONSPOSITIONStationShifSupervisor(d)AssistantationShiftSupervisorg)Operator121,3)2~45451(e)Noe1Unlicensed(f)ShiftTechnic1Advisor(g)1!1TABLNOTATIONSa)tyonetime+more1icendorun>censoperat>ngprsentformaintenance,rairsrefuelutaesetc13c)Nne1(c)'A4loplecouldbe(b)$'.gX.c(c)TheshiftcrewcompositionmaybeonelessthantheminimumrequirementsofTable6.2.2-1foraperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembers,providedimmediateactionistakentorestoretheshiftcrewcornoitiontowithintheminimumreuirementsofTable6.2.-1provsssonsanyshiftcwposlsonoeunmanneduponsftchangebeauseanoncom-ingshiftewmanschedultocomeondutyilateorabsnt.Foroperationlongerthan8hourswithoutprocesscomputer.nytimetheitSupervisorisabsentfromthecontrolroomwhiletheunitisinOPERATIONALCOHDITION1,2,or3,theAssistantStationShiftSupervisorwhennotintheSTAfunction,oranotherindividualwithavalidSeniorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheShiftSupervisorfromthecontrolroomwhiletheunitisinOPERATIOHALCONDITION4or5,anindi-vidualwithavalidSeniorOperatorlicenseorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassthecontrolroomcommandfunction.A>3-(e)hnadditnalSeniorReactorQratororSeniorReaorOperatorLiqrftedtoFuelHalingwhohasnootheconcurrentresonsilitiesshallsgervise11corerations(f)ThoseoperatingpersonnelnotholdinganOperatororSeniorOperatorlicense.(g)TAssistantStationShtSupervisorshallhldaSeniorOpator'slcenseand,ifqualifie,mayperformtheSh'TechnicalAdisorfunc-ionwhentheSiteEmerencyPlanisactivatinOPERATIOHACONDITIONS12,or3ifadedicedShift,TechnicalAvisorisnotailable.hOPERPTIOHALCOHTIO2onlNINEHILEPOINT-UNIT26-6AmendmentNo.i4,34

IBJIAAKL$..76.2.3.4RecordsofactivitiesperfoedbytheISEGshallbeprepared.aintained,andforwardeeachcalendarmonthtoVicePresident-NuclearSafetyAsmentandSupport4HFTTHLA.3Nally,ehiftecniceAsor(STA)shallbeadedicatedpositio.If.however,adedicedSTAcannotbeprovidedashift,thentheAssistantStationShSupervisorIASSS)shallfun'inadualrole(SRO/STA)assumethedutiesoftheShiftTec'calAdvisor.(STA)whPlniai2TeSTA.4shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheuinteareasomayrauics,reactorengineerin,andlantanalysiswithregardtosafeoperationoftheunit.Theanthe,wenfulfillingtheroleoeA)saaveaachelor'sdegreeinaphysicalscience.engineering,oraProfessionalEngineer'slicenseissuedbyexamination,andshallhavereceivedspecifictrainingintheresponseandanalysisoftheunitfortransientsandaccidents,aninunitdesignandlayout.includingthecapabilitiesofinstrumentationandcontrolsinthecontroroom.7FAITYTAFFIIATIEachmemberoftheunitstaffshellmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSI/ANS3.1-1978forcomparablepositions,exceptfortheManagerRadiationProtectionwhoshallmeetorexceedtheualificationsofRegulatoryGuide18,September1975.4TRAIAretrainingandreplacementtrainingprogramfortheunitstaffshallbemaintainedunderthedirectionoftheManagerTraining,shallmeetorexceedtherequirementsandrecommendationsofSection5.5ofANSI/ANS3,1-1978and10CFR55.andshallincludefamiliarizationwithrelevantindustryoperationalexperience,AtrainingprogramfortheFireBrigadeshallbemaintainedunderthedirectionoftheManagerTrainingandtheSupervisor-FireProtectionNuclearandshallmeetrexceedtherequirementsofAppendixRto10CFR50.~<~$/oD4fCA4~qq"~"'~>"u-kegPcRI+QQIf~NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT26-7AmendmentNo.kk,krf.671<ga200$

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.2-ORGANIZATIONADMINISTRATIVE(continued)A.6ThepersontowhomtheSTAprovidesadvisorytechnicalsupporthasbeenreplacedwithamoregenericstatement.Currently,theSTAisrequiredtoprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor.ThistermforwhomtheSTAsupportswasderivedfromthegenerictermprovidedinNUREG-0737.AtNMP2,bothan"AssistantStationShiftSupervisor(ASSS)"anda"StationShiftSupervisor(SSS)"areontheoperatingshift,andbothholdsenioroperatorlicenses,asrequiredbytheCTS.TheUSARdoesnotprovideanyclarificationastowhichofthesetwosupervisorstheCTSisreferring,sinceitusesASSS,SSS,andshiftsupervisorinterchangeablywhendiscussingtheSTArole.Normally,theSTAwouldprovidesupporttotheASSS,sincetheASSSisnormallythecontrolroomsupervisor.However,whentheASSSisnotinthecontrolroom,theSSSwouldassumethecontrolroomsupervisorduties.ThustheSTAcouldprovidesupporttoeithertheSSSorASSSatthestartofanevent,dependinguponwhichofthepersonnelwasinchargeofthecontrolroom.Toprovideamoregeneric,buttechnicallyaccurate,statementastowhomtheSTAprovidesadvisorytechnicalsupport,thewords"ShiftSupervisor"havebeenreplacedwith"shiftsupervision."A.7ThespecificSTArequirementshavebeenmodifiedtoreferencetheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift.Sincethepolicystatementencompassesthecurrentrequirements,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.RELATEDSPEIFIATIONNoneTECHNICALHAN-MRERESTRICTIVENoneTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE"Generic"LA.1DetailsoftheminimumshiftcrewrequirementslocatedinCTSTable6.2.2-1areproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR,wheremostoftheserequirementscurrentlyreside(Section13.1).TheminimumshiftcrewrequirementsforNMP2Revision~9 g(

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.2-ORGANIZATIONTEHNICALHANES-LRESTRICTIVELA.1(cont'd)LA.2licensedoperatorsandsenioroperatorsarealsocontainedin10CFR50.54(k),(1),and(m)anddonotneedtoberepeatedintheITS.Theminimumshiftcrewrequirementsfornon-licensedplantequipmentoperatorsare~~sicredfromCTSTable6.2.2-1toITS5.2.2.a.Inaddition,ITS5.1.2containsrequirementsforthecontrolroomcommandfunction,ITS5.2.2.ccontainsminimumrequirementsforlicensedReactorOperatorsandSeniorOperatorstobepresentinthecontrolroom,andITS5.2.2.gcontainsSTArequirements.TherelocationofthedetailsoftheminimumshiftcrewrequirementstotheUSARisacceptableconsideringthecontrolsprovidedbyregulations,theremainingrequirementsintheITS,andtheUSARchangecontrolprocess(10CFR50.59).Therefore,therelocatedrequirementsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.CTS6.2.2.d,requirestwoLicensedOperatorsintheControlRoom.duringreactorstartup,scheduledreactorshutdown,andduringrecoveryfromreactortrips.Inaddition,CTSTable6.2.2-1,includingNotes(c)and(h)alsorequiresoneadditionalLicensedOperatorduringMode2andoneadditionalAssistantStationShiftSupervisorandLicensedOperatorduringMODES4and5whentheprocesscomputerisoutofoperationforgreaterthan8hours(notecalsoappliestotheStationShiftSupervisorrequirement,butitdoesnotchangethemanning'requirementcurrentlyrequiredundernormalconditionsinMODES1through5).TheserequirementsareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TherequirementspecifyingtheminimumnumberofoperatorsinthecontrolroomisadequatelycontrolledbyITS5.2.2.b.UndertheconditionsspecifiedinCTS6.2.2.d,itismorethanlikelytwooperatorswillbeassignedtotheControlRoombytheSSSduetothenumberofmaneuverswhichmustbeperformed.TherequirementforthelocationoftheseoperatorsisalsoalreadyspecifiedinGenerationAdministrativeProcedures.Inaddition,thenormaloperatingshiftincludesmoreoperatorsthanarerequiredbyCTSTable6.2.2-1,andduringMODES4and5,additionaloperators,abovethoseonthenormaloperatingshift,arealsoroutinelyavailabletoassistinoutagerelatedactivities.Therefore,therelocatedrequirementisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.3CTS6.2.2.eand6.2.4,whichspecifystaffingrequirementsduringMODES1,2and3andwhentheemergencyplanisactivated,isproposedtoberelocatedtotheSiteEmergencyPlan.TherequirementisthataLicensedOperatorshallberequiredtobeinthecontrolroomandthispersonmaybeeithertheSSS,ASSS,oranotherpersonwithavalidsenioroperatorlicense.WhentheEmergencyPlanisactivatedandifadedicatedShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)isnotonshift,thentheASSStakestheroleoftheSTAandtheSSSmustremaininthecontrolroomuntilanadditionalLicensedSeniorOperatorarrives.RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.2-ORGANIZATIONTEHNIALCHANG-LRTRITIVELA.3(cont'd)ThestaffingrequirementsoftheEmergencyPlanarealsodocumentedintheSiteEmergencyPlanandinGenerationAdministrativeProcedures.ITS5.2.2.bwillcontinuetoprovidethestaffingrequirementsduringMODES1,2,and3andisadequatesincethepersonnelrequiredduringemergenciesisspecified.Therefore,therelocatedrequirementisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheSiteEmergencyPlanwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.54(q).LA.4TheFireProtectionrequirementshavealreadybeenrelocatedtotheFireProtectionPlan,inaccordancewithGenericLetter88-12.Therefore,thefirebrigademanningrequirementsinCTS6.2.2.g,includingtheallowanceinCTS6.2.2.gfootnote*(tobebelowtheminimumfirebrigadecompositionrequirementforaperiodofupto2hourstoaccommodateunexpectedabsence)isnotneededintheTechnicalSpecificationsandisproposedtoberelocatedtotheFireProtectionPlan.ITS5.4.1.dmaintainstherequirementthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedforFireProtectionProgramimplementation.Therefore,therelocatedallowanceisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotherequirementsintheFireProtectionPlanwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.5DetailscontainedinCTS6.2.2.fthatrequireallCoreAlterationstobesupervisedbyeitheralicensedSeniorOperatororSeniorReactorOperatorLimitedtoFuelHandlingareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR,ThesecurrentTSrequirementsarecontainedin10CFR50.54(m)(2)(iv)anddonotneedtoberepeatedintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.OnceinUSAR,theserequirementswillbeunderthechangecontrolprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Inaddition,thedetailsinCTS6.2.2.fthatrequirethefuelmovestobedirectlymonitoredbyamemberofthereactoranalystgroupisalsobeingproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.10CFR50.54(m)(2)(iv)specifiestheminimumrequirementsformovingreactorfuel.Itdoesnotrequireanon-licensedmemberofthereactoranalystgroup(oranyothertypeofengineer)tomonitorthefuelmovement.ThisisanadditionaladministrativerequirementthatisnotneededtobeintheITSforprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.OnceintheUSAR,thisrequirementwillalsobeunderthechangecontrolprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.6DetailsoftheoperatorlicenserequirementsinCTS6.2.2.jforthesespecificpositionsStationShiftSupervisor-NuclearandAssistantStationShiftSupervisorNuclearareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSARwheretheycurrentlyreside(Section13.1).ThislevelofdetailisnotnecessaryintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ThesedetailsareNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.2-ORGANIZATIONTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELA.6(cont'd)adequatelyaddressedbytheminimumshiftcrewrequirementsin10CFR50.54(k),(1),and(m)andbythequalificationrequirementsinITS5.3.1.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.7TheIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG)requirementsinCTS6.2.3.4areproposedtoberelocatedtotheAppendixBoftheUSARQualityAssuranceProgramdescriptionsincetheycanbeadequatelyaddressedelsewhereandthereisadequateregulatoryauthoritytodoso.TheISEGperformsindependentsafetyreviews.SincetheISEGprovidesafter-the-factrecommendationstoimprovesafety,thisorganizationisnotnecessarytoensuresafeoperationofthefacility.Therefore,inclusionoftherequirementsfortheISEGinITSisnotnecessarytoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestoAppendixBoftheUSAR(whichimplements10CFR50.54and10CFR50AppendixB)willbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.54(a).LA.8CTS6.2.1.busesthetitle"ChiefNuclearOfficer."InITS5.2.1.cthisspecifictitleisreplacedwiththegenericterm"aspecifiedcorporateofficer."CTS6.2.1.cand6.2.2.iusethetitle"PlantManager."InITS5.2.1.band5.2.2.e,thisspecifictitleisreplacedwiththegenerictitle"plantmanager."CTS6.2.2.iusesthetitle"VicePresident-NuclearGeneration."InITS5.2.2.e,thisspecifictitleisreplacedwiththegenericterm"aspecifiedcorporateofficer."CTS6.2.2.jusesthetitles"GeneralSupervisorOperations"and"SupervisorOperations."InITS5.2.2.f,thesespecifictitlesarereplacedwiththegenerictitle"operationssupervisors."ThespecifictitlesareproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSARSection13.1,whichiswheretheorganizationalchartanddescriptionofthesespecifictitles(exceptSupervisorOperations-onlythetitleisprovidedintheUSAR)iscurrentlylocated.TheallowancetorelocatethespecifictitlesoutoftheTechnicalSpecificationsisconsistentwiththeNRCletterfromC.GrimestotheOwnersGroupsTechnicalSpecificationCommitteeChairmen,datedNovember10,1994.ThevariousrequirementsoftheindividualsarestillretainedintheITS.Inaddition,theITSalsorequirestheorganizationalcharttobeintheUSAR.Therefore,therelocatedspecifictitlesarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59."Specific"L.lCTS6.2.2.i.4providesadescriptionoftheindividualswhocanbedesignatedbythePlantManagertoapprovemodificationstoovertimerequirements.ITS5.2.2.ewillnotprovidethisdescription,butwillrequirethepersontobeNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.2-ORGANIZATIONTEHNIALHN-LRTRITIVEL.l(cont'd)designatedbytheplantmanager(changedtothegenerictitlebyDiscussionofChangeLA.8above).Inthisway,controlofwhocanapprovethisactivityisstillcontrolledbytheplantmanager,consistentwithCTS6.1.1(proposedITS5.1.1),whichstatesthatthePlantManagerisresponsibleforoverallunitoperation.Sincetheplantmanagerisstillmaintainingthiscontrol,theremovaloftheactualpersontowhomthePlantManagerdelegatesresponsibilitydoesnotimpactplantsafety.Inaddition,CTS6.1.1(proposedITS5.1.1)alreadyallowsthePlantManagertodesignateanindividualtotakeoverthisresponsibilityduringthePlantManager'sabsence,andthisindividualisnotspecifiedbytitle.Therefore,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.NMP2RevisionA

4.0.1SurveillanceReqjgremantsshallbematduringtheIONALCONDITIONSorotherconditionsspecifiedforhxlividualLimitingConditionsforOperationunlessotherwisestatedinanindividualSurveillanceRequirement.4.0.2EachSurveillanceRequirementshallbeperformedwithinthespecifiedtimeintervalwithamaximumallowableextensionnottoexceed25%ofthesurveillanceinterval.4.0.3FailuretoperformaSurveillanceRequirementwithintheallowedsurveillanceinterval,definedbySpecification4.0.2,shallconstitutenoncompliancewiththeOPERABILITyrequirementsforaLimitingConditionforOperation.ThetimelimitsoftheACTIONrequirementsareapplicableatthetimeitisidentifiedthataSurveillanceRequirementhasnotbeenperformed.TheACTIONrequirementsmaybedelayedforupto24hourstopermitthecompletionofthesurveillancewhentheallowableoutagetimelimitsoftheACTIONrequirementsarelessthan24hours.SurveillanceRequirementsdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipment.4.0.4EntryintoanOPERATIONALCONDITIONorotherspec)fiedapplicableconditionshallnotbemadeunlesstheSurveillanceRequirement(s)associatedwiththeLimitingConditionforOperationhavebeenperformedwithintheapplicablesurveillanceintervalorasotherwisespecified.ThisprovisionshallnotpreventpassagethroughortoOPERATIONALCONDITIONSasequiredtocomplywithACTIONrequirements.4.0.5SurveillanceRequirementsforlnsarvice'nd3shallbeapplicablaasfollows:testingofASMECodeClass1,2,PllkPg4'A)bnsarvictestingoea,2,apumpsavashallbeperformedinaccordsewithSectionXIoftheMEBoilerandPressureVeodeandapplicableandaasrequiredby10C0.55a(f),exceptwherespecific'nreliefion50.556i)celnspeess;nedin'ccordanwithSectionXIoftheASBoilerandPressureVesselCandapplicablaaddendaasriredby10CFR50.55a(g,xcaptwherespecificwrittenr'hasbeenASLA.i//b.SurveillanceintervalsspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASMBoilerandPressureVesselCodaandapplicableaddendafortheinsarvicetastingactivitiesrequiredbytheASMEBoilerandPressureVassalCodeandapplicableaddendashallbeapplicablaasfollowsintheseTechnicalSpecifications:NINEMILEPO)NT-UNIT23/40-2AmendmentNe./If,Elf.flf84[6

COHTAIHMEHTSYSTEMSSECONDARYCONTAINMENTSTANOBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEM5~c.l5i5cvsc1oIi4f~~~/+~$..rr<;Z,(,~i,p"S(<wYggc~gpJSeg+is&Pi~i)SURVEILLANCEREOUIREMEHTS6.5.3EacstanbygastreatmentsubsystemshallbedemonstratedOPERABLE'a.bZ,~,'7.~5S9.c.Atleastonceper31daysbyfnftfatfng,fromthecontrolroom,flowthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorbersandverifyingthattheubsstesfaratle10hourswiththeheatersOPERABLE.Atleastoncepermohsor(1)afteranystructuralmaintenanceontheHEPAfilterarcharcoaladsorberhousingsor(2)followingpa>nt-fng,ffreorchemicalreleasefnanyventflatfonzonecoaeunicatingwiththesubsystemby:gC~iQ<f.l.Verffyingthatthesubsystemsatisfiesthefn-placepenetrationandbypassleakagetestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05KandusesthetestprocedureguidancefnPositionsC.5.a,C.5.c,and.C.5.dofRG1.52",Revision2,March1978,ndthesubsystemflowratefs4000cfmi10K..~~q<~~~g<oigloo2.VerifyingwavthatalaboratoryanhlysisofarepresentatvecarbonsampleobtainedfnaccordancewithPositionC.6.bofRG1.52",Revisian2,March1978meetsthe1ttfos..ao.evsoiy39,o3-I'1>FgNa4hqdg}rch,orameyoddepenetratonoessan0.an~+~f'Cic4i'vehum'chic>$$57o)4ii+'.Verifyingasubsystemflowrateof4000cfaa1'urngsystemoperationwhentestedfnaccordancewithANSIN510-1980.g,S,7~c.Afterevery?20hoursofcharcoaladsorberoperationbyverifyingatalaboratoryanalysisofarepresentativeosampeoanfnaccordancewithPosftfanC.6.bofRG1.52",Revision2March1978meetsthelaboratorytestingcriteriaofPosftionC.6.aaf.evsonrcforamethyliodidepenetrationof1eaan8$ThhQ3ga3H'?PQc,la./<ac.4vf&a4E'LEYo(e~~~~B)P.l%N80isapplicablefnplaceofANSIH510-19?5,andANSIH509-1980isalfcablefnplaceofANSIH509-1976.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2

5pequiP'ad-sACONTAIHMEHTSYSTEMSSECONDARYCONTAIHMEHTSTAKOBYGASTREATMENTSYSTEMSURVEILLANCEREUIREMEHTS4.6.5.3(Continued)d.Atleastoncepermonthsby:l.VerifyingthatthepressuredropacrossthecombinedHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbanksislessthan5.5inchesWaterGaugewhileoperatingthefiltertrainataflowrateof4000cfma10X.Verifyingthatthefiltertrainstartsandisolationvalvesopenoneachofthefollowingtestsignals:2.$CCQlfCuft~OA+C>~<<4~rT<;'3,QA,3)i~+Sec+'i>3.a.Manualinitiationfromthecontrolroom,andSimulatedautomaticinitiationsignal.Verifyingthatthedecayheatremovalairinletvalvesareclosedandcanbemanuallyopened.h.tqf>Og/~$~ygQgg4.Verifyingthattheheatersdissipate0a'henteseaccordancewithANSIN510-1980.fagpe.AftereachcompleteorpartialreplacementofaHEPAfilterbankby5.~.'lverifyingthattheHEPAfilterbanksatisfiestheinplacepenetrationandbypassleakagetestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05XinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980whileoperatingthesystemataflowrateof4000cfm410X.1f.Aftereachcompleteorpartialreplacementofacharcoaladsorberbankby.erifyingthatthecharcoaladsorberbanksatisfiestheinplacepenetra-tionandbypassleakagetestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05XinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980forahalogenatedhydrocarbonrefrigeranttestgaswhileoperatingthesystemataflowrateof4000cfme10X.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2/galI60f2.M

~,

og+gSP+c.<CiC<<<4<4p)~<&<1PLANTSYSTEMSCONTROLROOMOUTDOORAIRSPECIALFILTERTRAINSYSTEMSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS5S.'?5'<7.c.~-,~-,nd.Afterevery720hoursofcharcoaladsorberaperationbyverifyingwvthatalaboratoryanalysisofarepresentativecarbonsampleobtainedinaccordancewithPositionC.6.bofRG1.52",Revi"sion2March1978,meetsthelaboratotestincriteriaopg,'),Carc,oramethyioepenetrationoflessthan0.17<t,coh4~A<vcvNJ<'f9atoggT'~gpgog(q'7q(~a<tAO<g)e.Atleastoncepermonthsby:P,)f2,9Lb.>1.VerifyingthatthepressuredropacrassthecombinedHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbanksislessthan5.5incheswatergauge(WG).whileoperatingthesubsystemataflowrateof2250cfmtlOX.s;s;g,Aerfyingthaoneacothebelowpressurszatsonmodeactuatontestsignalsthefiltertrainautomaticallyswitchestotheemergencypressurizationmodeofoperationandthecontrolroomismaintainedatapositivepressureofh'8inchWGrelativetotheoutsideatmosphereduringsubsystemoperationatanoutsideairieflowrateleshanorequalto1500cfm.(a)Airintakeradiationmonitors,and(b)LOCA,and,~Scc0<sc~Ssiou~FC<a~ger4"ZTS,9,7,3>"g~g+iR+o~<crvc.lPpcF<ITvaTlPs(CKQF')5p~<~"iJ5'c<.f<oPZ<je198NSIN->sapp>caesnpaceosapplicableinplaceofANSIN509-1976,andANSP,l8NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2Ppg~<~f22.4.7.3(Continued)2.'fLD.3c.Atleastoncepermonthsor(1)afteranystructuralmaintenanceontheHEPAfilterorcharcoaladsorberhousingsor(2)followingpainting,A,fSfire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththfiltertrainsby:1.Verifyingthatthefiltertrainsatisfiesthein-placepenetrationandbypasstestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05KandusesthetestprocedureguidanceinPositionsC.S.a,C.S.c,andC.S;dof5<5,'l.+-RG1.52",Revision2,March197,andthesystemflowrate.is5..sn.b2250cfmt10K.o.>A<SX~rib-<<8~2.VerifyingwssaerrovathatalaboratoryanalysisofarepresentativecarbonsampleobtainedinaccordancewithPosi-tionC.6.bofRG1.52"Revision2Mah1978meetsthelaboratotestinriterasstonC..aoGl./5T~038b319,orameyiodieenetratsonoessthan0.17;an~g<<.f'c/a,<v<<<~<et<yo9oA.g,g,7,~>k3.Verifyingasubsysemlowrateocme10%duringsubsystemoperationwhentestedinaccordancewithANSIN510"1980.

PLANTSYSTEMSCONTROLROOMOUTQOORAIRSPECIALFILTERTRAINSYSTEMSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.7.3.e(Continued),nL,gski4Jegrg,gg,(g3.Verifyingthattheheatersdissipate7.95kWormorwhentestedinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980.Jf.AftereachcompleteorpartialreplacementofaHEPAfilterbankbyg,5','9erifyingthattheHEPAfilterbanksatisfiestheinplacepenetrationandbypassleakagetestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05XinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980whileoperatingthesystemataflow'ateof2250cfm+10K.<b~g.rtaraacbcompleteorpartialreplacementoracbarcoaladeorberbankbyverifyingthatthecharcoaladsorberbanksatisfiestheinplacepenetra-tionandbypassleakagetestingacceptancecriteriaoflessthan0.05XinaccordancewithANSIN510-1980forahalogenatedhydrocarbonrefrigeranttestgaswhileoperatingthesystemataflowrateof2250cfm+10K.NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT23/47-13Pgy~if'rfz2

120heatupendooldowncycles80stepchangeces198reactortripc$30hydrostaticendsmleakagetests704Fto555Fto704FLossoffeedwrheaters100%to0%ofTEDTHERMALPOWERPressurizedtoa9psiganda1250psigNINEMlLEPOINT-LINIT25-9AfhmAdlllentNO.84(gj

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSADMINISTRATIVE(continued)A.16A.17A.18A.i9Notused.Notused.CTS4.6.5.3.band4.7.3.crequirecertainSGTandCREFSystemfiltertestingfollowingpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththefiltertrains.ITS5.5.7onlyrequirestestingifthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseissignificant.CurrentNMP2practiceisthatnotallpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseresultsintheneedtoperformcertainventilationtests.Onlypainting,fire,orchemicalreleasethatcouldaffecttheventilationfiltertrains,i.e.,thatwhichissignificantwouldrequireperformanceofthetests.Theword"significant"wasaddedforclarityandconsistencywithcurrentpracticetoavoidamisinterpretationthatanypainting,fire,orchemicalrelease(suchasusingasmallcanofpainttodotouch-upworkinthereactorbuilding)wouldresultintheneedtoperformthetests.Thisclarificationisadministrative,andisconsistentwiththemostrecentlyapprovedBWR/5ITSamendment,WNP-2.Inaddition,theNRC,inalettertoEntergyOperations,Inc.,datedSeptember11,1997,supportedtheclarificationthatnotallpainting,fires,orchemicalreleasesrequiredthefiltertrainstobetested.CTS4.6.5.3.d.4requirestheSGTSystemheaterstodissipate20.0J2.0kWandCTS4.7.3.e.3requirestheCREFSystemheaterstodissipate>7.95kW.However,novoltageconditionstowhichtheheatersarenormalizedarespecified.Theaccidentanalysisassumesthedegradedvoltagecondition,therefore,ITS5.5.7.ewillspecifytheheatersmustdissipatetherequiredkWatdegradedvoltageconditions.ThecurrentheatervaluefortheCREFSystem(~7.95kW)isalreadynormalizedtodegradedvoltageconditions.However,theSGTSystemvalueisatnominalconditions(i.e.480V).Therefore,thevalueof20.0+2.0kW(i.e.18kWto22kW)isbeingchangedtothepropervaluewhennormalizedtodegradedvoltageconditions,i.e.,14.0kWto17.1kW.Sincethischangeisonlyapresentationpreferenceandtherequirementsarenotchanging,thischangeisconsideredadministrative.IlhINRELATEDPEIFIATINNoneNMP2Revisionggj

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHANGES-MRERESTRICTIVEM.1TwonewprogramsareincludedintheproposedTechnicalSpecifications.Theseprogramsare:ITS5.5.10ITS5.5.11TechnicalSpecification(TS)BasesControlSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP)TheTSBasesControlProgramisprovidedtospecificallydelineatetheappropriatemethodsandreviewsnecessaryforachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBases.TheSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramisincludedtosupportimplementationofthesupportsystemOPERABILITYcharacteristicsoftheTechnicalSpecifications.ThespecificwordingassociatedwiththesetwoprogramsmaybefoundinITS5.5.10and5.5.11~M.2ExpandedrequirementsfortheODCMareincludedintheproposedITS5.5.1.Theserequirementsidentifymonitoringactivitiesandreportrequirements,andestablishcontentandformatfordocumentinglicensee-initiatedchanges.TheseareconsistentwithGenericLetter89-01,andareadditionalrestrictionsonplantoperations.TEHNIALCHAN-LRTRICTIVE"Generic"LA.1ThedetailscontainedinCTS6.8.4.b,"In-PlantRadiationMonitoring,"areproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR,whereitcurrentlyresides(USAR,Chapter12).ThisprogramisrequiredbytheNMP2commitmenttoNUREG-0737,ItemIII.D.3.3asstatedintheUSAR,Section1.10.Thisprogramcontainscontrolstoensurethecapabilitytoaccuratelydeterminetheairborneiodineconcentrationinvitalareasunderaccidentconditions.Thisprogramisdesignedtominimizeradiationexposuretoplantpersonnelpost-accidentandhasnoimpactonnuclearsafetyorthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Thetrainingaspectoftheprogramisaccomplishedaspartofthecontinualtrainingprogramforpersonnelinthecognizant'organizations,aswellasduringthetrainingforthoseindividualsresponsibleforimplementingtheRadiologicalEmergencyPlanningprocedures.Provisionsformonitoringandperformingmaintenanceofthesamplingandanalysisequipmentareaddressedinchemistryandradiationprotectionprocedures.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)LA.2ThedetailscontainedinCTS6.8.4.d,"FireProtectionProgram,"areproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR,whereitcurrentlyresides(USAR,Appendix9A).ThisprogramisrequiredbyanNMP2commitmenttoBranchTechnicalPositionAPCSB9.5-1AppendixA,asstatedinUSAR,AppendixB.ITS5.4.1.dwillcontinuetorequirethatproceduresshallbeestablishedtoimplementandmaintaintheFireProtectionProgram.ThisisconsistentwithGenericLetter88-12,whichallowedtheFireProtectionProgramrequirementstoberelocatedtoplantcontrolleddocuments.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.3TheCTS6.14.2.a.3and6.14.2.brequirementsthattheODCMmustbereviewedandacceptedbytheStationOperationsReviewCommittee(SORC)priortoimplementationandtodocumentthisreviewandacceptanceareproposedtoberelocatedtoAppendixBoftheUSAR(QualityAssuranceProgramdescription).ThedetailsoftheSORCresponsibilitiescurrentlyresidesinSection13.4oftheUSAR.AcrossreferencetoSection13.4oftheUSARisproposedtobemadeinAppendixBoftheUSARsothatchangestotherelocatedrequirementwillbemadeinaccordancetothesamerequirementsofAppendixB.ThereviewactivitiesperformedbytheSORCarerequiredbyANSIN18.7-1976.Thus,theprovisionsarenotnecessarytobeincludedintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety,giventheexistenceoftheseredundantrequirements.ChangestoAppendixBintheUSARwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.54(a).LA.4DetailsoftheInserviceInspection(ISI)PrograminCTS4.0.5areproposedtoberelocatedtotheplantcontrolledISIProgram.TheISIProgramisrequiredby10CFR50;55atobeperformedinaccordancewithASMESectionXI.Compliancewith10CFR50.55aisrequiredbytheNMP2OperatingLicense.TheNMP2ISIProgram,outsideoftheCTS,implementstheapplicableprovisionsofASMESectionXI.GenericLetter88-01providesanISIProgramforpipinginaccordancewiththeNRCstaffpositionsonschedule,methods,personnel,andsampleexpansionorinaccordancewithalternatemeasuresapprovedbytheNRCstaff.NMP2commitmentstoGenericLetter88-01aredocumentedtotheNRCinaletterdatedJuly28,1988,anddonotneedtoberepeatedintheITS.RegulationsandNMP2commitmentstotheNRCcontainthenecessaryprogrammaticrequirementsforISIwithoutrepeatingthemintheITS.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheplantcontrolledISIProgramwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.55a.Inaddition,sincetheInserviceTestingProgramistheonlyrequirementremaining,thereferencetoASMECodeClass1,2,NMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVELA.4(cont'd)and3"components"hasbeenchangedto"pumpsandvalves"forclarity.PumpsandvalvesaretheonlycomponentsrelatedtotheInserviceTestingProgram(asdescribedinCTS4.0.5.a).LA.5DetailsoftheInserviceTestingProgram(IST)intheCTS4.0.5areproposedtoberelocatedtotheplantcontrolledISTProgram.Therelocatedrequirementsareduplicatedin10CFR50.55a,whichrequirestheimplementationofASME,SectionXIandapplicableaddenda,forinseryicetestingofASMECodeClass1,2,and3pumpsandvalves.Compliancewith10CFR50.55aisrequiredbytheNMP2OperatingLicense.Therefore,itisnotnecessarytoretainthedetailsproposedtoberelocatedintheITS,sincethesedetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheplantcontrolledISTprogramwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.55a.LA.6DetailsofthemethodsforimplementingCTS4.6.5.3.b.2,4.6.5.3.c,4.7.3.c.2,and4.7.3.darerelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TherequirementsofITS5.5.7areadequatetoensuretherequiredventilationfiltertestingisperformed.ProposedSR3.6.4.3.2ofITS3.6.4.3,"StandbyGasTreatment(SGT)System,"whichrequiresventilationfiltertestingoftheSGTSystemtobeperformedinaccordancewiththeVFTP,andproposedSR3.7.3.2ofITS3.7.3,"ControlRoomEnvelopeFiltration(CREF)System",whichrequiresventilationfiltertestingoftheCREFSystemtobeperformedinaccordancewiththeVFTP,andtherequirementsofITS5.5.7provideadequateregulatorycontrolsoverthetestingrequirementsproposedtoberelocated.Asaresult,therequirementsproposedtoberelocatedarenotrequiredtobeincludedintheTechnicalSpecificationstoensurerequiredventilationfiltertestingisadequatelyperformed.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.7ThedetailsforimplementingtherequirementscontainedinCTS3/4.11.1.4andCTS3/4.11.2.6areproposedtoberelocatedtotheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM).TherequirementsofITS5.5.8areadequatetoensurethequantityofradioactivityinoutsideliquidstoragetanksismaintainedwithinlimitsandexplosivegasmixturesinthemaincondenseroffgastreatmentsystemaremaintainedwithinlimits.ITS5.5.8providesregulatorycontroloverthelimitationsandsurveillancesproposedtoberelocated.ThedetailsproposedtoberelocatedarenotrequiredtobeincludedintheITStoensurethequantityofradioactivityinoutsideliquidstoragetanksismaintainedwithinlimitsandexplosivegasmixturesinthemaincondenseroffgastreatmentsystemareRevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNICALHANGES-LESSRTRITIVELA.7(cont'd)maintainedwithinlimits.Therefore,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.TheTRMwillbeincorporatedbyreferenceintotheNMP2USARatITSimplementation.ChangestotheTRMwillbecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.8DetailsofthecomponentsgovernedbyCTS5.7(ComponentCyclicorTransientLimit)areproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSAR.TherequirementtomonitorthecyclicandtransientoccurrencesismaintainedasaprograminITS5.5.5(ComponentCyclicorTransientLimit).ITS5.5.5providesadequateregulatorycontroloverthedetailstoberelocated.Asaresult,therelocateddetailsarenotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LA.9CTS6.5.2.11usesthetitle"PlantManager."InITS5.5.1.c.2,thisspecifictitleisreplacedwiththegenerictitle"plantmanager."ThespecifictitleisproposedtoberelocatedtotheUSARSection13.1,whichiswheretheorganizationalchartand.descriptionofthisspecifictitleiscurrentlylocated.TheallowancetorelocatethespecifictitleoutoftheTechnicalSpecificationsisconsistentwiththeNRCletterfromC.GrimestotheOwnersGroupsTechnicalSpecificationCommitteeChairmen,datedNovember10,1994.Thevarious~requirementsoftheplantmanagerarestillretainedintheITS.Inaddition,theITSalsorequirestheorganizationalcharttobeintheUSAR.Therefore,therelocatedspecifictitleisnotrequiredtobeintheITStoprovideadequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety.ChangestotheUSARarecontrolledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.LD.1TheFrequencyforperformingCTS6.8.4.a.2(ITS5.5.2.b)hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24months.Thisrequirementestablishesaprogramtoreduceleakagefromthoseportionsofsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccidenttoaslowaspracticallevels.TheproposedchangewillallowthisSurveillancetoextendtheSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthistestnormallypassestheSurveillanceatthecurrentFrequency.AnevaluationhasbeenNMP2RevisionA

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHANGES-LRTRITIVELD.1(cont'd)performedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.Thisconclusionisbaseduponthefactthatmostportionsofthesubjectsystemsincludedinthisprogramarevisuallywalkeddown,whiletheplantisoperating,duringplanttesting,and/oroperator/systemengineerwalkdowns.Inaddition,housekeeping/safetywalkdownsalsoservetodetectanygrossleakage.Ifleakageisobservedfromthesesystems,correctiveactionswillbetakentorepairtheleakage.Finally,theplantHealthPhysicsradiologicalsurveyswillalsoidentifyanypotentialsourcesofleakage.Thesevisualwalkdownsandsurveysprovidemonitoringofthesystemsatagreaterfrequencythatonceperrefuelingcycle,andsupporttheconclusionthattheimpact,ifany,onsafetyissmallasaresultoftheproposedchanges.LD2Thereviewofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedataalsodemonstratesthatthereisnoadversetrendthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpactonsystemavailability,ifany,issmallfromachangetoCTS6.8.4.a.2asimplementedinITS5.5.2.b.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequency,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)doesnotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.TheFrequencyforperformingCTS4.6.5.3.b.1,4.6.5.3.b.2,4.6.5.3.b.3,4.6.5.3.d.1,and4.6.5.3.d.4hasbeenextendedfrom'8monthsto24monthsinITS5.5.7.TheserequirementsensurethattheSGTSysteminplacecharcoaladsorbers,HEPAfilters,andheatersperformtheirsafetyfunction.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).ThisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.Anevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdata,andithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.USARSection6.5.1.4identifiesthatcharcoaladsorberandHEPAfilterin-placetestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52,whichstatesthattestingFrequenciesbeatleastonceper18months.TheSGTSystemfiltersradioactiveparticulatesandbothradioactiveandnonradioactiveformsofiodinefromtheairexhaustedfromthereactorenclosureand/orrefuelingareatomaintainanegativepressureNMP2RevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHANES-LRTRITIVELD.2(cont'd)duringsecondarycontainmentisolation.RegulatorypositionsC.5.candC.S.dofRegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2,stateHEPAfiltersandcarbonadsorbersshouldbein-placetested(1)initially,(2)atleastonceper18monthsthereafter,and(3)followingpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththesystem.PositionC.S.dalsostatesthatcarbonadsorbersshouldbein-placetestedfollowingremovalofanadsorbersampleforlaboratorytestingiftheintegrityoftheadsorbersectionisaffected.ITS5.5.7alsorequiresin-placefilterandcharcoaladsorbertestingandfilterpressuredroptestingafteranystructuralmaintenanceontheHEPAfilterorcharcoaladsorberhousingsorfollowingpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththeSGTSystem.Bytestingaftermaintenance,fire,chemicalrelease,painting,HEPAreplacement,orcharcoalreplacement,potentialchangesinHEPAfilterefficiency,carbonadsorberbypassleakage,andfilterpressuredropwillbedetectedthatwouldbedetectedbyconductingthe18monthsurveillancetests.TheSGTSystemisnormallyinstandby.Inaddition,theSGTSystemactivecomponentsandpowersuppliesaredesignedwithredundancytomeetthe.singleactivefailurecriteria,whichwillensuresystemavailabilityintheeventofafailureofoneofthesystemcomponents.BasedonthefactthattheSGTSystemisnormallyinstandbyandadditionaltestingwillbeperformedifpotentialdegradationoccursandthesystemdesign,itisshownthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthischange.Thereviewofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedataalsodemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpactonsystemavailability,ifany,issmallfromachangetoCTS4.6.5.3.b.1,4.6.5.3.b.2,4.6.5.3.b.3,4.6.5.3.d.1,and4.6.5.3.d.4asimplementedinITS5.5.7,5.'5.7.a,5.5.7,b,5.5.7.c,5.5.7.d,and5.5.7.e.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.LD.3TheFrequencyforperformingCTS4.7.3.c.1,4.7.3.c.2,4.7.3.c.3,4.7.3.e.1,and4.7.3.e.3hasbeenextendedfrom18monthsto24monthsinITS5.5.7.Theserequirementsensurethatin-placeControlRoomEnvelopeFiltrationSystemcharcoaladsorbers,HEPAfilters,andheatersarecapableofperformingtheirsafetyfunction.TheproposedchangewillallowtheseSurveillancestoextendtheirSurveillanceFrequencyfromthecurrent18monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof22.5monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2)toa24monthSurveillanceFrequency(i.e.,amaximumof30monthsaccountingfortheallowablegraceperiodspecifiedinCTS4.0.2andproposedSR3.0.2).Thisproposedchangewasevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovided10RevisionA 0

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHANES-LESSRTRITIVELD.3(cont'd)inNRCGenericLetterNo.91-04,"ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-MonthFuelCycle,"datedApril2,1991.ReviewsofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedatahaveshownthatthesetestsnormallypasstheirSurveillancesatthecurrentFrequency.AnevaluationhasbeenperformedusingthisdataandithasbeendeterminedthattheeffectonsafetyduetotheextendedSurveillanceFrequencywillbesmall.Table1.8-1(ConformancewithDivisionINRCRegulatoryGuides)andSection9.4.1.2.2oftheUSARidentifiesthatcharcoaladsorberandHEPAfilterin-placetestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52,whichstatesthattestingFrequenciesbeevery18months.TheControlRoomEnvelopeFiltration(CREF)Systemprovidesfiltrationforcontrolroomairintakeandrecirculatedairduringahighradiationaccidentandmaintainsapositivepressureinthecontrolroomduringcontrolroomisolation.RegulatorypositionsC.5.candC.5.dofRegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2,requireCREFSystemfiltersandcharcoaladsorbersbein-placetested(1)initially,(2)atleastonceper18monthsthereafter,and(3)followingpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththesystem.PositionC.5.dalsostatesthatcarbonadsorbersshouldbein-placetestedfollowingremovalofanadsorbersampleforlaboratorytestingiftheintegrityoftheadsorbersectionisaffected.ITS5.5.7alsorequiresin-placefilterandcharcoaladsorbertestingandfilterpressuredroptestingafteranystructuralmaintenanceontheHEPAfilterorcharcoaladsorberhousingsorfollowingpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththeCREFSystem.Bytestingaftermaintenance,fire,chemicalrelease,painting,HEPAreplacement,orcharcoalreplacement,potentialchangesinHEPAfilterefficiency,carbonadsorberbypassleakage,andfilterpressuredropwillbedetectedthatwouldbe'etectedbyconductingthe18monthsurveillancetests.TheCREFSystemisnormallyinstandby.Inaddition,theCREFSystemactivecomponentsandpowersuppliesaredesignedwithredundancytomeetthesingleactivefailurecriteria,whichwillensuresystemavailabilityintheeventofafailureofoneofthesystemcomponents.BasedonthefactthattheCREFSystemisnormallyinstandbyandadditionaltestingwillbeperformedifpotential'degradationoccursandthesystemdesign,itisshownthattheimpact,ifany,onsystemavailabilityissmallasaresultofthischange.Thereviewofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedataalsodemonstratesthattherearenofailuresthatwouldinvalidatetheconclusionthattheimpactonsystemavailability,ifany,issmallfromachangetoCTS4.7.3.c.1,4.7.3.c.2,4.7.3.c.3,4.7.3.e.1,and4.7.3.e.3asimplementedinITS5.5.7,5.5.7.a,5.5.7.b,5.5.7.c,5.5.7.d,and5.5.7.e.Inaddition,theproposed24monthSurveillanceFrequencies,ifperformedatthemaximumintervalallowedbyproposedSR3.0.2(30months)donotinvalidateanyassumptionsintheplantlicensingbasis.NMP2RevisionA y/

DISCUSSIONOFCHANGESITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALSTEHNIALHAN-LRTRITIVE(continued)"Specific"NoneNMP212RevisionA 0

CT5)5.2OrganizationOrganization5.25.2.24,2.h./,)$,z,},,~)~i'fWKT$TF-bC~rF-45unitStaff(continued)1.Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursstraight,excludingshiftturnovertime;2.Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursinany24hourperiod,normorethan24hoursinany48hourperiod,normorethan72hoursinany7dayperiod,allexcludingshiftturnovertime;3.Abreakofatleast8hoursshouldbeallowedbetweenworkperiods,includingshiftturnovertime~)4.Exceptduringextendedshutdownperiods,theuseofovertimeshouldbeconsideredonanindividualbasisandnotfortheentirestaffonashift.~~g,Anydeviationfromeaboveuidelinesshallbeauthorizedinavanceeanerinnenordesignee,inaccorancewiapprovedadministraiveprocedures,orbyhigherlevelsofmanagement,inaccordancewithestablishedproceduresandwithdocumentationofthebasisforgrantingthedeviation.gTF-4$Controlsshallbeincludedintheproceduressuchthaindividualovertimeshallbereviewedmonthlyby[1tneordesigneetoensurethatexcessivehoursavenotbeenassigned.Routinedeviationfromtheaboveguidelinesisnotauthorized.~0TheamounofovertimeworkedbyunitstfmembersperformisafetyrelatedfunctionsshalbelimitedandcontroldinaccordancewiththeNRCPicyStatementonworkinhours(GenericLetter82-12).gPLCsBC)cotyetattOS\ekeaciawho'f,yepnrr'ieersgta,h.>)(6.z.~).g.shgg+<pMViQo~Theetions'naerorAssistt0eraonsnaeshaloan0license.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisorTAshallrovideadvisorytechnicalsuorttothe'urvisointheareasoermayrauics,reacorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationoftheunit.Inaddition,theSTAshallmeetthequalificationsspecifiedbytheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift.BMR/6STS5.0-4Rev1,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:5.2-ORGANIZATION1.Thebracketshavebeenremovedandtheproperplantspecificinformationhasbeenprovided.2.Typographical/grammaticalerrorcorrected.3.SinceNMP2isasingleunit,theEquipmentOperatorrequirementshavebeenrevisedforclarity.Also,thebracketedinformationregardingdualunitsiteshasbeendeleted.4.ThereferencedrequirementisaSpecification,notaCFRrequirement.Therefore,theword"Specification"hasbeenaddedtoclearlystatethat"5.5.2.a"isaSpecification.Inaddition.Specification5.5.2.ghasbeendeletedsinceitonlydescribestheSTAqualifications,notthatanSTAispartoftheshiftcrewcompositionandwhentheSTAisrequired(i.e.,MODES1,2,and3).5.ThesewordshavebeenaddedtoITS5.5.2.dforconsistencywithasimilarstatementinITS5.5.2.candthecurrentlicensingbasis.6.TheSTAprovidesadvisorytechnicalsupporttoallmembersoftheshiftcrew,includingtheStationShiftSupervisorandAssistantStationShiftSupervisor(i.e.,theNUREGShiftSupervisorposition).Inaddition,theSTApositioncouldbefilledbytheASSS(providedtheASSSmeetstheappropriaterequirements).ToprecludeconfusionthatcouldarisewhentheSTApositionisfilledbytheASSS(e.g.,cantheSTAprovideadvicetohin>self/herselfastheASSS),thestatementastowhotheSTAprovidesadvicetohasbeenntodittedtousethegenericterm"shiftsupervision."(Qp7.TheproperplantspecificdepartinentdescriptionhasbeenprovidedinITS5.2.1.dand5.2.2.e.NMP2Revision+Qp

/cry)5.5ProgramsandManualsProgramsandManuals5.5RadioactiveffluentControlsProram(continued)thepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonablyachievable.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheODCM,shallbeimplementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsareexceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a.b.+g4,IM<SMA,~curac8sP4H.5<odValucScAe.7sJscgCNa5~4f,Qh.LimitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCM;Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialtalocal"-R,releasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingtoQEZSKZAppendix8,Table2,Column;wc.z.qo2.Monitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.1302andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCM;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromeachunittounrestrictedareas,conformingto10CFR'50,AppendixI;Determinationofcumulativeand'projecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCMatleastevery31days;Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiodof31dayswouldexceed2Xoftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50AppendixI;Limitationsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivmaterialreleasedinaseouseffluentstoareaseyonthesseounarormingeocubaewdix8T12ColLimitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesresultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromeach(continued)8WR/6STS5.0-9Revl.,04/07/95

INSERT5.5.4.shallbeinaccordancewiththefollowing:Fornoblegases:adoserate,~500mrems/yrtothewholebodyandadoserate~3000mrems/yrtotheskin,and2.Foriodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflivesgreaterthan8days:adoserate~1500mrems/yrtoanyorgan;InsertPage5.0-9

/'~'~'E(pvpgiagof+icp+~~)C&C~'c~C+AnavSI,+~~Sb.>J<)G~s<wcg>c'ag$>$(c~4o>~>zg~~~hc'caseyasJaw4lr'rcso~c.bIyac.h:cv~6lc,ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals5.5.4~~RadioactiveffluentControlsProam(continued)unittoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,Appendix1;+H~oucs<<<i~sR3W.l.~$Sasg,z4PP~icahLc4~4~*~C'ClaeA+an'tRg~~rve<l(<wee~Q~Pcres,J~Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromeachunittoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conform'o10CFR50,AppendixI;JQordc5j+ovLimitationsontheannualseorosanymemberofthepublictoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190'5.5.5ComonentCclicorTrasinmiThisprogramprovidescontrolstotracktheAR,,Seion,<<fc:scyclicandtransientoccurrencestoensuretatcomponentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.5.5.6Pre-SessedConcreteContainmentendonSurveillanceProamThiprogramprovidescontrolsormonitoringanytendodradationinpre-stressed'cretecontainments,inudingfectiveness.ofitscorrosinprotectionmedium,tonsurecontainmentstructuralintrity;Theprogramshalincludebaselinemeasurementspritoinitialoperations.TheTendonSurveillanceProgram,inectionfrequencies,andacceptance'criteriashallbeinacordancewith[RegulatoryGuide1.35,Revision3,1989].Theprovisionsof3.0.2andSR3.0.3areplicabletotheTendonSurveillanPrograminspectionfreqencies.5.5nserviceTestinProrampu~saHva)vsThisprogramprovidescontrolsforinserviceesingofASHECodeClass1,2,and3pTF-R>(continued)BMR/6STS50-10Rev1,04/07/95

(cps)5.5ProgramsandHanualsProgramsandHanuals5.55.5.entilationFilterTestinProramVFTP(continued)q',t.0'.3,Q.I)9).3.u.I)d.g$5(5.3egggg'Ltf8OemonstrateforeachoftheESFsystemsthattheressuredropacrossthecombinedHEPAfilteranthecharcoaladsorbersislessthantevaluesecifiedbelowwhentested>naceaorH-attessemflowratespecifiedbelow28ESFVentilationSystemOelta'"'~~lowrat(c7~)SGT'pa<i..~Qe004V~/eaa2.cngFyszcdjtige)Qgcagit'febvdplkytptheESFsystems~>is'wiOemonstratethattheheatersforeachofdissipatethevaluespecifiedbelowwhentestedinaccordancewith$ASHEN510-19OESFVentilationSystemMattagkg/sar5'>~~-~M<FSystemq,g,S'.Z.dv)0'7,3,e.,3)e.aTHiS'TcJS'equi9rt3PAiea~>'79$$.5.'7-Saa33IThe>stoneoSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheVFTPtestfrequencies.(PeCb.ls)"7xlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivitHonitor-'.nProram'hisroramrovidescontrolsforpotentiallyexplosivegasm>xuresconta>ne>nthasasopysm,an>royna>ninasfedinothfastandthequantityofradioactivltcontainedinunprotectedoutdoorliquidstoraetanks'.Theseouoac>viyquan>eaeeermineolowngtemethodoogyintBranchTenicalPositionTP)ETSB11-5"PostatedRadioactiveleaseduetoMaeGasSystemeakorFaile"].Theliquidadwastequantitisshallbederminedinacrdancewitht'StanrdReviewPlan,ection15.7a3"PostulatedRioactiveReleaseetoTankFailurs"].hn~.~Cymar.~s~rQ]y)<sjn,q~~qSpsee~(continued)BMR/6STS5.0-13Rev1,04/07/95

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALS16.(continued)SurveillanceProgram(ITS5.5.8.b).Therefore,thesentenceintheintroductoryparagraphisnotnecessarytospecifyamethodtodetermineliquidradwastequantities.17.TherequirementtolimitoxygenintheMainCondenserOffgasTreatmentSystemhasbeendeletedconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis.18.TheseprovisionsinISTS5.5.9.bareonlyforthePWRsandarenotapplicableforNMP2.Duetothisdeletion,thefollowingSpecificationhasbeenrenumbered.19.Thelimitforthequantityofradioactivityinunprotectedoutdoorliquidstoragetankshasbeenchangedtobeconsistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasislimit.20.ThefollowingchangeshavebeenmadetoISTS5.5.10:alTheallowancetoperformaspeciticgravitydeterminationhasbeenaddedtoISTS5.5.10.a.1,consistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis(asdescribedinthecurrentBasesforLCO3.8.1,whichwereapprovedbytheNRCinAmendment70).b.TherequirementtoverifypropercolorinISTS5.5.10.a.3hasbeendeleted,consistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis(alsoapprovedinAmendment70).C.Thetypeoffueloil,Type2D,hasbeendeletedconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis.d.Theterm"samplingand"inISTS5.5.9.bhasbeendeletedtoavoidconfusionastowhenthe31daysstarts.Thisisconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis(alsoapprovedinAmendinent70).e.ThewordsinISTS5.5.10.c"MethodA-2orA-3"havebeenchangedto"MethodA"inITS5.5.9.ctobeconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasis.ThisisalsoconsistentwithTSTF-120.21.Thesewordshavebeenaddedforclarity.22.The10CFR50AppendixJTestingProgramhasbeenaddedtobeconsistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasisandTSTF-52.23.TheserequirementsinITS5.5.4arecurrentlylocatedinindividualSpecificationsintheCTS.Thus,CTS4.0.2(ITSSR3.0.2)andCTS4.0.3(ITSSR3.0.3)applytotheCTSsurveillancefrequencies.Tomaintainconsistencywiththecurrentlicensingbasisrequirements,anallowancethatSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletothesurveillancefrequencieshasbeenaddedtoITS5.5.4.ThischangeisconsistentwithNMP2RevisionÃ

JUSTIFICATIONFORDEVIATIONSFROMNUREG-1434,REVISION1ITS:5.5-PROGRAMSANDMANUALS23(continued)TSTF-258,Rev.3,exceptthatintheNMP2submittal,thewordsare"surveillancefrequencies"inlieuof"surveillancefrequency"sincethesurveillancetestsrequiredbyITS5.5.4arenotallperformedatthesamefrequency.NMP2RevisionP@

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