ML20088A202

Petition to Show Cause on Revocation of Low Power License & Denial of Full Power License Re Transamerica Delaval, Inc Generators.Summary of Generator Operation Experience Encl

ML20088A202
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	03/29/1984
From:	Stewart C JACKSONIANS UNITED FOR LIVABLE ENERGY POLICIES
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8404110200
Download: ML20088A202 (36)

Text

Y March 29,1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION 00,, TfD BEFORE THE C MMISSION

'84 !!R 10 p;):44 In the Matter of ) ._' 'r-

)

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT-COMPANY,et al. ) D'o'cket No.

(Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1) -

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g- f/ h SHOW CAUSE PETITION FROM JACKSONIANS UNITED FOR LIVABLE ENERGY POLICIES ON T. D. I. GENERATORS, REQUESTING REVOCATION OF LOW POWER LICENSE AND DENIAL OF A FULL POWER OPERATING LICENSE FOR GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 I. INTRODUCTION. '

1. Comes now Jacksonians United for Livable Energy Policies (hereinafter " Petitioner" or

" JULEP") to petition the Commissioners of the' U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,'Section 2.206, to serve upon Mississippi Power and Light Company (" Licensee" or "MP&L") an order to show cause, pursuant to.

10 C.F.R. 2.202(a), why the low' power license for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, should not be revoked, a stay of operation issued, the p' ending application for an operating license denied,and a proceeding initiated under 42 U.S.C. 2239(a).

II. DESCRIPTION OF PETITIONER

2. JULEP is a public interest organization formed in 1979 to address issues of nuclear power, and utility rates and conduct. Members have testified at Atomic Safety.and Licensing Board Panel hearings and environmental hearings on Grand Gulf and have written letters pro-

. testing Grand Gulf to the NRC. The~ organization is currently involved in proceedings to challenge certain technical changes in the operating license for Grand Gulf, Unit 1. Several

- members of JULEP live within 20 miles or less of Grand Gulf.

III. ' AUTHORITY

3. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,2.206(a), establishes the right of the public to petition the Commission to institute a proceeding pursuant to 2.202(a) to modify, k

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suspend, or revoke a license or for other relief. Such a petition must set forth the factual basis and the relief requested. The Commission may, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.202(a), institut'e such a proceeding by servicing upon the licensee an order to show cause.

IV. DISCRETIONARY HEARING

4. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives discretion to revoke, suspend, or modify the construction permit of an NRC licensee:

A license or construction permit may be revoked, suspended or modified in whole or in part, for any material false statement in the application for license or in the supplemental or other statement of fact required by the applicant,or because of conditions revealed by the application for license or statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means which would warrar;t the Commission to refuse to grant a license in an original application; or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accorda.nce with the terms of the construction permit or license or the technical specifications in the application; or for the violation of or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this chapter, or of any regu-lation of the Commission.

42 U.S.C. 2236. Notwithstanding the discretionary aspect of this statute, the NRC has a manda-tory duty to exercise its authority when necessary and is required to determine that there will be adequate protection of the public health and safety. See Natural Resource Defense Council vs.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,528 F. 2d 166 (2d Cir.1978). The Supreme Court has determined that the Atomic Energy Act mandates that "the public safety is the first,last and permanent consideration in any decision of . . a license to operate a nuclear facility." Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians,367 U.S. 396,402 (1961), quoting In re Power Reactor Development pa,1 A.E.C.128,136 (1959).

5. JULEP seeks consideration of whether the Licensee has met and will continue to meet the requirements of the Rules and Regulations of the NRC, and further,whether there exists reasonable assurance that continued low power operation, and issuance of a full power license to the Licensee, will not jeopardize the public health and safety.

6. There is no existing forum to address the matters at issue. The operating license for Grand Gulf was uncontested. A request for hearing and petition to intervene filed at this stage pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.714 would be untimely. At the time the Operating License application for Grand Gulf, Unit 1, was noticed, JULEP did not represent affected members of the public, and was unable to contemplate an active role as intervenor.

7. The lack of an existing forum does not alter the fact that a utility bears the burden of preof. As the Commission has stated:

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We think it ineluctable that a utility must bear the burden of proving compliance with the Commission's safety regulations not only at the beginning and at the end of the nuclear licensing process - but, as in this case -when called upon at some interim point to "show cause" why a construction permit should not be lifted for unsafe construction practices.

Consumer Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-315, 3 N.R.C.101,104 (1976). A petitioner need only provide the NRC staff with " sufficient reason" to look into the matter of revocation of a license, but is not required to assume the burden itself. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, et al. (Indian Point Units 1,2 and 3), CLI-75-8,2 N.R.C.173, 177 (1975). Public safety, as well as the right of the public to due process of law, dictate that this should be so.

8. Regardless of the lack of an existing forum, the public is entitled to a hearing in order to protect the public interest in its health and safety. As Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference

v. Federal Power Commission,354 F. 2d 608 (1965), demonstrates,the NRC is under an obliga-

. tion to consider all relevant information in an effort to protect the public interest, especially.in an issue of this type where concern for public health and safety is so great.

9. A petitioner,in requesting a show cause order, must show that " substantial health or safety issues [have] been raised." Indian Point, supra, at 177. Another test against which any request for a discretionary hearing must be judged is whether such a proceeding would serve any' "useful purpose." Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI 8010,11 N.R.C. 438,443 (1980). In the instant case, the lack of inter-vention in the licensing of Grand Gulf notwithstanding, the matter of the operation of tlie plant is of great concern _ to residents of Mississippi. Enormous cost' overruns, resulting predicted increases in utility rates, and a history of delays, management and technical difficulties, and the falsification of training data of employees at Grand Gulf have given rise to tremendous interest and concern about the plant. As will be shown, the problems forming the base of this request point to an inevitability of harm to public health and safety. The understandable interest of the public can ,only be addressed in a public forum. The long history of problems has caused the public to lose faith in the regulatory process.~ Regulation of Grand Gulf, because of the lack of prior pnblic intervention, has been conducted largely out of the public eye.

10. The "useful purpose" served by a discretionary hearing is the technical resolution of

. problems resulting in a greater degree of safety afforded to the public. Suspending orders can be used to remove a threat to the public health and safety. The primary test of "useful purpose" is liased on what type of regulatory action best serv,es the public welfare.

11. Given the EJcensee's constant failures to meet reguhtions - indeed, its apparently deliberate breaking of. regulations in the case of employee training - and the enormous number of discrepancies between physical plant and specifications, it can only be concluded that neither the NRC nor the Licensee knows what has been constructed. The relief reouested by the peti-tioner, including 100% review of the design and as-built plant and an adjudicatory determination of both the quality of the Licensee's plant and management,is the only method of determining that operation of this facility will not pose a threat to the public health and safety. This,in essence, is a determination of the " inevitability of harm," based on the extent to which the Licensee has conformed to the NRC's regulations.

V. 10 C.F.R. SECTION 50, APPENDIX A, CRITERIA

12. Grand Gulf, Unit 1, received a low power license in June 1982. Discovery of a design flaw requiring modifications delayed completion of low power testing until late last year. In the NRC-conducted Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) annual Board reviews,'MP&L management has consistently scored poorly. Grand Gulf received a license despite the fact that approximately 200 technical specifications and 600 surveillance procedures were in error, despite the fact that the qualifications of operators were apparently falsified,and despite the fact that the drywell cooling system was inadequately designed and constructed.

Some of the erroneous surveillance procedures were submitted for equipment that does not even exist at the plant. Some of the incorrect technical specifications were written for a different size and type containment building than the one at Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf, Unit 1,is the first U.S. boiling water reactor to use Mark III containment. MP&L has no previous nuclear experi-ence. Until very recently, none of the operating staff had operated a commercial reactor. In light of all these factors, Grand Gulf should have received the strictest scrutiny by the NRC.

Hugh Thompson of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has admitted that neither staff nor applicant review of the technic'al specifications was adequate (Inside NRC, March 5,1984,

p. 9). Prior to licensing, the NRC sent MP&L a copy of technical specifications for a Mark II containment plant, expecting the licensee to review and adjust them to meet the actual physical

- plant. MP&L did not do this. NRC assumed that it had and issued a low power license. None of the problems - the considerable discrepancies in technical specifications and surveillance procedures, the falsification of operator training data, a design flaw requiring modification -

were even discovered until after issuance of the license. No public hearing has been held on these

y issues, nor was a prior public hearing held when the NRC agreed to waive certain technical requirements in September 1983. In spite of these problems, and consistent poor performance of Licensee management, the NRC has repeatedly assured itself that corrective actions have been

- initiated which will result in the fulfillment of NRC regulations. Nothing in the existence or history of this plant justifies this excusing.

13. The Licensee has been, a'nd continues to be, incapable of meeting NRC requirements, particularly Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Section 50. Criterion 17 under IIin Appendix A states:.

The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and test-ability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure."

VI. INADEQUATE ONSITE ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION

14. Two of the three electrical generating engines at Grand Gulf are Model DSRV 16, supplied by Transamerica Delaval (TDI). These engines have experienced significant problems in, completing the pre operational test program, have had several major failures,includin'g a fuelline break which caused a fire, and many minor failures. The problems to date include:

3/81 Excessive turbocharger thrust bearing wear; 4/81 Non-class IE motors supplied with EDG auxiliary system pumps; 11/81 Piston crown separation during operation; 1/82 Governor lobe oil cooler located too high, creating possibility of trapping air-in the system; 3/82 Air start sensing line not seismically supported; 3/82 Engine pneumatic logic improperly designed, creating possibility of prema-ture engine shutdown; 3/82 The crankcase cover capscrew failed, with head lodging in and shorting out the generator; 6/82 Air starting valve capscrews replaced because they were too long for holes; 8/82 The flexible drive coupling material incompatible with the operating environ-ment; 8/82- The latching relay failed during testing; 7/83 Air start valve failures;.

8/83 High pressure fuelinjection line fr.iled; 8/83 Cracks in connecting push red welds discovered; 9/83 The fuel oil line failed, causing a major fire; 9/83 Unqualified instrument cable; 10/83 Fuel oil leak; 10/83 Cracked ptish rod weld; 1983 Turbocharger mounting bolt failures; 1V83- Cracked jacket water welds;

- 1983 Turbocharger vibration; 12/83 Cylinder head cracks; 12/83 Cracks in piston skirts in Division II EDG;

' During EDG Installation ' Cylinder head cracks.

15. The long-history of problems with TDI generators at Grand Gulf and other plants (see Attachment 1) demonstrates that they cannot be depended upon to function when needed.

Th.is leaves only one dependable source of electric power in the event of an emergency. This does not meet the redundancy required by the NRC.

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16. The Licensee proposes to jury rig gas turbines to overcome the problem (see Attach-ment 2). At the February 29 NRC Commission meeting,MP&L indicated that these gas turbines would require 10-15 minutes to come to power as opposed to the 1015 seconds now required for the diesel generators (February 29 Briefing on the Status of Grand Gulf before the NRC,

i. page 18). This long delay is totally unacceptable in the course of an accident.

17. MP&L has proposed to switch the third non-TDI diesel generator, which is dedicated to the High Pressure Core Spray system (HPCS), over to carry other loads during an accident.

This would result in tha HPCS being taken out of service (February 29 Briefing,page 18). This results in a loss of a vital emergency response system.

18. It is clear that the TDI generators are completely unreliable. The NRC has expressed concern over the multiple and seemingly endless problems with the generators. Harold Denton, the NRC's director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has directed that no nuclear plant be allowed to operate with a TDI emergency diesel generator until technical questions about their operating history are answered (see Attachment 3). Last October, Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division 1-of Licensing,in a letter to NRC Commissioners stated that "the identification of QA problems at TDI, taken together with the number of operational problems and the Shoreham crankshaft failure, has reduced the staff's level of confidence in the reliability of all TDI diesel generators."

(See Attachment 4.) Certainly no exception or reduction in scrutiny should be made for Grand

~ Gulf, particularly in light of the fact that it is precisely the lack of vigilant regulation and scrutiny that has resulted in a plant with the magnitude of problems present at Grand Gulf being per-mitted to operate at all.

19. The proposals of the Licensee to deal with this, to jury rig gas turbines and to switch the HPCS diesel power over, are makeshift measures to try and compensate for serious deficien-cies. This licensee has been unable to conform specifications to physical plant. It is question-able, given the poor management, training data falsification, and discrepancies in specifica-tions and surveillance procedures, w'hether MP&L really understands the construction and opera-tion of Grand Gulf, Unit 1. If they have not proved competent to even conform to the most basic regulations, they certainly should not be considered competent to implement makeshift

- measures.- For the NRC to allow this, and once again permit MP&L to proceed in the face of ,

problems and inadequate scrutiny, would be inexcusable.

20. The crankshafts of the TDI generators are inadequately designed. In similar TDI diesel engines at the Shoreham Nuclear Station operated by Long Island Lighting, one crankshaft broke

and cracks appeared on the remaining crankshafts. Crankshaft problems have also occurred at the Catawba plant operated by Duke Power Company. The TDI generators at Catawba and Grand Gulf are identical.

21. The pistons are inadequately designed. Early on at Grand Gulf, piston crown separa-tion occurred during operation. They were returned to TDI for rework. TDI is the source of the TDI generator malfunctions. There is no indication that any change in design has occurred to ensure that the separation, or other problems, will not recur. Defective performance of the pistons has occurred almost across the board with TDI generators, both at nuclear plants and on marine operation. (See Attachment 1.)

22. The cylinder heads are inadequately designed. At Grand Gulf, three heads have already had to be replaced due to cracks. Again, cylinder malfunctions have occurred across the board with TDI generators. Only redesign, and not replacement, will ensure proper operation!

23. The fuel lines are inadequately designed and/or installed. Numerous fuel line failures have occuyred at Grand Gulf. One resulted in a major fire. Fuel oillines at Shoreham ruptured.

VIL N. R. C. ENFORCEMENT

24. The responsibilities of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I & E) are established by 10 C.F.R.1.64:

The Office of Inspection and Enfo1 cement develops policies and administers programs for: Inspecting licensees to ascertain whether they are complying with NRC regulations, rules, orders, and license provisions, and to determine whether these licensees are taking appropriate actions to protect nuclear materials and facilities, the environment, and the health and safety of the public; inspect-ing applicants for licenses, as a basis for recommending issuance or denial of a limited work authorization, construction permit or an operating license; inspect-ing suppliers of safety-related services, components, and equipment to determine whether they have established quality assurance programs that meet NRC criteria; investigating incidents, accidents, allegations, and unusual circumstances including those -involving loss, theft, 'o'r diversion of special nuclear material; enforcing Commission orders, regulations, rules, and I: cense provisions; recommending changes in licenses and standards, based on the results of inspections,investiga-tions',hnd enforcement actioni; and notifying licensees regarding generic problems so as to achieve appropriate precautionary or corrective action. . . . NRC's five Regional Offices are responsible for carrying out inspections and investigations.

25. The lack'of decisive actions on the part of I & E, Region II, to ensure that this Licensee meets Appendix A requirements, as well as other regulations, has resulted in conditions that present a serious threat to public health:and safety. The staff has allowed the Licensee to get by withiprospective commitments, w'ith the result that past defects are not adequetely analyzed

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- or corrected.. It is inappropriate and tota'.ly unacceptable for the NRC to continue to accept the Lidensee coming forwani with new " plans" in which it proposes to meet NRC criteria.

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- 26.~ There is no' assurance that the public record, upon which the Petitioner must rely, is in any way complete, It is r,elevant to note that James J. Cummings, director of the Office of Investigator and Auditor (OIA), responsible for authorizing allinvestigations,was removed from his position by the Commissioners in September 1983. The public has no way to know what matters the NRC and the Licensee have " settled" between themselves, whether properly or improperly.

'VIII. RELIEF REQUESTED

27. Petitioner, having shown herein that the Licensee, Mississippi Power and Light Com.

pany, has failed to meet the criteria of 10 C.F.R. Section 50 for electric power systems, requests the revocation of the low power license of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, and a stay of operation,in that prior knowledge of the scope and substance of the Licensee's failure to meet NRC requirements would have caused the Commission to refuse the original application. More.

over, the foregoing has demonstrated that the NRC cannot yet make the finding required by 10 C.F.R. Section 50.57 for issuance of an operating license that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized could be conducted without endangering the public health and safety, and thus the pending application for full power license should be denied.

28. The request for a revocation of the low power license not.vithstanding,the petitioner requests further relief, to include:

(1) . Appointment of an independent panel of investigators from outside the agency to investigate (a) possible improprieties and illegal acts by NRC inspectors and investigators; (b) the

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handling by.the OIA of the improprieties which have been previously identified; and (c) the effectiveness of NRC Region II in fulfilling the mandated responsibility to enforce the regulations of the NRC which exist to ensure protection of the public health and safety; (2) Modification of the operating license to include (a) removal from the management organization of those responsible for past failures at Grand Gulf; (b) implementation and verifi.

cation of corrective actions for allidentified deviations from requirements; and (3)' Hearings before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

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IX. CONCLUSION

29. 'As the foregoing petition has illustrated, the Licensee has not designed, constructed and documented Grand Gulf in compliance with the regulations of 10 C.F.R. Section 50 and

in conformity with the terms of its technical specifications and operating license. The evidence presented herein is only that which is in the public record and is but a fraction of the findings made by the NRC over the course of the regulatory history of Grand Gulf.

30. WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for an order granting the requested relief set forth above.

Respectfully submitted, M. L . ~3 '

C'yrfthia Stewart Jacksonians United for Livable Energy Policies 4

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a Delaval Diesel Generator Operation Experience U. S. Nuclear Experience In 1974, the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCo) contracted with TDI to purchase three emergency diesel generators for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. This was the first order received by TDI to provide an EDG for a comercial nuclear power station. In the next seven years, engines for 14 other plants were ordered from TDI.

San Onofre 1 Two TDI Diesel Engines Installed in 1976 - DSRV-20 Serial No. 75041/42, Ratedat6000KW(nominal) 8800KW (peak)

Engine Run Time to Date - 450 hours0.00521 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.440476e-4 weeks <br />1.71225e-4 months <br /> per engine The first plant to actually place a TDI engine into nuclear service was San Onofre Unit 1 (SONGS 1), which purchased two V-20 units to provide emergency power for its feed pumps, which also serve as Emergency Core Cooling System pumps.

The enoines at SONGS I were installed in 1976, and declared operational in April 1977. Since then, SONGS has experienced some problems with the operation of the engine turbochargers, a lube oil pressure sensing line failure which resulted in a fire, and several other minor problems. Because SONGS did not comit to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.108, but rather Regulatory. Guide 1.9, the program it used to test the engines before they were placed in service was'more abbreviated than for a new plant. A detailed list of problems to date follows.

Date Problem Cause/ Solution' l 12/80 Excessive Turbocharger No lube oil during standby.

thrust bearing wear. Lube oil system modified.

l 10 CFR Part 21 report issued because problem generic.

i 7/81 Lube oil leak and fire. Excessive vibration of a lube oil test line which had inadvertently been left installed by the licensee.

Line removed.

12/81 Piston modification to Pistons reworked by TDI to prevent crown separation. respond to Part 21 report.

Problem identified at Grand Gulf. .

9/83 Unqualified instrument Replaced in accordance with ~

cable. Part 21 report.

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Grand Gulf Two TDI engines installed - Model DSRV-16

• Serial No. 74033/34, Rated at 7000KW Operating Hours to Date - Division I = 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />; Division II = 700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> In 1981, Mississippi Power & Light (MP&L) commenced pre-operational testing of two V-16 engines installed at Grand Gulf Unit 1. They represent the first V-16 units ordered from TDI, and in fact, one of the Grand Gulf e ,gines was used to qualify the entire TDI V-16 line of nachines for nuclear applications. ,

The Grand Gulf engines have experienced significant problems in completing the pre-operational test program, have had several major failures, including a fuel line break which caused a fire, and many minor failures. A detailed list of problems at Grand Gulf follows.

Date Problem Cause/ Solution 11/81

Piston crown separation during Holddown studs failed.

operation. Pistons returned to TDI for rework. Generic problem.

3/81 Excessive turbocharger thrust No lube oil during standby.

bearing wear. Lube oil system modified.

6/11/82 Air starting valve capscrews Response to Part 21 report.

replaced. Too long for holes.

8/23/82 Flexible drive coupling material Replaced with different incompatible with operating material.

environment.

8/82 Latching relay failed during Relay replaced.

testing.

3/8/82 Air start sensing line not Sensing line relocated and seismically supported, properly supported.

1/29/82 Bovernor lube oil cooler Lube oil cooler relocated to located too high. Possibility lower elevation, of trapping air in system.

3/23/82 Engine pneumatic logic Pneumatic logic design improperly design. Could corrected. '

. result in premature engine shutdown.

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Cause/ Solution Problem Motors replaced with Class IE qualified motors.

Non-Class IE motors supplied

/81 with EDG auxiliary system pumps. Capscrews replaced with higher strength screws.

Crankcase cover capscrew 5/82 failed.

Head lodged in generator and shorted it out.

Lock tab washers installe Manufacturing defect inTubing replaced tubing.

' High pressure fuel injection _

'2/83 line failed. High cycle fatigue ofAdditional Caused Swagelock fitting.

-Fuel oil line failed. tubing supports to be f4/83 major. fire. installed.

All push rods replaced.

Cracks in connecting push 8/11/83

' rod welds. Turbocharger replaced.

Turbocharger vibration. Excessive turbocharger welds. Cracks re-1983 vibration.

Cracked jacket water welded.

1983 ,

Excessive turbochargerBolts replaced.

vibration.

Turbocharger mounting bolt System cleaned 1983 failures, Cause unknown.and several valves re Air start valve failures. More frequent maintenance L 7/83-scheduled.

Tubing replaced.

' Push rod replaced.

Fuel oil leak.

10/28/83 Cracked push rod weld. Head replaced.

Cylinder head cracks.

I During EDG Two heads replaced.

.. Installation Cylinder he'ad cracks. All Division II pistonsDivis' ion I piston

- 12/83 replaced. .

, Cracks in piston skirts to be inspected.

12/83 on Division II EDG. Replaced in response to Part 21 report.

Unqualified instrume'nt cable.

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Shoreham Three TDI Diesel Engines installed, Model DSR-48 '

Serial No. 740I0-12, Rated at 3500KW Operating hours at time of crankshaft failure (8/83) -

1. 101 = 646 (cracked crankshaft) i

1. 102 a 718 (failed crankshaft) i

1. 103 = 818 (cracked crankshaft) -

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The engines at Shoreham are the first straight-8 units to be placed in nuclear service in the U. S. One of the Shoreham engines (#101) was used to qualify the straight-8 series (R48) diesel engine for nuclear service. l j

Pre-operational testing of the engines at Shoreham started in late 198'1 and  !

continued until the major failure of the #102 crankshaft on August 12, 1983.

After the performance of extensive tests in late September and early October,

which were observed by staff members from NRR and Region I, as well as an NRC (~

consultant, LILCo presented the results of its crankshaft failure investigation,in a meeting on November 3, 1983. It reported that the crankshaft had been improperly designed, and had failed because the loading function used in the original design calculations was-too small. LILCo also j!

reported that it was investigating four failed connecting rod bearings which were discovered when the EDGs were disassembled. Their preliminary finding was that the failures occurred because the bearing material did not meet specifications, and the bearing loads had not been properly accounted for. ,.

~A detailed list of the EDG problems at Shoreham follows. l Date Problem Cause/ Solution 3/81 Excessive turbocharger thrust No lube oil during standby. F bearing wear. Lube oil system modified.

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12/81 Piston modifications to prevent Pistons reworked by TDI to crown separation. respond to Part 21 report.

Problem identified at Grand Gul f.

l l 9/82 Engine jacket water pump Water pumps reworked by TDI.

Inodifications.

i 6/82~ Air starting valve capscrews Response to Part 21 report.

replaced. Too long for holes.

9/82- Engine jacket water pump shaft Pump shafts redesigned and n

-failed by fatigue. replaced. ,

Spring /1983 Cracks in engine cylinder heads. Fabrication flaws. All heads replaced. -

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Date Problen _

Cause/ Solution 3/83 ,Two fuel oil injection lines Manufacturing defect in ruptured. tubing. Tubing replaced with shielded design.

3/83 Engine rocker arm shaft bolt High stress cycle fatigue.

failure. Bolts replaced with new design.

8/12/83 Broken crankshaft. Cracks in Inadequate design. Replaced remaining crankshafts. with larger diameter crankshafts.

9/83 Cracked connecting rod bearings. Inadequate design and substandard material.

Replaced with new design.

10/83 Cracked piston skirts. Replaced all piston skirts

- with new design. Generic problem.

11/83 Broken cylinder head stud nuts. Replaced all head stud nuts.

9/83 Cracked bedplates in area of Cracks evaluated by LILCo and main journal bearings, determined to not be significant.

9/83 Unqualified instrument cable. Replaced in response to Part 21 report.

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. . .-g 6-Operating Experience - Non-Nuclear Marine Applications '

Besides being used for stationary electric power generation, TDI diesel engines have been placed in service as propulsion units vi commercial cargo vessels. As part of the Shoreham operating license hearing, an intervenor, Suffolk County, requested and was granted by the Licensing Board, subpoenas for the State of Alaska, U. S. Steel, and Titan Navigation, Inc. These three organizations operate vessels which use TDI Y-16 diesel engines which are very similar to most of the TDI units installed in nuclear power plants. The responses which were received indicate that the TDI engines in marine service for these organizations have experienced severe reliability problems. Most have related to faulty cylinder heads, but they have also included problems with pistons, cylinder liners, turbochargers, cylinder blocks, connecting rods, connecting rod bearings, main journal bearings, and camshafts. A detailed experience list follows. The staff is reviewing this material to see how much of it is applicable to engines in nuclear service.

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Marine Experience with TDI Diesel Generators State of Alaska, M. V. Columbia Yessel fitted with two DMRV-16-4 Engines - Serial No. 72033/34 Rated at 9200 HP (6900 XW) at 450 RPM Vessel and engines placed in service in June 1974.

Each engine has approximately 30,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operating time to date.

Document Date Prablem Description 12/76 All cylinder liner seals replaced. All cylinder heads have been removed, reinstalled, or renewed at least three times.

All pistons have been removed and reinstalled at least once.

.: Turbochargers have been removed, repaired and reinstalled, or renewed 16 times due to l'eaking oil seals, vibration, rotor damage, or defective bearing seal housing.

Exhaust manifolds have been removed and reinstalled because of frozen expansion joints and resulting cylinder head flange face damage.

Lube oil consumption is excessive.

6/15/78 Rapid deteriorations of fire seal rings causing blowby across gasket surface of cylinder heads.

Very low lube oil filter life (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />).

Caused by blowby of pistons and valve guides.

Stainless steel exhaust bellows burn out rapidly. Installed backwards by TDI.

. 11/28/78 (Letter to Alaska from TDI).

Recommends timing changes to improve turbocharger performance. ,

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Document Date Problem Description 1/31/79 . Valve seats and valve guides not concentric. Results in bad valve contact.

Defective piston rings shipped as replacement parts.

Reworked cylinder head received from TDI without all required modifications and with damaged gasket face.

Newly furnished cylinder liners received with incorrect surface finish (twice).

Connecting rod bearings furnished as spare parts were wrong size - 13" vice 12".

Turbocharger exhaust flex section

.; incorrectly furnished by TDI. '

2/2/79 Chrome plating failure of piston rings.

Caused heavy scoring of cylinder liner.

Associated cylinder head found cracked.

Seven cylinder heads replaced during 15 weeks of operation.

Excessive lube oil filter change out rate. Due to piston blowby.

Fuel injector spray tips changed at TDI recommendation to reduce carbon buildup and eliminate washing of liner walls with fuel oil.

Three major overhauls of engines in 5 years of operation.

Carbon accumulations in rocker box areas.

Excessive oil vapor discharge from engine crankcases.

Heavy carbon deposits on valve springs.

Suspect valve blowby.

When exhaust valve guides were modified by TDI, they did not follow the procedure -

outlined in their SIM (Service Information Memo).

Document Date . Problem Description Loose piston pin end caps.

Incorrect piston crown to skirt bolt torque.

Bad connecting rod bearings. Excessive wear, cracks.

Damaged connecting rod bolts.

Valve push rods cracked at weld of ball to pipe. QC problem.

Crankshaft size changed after engines for ship installed. No notice to owners of reason for change.

Excessive main bearing wear.

Camshaft lobe hard facing worn.

TDI recommended the installation of a new flexible exhaust duct which was too short (new design). Installation attempted at insistence of TDI. Unit damaged by attempt and returned to TDI for repair.

3/19/79 QC or material problems with respect to non-concentricity /out-of-round valve seats, push rods, rod bolts, bearing shells, velve stem plating.

6/14/79 Thermal growth and cracking of exhaust manifeld.

12/26/79 Failure of new connecting bearings.

Cracks of 25% of connecting rods.

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I Document Date Problem Description 1/16/80 Ten (10) new cylinder heads have cracks. ,

This includes 8 that were previously repaired.

Fifteen (15) valves are defective with chrome flaking off the valve stems. l:

Valve stems are being deformed.  !

Five additional push rods have cracks.

Turbocharger air cooler inlet housing is  !

cracked.for fourth time. ,

Internal bracing in engine intercoolers is  ;

cracked. i 2/5/80  ;

Piston rings installed improperly because mistake by TDI in the drawing used by TDI shop.

2/29/80 Piston crown-to-skirt nut torque inconsistent among nuts on various pistons.

Excessive link red bushing bail wear i caused by improperly relieved, drilled oil passages on the matching link rod pins.

' 3/24/80 Abnormal carbon deposits and formations

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noted on pistons and cylinder head assemblies.

Fretting of jaw areas of connecting rods.

Insufficient turbo (manifold) air except at near full speed operation.

Cracked exhaust manifold end plates.

Cracking of connecting rod boxes.

Cracking of newly installed connecting rod '

bearing shells at 4500/ hours.

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2 Document Date . Problem Description Fretting of link rod and link rod pins at their attachment together.

Fretting between link rod bushings and link rod bushing bore.

Galling of link rod bushings in way of link rod pin outer drilled oil passages.

Improper wear / contact pattern on newly installed connecting rod bearings at 4500/ hours. Four-point loading.

Insufficient connecting rod bearing l

wear / contact area to journal wherein it is

! less than 15% of the total bearing area.

Upsetting of stems in valve keeper area.

Damage to number four piston ring and ring groove on all pistons modified during the 1978-79. engine teardown and rebuilt after 4500/ hours operation.

! Fretting between piston crown and skirts

at 4500/ hours since piston modifications.

l Variations in piston bolt torque, beyond l specified limits, at 4500/ hours since piston modifications.

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Damage to rod bolts, including cracking, and damage to threads on both the bolt and in the rod boxes.

l 4/18/80 Exhaust manifold conversion kits received l

with cuts and grooves in finished l surface. Required rework by owner before installation.

5/12/80 New connecting rods received without required code (American Bureau of Shipping) approval. TDI did not have record of which rods were shipped with approval or without approval.

Some new connecting rods shipped with -

. oversize bearings but no note to customer informing'of difference.

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Document Date Problem Descriotion 5/14/80 Cylinder head returned to TDI has been lost by TDI. Cannet be located.

5/15/80 Customer received new connecting rod bolt in rusty condition with damaged threads.

5/27/80 Customer received reworked cylinder heads with lip left on exhaust seats which prevents valves from seating.

Customer noted that it now was in possession of two cylinder heads with the same serial number.

Could not install lockwire in new connecting rod cap screw. Hole drilled partway through with drill broken off in

.. center of hole. Also noted that edges of lockwire holes on other screws had not been rounded to prevent damage to lockwire.

5/29/80 Discovered leaks in newly installed exhaust manifold head plates.

9/4/80 (Meeting Summary)

TDI says that all cylinder head problems should be corrected by new design.

TDI reports that connecting rod bearing cracks could have resulted from bad bearing alloy makeup by vendors. TDI looking at different bearing materials.

TDI stated that they had erred on piston modifications. Effected others besides COLUMBIA. .

9/30/80 Eleven remaining master connecting rods to be sent to TDI to have oversize bearings and other modifications installed.

Many of the original cylinder heads that were returned to TDI for rework were exchanged for other used heads.

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Document Date .

Problem Description 11/6/80 Cylinder head changed due to heavy external water leakage.

Severe smoke causing excessive lube oil contamination and engine room atmosphere probl ems. Engine secured to prevent possible crankcase explosion.

12/10/80 All connecting rods removed. New rod cap screws and washers to be installed because increased torque specified by TDI caused galling.

New connecting rod bearing shell found cracked.

Heavy wear noted on piston side thrust areas. Heavy hard carbon buildup noted in

., area of compression rings. Fourth ring groove area to be reworked by TDI due to design / machine error by TDI during previous modifications.

Nineteen (19) of 32 cylinder liners exceed spec for out-of-ro .id. TDI to modify limits to permit c.atinued usage.

Twenty-one (21) of 32 liners lost crush.

New phenomena. Repairs require machining i - of engine block.

Fuel injectors removed and to be changed from 140* spray pattern to 135* pattern.

Original nozzles had 150* pattern.

1/16/81 Cylinder bicck bores found to be distorted.

Four new engine camshafts installed.

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r Document Date Problem Description '

3/13/81 Reworked cylinder heads were returned to the customer without removing the grinding '

compound from the valves and valve seats.  !

Two reworked pistons returned to customer without roll pins, which lock the securing nuts in place.

Cylinder liner delivered with wrong surface finish.

Cracks found in cylinder blocks. All replaced.

Main engine blocks found to be cracked and warped. The main block-to-base through bolts appear to have been improperly

.; torqued during initial assembly.

One "new" camshaft found to be a rebuilt unit containing several damaged bearing journal areas.

The threaded head stud holes in the new cylinder blocks were not counterbored deeper, as TDI had indicated they currently do. This was to eliminate cracking of the block near the stud holes. The customer re-machined each of the 256 head studs to accomplish the same intent.

4/9/81 Several reworked pistons were returned without groove pins. l In response to a request for 20 li"

! capscrews and washers, TDI supplied 1 7/8" '

capscrews.

Drawings furnished by TDI for head stud ,

modifications were not applicable to the [

studs in question. [

f 50% of the fuel pump bases would not fit onto the new cylinder blocks be~cause of slight changes in the design of the blocks.

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One new cylinder liner provided with flange thickness larger than manufacturer's maximum tolerance.

New connecting rod capscrews were found to be galled and unfit for use.

-4/29/81 Service manual showed incorrect installation of engine camshafts.

2/3 of fuel cam tappet assemblies on one engine could not be installed on one engine because the new cylinder blocks had not been properly counterbored.

. Cylinder liner counterbore depths were off to such an extent that difficulty experienced in establishing proper liner crush.

Weld spatter noted on many seating surfaces.

Dirt, sand, and metal showings found in passages and holes which should have been clean.

Cylinder head water port outlet locations varied considerably, causing a water flow restriction.

Air start distributor not properly assembled at factory.

6/1/81 Exhaust manifold head plate developed a leak. Cracks found around 2 of 3 tie rods due to poor initial welding.

11/19/81 Defective valve springs found on one engine.

7/29/82 Valve rotator failed.

Cracks discovered in the intercooler. -

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Document Date Problem Description 7/29/82 "In nine years of operation every basic

• engine component has been modified or replaced with an improved item, at least once, with the exception of the crankshaft (which is obsolete and has not been used .

for years), the engine base, the fuel  ;

pumps and the governor. The last two items are not manufactured by TDI."

10/15/82 Turbochargers replaced.  ;

Exhaust valve lubricating system to be '-

installed.

3/9/83 Cracks discovered in three cyli.nder heads.

Reworked cylinder returned to customer

with tap broken off in threaded hole.

Others returned with internal cracks and damaged flange faces.

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Titan Navigation, M. Y,. Pride of Texas Vessel fitted with two DMRV-12-4 engines, Serial No. unknown Rated at 7800 HP at 450 RPM Engines installed 1981 - no information on total engine hours to date.

Document Date Problen Description 7/16/82 Catastrophic piston failure. Due to crack in piston skirt. Engine had 5791 hours0.067 days <br />1.609 hours <br />0.00958 weeks <br />0.0022 months <br /> of operation.

4/1/82 Cylinder block broken and cracked.

Cylinder head cracked.

Cylinder liner cracked.

Piston skirt fractured.

.; Suspect that all of above problems caused by water leaking into cylinder from air intake manifold. Leaking tubes found in air intercooler.

8/19/82 Cracks discovered in six piston skirts.

7/22/82 Cracked exhaust valve seats in cylinder heads. Engine had 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br /> service.

Camshaft lobe design appears to be deficient. Causes excessive stress on fuel cam lobe and roller.

l Tappet assembly rollers severely galled.

l 8elieved to be due to camshaft and lobe placement and inadequate heat treatment.

Fuel cam lobes have failed twice due to improper heat treatment.

l Chrome plating lost from one piston wrist L

pin.

All four intercoolers have failed because

< of erosion due to high fluid ve,locity.

l. Air start valves have suddenly ceased to

, function, for no apparent reason.

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Document Date Problem Description Plugs in crankshaft oil ways may be cracking because improper material used.

Under investigation.

Fuel oil return lines have failed. To be replaced with heavier wall tubing. '

4/1/83 Exhaust valves fail after about 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> of use. Serious problems with cylinder head cracks.

Turbochargers experiencing difficulty supplying sufficient air.

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s U. S. Steel, MV E. H. Gott Vessel fitted with two DMRV engines (model unknown)

Engine Serial No. 75039-40 No information on engine hours to date.

Document Date Problem Description 11/13/80 Cracked cylinder head. Replaced.

11/1/79 Cracked cylinder head. Replaced.

6/1/80 Cracked cylinder head. Replaced.

10/8/81 Cracked cylinder head. Replaced.

Note: This information was summarized from -

documents provided by U. S. Steel in response to a subpoena which asked specifically for information about cyliner "e

head failures. Many other portions of the documents were deleted by U. S. Steel, and it appears that the deleted portions referred to problems with other engine -

parts.

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Other Applications-The staff understands that other TDI engines are in service as stationary electric power generators. The operating history of these engines will '

be taken into consideration during the staff assessment of TDI engines.

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Reference List Shoreham Letter dated 1/6/84 from B. McCaffrey (LILCo) to H. Denton (NRC)

Board Notification 83-160 dated 10/21/83 Board Notification 83-160 dated 11/17/83 Letter dated 12/9/83 from J. Smith (LILCo) to T. Muley (NRC)

Letter dated 12/9/83 from A. Schwencer (NRC) to M. Pollock (LILCo)

Letter dated 12/29/83 from A. Schewncer (NRC) to M. Po'llock (LILCo)

Letter dated 12/16/83 from C. Matthews (TDI) to T. Novak (NRC)

Letter dated 12/16/83 from J. Smith (LILCo) to T. Murley (NRC)

Letter dated, 12/16/83 from A. Dynner (Suffolk County) to A. Earley (LILCo)

Letter dated 10/20/83 from A. Earley (LILCo) to L. Brenner (NRC)

Letter dated 10/16/83 from R. Boyer (TDI) to NRC Letter dated 11/17/83 from A. Earley (LILCo) to L. Brenner (NRC)

IE Information Notice 83-51, dated 8/5/83 IE Inspection Report 99900334/83-01, dated 10/3/83 IE Information Notice ~83-58, dated 8/30/83 Grand Gulf Letter dated 11/15/83 from L. Dale (MP&L) to H. Denton (NRC)

Letter dated 10/19/83 fromL. Dale (MP&L)toH.Denton(NRC) ,

LER 50-416/83-171/03L-0 dated 11/28/83

. Letter dated 10/26/83 from L. Dale (MP&L) to H. Denton (NRC)

LER 50-416/83-082/01T-0 LER 50-416/83-126/01T-0 e e

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22 San Onofre Unit 1 LER 50-206/81-017 dated 8/12/81 Letter dated 9/15/81 from H. Ray (SCE) to R. Engelken (NRC)

LER 50-206/80-039 dated 12/23/80 Letter dated 6/8/81 from J. Haynes (SCE) to R. Engelken (NRC)

Marine Applications Letter dated 12/21/83 from A. Dynner (Suffolk County) to A. Earley (LILCo)

Includes many other individual documents.

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stounded" to find NRC inspec-e the purpme of the plan to protect against sabotage. And "we were even more aC staff,in fact, exam tion reports of the reactor for 197519N and for lHi2 indicating that NR activities related to physical protection against sabotage. - Michael Knapik. Washincron li FINDING SITES FOR FUTURE REACTORS WILT.NOT f h t agency.The study,which has not been endorsed by NRC, concluded that "iia and sernce atess with thelargest population densities." h i that meet in a% tion to 48 sites that already have reactors on them,the study identified 90 ot er s te ll started all six alternatives for population restrictions considered in the study. The alternative by requiring no popul.ition in a circle formed at a half mile d i radius eseral and no mor mile the circle within a two mile radius from the site. Beyond i two i l miles,the ith a 30 effects were ll d ithin types of restrictions.The altematises allowed either 500 o any 22.5-degree sector drawn in the circle with the d30 pted.mile radius l

reactors would not be affected,new d Turkeyreactors Point and St. Lucie. could no restrictions. They are Ginna, Fermi, Seabrook, 80,butOyster has Creek ofits siting regulations.The agency issued an adunced notice of proposed rule d severe accident suspended consideration of new siting regulations untilit makes decisions on source issues. - James Branscome, Washington GRAND GULF PROBLEMS MULTIPLY AS LOW POWER LICE Pros,oects are dim for quick issuance of a full. power license for G f the plant last week, is recommending the plant's low. power license be suspended. At a hearing on the statu

, NRC strff said they couldn't recommend a fulbpower Gilinsky said license problems at until proble ators and with defective technical specirtestions are resolved. Commissioner Victorbe s the plant are greater than he thought and he suggested the low-power J Assel-license i full-sioners are convinced the problemsl are resolved. C the last safety power operation they would like a staff update on the areas where the utility d review.

Mississippi Power & Ught (MP&L) officials said the h thatplant would be. is complete operation as soon as the h tech specs and generator problems are solv d elsewhere, NRQJsje.

- , GartGJLiterte_o_f_2_0_ plants in t e coun r l erators. Because of problems discovered in TDI generators at the Shoreham p ant anf h newing their use on a case.by<ase basis. MP&L h officials ti said that only two o t e rshows f the TDI generators, that theirs are a different model than the ones at Shoreham.and t at tes ne response rate. In addition,the plant has rented guee gas turbines to serve as back themselves a backup system. MP&Lis also part of a TDI owners' group w i

ify the generators.

The problems with the tech specs are kmore 11 soecscomniez.

instead as a draft Grand copy.ex._ Gulf is th the country. Because tech specs weren't anilable, NRC sent MP&L_ lh gh MP&L Mard2dn't do pectine the utility to review and adjust them to meet hcense thewasissued actualin Jurie plant descrip d for 205 tech spec 4 so NFr mrr mnceeded on the assumption that it f had bee b

changes of which 45%. deal with some f unction of IEe plant ashn!L

. Gilinsky asked how an earlier utihty review of surveillance iprocedures, deficiencies in the tech specs and the surveillance i ssid the review procedures,didn't was focused on pro tech spec packay_e. J.idhard, senior vice president for nuclear k operat th NKL staf ons, f to come surveillance procedures, not on the tech specs as a whole. MP&L.he said.is wor ing w f l up with a position on the tech spec issue.~ Neither staf dtand not howappucan Reactor Regulation admitted. A lung term resiew ibties is being to certify conducted in writing on ho

' t6 prevent it f rom happening again,he said. In the short term, NRC i ment,he said,but he ex- is requirin that their tech specs are correct,he said. A number "are struggling" i Laboratories with to make the requ re pects they will comply For Grand Gulf, NRC has asked the Idaho 9 Natio E31DE N.R.C. - klarch 5,1984

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/ certain that the meanwhile,is final safety trying analysis repurt and Repon_Ilstaff to determine if thethe safety specs eatuatiun match report the rent as bm!!.reflect these poth efforts correct hue p specs. NRC igd up discrepancies, T.sompson added. Additionally, cach NRC technica' branch has been asked to review

, its carher rests on Grand Guif in licht of the tech spee aanret he oil-Gilinsky was joined by Asselstine and Palladino in voicing concern over the latest systematic assessment f oflicensee performance (Salp) report on which Grand Gulf got the lowest possible rattng on fne out of nine catesones. The fhe, Gihnsky noted,were the important operational categories (plant operations, maintenance surveillance, licensing actinties and quabty assurance).The lowest rating signifies that the plant is acceptable but needs some attention, the staff pointqd out. But Asselstine commented that the staff found the plant was barely at lowest levelin some of the categones,sometimes dipping even lower during the year long assess-ment period.

NRC staff said the resiew showed MP&L has made progress in some of the weak areas. James O' Redly, Region !! administrator, said recent additions to the nuclear management staff are substantialimprovements, that work has been done on procedures and they are now in " excellent shape,"and that the operator recerti-fication has been successfully completed.

Asselstine,still skeptical, suggested a special team be sent to the plant to review each of the categories j before the plant comes up for full power operation. "1 think what we're saying is that before we can go for- E ward, you have to have a satisfactory rating in each of these categories," Gilinsky added. - FrancerSegherr  !

SEN. ALAN SIMPSON (R WYO.) SAID NRC PROCEDURE ON THREE MILE ISLAND restart is more of a prob-lem than the question of TMI management integrity. Simpson. chairman of the Senate Envi onment & Pub.

L lic Works Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, made his comments during a hearing on the NRC authoriza.

tion bill for FY 84 and 85. Ile echoed complaints by Sen. Arlen Specter.(R Pa.) about the length of time it has taken the commission to deal with the TM! l restart. I "I don't think there's any wiy you could have constructed this hearing that could have taken any more time than you hae," Specter said. The issues involved have been considered by five groups, Specter said. He asked why the commissioners hadn't just held a heanng themselves instead. NRC is considering the integrity of TMI top management, but didn't ask the top two people whether they knew about alleged leak rate falsifi- ,

cation until five years after the TMI 2 accident and a week after he Grst raised the issue, Specter said. Simpson said NRC is " paralyzed by tentativeness," and sa;d he would join with Specter in proposing legislation to sim- ,

plify NRC procedures.

I GPU NUCLEAR, NRC STAFF SPLIT ON STATUS OF INTEGRITY ISSUES GPU Nuclear has told NRC that all but two issues,on a list of more than 60 potentialissues of manage-ment integrity, have been resolved and should not hold up Three Mile Island l restart.The NRC staffis main-tairying thag the implications of five major issues remain unknown and should be resolved before TMI l ascends above 25% power, while intervenor groups claim the issues are unresolved and the issues list should be far longer The conflicting claims were filed with the NRC commissioners, who had asked the parties in the restart proceedings to tell them whether the list was accurate and whether each issue had been resolved (INRC,6 Feb.,

5). The list was compiled by the commissioners' OfSces of General Counsel and Policy Evaluation, and was re-leased after an angry dispute among the commissioners over whether the list should be made public (INRC, 9 Jan.,1).

"So m. ' the issues included in the proposed list legitimately can be termed ' integrity

• issues," GPU

' Nuclear said. "llowever, the vast majority of the issues on the proposed list ofintegrity issues have absolutely no factual relationship to the issue of ficensee's(GPU Nuclear) integrity, other than mere assertion. In the ab-sence of a substantial basis for linking each of these issues with licensees integrity, that issue ought not be treated by the commission as an integrity issue."  !

Though the commission itself must make the final decisions that " resolve" issues, GPU Nuclear said. al- i most all of the issues on the list have been considered, and decided in GPU Nuclear's favor, by Atomic Safety i

& Licensing Boards or by NRC irtspections or investigations. The only exceptions, the utility said, are allega- {

tions of falsiGed leak rates at TMI I and 2 before the March 1979 accident, which are two of the issues on the list. The GPU Nuclear fihng was made before Metropolitan Edison, the General Public Utilities subsidiary that ran TMI before CPU Nuclear, pleaded guilty and no contest in federal court to criminal counts involving the TMI 2 leak rate tests. The hsues on the lis't involve management knowledge of the alleged falsifications.

Ilut. for all other istues, CPU Nuclear said, the commissmn has enough information to decide them for restart. "M >st of the issues on the proposed list were fully addressed and resolved by the licensing board on ,

the basis of extensive record evidence adduced during the restart proceeding. A few of the listed issues were  ;

addressed and sufficiently resolved, for purposes of deciding the question of restart,in documents, statements and pleadings provided to the commission. . . .Some of the items were unsuccessfully raised by the intervenors e t

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Picu e was .m . need mih l Ao n wheneset they reh it umdd be m ihe best mieseu of the unnp m> ro do .s for 34 yeais. Wilham Catacosmos,a Ldco director sm e 197d,has been named to seplace Piers C Im... a I ng hiand hned unnpmer company, was chief executive of 6ect of Apphed Digital Data % stems from 1969 untd last Novenjher and prmt to that was assistant duceror of the lhookhoen Namnut 1.ib Another measure recently taken by Lilco to r.nive its Shmelum related problems n to propose a "hnsiness development rate" for estabbshed lAng Island businesses. h 15 hoped shar.d apprmed by rate emnmisdon,the mcen'tne rate would resuh in larger power sales.pourbl) deucasmp, the overal crease needed to pay for Shoreham. Concern over the anticipated 567o rate mcrease tus fueled oppo Shotcharn.

De utihty's proposalis to give its customers wah yearly demands of 1002.w or mme - about businesses - a discount of about one cent per kilowatt hour for electricityT consumed h ld above the accordmg to another Ulco spokesman. "This is power that wotddn't be used otherwise," he s encourage them to use more power.our reserve power." Lilco expects no growth m consum year and,said the spokesman,any increase in power sold would translate into lower rates for DENTON BANS OPER ATIONS Wl'lH DELAVAL DIESELS UNTil PROBLEMS R No nuclear plant will be allow ed to operate with a Transamerica D_elaval Inc. (TDI) emergency die generatotyntlueshn.i.calquestions about their op,erating history are answered. said liarold De director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),lhs decision most immediately puts a hurdle m the path the utilities trying to get Shoreham and Grand Gulf.! on line,although there are nine others with TD It was a sph crankshaft in one of three TDI diesels at Long Island Ughtmg Co.'s (Ulco) Shoreh that first drew attention to them (NW,25 Aug. '83,6). Discovery of more problems with simdat diesels other sites led NRC of6cials to declare in October 1983 that they would require case by<

of the adequacy of each diesel (Inside NRC,31 Oct.'83,10). Now,said Denton at a Jan 26 me top staff and utility and TDI executives, further inspections at TDl's Oakland, Calif., pla more operating data have consinced NRC staff that the issue is "very serious." f Some Gndin to NRC's' Office of Investigations (01). Based on findings to date, Darrell Eisenhut, Denton's di censing, said that "out overall confidence in TDI diesel generators had been significantly reliability will have to be demonstrated."

Similar problems showed up during testing at Shoreham, Mississippi Power & Licht's Gulf.1,and Southern Cahfornia Edison's (SCE) San Onofre-lEC staffers told the meetmg. T same types of problems have occurred in marine use of the diesels. Cylinder head c and crown separation, turbocharger vibrations, fuel hne failures,and fires were all experie one cf the diesels,whose operating times varied from 450 hours0.00521 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.440476e-4 weeks <br />1.71225e-4 months <br /> at San Onofre.1, which is s repairs, to more than 30,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> for one in marine use. A review of nine NRC inspe 1979 showed that more than 60 nonconformances and violations d had b missing quahty control paperwork, mspections certi6ed for parts that were not there, and in off for dates after equipment was actually shippeJ. '

Eleven utilities with TDI diesels have formed an owners' g;oup, hired consultants, and of both the overall designs and individual components of the TDI diesel models they ow _

MP&L nuclear vice president who is chairing the group, said_that Failure Ulco's Analysis Asso and independent consultants have been hired for the effort at the Shoreham site and at T Wdham Museler said Se group plans to produce " document packages" for each of the 57 dies owns, detailing enginc. specific design and operationl dstudies in the groupand andpreoperational the plants tes the Shoreham and the Grand Gulf diesels', are due in March, Other utilities invo ve for which they bought TDI diesels are: Culf States Utilities at River 13end, Carolina P Duke Power at Catawba, Cleveland Electric illuminatmg at Perry, Tesas Utihties Serv Georgia Power at Vogtle, Consumers Power at Midland, Sacramento Municipal and SCE at San Onofre 1. Mathews.

At the NRC meeting, TDI executives pronused full cooperalmn wnh the owners' group.Ch TDI vice president and general manager,said the company "will apply allour resom lems." The company is " dedicated." he said,to quality,to supporting the nuclear mdustr nffort our tarnished image." Don Ilixby. chairman of the TDI board,said the company welcomed the because "it would be difficult,on out own,to conymce everyone these issues had be ltesolution of the issues is, however,on "the entical path" for Shoreham and Grand Gulfs heense for Shore.

nnted.1he diesel generstnr issue is the only flung standing.hetween Ldeo and a low powei ham,according to an NitC source. The Shoreham htensing board hasi have issueda a partal m all health and safety issues except for the TDI generators,he said,addmg that the board w 5

NtJCt10NICS WElX liinuary 2. l%4

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j SCket No. iD '16 IM0RANDUMFOR: Chairman Palladinc' Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts '

0mT.issicner Asse'stine tcmrissioner hernthal

..' - Carreli G. Eisennut, Directcr Divisjon cf Licensing (UBJECT: t Ek' INFORMATION CONCERNING TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL (TDi) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS, BGARD NOTIFICATION 83 160 -

r. accordance with NRC procecures for coard notifications, The the apprcpriate folicwing niormation is being proviced directly to the Commission. The cards and pcrties are being provided with a cocy of this memorandum.

nferration is .rolicable to Grand Gulf (an uncontested case), which uili be e#cre the Com.-ission fer full power autnorization in Novembe'r, 1983.

9n August 12, 1983, during post-modification testing, the main crankshaft en

ne of the three emergency diesel generators (EDG) at the Shorehan Nuclear Fower Static.n fai'ed 2.d orcke intc tuo pieces. Tr.e a

;iicant rubsrcuently inspected the remaining two ciesel generators at Shoreham ar.o identifiec pdditional flaws in the crankshafts A ofmore thesedetailed machines. in locations description of the similar to failure t e failure of the first machine.

F is contained in Enclosure 1 (IE Informati'on Notice No.~83-58).

The EDGs at Shoreham were manufactured by Transamerica DeLaval Incorporated

-(TDI). TDI has also provided EDGs to several cther nuclear power piants (see Enclosure 1). The only currently operating reactor with TDI diesels is Grand Gulf. The TD1 diesei at San Onofre is used by Unit 1, which is shutdcwn for seismic modifications, and the diesels at Rancho Seco are not yet installed.

IBesides the failure of the crankshaft at Shoreham', the staff has noted the  !

Occurrence of many minor problems with TDf; EDGs, which are screarized in Enclosure 2. The staff would expect minor problems to occur during the startup ^ testing of .any large piece of machinery, such as a diesel generator, but the number of minor problems experienced by the TDI machines in nuclear ,

service appears to be ebncrmally high (also See Enclosure 4). .

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-l , ' a'l l 2 , c;i;r i r.c eed: - i: : ec'.' c r s c ' T U .M tr .ere m ' .

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'- eris rce:e c e'lecz'irr t . 'rt tit " ider.;'#i+t cerr tit

..aich imply :nat .ccrtices c #thr ID1_ Ouelity %sturance (rp Frcgram hase not b(cn carricc cut in accordance with the i.covisicr o# 10 CFF 50, A;pendiy E.

F..c; ur. I'. hi s re c > ed *hr TA rr:blers t..the Of' ice cf ir.cs;igations, -nicn

.hss.requestec tha cetatis n ; be revealed to avoid cerrrcr' sir.; the in-

-vestigation. . /.s 'e result of ' an inspectic.n perforried in si uly 1983, the staf f identified a potential violation and several potential nonce-ferrerr.cs which are described.in IE Inspection Report No. 99900334/83-01, dated October 2.

1983~(EnclosureL5).

.Tre Sherchce applicant is investigating-the crerksbaft failure, but dc.es net

rect *c'nu'.lish a reper* re-31 la'.or ir. Oc.cber. The staff has asked the

..,'i:;c.;;;c ac: ess a'serits cf c.uc;t'cre.cc-cernir; Se 5'tre"tr Eri c::i;r, f ab'ricaticr., cpcraticn, and naintenance in its 't.' lure report (see Enciosure 3). A similar list of ouestiers is being developed for other applicants.

The_.identifica;ico cfLOA problens at TDI, taken together with the number of operationai~problens and the'Shoreham crankshaft failure, has reouced the

-staff's ievel of confidence in the reliacility of all TDI diesel cercrators.

The sta#f will recuire, on a_ case by1 case basis, a demonstration that these

.cencerns are_not' applicable to specific diesei. generators because cf sub-sicuert insrections or testing performed.specifically to address tLe etrve f.:s tt e rs . Far-her developments and aeditional information on this sub,iect will'be reported to th_e appropriate Boaros.

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.. 2 s-Da'rrel(i G. Eiser hu' Di rector

- Division of Licensing Encicscres:

.(1): LIE'information Uctice'E3-52

'(2) Summary of DeLaval DG Problems

~

(12/80-8/83).

33) Secr.ar.v of St.ptember 2,--1983 L . EDG Meeting on Shereham ..

14) IE 1r. formation Netice'83-51 (5): (!E Inspection Report Vo. 99900334/83-01 L With October 3.1983 Trar.smittal letter

'- t'o Trans America DeLaval,' Inc. .

lcc: See next.page. <

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