ML20065G147
| ML20065G147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1994 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065G145 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9404120203 | |
| Download: ML20065G147 (29) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_. Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 9 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be g 1% ak/k. , APPLICABILITY _: MODES 1, 2*, 3, 4 and S. ACTION _: With the SHUT N MARGIN < 1% ak/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at > pm of 7875 ppm boron or its equivalent, until the { required SHUT N MARGIN is restored. ZS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be > 1% ak/k:
- a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours thertraf ter while the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is irrmovable ;
or untrippable, the above required SHUT 00WN MARGIN Shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth l of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s).
- b. When in MODES 1 or 2 , at least once per 12 hours, by verifying that regulating rod groups withdrawal is within the limits c' Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2 0 within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criti-cality by verify,ng i that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER af ter each fuel loading by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the regulating rod groups at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.
With Keff > 1.0. With Kef f < l .0. See Special Test Exception 3.10.4. DAVIS-DESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 1-1 940412O203 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P PDR
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 10 Tii!S PAGE PiSVi&B ! FORINFORMAIl0N UNiy REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- e. When in H0 DES 3, 4 or 5, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
- 1. Reactor coolant system boron concentration,
- 2. Control rod position,
- 3. Reactor coolant system average temperature,
- 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, S. Xenon concentration, and
- 6. Samarium concentration.
4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1% ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1.e. above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective Full Power Days after each fuel loading. i l l 1 l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-2 l
i i Docket Number 50-346 i License Number NPF-3 i 1 Serial Number 2210 Attachment
-" THIS PAGE PROVIDED l FORINf0RMATION ONiy :
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS , 1 BASES ! I l 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactoi can be made subcritical from all operating conditions. 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. During Modes 1 and 2 the SHUTDOWN HARGIN is known to be within limits if all control rods are OPERABLE and withdrawn to or beyond the insertion limit. SHUTDOWN MARGIN requiremen" vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion. RCS boron concentration and RCS Tavg. The most restrictive , condition occurs at E0L. with Tava at no load operating temperature. The l SHUTDOWN MARGIN required is consittent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. 3/ 4.1.1. 2 BORON DILUTION 4 1 A minimum flow rate of at least 2800 gpm provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual through the Reactor Coolant System in the core during boron concentration l reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 2800 gpm will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 12.110 cubic J feet in approximately 30 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated I with boron concentration reduction will be within the capability for operator recognition and control. In MODE 6, the RCS boron concentration is typically somewhat higher than the minimum boron concentration required by Specification 3.9.1. and could be higher than the boron concentration of nonnal sources of. water addition. At reduced inventory conditions in the RCS. in order- to reduce the possibility of vortexing. the flowrate through the decay heat systenrmay- be procedurally restricted to somewhat less than 2800 gpm. In this situation. if water with a boren concentration equal to or greater than the boron concentration required by Specification 3.9.1 is added to the RCS. the RCS is assured to remain above the Specification 3.9.1 requirement, and a flowrrte of less than 2800 gpm is not of concern. 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT l The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirement for measurement of the MTC each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value l since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within it: limit provides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel
. cycle.
DAWS-BESSE. U.11T 1 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No.176
d Docket Number 50-346 y License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 12 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED VATER SOURCES - SHUTDOVN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one of the following borated vater sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. A boric acid addition system with:
7c<> ld
- 1. A minimum available borated vater volume o 400 gallons,
- 2. Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and
- 3. A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.
a
- b. The borated water storage tank (BVST) with:
- 1. A minimum available borated vat ","olume of 3,000 gallons, ElCT)
- 2. A minimum boron concentration of 1900 pm, and l
- 3. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F. !
APPLICABILITY: HODES 5 and 6. l ACTION: Vith no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated vater source is restored to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 The above required borated vater source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by: ~
- 2. Af. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,o n cl i Jf. Verifying the available borated vater volume of the source, end-*-
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 l-14 Amendment No. 67, 123
l Docket Number 50-346 : License Number NPF-3 l Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 13 THIS PAGE PROVIDED FORINFORMATION ONU ; I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS _ SURVEILLMCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 3. Verifying the boric acid addition system solution tempera-i ture when it is the source of borated water,
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the BWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is < 35'F. .
l 1 l l l DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 1-15
\
1
Dock.et Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 ' Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 14 l Figure 3.1-1
'Minicium Boric A@ Tank Volume as on ot Stored Boric ncentration--Davis-Besse1j
}?.<.plA n s Y AYY l 'l WC-(ned pge) "
00 l 8000
\ N E 7500 !
S
% 7000
\x ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 6500 N '
6000 \ b
* \ \
5500 , U UNACCEPTABLE \ S 5000 OPERATION f 2
$ 4500
\N N i %
l E 4000 3500 3000.. 7000 8000
! l 9000 10,000 11;,000 12,000 N
13,000 1 000 l Concentration of Boric Acid Solution, ppm B l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 11.123 l I F
Docket Number 50-346 , License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 15 Rep l% c e M b vec. 3.1 - i i Figure 3.1-1 Boric Acid Addition System Minimum Required Volume as a Function of Boric Acid Concentration Required in Modes 1-4 10000 _ 9500 : e
$ 9000 !
eti ea 8500 i +\x 7 s S> 7000
\
%13
<c .t- 6500 i
""8?SfR$P" \-
a 5 0 , N,E 5000 y 4500 _ 4000 [
~ ' '
3500 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 Concentration of Boric Acid Solution, ppmB
Docket Number 50-346
- License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment ,
Page 16 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED VATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ources shall be OPERABLE: 3.1.2.9 Each of the following borat a AAS l
- a. The boric acid addition sys t :
- 1. A minimum available borated vater volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1,
- 2. Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and
- 3. A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.
j
- b. The borated vater storage tank (BVST) vi'th:
i l 1. An available borated vater volume of between 482,778 and , 550,000 s, ' 21C0
- 2. Between and 2200 ppm of boron, and l l
- 3. A minimum solution t'emperature of 35'F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACIION: 6AAS
~
6AAS
- a. Vith_ the boric acid addition syste noperable, restore the l
to OPERABLE status within 74 ours or be in at leas to 1% ok/_k at_
@~'BYandboratedtoaSHUIDOVNMARGINehuivalents!(-j STAND 200*F vithin the next 6 hours; restore the - rzig6MS l#d ' Jd 4 '
to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOVN within the next 30 hours. ed vater storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to I f D vita Um ^ hour or be in at least HOT STANDBT vithin i OPERABLE status vi , the next 6 hours and in COLD SBuiuv.5; ,' 6Ik @a following30hoursg
= _ _ - - - a.
I N3CET (4 t'd f
- 8-)
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 36, 67,123 l
~ . . . - . , . - - - . - . - . . . . .
46 -i. a s -a e-.-. - o a .+ -+m-du.ew% m. ,=. Docket Number 50-346
, -License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 17 INSERT (3/4.1.2.9 Action)
- b. Vith the BVST inoperable because of boron concentration or temperature not within limits, restore the BUST to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in-at least HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTD0VN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the BWST inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration or-
- temperature not within limits, restore the BVST to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTD0VN within the following 30 hours.
f 1 1 1 l l I l' l
Docket Number 50-346 -
~
Li' cense Number NPF-3 ' Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 18 REACTIVIN CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEII. LANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.9 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: i i
- a. At lea.st once per 7 days bys ___
Z, Verifying the boron concentration in each vater source, ca n d ' l
- I t. Verifying the available borated vater volume of each water $
source, and-e ,
.SAAS I
- 3. Verifying the alv omia .aditi:r. cye::: solution temperature. ~-
= ___ _
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the BVST temperature when the j l outside air temperature is < 35'F. l
\
l l l I i ! i 1 1 l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. 123 l 1 L
~_
l Docket Number 50-346 l License Number NPF-3 ! Serial Number 2210 l Attachment Page 19 l l l i REACTIVITY CO?TTROL SYSTEMS BASES I i 3/4.1.1.4 HINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY l l This specification ensures that the reactor vill not be made critical vith the reactor coolant system average temperature less than 525'F. This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT g temperature. 3/4.1.2. BORATION STSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include (1) borated vater sources, ,(2) makeup or DHR pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid pumps, (5) associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from j operable emergency busses. Vith the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of tvo separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single l functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the-l systems inoperable. Allovable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair o.r corrective action may be completed vithout undue-l rist to. overall facility safe f rom inLection system failures- during the repair period. g,$g The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUIDOVN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% tk/k af ter xenoir decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibriuse xenors conditions and* p scquises tne equivalent of eitherl74!RL3-g*'a e of a722 pp: breted-watees fr= th; bri: dd stereg: t " er 32,726 ;;ellene ef Innn pp- Mrat+de vuer fr : t h bera.ted . d er sterege io d .s , 1 The requirement for a sinimum available volume of 482,778 rallons of
~
i borated vater in the b r:tcd ..tu mare for borating the RCS to the desired level.gEank
/~ g g/ l l The ensures specifiedthe capability quantity of L borated vater is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4; therefore, the larger volume of borated vater is specified.
Vith the RCS temperature belov 200*F, one injection systes is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the-L- l 90~18 3a llons ok 9875 ppo w bor&d w&e ham. -{L horic.D ac.il a dddsch syt+e+s(B,AA s) or 75,300yllen.5 crf 2. I00 ff n
} ors-le d wEer from -fl. Qyl$T Y DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment tio .M .
33, 3/>. A6. M.123
4 l- Docket Number 50-346 i License Number NPF . j - Serial Number 2210 j Attachment 2 Page 20 i i j INSERT (Bases 3/4.1.2) Vith either the borated water storage tank (BVST) boron concentration.or BVST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition must be corrected in ~
- eight hours. The eight hour limit to restore the temperature or boron
~ concentration to within' limits was developed considering the time required to
- change boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the
- BVST are still available for injection.
i i i ' I , 4 f ! 1 1 1 } 1 4 b i
}
i-
1' Docket Number 50-346 . License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 21 REALumI CONTROL STSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) stable reactivity condition of the reactor'and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivit change $- l in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable. The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a - SEUTDOVN MARGIN of -l% Ak/k af ter renon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 7og 70'T. This_ condition requires either 606Eallons of 7875 pp ted .- i>AAS vete_r tron thy:ri: ::i: = .:.. ;;; = '4r 3,ooo gallona of r pa dorated water rrom thap;;;;; ;;arr_ m .; "".
- The bottom 4' inches of the r :::r:g: ::.sh are not available. l cA M. *, g and thednstrumentation is calibrated.to reflect the available volume.
All boric acMtank volume is available. The limits on water volume, l boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the Oo~ solution recirculated within containment.af ter a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimises the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on sechanical systems and components. , t The OPERABILITT of one boron injection system during RETUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6. i 3/4.1.3 HOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLTES The specifications of this secti'on (1) ensure that acceptable power distributio:. U sits are maintained, (2) ensure that the minimum $HUTD0VN - MARGIN is rair ained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection at.N dent. OPERASILITY of thq control rod position indicators , is required to determine control red positions and*thereby ensure. i
' co:pliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. .
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic ; requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are'aet. For example, sisalignment of a saf ety or regulating rod requires a restriction in THERMAL POVER. The reactivity vortn or a assal2gned rod is italted for the remainder of the I fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the safety I analysis.- l The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment should not , be included in computing the average group position for determining the OPERASILITY of rods with lasser misalignaents. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amend =ent No. 123
i Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 22 l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) CORE FLOODING TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
$C-fT D I 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system core flooding tankJshall be OPERABLE ( , - with: -
t
.a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume between 7555 and 8004 gallons borated water, Zsoo
- c. Between nd 3500 ppm of boron, and ' l:
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 575 and 625 psig.
~~"
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*. 1M ACA T 61<d pye. ) ACTION: l
- a. With one core flooding tank inoperable, except as a result a]
closed isolation yalve, restore the inoperable tank RABLE status ' within one hour or be in h07 SHilTDOWr n the next 12 hours.
- b. With any core floodin nk inoperable due to the isolation valve being cl , either inmediately open the isolation valve or be i TANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN n the next 12 hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each core flooding tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours byt.
- 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
- 2. Verifying that each tank isolation valve is open.
*With Reactor Coolant pressure > 800 psig.
DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 _ - _ . _ - - ~.
. - _ ~ -- , _ _ _ . - - __ --- . ___
'l Docket Number 50-346- ;
. - License Number WPF-3 Serial Number 2210 l Attachment Page 23 J
INSERT (3/4.5.1 Action)
- a. With one CPT inoperable because of boron concentration not within limits, restore-the inoperable CPT to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or:be in ii0T !
STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS pressure to less.than l 800 psig within the following 12 hours. l
- b. .
With any CFT' inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, restore the CFT to OPERABLE. status within one. hour or be in l HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and reduce the-RCS pressure to less ! than 800 psig within the following 12 hours. l l l 1 1 I i i l i -qw,-< w e, . ,e , ,, - - - gv,wv. - = - ,y,--- ,y ..+-cat,.e~.- -w -, ..-wy , ,--er - ew. rm+ - - . - - , .v . . --i----+-w'... , es- -- rw -=%., -,
Docket Number 50-346
- License Number NPF-3
, Serial Number 2210 i Attachment l Page 24 i EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- b. At le'ast once per 3 ays and within 6 hours of each solution l volume inc _80 gallons,by verifying the boron concentra-
-tion of th olution. t -
- c. At least once 31 days by verifying that power to the l
isolation valve operator is disconnected by locking the ; breakers in the open position.
- d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each core flooding.
i tank isolation valve opens automatically and is interlocked l ! against closing whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure exceeds 800 psig. l
-% x I 4 M t F C SU h d 4 t) sito
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rom $ Nors'$t t$ Luskrs shee e fqng(gw$7), i l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-2
i Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 g Q Attachment g g@Q ll. Q 1 j Page 25 FORINFORiRTIONONIY EMERGENCY CORE C00LlHG SYSTEMS j ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T 1 280*F
.g l LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
- a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,
- b. One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump, l
- c. One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and
- d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) on a safety injection signal and mnually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. 4 ACTION:
- a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT i SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS . 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be detronstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manugl.
power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. $6,182
Docket Number 50-346 Ideense Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 g q r Attachment p Page 26 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) I b. At least once per 18 months, or prior to operation after ECCS piping ! has been drained by verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water I by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points.
- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the contairenent which could be transported to the containment emergency sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be perfonned:
- 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and
- 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1. Verifying that the interlocks:
a) Close DH-11 and DH-12 and deenergize the pressurizer heaters, if eithe DH-il or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied. The interlock to close DH-11 and/or DH-12 is not required if the valve is closed and 480 V AC power is disconnected from its motor operators, b) Prevent the opening of DH-il and DH-12 when a simulated or actual reactor coolant systen pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied.
- 2. a) A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or co"rosion.
b) Verifying that on a Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Low-Low Level interlock trip, with the motor operators for the BWST outlet isolation valves and the containment emergency sump recirculation valves energized, the BWST Outlet Valve HV-DH7A (HV-DH78) automatically close in 175 seconds after the operator manually pushes the control switch to open the Containment Emergency Sump Valve HV-DH9A (HV-DH98) which should be verified toopenin$]5 seconds.
- 3. Verifying a total leak rate < 20 gallons per hour for the LPI system at:
a) Normal operating pressure or hydrostatic test pressure of
>150 psig for those parts of the system downstream of the Fump suction isolation valve, and b) >45 psig for the piping from the containment emergency sump Isolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve. j Anendment No. 3.25.78.# ,77 /lAS,182 DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-4
l Docket Number 50-346 Lic'ense Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 j Attachment l Page 27 EMEPGEN~Y CORE CZLING SYSTEMS _
$URYEILLANCE EEC'J:REf1ENT; (* n:irued) 4.
Verifying that a minimum of 72 cubic feet ofhc!!d auch l trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the
- j
. TSP storage baskets. )
l
- 5. Verify that a representative sample of TSP from a TSP '
storage basket has a density of > 53 lbs/cu ft. , g ~ _ . 05 Verifying that when a representative sample of L 6. lbs of TSP from a TSP storage basket ,erged, without i agitation, in 50 + 5' 1 + 10*F borated water I
~
~from the BWST, t of the mixed solution is raised to
>6 '+" ours.
NW
- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown ~, by <ble
- 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection
. test signal.
- 2. Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump starts auto-matica11y upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.
- f. By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves DH-11 and DH-12 will not be flooded for at least 7 days following a LOCA:
~
- 1. At least once per 18 months.
- 2. After each opening of the watertight enclosure.
- 3. After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight enclosure which could affect its integrity.
- g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for valves DH-14A and DH-14B.
- 1. Within 4 hours following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position stop or following completion of maintenance on the valve when the LPI system -
is required to be OPERABLE
~
- 2. At least once per 18 months.
l 3/ 4 5-5 Amendment He. 44,40 0 Avl 5-BC55E, UNIT I
- .. . . = . . . .~ .
Docket Number 50-346
. License: Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 j Attachment Page 28 INSERT (SR 4.5.2.d.6) 6.. Verifying that when a representative sample of TSP from a TSP storage basket'is submerged, without agitation, in at least one liter of 180 1 10'F borated water from the BVST,' such'that ~he t resulting concentration of TSP is less than 0.84 grams per liter, the'pH of the mixed' solution is raised j to 17 (measured at 77'F) within 4. hours. !
l i 4 t 1 l
-l 1
I 1
.J ,.. - , . . - . _ , , _ . _ . , . . . . . . , . _ , . ,_ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . . . _ . . - , . _ _ _ , , , . ~ . _ _ _ . . . _
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 2"#"' THIS PlGE PROVIDED FORINFORMATION DNIY l l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the HPI or LPI subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:
HPI System - Single Pump . Injection leg 1-1 l 1 375 gpm at 400 psig* Injection Leg 1-2 > 375 gpm at 400 psig* Injection Leg 2-1 1 375 gpm at 400 psig* Injection leg 2-2 ,,375
> gpm at 400 psig*
LPI System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1 > 2650 gpm at 100 psig** Injection leg 2 > 2650 gpm at 100 psig*$
- Reactor coolant pressure at the HPI nozzle in the reactor coolant pump discharge.
** Reactor coolant pressure at the core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel.
1 I l l l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-Sa Amendment flo. 20
Docket Number 50-346 Li' cense Number WPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 30 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BORATED VATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The borated, vater storage tank (BVST) shall be OPERABLE vith:
- a. An available borated water volume of between 482,778 and 550 allons, 1100
- b. Between 1600 and 2200 ppm of boron, and l
- c. A minimum vater temperature of 35'F.
APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: IM.5EWO W e horated water storag tank inoperable, restore the tank to
, OPERABLE statu N in v..s he n at least BOT STANDBY vithin the l
next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOVN vithin the follovmg 3G huuu. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 ' The BVST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by:
- 1. Verifying the available borated water volume in the tank,
- 2. Verifying the boron concentration of the vater.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the vater temperature when outside air temperature <35'F. ;
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 57 Amendment tio . 36,123
l Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210
- Attachment l Page 31 i
l INSERT (3/4.5.4 Action)
- a. Vith the BVST inoperable because of boron concentration or temperature not within limits, restore the BVST to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in I at least HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTD0VN within
! the following 30 hours.
- b. Vith the BVST inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration or temperature not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE status within
, one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOVN within the following 30 hours. t
Docket Number 50-346 i.icense Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 32 l 1 l i l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) BASES 3/4.5.1 CORE FLOODING TANKS The OPERABILITY of each core flooding tank ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor vessel in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the tanks. This initial surge of water into the vessel provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures. The limits on volume, baron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for core flooding tank injection in the scfety analysis are met. The tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to he valves is required. 93gh.f pe pp)
The limits for operation with a core flooding tank inoperAMTor any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizguthtrTsiIe exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring con with failure of an additional tank which may result cceptable peak cladding tempera-tures. If a closedone i tank isvalve not cannot be immediately opened, the available and prompt action is full capabilit ) ace the reactor in a mode where this capability is not I 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS. i The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280*F, ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability.wT11 be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with tN core flooding tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cool'ng to maintain the peak cladding tempera-tures within acceptable limiis for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended bre3K of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period. i 0 AVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 20
, Docket Number 50-346 License Number RPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 33 l
l I INSERT (New Paragraphs, Bases 3/4.5.1) The one hour limit for operation with a core flooding tank (CFT) inoperable for l reasons other than boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time I the plant is exposed to a possible LOCA event occurring with failure of a CFT, which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. With boron concentration for one CPT not within limits, the condition must be corrected within 72 hours. The 72 hour limit was developed considering that the effects of reduced beron concentration on core suberiticality during reflood are minor. Boiling of the ECCS vater in the core during reflood concentrates the boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core. In addition, the volume of the CFTs is still available for injection. Since the boron requirements are based on the average boron concentration of the total volume of both CFTs, the consequences are less severe than they would be if the contents of a CFT vere not available for injection. The completion times to bring the plant to a MODE in which the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) does not apply are reasonable based on operating experience. The completion times allow plant conditions to be changed in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. CFT boron concentration sampling within 6 hours after an 80 gallon volume increase vill identify whether inleakage from the RCS has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron concentration if the added water inventory is from the borated water storage tank (BVST), because the vater contained in the BVST is within CFT boron concentration requirements. l l l l
Docket Number 50-346
. License Number NPF-3
. Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 34 l l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l BASES ) With the RCS temperature below 280*F. one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The decay heat removal system leak rate surveillance re~quirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system during the recirculationJhase_of_ the low pressure injection will not be exceeded. .T' hNth@ Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance
~
testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration. (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-98 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a Control Room fire, which c'uuld result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown. Re-energization of DH-9A and DH-9B is pennitted on an intermittent basis during N0 DES 1. 2, 3 and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls. Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-78 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST. Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-78 is permitted on an intermittent basis during H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under adminis-trative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such contr 1s. 3/4.5 4 BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK NN b # M '- )
'The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part ne1fCS
[ ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is a e or injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The li ST minimum volume and J boron concentration ensure that lent water is available within contain- i j ment to permit recirculati oling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritica e cold condition following m.txing of the BWST and the RCS wate .. s with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive ) y con o assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analysis. j The bottom 4 inches of the berated m tu-4torage-tenk e allable, and l the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. The limits on water volume. and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and l 11.0 of the solution sprayed within the containment af ter a design basis l accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the I effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components. B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 20,123)82-navis-nFssr UNIT I
1
' Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2210 Attachment Page 35 INSERT (New Paragraphs, Bases 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3)
The function of the trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) contained in baskets in the containment normal sump is to neutralize the acidity of the post-LOCA borated water mixture prior to establishing containment emergency sump recirculation. The borated water storage tank (BUST) borated water has a nominal pH value of approximately 5. Raising the borated water mixture to a pH , value of 7 vill ensure that chloride stress corrosion does not occur in 2 austenitic stainless steels in the event that chloride levels increase as a l result of contamination on the surfaces of the reactor containment building. Also, a pH of 7 is assumed for the containment emergency sump for iodine retention and removal post-LOCA by the containment spray system. The Surveillance Requirements (SR) associated with TSP ensure that the minimum amount and density of TSP is stored in the baskets, and that the TSP in the baskets is sufficient to provide adequate, post-LOCA, long-term pH adjustment. INSERT (Bases 3/4.5.4) The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BVST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on the BVST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:
- 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core following manual switchover to the recirculation mode, and
- 2) The reactor vill remain at least 1%ok/k suberitical in the cold condition at 70*F, xenon free, while only crediting 50% of the control rods' worth following mixing of the BVST sad the RCS vater volumes.
These assumptions ensure that the reactor remains suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the BVST and the RCS vater volumes. Vith either the BVST boron concentration or BVST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition must be corrected in eight hours. The eight hour , limit to restore the temperature or boron concentration to within limits was ' developed considering the time required to change boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the BVST are still available for i injection. 1 [ l l
Dockst Number 50-346 Licznsa Numbsr NPF-3 S:licl Numbsr 2210 Attachment P ge 36 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.4 The SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and shutdown margin provided:
- a. Reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPER-ABLE control rod (s), and
- b. All axial power shaping rods are withdrawn to at least 35%
(indicated position) and OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 2. ACTION:
- a. With any safety or regulating control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion or the axial power shaping rods not within .-
O their withdra limits, innediately initiate and continue l' 2)' . boration at pm of 7875 ppm boric acid solution or its equivale until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specifi- ,/ cation 3.1.1.1 is restored.
- b. With all safety or regulating control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity N e f 25 Q@quivalent, immediately gpm of 7875 ppm boric initiate and continue acid solution boration at >
or its equivalent
'd until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is lr/
restored. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.4.1 The position of each safety, regulating, and axial power shaping rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours. 4.10.4.2 Each safety or regulating control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MRGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.
. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 10-4
Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 . Serial Number 2210 Attachment TlilS PAGE PROVIDED 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES l 3/4.10.1 GROUP HEIGHT, . INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS I This special test exception permits individual control rods to be positioned outside of their specified group heights and insertion l limits and to be assigned to other than specified control rod groups, ! and permits AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE and QUADRANT POWER TILT limits to be exceeded during the performance of such PHYSICS TESTS as those required to 1) measure control rod worth, 2) determine the reactor stability index and damping factor under xenon oscillation 'nditions and 3) calibrate AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE and QUADRANT POWER TILT instrumentation. 3/4.10.2 PHYSICS TESTS This special test exception permits PHYSICS TESTS to be performed at less than or equal to S5 of RATED THERMAL POWER and is required to verify the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. 3/4.10.3 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under various flow conditions and is required in order to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels. 3/4.10.4 SHUTDOWN MARGIN This special test exception provides that a minimum amount of con-trol rod worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for control rod worth measurement. This special test exception is required to permit the periodic verification of the actual versus predicted core reactivity condition occurring as a result of fuel burnup or fuel cycling operations, l 1 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 10-1}}