IR 05000277/2012007
| ML12160A105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/2012 |
| From: | Rogge J F Engineering Region 1 Branch 3 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-12-007 | |
| Download: ML12160A105 (33) | |
Text
UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I21OO RENAISSANCE BOULEVARDKING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406June 8, 2AI2Mr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield RoadWarrenville, lL 60555
SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRCTRI E N N IAL F I RE PROTECTI ON I N SPECTI ON RE PORT O5OOO27 7 I2O12OO7AND 05000278t2012007
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On May 18,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fireprotection inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Station (PBAPS), Unit Nos. 2 and 3. Theenclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed onMay 18,2012, with Mr. Garey Stathes and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of yourlicense. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed station personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressinglarge fires and explosions.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and ManagementSystem (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,h.John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-277: 50-278License Nos. DPR-44; DPR-56 Mr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield RoadWarrenville, lL 60555
SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRCTRI EN N IAL FI RE PROTECTI ON I N SPECTI ON REPORT O5OOO27 7 I2O12OO7AND 0500027812012007
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On May 18,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fireprotection inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Station (PBAPS), Unit Nos. 2 and 3. Theenclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed onMay 18,2012, with Mr. Garey Stathes and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of yourlicense. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed station personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressinglarge fires and explosions.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and ManagementSystem (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://rrr,rww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RNJohn F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-277, 50-278License Nos. DPR-44; DPR-56DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\Engineering Branch 3\Young\PEACH BOTTOM FP 2012007a.docxADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML121604105g suNstReviewg Non-Sensitiven SensitiveV Publicly Availablen Non-PubliclyAvailabbOFFICERI/DRSRI/DRSRI/DRPRI/DRSNAMEKYoung/JFRWCookPKrohnJRoggeDATE6t5t126t6t126t7t126t8t12OFFICIAL RECORD COPY M. Pacilio
Enclosure:
I n specti on Re po rt 0500027 7 l 2U 2A07 a n d 0 5000 27 I l 20 1 2007d
Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/encl:W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAlL Resource)D. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAlL Resource)D. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAlL Resource)J. Clifford, DRP (RlDRPMail Resource)C. Miller, DRS (Rl DRSMail Resource)P. Wilson, DRS (Rl DRSMail Resource)P. Krohn, DRPA. Rosebrook, DRPS. lbarrola, DRPE. Miller, DRPS. Hansell, DRP, SRIA. Ziedonis, DRP, RlA. Rao. DRP, Acting RlS. Schmitt, DRP, AAM. McCoppin, Rl OEDORidsNrrPMPeachBottom ResourceRids N rrDorlLpll -2 Resou rceROPreports ResourceD. Bearde. DRS Docket Nos.:License Nos.:Report No.:Licensee:Facility:Location:Dates:lnspectors:Approved by:U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I50-277" 50-278DPR-44; DPR-560500027 7 l 2U 20A7 and 05000 27 8l2A 2047Exelon Generating Company, LCCPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 31848 Lay RoadDelta, PA 17314April 30, 2012 through May 18,2012K. Young, Senior Reactor lnspector (Team Leader), Division of ReactorSafety (DRS)W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, DRSL. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSJ. Rady, Reactor Inspector, DRSJ. Patel, Reactor Inspector, DRSD. Helton, Senior Reliability and Risk Engineer, Office of NuclearRegulatory Research, Division of Risk Analysis (Observer)John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetyEnclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGSI R 05000277 12012007, 05000278 12Q120Q7 ; 0413012012 - 051 1812012; Exelon GenerationCompany, LLC; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3; Triennial FireProtection Baseline Inspection.This report covered a two week on-site triennial fire protection team inspection by specialistinspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear powerreactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, datedDecember 2006.Gornerstone: Mitigating SystemsNo findings were identified.Other FindingsOne violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has beenreviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Exelon have been enteredinto the corrective action program (CAP). This violation and the corrective action trackingnumbers are listed in Section 4OA7.Enclosure BackqroundThis report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordancewith the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Procedure (lP) 71111.05T,"Fire Protection." The objective of the inspection was to assess whether Exelon GeneratingCompany, LLC has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safeshutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained at the PeachBottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit Nos. 2 and 3 facilities. The following fire areas(FAs) and/or fire zones (FZs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from thePBAPS Individual Plant Examination (lPE)/lndividual Plant Examination of External Events(TPEEE).o FA 65, Unit 2, South Control Rod Drive (CRD) Equipment Area (Reactor Building)r FA 31, Unit 3, Battery Room 266. FA 35lFZ 122, Unit 3, Emergency Switchgear Room 263. FA 44lFZ 133, Diesel Generator (E3) Building Bay CInspection of these areas/zones fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect aminimum of three samples.The inspection team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program against applicablerequirements which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating LicenseCondition 2.C.(4), NRC Safety Evaluations, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations(10 CFR) 50.48, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The team also reviewed related documentsthat included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 10.12, the fireprotection program (FPP), the fire hazards analysis (FHA), and the postfire safe shutdownanalyses.The team also evaluated five licensee mitigating strategies for addressing large fires andexplosions as required by Operating License Condition 2.C.(11) and 10 CFR 50.54 (hhx2).Inspection of these strategies fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimumof one sample.Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.iiiEnclosure Report Details1. REACTORSAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R05 Fire Protection (lP 7111 1.05T).01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilitiesa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the FHA, safe shutdown analyses and supporting drawings anddocumentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. Theteam ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and the licensee's design and licensing bases weremaintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power,control, and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of theadequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactorheat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..02 Passive Fire Protectiona. Inspection ScopeThe team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to evaluatewhether the material conditions of the fire area boundaries were adequate for the firehazards in the area. The team compared the fire area boundaries, including walls,ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, electrical raceway andconduit fire barriers, and redundant equipment fire barriers and radiant energy heatbarriers to design and licensing basis requirements, industry standards, and the PBAPSFPP, as approved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-conformances.The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations, installation and repair work orders,and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether the fillmaterial was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied designrequirements for the intended fire rating. The team also reviewed similar records forselected fire protection wraps to verify whether the material and configuration wasappropriate for the required fire rating and conformed to the engineering design.Enclosure
.032The team also reviewed recent inspection and functional test records for fire dampers,and the inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers, to verify whether theinspection and testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, andany potential performance degradation was identified. In addition, the team reviewedrecent test results for the carbon dioxide (COr) and fire damper functionality tests for theareas protected to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteriawere met, and any performance degradation was identified.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Active Fire Protectionlnspection ScopeThe team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in theselected fire areas to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained, andoperated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Association(NFPA) codes of record, and the PBAPS FPP, as approved by the NRC. The team alsoassessed whether the suppression systems capabilities were adequate to control and/orextinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas.The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verify thedesign and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements were satisfied, and toassess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazards involved. The teamreviewed the fire water system hydraulic analyses to assess the adequacy of a singlefire water pump to supply the largest single hydraulic load on the fire water system plusconcurrent fire hose usage. The team evaluated the fire pump performance tests toassess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pump minimum dischargepressure at the required flow rate, to verify the criteria was adequate to ensure that thedesign basis and hydraulic analysis requirements were satisfied. The team alsoevaluated the underground fire loop flow tests to verify the tests adequatelydemonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet design basisrequirements. In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flow test results toverify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and anypotential performance degradation was identified.The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, vendor requirements,modifications and engineering evaluations, and routine functional testing for the COzsuppression systems for the areas protected. The team walked down accessibleportions of the CO2 system, including storage tanks and supply systems, toindependently assess the material condition, operational lineup, and availability of thesystems. The team also reviewed and walked down the associated fire fightingstrategies and COz system operating procedures.The team walked down accessible portions of the detection and water suppressionsystems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supply system,Enclosure
.043including motor and diesel driven fire pumps, interviewed system and programengineers, and reviewed selected issue reports (lRs) to independently assess thematerial condition of the systems and components. In addition, the team reviewedrecent test results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected fireareas to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met,and any performance degradation was identified.The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, anddrill critique records. The team also reviewed PBAPS's fire fighting strategies (i.e., pre-fire plans) and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine ifappropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators toidentify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of afire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability, The team independentlyinspected the fire brigade equipment, including personnel protective gear (e.9., turnoutgear) and smoke removal equipment, to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.In addition, the team reviewed PBAPS's fire brigade equipment inventory and inspectionprocedure and recent inspection and inventory results to verify adequate equipment wasavailable, and any potential material deficiencies were identified.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Protection from Damaoe from Fire Suppression ActivitiesInspection ScopeThe team walked down the selected fire areas and adjacent areas, and reviewedselected documents to determine whether redundant safe shutdown trains could bepotentially damaged from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertentoperation of fire suppression systems. During the walkdowns, the team evaluated theadequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.Specifically, to determine whether a potential existed to damage redundant safeshutdown trains, the team evaluated whether:o A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not release smoke, heat, or hotgases that could cause unintended activation of suppression systems in adjacentfire areas which could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains; oro A fire suppression system rupture, inadvertent actuation, or actuation due to afire, in one of the selected fire areas, could not directly damage all redundanttrains (e.9. sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); ando Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppressionsystems.a.Enclosure b.a..054FindinssNo findings were identified.Normal and Alternative Shutdown CaoabilitvInspection ScopeThe team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping andinstrumentation drawings (P&lDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR, and other supportingdocuments for the selected fire areas to verify that the licensee had properly identifiedthe systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdownconditions.The team assessed the adequacy of the selected systems and components for reactivitycontrol, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and supportsystem functions. This review included verification that alternative post-fire shutdowncould be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. Plantwalkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent withthat described in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. The team verified thatthe systems and components credited for use during shutdown would remain free fromfire damage.The team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operatorsincluded alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel requiredfor safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures aretrained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigademembers. Additionally, the team observed fire protection training provided to theoperations department to determine its adequacy.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown andperformed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure theimplementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verifiedthat the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within thetime required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included thefollowing:. ON-114, Actual Fire Reported in the Power Block, Diesel Generator Building,Emergency Pump, Inner Screen or Emergency Cooling Tower Structures -Procedure, Rev. 18;. SE-10, Alternative Shut Down, Sheets 1 &2, Revs. 18 and 16;. T-3065-2(3), Area 065 Fire Guides, Revs. 6(3);. T-331-2(3), Area 31 Fire Guides, Revs. 1(3);. T-335-2(3), Area 35 Fire Guides, Revs, 1(1); and. T-344-2(3), Area 44Fire Guides, Revs. 1(1).Enclosure b.5The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed andapproved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plantprocedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each firearea. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfercapability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests are adequate toensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Circuit AnalvsisInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for theselected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, andcomponents important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Additionally, theteam verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits wereproperly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hotshorts or shorts to ground were identified, evaluated, and dispositioned to ensurespurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.The team's review considered fire and cable attributes, cable routing, potentialundesirable consequences and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific itemsincluded the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes,and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.The team also reviewed cable raceway drawings and/or cable routing databases for asample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables wererouted as described in the safe-shutdown analysis. The team also reviewed equipmentimportant to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to verify that the licenseehad taken appropriate actions in accordance with the design and licensing basis andNRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2.Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:. 0AP57, Emergency Service Water Pump A;. 2AP37, Unit 2 Core Spray Pump A;. Fl2-14-50A, Unit 2 Core Spray Loop A Flow Indicator;. Ll2(3)-2-3-1 13, Units 2 and 3 Reactor Vessel Water Level Indicator;. MO-2-13-030, Unit 2 Reactor Core lsolation Cooling (RCIC) Full Flow Test Valve(Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) scenario 2aa);. MO-2-14-O12A, Core Spray Loop Inboard lsolation Valve (MSO scenario 2q);. MO-2-23-016, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant lnjection (HPCI) Steam Supplylsolation Valve:.06Enclosure
,Q76. MO-3-10-034A, Unit 3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop A Full Flow Test LineBlock Valve (MSO scenario 5k);. MO-3-23-015, Unit 3 HPCI Turbine Steam Line Inboard lsolation Valve (MSOscenario 5k);. MO-3-23-019, Unit 3 HPCIando RV-3-02-071G, Unit 3 Mainscenario 3alblc).Discharge to Feedwater Line A (MSO scenario 5k);Steam Line C Safety Relief Valve (SRV) (MSOThe team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipmentneeded to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lackof coordination that could result in a common power supply or common bus concern.The team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternativeshutdown location(s) would not be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.9., by theprovision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).FindinosNo findings were identified.CommunicationsInspection ScopeThe team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, andassociated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would beavailable to plant operators following a fire. During this review the team considered theeffects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability, and coverage patterns.The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify theavailability of portable radios for the fire brigade and for plant operators. The team alsoverified that communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not beaffected by a fire.FindinosNo findings were identified.Emerqencv LiqhtinqInspection ScopeThe team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lightsthroughout the selected fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access andegress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentationmonitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery powersupplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenance.08Enclosure b.a..097procedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests, and battery replacementpractices were also reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintainedconsistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and in a manner that would ensurereliable operation.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Cold Shutdown RepairsInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, andmaterials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which mightbe damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the timeframes specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repairequipment, components, tools, and materials (e.9. pre-cut cables with preparedattachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Compensatorv Measureslnspection ScopeThe team verified compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded, orinoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features(e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps,valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). Theteam evaluated whether the short term compensatory measures adequatelycompensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actioncould be taken and whether Exelon was effective in returning the equipment to service ina reasonable period of time.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Review and Documentation of the Fire Protection Prooram Chanoeslnspection ScopeThe team reviewed recent changes to the approved fire protection program to verify thechanges did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown..10b..11a.Enclosure b.8FindinosNo findings were identified.Control of Transient Combustibles and lsnition SourcesInspection ScopeThe team reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignitionsources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires andin controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hotwork and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The teamperformed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sourceswere being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Laroe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation StrateoiesInspection ScopeThe team conducted a review of selected mitigation strategies intended to maintain orrestore core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities underthe circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosionsand/or fires. The team assessed whether Exelon continued to meet the requirements ofOperating License Condition 2.C(11) and 10 CFR 50.54(hhx2). The team reviewed thefollowing mitigation strategies:. TSG 4.1, Attachment 1 - Internal Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Makeup & Spray;. TSG 4.1, Attachment 2 - External SFP Makeup & Spray;r TSG 4.1, Attachment 9 - Reactor Core lsolation Cooling (RCIC) SystemManual Start on Loss of DC Power;e TSG 4.1, Attachment 11 - Alternate Injection into the Residual Heat Removal(RHR) System; and,. TSG 4.1, Attachment 16 - Manual Operation of Containment (Drywell) VentValves.The team's review included: a detailed assessment of the procedural guidance; awalkdown of the strategy with trained operators to assess the feasibility of the strategyand operator familiarity; maintenance and surveillance testing of all designated strategyequipment; and an inventory check of all strategy equipment to ensure theappropriateness of equipment storage and availability. The team also evaluated theadequacy of corrective actions associated with issues identified during previous.12a.b..13a.Enclosure inspectionslnformationIin this area. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Supplementalattached to this report.b.4.4c.A2a.4043.1No findings wereOTHER ACTIVITIESldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)Inspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee was identifying fire protection and post-fire safeshutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the CAP. The teamalso reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that the licensee had taken orplanned appropriate corrective actions.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000278/11-004-00: HPCI Cable Routing ErrorResults in Degraded Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) AnalysisOn November 15, 2011, a fire protection program document impact review wasperformed for the MSO modifications installed during the Unit 3 refueling outage (RFO)P3R18 in September 2Q11 . As a result of the review, the licensee determined that themodification for the HPCI turbine steam supply valve (MO-3-23-014) control circuitadversely impacted the PBAPS post-FSSD analysis. Specifically, the modificationrouted a new cable through a fire area (fire area 13S, room 257, south CRD EquipmentRoom) that relies on the HPCI system to achieve post-fire safe shutdown following a firein that speciflc fire area.PBAPS determined that the cause of the cable routing error was plant procedures andadministrative controls were not followed. This resulted in the FSSD analysis of themodification not being performed until after it was completed. Plant procedures providecontrolto ensure such analyses are completed and approved before a FSSDmodification is installed. PBAPS entered this issue into the CAP (lR 01290922),established compensatory measures, performed an extent of condition review for otherMSO modifications, and performed a root cause analysis. PBAPS also revisedconfiguration change procedures and accountability standards to prevent recurrence.Additionally, PBAPS modified the circuit design for the HPCI turbine steam supply valveat the motor operated valve (MOV) MO-3-23-014 and at the motor control center (MCC)so that the new cable was not needed for MSO fire scenarios. There was no actualEnclosure 10safety consequences associated with this event. The enforcement aspects of this LERare discussed in Section 4OA7. This LER is closed.4OA5 Other Activities.1 (Closed) AV 05000277,05000278/2000003-01, Aoparent Violation of 10 CFR Part 50Appendix R Sections lll.G and lll.L Requirement to Protect Alternative ShutdownEquipment from the Adverse Effects of a FireDuring the 2000 triennialfire protection inspection, the NRC identified an apparentviolation that the licensee adopted a licensing position that the mechanical damagescenario described in NRC lnformation Notice (lN) 92-18, "Potentialfor Loss of RemoteShutdown Capability during a Control Room Fire," was outside the design and licensingbasis of the facility. As a result, the licensee did not evaluate the impact that thisconcern may have on their facility with regard to post-fire safe shutdown. lN 92-18described the potential for control room fires causing "multiple hot shorts" (i.e., shortcircuits between controlwiring and power sources) for certain MOVs needed for post-firesafe shutdown actions. These hot shorts could ultimately result in mechanical damageto the valves or other components, rendering them incapable of performing their requiredpost-fire safe shutdown function.The potential of multiple hot shorts during a fire and whether the accumulated effects ofthese multiple hot shorts should be addressed in licensee's fire protection programsbecame a generic issue that needed to be resolved between the NRC [Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR)I and the nuclear industry. In October 2009, the NRC issued guidancein Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2,to identify acceptable methods for resolving issues related to circuits required andimportant for post-fire safe shutdown. Additionally, the guidance provided the methodsto evaluate circuits for single and multiple spurious operations (MSOs) and thus allowingthe industry to appropriately identify and correct circuit issues. PBAPS evaluated theirpost-fire safe shutdown circuits per the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl)guidance and identified MOVs needing modifications. The licensee entered theidentified issues into their corrective action program, established compensatorymeasures, and developed technical evaluations/modification packages to resolve theissue. The modifications for the affected MOVs needing an outage were installed duringRFO P3R18 (September 2Q11), for Unit 3 and are scheduled to be installed for theaffected MOVs for Unit 2 during RFO P2R19 (September 2012). Modifications that donot require an outage are scheduled to be completed prior to November 2012. Theteam verified that the licensee followed the NRC and NEI guidance to identify andresolve this issue. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of modifications associatedwith lN 92-18 and identified no issues. PBAPS continues to maintain compensatorymeasures pending completion of the modifications. The NRC will continue to inspectthis aspect of circuit evaluations in the baseline triennial fire protection inspectionprogram. This item had remained open to track the issue until generic guidance waspromulgated and appropriate corrective actions to resolve were identified, therefore thisAV is now administratively closed.Enclosure 404611(Closed) AV 05000277.05000278/2000003-02, Apparent Violation of 10 CFR Part 50Appendix R Sections lll.G and lll.L That Multiple Spurious Actuations must beConsidered in the Fire AnalvsesDuring the 2000 triennialfire protection inspection, the NRC identified an apparentviolation concerning an issue that a single fire in some plant areas could potentiallycause multiple fire-induced spurious actuations of safe shutdown components to occur,as specified in Section lll.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and documented inGeneric Letter (GL) 86-10, and reiterated in a March 11, 1997 ,letter from the NRC to theNEl. PBAPS licensing document, NE-00296, "Post-Fire Safe Shutdown ProgramRequirements at PBAPS,' Section 5.1 .5, requires only a single fire-induced spuriousaction to be considered at a time, except for high/low pressure interface devices.The potential of multiple fire-induced spurious actuations in a single fire and whether theaccumulated effects of these spurious actuations should be addressed in licensee's fireprotection programs became a generic issue that needed to be resolved between theNRC (NRR) and the nuclear industry. In October 2009, the NRC issued guidance in RG1 .189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, to identify acceptablemethods for resolving issues related to circuits required and important for post-fire safeshutdown. Additionally, the guidance provided the methods to evaluate circuits forsingle and MSOs and thus allowing the industry to appropriately identify and correctcircuit issues. PBAPS evaluated their post-fire safe shutdown circuits per the NRC andNEI guidance and identified MSO circuit scenarios needing modifications. The licenseeentered the identified issues into their corrective action program, establishedcompensatory measures, and developed technical evaluations/modification packages toresolve the issues. The modifications for the affected circuits needing an outage wereinstalled during RFO P3R18 (September 2011), for Unit 3 and are scheduled to beinstalled for the affected circuits for Unit 2 during RFO P2R19 (September 2012).Modifications that do not require an outage are scheduled to be completed prior toNovember 2012. The team verified that the licensee followed the NRC and NEIguidance to identify and resolve this issue. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample ofmodifications associated with MSO scenarios and identified no issues. PBAPScontinues to maintain compensatory measures pending completion of the modifications.The NRC will continue to inspect this aspect of circuit evaluations in the baselinetriennial fire protection inspection program. This item had remained open to track theissue until generic guidance was promulgated and appropriate corrective actions toresolve were identified, therefore this AV is now administratively closed.Meetinqs. includinq ExitThe team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. Garey Stathes, PlantManager, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on May 18, 2012. Noproprietary information was included in this inspection report.Enclosure 124C,A7 Licensee-ldentified ViolationsThe following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by thelicensee and is a violation of NRC requirements. This issue satisfies the criteria of theNRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.e Licensee Event Report 0500027812011-004-00 described a modification error inwhich a control cable for the HPCI turbine steam supply MOV (MO-3-23-014)was routed through the same fire area the system is credited for post-fire safeshutdown. The valve is credited for post-fire safe shutdown capability for a fire infire area 135, South CRD Equipment Room (Room 257) for Unit 3. This was aviolation of Operating License Condition 2.C.(4) and 10 CFR Part 50, AppendixR, Section lll.G.2, for failure to ensure that the cable was protected per theAppendix R, lll.G.2 requirements. Contrary to the above, the control cable forthe HPCI turbine steam supply MOV was routed in error during the period of timebetween September 2011 (RFO P3R18), and December 19, 2011. Specifically,PBAPS determined that a postulated fire in fire area 133 could cause damage tothe HPCI turbine steam supply control cable and cause the HPCI pump to beunavailable. The issue was more than minor because it was associated with theprotection against external events (fire) attribute of the mitigating systemscornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring theavailability, reliability, and capabitity of systems that respond to initiating eventsto prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding wasof very low safety significance (Green), based on IMC 0609, Appendix F, "FireProtection Significance Determination Process (SDP)," phase 2 screening, tasknumber 2.3.5 because the cable was routed in conduit predominately through atransient combustible free zone. Additionally, the cable was not routed near acredible fire ignition source in the fire area. Because this finding is of very lowsafety significance and had been entered into Exelon's CAP under lR01290922,this violation is being treated as a Green, licensee-identified NCV consistent withthe NRC Enforcement PolicY.
Attachment:
Supplemental InformationEnclosure A-1ATTAGHMENTSUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee PersonnelG. Stathes, Plant ManagerJ. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance ManagerT. Moore, Engineering DirectorN. Alexakos, Emergency Preparedness LeadR. Birmingham, Operations SupportR. Bleeker, Electrical Design EngineerP. Briedenbaugh, Operations Support & Services, Senior ManagerK, Doyle, Communications System ManagerD. Dullum, Regulatory AssuranceK. Forney, System Manager, Batteries & Emergency LightingD. Foss, Regulatory EngineerF. Gialo, Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) Engineering Project ManagerP. Gigliotti, Operator Training InstructorS. Griffiths, Security SupervisorD. Henry, Program ManagerM. Herr, Operations DirectorC, Howell, Mechanical Design EngineerK. Kaufmann, Emergency Light System EngineerJ. Koester, Site Fire MarshalJ. Lyter, Operations SupportB. Miller, Fire Protection System ManagerC. Pragman, Corporate Fire Protection Program ManagerC. Sinopoli, Fire Protection Program ManagerF. Sturniolo, Maintenance DirectorS. Sullivan, Operations Support ManagerM. Taylor, Corporate Fire Protection EngineerB. Wargo, NOSP. White, Plant Equipment OperatorNRC PersonnelJ. Rogge, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor SafetyW. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor SafetyS. Hansell, Senior Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom Atomic Power StationA. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom Atomic Power StationA. Rao, Resident lnspector (Temporary), Peach Bottom Atomic Power StationAttachment A-2LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDOpenedNONEOpened and ClosedNONEClosed05000278t2011-004-0005000277 t2000003-010500027812000003-010500027712000003-0205000278t2000003-02LER HPCI Cable Routing Error Results in DegradedPost-Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) Analysis(Section 4OA3.1)AV Apparent Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Sections lll.G and lll.L Requirement to protectalternative Shutdown Equipment from the AdverseEffects of a Fire (Section 4OA5.1)AV Apparent Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Sections lll.G and lll.L that Multiple SpuriousActuations Must be considered in the Fire Analysis(Section 4c.A.5.2)DiscussedNONELIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFire Protection Licensinq DocumentsExemption dated 3113185, Exemption from the Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50Exemption dated 11114186, Exemption from Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 GoncerningPenetration Seals & Fire DetectionExemption dated 12131186, Exemption from 10CFR50 Appendix R Regarding Dampers,Structural Steel & Automatic Fire SuppressionExemption dated 1013191, Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,PBAPS,Units2&3Exemption dated 1/30/09, PBAPS, Units 2 & 3, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix R RequirementsNE-00296, Specification for Posffire Safe Shutdown Program Requirements for PBAPS, Rev. 1PBAPS Technical Requirements Manual, Unit 2, Rev. 16PBAPS Technical Requirements Manual, Unit 3, Rev. 16PBAPS Updated Final SafetyAnalysis, Section 10.12, Rev. 19Attachment A-3PBAPS Units 2 & 3 Fire Protection Program, Rev. 17Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated 5123175, Fire Protection, PBAPS, Units 2 & 3SE dated 8114180, Supplement 1 to the Safety Eval. of the PBAPS Fire Protection ProgramSE dated 9115180, Supplement 2 to the Safety Eval. of the PBAPS Fire Protection ProgramSE dated 10/10/80, Supplement 3 to the Safety Eval. of the PBAPS Fire Protection ProgramSE dated 11124180, Supplement 4 to Safety Evaluation f of the PBAPS Fire Protection ProgramSE (lnterim) dated 5127181, Post Fire Shutdown Capability PBAPS Units 2 & 3SE dated 1126184, Fire Protection Rule-Alternate Safe shutdown Capability-Sections lll.G.3 &lll.L of Appendix R to 1OCFR Part S0-PBAPS, Units 2 and 3SER dated 514194, Fire Protection Rule-Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability-Sections lll.G.3 &lll.L of Appendix R to 1OCFR Part SO-PBAPS, Units 2 and 3SE dated 1Q110185, PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, Fire Protection ProgramSE dated 12128188, Diesel Generator CO2 Fire Protection SystemSE dated 9/16/93, PBAPS, Units 2 & 3, Fire Protection ProgramSE dated 6124105, PBAPS, Units 2 & 3-lssuance of Amendment RE: FPP ChangesDesiqn Basis DocumentsP-S-51, PBAPS Fire Protection System, Rev. 10P-T-10, PBAPS fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 9Desiqn ChanqesECR PB 95-05708, PBAPS Safe S/D Analysis Error in Assumptions for Rerate, Rev. 0ECR PB 98-02073-001, Thermo-Lag Upgrade Raceway Encapsulation-FBS, Rev. 1ECR PB 99-01916, CS System Capability for Alternate Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 0ECR PB 10-00449, Unit 3 MSO 5k - MCC AC and DC Bucket Mod. 50.59 Review, Rev. 3ECR PB 10-00449-01 1, MSO 5k (NRC lN 92-18) MCC Bucket Rework, Rev. 1 1Calculations/Enoineerinq Evaluation Reports & TestsA1754608-01, Technical Evaluation for Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 2Q Evaluation,Rev.0A1754773-01, Technical Evaluation for Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 2AA, Rev. 0A1754781-01, Technical Evaluation for Multiple Spurious Operation Scenarios 3A, 38, and 3C,Rev.0BISCO Test Report 748-14, Metal Clad Fire Wall Penetration Barrier Fire Testing , 5121179BISCO Test Report 748-105, Fire Test Utilizing BISCO SF-60 Where Cable Trays Exist, 6/10/83BISCO Test Report 1064-10, Fire Test Configuration for Silicone Foam Fire Barriers in GypsumBoard Stud Partiti ons, 6120179ECR 1 1-00136, MSO Scenario 2Q Spurious Opening of Testable Check Valve Bypass, Rev. 0ECR 1 1-00137 , MSO Scenario 2Q Spurious Opening of Testable Check Valve Bypass, Rev. 0EE-0007, 10CFR50 Appendix R Electrical Coordination Study for Units 2 and 3, Rev. 8Factory Mutual Test Report J.l. 4C3Q9.AC, Fire Endurance Test on Silicone Foam PenetrationSeal in a Masonry Seal in a Masonry Floor, Design FC-270,12114178MDE-86-0786, Safe and Alternative Shutdown Analyses - Peach Bottom Atomic Power StationUnits 2 and 3, Rev. 1Attachment A-4ME-0093, Verify that Stresses in Conduit & Conduit Supports are within Allowable LimitsConsidering AdditionalWeight of Encapsulation Material, Rev. 2ME-0203, Verify that Stresses in Conduit & Conduit Supports are within Allowable LimitsConsidering AdditionalWeight of Encapsulation Material, Rev. 4NE-00296, Specification for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Program Requirements at Peach BottomAtomic Power Station, Rev. 1Peam-S, Loss of HVAC Analysis for Miscellaneous Rooms Following an Appendix R Fire,Rev. 0PE-0193, Coordination Study for 480V Load Centers and MCC's, Rev. 6PE-0194, Coordination for 4KV 1E Switchgear, Rev. 4PE-0195, 120VAC Coordination Study, Rev.4PE-0196, 1251250VDC System Coordination, Rev. 2PF-0016-065, Fire Area 65 - Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 1PF-0016-031, Fire Area 31 - Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0PF-0016-035, Fire Area 35 - Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0PF-0016-044,Fire Area44 - Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0PM-736, Battery Room Hydrogen Concentration, Rev. 3PM-1036, Minimum and Maximum Alternate Shutdown Cooling Pressures and MinimumNumber of SRVs Required for Alternate Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 0PSB-0001, Re-Evaluation of Block Walls for MOD 25178 & Project P00680, Rev. 1PSB-0007, Re-Evaluation of Block Walls for MOD 5209 & Project P00680, Rev. 1PSB-0099, Re-Evaluation of Block Walls for MOD 5209 & Project P00680, Rev. 1SDOC 737-D-VC-S, PBAPS Thermo-Lag Fire Endurance & Ampacity Evaluation Report, Rev. 0SDOC 737-D-VC-63, Fire Endurance Test of Thermo-Lag 330-1, Fire Protective Envelopes(12" &24" Cable Trays, &5",2", & 1" Steel Conduits Omega Point Labs ProjectNo.11960-97553, Rev.0SDOC 737-D-VC-67, Installation & Inspection Guidelines for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier MaterialSpec. No. MN-3.21, Rev. 0T-061-VC-1, Assessment of the Fire Sprinkler & Hose Station Supply Piping, Rev. 087RE/ACl 040.002, Masonry Wall Re-Evaluation for Additional Attachment Since 80-1 1 ,Group No. 1 Wall Nos. 40.1 through 40.26, Rev. 31047196, Technical Evaluation to Support the use of an Alternate Compensatory MeasureDrawinos and Wirinq DiaoramsA-168, Fire Detection & Suppression - Floor Plan at 135'-0', Rev. 13A-169, Fire Detection & Suppression - Floor Plan at 165'-0', Rev. 9A-170, Fire Detection & Suppression - Floor Plan at EL 195'-0", Rev. 1 1A-172, Fire Detection & Suppression - Emergency Cooling Towers, Re-combiner & DieselGenerator Buildings, Rev. 8,4-486, Sht. 1, Barrier Plans EL 135'-0', Rev. 7A-487, Sht. 1, Barrier Plans EL 165'-0', Rev. 11A-488, Sht. 1, Barrier Plans EL 195'-0', Rev. 7A-490, Barrier Plans C.W. Pump Structure, Emergency Cooling Tower & Diesel GeneratorBuilding, Rev.4ACS-REP-41410-23C, Peach Bottom Radio Repeater System ACS/Fire Channel, 815/10E-1, Sht. 1, Single Line Diagram, Rev.51Attachment A-5E-8, Sht. 1, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Standby Diesel Generator and 4160VEmergency Power System Unit 2, Rev. 17E-12, Sht. 1, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Standby Diesel Generator and 4160VEmergency Power System Unit 3, Rev. 11E-26, Sht. 1, Single Line Diagram 1251250 VDC System Unit 2, Rev. 80E-27, Sht. 1, Single Line Diagram 1251250 VDC System Unit 3, Rev. 74E-183, Sht. 1 , Electrical Schematic Diagram Core Spray Pump 4.16KV Circuit Breaker, Rev. 20E-187, Sht. 1, Electrical Schematic Diagram Emergency Service Water Pumps 4.16KV CircuitBreaker, Rev. 30E-187 , Sht. 2, Electrical Schematic Diagram Emergency Service Water Pumps 4.16KV CircuitBreaker, Rev. 28E-1 139, Sht. 1 , Raceway Layout - Turbine Bldg Unit 2 Area 2 Elevation 135'-0', Rev. 43E-1151, Raceway Layout - Turbine Bldg., U2 H&V Fan Room, EL 195'0", Rev. 19E-1166, Sht. 2A, Raceway Layout - Reactor Bldg. Unit 2 Area 8 Elev. 135'-0", Rev. 77E-1615, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E124 &E224 Emergency L.C., E124-R-C &E224-R-B Reactor MCC and E124-T-B &E224-T-B Turbine MCC 440V Unit 2, Rev. 76E-1617, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E324 &E424 Emergency L.C. and E324 -R-8,E424-W-A, E324-R-D &E424-R-D Reactor MCC 440V Unit 2, Rev. 66E-1715, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E134 & E234 Emergency L.C., E134-W-A &E234-R-B Reactor MCC and E134-T-B & E234-T-B Turbine MCC 440V, Rev. 75E-2400, Cable Block Diagram Radio Equipment, Rev.9E-2472, Sht. 30, Raceway Encapsulation Layout, Rev. 26E-2472, Sht. 45, Raceway Encapsulation Layout, Rev. 26E-2472, Sht. 79, Raceway Encapsulation Layout, Rev. 34E-2557, Sht. 1 Alternative Control Instrumentation, Rev. 1 1E-5208, Radio Repeater System, Rev. 1M-1-5-36, Sht. 7, Electrical Schematic Dia. High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 75M-1-5-36, Sht. 17, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Rev. 74M-1-5-36, Sht. 174, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Rev. 74M-1-5-36, Sht. 18, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Rev. 74M-1-S-36, Sht. 20, Schematic Drawing HPCI Valve MO3-23-19, Rev. 76M-1-5-36, Sht. 22, Electrical Schematic Dia. High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 78M-1-5-36, Sht. 30, Schematic Drawing HPCI, Rev. 82M-1-S-40, Sht. 13, Electrical Schematic Diagram Core Spray System, Rev. 59M-1-S-52, Sht. 12, Electrical Schematic Diagram Automatic Blowdown System, Rev. 39M-1-5-65, Sht. 31A, Electrical Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 96M-1-5-65, Sht. 49, Schematic Drawing RHR Valve MO3-10-34A, Rev. 96M-1-5-65, Sht. 66A, Electrical Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 96PD-7, Typical Penetration Seal Detail Cable Tray Wall Seal (SF-20), Rev. 1PD-g, Typical Penetration Seal Detail Pen. Through Barrier Less than Req. Thickness, Rev. 0PD-11, Typical Penetration Seal Detail Cables through Opening of Conduits (SF-60), Rev. 0PS-263, Penetration Seal Locations Cont. Barriers-Rm. No. 263, U3 ELEV 135'-0", Rev. 1PS-265, Penetration Seal Locations Cont. Barriers-Rm. No. 265, U3 ELEV 135'-0", Rev. 1737-D-VC-22, Shts. 1-5, Thermo-Lag Upgrade Barrier 122-01, Rev. 0737-D-VC-23, Shts. 1-7, Thermo-Lag Upgrade Barriers 122-02&122-03, Rev.0Attachment A-6Pipinq and Instrumentation DiaoramsM-315, Sht. 1, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Rev. 75M-315, Sht. 2, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Rev. 57M-315, Sht. 3, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Rev. 53M-315, Sht. 4, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Rev. 54M-315, Sht. 5, Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Rev. 59M-318, Sht. 1, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 64M-318, Sht.2, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 88M-318, Sht. 3, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 68M-318, Sht.4, Fire Protection System Pl&D, CO2 System, Rev. 69M-318, Sht. 5, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 7M-318, Sht. 6, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 5M-318, Sht. 7, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 12M-318, Sht. 8, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 17M-318, Sht. 9, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 29M-318, Sht. 10, Fire Protection System Pl&D, Rev. 14M-333, Sht. 1, Instrument Nitrogen, Rev. 57M-333, Sht. 2, Instrument Nitrogen, Rev. 58M-351, Sht. 1, Nuclear Boiler, Rev. 77M-351, Sht. 2, Nuclear Boiler, Rev. 69M-351, Sht. 3, Nuclear Boiler, Rev. 74M-351, Sht. 4, Nuclear Boiler, Rev. 69M-352. Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrumentation, Rev. 60M-356, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Part A, Rev. 74M-357, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Part B, Rev. 37M-359, Sht. 1, Reactor Core lsolation Cooling System, Rev. 50M-359, Sht. 2, Reactor Core lsolation Cooling System, Rev. 48M-360, Sht. 1, R.C.l.C. Pump Turbine Details, Rev. 56M-360, Sht. 2, R.C.l.C. Pump Turbine Details, Rev. 54M-361, Sht. 1, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev.81M-361, Sht.2, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev.67M-361, Sht.3, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev.70M-361, Sht.4, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev.70M-362, Core Spray Cooling System, Rev. 3M-365, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 63M-366, HPCI Pump/Turbine Details, Rev. 57M-372, Containment Atmosphere Dilution System, Rev. 63Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Desiqn ChanoesECR PB 98-02073-001, Thermo-Lag Upgrade Raceway Encapsulation-FBS, Rev. 1ECR PB 10-00449-01 1, MSO 5K (NRC lN 92-18) MCC Bucket Rework, Rev. 1 1Qualitv Assurance Audits and Self-AssessmentsNOSA-PEA-10-10, Fire Protection Audit Report, 8l25l101141820 #3, PBAPS Triennial Fire Protection Preparatory Self Assessment, 4116112Attachment A-7Svstem Health ReportsPeach Bottom Electrical- DC Systems, Completed 4th Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Electrical- DC Systems, Completed l".Quarter 2012Peach Bottom Electrical - 4KV Systems, Completed 4'n Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Electrical - 4KV Systems, Completed l".Quarter 2012Peach Bottom Electrical - 480V Systems, Completed 4'n Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Electrical- 48OV Systems, Completed 1't Quarter 2012Peach Bottom Fire Protection, Completed 4th Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Fire Protection, Completed 1't Quarter 2012Peach Bottom Fire Protection/Fire Safe Shutdown Program, Completed 4h Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Fire Protection/Fire Safe Shutdown Program, Completed 1" Quarler 2012Peach Bottom Fire Suppression, Completed 4th Quarter 2011Peach Bottom Fire Suppression, Completed 1" Quarter 2012ProceduresCC-AA-206, Fuse Control, Rev. 6FF-O1, Fire Brigade, Rev. 18lC-11-02007, Preventive Maintenance for Model-200 Emergency Lighting Units, Rev. 7M-054-005, Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Routine Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 14M-056-001, 480V MCC Breaker Assembly and Cubicle Terminal Maintenance, Rev. 30MA-MA-716-010-1008, Work Order Work Performance, Rev' 5MA-MA-716-010-1010, Post-Job Review, Documentation Review, Action RequestMorkOrderMork Order Activities Package Closure, Rev. 9OP-AA-201-003, Fire Drill Performance, Rev. 12OP-AA-201-004, Fire Prevention for Hot Work, Rev. 9OP-AA-201-005, Fire Brigade Qualification, Rev. 8OP-AA-201-006, Control of Temporary Heat Sources, Rev. 5OP-AA-2O1-009, Control of Transient Combustible Material, Rev' 1 1OP-MA-2O1-007, Fire Protection System lmpairment Control, Rev' 6RT-M-037-319-2, Fire Damper Function Test, Rev. 3RT-O-037-324-2, Monthly Inspection of Outside Operator Area Fire Extinguishers, Rev. 11RT-O-037-710-2, Complete Safe Shutdown Emergency Light Battery Pack Inspection, Rev. 8RT-O-52D-650-2, Diesel Fuel Oil Receipt Requirements, Rev. 18ST-C-37D-371-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil Sample Analysis, Rev. 5ST-C-095-884-2, Sample Diesel Fuel Prior to Delivery to On-Site Storage Tanks, Rev. 20ST-M-037-314-2, Visual Inspection of Encapsulated Electrical Raceways, Rev. 5ST-M-037-399-2, Fire Damper Inspection, Rev. 9ST-O-054-g5O-2, Offsite and Onsite Electrical Power Breaker Alignment and Power AvailabilityCheck, Rev. 18Procedures (Operations)AO 10.12-2, Unit 2 Alternate Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 2AO 10.12-3, Unit 3 Alternate Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 2ON-115, Loss of Normal Main Control Room Ventilation - Bases, Rev' 16ON-115, Loss of Normal Main Control Room Ventilation - Procedure, Rev. 19Attachment A-8OP-PB-101-111, Peach Bottom Operations Department, Rev' 13OP-PB-101-111, Peach Bottom Operations Department, Rev. 14SE-10, Plant Shutdown from the Alternative Shutdown Panels - Bases, Rev. 20SE-10 Attachment 1 - Operation of MO-2-10-1548 From the MCC (U/2 Only), Rev. 4SE-10 Attachment2 - Operation of MO-3-10-1548 From the MCC (U/3 Only), Rev. 5SE-10 Attachment 3 - Operation of MO-2-10-089D From the MCC (U/2 Only), Rev. 6SE-10 Attachment 4 - Operation of MO-3-10-0898 From the MCC (U/3 Only), Rev. 7SE-10 Attachment 5 - Alternate RPV Injection Using CRD, Rev. 2SE-10 Attachment 6 - 4kv Alternate Shutdown Panel Setup and Transfer of 125 BatteryCharger 28D003 to Alternate Power Source, Rev. 6SE-10 Attachment 7 - RCIC Operation at the Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev' 1SE-10 Attachment 8 - NRC Notifications from the Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 1SE-10 Attachment I - HPCI Operation from the Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 1SE-10 Attachment 10 - Depressurization Cooldown Log, Rev. 0SE-10 Attachmentll -Alternate Shutdown Cooling Cooldown Log, Rev.0SE-10 Attachment 12 - Bypass of SV-8130A (U/2 Only), Rev. 2SE-10 Attachment 13 - Bypass of SV-9130A (Ui3 Only), Rev. 2SE-10 Attachmenl14 - Reactor Protection System De-energization (Ul2 Only), Rev. 0SE-10 Attachment 15 - Reactor Protection System De-energization (U/3 Only), Rev. 0SE-10 Attachment 16 - HPSW Pump Room Temperature Local Monitoring, Rev' 1SE-10, Sht. 1, Alternative Shutdown, Rev. 18SE-10, Sht.2, Alternative Shutdown, Rev. 16SO 10.1.D-2, Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Torus Cooling, Rev. 19ST-O-054-950-2, Offsite and Onsite Electrical Power Breaker Alignment and Power AvailabilityCheck Rev. 1BT-100, Reactor Scram, Rev. 10T-101, RPV Control, Rev. 19T-102, Primary Containment Control, Sheet 1, Rev' 20T-102, Primary Containment Control, Sheet 2, Rev' 15T-102, Primary Containment Control, Sheet 3, Rev' 13T-111, Level Restoration, Rev. 15T-112, Emergency Blowdown, Rev. 17T-302-2, Area02 Fire Guide, Rev.8T-302-3, Area 02 Fire Guide, Rev. 5T-3063-2, T-3065-2 Area 065 Fire Guide, Rev. 5T-325-2(3), Area 25 Fire Guides, Revs. 1(1)T-350-2, Area 50 Fire Guide, Rev. 6T-350-3, Area 50 Fire Guide, Rev. 7T-358-2, Area 58 Fire Guide, Rev. 5T-358-3, Area 58 Fire Guide, Rev. 7Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation Strateqies DocumentsOP-AA-2O1-010-1001, 8.5.b Mitigating Strategies Equipment Expectations, Rev.0SE-23, Response to Security ThreatsTSG 4.1, PBAPS Operational Contingency Guidelines, Rev. 20TSG 4.2, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guideline for Loss of Large Areas of the Plant, Rev. 3Work Order Number R1094814Attachment A-9Work Order Number R1154596Work Order Number R1191956Work Order Number R1192040Work Order Number R1200341Operator Safe Shutdown TraininsPNEOLRTP2O12, Nuclear Equipment Operator Training Program for 2012-2014, Rev. 0PNLO-053P, Job Performance Measure - T-302-3 Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 2PNLO-054P, Job Performance Measure - T-306N-2 Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev' 3PNLO-2215, Lesson Plan - Effects of Fire on Safe Shutdown Equipment, Rev. 4PNLO-83P, Job Performance Measure -T-301-2 Attachment 1, Operation of AO-251 1, Rev. 0PSEG-0214L, Simulator Exercise Guide - ON-114: Actual Fire Reported on Power Block, D/GBLDG, Emergency Pump, lnner Screen or Emergency Cooling Tower Struct., Rev. 11PSEG-0221R, Simulbtor Exercise Guide - ON-114: Fire Near Ref. Leg Backfill System, Rev.1PSEG-0409R, Simulator Exercise Guide - Fire in Cable Spreading Room, Rev' 9PSEG-0413R, Simulator Exercise Guide - Fire, Rev. 8PSEG-04251, Simulator Exercise Guide - T-300: Fire in the Reactor Building, Rev. 2PSEG-os10L, Simulator Exercise Guide - SE-10 Plant Shutdown from the AlternativeShutdown Panel, Rev.7Fire Fiohtinq Strateoies (i.e.. Pre-Fire Plans)PF-SJ, U2 RX BLDG., GeneralArea-ELEV 165'-0", Rev' 4PF-SK, U2 RX BLDG., GeneralArea-ELEV 195'-0", Rev' 5PF-SP, U2 RX BLDG. 135'EL South, Rev. 4PF-13P, U3 RX BLDG; South CRD Equipment & East Corridor ELEV 135'-0", Rev. 5PF-19, U2 RX BLDG., South lsolation Valve Room-ELEV 135'-0", Rev. 3PF-20, U2 RX BLDG, TIP Room/Neutron Monitoring-ELEv 135'-0", Rev. 3PF-30, U3 RX BLDG; TIP Room/Neutron Monitoring-ELEv 135'-0", Rev' 4PF-31, U3 RX BLDG; South lsolation Valve Room-ELEV 135'-0", Rev.4PF-47A, U2 RX BLDG., RWCU Filter Demin. Valve rooms-ELEV 180'-0", Rev. 2PF-51, U2 RX BLDG., Refuel Floor Vent Equipment-ELEv 195'-0"1214'-0", Rev' 2PF-57, U2 RX BLDG., Refuel Floor-ELEV 234'-0", Rev' 5PF-117, U3 Turbine Building, Emergency Battery SWGR Rooms-ELEV 135'-0", Rev' 8PF-132, Diesel Generator Building, GeneralArea-Elevation 127',-0", Rev. 7PF-132A, Diesel Generator Building, GeneralArea (Upper Level), Rev. 3Fire Briqade TraininoFire Brigade Drill Spreadsheet, 5115112Fire Brigade Qualification List, 4117112Fire Brigade Training Slides for 1" Quarter 2012List of Fire Brigade Lesson Topic training and dates' training was provided,2QlO-2011List of Fire Drill Scenarios, 2010-2012N-LP-PIMS-GRT-SPD, Scott Alr-PACK 4.5, SCBA Requalification, Rev. 1Training Slides for VentilationAttachment A-10Fire Brisade Drills, and Critiques2010-04, Lube Oil Tank Room, U2 Turbine Building 116' Elevation, 121151092011-24, U3 H2 Farm Fire, 111il112012-01, Unit 2 Main Generator Bushing H2 Fire,1l27l122012-02, Unit 3 Main Generator Bushing H2 Fire,2l22l122012-03,2G4 Load Center (52-0142 Breaker) Turbine Area MCC 2G4 Cubicle Fire,Fire Zone-7g{, 3171122012-05,4PS4 (0334) Breaker Fire (MCC 4PS4 W-B Feeder Breaker), Fire Zone-7gA,217112Transient Combustible Permits and Evaluations2012-06, Turbine Building, 50% Hydrogenl1}o/o Nitrogen CU. FT. Bottle for Calibration ofH2lS-5374, end date 6111022012-07 , U2 Reactor Building, Bubble Wrap used for Protecting the Fuel Rack Inserts(11 Pieces of 14'X 8"), end date 31211122012-08, RAIV Building, 14 Cardboard Drums Containing Bead Resin, end date 41271122012-09, U3 Reactor Building, Several Lengths of Water Hoses (Approx. 200 ft.) that will runthrough the TFCZ, end date 4161122012-10, U3 Reactor Building ,22 Camera Storage Boxes, end date 5112112Hot Work and lqnition Source PermitsA1807403 00 01, Computer Room UPS HVAC Untt, 2120112C0235024 01 01, Install Piping Per ECR 10-00028, 412112C0237854 03 01, U2 RB 135' Elevation Railroad Bay, 216112R1064728 01 01, ESW Pump Discharge Pipe,3l13l12R1209840 15 01, U2 RB 135' Elevation,4l2l12Completed Tests and SurveillancesRT-O-006-450-3, Feedwater Stop Valve M0-3-02-029A Alternative Control Test, Rev. 0,performed 9116111RT-O-O10-304-3, RHR/HPSW System Valves Alternative Control Testing, Rev. 12, performed11/13t11RT-O-010-310-3, RHR System Functionalfrom the Alternative Control Panels, Rev. 10,performed 8121110RT-O-O10-750-3, MO-3-10-016D Power Supply Operational Check, Rev. 2, performed 913111RT-O-22C-910-3, Alternative Shutdown Communication FunctionalTest, Rev. 3, performed513110RT-O-22C-910-2, Alternate Shutdown Comm. FunctionalTest, Rev. 4, performed 12123111RT-O-023-750-3, HPCI Functional Test from Alternative Control Panels, Rev. 15, performed3121112RT-O-023-760-3, HPCI Valve and Component Test from Alternative Control Panel, Rev. 12,performed 6124111RT-O-023-770-3, Alternative Control Panel Power and Logic Relays Check, Rev. 6,performed 3121112Attachment A-11RT-O-037-710-2, Complete Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Battery Pack lnspection,Rev. 8, performed 2120112RT-O-052-760-2, E4 Diesel and A ESW Pump Alternative Shutdown Gontrol Panel, Rev. 1 1,performed 3129110RT-O-100-505-2, Emergency Operating Procedure Tool lnventory, Rev. 32, performedl2l27l11RT-O-100-950-2, Alternative Shutdown Key Accountability Verification, Rev. 5,performed 6114111 and 12113111RT-O-1 01-901-2, Local Fire Department Training, Rev. 2, performed 413112SI2F-14-40-A1C2, Calibration Check of Core Spray Flow Instruments FT2-14-40A andFl2-14-50A, Rev. 2, performed 4128108 and 6121110Sl2L-2-1 12-YJC2, Calibration Check of Alternative Shutdown Panel Reactor Vessel LevelI nstruments LT/LS/Ll2 -2-3-1 1 2, Rev. 2, performed 9/1 5/08 and 9 l 1 3l I OSl2T-7-2442-81C2, Calibration Check of Suppression Pool Temperature InstrumentationTEffTm-24428,T1-2445, and TE/TTlT\-8457, Rev. 7, performed 2112109 and2l15l11Sl3L-2-1 12-y\XC2, Calibration Check of Alternative Shutdown Panel Reactor Vessel Levellnstruments LT/LS/LI3 -2-3-11 2, Rev. 1, performed 9l I 4109 and 91 121 1 1Sl3T-7-3442-81C2, Calibration Check of Suppression PoolTemp. Inst. TE/TT/T\-34428,l-3445, and TE/TTlT\-9457, Rev. 4, performed 3/10/09, 3115111 and 5126111ST-l-037-223-3, U3 4KV Switchgear & Battery Room Smoke Detectors Functional Test, Rev. 7,performed 1117lO7ST-l-037-223-3, U3 4KV Switchgear & Battery Room Smoke Detectors FunctionalTest, Rev. 7,performed 314110ST-l-037-243-2,E-3 Diesel Gen. Heat Detectors FunctionalTest, Rev. 15, performed6116111ST-l-037-243-2, E-3 Diesel Gen. Heat Detectors Functional Test, Rev. 15, performed 10120111ST-l-037-275-2, Reactor Bldg. 135' General Smoke Detectors Functions Test, Rev. 3,performed 7l22logST-l-037-275-2, Reactor Bldg. 135'General Smoke Detectors Functions Test, Rev. 3,performed 3124111ST-l-37G-393-2, E-3 Diesel Gen. Cardox System Simulated Actuation & Air flow Test, Rev. 7,performed 1211109ST-I-37G-393-2, E-3 Diesel Gen. Cardox System Simulated Actuation & Air flow Test, Rev. 8,performed 12126110ST-M-037-310-3, VisualWalkaround Inspection of Fire Barriers, Rev. 7, performed 218110ST-M-037-310-3, VisualWalkaround Inspection of Fire Barriers, Rev. 8, performed 2l10l12ST-M-037-311-3, Detailed Visual Inspection of Penetration Seals & Difficult to View FireBarriers, Rev. 4, performed 07117103ST-M-037-314-2, Visual Inspection of Encapsulated Elect. Raceways, Rev. 5, performed 6/6/08ST-M-037-314-2, Visual Inspection of Encap. Elect. Raceways, Rev. 5, performed 3131l10ST-O-037-375-2,1n-Plant Fire Brigade Equip. Inventory & Inspection, Rev.5, performed2l21l12ST-M-037-399-2, Fire Damper lnspection, Rev. 9, performed 2122110ST-M-037-399-2, Fire Damper Inspection, Rev. 9, performed 11110111ST-O-378-323-3, U3 Battery Room & 4KV Switchgear Rooms Sprinkler Systems Actuations,Rev. 5, performed 11l4llgST-O-378-323-3, U3 Battery Room & 4KV Switchgear Rooms Sprinkler Systems Actuations,Rev. 5, performed 11125111ST-O-37B-326-2, Reactor Bldg. Water Curtain Simulated Actuation Test, Rev. 3,performed 10126110Attachment A-12ST-O-378-326-2, Reactor Bldg. Water Curtain Simulated Actuation Test, Rev. 3,performed 1111111ST-O-378-381-2, Underground Fire Main Flow Test, Rev. 7, performed 5120108ST-O-378-381-2, Underground Fire Main Flow Test, Rev. 8, performed 1115111ST-O-37C-330-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37C-330-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37C-330-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37D-340-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37D-340-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37D-340-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Flow Rate Test,ST-O-37C-360-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Operability Test,ST-O-37C-360-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Operability Test,Rev. 9, performed 1l39l08Rev. 10, performed 817109Rev. 10, performed 4126111Rev. 13, performed 118108Rev. 16, performed 11125109Rev. 17, performed 619111Rev. 14, performed 212112Rev. 14, performed 2127112ST-O-37D-370-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operability Test, Rev. 29, performed2l14l12ST-O-37D-370-2, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operability Test, Rev. 30, performed3113l12tCorrective Action Proqram Documents (lssue Reports and Action Requests)2930A097660941190781A1200806007779480089968701 1 801 0301199761012279530128288001312394013347920134921301362257.01367134*01 367638*A110797741190791A136788000892345009022480118912001197952012279580128431101 3140680134352601 35946801 362556*01 3671 53"01367880.41189363A119612301 99643008955230102633401 1 99620012200080126434801306171013302250134905401 35909901 366946.01367242.A1189595A11980390199773008988610110134201 1 99739012204300128151801 31 314501 33025601 34907601 361 907.01 366954.01367245*A1108963 41188661A1192350 A1194032A1831504 019960200893919 0089452000902274 0102620001191845 0119592101202173 0120262101235317 0126325301289882 0129092201321396 0132887801346097 0134907001360139 0135901601366468 01366938.01367233* 01367239*(* initiated during this inspection.)Work Ordersc0131 171R0496480R1045470R1101029R1208329c0183228R086021 5R1 058797R1111003c0240968R0929031R1070122R1143254c0241398R1041916R1098647R1191024c0233481 C0236548R0868027 R0898273R1062389 R1069901R1124240 R1126290Vendor ManualsB.2001201 Exide Electronics, Emergency Light Unit,6/76Sentry Battery Corporation, High Density PM Type Sealed Lead-Acid Battery, 5129102Attachment A-13lndustrv StandardsNEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Rev. 2Miscellaneous DocumentsCARDOX, Field Test Report Number 4, E3 & E4 Diesel COz Initial Discharge Test, 1112171Control Room Shift Attendance Briefing Sheet, 5115112Exelon Letter of Agreement between PBAPS & Delta-Cardiff Volunteer Fire Company, 113112lN 92-18, Potentialfor Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room FireINDMS Safe and Alternative Shutdown Cable Location Report, Dated 4112112INDMS Safe and Alternative Shutdown Equipment Location Report Sorted by Fire Area andRoom Number, Dated 4113112INDMS Safe and Alternative Shutdown Equipment Location Report Sorted by INDMSComponent Designation, Dated 4113112INDMS Safe and Alternative Shutdown Methods Logics Report, Dated 4112112f NDMS Safe and Alternative Shutdown System Logics Report, Dated 4112112LER 0500027812012004-00, HPCI Cable Routing Error Results in Degraded Post-FireSafe Shutdown (FSSD) AnalysisMSO eSOMS Operator Round Tour Sheets,5l3l12NE-00296, Specification for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Program Requirements, Rev. 1NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 2Penetration Seal Detail for TB3-135-265-2012, last updated 7116103Penetration Seal Detail for TB3-135-265-2012A, last updated 7116103Penetration Seal Detail for TB3-135-265-2012B, last updated 9125194Penetration Seal Detailfor TB3-135-265-2012C, last updated 9125194Penetration Seal Detail for TB3-135-265-2012D, last updated 7116103Penetration Seal Detail for TB3-135-265-2012E, last updated 9125194PBAPS Multiple Spurious Operations Outage Modification Schedule for Unit 2 & Unit 3PBAPS Multiple Spurious Operations Online Modification Schedule for Unit 2 & Unit 3ST-C-37D-2, Analysis of Diesel Driven Fire Pump Storage Tank, 1217111Tactical Public Safety, Preventative Maintenance Testing for Exelon Radio CommunicationsSystems, Rev. 1ACADAMSAPCSBAVBTPCAPCFRCRDCOzDCECRLIST OF ACRONYMSAlternating CurrentAgencywide Documents Access and Management System[NRC]Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems BranchApparent ViolationBranch Technical PositionCorrective Action ProgramCode of Federal RegulationsControl Rod DriveCarbon DioxideDirect CurrentEngineering Change RequestAttachment EDGElev.FAFHAFPPFSSDFZGLHPCIINIPIPEIPEEEIRIRKVLERMCCMOVMSONEINFPANCVNRCNRRPARSPBAPSP&IDRCrCRFORGRHRSDPSESERSFPSRVSWGRUFSARVA-14Emergency Diesel GeneratorElevationFire AreaFire Hazards AnalysisFire Protection ProgramPost-Fire Safe ShutdownFire ZoneGeneric LetterHigh Pressure lsolation CoolingINRCI Information Notice[NRC] Inspection Procedurelndividual Plant Examinationlndividual Plant Examination of External Eventslssue Report[NRC] lnspection ReportkilovoltLicensee Event ReportMotor Control CenterMotor Operated ValveMultiple Spurious OperationNuclear Energy InstituteNational Fire Protection AssociationNon-Cited ViolationNuclear Regulatory Commission[NRC] Nuclear Reactor RegulationPublicly Available Records SystemPeach Bottom Atomic Power StationPiping and Instrumentation DrawingReactor Core lsolation CoolingRefueling OutageINRCI Regulatory GuideResidual Heat Removal[NRC] Significance Determination ProcessINRCI Safety Evaluation[NRC] Safety Evaluation ReportSpent Fuel PoolSafety Relief ValveSwitchgearUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportVoltAttachment