ML19326A982

Recommends Attachment of Conditions to License That Will Eliminate Inconsistencies W/Antitrust Laws.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19326A982
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Perry
Issue date:	09/22/1976
From:	Berger M, Charno S, Urban J JUSTICE, DEPT. OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8003050915
Download: ML19326A982 (18)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE. ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

')

The Toledo Edison Company and -) -

Tne Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) ,

0:3J339 Company (Davis-Desse Nuclear Power Station,

) Docket Ncs. (50-duuA Units 1, 2 and 3)

) 50-501A

)

)

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al. .) 50-441A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) .)

_ REPLY BREIF OF 411E DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE -- -

DONALD I BAKER Acting Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division JOSEPH J. SAUNDERS STEVEN M. CHARNO .

Attorney, Department of Justice .

MELVIN G. BERGER JkNET R. URBAN Attorneys, Department of Justice September 22, 1976 3 0 0,4 0 5 0 r

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UNITED STATES-OF AMERICA -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

') i The Toledo Edison Company and -) .

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-346A Company -

) 50-500A ,

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, -) 50-501A Units 1, 2 and 3) )

)

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al. ) 50-441A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units ,1 and 2) ,)

_ _ REPLY BRIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE -- -

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INTRODUCTION On. August 23, 1976, the " Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the United States Department of Justice" (hereinafter " Depart-ment's Findings") were filed with the. members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. On August 30, 1976, Applicants filed with the Licensing Board " Applicants' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-clusions of Law" (hereinafter " Applicants' Findings"). All parties exchanged pleadingr on September 8, 1976.

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. The Department does not propose to address issue by issue th'e matters raised 'in Applicants' Findings.1/ - Virtually all of the arguments raised by Applicants have been dealt with, and the-appropriate portions of the record cite'd, in the Department's Findings. Here, the Department will merely highlight certain erroneous contentions raised for the first time in Applicants' Findings. While we do not intend to engage in a point-by-point discussion of Applicants' citations to the record in this proceed-ing, we would point out that those citatio's n contain numerous serious inaccuracies. 2/ For example, Applicants cited Dr. Wein 1/ On August 30, 1976, Applicants moved for leave to file "Appli-cants' Joint.Brief in Support of Their Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law" (hereinafter " Applicants' Joint Brief"). That plead-

'ing was made available to the Department on September 8, 1976. On August 31, 1976, the Licensing Board issued an Order stating tha t it would deter acting upon Applicants' Motion For Leave to File Appli-cants' Joint Brief, and tha t the parties adverse to Applicants were v '

. ,_ not .regu_ ired _ to__ respond to Appl,icants ' Motion until notified by the ,

Board'. As o~f the date of the present filing, the Board had taken i no further action on Applicants' Motion. The Department has not )

. . . undertaken,. in the limited time 'and' space available for reply briefs, to respond to Applicants' 697 page unauthorized pleading.

The Department asserts that~ it will be prejudiced if Appli-c an't s ' Mot' ion for Leave to File is granted. In endeavering to meet

. 3 page limitation on findings and conclusions ordered by the Li'ansing Board, the Department, of necessity, did not undertake the type of detailed exposition of the law and facts undertaken by Appli-cants in Applicants' Joint Brief. Nor is such an exposition possible in the context of this reply brief. To grant Applicants' Motion for leave to file Applicants ' Joint Brief would permit Applicants to' com-ment on the law and the record in a manner not afforded the Depar tment.

O 2/ Applicants have also cited and relied upon non-legal publications, such as the National _ Power Survey, Coordination. Competition and Reg-ul-ation in the Electric Utility _ Industry and Energy Regulation by tne Federal Power Commission, which vore not introduced into evidence in his proceeding. Many of the cited portions' of these publications are in the nature of expert testimony on highly controversial matters.

Becau'se the Department was not af forded ~-he right of cross-examination concerning these publications , they should be disregarded.

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4 for the Finding that "Non-captive wholesale sales by Chio Edison and Toledo Edison are both subject to price influence by Ohio Power," (Applicants' Findings, Finding of Fact 31.12) l 'although Dr. Wein's testimony at the pages cited by Applicants supports-tne opposite conclusion.

l Below is a discussion of those of Applicants' contentions l

which the Department believes merit reply. .

Applicants' conclusion that " captive" ' wholesale sales must be excluded from the wholesale market (Applicants' Findings, Conclusion of Law 31.16) is not supported by their cited authorities. Those cases cited .by Applicants hold only that "in-house" or " captive" requirements of non-parties to an acquisition may be omitted from the relevant market when considering the effect on competition of the acquisition. They do not hold that such captive sales should

-always be lef t out of the relehant market.- FoT examp1~e , the ~ ' -~~

, _ - Federal Trade Commission, in British Oxygen _Co., 3'CCH Trade Reg.

Rep. 120,910 (1975 while. excluding captive sales from-the relevant market, distinguished United States v. Aluminum Compang_of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), on the facts and pointed out:

Alcoa was virtually the sole supplier of ingot to non-integrated fabricators.of products (sheet, foil, rod, bar) that Alco.a also produced. The fact that Alcoa was in competition with its customers and could impose, as it did.at times', a cost-price squeeze was an important element of the monopoliza-

, tion case against it. The vertical integration of Alcoa played a quantitatively different role in the Aluminum industry compared with the backucrd inte-gration of industrial gases users. 3 CCH Trade Reg.

Rep. 9 21,063 at 20,910

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It ,is clear that the facts in the present proceeding are more nearly analogous to those in Alcoa, _ supra, and U[ited States

v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 543 (1971) (See Department's Findings L-48) than to tne facts of those cases cited by Appli-cants, and that Applicants' " captive" sales should be included in the wholesale-for-resale firm power market.

Applicants have made several arguments designed to show .

that wholesale competition cannot exist in , Ohio and Pennsylvania.

As will be shown, these argumen'ts are without merit.

Applicants have erroneously contended that the Ohio Anti-P,irating Statute (Ohio Revised Code, Section 4905.261) applies to wholesale customers ( Applicants' Findings, Conclusion of Law 31.05(c)). As we have previously stated, the states of Ohio and Pennsylvania have no authority to raise barriers to wholesale com-

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~ peti ti6n '( De]l Tar tYent's Find ings 'L-5, L-6).~Nor are we aware of any pase which holds that a sale ' at wholesale in interstate commerce

, .to an electric utility, be it a municipal system, a cooperative system, or an investor-owned utilit'y, could or would be w.i thin the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO).

There is no question in this proceeding of the interstate nature o f the Applicants' wholesale sales (p. 412 NRC 161, 165, 167, 169; Applicants' Finding 37.14). The di stinction between sales to shopping centers (which were the subject of the authorities on which Applicants rely) and wholesale sales to electric utilities is one clearly recoonized cy Applicanta who have not undertaken 4 .

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. J to file rate schedules for sales to shopping cen.ters with the Federal Power Commission (p. 412 of NRC 161, 163, 165, 167, 169).

Applicants assert that Orrville does not have excess power available for sale to non-Applicant entities within the CCCT, and that even if such power is available, Orrville's contracts with Ohio Power and AMP-O do not provide for its transmission (Appli-cants' Findings, Findings of Fact 23.17). Applicants' assertion .

is untrue. With the benefits of coordinated operation and develop--

ment available through its contractual arrangements with Ohio Power and AMP-0, Orrville will have excess powes available for sale to other electric entities (Lewis Tr. 7973-75; App. 183,

p. 3 of study and Table 6; App. 186, SSO.06-0.07; App. 186a, S0.05). These contracts also provide'for the transmission of power from Orrville to other electric entities. The record shows

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that under the terms of the Orrville-Ohio Power Agreement, the point at which Orrville's 138. k'v transmission line connects - with

~ Ohio Power's facilities is an interconnection point as well as a delive'ry point ( Ap p. 186, S1. 02) , and that Ohio Power has agreed to transmit power from Orrville as provided in the AMP-O-Ohio I Power Agreement (NRC 141A, Schedule A, p. 33-35). Because Orrville's agreement with Ohio Power specifically states that Orrville may, from time to timd, provide power to AMP-O (App. 186, S0.07), the only possible reading of this agreement is that it, in

- conjunction witn the AMP-0-Ohio Powdr Agreement, provides for the transmission of that power. . .

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i Applicants h&ve also arguer. that there is no potential for

. i wholesale competition in Pennsylvania because of Pennsylvania's ,

limitation of the condemnatica power of public utilities (Appli-cants' Findings, Findings of Fact 22.09). Even if Pennsylvania, through its limitation of a public utility's ability to exercise its power of eminent domain to build transmission lines, could legally ,

raise a barrier to competition for wholesale sales, such a barrier is easily overcome if wheeling services are available.

Applicants have also' attempted to convey the impression

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that there can be little retail competition in Ohio and Pennsylvania and that any such retail competition would be one-time competition. These contentions are not supported by the record.

Two forms of competition at retail are competition for _

large industrial customers and competition for franchises -- for the opportunity to serve " blocks" of retail customers (Depar tmen t 's 1 Finding 3.09). 3/

Franchise competition can exist because a municipality I

which is served. at retail by one of the Applicants may condemn '

the ' facilities of that Applicant and establish its own municipal l

l 3/ Other forms of retail competition are also present (Depart- l ment's Findings 3.09).

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ele.ctric system. 4/, The municipal system may obtain a supply of bulk' power either by (1) self generation, (2) purchase at wholesale from its former supplier, (3) purchase at wholesale from another supplier or (4) any combination of the above. 5/

Municipalities have the power of condemnation in both Ohio and Pennsylvania (Department's Findings p. 33 fn. 4). The City of Cleveland, for example, has considered using this power to ,

l condemn CEI distribution facilities (App. 205, 206). There is no evid'ence that a Pennsylvania municipality may not use its power . of condemnation in the same manner. Pennsylvania law does not prevent such condemnation and, at most, requires that prior to condemnation of the facilities of a public utility, a municipality obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity (66 P.S.

Sll22(e)). The most recent ennunciation of the standards which

-- 16Est be met to obtain a certificate of public' convenience and

., necessity is set forth in Metropolitan Idison Company v. P.S.C.,

127 Pa. Super. 11, 191 A. 678 (1937). This 1937 case', the'only

-4/ Even if,a municipal system exercised its powers of condemna--

tion to establish a municipal distribution system, competition for service to the municipality would still exist. This is so because the voters, who are the customers of the municipal system, can at any time abolish the municipal system upon a determination that they can obtain better rates or service from'the former supplier (Wein Tr.'6998).

5/ Nhere ' all or a portion of the municipalities' power is obtain-ed 'f rom a new supplier , wheeling by the former supplier would

. eliminate tne need for wasteful duplication of facilities.

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interpreta tion of 66 P.S. S1122(e),'may not necessarily reflect a contemporary interpretation of the s'tatute in question. 6/ {

Even if the 1937' standards are still applicable,'-it is likely that a municipality wishing to enter the utility business could meet those standards. That this is true is evidenced by DL's fear that some of the municipalities within its service area

,I would condemn DL's distribution facilities for the purpose of '

l setting up a municipal distribution system (DJ 251, 255).  !

Competition for large loads is not limited to competition for new loads as Applicants contend (Applicants' Findings, Find-ing of Fact 23.04). Because of the size of these loads, the expenditure by a competing utility to construct facilities needed to provide adequate service would be small in proportion to the revenue to be obtained (iforan DJ 583', pp. 21, 26)._ In fact, the record demonstrates that in some areas there has been competition

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for existing large loads (Dorsey Tr. 5256, 5253-54). In many other areas, competi' tion for such loads has been prevented by restrictive provisions which appeared in wholesale contracts with municipal systems (Department's Findings 8.13-8.15

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8.17-8.18, 9.27).  ;

6/ It should be noted that while 66 P.S. S1122(e) takes into consideration federal regulation of railroad cacriers, it does not consider federal regulation of motor carriers or the Federal Power Act.

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Applicants have also argued that retail competition in Ohio  ;

i is further precluded because a full-requirements wholesale munic-i ipal customer has no surplus power and is therefore prevented by Article XVIII, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution from selling power outside its corporate limits (Applicants' Findings, Finding of Fact 22.08(a), Conclusion of Law 31.05(a)). Applicants' argu-ment is totaily without merit. The question of whether a full-requirements wholesale municipal customer has surplus power has not been litigated in Ohio (White Tr. 9525-26, 9680-81).

Mr. White, the only one of Applicants' witnesses to testify on this matter , stated that while he perso,nally believed that a full-requirements wholesale customer does not hav " surplus" power to sell outside~ its boundaries, he was aware ~ that his interpretation

. _ could be wrong (White Tr'. 2525-26, 9683, 9688-89).. Mr.. Whi~te -

also testified that' OE had no company policy with respect to that

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provision of the Ohio Constitution (White Tr. 9683-84). We would also note that' Bowling Green, a full-requirements wholesale municipal customer of TE, serves outside its municipal boundaries (DJ 166, p. 11',059; Hillwig Tr. 2426).

Pennsylvania municipalities may alco compete for loads

, located outside their boundaries (Department's Finding L-9).

The Pennsylvania statute establishing retail service areas for public utilities and electric cooperatives specifically 9

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excluded municipalities from the operation of that law ( Act No.

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57, Session of 1975 (July 30, 1975)). ,

, Applicants contend that they are subject to pervasive regulation by the Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.) (Applicants' Findings, Conclusion of Law 31.01, 37.08). The powers of the F.P.C. are, however, less broad than Applicants have asserted.

The F.P.C. has no power to order wheeling. Otter Tail _ Power Co.

v.. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); City of Paris, Ky. v.

Kentucky Utility _Co., 41 F.P.C. 45 (1969). Nor does the Federal Power Act specifically authorize the F.P.C. to order pooling or coordinated development. Power is available through an F.P.C.

crdered interconnection only insofar as such power sales do not require installatior, of additional generation or impair the utility's. ability to render adequate service to its customers.

--16 U.S.C.Ar 824a(b); Gainesville Utilities Department v. Florida -

, Power Corp., 402 U.S.,515 (1971); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 473 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1973); It is therefore clear that the F.P.C. lacks the authorit'y to order those elements of coordination necessary for pooling and coordinated development (Dempler DJ 570', pp. 148-149; Schaffer Tr. 8537; Department's Findings 2.13, 2.20-2.24).

Applicants have further , stated that while exercising its regulatory authority, the F.P.C. must take into account antitrust considerations (Applicants' Findings, Conclusion of Law 31.01(c)).

linile this is true, the public interest standard applied by the

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4 F.P.C. differs from,the standard under 105(c) of the Atomic l Energy Act, and, in any case, antitrust considerations are not i

determinative under the Federal Power Act._ Otter Tail Power Co. '

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v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 7/ It is clear that the F.P.C. relies on " voluntary commercial relationships" to serve the public interest in the interstate distribution of power.

Otter _ Tail Power Co. v. United States, .410 U.S. at 374 ,  !

The Applicants conclude that private action in direct furtherance of a regulatory policy is lawful (Applicants' Find-ings, Conclusion of Law 20.08). The Qantor decision cited by the Applicants in support of this proposition in fact supports the contrary view, that private action may be illegal notwithstanding regulation. In that case the Court held: "This court has never sustained a claim that otherwise unlawful private conduct is exempt fEom the antitrust laws because it is permitted or required by

' state laws." Cantor.v. Detroit Edison Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 5357, 5363 (1976). The other two cases Applicants use~ to support their conclusi.on 8/. hold that such private action is protected only

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I 7/ The limited ; antitrust jurisdiction of the F.P.C. is more fully discussed at pages 36-39 of the Memorandum of the Depart-ment of Justice in Response to Applicants' individual Motions to Dismiss which is herein in'corporated by reference.

8/ Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. National Association ot Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694

- i (1975). It shEuld bc not2d tha t Ene former case was captioned

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" Silver v. New York Stock Exchanue" on c. 154 of the Apolicants' 1 Finaings anc Conclusions, but tnat the citation refers to Gcrdon.

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The Department assumes that Applicants intended to cite Gordon v. ~

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New York' Stock Exchange, suora.

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insof ar as there is ," plain repugnancy" between the regulatory statute and the antitru,st law 3, and that the antitrust laws with respect to the regulated activity are repealed only to the extent required to make the particular regulatory act work. The Supreme

, Court in Otter Tail applied this " plain repugnancy" standard to F.P.C. jurisdiction over the electric power industry and found that where wheeling and interconnection were' ordered by a Federal Court, to remedy an anticompetitive situation, there was no conflict with the,authurity of the F.P.C. 410 U.S. at 376. Thus, Applicants' conclusion 20.08 is wrong both as a general proposition and as specifically rejected by the Supreme Court with respect to the electric power industry.

Finally, three other-minor points deserve mention. OE cites competition between itself and Ohio Power for service to Orrville ln support of its statement that no agr'eements concerning whole-

. sale service exist between OE and any other entity (Applicants' Findings, Finding of Fact 36.156). However, in 196-5, ' while drawing boundary lines, OE and Ohio Power discussed the problem of which company should serve Orrville, but were unable to reach any conclusi.on (DJ 200, Attachment 3, p. 1 11 1-3, p. 2, t 5).

Thus, any such competition' for service to Orrville is not probative of an absence of territorial agreements.

Applicants have argued that municipal systems may be able to build small coal-fir ed plants and obtain power at a cost clocely approximating the cost of power which Applicants will get f rom the 1

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nuclear - facilities ,being licensed (Applicants' Findings, Finding of Fact 38.04). The Department would first point out that Appli-cants have nowhere asserted that such a plan was feasible, but only that it may be feasible. This is, in fact, supported by Applicants' own expert witness (Gerber Tr. 11,562-64). 9/ Even Applicants' statement concerning the possibility of a municipality economically constructing and operating a small coal-fired plant is not supported ,

by the record. Numerous assumptions made by Applicants' expert to reach the above conclusion are speculative and of questionnble reliability. Thus, Mr. Gerber in reaching his conclusion used cost data which was admittedly inaccurate (Gerber Tr. 11,544, 11,559-60), did not consider the impact of inflation although recognizing it as an important cost factor (Gerber Tr. 11,582, 11,-549) and admitted that it was difficult to make that type of

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- -cost projection with a high dehree of. accdracy (Gerber 11,546")Ti/

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9/ There is evidence of record which indicates that within Ohio, because of antipollution legislation, it would be difficult for a municipality to install any new coal-fired generatihg capacity (Pandy Tr. 3119 ) .

10/ To the extent that Mr . Kampmeier may have agreed with Appli-cants' contention, his agr-eement was. based in part on cost figures provided by Applicants, some of which figures are unsupported by evidence of recora. Mr. Kampmeier later testified that if the

' hypothetical 100 mw coal-fired plant were to burn western coal.

and was - to be built to meet current pollution control standards, the cost of power from the 100 mw coal-fired unit would be higher than the cost of power from a large nuclear unit (Kampmeier Tr.

6119-6123, DJ 511, pp. 91-92; Pandy Tr. 3119).

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Applicants have also contended that non-Applicant entities I i

within the CCCT would be .in at least as good a position econom- I ically if they purchased power from Applicants at F.P.C. approved wholesale rates than if these entities were to have direct access to nuclear units (Applicants' Findings,~ Finding of Fact 38.03).

The record, however,. clearly demonstrates that as wholesale cus- l tomers these entities would not have as much freedom of choice between bulk power supoly options to meet their bulk power needs and that direct participation would result in the least expensive long range bulk power supply (Hughes Tr. 4077-78, 4090-92; Lewis

, Tr. 5632; Wein Tr. 6627-33, 7204-06, 7265-80, 7286; DJ 596; App.

,105).

CONCLUSION For the' reasons set forth above and for the reasons set forth in the Department's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed on August 23, 1976, the Department respectfully submits that the Board should find that the issuance.of an unconditional license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power St'ation, Units 1, 2 and 3, and the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and, accordingly, B

attach conditions t'o those licenses which will eliminate that .

situation. .

Respectfully submitted,

_.I li.idiL__[b--

STEVEN M. CHARNO d ' x c' /_.

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MELG N G. B2R5ER 6

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['JA55.Ve f R. URBAN Attorneys, Antitrust Division Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

-E. GREGORY -BARNES Of Assistance September 22, 1976 D

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE_THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD t

In the Matter of .) ,

)

The Toledo Edison Company and . )

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-346A Company ) 50-500A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) 50-501A Units 1, 2 and 3) )

)

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al. ) 50-441A (Perry Unclear Power Plant, *)

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of REPLY BRIEF OF THE DEPART-MENT OF JUSTICE have been served upon all of~ the parties listed on the attachment hereto by deposit in the United States mail, first class, airmail or by hand this 22nd day of September 1976, i

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JANET R. URdAN

' Attorney, An ti trust Division Department of Justice 4

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ATTACHNINT Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. Gerald Charnoff, Esq. -

Chairman, Atomic Safety and Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Esq.

Licensing Board Robert E. Zahler, Esq. l Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh Jay H. Bernstein, Esq. j and Jacobs. Shaw, Pittman, Potts &

815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Trowbridge Washington, D.C. 20006 1800 M Street, N.W.

Ivan W. Smith, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Frank R. Clokey, Esq.

Board Sp'ecial Assistant, Attorney i Nuclear Regulatory Commission General .

Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 219 j

• Towne House Apartments t John M. Frysiak, Esquire Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Donald H. Hauser, Esq.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Victor A. Greenslade, Jr., Esq.

Washington, D.C. 20555 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Atomic. Safety and Licensing 55 Public Square Board Panel Cleveland, Ohio 44101

. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Leslie Henry, Esq.

Michael M. Briley, Esq.

Docketing and Service Section Roger P. Klee, Esq.

. Of fice of the Secretary --- Paul M. Smart, Esq. - - -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 2088 Toledo, Ohio 43604 Re'uben Goldberg, Esq.

David C. Hjelmfelt, Esq. Russell J. Spetrino,-Esq.

Goldberg, Fieldman & Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq.

Hj elmfe1~t Ohio Edison Company 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 47 North Main Street Suite 550 ,

Akron, Ohio 44308 Washington, D.C. 20006 Steven B.

Terence H. Peri, Esqgsq.

Benbow, m James B. Davis, Director of A. Edward Grashof, Esq.

Law Steven A. Berger, Esq.

Robert D. Hart, lst Assistant '

Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam Director'of Law & Roberts City of Cleveland 40. Wall Street 213 City Hall New York, New York 10005 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Thomas J. Munsch, Esq.

General Attorney Duquesne Light company 435 Sixth Avenue

. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 9

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, x David Olds, Esq. Joseph Rutberg, Esquire William S. Lerach. Esq. Of fice of the E::ecutive Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay Legal Director Union Trust Building, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Box 2009 Washington, D.C. 20555 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 .

William J. Kerner, Esquire Lee A. Rau, Esq. Office of the General Attorney Joseph A. Rieser, Jr., Esq. The Cleveland Electric Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay Illuminating Company Suite 900 -

Post Office Box 5000 1150 Connecticut Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Washington, D.C. 20036 Alan P. Buchmann, Esquire Edward A. Matto, Esq. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey

• Richard M. Firestone, Esq. 1800 Union Commerce Building Karen H. Adkins, Esq. Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Antitrust Section 30 E. Broad Street

. 15th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 Christopher R. Schraff, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Environmental Iau Section 361 E. Broad Street 8th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215

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James R. Edgerly, Esq.

Secretary and General Counsel

, . Pennsylvania Power Company , -

One' East Washington Street '

New Castle, Pennsylvania -16103 -

John Lansdale, Esq.

Cox, Langford & Brown 21-Dupont Circle, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Michael R.'Gallagher, Esq.

Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton, Norman-& Mollison 630 Bulkley Building

• Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Jack R.' Goldberg, Esq.

Benjamin H. Vogler, .Esq .

Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esq.

Office of the General Counsel Nuclear Rec.tulatory Commisrlon Washington, D.C. 20555 t

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