ML19329A877
| ML19329A877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1976 |
| From: | Companella V, Goldberg R, Hjelmfelt D CLEVELAND, OH, GOLDBERG, FIELDMAN & HJELMFELT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001150769 | |
| Download: ML19329A877 (20) | |
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 4
t; The Toledo Edison Company and
)
Docket Nos.
34 l
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
50-500-A Company
)
50-501-A i
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station )
l Units 1, 2 and 3)
)
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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Docket Nos. 50-440-A Company, et al.
)
50-441-A i
l (Perry Nuclear Power Plant
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
I I
REPLY BRIEF OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND i
j l.
i Reuben Goldberg David C. Hjelmfelt Goldberg, Fieldman & Hjelmfelt j
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
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Washington, D. C.
20006 I
Vincent C. Campanella 1
Director of Law Robert D. Hart First Assistant Director of Law City Hall Cleveland, Ohio 44114 I
Attorneys for l
City of Cleveland, Ohio l
September 22, 1976
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TABLE OF CONTENTS j
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AR G U MEN T...............................................
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THE NATURE OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY i
INDUSTRY PERMITS SUBSTANTIAL C O MP E T ITION...............................
2 l
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l II CEI HAS USED ITS MONOPOLY POWER.........
7 III THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT THE ANTITRUST LAWS ARE NOT FULLY I
APPLICABLE TO ELECTRIC UT;LITIES OR THAT APPLICANTS HAVE NOT VIOLATED i
l T H O SE LA WS.................................
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l C O N C LU SIO N............................................... 13 i
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TABLE OF CITATIONS.
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Page t
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Cantor v. Det roit Edis on, 96 S. Ct. 3110......................
12 s
i Columbo v. Public Utilities Commission, 4 8 A 2 d 5 9 ( 19 4 6 )..........................................
5 l
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Public Service Commis sion, 191 A 6 7 8 ( 19 3 7 ).............................
4, 5 Ohio Public Interest Action Group, Inc. v.
Ohio Public Utilities Commission, 331 NE 2d l
7 3 0 ( 19 7 5 )................................................
4 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US366...................................................7, 12 Pa rke r v. B rown, 3 71 US 341................................. 12 Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 171 A!1. 412 ( 19 34)....................
6 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
- v. Scapell, 41 O. Misc. 107 aff'd, Ct. App.
l No.33428................................................
10 Commission Cases l
Lake Greely Camp v. Lackawaxen & H. Teleph.
j Co., 9 5 P UR (N S ) 12......................................
5 Northwestern Mining & Exchange Co. v. West I
Penn Powe r Co., 61 PUR (NS) 186 (194 5)....................
6 Re Bell Telephone Co., 29 PUR (NS) 233 (1939).................
5
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Re Meyerstown, 12 P UR (NS) 3 9 ( 19 3 6 )......................... 6 Schuylkill Haven v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 3 P UR (N S ) 12 7 ( 19 3 4 ).................................
5 Sienins ki v. Amb ridge, 27 PUR (NS) 3 0 5.......................
6 Statutes i
Ohio Revised Code j4905.261...........................................
3
$ 4 9 0 6. 10 ( A ) (4 )......................................
10 i
Miscellaneous Promoting Competition In Regulated Markets, The B roo kin g s In s titut e 19 7 5...................................
2 l
Wilcox and Shepherd, Public Policies Toward Business, Richard D. Irwin,Inc., Homewood, Illinois, Fifth E d itio n 19 7 5..............................................
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
r-i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, l
The Toledo Edison Company and
)
Docket Nos. 50-346-A The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
50-500-A j
l Company
)
50-501-A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station )
j Units 1, 2 and 3)
)
i l
)
i i
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Docket Nos. 50-440-A i
Company, et al.
)
50-441-A I
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
i I
Units 1 and 2)
)
1 2
REPLY BRIEF OF I
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THE CITY OF CLEVELAND I
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Applicants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law ignore l.
the record developed before this Board, mistate certain facts and miscon-strues the law.1/ In this reply brief the City will show the fallacies in i
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Applicants' submittal to the exte' it has not done so in its initial brief and
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proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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1/ Applicants have also requested leave to file a 698-page supporting brief
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greatly in excess of the 250 page limit ordered by the Board (Tr. 12,685-i
- 86) for Applicants, which, itself, gave the Applicants 50 more pages than l
the 200 pages allocated to the other parties. No action has yet been taken upon Applicants' motion. Obviously, the 15-page limit on reply briefs (Tr.
l 12,701) is inadequate to permit the City to fully respond should the motion be granted.
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THE NATURE OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY PERMITS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETITION.
Applicants have argued throughout their findings of fact and conclusions of law that by its very nature the electric utility industry permits only de mini-7 mis competition and that, in fact, within the CCCT outside of Cleveland there f
is only de minimis competition. Neither prong of Applicants' argument is correct.
i Economic studies have ahown that cost benefits do, in fact, accrue 2/
when two electric utilities serve in the same municipality. -
Wilcox and Shepherd have noted that the bulk supply of electricity is technologically 3/
capable of effective competition in most areas. -
They state at page 415:
Many utilities could compete, and would compete, vigorously among themselves for at least their major customers. Each utility would gain by raiding its neighbors main clients and nearly all major urban centers have at least two or three alternative suppliers.
Dr. Leonard Weiss has also concluded that most regions of the country could support extensive competition in the generation of electricity.
/
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2,/
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Struc-1 ture for Electrical Utilities, published in Promoting Competition In Regu-lated Markets, the Brookings Institution 1975.
3/ Public Policies Toward Busine s s.
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois, Fifth Edition 1975.
i 4/ Antitrust In The Electric Power Industry, published in Promoting Compe-tition In Regulated Markets, The Brookings Institution 1975.
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I Applicants argue at Finding of Fact 22. 08 that the Ohio Constitution j
precludes an all requirements wholesale customer from making resales of l
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purchased power outside of the city limits although they admit elsewhere that 1
that question has never been decided by the Ohio courts. Certainly, the pro-i vision of the Ohio Constitution relied upon is not clear and has not, in fact, j
prevented such sales. The Constitution speaks in terms of sales of surplus j
j product without stating that the municipality must produce the product. It 1
is,of course, possible to purchase more of a product than needed and thus to 1
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j have " surplus product". Moreover, if the all requirements municipal sys-1 I
tems should gain access to alternate bulk power supplies they may, in fact, f
purchase shares in generating units which would permit them to self-generate 1
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" surplus product" for sale beyond the confines of the municipality.
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Applicants' argument that Section 4905.261 of the Ohio Revised Code precludes whalesale competition between investor-owned utilities and REA distribution cooperatives for wholesale customers simply ignores the t
I fact that the wholesale segment of the electric utility business is not subject j
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to regulation by the states. Indeed, Applicants admit that the states cannot l
l regulate wholesale sales of electricity. (Proposed Brief p. 671a).
The argument that the rates, terms, and conditions of all forms of t
l electric service provided by Applicants are regulated and that Applicants cannot engage in rate competition and do not consider competition in design-6/
ing rates - is contrary to the record developed through Applicants' own i
5_/
Proposed Finding of Fact 22. 08(c),
6_/ Proposed Finding of Fact 22.10, i
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witne s se s.
For example, Mr. Bingham testified that CEI does, in fact, con-sider electric competition in designing rates (Tr. 10,330). Ohio utilities can 1
negotiate -- without regulatory supervision -- rates for street lighting (Bing-i ham Tr. 10,303). Ohio Edison is unregulated with respect to its charges to 4
l developers for undergraund wiring (White Tr. 9811). The Ohio Public Utili-i 1
ties Commission places no restrictions on the amount spent by a public utility on various promotional practices (Rudolph deposition DJ 558 p. 20). 7/
t CEI provides services for customers in competitive areas not provided to custo-i i
mers in non-competitive areas (Rudolph deposition DJ 558 pp. 16-17).
i Despite Applicants' assertions to the contrary, there is more than e
de minimis competition in the CCCT and the potential for much more upon the removal of the restrictive practices engaged in by Applicants. Once
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again Applicants seek to buttress their A gument by ignoring or completely mistating the record. For example, Applicants make the astonishing asser-tion that there is no competition between CEI and Painsville. 8/ In fact, CEI r
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and Painsville do compete for residential, commercial and industrial loads.
,I (Pandy Tr. 3117-18, 3152-53).
Nor is it true that Pennsylvania law precludes or is intended to pre-clude competition. Applicants cite Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Public Service Commis sion, 191 A 678 (1937) for the proposition that the Pennsylvania state i
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~7/ The Ohio Commission has no authority to prohibit public utilities from engaging in promotional activities. Ohio Public Interest Action Group, 1
Inc. v. Ohio Public Utilities Commission (1975), 331 NE 2d 75G.
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Proposed Finding of Fact 34,14.
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4 policy is one of regulat?d monopoly. 9 / In Metropolitan Edison the Public Service Commission.nnounced that the policy of the state was to be "regu-1 lated competition" and not " regulated monopoly". Moreover, the court I'
i agreed that in certain instances competition between privately owned sys-tems and municipal systems is desireable.
In Columbo v. Public Utilities Commission, the court observed that u
l the purpose of Pennsylvania public service laws is to ser re the public, not to i
establish monopolies.10/
The Pennsylvania Commission has stated that in some instances i
duplication of facilities might be in the public interest. Re Bell Telephone Co., 29 PUR (NS) 233 (1939).
4 A Pennsylvania utility cannot by agreement between itself and a J
f customer, limit or relieve itself of the obligation to serve the public. Lake Greely Camp v. Lackawaxen & H. Teleph. Co., 95 PUR (NS) 12.
It is not true that in Pennsylvania a municipality has absolute mono-poly power to exclude competition and control prices within its municipal boundaries.
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11 For example, an industry can purchase power outside of a City and import it into the City for its own use. Schuylkill Haven v. Pennsyl-vania Power & Light Co., 3 PUR (NS) 127 (1934). An electric utility may I
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deliver electric energy at a point in its charter territory, for use outside the F
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i 1/ Applicants' Conclusions of Law 37. 02.
10,/ 48 A 2d 59 (1946).
1 / Applicants' Conclusions of Law 37. 01(e).
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_ charter territory where transmissicn from point of delivery to point of use is u
c-carried out over patron's privately owned line. Northwestern Mining & Ex-4 I
change Co. v. West Penn Power Co. (1945) 61 PUR (NS) 186.
i A Pennsylvania hydroelectric company has been permitted to compete with other investor-owned electric systems. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
- v. Public Service Commission, 171 Atl. 412 (1934).
A municipality may be permitted i.o construct and operate an electric system in competition with an existing electric utility serving under a non-exclusive franchise. Re Meyerstown, 12 PUR (NS) 39 (1936).
Similarly, the assertion that municipalities can charge such rates as I
they desire is overstated. The rates charged by a municipal electric system within its boundaries may very well be influenced by Public Service Commis-
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sion regulation of rates charged by the municipality outside the city boundaries.
The Commission, for example, can require a municipal system to charge uni-form rates within and without a municipality to avoid rate discrimination.
i Sieninski v. Ambridge, 27 PUR (NS) 305.
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Applicants' argument 12/ that restrictions in Pennsylvania law on the condemnation powers of public utilities precludes even potential competition i
k for wholesale customers is equally fallacious. First, it must assume com-i plete refusals to wheel as well as the complete absence of transmission lines j
of competitors and also the complete absence of transmission routes not re-quiring condemnation. Moreover, Applicants' argument utterly ignores the potential competition inherent in the possibility that municipalities might be-J2,/ Proposed Finding of Fact 22. 09.
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come self-generating. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States. -
Clearly, Applicants' argument that only " fringe area" competition l
is possible is not in keeping with either the law or the facts. Neither can
" fringe area" competition be so easily dismissed with unsupported -- but oft repeated -- assertions that it is de minimis. It must be remembered that it is in the " fringe areas" that municipal growth is most likely to occur. It is in the fringe areas that new subdivisions are built and industrial parks are located.
II CEI HAS USED ITS MONOPOLY POWER i
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Applicants' argument that CEI has no monopoly power, and, assuming l
it had monopoly power, har not used it once again ignores the record.
It is argued that CEI's offers of access to generation and transmission lines have removed any advantage CEI might have.14/ For this untenable position, I
Applicants cite the testimony of Mr. Mayben attranscript pages 7782, 7792 and 7797. Nothing stated by Mr. Mayben at the pages cited in any way surports the argument made. All that Mr. Mayben said was that CEI had offered access I
to generation in the amounts requested by the City. Nothing is said with re-l l
gard to the terms and conditions of the offer. It appears that the Board cannot i
i take Applicants' record citations at face value.
13/ 410 US 366, i
14/ Proposed Finding of Fact 34. 23.
_. Although Applicants' suggestion that the City was not in good faith in
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seeking access to nuclear units and CAPCO membership was fully answered in the City's initial filing, one further mistatement of the record must be Applicants have stated 15/ that the City never responded to Mr.
laid to rest.
Hauser's letter of April 10, 1974 inquiring as to the City's true intentions.
Applicants' own exhibit no. 64 states in a portion not quoted by Applicants that at a meeting on March 28, 1974, after reference by Mr. Hauser to Director Kudukis' testimony before City Council Mr. Goldberg:
... responded that you [Mr. Goldberg] were the spokesman for MELP and that MELP's official position was that its preference was to obtain ownership interests in these units but that if there was a legal impediment to ownership your alter-native position was that MELP still desired Unit Power Participation in these facilities.
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Applicants' futile effort to argue that the City had never shown an i
interest in an interconnection prior to 1969 was again fully answered in the City's initial filing. However, once again, it is necessary to set the record I
straight. Applicants claim that exhibit DJ621 " suddenly surfaced for the first i
time at the very end of these proceedings. "- /
16 Exhibit DJ 621 was described and discussed very specifically at page 27 of the City's Prehearing Brief filed Novembe r 26, 1975. It is simply not true the document " suddenly surfaced" i
for the first time at the very end of these proceedings.
It is incredible that Applicants would now assert that CEI's constant study and repeated offers to acquire the City's electric system were merely 1
M/ Proposed Brief pp. 448-49.
16/ proposed Brief p. 427.
, in response to stimuli for such acquisition from sources outside the com-pany. When evidence to the contrary was offered, Applicants asserted that they were making no such contention. Mo reove r, CEI's public relations department proposed a publicity campaign to prepare public acceptance of acquisition of MELP by CEI. (DJ 603; See also C-102, C-121, C-142 re-jected; DJ 383-390 rejected).
1 Applicants' argument that the criteria employed by CEI in determining whether load transfer service should be provided 17/ would not have prevented the City from maintaining its equipment confuses maintenance with emergency repair. CEI says the test was "whether M'ELP could carry its load without load transfer service. " Clearly, the test contemplates that the City use all operable equipment. Only when a forced outage occurs forcing equipment out of service would the City be able to meet the CEI test.
While it is true that the City requested that the load transfer facilities be maintained after the 138 kv interconnection was effected,18 / it was not for a continuation of power purchases over those facilities. Rather, the purpose was pointed out in the very exhibit cited by Applicants (A-153) at page 3:
... the load transfer points have reliability benefits which would be of value in the event of an outage on the interim 138 kv interconnection. In-deed, your company has expressed concern about reliance solely on one 138 kv interconnection and has suggested consideration of the installation by the City of a second 138 kv interconnection.
l E/ Proposed Brief p. 435.
18/ Proposed Brief p. 447.
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4 Clearly, the City sought to have the load transfer points maintained only for
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back-up for the temporary 138 kv interconnection.
At pages 414 - 415 of their proposed brief Applicants play statistical 1
games to contend that more than 55% of the 9,050 customers -- residential and small commercial -- lost by the City between 1968 and 1974 were lost for reasons other than transferring to CEI. In fact, as Applicants' 132 p. 4 shows, transfers to CEI amount to 5,229 customers. It is only by subtracting all new customers acquired by the City from the figure for those lost to CEI 1
that Applicants were able to develop their figure. In fact, the 5,229 residen-tial and small commercial customers lost to CEI were offset by only 720 cus-tomer transfers from CEI to the City. Applicants' figures totally ignore the City's loss of large commercial and industrial customers to CEI.
-l Applicants' argument that the City could have constructed its own transtr, ssion lines ignores the testimony of Applicants' own witness Caruso.
See City Initial Submittal pp. 67-70. City would further note that in any i
court action concerning an attempt by the City to construct transmission lines, the court would consider both the necessity for the service and the i
affect of the service on the welfare of the general public. The Cleveland Elec-t tric Illuminating Company v. Scape 11, 41 O. Misc. 107, aff'd Ct. App. No.
33428.
In addition, when the City sought the required certificate of the Ohio Power Siting Commission, the Commission could not grant the certificate unless it determined that:
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19 / O. R. C. $4906.10(A)(4).
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... such facility is consistent with regional plans for expansion of the electric power grid of the elec-tric systems serving this state and interconnected utility systems; and that such facilities will serve the interests of electric system economy and relia-bility.
Given the developing CAPCO transmission grid, it is unlikely that any of the lines Mr. Caruso studied would be certificated by the Ohio Power Siting Commis sion.
4 Applicants attempt to rely on Applicants' Exhibit 159 for the propo-sition that load transfers were operated reasonably and that the delays occa-sioned thereby were infrequent and of short duration -20/
does not suffice to rebut the testimony to the contrary. Applicants' 159 does not cover the entire period of operation of the 11 kv service (Hauser Tr. 10,832). Some of the 11 kv outages omitted from Applicants' 159 lasted 15 - 20 minutes (Hauser Tr. 10,834-35). Nor can one ascertain from Applicants' 159 which of the outages shown svere caused by the load transfers (Hauser Tr. 10,837).
Only 11 kv outages are reflected (Hauser Tr. 10,829), although load transfers were also made at lower voltages (Hauser Tr. 10,843). Load transfer some-times occurred at lower voltages only because facilities did not exist for transfer at 11 kv (Hauser Tr. 10,858).
An argument predicated on an incomplete and inaccurate document purposely prepared in such a manner as to omit important data is a flimsy J
argument indeed.
l 20/ Proposed Finding of Fact 34,34.
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THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT THE ANTITRUST LAWS ARE NOT FULLY APPLICABLE TO ELECTRIC UTILITIES OR THAT APPLICANTS HAVE NOT VIOLATED THOSE LAWS.
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Applicants have argued
/ that the Commission should not apply per 21 se rules to the electric utility industry.
Fatal to Applicants' aigument is the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US 366 (1973). In Otter Tail the Court expressly affirmed the District Court's ruling that restructive provisions in Otter Tail's contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation were territorial allocation schemes which were per se viola-tions of the Sherman Act. Applicants' reference to the musings of Justice Blackmun in Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 96 S. Ct. at 3126, is misplaced. No issue of the applicability of per se rules was before the Court in Cantor.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun was not addressing the issue of whether a tying J
arrangement, for example, would be a per se violation in the context of the electric utility industry. Rather, his comments were that a rule of reason should be applied in the first instance in determining whether an immunity l~
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existed under Parker v. B rovin. -
I Applicants have also argued that to show conspiracy through conscious parra11elism, it must be shown that Applicants' adopted policy not in their own s elf-inte re s t.
While the City believes the record provides ample evidence of conspiracy without reliance on conscious parrallelism, it would point out that M/ Proposed Brief pp. 59-66.
g/ 371 US 341 (1943).
Applicants did, in fact, adopt the P/N method, the application of which was not in their own self-interest. Indeed, the original CAPCO allocations among Applicants were made arbitrarily to avoid the adverse impact of the P/N method (See City's main brief pp. 91-92).
CONCLUSION The weakness of Applicants' case was made apparent in the closing weeks of the hearing when Applicants surface one defense after another only to have it crumble under the weight of the facts. Now, in their initial filing, Applicants have largely ignored the facts to argue policy and economic theory.
The record fully supports the City's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the City submits that they should be adopted by the t
Board.
Respectfully submitted, t-Reuben Goldberg llf
<<4 <</l &tb.
David C. Hjelmfelt Goldberg, Fieldman & Hjelmfelt 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Vincent C. Campanella Director of Law Robert D. Hart First Assistant Director of Law i
City of Cleveland i
City Hall Cleveland, Ohio 44114 September 22, 1976 6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the foregoing " Reply Brief of The City of Cleveland" has been made on the following parties listed on the attachment hereto this 22nd day of September, 1976, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, or by hand I
delive ry.
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s David C. kjelmfpft Attachment s
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ATTACHMENT Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. Chairman Christopher R. Schraff, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Attorney General Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh and icobs Environmental Law Section 815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
361 East Broad Street, 8th floor Washington, D. C.
20006 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Alan b. Rosenthal, Chairman Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board John M. Frysiak, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Richard S. Salzman Jerome E. Sharfman Andrew C. Goodhope, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 3320 Estelle Terrace U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wheaton, Maryland 20906 Washington, D. C.
20555 Robert M. Lazo, Esq., Chairman Howard K. Shapar, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Daniel M. Head, Esq., Member Mr. Frank W. Karas, Chief Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Public Proceedings Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Abraham Braitman, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Antitrust and Indemnity Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Joseph Rutberg, Esq.
Ja ck R. Goldberg, Esq.
Frank R. C1okey, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Director Special Assistant Attorney General U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Towne House Apartments, Room 219 Wa shington, D. C.
20555 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Edward A. Matto, Esq.
Roy P. Le s sy, Jr., E sq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the General Counsel Chief, Antitrust Section R e gulation 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Columbuc, Ohio 43215 Washington, D. C.
20555 i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ATTACHMENT (continued)
Melvin G. Berger, Esq.
David McNeill Olds, Esq.
Joseph J. Saunders, Esq.
William S. Lerach, Esq.
Steven M. Charno, Esq.
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay David A. Leckie, Esq.
Post Office Box 2009 Janet R. Urban, Esq.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Antitrust Division l
Department of Justice Terrence H. Benbow, Esq.
Post Office Box 7513 Steven B. Peri, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20044 Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts 40 Wall Street Karen H. Adkins, Esq.
New York, New York 10005 Richard M. Firestone, Esq.
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Assistant Attorneys General Alan P. Buchmann, Esq.
Antitrust Sectio.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor 1800 Union Commerce Building Cclumbus, Ohio 43215 Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Russell J. Spetrino, Esq.
Leslie Henry, Esq.
Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq.
Michael M. Briley, Esq.
Ohio Edison Company Roger P. Klee, Esq.
47 North Main Street Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Akron, Ohio 44308 Post Office Box 2088 Toledo, Ohio 43604 John Lansdale, Jr., Esq.
Cox, Langford & Brown James R. Edgerly, Esq.
21 Dupont Circle, N. W.
Secretary and General Counsel Washington, D. C.
20036 Pennsylvania Power Company One East Washington Street Richard A.
Mille r, Esq.
New Castle, Pennsylvania 16103 Vice Pre ;ident and General Counsel The Clev 21and Electric Illuminating Co.
Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
Post Office Box 5000 Victor A. Greenslade, Jr., Esq.
Cleveland, Ohio 44101 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Post Office Box 5000 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Esq.
Robert E. Zahler, Esq.
Thomas J. Munsch, Jr., Esq.
Jay H. Berstein, Esq.
General Attorney Shaw, Pit tman, Potts & Trowbridge Duquesne Light Company 1800 M Street, N. W.
435 Sixth Avenue Washingt n, D. C.
20036 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docketing and Service Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C.
20555 O
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wr.shington, D. C.
20555
.... ATTACHMENT (continued)
Joseph A. Rieser, Esq.
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Wa shington, D. C.
20036 John C. Engle, President AMP-O, Inc.
20 High Street Hamilton, Ohio 45012 Michael R. Gallagher, Esq.
630 Bulkley Building 1501 Euclid Cleveland, Ohio 44115
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