Text

Motion for Reversal of ASLB Decisions & Denial of Ol. Applicants Have Not Demonstrated That Reasonable Assurance of Adequate Protective Measures Exists.W/Certification of Svc
	ML20138L319
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	10/30/1985
From:	Lodge T; LODGE, T.J., SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE
To:	; NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
	CON-#485-946 OL, NUDOCS 8510310266
	Download: ML20138L319 (29)
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l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

)Qqi Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board ~

In the Matter of:

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC

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'ILLUMINATNG CO. ET AL.

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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2)

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-APPELLATE BRIEF OF SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE g.

Terry J.' Lodge 618 N. Michigan Street

~ Suite 105 Toledo,-Ohio 43624 Phone: (419) 255-7552 Counsel for Sunflower Alliance, Inc.

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TABLE OF AUT110RITIES Federal Cases Page(s)

GUARDS v. United States Nu8 clear Regulatory Commission, 9

753 F. 2d ll44(D.C. Cir. 1985) 21 State Statutes Ohio Revised Code Sect. 3313.172 4

Ohio Revised Code Sect. 3327.09 5

Ohio Revised Code Sect. 3327.14 4, 5

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Ohio Revised Code Sect. 5915.10 5

Ohio Revised Code Sect. 3734.01 24

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Federal Regulations 10 CFR Sect. 50.47 6, 14, 16, 21, 26 State Regulations 2 Ohio Admin. Code Sect. 3301-83-12(L) 4, 5 NRC Decisions Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CL1-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528, 530 (1983) 21 Documentary References Manual of Protective Action Guides for Nuclear Incidents, EPA 520/1-75-001 (Sept. 1975) 3, 10 Final Environmental Statement, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-0884 7, 8 Ohio Department of Health, Letter from Charles Croft dated October 24, 1980 8

Ohio Department of Education, Letter from Herman L. Massie dated May 27, 1983 4

Federal Emergency Management Agency Interim Report on Emergency Plans for Perry Nuclear Power Plant 4, 26 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Perparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (1980) 6, 13, 15 Ashtabula County Radiolecical Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 9 Radiological Training Manual, Ohio Disaster Services Agency 24 Status Report: Planning for an Accident at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Perry Legal Defense Fund (1983) 12 n

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I.

ARGUMENT ~

Proposition No. 1: The Licensing Board Incorrectly Dismissed 20.of Sunflower's Particularized Contentions By Its Orders of January 11 and 15, 1985

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===1.

Background===

As originally admitted and modified by subsequent Licensing Board determinations the emergency planning contention was worded as follows:

State and local emergency evacuation plans do not demonstrate that they provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the svent of.an emergency.1/

Later, the Licensing' Board directed Sunflowers to " particularize" its concerns Memorandum and Order (Particularization of Emergency Planning Contention), July 26, 1984. Sunflower.did,-by its filing of " particularized objections" on August 20, 1984.

On September 20, 1984, Applicant filed a " Motion to Dismiss" Sun-

- flower's particularized contentions, to which submission Sunflower timely objected by " Memorandum in Opposition" dated September 27, 1984 The Licensing Board went on to consider the " Motion to Dismiss and on Januaryfil,1985 and January 15, 1985, " granted" 18 of the 38 total contentions and " denied" 20 other. Those " granted" were allowed to go to summary disposition.

Sunflower objects to the procedurally irregular use of a " Motion to Dismiss" to screen the contentions for later summary disposition litigation, as well as to the actual rulings of the Board.on Applicant's " Motion to Dismiss" 1/ LBP-81-24 14 NRC 175,189 (1981), as modified by LEP 81-35, 14 NRC 682, 686, (1981), and by Memorandum and Order (Particularization of Emergency Planning Contention), July 26, 1984.

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-2.

Errors a.~. The Licensing Board Improperly A1, lowed Applicant to Use a 'Metion to Dismiss' to Secure Dismissal of L

Some of the Contentions L

A '! Motion to Dismiss" is a procedural nullity in the regulations

. governing NRC operating license cases.

Following particularization of the issues.

the Licensing Board should either have set up a summary disposition timetable on l

all'38 of che contentions, or set matters for adjudication.

Instead, it-let Applicant urge-all allegations and conclusions as to the sufficiency of the particularized contentions, whereupon the Licensing Board dismissed 20 of the 38 contentions and~only at. that point set the remaining down for summary disposition.

This procedural irregularity denied Sunflower's substantive right to have these matters go to the finders-of fact for determination on their merits.

l b.

Protective Actions Decision-Making At. Table 6-1 in the State Plan,'Rev. 3-(appearing at 6-16), the option

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of remaining indoors is deemed to be adequate protection of the public when shel-l ter affords less than 5 rems of whole body gamma dose exposure.

Shelter continues l

to be presumed adequate when the " shelter dose" of radiation equals or exceeds 5 rems, but the " evacuation dors' equals or exceeds the " shelter dose."

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the " shelter dose" exceeds the " evacuation dose" is evacuation indicated, so says the State Plan, Rev. 3.

These proposed action indicators are faulty in several ways.

First,-

-Table 6-l's footnote indicates that "[s]helter is to be with ventilation control,"

l the latter-term meaning that air conditioners and fans are to be turned off, doors and windows closed, and refuse sought in basements. This guidance is unhelpful and potentially disastrous if hundreds are trapped in a rest home, shopping center.

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or school in the plume exposure pathway, on a 95 degree August afternoon or a 5 degree January one.

Many modern buildings have unclosable ventilation required by law - another ponderance.

Furthermore, Applicant has ignored the plain intentions expressed in guidance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

In its " Manual of Protective Action Guides for Nuclear Incidents," EPA 520/1-75-001 (Sept. 1975)

(Rev. June 1980), the EPA has stated at Table 2.1 that whole-body exposures to altborne radiactive materials for the general public should not exceed 1-5 rems.

In the footnote to the table, EPA asserts:

When ranges are shown the lowest values should be used if there are no major local constraints in providing protection at that level, especially to sensitive populations.

Local constraints may make lower values im-practical to use, but in no case should the higher value be exceeded in determining the need for protective action.

Id. (emphasis supplied)

CEI and involved local and state governments have no apparent com-punction about refusing to follow this authoritative guidance.

It is hardly unimaginable that blind adnerence to a set of standards that flies in the face of better sense and authority will compound public panic.

There are no proposals in state and local plans to evaluate the relative degrees of " ventilation control" within each and every structure in the EPZ; hence there is no possibility at all that even the best-documented analysis of plume pathway exposure will suffice to backup public officials' recommendations of shelter, because of the wide range of variability in ventilation controis.

c.

Authority Lacking for School Bus Usage Under Ohio law, it is quite clear that school buses may not be put into service as a compoenent of any offsite evacuation procedure.

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l The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has previously noted o

this.

FEMA Interim Report at 13.

Sunflower is aware of the May 27, 1983 letter to the Ohio Disaster Services Agency (ODSA) from Herman L. Massie, Chief l

of Pupil Transportation for the State Department of Education.

See FEMA Interim Report. App. B.

That letter, in ipse dixit fashion, concludes that the code of state administrative regulations, the Ohio Administrative Code, authorizes the use of school buses in the event of a civil emergency.

2 OAC $3301-83-12(L).

Scrutiny and analysis is nohetheless in order.

Ohio statutory law clearly and flatly prohibits the use of school buses for nonschool purposes.

R.C. 3313.172 states:

The board of education of any city, exempted village, local, county, or joint vocational school aistrict may expend district funds to obtain one or more motor vehicles, as defined in section 4501.01 of the Revised Code.

Ex-cept as provided in section 3327.14 of the Revised Code any motor vehicle so obtained shall be used solely for school purposes.

(emphasis supplied)

No exception appears in the statute.

R.C.

3327.14 states, pertinently:

The board of education of any school district that owns and operates buses for transporting pupils may contract under a lease agreement with a municipal corporation or a public or nonprofit agency or organization delivering services to the aged, to make available one or more of the district's buses or other vehicles to be used for transporting persons sixty years of age or older. The board of education of any school district may also contract under a similar agreement with any group, organization or otherN entity engaged in adult education activities.

Again, there is no recitation of any legislated right for school buses to be utilized in a civil emergency,'

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, v The State Board of Education in 1970 prumulgated 2 OAC 53301-83-12 allowing "nonroutine" use of school buses, subsection (L) of which appear as follows:

0 School buses may be used by Ohio governmental agencies during time of civil emergencies.

Questionable use should be clarified with assistance of the department of education (Example of a civil emergency - Ohio nat-ional guard reserves require transportation to a threctened area).2/

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The problem is simple: assuming that on questions of substance, statutory law governs over administrative regulation, there is no proper legal fundament for the Ohio Department of Education to have short-circuited facially obvious leg-islative mandates. With all due respect to the Department of Education, this conflict at a minimummight benefit from input from the Department's lawyer, the Attorney-General, and not simply lay interpretations.

This is not merely a lesson in jurisprudential obscurity.

R.C. 53327.14 obligates a board of education lending bus equipment to main-tain liability insurance coverage in accordance with R.C. 3327.09. The latter mandates liability cove? age of $100,000 per person / $300,000 per occurrence /

$50,000 property damage coverage / $3,000 medical payments coverage.

Besides the conflict between statutes and regulation, there is also the previously-discussed difficulty which any board of education would have in obtaining the liability coverage in an amount sufficient to cover errors, omissions and negligence during a nuclear emergency.

R.C. 5915.10 provides immunity from liability to persons performing during a civil defense emergency with an exception:

'{ E]xcept in cases of wijlful misconduct."

R.C. 5915.10(A).

2 2/ The regulation was doubtless established in response to the use of Ohio National Guard personnel at Kent State University, where on May 4, 1970 a chapter in American ignominy was written.

At any rate, citizen evacuation by bus was evidently not contemplated at that moment.

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In practical terms, the boards of education in Lake, Geauga and Ashtabula counties which have been approached by CEl or respective county officials would do well to contemplate realities.

Those realities are that-in case of_a major nuclear accident, panic will predominate; that boards of education employees may refuse to " volunteer" to drive into or near the plume exposure pathway to evacuate citizens of any age, necessitating ~ substitute, possibly less apt, drivers to take the wheels; and that any drivers may well-take incredible chances in txcessive traffic, causing-uncalculable physical

-harm to passengers. Who wishes to be first to test a poorly-reasoned regulation

" authority" in defense of multimillion dollar damage actions brought by angry plaintiffs who cannot successfully sue CEI because of the Price-Anderson Act?

Once again, the overall uncertainty of "who pays" - when the friendly utility company will not - should be an inestimably major factor-in local education officials' thinking.

d.

Insufficient Proofs of Volunteer Aid 10 CFR 550.47(b)(2) requires emergency plans to specify " interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite' support and response activities.

." The state and local plans are deficient because they fail

.to fix in unequivocal fashion the' availability _of volunteers - medics, police auxillary people, bus drivers, civil defense workers, etc.

NUREG-0654, requires 1(at 41) that:

Each [ emergency ] organization shall identify.

individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance. Euch assistance shall be id-entified and supported by aporopriate letters of agree-ment.

The plans contain no such estimates.

The parties were put on notice long ago of this inadequacy by a study commissioned by the Perry Legal Defense

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-Fund, " Status Report:

Planning for an Accident at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,"

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n (1983), provided to all through seasonable discovery update. The PLDF Status Report surveyed the circumstances of notice lto emergency and volunteer person-

.nel and lacking formal arrangements' extant between public and private emergency response agencies and CEI. The study revealed considerable superficiality of knowledge of. radiation hazards among this grouping of personnel, stemming

-possibly from the failure.by Applicant to individually fix each person's

' volunteer status.

Obviously, the institutional response organizations - fire

' departments, police auxiliaries, boards of education - are not in a legal or

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moral position to commit individuals who would be placing their personal health on the line in the event of a general emergency.

Quite arguably, individual

would-be volunteers who are asked to sign their names to broad form waivers or releases from liability might determine not to volunteer so readily.

e.

Implementation of Staff Recommendations on EALs The Staff provided comments to Applicant by letter dated January 11 1984 concerning the emergency actions levels.

(Letter from B.J. Youngblood to Murray R. Edelman of CEI).

Sunflower incorporates each of the Staff's criti-cisms of the EALs and realleges them herein by reference as particularized ob-jections.

f.

Radius of the EPZ The emergency planning zone (EPZ) to which evacuation response must

.be directed must have a ten (10) mile radius, a fact quite well established.

Why, then, does the-FinalLEnvironmental Statement (FES) propose a radius of effectively fifteen (15) miles?~

At F-2 of the FES (NUREG-0884), the Staff discussion of evacuation modeling for Perry states:

The evacuation' distance is selected to be 15 miles (which is 5 miles more than the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ radius). After reaching the end of the travel distance the evacuee is assumed to receive no further radia-tion exposure.

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The inescapable assumption implicit in this statement is that one might sustain radiation exposures within a 15, not 10-mile radius before reaching safety.

Sunflower demands:that the EPZ* radius be increased to 15 miles or

- more to conform to this ominous assumption in the Final EIS.

g.

, Ingestion Pathway Monitoring The plan enumerates steps that the State of Ohio is to take to monitor and implement protettive measures throughout the ingestion pathway.

Among them, the Ohio Departmentof Health (ODH) is to provide technical input in these respects, including the measurement, via radiochemistry analysis, of gamma ray emitting nuclides and alpha and beta emitting nuclides which may

. be present'in soil, vegetation and other solid or particulate substances.

A major obstacle to ODH's execution of its responsibilities in this vital capacity is that the Department does not have the equipment capa-bility to perform radioactivity analysis upon " hot" samples - those exceeding threshold limit values established by the National Committee on Radiation Pro-tection.

In an October 24 1980 letter to the State Adjutant General's Office Charles Croft, Chief of the Division of Public Health Laboratories of ODH, noted

. that all samples selected for testing must be "prescreened" in the field, and that ODH does not have container equipment with lead linings for shipment, robot arm machinery for handling, etc., to handle or even read excessively " hot" samples.

An ingestion pathway could encompass literally hundreds of square miles of agricultural countryside, with crops, livestock, groundwater, firm equipment, trees,. stored crops, seed, and such all in need af sampling and monitoring.

It is fatuous to assume that the State can perform this very critical function,

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absent hard and extensive evidence of new equipment and personnel resources.

The State clearly does not comply with the criteria in NUREG-0654 at 64 pertinent to protection of the public from contaminated foodstuffs.

h.

Insufficient Background Data Background radiation readings must be taken before PNPP becomes operational of the entire 50-mile EPZ.

Radiation meters only measure " relative contamination" - meaning that after an accidental release, radiation on an individual will be indicated by equipment only in comparison with a then-elevated background count.

Under such circumstances, the reading on the person will be "lowballed" or understated, when by comparing it with pre-Perry background levels, that reading might otherwise be severely high.

The plans do not contain the necessary baseline data to have a sy, stem-atic set of pre-Perry levels.

It is obviously of great importance that readings be taken and logged now of virtually every inhabitable space within the 50-mile zone.

Utility companies have frequently claimed that the amount of radiation emitted from a nuclear facility during normal operations is equivalent to a stroll through the mostly-granite Grand Central Station in New York City.

To plan for the time when that claim may not be true, and to conform with NUREG-0654 at 67, it is imperative that this data be obtained, because an accident scenario will not give the opportunity to Applicant to learn the levels at which people must be decontaminated.

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Unavailable Extension Agent The Ashtabula County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) requires that county's Cooperative Extension Service agent to advise on food and livestock protection.

However, in reality that person has received no equipment or training, and internal Service regulations require him to take

whatever steps are needed for him to secure himself and his family in time of accident.

This_ conflict must be fcrmally and clearly resolved.

J.

Shelter and Loading Buses The EPA Protective Action Guid6s document states at 1.38 as follows:

Generally, shelter provided by dwellings with windows and doors closed and ventilation turned off would provide good protection from inhala-tion of gases and vapors for a short time (i.e.,

one hour or'less) but would be generally ineffec-tive after about two hours due to natural venti-lation of the shelter.

Sunflower objects to mere shelter precautions for any sustained release of any magnitude for the reason that in relatively still meterological conditions, it simply is unrealistic to expect a plume of hundreds or thousands of meters' length to " blow over" in an hour or less.

The situation is worse still if the emissions in any one direction would be continuous for many hours, of course.

What if the authorities at first recommended shelter, but shortly afterward move to a full-scale evacuation? The PNPP plan at 5.5 indicates that school children could be loaded onto buses within the 30 to 90 minute range after the word is given. Apart from the fact that no motor vehicle will afford even the shelter capabilities of a house, it is evident that the plans effectively could cause school children to evacuate outside under or into a plume.

The plans do not adequately address the problems which might befall the populations without individual transportation who are caught by the changing of gears from less severe to more severe protective actions.

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Monitoring Contaminated Consumables There is little more than a lip service description of the role of the State and county public health departments in monitoring the agricultural

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t food chain.

If a PNPP accident were to occur during a period of significant harvest, how would officials ensure that all' contaminated farm products were intercepted? No crop insurance would exist to indemnify farmers from radiation t

losses.

It would not be difficult to envision desperate farmers, particularly at the far ranges of the ingestion exposure pathway, rushing in a day or so after the accident, specifically to harvest and sell their crops quickly, just to avoid public health scrutiny. To a desperate small business person in these the threat ol sanctions af ter the fact may not deter such actions.

circumstances, Once again, ' the existence of the Price-Anderson Act may actually motivate private i

actions out of the economic considerations which are against the public interest.

The PNPP plan neither offers guidance, nor clearly specifies the num-bers of personnel and equipment nor the types of steps to cut off this problem.

1 Phantom Reimbursements The state plan at 1-4 Indicates that relevant state and local officials will maintain accounting records of public funds expended in a PNPP emergency for purposes of seeking reimbursement.

From'whom reimbursement is to be obtained'is not clear.

Is it CEI?

6 FEMA? Congress?.

Either this plan component must be clarified or be discarded because of the vicious falsehood it represents. The federal Price-Anderson Act limits a nuclear utility to a ceiling of liability, beyond which the only recourse for damages is the U.S. Congress, from which aupplemental appropriations need be

- sought. The public sectot has no particular priority, in terms of claims for reimbursement it might press, over other claimants.

Either the plans must reflect fully.the means by.which recoupment is to occur, if at all, including a sensible discussion of Price-Anderson, or this section must be discarded.

Any and all J

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agreements with CEI for reimbursement must also be included.

It is absurd to use the emergency plans as a public relations document to give the public assurances that the economic aspects of implementation will not be burdensome to taxpayers.

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Source Term do part of the plans can be approved until the internal NRC re-evaluation of so-called " source terms" is completed.

The very basis for the plans is shaky at present, and revisions to source terms could mean speculations of greater radiation danagers to the populace around Perry than presently pertain.

Therefore, until the revisions occur to this fundamental assumption, Sunflower urges that no plan approval is substantively possible, nor practically meaningful.

n.

Incoherent Ambulance Usage Lake County proposes to use ambulance services to move persons with health limitations who cannot be moved by bus.

Lake County proposes to draw upon ambulances from Ashtabula and Geauga counties to accomplish this end in the event of emergency. This underscores the possibilities of conflicting responses at the county level, o.

Sunflower's " Status Report" Sunflower Alliance hereby incorporates by reference and realleges herein all objections to state and local emergency plans which appear in the

" Status Report:

Planning for an Accident at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant,"

Perry Legal Defense Fund (1983).

p.

Reception Center Locations Sunflower objects to locating the reception centers within 20 miles of PNPP. Many are downwind under normal meterological conditions, and at least one expert on radiological dispersion (Jan Beyea, who participated

in the Indian Point evacuation planning case) believes that prompt fatalities might occur as far away from a leaking plant as 20 or more miles.

The undecided source terms and the design and possible accident sequences of the Perry plant suggest strangly that a greater evacuation. radius is needed.

q.

Remote-Control Sirens NUREG-0654 requires (at 45) that CEI install and maintain sirens, yet it is the responsibility of state and local governments to activate such a system.

Sunflower objects to the setup as described in relevant plans unless it is delineated how Federal Communications Commission approvals will or have been granted for the radio-activation system.

It would appear that CEI must be the licensee, and thereby must actually put into motion the activation of the sirens.

r.

Evacuees Not Going to Centers Had CEI bothered to analyze the reactions of evacuees in comparable evacuation s.ienarios, it might find that a majority, or at least a significant minority, of people go to friends' and relatives' homes during a crisis, not to evacuation centers.

How will these people be identified and checked if need be, decontaminated? The plans do not address this potential in any note-worthy way.

s.

Evacuation Center Resources Other than identifying the centers, data on available resources there is nil.

It is not covered in the plans that food, drugs, beds, protective gears, potassium iodide, and numerous other things such as telephones would be available. There is no documentation of the potential lengths of stays which might be necessitated by a severe accident.

There is no mention of the need for psychological services to assist those who cannot accept the possible facts that they may never be able to return to homes, pets, etc., or might not be able to cope with the loss of friends or relatives to a nuclear accident.

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Returning to the EPZ f,

other than general references to cordoning off all or parts of the EPZ, the plans do not tell how persons re-entering the EPZ will be handled if an accident is in progress.

It is not too hard to envision worried parents (particularly single parents) who work outside the EPZ racing belatedly back into it to get school children, retrieve pets or valuables, feed livestock, etc.

The issues of securing the cordoned area while allowing access to boha fide residents is difficult to manage.

.In conjunction with the issue would be the question of how to limit radiation exposures to people venturing back into the zone, as well as documenting and measuring exposures when they oncecgain depart.

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The Plans Will Not Work The Commission is bound by 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1) to find that there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" in the event of nuclear emergency at Perry.

None of the plans have been subjected to anything but, at best, tabletop drills. There has been no full-scale drill of any sort, and none is contemplated for some months.

Even after a full-scale drill occurs, experience at other. plants indicates that much reworking and fine-tun-ing will be necessary.

Sunflower objects to the plans as being unworkable because they have not been submitted to these myriad acid tests which implementation would impose.

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Proposition No. 2:

The Licensing Board Improperly Granted a Partial Initial Decision in Favor of Applicant to the Adequacy of Offsite Emergency Preparations

===1.

Background===

In its " Concluding Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning, Hydrogen Control and Diesel Generators" (" Partial Initial Decision"), dated September 4, 1985, the Licensing Board held against Sunflower on each of the contentions which remained for adjudication findng that " adequate assurance" of workable emergency plans ex'isted.

Discussion of those issues follows, referenc-ing them by their identifying letters from the particularization stage.

2.

Errors a.

Contention A: Evacuation Time Estimates Have Not Been Reviewed by State or Local Organizations Sunflower argued that Applicant had failed to incorporate county engineers from the three affected Ohio counties of Lake, Geauga and Ashtabula in the calculation of evacuation time estimates needed on area highways. This position was based on the belief that criteria of NUREG-0654 FEBiA-REP-1 Rev. 1 App. 4 were not being met.

Applicants' witness on this mattet was Scott T. McCandless, a consultant. His testimony left disturbing gaps. Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 provides that review and comment upon draft evacuation time estimates shal. ue solicited and included with the submitted ETE.

Testimony indicates that, while some reviews have taken place, county engineers of Lake, Geauga and Ashtabula Counties, who have central day-to-day roles in road maintenance, were approached by the Consultant only three (3) weeks before this hearing, and then only at the litigative insistences of Sunflower Alliance.

As of the date of hearing, McCandless had no written l

commentary from Geauga County's engineer. Applicant further had no written signoff from Genuga's DSA Director. Written confirmation of' satisfaction from Ohio's DSA also was not sought nor received.

Applicants sought only concurrences, rather than, and in lieu of, written comments, from local officials. Applicants erred significantly on this matter, and reversal of the Licensing Board is warranted.

b.

Contention J: Emergency Action Level Indicators Are Incomplete in Applicants' Emergency Plan The EALs were found by the Licensing Board to be complete. A review of Rev. 5 of the PNPP Plan reveals that the missing numbers have been supplied.

Sunflower reserves the right, with this new information, to reattempt raising a late-filed contention Sunflower would note that the, late provision of this data has helped them successfully to slick by the operating license stage, and have orchestrated the startup impectus, such as to forestall any serious regulatory questioning of the new data.

c.

Contention M:

Independent Data Monitoring Systems Should be Installed Within All Counties In the EPZ.

Sunflower proposed this option of some 100 fixed-site monitors to the several roving CEl and public agency teams on grounds that the shape, intensity and motion of a radioactive plume from Perry could not adequately be tracked.

Equipment would include fixed radiation monitors, meterological equipment and telemetering equipment.

Applicants presented two witnesses, Richard Bowers, Cleveland Electric illuminating Company's corporate health physicist, and Kenneth Cole, Ohio DSA's nuclear operations officer.

While there is no regulatory requirement strictly mandating indepen-dent ronitoring systems, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requires an applicant to

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demonstrate " adequate" methods, systems, and equipment for assessing actual or potential radiological emergency conditioning.

The adequacy of the combined utility and state monitoring efforts is questionable.

CEI would deploy teams te assessment sites within 11 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of the commencement of an accident, even though witness Bowers acknowledged that a major release could occur within 45 minutes of the beginning.

Bowers surrealistically argued that a mixture of " Cadillac" fixedsite monitors and mobile monitoring teams'would not be as effective as the exclusive use of monitoring teams.

This was his conclusion even though his team approach did not provide for monitoring in Lake Erie, offshore from PNPP, which includes a sub-stantial expanse of the EPZ, and despite the fact that monitoring teams would be largely confined to sampling along road rights-of-way.

Tr. 2930-2,2944-5.

The veracity of Bowers' position was also undercut by his highly suspect comparative cost-benefit rendition of fixed monitors versus monitoring teams.

His projected costs of independent systems did not even mathmatically add up.

Moreover, he repeatedly admitted that he had not comparatively assessed the economic expense of emplacing the maintaining teams and their equipment, nor had he calculated the expense of existing effluent monitors at PNPP or installation and maintenance of the 77 htermuminescent dosimeters in the EPZ around Perry.

CEI's evidence in support of mobile field monitoring teams was bad mathematics. A state-of-the art system of some 100 fixed site monitors would cost $2.7 million dollars. Each telemetry station would cost $7,800.00; wind speed and director sensors, $700.00 each; air samplers, $1,800.00 each; all for a supposed total of $19,300.00 (totcls $10,300.00) Tr. 2917-18 (Bowers).

Enclosing units in small buildings could range as high as $3,000.00 per station,

I at an installation cost of $2,800.00 per station, Tr. 2918A (Bowers),all for an alleged estimated total of $24,350.00 per unit.

A central computer would cost $200,000.00.

Tr. 2919. (Bowers).

CEI's witness did not know th'e cost of existing effluent monitors at PNPP, guessing "well over half a million dollars."

Tr. 2921 (Bowers).

There was no assessment performed by CEI of the costs of mobile monitoring teams.

Tr. 2921, 2922 (Bowers).

However, each team's equipment would cost

$15,000.00 annually.

Tr.'2922 (Bowers).

CEI fails to account in its cost-benefit evidence for the expense of 77 thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD's) set at varying radii from PNPP.

Tr. 2923 (Bowers).

Without support, Applicants neintain that their proposed system would total less than $2.7 million dollars.

Tr. 2925 (Bowers).

Applicants maintain that a hybrid approach of fixed monitors and mobile teams would be less satisfactory than the use solely of mobile teams.

Tr. 2928.(Bowers).

Applicant proferred false interpretation that regulatory requirements favor mobile monitoring over fixed-site monitors.

Tr. 2929-30 (Bowers). While admitting that instantaneous readouts would be somewhat efficient, the Applicant incorrectly argued that only a mobile t am could get under and mea-sure the plume centerline, even though the teams would be expected to adhere to existing roadways so to do.

Tr. 2931-2 (Bowers).

CEI also apparently believes that the 1.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months necessary to dispatch monitoring teams would be advantageous over instantaneous monitoring readouts, although a major release could occur within 45 minutes to an hour of the start of an accident.

Tr. 2935, 2943 (Bowers).

There would be a 12-hour delay in obtaining data from TLD's following radiation exposure.

Tr. 2939 (Bowers).

None of the drills to date of the monitor-iag teams have taken place under any more adverse conditions than darkness and

rain.

Tr. 2944-5 (Bowers).

Ohio Disaster Services Agency (DSA) has three (3) mobile monitoring teams for use at a PNPP accident.

See generally Tr. 2847-2855 (Cole).

Dis-patching of the teams would take 3.5 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Tr. 2869 Compare Cole at 3.

Five to six hours elapse from start to finish to dispatch teams, obtain soil and vegetative samples from the EPZ, and have them delivered to an Ohio Department of Health (ODH) laboratory in Columbu-Ohio.

Tr. 2878 (Cole).

Although CEI's witness inicially stated that Ohio DSA field data would be consolidated for use during the emegency.

Cole prefiled testimony at 6, DSA's data gathering role was minimized in later testimony to the use of

~

samples only to determine recovery and reentry into the EPZ after an accident, and to double-check the veracity of earlier, projected radiation leakage levels.

Tr. 2902 (Cole).

The Ohio DSA is notified of a potential accident, not at a pont in time when no (0) radiation leakage has occurred, but rather when radiation has already, in fact, escaped into the en ironment.

Tr. 2904 (Cole).

Applicants in fact desire that the public, media and local officials not have access to information of subaccident, routine radiation released from PNPP, as PNPP is effectively licensed to emit some radiation at all times.

Sternglass prefiled testimony at 9.

Abnormal, unreported releases of radiation from Three Mile Island endangered the health of the public, particularly newborn children, showing up g

as " spikes" in graphs of infant mortality rates in upstate New York and Maryland along the Susquehanna River.

Sternglass prefiled testimony at 11.

These correlate to similar mortality data for other plants.

Id. at 12.

i.

I

f.

d.

Contention P:

Emergency Plans are Deficient Respecting Hospital Designations and Medical Services as Well as Procedures Required to Assist Contaminated Individuals.

Applicants' esidence consisted,of testimony from Dr. Roger E.

Linneman, M.D., and Dr. Deborah Henkins, Ph. D.

In opposition, Sunflower sub-mitted the testimony of Dr. Robert McTrusty, M.D.,

an obstetrician at Ashtabula County Medical Center.

10 CFF Section (0.47(b)(12) requires a showing of " arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals." The Commission has previously interpreted this regulation to encompass radiation exposures as well as contaminated injured individuals.

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528, 530 (1983).

l In February of this year, the District of Columbia Federal Court of Appeals ruled that " arrangements" for medical services for contaminated, injured and exposed members of the general public require more than a simple listing of treatment facilities already in place; mere ad hoc arrangements are not adequate:

The underlying assumption made by the Commission-that wherever present or future nuclear power plants may be located, adequate facilities will be available in the area to serve victims of radiation exposure in the event of an accident-is hardly within the core of the Commission's expertise.

In any case, it is not an assumption properly indulged in an emergency prepardness regulation.

Section 50.47(b) describes the uedical arrangement requirement as one of the several " standards" applicants' emergency response plans "must" in fact meet.

CUARD v. United State Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 753 F. 2d 1144, (D.C. Cir.

1985). The Board believes that GUARDS converts the inquiry on this issue to one wherein an applicant must detail medical arrangements fully, as to facilities, equipment, personnel, etc., for each facility which would be included in emergency p re pa ra t ior.s.

Instead of taking this constructive tack, Applicants instead chose

to minimize the very possibility of a serious accident. Sandia Laboratory modeling suggests that a worst-case accident hypothesis at Perry could I

cause 5,500 deaths within the first 60 days, 100,000 injuries, and 14,000 malignancy cases. McTrusty prefiled testimony at 3; Hankins prefiled test-l imony at 1.

CEI witnesses considered it unimaginable that severe radiation exposure or contamination victims would occur from any mishaps.

Findings 41, 43, 46.

Dr. Linneman refused to acknowledge the possibility that all or a part of 5,500 severely injured victims might flood Decontamination is easy to accomplish if proper equipment to detect and trap radiation particles, and proper personnel training, are in place.

However, contamination of breathing passages and internal organs, while mini-l.

mized by Applicant, is not so easily treated. McTrusty prefiled testimony at 3; Tr. 2984, 2985, 2986, 2991-4, 3030 (Linneman). Training of personnel at Ashtabula's Medical Center is neither full nor complete. McTrusty at 3.

Ashtabula County's Medical Center does not have a lead-lined room for treatment of contaminated and injured patients.

Tr. 2982 (Linneman). There is no evidence of the ventilation system for this treatment being controlled to suppress airborn radiation spread. See Tr. 2982 (Linneman).

App'icants' evidence suggests that an exposure of 800,000 millirem is the lowest level of exposure which would cause reddening of the skin.

Linneman at 4.

The victims at this point would be dead.

Tr. 2045.

Applicants admit that existing PNPP Plans to transfer radiological victims who are from the general public to referral hospitals are ad hoc in nature.

Tr. 2999 (Linneman).

Applicants' witness considered it impossible to contract the con-dition of pulmonary edema from inhaling radiation, but implicitly retracted that conclusion to acknowledge that edema was " unimaginable." Tr. 3000-1 (Linneman).

Despite the Sandia conclusion that 5,500 deaths would occur within 60 days of a worst-case accident at PNPP. CEI's witness indicated that early treatment of those victims would not be an undue burden on hospitals. Tr. 3004 (Linneman).

CEI's witness could not imagine high radiation exposure to emergency personnel in a major accident at PNPP.

I Tr. 3007 (Linneman).

Despite a Federal Emergency Managment Agency criticism to the

=

contrary, CEI's witness did not believe that a health physicist needs to be present at Ashtabula's Medical Center in the event of a serious radiological emergency.

Tr. 3017-8 (Linneman).

CEI put forth no substantive evidence of arrangements for pro-vision of medical services to public persons who would be radiological victims beyond a superficial discussion of persons trained at area hospitals.

See generally Tr. 2978-3045.

ML20138L319

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