ML20005G281

LER 89-040-00:on 891206,discovered That Mode Limitations from Surveillance Procedure Omitted,Resulting in Inoperable ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip Sys Instrumentation.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Surveillance revised.W/900108 Ltr

ML20005G281
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	01/08/1990
From:	Holtzscher D, Rasor S ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-040, LER-89-40, U-601585, NUDOCS 9001180383
Download: ML20005G281 (5)

Text

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-January 8, 1990 10CFR50.73 Docket No. 50-461 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Subj ect: Clinton Power Station -: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report No. 89-040-00

Dear Sir:

Please find enclosed-Licensee Event Report No.89-040 00:

Omission of Mode Limitations From Surveillance Procedure Results in Inonerable Anticinated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pumn Trio System Instrumentation. This report is being submitted in accordance-with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely yours, 3/ A D. L. Holtzscher Acting' Manager -

Licensing and Safety TSA/krm Enclosure cc: NRC Resident Office NRC Region III, Regional Administrator INPO Records Center Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety NRC Clinton Licensing Project- Manager I

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F ACiLITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE(3s Clinton Power Station 0 l5 l o l0 l 0141611 1 lOFl014 j

" idi Omission of Mode Limitations From Surveillance Procedure Results in Inoperable I Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation  !

EVENT DATE (S) LER NUusER 461 REPORT DATE (M OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED (8) i ON DAY I YEAR YEAR 88,0 ( ff[,$ MONTH DAY YEAn t ACsLitv h AMes DOCKE T NUMSERISI None 0l5l0l0l0l l l

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l l On December 6 and 7, 1989, the plant was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION).

Surveillance testing was performed on Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Recirculation Pump Trip /RPT) system instrumentation in accordance with surveillance 9434.02. During the surveillance, a test switch on the l ATWS panel was placed in the " TEST" position, bypassing all four channels l in the trip system. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.4.1 requires that i

two reactor pressure high 1cvel and two reactor vessel water level low channels per trip system be operable in Mode 1. However, one channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to two hours for required surveillances provided the redundant trip system is operable and monitoring that parameter. While performing surveillance 9434.02, all four channels in a trip system are bypassed, placing them in an inoperable status. On December 9, 1989, the Shift Supervisor identified that on December 6 and 7, 1989, the requirements of TS 3.3.4.1 were not met. The cause of this event is attributed to an inadequate procedure.

Surveillance 9434.02 did not identify that to comply with TS 3.3.4.1 the surveillance must be performed in operational conditions other than Mode

1. Corrective actions include revising ATWS-RPT system instrumentation surveillances and evaluating a chat.ge to TS 3.3.4.1.

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0l0 0l2 OF 0l4 vart era =,. . w. , O.,w mac s asiaw nn DESCRIPTION OF EVENT on December 9,1989, the Shift Supervisor identified that on December 6 and 7, 1989, during the performance of surveillance testing, Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 requirements for the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Recirculatic Pump Trip (RPT) system instrumentation were ,

not met.

On December 6, Ifl9, the plant was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) and the reactor (RCT] was at sixty-five percent power. At 1710 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.50655e-4 months <br />, in accordance with surveillance 9434.02, "ATWS Reactor Pressure High-Level B21 N401A (B.E F) Channel Calibration", Control and Instrumentation (C&I) technicians began surveillance testing on reactor pressure high level channel 1B21-N401B. In accordance with the surveillance procedure, the

• C&I technicians placed the test switch on the front of ATWS panel [PL) 1RR04JB in the " TEST" position. The C&I technicians then proceeded with the channel calibration. By 1925 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.324625e-4 months <br />, the C&I technicians had completed the surveillance with satisfactory results and had restored the system.

On December 7, 1989, at 2018 hours0.0234 days <br />0.561 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.67849e-4 months <br />, in accordance with surveillance 1 9434.02, C&I technicians began surveillance testing on reactor pressure high 1cvel channel 1B21-N401F. The test switch on the front of ATWS panel 1RR04JB was again placed in the " TEST" position. By 2204 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.38622e-4 months <br />, the C&I technicians had completed the surveillance with satisfactory results and had restored the system.

On December 9, 1989, a C&I foreman requested permission from the~ Shift Supervisor to perform surveillance 9434.02 on reactor pressure high level channel 1B21-N401E. During discussion of the surveillance it was brought to the Shift Supervisor's attention that placing the test switch on the front of the ATWS panel in the " TEST" position bypasses the trip function of all four channels (two reactor pressure high level and two reactor water level low channels) in that trip system. After reviewing the applicable Technical Specifications, the Shift Supervisor identified that Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 requirements were'not met during the performance of survnillance 9434.02 on either December 6 or 7, 1989.

Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 requires that two reactor pressure high level and two reactor vessel water level low channels per trip system be i operable in Mode 1. If any one of the four channels in a trip system l becomes inoperable it must be restored to an operable status within i forty-eight hours or the plant must be placed in at least Mode 2 (STARTUP) within the next six hours. However, in accordance with the l Technical Specification, one channel may be placed in an inoperable '

status for up to two hours for required surveillances provided the redundant trip system is operable and monitoring that parameter. Placing the test switch on the front of the ATUS panel in the " TEST" position l

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0 l0 0l3lOF 0l4 vint w A w eme r ama nn bypassed four channels, placing them in an inoperable status. Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 were not met.

No automatic or manually initiated safety system responses were necessary i to place the plant in a safe and stable condition. No equipment or  !

components were inoperable at the start of this event such that their -

inoperable condition contributed to this event.

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CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of this event is attributed to an inadequate procedure.

Surveillance 9434.02 did not identify that to comply'with Technical Specification 3.3.4.1, surveillance 9434.02 must be performed in operational conditions other than Mode 1.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Surveillance 9434.02 has been revised to specify that the surveillance shall not be performed in Mode 1.

A review determined that surveillance 9434.02 had,not been performed in Mode 1 prior to December 6, 1989.

Additionally, although surveillance 9434.01, "ATWS Reactor Vessel Water Level B21-N400A (B,E,F) Channel Calibration" has never contained a requirement to place the test switch on the front of the ATWS panel in j the " TEST" position, it been revised to specify that the surveillance shall not be performed in Mode 1.

l The Licensing and Safety Department is evaluating changing Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 to allow one trip system, versus one trip channel, to be placed in an inoperable status for a limited time to perform

-surveillance testing. This evaluation is expected to be completed by April 4, 1990.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT The requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.4.1 were not met from 1710 to 1925 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.324625e-4 months <br /> on December 6, 1989, and from 2018 to 2204 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.38622e-4 months <br /> on December 7, 1989. Therefore, this event is reportable under the  !

provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) . ,

Assessment of the nuclear safety consequences and implications of this event indicates that this event is not nuclear safety significant.

During the limited time that one ATWS RPT system was inoperable the.

redundant trip system was available to limit the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of the failure to scram during an anticipated ,

transient.

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0 l0 0 l4 0F 0 l4 rtxt --- . -anc w w.nm ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No components failed during this event.

LER 89 026-00 discusses the missed verification of trip setpoints for the Average Power Range Monitors. A deficient procedure, possibly resulting-from confusion of Technical Specification requirements, resulted in the missed verification.

For further information regarding this event, contact S. E. Rasor, Director - Plant Maintenance, at (217) 935-8881, extension 3204, e

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