ML20042E155

LER 90-004-00:on 900307,review of NRC Info Notice 88-024 Re Failures of air-operated Valves Determined Pressure Differential of 73 solenoid-operated Valves Less than Max Instrument Air Sys Pressure.Valves replaced.W/900406 Ltr

ML20042E155
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	04/06/1990
From:	Chitester T, Spangenberg F ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
IEIN-88-024, IEIN-88-24, LER-90-004, LER-90-4, U-601635, NUDOCS 9004200278
Download: ML20042E155 (6)

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U- 6'01635 L45-90(04,06)' LP 20.220-

/LLIN0/8 POWER COMPANY'  ?

IP , CLINTON POWER STATION. P.O. BOX 678 CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 [:

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April 6, 1990-.

2 10CFR50.73 1

Docket No. 50 461  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- r

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Document Control Desk g: Waihington; D.C. 20555 Subj ect : - Clinton Power Station -.-Unit 1 '

Licensee Event Reoort No. 90-004-00 l

Dear Sir:

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No.l90-004 00:

Vendor Errors and Architect Engineer Miscommunication Result in

- Selection of Inadeauste Solenoid Valves and Potential Inability of /s; .:

Ooerated Valves to Function Under All Conditions. This report is-being "

submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely:yours, '

.[

c. ]p n F. A. Spangenbi g, III.

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~ Manager : Licensing and Safety TSA/alg Enclosure cc: NRC. Resident Office NRC Region III, Regional Administrator 1

'INPO Records Center Illinois'_ Department of Nuclear > Safety NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER T. R. Chitester, Director - Design and Analysis Engineering ^"'^ COD' Extension 3981 2 l 1 ;7 9l3 5 l-l8 l8 l8l1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OtsCRISto IN THis REPORT H3)

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( On March 7, 1990, following review of the results of the investigation of l Information Notice (IN) 88-24 " Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety Related Systems," it was determined that Clinton Power Station l (CPS) was in an unanalyzed condition. Investigation of IN 88 24 revealed that the maximum operating pressure differential (MOPD) of 73 solenoid operated valves (SOVs) supplying active safety-related air operated l valves (A0Vs) and dampers was less than the maximum Instrument Air system pressure (max IAp). The SOVs would be subjected to max IAp in the event of Air Regulator (AR) failure. Three SOVs were determined to be acceptable as installed. Three SOVs are being replaced during the in-progress third planned outage (PO-3). An evaluation was performed to provide reasonable assurance of the reliability of the Fisher Series 67 I ARs, associated with the remaining 67 SOVs, from PO-3 until the second refueling outage when the SOVs will be replaced. This event was the result of vendor error and miscommunication with the architect engineer (AE). The vendors supplying the A0Vs did not consider the failure of the ARs in determining the SOV MOPD. Additionally, the AE did not clearly identify the required air pressures. Corrective actions include revising procurement specifications to assist vendors in selecting SOVs with -

adequate MOPDs.

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0l0 bl2 OF 0l5 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT b On March 7,1990, the plant was in Mode 4- (COLD SHUTDOWN) and the- reactor.

[RCT) was at atmospheric pressure l and.124. degrees Fahrenheit. . The third :

l planned outage (PO-3) was in progress.

At 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br />, following review of the: results of the investigation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ (NRC)?Information Notice 88-24, " Failures y of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety Related Systems," Illinois Power Company '(IP) determined that Clinton. Power Station (CPS) was in an

.unanalyzed condition.

NRC Information Notice 88-24 was issued by.the NRC May 13, 1988. This  ;

'Information Notice was provided to alert licensees of potential problems y!

with air.. operated valves (A0Vs) [V)/ in safety related systems. . These. , 'l problems result from overpressurization of solenoid [ SOL) operated valves (SOVs) which may result in a subs'equent failure. of associated A0Vs ' to reposition'to their safety position. . When the rated maximum operating pressure differential- (MOPD). of the.SOVs is exceeded the SOVs become ,)

, - overpressurized. . The.MOPD is the ' maximum' differential pressure between j the inlet and outlet sides ofl the valve against which the : solenoid' can '

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safely' operate the valve. Initial analysis of the failure modes of.the SOVs included an evaluation of 'a loss of air, but as discussed -in the 4 Information Notice,.overpressurization had not been considered. i

.i The investigation of the applicability, of Information Notice 88-24 to CPS j included an evaluation of SOVs, manufactured by Asco Valves and' other 1)

-vendors, with MOPDs less than the maximum Instrument Air system (IA) [LD)  !

design pressure (110 psi). (In general, the A0Vs, SOVs, and the . .

l associated upstream non-safety air regulators (ARs)'[RG) are provided by l

the vendor as an assembly. The vendor establishes the requirements for- i the individual components of the assembly, which can be manufactured by another vendor.) The types of valves evaluated include: containment. 4 isolation valves [ISV) for the IA system, the Respirator Air' system (RA)  ;

[LH), the Containment (NH), Auxiliary (NF) and Fuel Building.[ND}-Drain .j (RF) and Equipment Drain systems (UK); recirculation sample line 'i containment isolation valves; Reactor Core; Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN) j system turbine [TRB) supply and exhaust drain valves; Standby Cas  ;

Treatment System (SGTS) [BH) dampers; Emergency Diesel Generator air i start SOVs; Main Steam (MS) [SB) safety relief valve [RV) 'SOVs; Scram l Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Safety Related SOVs; and Shutdown Service l Water System [BI) discharge valves. l i

The investigation identified seventy-three SOVs on active safety-related valves and dampers with MOPDs less than the maximum IA system pressure.

Two of the seventy-three SOVs were supplied by Valcor and were previously l tested to a maximum differential pressure of 105 pounds per square inch y*c= =a4 .v.s. cPo. n ..smies,ooovo  ;

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VEAR >s 'E $ $ ^b Miy$sg Clinton Power Station sexi tu==. a, e s m : - :nec re,,, anuw on o ls o lo o 4l6 l1 9l0 -

0l 0l 4 0l0 0l 3 OF 0l5 (psi). plus a ten percent margin (115 psi maximum) which is greater than '

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, the maximum IA pressure of 110 psi. These.two valves were therefore ,

determined to.be adequate for'use. 1 One' SOV, ' associated' wit!h isolation damper' 1VA100Y, was determined to serve a passive function- and was incorrectly ' included in th'e original' -

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! seventy three suspect valves identified. Therefore, no action is required for this SOV.

A walkdown was performed to determine the type of AR associated with the remaining seventy SOVs which were all manufactured by Asco. The walkdowns determined that the ARs associated with- all but four of- the SOVs were manufactured .by. Fisher Controls Company.

.j The four' SOVs which are not associated' with ARs' manufactured' by Fisher

. Controls are:- 1FSVFC111'and-1HSVFC111, the 1FC004B Fuel Pool Cooling and j Cleanup System (FC) (DA)- Filter Demineralizer. [FDM) ' Supply. Controls'; the- {

solenoid for valve 1FC017, the FC Cleanup Pumps [P] to FC demineralizer tank isolation valve; and the solenoid' for valve 1FC023,' thel FC demineralizer tanks to FC heat'exchangers -[HX} -isolation valve. The single' AR associated with 1FSVFC111 and 1HSVFC111'is Speedaire model 1Z6968. L The- ARs associated with 1FC017 and 1FC023 are models 'B 1103 .

j Watts Airsets. The solenoids for valves 1FC017 and 1FC023,-'and 1HSVFC111 -

will be ' replaced with SOVs with MOPDs ~ equal to or greater than the ~  !

maximum IA system pressure prior to completion of PO 3. In addition, the i: Speedaire Model- 126968 AR will be. replaced with a Fisher Series 67 AR. j 1

An evaluation was performed to ensure reasonable assurance exists that  !

the non safety Fisher ARs (which are passive mechanical components) will t' function in supporting the associated SOVs until the second refueling'. l

, outage (RF-2) which is currently scheduled to begin September 9,1990, i This evaluation centered on remedial actions to address the reliability, c seismic qualification and environmental suitability of the ' Fisher i Controls ARs to assure a common mode failure does not exist, along with an evaluation to assure that single failure criteria'is met. Based on the results of the evaluation IP has a high lovel- of assurance that the SOVs and their associated Fisher Controls ARs will not result in a. common i mode failure and will support safe plant operation until RF-2. These sixty-seven SOVs will be replaced during RF-2 with MOPDs equal to or

greater than the maximum IA system pressure.

No automatic or manually initiated responses were necessary to place the plant in a safe and operable condition. No equipment or components were inoperable at the start of this event such that their inoperable condition contributed to this event.

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, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION - Aeraoveo ous s.o. nso-oio4 EXPIRES: $/31/m FAC#Lity NAMs til -

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TEXT M more spece 4 esondest oss seideons/ NAC term Jm4 W (17) l-

! CAUSE OF EVENT L The installation of SOV selection with MOPDs less than the maximum IA '

j. pressure was the result.of vendor error and miscommunication with the L architect engineer (AE)'(Sargent and Lundy Engineers). The vendors =

supplying the A0Vs did not consider tho' failure of the ARs in determining-the MOPD of.the-associated'SOVs and the' AE did not clearly _specify the air. pressures.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS' To assist vendors in sel'ecting.SOVs with MOPDs' adequate for applicable failure modes,iprocurement specifications for'A0Vs-with SOVs will.be revised to-include the'SOV MOPD in,the. failure analysis. .This revision '

is expected to be completed by. June 15,1990. ,

The Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED) will develop General Design Review Standards (GDRS) for SOV selection. The GDRS for SOVs is

~

expected .to be issued June 15, 1990. '

Three.of the four SOVs in the FC system for which the' associated AR is .

not supplied by Fisher Controls' will. be replaced during the -in-progress planned outage, PO-3, in accordance with Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs)-

D15872, D15873~and D15874. A Fisher AR will be installed to correspond to the fourth SOV. PO 3 is currently expected to be completed on April 10,.1990.

The sixty-seven SOVs with low MOPDs will be replaced during RF-2. RF 2 is currently scheduled to begin September 9,.1990.

l, IP is also evaluating this event for reportability in accordance with the

l. provisions of ?.0CFR21. If the evaluation determines that'a:10CFR21 defect report is required, a supplement to this LER will be' issued.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) due to the plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The potential overpressurization of the SOVs associated with safety-related A0Vs had not previously been considered, l Assessment of the safety consequences and implications of this event indicates that this event was not nuclear safety significant for existing plant conditions or other power modes or pcver levels. Sixty-six of the seventy-three safety related SOVs with low MOPDs have been evaluated and l L have been determined to provide reasonable assurance that they will l l support the function of their associated A0Vs until RF-2. Two of the 1 l

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seventy-three have been previously- tested, with satisfactory results, to a pressure' greater than; maximum IA system pressure. -One.SOV was determined to serve a passive function, therefore no action is required.

The remaining four solenoids IFSVFC111, 1HSVFC111, and the solenoids for

1FC017 and 1FCO23 may have overpressurized upon failure of the AR. This could have resulted in the loss of FC system operability under certain [

conditions, however, the Shutdown Service Water system (SX) [BI) would -

have been available to supply makeup water to the FC spent fuel storage >

pools. 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ,

4 No other unanalyzed conditions reportable under- the provisions ' of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) have occurred at CPS.

j 'The SOVs with less than adequate MOPDs were manufactured.by Asco Valves.

The air regulators determined to provide reasonable assurance of continued safe plant operation until RF-2 are Fisher Controls Model 67 air regulators.

For further information regarding this event, contact T. R. Chitester, l Director-Design and Analysis Engineering at-(217) 935-8881, extension ,

l 3981.

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