IR 05000245/2007004

Download: ML073050271

Text

October 31, 2007

Mr. David A. ChristianSr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glenn Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000336/2007004 AND 05000423/2007004

Dear Mr. Christian:

On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2007, with Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Raymond J. Powell, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-336, 50-423License Nos.:DPR-65, NPF-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000336/2007004 and 05000423/2007004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:see next page Mr.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

...................................................iii

REPORT DETAILS

..........................................................1

REACTOR SAFETY

.........................................................11R01Adverse Weather Protection .......................................1

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications ....................................12

1EP2Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation .......................121EP3Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System ............................................................131EP4Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes ...........131EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses ..................131EP6Drill Evaluation

RADIATION SAFETY

.......................................................142OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]....................................................164OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification ..............................16 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................164OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................17ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

................................................A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

...........................A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

..........................................A-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS

.....................................................A-10

iiiSUMMARY

OF [[]]

FINDINGSIR 05000336/2007-004, 05000423/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Millstone PowerStation, Unit 2 and Unit 3; Post-Maintenance Testing.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most

findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter

(IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not

apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The

NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is

described in

NUREG -1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Initiating EventsGreen. A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water" during restoration of

the "B" turbine plant component cooling water (TPCCW) heat exchanger on

August 28, 2007. Specifically, following maintenance that left the heat exchanger shell

in a partially drained condition, Dominion did not fill and vent the heat exchanger in

accordance with

OP 3330B. This resulted in two of the three

TPCCW pumps receiving

an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Loss of the remaining

TPC [[]]

CW pump

would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within three minutes per

plant procedures. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as

CR -07-09057. Corrective actions included revising

OP 3330B to require the fill and vent

section be used following maintenance to ensure the

TPC [[]]

CW side of the heat

exchanger is completely full of water, and revising the work planning procedure to

request operations work planning provide restoration packages for all applicable work

orders. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performanceattribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of

limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical

safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's

failure to implement the fill and vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger

conditions, could potentially have led to the loss of all

TPC [[]]

CW pumps and required

operators to manually trip the reactor. This finding was determined to be of very low

safety significance (Green) by performing a Phase 1 evaluation in accordance with NRC

IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for

At-Power Situations," because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip

and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The

finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work practices

component, because Dominion did not implement proper procedures for the restoration

of the "B"

TPC [[]]

CW heat exchanger. H.4(b) (Section 1R19)B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.

EnclosureREPORT

DETAIL [[]]

SS ummary of Plant StatusUnits 2 & 3 operated at or near 100 percent through out the inspection period.1.REACTOR

SAFET [[]]

YCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01).1Seasonal Site Inspection a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors performed a review of severe weather preparations during the onset ofthe hurricane season to evaluate the site's readiness for seasonal susceptibilities. The

inspectors reviewed selected equipment, instrumentation, and supporting structures to

determine if they were configured in accordance with Dominion's procedures and that

adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors

reviewed the Unit 2 and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Technical

Specifications (TS) and compared the analysis with procedure requirements to ascertain

that procedures were consistent with the

UFS [[]]

AR. The inspectors performed partial

walkdowns of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 intake structures, service water systems, intake

structure traveling screens and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to determine the

adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. Documents reviewed

during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2System Inspection a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the readiness of the Unit 2 service water system for extremeweather conditions, specifically, hurricanes, high winds, high tides, and other severe

weather events. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and walked down the

system to determine if the service water systems, including instrumentation and

supporting structures, were configured in accordance with Dominion procedures and

that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the system. Documents

reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

2Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Partial System Walkdowns (Four Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the

correct system alignment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of each system to

determine if the critical portions of selected systems were correctly aligned, in

accordance with these procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had

an effect on operability. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position

checks, and verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the

inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and

component labeling. The following systems were reviewed based on their risk

significance for the given plant configuration:Unit 2*"C" High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system while "B"

HPSI out for plannedmaintenance on August 7, 2007; and*"B" Enclosure Building Filtration System (

EBFS ) while the "A" train was out forplanned maintenance on August 14,

2007.U nit 3*"B"

EDG while "A"

EDG out for planned maintenance on July 18, 2007; and*"A" High Pressure Safety Injection (

SIH ) system while "B"

SIH [[out for plannedmaintenance on August 28, 2007. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S) a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2Safety Injection System (]]

SIS) and Unit 3 Containment Recirculation Spray System

(RSS). The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the systems to determine if critical

portions, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned, in

accordance with procedures, to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect

on operability.The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders todetermine if the deficiencies significantly affected the

SIS and

RSS system functions. In

addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the system engineering staff and

reviewed the condition report (CR) database to determine if equipment alignment

3Enclosureproblems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed duringthe inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q) a.Inspection Scope (Twelve Samples)The inspectors performed walkdowns of fire protection areas during the inspectionperiod. The inspectors reviewed Dominion's fire protection program to determine the

required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading

requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to

assess Dominion's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In

addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire

detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory

measures. The inspectors then compared the existing conditions of the areas to the fire

protection program requirements to determine if all program requirements were being

met. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The fire

protection areas reviewed included:Unit 2*Auxiliary Building 480 Volt MCC B51 and B41A (Fire Area A-13);*Auxiliary Building Railroad Bay Area (Fire Area A-14B);

• Enclosure Building Filtration System

EBF [[]]

AS Equipment Area (Fire Area A-14D);

• Diesel Generator Room A (Fire Area A-15);

• Diesel Generator Room B (Fire Area A-16); and

• Auxiliary Building Hallway/Storage Area/Hot Tool Crib (Fire Area A-19).Unit 3*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 24'-6"Elevation (Fire Area

AB -6, Zone A);*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 43'-6"Elevation (Fire Area

AB-6, Zone A);*West Service Water Cubicle, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area CSW-4);

• Control Building, Cable Spreading Area, 24'-6" (Fire Area CB-8);

• Control Building, East Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-2); and

• Control Building, West Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-1). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

4Enclosure.2Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A) a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)Unit 2The inspectors observed personnel performance during a fire brigade drill onSeptember 14, 2007, to evaluate the readiness of station personnel to fight fires. The

drill simulated a fire in the Unit 2 'A' DC Switchgear Room. The inspectors observed the

fire brigade members using protective clothing, turnout gear, and self-contained

breathing apparatus and entering the fire area. The inspectors also observed the fire

fighting equipment brought to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment

was available to effectively control and extinguish the simulated fire. The inspectors

evaluated whether the permanent plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire

area and whether hose usage was adequately simulated. The inspectors observed the

fire fighting directions and communications between fire brigade members. The

inspectors also evaluated whether the pre-planned drill scenario was followed and

observed the post drill critique to evaluate if the drill objectives were satisfied and that

any drill weaknesses were discussed. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06).1Internal Flooding Inspection a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the flood protection measures for Unit 3 equipment in thesafety-related "A" and "B" service water pump cubicles. This review was conducted to

evaluate Dominion's protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal

flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the

UFS [[]]

AR, the internal flooding evaluation and related documents. The inspectors

examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained

consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation

documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection

are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

5Enclosure.2External Flooding Inspection a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors evaluated Dominion's preparation for, and protection from, the effects ofexternal flooding conditions for Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed the

UFS [[]]

AR and

applicable procedures to determine the readiness of protection for applicable safety-

related structures, systems, and components. The inspectors performed walkdowns of

the Unit 2 turbine, auxiliary, and EDG rooms to determine the adequacy of the

floodgates, flood doors, temporary equipment, and removable flood planks to perform

their design function. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed recent Dominion inspection

results, including floodgate inspections, to determine whether previously identified

deficiencies had been entered into Dominion's corrective action program for resolution.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.7A)Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 "B" EDG service water heat exchanger. Theinspectors observed the as-found condition of the heat exchanger once it was opened to

determine whether any adverse fouling concerns were appropriately addressed. The

inspectors reviewed the results of the inspections performed in accordance with

Dominion procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inspection results against the

acceptance criteria contained within the procedure to determine whether all acceptance

criteria had been satisfied. The inspectors also reviewed the

UFS [[]]

AR to evaluate

whether heat exchanger inspection results were consistent with the design basis. The

inspectors determined whether adverse conditions identified by Dominion were

appropriately entered into Dominion's corrective action program. The inspectors also

reviewed Work Order (WO) M2 06 07171, "B EDG Clean service water heat exchanger

and inspect expansion joints," and

WO M2 0510019 "B

EDG 18 Month 100 percent

eddy current testing tubing examination." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

6Enclosure1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q)Resident Inspector Quarterly Review a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification trainingprovided to operators for Unit 2 on August 28, 2007, and Unit 3 on August 28, 2007.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of

communications; ability to take timely actions; prioritization, interpretation, and

verification of alarms; procedure use; control board manipulations; oversight and

direction from supervisors; and command and control. Crew performance in these

areas was compared to Dominion management expectations and guidelines as

presented in

OP -

MP-100-1000, "Millstone Operations Guidance and Reference

Document." The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control

board configurations. The inspectors also observed Millstone evaluators discuss

identified weaknesses with the crew and/or individual crew members, as appropriate. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (71111.12Q) a.Inspection Scope (Three Samples)The inspectors reviewed three samples of Dominion's evaluation of degradedconditions, involving safety-related structures, systems and/or components for

maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed

licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors reviewed work

practices that may have contributed to degraded system performance, Millstone's ability

to identify and address common cause failures, the applicable maintenance rule scoping

document for each system, the current classification of these systems in accordance

with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2), the applicable system (a)(1) performance evaluation,

and the adequacy of the performance criteria and goals established for each system, as

appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed recent system health reports and/or

discussed system performance with the responsible system engineer. The specific

samples are listed below:Unit 2*CRAC (a)1 Action Plan; and*DC Breakers Testing and Maintenance.

7EnclosureUnit 3*Emergency Safeguards Facility (ESF) Building Ventilation (HVQ) System (a)1Action Plan. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) a.Inspection Scope (Nine Samples)The inspectors evaluated online risk management for emergent and planned activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control

room logs to determine if concurrent planned and emergent maintenance or surveillance

activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with out-of-service

components. The inspectors evaluated whether Dominion took the necessary steps to

control work activities, minimize the probability of initiating events, and maintain the

functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Dominion's risk

management actions during plant walkdowns. Documents reviewed during the

inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and

adequacy of scheduled and emergent maintenance risk assessments for the following

maintenance and testing activities:Unit 2*"A" instrument air compressor unavailable due to planned maintenance on July 19, 2007;*"B"

EDG starting air tank unavailable due to planned maintenance for the doublecheck valve replacement on July 23, 2007;*Containment and enclosure building heating and ventilation maintenance during"A"

EDG maintenance on August 8, 2007;*Dominion's response to rising power operated relief valve (PORV) temperaturesduring the time period of August 15 -20, 2007;*Dominion's response to an unexpected indication during surveillance testing ofReactor Protection System (RPS) matrix logic circuitry on September 7, 2007;

and*Dominion's response to pressurizer back-up heater failures during the timeperiod of September 1-21, 2007. Unit 3*"A"

EDG jacket water cooling heat exchanger unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on July 20, 2007;*

TDAFW system unavailable due to emergent maintenance on August 19, 2007;and*TDAFW and "B" quench spray system (QSS) unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on August 23, 2007.

8Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15) a.Inspection Scope (Six Samples)The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations. The inspectors evaluated theoperability determinations against the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Issue

Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter

91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on

Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability." The

inspectors also discussed the conditions with operators and system and design

engineers, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the following

evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions:Unit 2*CR-07-07926, Six tubes recommended for plugging in X53B,

EDG lube oil heatexchanger on July 26, 2007;*

CR -07-02246 B

CRAC exhaust fan damper leaks by air causing fan to rotatebackwards on August 30, 2007; and*

CR -07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the pressurizer

PORV 's onSeptember 11, 2007.Unit 3*

CR -07-08539, Pressure test not performed after Class I valve replacement;*CR-07-08565, "C" component cooling water (CCP) heat exchanger coversuspended over "A"

CCP pump; and*

CR-07-08599, Feedwater isolation trip valves closing capability degraded. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R17Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17A) a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed a permanent plant modification on Unit 2 B EDG outputbreaker 15G-13U-2 closing coil. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area and

reviewed the

UFS [[]]

AR, licensing and design basis documents, and the engineering

disposition. These reviews were conducted to determine whether (1) the modified

components remained consistent with the assumptions indicated in the design basis

documents, (2) system availability, reliability, and functional capability were maintained,

and (3) any unrecognized conditions that significantly affected risk or could place the

plant in an unsafe condition were introduced as a result of the modifications.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

9Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were determined.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) a.Inspection Scope (Eight Samples)The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test (PMT) activities to determine whetherthe PMT adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was

satisfied, given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was

restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to

evaluate consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TSrequirements. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were

entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during

the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following maintenance activities and

their post-maintenance tests were evaluated:Unit 2*"B"

EDG operability test following various preventive maintenance tasks and lubeoil heat exchanger tube plugging on July 24, 2007 (

WO M2-06-07171); *Doble Testing on the 4.16KV breaker for "C" service water (SW) Pump followinga design change to wiring involving the power switch on August 21, 2007 (WO's

M2 04-12276, 03-08727, 04-07956); and*Repair of "B"

TPCCW heat exchanger tube leak.Unit 3*"B" service water strainer inspection and repairs on July 16, 2007(

WO M3-07-10233);*"A"

EDG jacket water cooling heat exchanger tube plugging on July 18, 2007(

WO [[M3-07-09476);*Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil leak repairs on July 23, 2007(WO M3-07-08384);*High pressure safety injection (SIH) to cold leg check valve (WO M3-06-00145);and*"A"]]

EDG testing following completion of an engine overhaul onSeptember 11, 2007 (

SP 3646A.1, "Emergency Diesel Generator A Operability

Test," Revision 17). b.FindingsIntroduction: A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water," during restoration of

the "B"

TPC [[]]

CW heat exchanger on August 28, 2007. Specifically, Dominion did not fill

and vent the heat exchanger in accordance with OP 3330B following maintenance that

left the heat exchanger shell in a partially drained condition. This resulted in two of the

three

TPC [[]]

CW pumps receiving an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Plant

10Enclosureprocedures would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within threeminutes had the third

TPCCW pump tripped.Description: On August 8, 2007, Dominion identified a tube leak originating from the "B"

TPCCW heat exchanger. Dominion prepared a work package to identify and repair the

source of the leak. On August 27, Dominion personnel began work on repairing the

TPC [[]]

CW heat exchanger. A leaking tube was identified near the bottom of the heat

exchanger, and the leak rate was estimated to be approximately one half gallon per

minute at that time. Dominion successfully completed the repairs to the heat exchanger

on August 28. During restoration of the heat exchanger, when operators opened the "B"

TPCCW heatexchanger discharge isolation valve, the "C"

TPCCW pump immediately tripped on low

suction pressure. The "B"

TPC [[]]

CW pump, which was in standby, also received an

automatic trip signal on low suction pressure, preventing the pump from starting. The

"A" pump, which was running, did not receive a trip signal and remained in operation.

Heat loads on the

TPC [[]]

CW system at full power require at least two pumps to be in

service. The plant operated with only one

TPC [[]]

CW pump running for approximately five

minutes, during which time lube oil temperatures increased and a generator bus duct

cooling system high temperature alarm was received. Operators were able to restart

the "B"

TPC [[]]

CW pump within five minutes, which provided sufficient cooling to the

TPCCW system. Dominion's investigation determined that the

TPCCW side of the heat exchanger hadbeen slowly draining through the failed tube since August 8, when the heat exchanger

was first isolated. Restoring the "B"

TPC [[]]

CW heat exchanger while in a substantially

drained condition resulted in two of the three

TPC [[]]

CW pumps receiving automatic trip

signals on low suction pressure, and could have potentially also led to a trip signal beingsent to the only remaining

TPC [[]]

CW pump. The performance deficiency is that Dominion

failed to implement procedure

OP 3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling

TPCCW Heat

Exchanger(s)", when required by heat exchanger conditions following maintenance to

repair a tube leak.Analysis: As a result of not implementing

OP 3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling

TPCCW HeatExchanger(s)," Dominion restored the "B"

TPC [[]]

CW heat exchanger while in a

substantially drained condition, which resulted in the "B" and "C"

TPC [[]]

CW pumps

receiving automatic trip signals on low suction pressure. This finding is more than minor

because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events

Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those

events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown

as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's failure to implement the fill and

vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger conditions, could potentially have led

to the loss of all

TPCCW pumps and required operators to manually trip the reactor. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with

IMC0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for

At-Power Situations." The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance

(Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the

likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available.

11EnclosureThe performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of HumanPerformance, Work Practices, in that Dominion did not implement proper procedures for

the restoration of the "B"

TPCCW )]Enforcement: Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiencydid not involve a violation of regulatory requirements because the]]

TPCCW system is not

safety-related equipment. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action

program (CR-07-09057). Corrective actions include revising the work planning

procedure to request Operations Work Planning provide restoration packages for all

applicable work orders, and revising OP 3330B to require the fill and vent section be

used following maintenance to ensure the

TPC [[]]

CW side of the heat exchanger is

completely full of water. Because this finding does not include a violation of regulatoryrequirements and is of very low safety significance (Green), it is identified as

FIN 05000336/2007004-01, Failure to Perform Fill and Vent of

TPCCW Heat ExchangerResulted in Loss of Two

TPC [[]]

CW Pumps.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22) a.Inspection Scope (Seven Samples)The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether the testingadequately demonstrated equipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the

intended safety-related function. The inspectors attended pre-job briefs, reviewed

selected prerequisites and precautions to determine if they were met, and observed the

tests to determine whether they were performed in accordance with the procedural

steps. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the applicable test acceptance criteria to

evaluate consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and TS

requirements and that the applicable acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors

also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective

action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in

the Attachment. The following surveillance activities were evaluated:Unit 2*On July 19, 2007, "A" containment spray pump and check valve

IST ;*On July 27, 2007, "C" high pressure core spray check valve

IST;

• On September 25, 2007, Diesel Fire Pump M7-7 monthly operabilitydemonstration; and*On September 28, 2007, "C" service water pump

IST test.Unit 3*Reactor protection set cabinet

II operational surveillance test (SP 3443B21);*On August 8, 2007, Service water relief valve

3SWP *

RV94A; and

• On August 24, 2007, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*P2 operational readinesstest. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

2Enclosure1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23) a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications to evaluate if the temporarymodifications adversely affected the function of the associated safety systems. The

inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and their associated 10 CFR 50.59

screening against the

UFSAR and

TS determine whether the modifications affected

system operability or availability. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in

the Attachment. Unit 2*Disconnect of faulted pressurizer back-up heaters in order to restore remainingheater on the breakers to operation on September 20, 2007

(DCN

DM 2-00-0185-07).Unit 3*Temporary removal of the 'A' control building air conditioning booster pumpcheck valve 3

SWP*V010 (DM3-00-0238-07). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Emergency Preparedness1EP2Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation (71114.02) a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the licensee'sANS. During this inspection, the inspector interviewed site Emergency Preparedness

(EP) staff responsible for implementation of the

ANS testing and maintenance.

CRs

pertaining to the ANS were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The

inspector reviewed the licensee's original ANS design report to ensure compliance with

those commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspector also interviewed

EP staff to gain an understanding of the new

ANS plans for Millstone. Planning

standard,

10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10

CFR 50, Appendix E

were used as reference criteria. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

13Enclosure1EP3Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System(71114.03) a. Inspection Scope (One Sample)A review of Millstone's

ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process fornotifying the

ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key

staff for responding to an event and to ensure timely facility activation. The inspector

reviewed procedures,

CR s, and call-in drills associated with the

ERO notification system

and drills. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO

augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the

training records for a sample of

ERO members. The inspector also verified that the

EP

department staff were receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan.

Planning standard,

10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10

CFR 50,

Appendix E were used as reference criteria. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1EP 4Emergency Action Level (

EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04) a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, the latest Emergency Plan Revisionwas implemented based on Dominion's determination, in accordance with

CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in effectiveness of the Plan,

and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and

Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. The inspector conducted a sampling review of the

Emergency Plan changes, and all changes to EALs, to evaluate for potential decreases

in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. However, this review was not documented in a

Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes.

Therefore, these changes remain subject to future

NRC inspection in their entirety. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1

EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses (71114.05) a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports to assess the licensee'sability to evaluate their performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs

initiated from January 2006 to September 2007 from drills, self-assessments, and audits

for 2006 and 2007 required by 50.54(t). Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and

the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

14Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06)Combined Functional Drill a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors observed the conduct of a Unit 2 licensed operator training emergencyplanning drill on August 29, 2007. The inspectors observed the operating crew

performance at the simulator and the emergency response organization performance at

the site emergency operations center. The inspectors evaluated the classification,

notification and protective action recommendations for accuracy and timeliness.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of Dominion's evaluators to adequately

address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise. Documents

reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION

SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (

OS)2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03) a.Inspection Scope (Nine samples)During the period September 24-28, 2007, the inspectors conducted the followingactivities to evaluate the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring

instrumentation, and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program, relative to

maintaining and issuing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Implementation of

these programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable

industry standards, and Dominion's procedures. The inspectors reviewed the

UFS [[]]

AR to identify area radiation monitors that are installedin Millstone Units 2 and 3 for the protection of workers, and reviewed the calibration

procedure and current calibration records for selected instrumentation, including the

Unit 2 spent fuel area monitors (RM-8139/8142/8156/8157), the Unit 3 spent fuel pool

area monitors (3RMS-RIY08/36) and the Unit 3 containment area monitors

(RE-01/02/03). The inspector discussed with the Instrument and Control (I&C)

supervisor the monitoring system health report and instrument reliability trends. The inspector reviewed the operating procedure and current source activities/dose ratecharacterizations for the Shepherd Model 89 instrument calibrators (Serial Nos. 9155 &

9068). The inspector observed a technician perform safety interlock testing on the

calibrator prior to using it.

15EnclosureThe inspector reviewed the calibration records for selected survey instruments andcontamination monitors including the small article contamination monitors (SAM 9 & 11),personnel contamination monitors (ARGOS-4A/B), electronic dosimeters (SeimensMk2), and various portable survey instruments (FH40TC,

RO -2A,

RO-20).The inspector reviewed the relevant procedures and observed a technician performing acalibration validation on electronic dosimeters and calibrate portable radiation survey

instruments (RO-2A &

RO -20).The inspector observed a technician performing daily functional checks on a variety ofcontamination monitors and survey instruments located in Units 2 and 3 including

SAC -4,

SAM -11,

ARGOS 4A/B,

CM -11,

RM -14, Ludlum 177,

BC-4, and Teleprobes.

The inspector reviewed the procedure and quality control records associated with

performing the instrument daily functional checks, including air sample counting

equipment and gamma spectrometers.The inspector reviewed recent contamination sampling (10 CFR 61 data) results forUnits 2 and 3 to determine if the instrument calibration sources used were

representative of the radioisotopes found in the plant source term.The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regardingthe maintenance and issuance of

SC [[]]

BA to emergency response personnel. Training

and qualification records were reviewed for licensed operators from each of the five

operating shifts at each unit and for selected response personnel who would wear

SCBA s in the event of an emergency. The inspector, with the assistance of Fire Protection technicians, physically inspectedthree

SCBA s staged for use in each control room, two

SC [[]]

BAs staged for use in the

Unit 3 turbine building, and two

SC [[]]

BAs staged in the Unit 2 Technical Services Area.

Maintenance and regulator test records were reviewed for selected

SC [[]]

BAs. The

inspector also evaluated whether the air used to fill the

SC [[]]

BAs met the Grade D quality

criteria of the Compressed Gas Association.The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for assuring quality in the radiationmonitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs by reviewing

self-assessments (MP-SA-06-56/69/74/79), Nuclear Oversight audits (Nos.05-06,

06-04/08, 07-06), and 21 CRs related to these program areas. The inspector

determined if problems were identified in a timely manner, that an extent of condition

and cause evaluation were performed, previous radiation surveys remained valid, and

corrective actions were appropriate to preclude repetitive problems. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

16Enclosure4.OTHER

ACTIVI [[]]

TIES [[[OA]4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151).1 Cornerstone: Initiating Events a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed Dominion submittals for the]]

PI s listed below to verify theaccuracy of the data reported during that period. The

PI definitions and guidance

contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator

Guideline," Revision 5, were used to verify the basis for reporting each data element.

The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs and monthly operating reports,

and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant licensing

and engineering personnel. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the

Attachment.Unit 2Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours.Unit 3*Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Emergency Planning Cornerstone (3 samples) a.Inspection Scope (Three Samples)The inspector reviewed data for the

EP [[]]

PI s: Drill and Exercise Performance,

ERO DrillParticipation; and

ANS Reliability. The inspector reviewed supporting documentation

from drills and tests from April 2006 to June 2007 to evaluate the accuracy of the

reported data. The acceptance criteria used for the review were

NEI 99-02. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4

OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program a. Inspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

17Enclosureissues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered intoDominion's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the

description of each new CR and attending daily management review committee

meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. .2 Annual Sample: Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Leakage (One Sample) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the actions taken by Dominion to evaluate and correct severalinstances of valve leakage that impacted SIT accumulator water levels and/or boron

concentration over the past several years of operation. The inspectors reviewed CRs

related to SIT accumulator leakage, the completed evaluations, and associated

corrective actions to assess the performance history and effectiveness of Dominion's

actions. The inspectors conducted interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors also

reviewed procedures, data and drawings. b.Assessments and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspectors concluded that Dominion hadadequately evaluated and corrected the various individual valve leakage issues.

However, the inspectors noted that engineers and operators were challenged by the

multiple system/valve leaks over the last several years. In particular, operator actions

were necessary to frequently fill the affected SIT accumulators or to depressurize an

associated accumulator fill header (via a temporary modification). Engineers and

operators also developed and executed troubleshooting plans to identify leaking

components. Although the past problems have not resulted in rendering the SIT

accumulator or related emergency cooling systems inoperable, continued leaks

represent challenges to plant equipment and staff. Dominion management

acknowledged the concerns related to the continuing challenges, and discussed some

of their ongoing and planned efforts to broadly address and evaluate additional

proactive measures to prevent further leakage problems, including an inter-discipline

review of the potential leakage paths and scenarios.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn September 14, 2007, the EP inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspector

confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the

inspection.On September 28, 2007, the radiation protection inspector presented the inspectionresults to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The

inspector confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the

inspection.

18EnclosureOn October 10, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the overall inspection results toMr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspectors

confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the

inspection.

ATTACH [[]]

MENT [[:]]

SUPPLE [[]]

MENTAL [[]]

INFORM [[]]

ATION AttachmentATTACHMENTSUPPLEMENTAL

INFORM [[]]

ATION [[]]

KEY [[]]

POINTS [[]]

OF [[]]

CONTACTLicensee personnelA. PriceSite Vice PresidentA. Jordan Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance

R. Griffin Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

D. AtwoodFire Protection Instructor

M. BrooksSenior Radiation Protection Technician

T. ClearyLicensing Engineer

K. CollinsFire Protection Technician

C. DibiasiChemist

S. DubickiFire Protection Technician

J. FirmamRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility

T. Gilbert Emergency Preparedness

T. GleasonRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility

W. GormanSupervisor Instrumentation & Control

J. HochdorferSupervisor, Water Treatment

N. HunterSenior Radiation Protection Technician

J. KunzeSupervisor Nuclear Operations Support

J. LaineManager Radiation Protection/Chemistry

P. Luckey Manager, Emergency Preparedness

S. Mazzola Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

E. ReimanFire Protection Technician

S. TurowskiSupervisor

HP Technical ServicesLIST

OF [[]]

ITEMS [[]]

OPENED ,

CLOSED ,

AND [[]]

DISCUS SEDOpened and Closed05000423/2007004-01FINFailure to Perform Fill and Vent of

TPC [[]]

CW HeatExchanger (Section 1R19)

A-2AttachmentLIST

OF [[]]

DOCUME NTS

REVIEW [[]]

EDSection 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP 3215, Rev. 007-06, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"OP 2271B, Rev. 000-02, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"

AOP 3579, Rev. 016-00, "Severe Weather Conditions"

AOP 2560, Rev. 010-03, "Storms, High Winds and High Tides"

SP 3665.2, Rev 008-02, "Intake Structure Condition Determination"

SP 2615, Rev. 006-01, "Flood Level Determination"

COP 200.6, Rev 002-01, "Storms and Other Hazardous Phenomena (Prep and Recovery)"Work OrdersM2 06 07806 Screen Wash Spool replacement Upstream of 2-

TS -4Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresOP

2308 HPSI System Valve Alignment, Facility 2

OP 2314 Enclosure Building Filtration System Alignment

OP 3306, Containment Recirculation Spray System

OP 3308, High Pressure Safety InjectionCondition Reports

CR -07-02301, Two broken bolts found on

3RSS *

MOV 23BCR-07-02946, Broken bolts on

3RSS *

MOV 23C

CR -07-04382, Water discovered in "D"

RSS piping

CR -06-05621, P43B Containment Spray pump exhibits Increased vibration

CR -06-06690, A Containment Spray pump vibration measurement not in normal limitWork OrdersM2-05-05854 A Containment Spray pump seal leakage,

CR-05-05149

Drawings25203-26015 Piping & Instrument Diagram

LP and

HP Safety Injection System and Pumps

Other DocumentsUFSAR Section 6.7 Enclosure Building Filtration SystemOperability Determination MP3-005-07, Rev. 2

2007 Qtr 1 System Health Report for Containment Recirculation Spray SystemSection 1R05: Fire ProtectionOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 9Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area AB-6, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area CSW-4, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area AB-1, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area HR-1, March 1998

Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area MSV-1, March 1998

A-3AttachmentSection 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProceduresSP 2665 Building Flood Gate Inspections, Revision 005-01AOP-2560 Storms, High Winds, and High Tides, RevisionCondition ReportsCR 07-08486

MP 2 Gate 1 Gouge in Seal Gasket

CR 07-08487 MP2 Gate 2 Seal Gasket Coming Off Top Left of Door

CR 07-08488

MP 2 Gate 5 Seal Gasket Coming Off Angle Iron

CR 07-08489

MP 2 Gate 6 Seal Gasket has Gouge

CR -07-08571, A

SWP cubicle west floor drain plugging

CR -07-08385, A Service Water pump cubicle floodingOther DocumentsUnit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Change 8

MP 3 Service Water Pump Cubicle Internal Flooding Evaluation, Calculation 01-ENG-01884M3Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramOther DocumentsCycle 07-5 Simulator Progress Review Exam #1LORTS E55, Rev 000-02, Operational Exam 55Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessCondition ReportsCR-04-07801,

3HVQ *

ACUS 1B did not auto start as expectedCR-05-00143,

HVQ *

ACUS 1A tripped due to compressor pressure high

CR -05-07540, Low freon charge on 3

HVQ *ACUS1B

CR -05-10244, During leak checks on 3

HVQ *ACUS1B an additional 30 lbs of freon were added

CR -05-11408, 3

HVQ *ACUS1A tripped unplanned LCO entry

CR -05-11752, Freon leaking from

SWP *PV113B2

CR -05-11760, Configuration management lost on 3

SWP *PV113B1 and

3SWP *

PV 113B2

CR -06-06088, Unplanned

LCO refrigerant leak found at threaded joint on

3HVQ *

ACUS 2B

CR -06-08651, Performing running checks on 3

HVQ *ACUS2B found refrigerant leak

CR -07-04036, Investigation of 125

VDC EC Breaker trip devices

CR-06-00443, Blown Fuse,

CR -06-07115, Positive pressure in control room

CR -07-01620,

MRFF on Interface Board

CR -07-01659, As found Program did not match

VTM or DM2S-0265-96

CR -06-03722, Charcoal Filter Failed Efficiency Testing

CR -07-07929, 2-

HV-207 Damper Failure

CR -06-10614, 1-2" gap below fan discharge damper 206B

CR 01-009042 New

EC -1 Devices failed

CR 03-10390 New

EC-1 Device failed as found testing

CR 03-07156 Left pole failed short time testing

CR 03-10929 Breaker failed testing

CR 05-13883 High failure rates of

EC -1 devices

CR 06-07999 Breaker Failed all but 1

LTA, device leaking oil

A-4AttachmentCR 06 10100 Breaker Failed Testing

CR 07-04801 All

DC [[]]

AKR Breakers

PM 'd during 3R11 Failed as Found over current testing.Drawings25203-30023 Single Line Diagram

125 VDC System- Turbine Battery25203-30024 Single Line Diagram 125

VDC Emergency and 120 VAC Vital System

212-30076 One Line Diagram

125VDC and 120

VAC Distribution System-CMPSTOther DocumentsMaintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation for the

ESF Building Ventilation (

HVQ) SystemSP-M3-EE-269 Revision 3, Electrical Design Criteria Unit 3 Electrical Distribution System

Calculation

PA -085-082-00812

GE [[]]

MP 2 125V

DC Coordination Study Revision 3

DM 2-02-0444-05 Modification for the Control Room Ambient TemperatureSection 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProcedures

MP -13-PRA-FAP01.1, "Performing (a)(4) Risk Assessments"DNAP-2000, "Dominion Work Management Process"

MP -14-

OPS-GLD600, "Plant Status and Configuration Control"

OP 23332B, "Unit 2 Instrument Air System"

M2-05-00069, "Unit 2 'A' Instrument Air Compressor"

M2-05-04047, "Containment and Enclosure Building

H&V Unit Fan Discharge Damper"

OP 3322, Auxiliary Feedwater SystemCondition Reports

CR -07-08729, Unplanned

LCO , failure of stroke time test of 3

FWA *HV32A during performanceof SP 3622.8-012

CR -07-08730, Unplanned

LCO , failure of stroke time test of

3FWA *

HV32B during performance

of

SP 3622.8-012

CR -07-08731, Unplanned

LCO , failure of stroke time test of

3FWA *

HV32C during performance

of

SP 3622.8-012

CR -07-08732, Unplanned

LCO , failure of stroke time test of

3FWA *

HV32D during performance

of

SP 3622.8-012

CR -07-08793, Air pockets identified in

FWA system pipingOther DocumentsPlan of the Day and

EOS Risk evaluation for 'A'

EDG maintenance(Work Week 0729)MNPS-3-UFSAR, Millstone Unit

3 UFSARS ection 1R15: Operability EvaluationsCondition Reports

CR -07-08599,

3FWS *

CTV 41's closing capability against main feedwater pump shutoff pressuremay be degradedCR-07-08565, The "C"

CCP [[]]

HX end cover is suspended over the operable "A" CCP pump

CR -07-08359, 0 Section

XI pressure test not performed after replacement of

CL 1 valve3

RCS*V106 for upstream weldCR-07-02246 2-HY-206B, The exhaust fan discharge damper, appears to be leaking by air,causing Fan 31B to rotate backwards.

A-5AttachmentCR-07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the new

MP 2 presssurizer

PORV sOther DocumentsOperability Determination

MP 3-014-07, 3

FWS *CTV41's closing capability against mainfeedwater pump shutoff pressure may be degradedOperability Determination

MP 3-013-07,

ASME Section

XI Pressure Test not Performed afterReplacement of

CL 1 ValveOperability Determination

MP 2-014-07, Potential failure scenario for the new

MP 2 presssurizerPORVsDM2-01-0146-06

RC -404 Tailpipe temperature indicator

TI-114 High Temperature Alarm

Setpoint ChangeSection 1R17: Permanent Plant ModificationsCondition ReportsCR-07-09362 White light on breaker A407 "C" Service Water Pump" is DimCR-03-02501

CR -07-09572Work OrdersM2-07-07133M2-04-12270 4.16

KV & 6.9

KV Circuit breaker Closing Coil ModificationDrawings25203-32013 Sheet 6, Service Water Pump

MP5B25203-32007 Sheet 32, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters

203-32007 Sheet 33, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters

203-32007 Sheet 34, Pressurizer Back-up HeatersOther DocumentsDesign Change Notice

DM 2-00-0283-04, 4.16

KV & 6.9 KV Circuit breaker Closing CoilModification

Design Change Notice DM2-00-0185-07, Temporary plant change required to disconnect failed

pressurizer back-up heatersSection 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingProceduresSP 3626.13, "Service Water Heat Exchangers Fouling Determination"SP 3622.1, "Auxiliary Feed Pump

3FWA *P1A Operational Readiness Test"

MP 3750

AA, "Service Water Strainer Maintenance"

CMP 795, "Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging"Condition Reports07-05627, 07-07655, 06-11755

Work OrdersM3-07-08384, M3-06-12743, M3-03-06351, M3-05-11224, M3-07-10233, M3-07-09476

A-6AttachmentDrawingsEM-130B, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System

P&ID "2275.002-014-016, "

MDAFW Oil Piping"

2179-EM-133D, "Service Water System"

2179-EM-116A, "Emergency Diesel Generator 'A" Lube Oil & Cooling System"Other DocumentsClearance # 3C12-FWA01-0001Clearance # 3C12-EGS01-0007"

03-5006289, "Areva Tubesheet Sleeving Data Sheet for 'A'

EDG Jacket Water Cooling HeatExchanger"Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProcedures

SP 3443B21-0041, "Protection Set Cabinet

II Operational Test Data Sheet"

SP 2612B, "C" Service Water Pump Tests, Rev. 010-02

SP 2606A, Containment Spray Pump Operability and Inservice Testing, Facility 1, Revision

013-02

SP -2604

BO -001, "C"

HPSI Pump and Check Valve

IST , Rev 000-00Condition Reports07-07602, 07-07630, 07-07627CR-07-08350,

3SWP *

RV 94A failed as found lift testWork OrdersM3-06-11784, M3-07-10123,M3-06-12681, A

RSS Heat Exchanger Relief Valve 3 year

PMD [[rawingsMillstone Unit 2 Inservice Test Program for Pumps and Valves, Rev. 7, Change 16Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsDrawings25212-26933, "Service Water System"Other DocumentsDM3-00-0238-07, "Temporary Removal of the Control Building Air Conditioning Booster PumpCheck Valve]]

3SWP *V010"50.59 Screening for Check Valve 3

SWP *V010

TM [[]]

OD [[]]

PROTO -

FLOW computer model for service flow with Check Valve

3SWP *V010

TMOD1

Service Water Pump 2A Discharge Check Valve Design Bases DocumentSection

1EP 2: Alert and Notification System (

ANS ) Evaluation"Alert and Notification Systems, Millstone Nuclear Power Station and Haddam Neck Plant," April1984MP-26-EPA-FAP08, "Public Alerting System Administration," Rev. 002-02, 8/30/06

MP -26-

EPA -FAP09, "Public Alerting System Test and Maintenance," Rev. 002-03, 8/1/07

MP -26-

EPA-FAP10, "Public Alerting System Test and Repair," Rev.000

A-7AttachmentLetter from Dominion to Connecticut DEP, "2006 Siren System Changes," February 7, 2007Maintenance Logs 2006 & 2007

Sample of Corrective Actions related to the sirensSection

1EP 3: Emergency Response Organization (

ERO ) Staffing and AugmentationSystemCall in Drill Records for 2006 &

2007SE [[]]

RO Position List and Personnel

TPD -7.2.12 "Emergency plan Training (

EPLAN) Training Program Description," Rev. 21

TQ 1 "Personnel Qualification and Training," Rev. 007-02

MP -26-

EPI -FAP07 "Notifications and Communications," Rev. 005

MP -26-

EPA -FAP01 "Management Program for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness,"Rev.002-03Sample of Student Qualification MatrixSection

1EP 4: Emergency Action Level (

EAL ) and Emergency Plan ChangesMP-26-EPA-FAP02, "Decrease in Effectiveness

10CFR 50.54(q) Determination," Rev. 001

MP -26-EPA-FAP06, "Emergency Plan Change Process," Rev. 002Review NumbersMP-07-28MP-07-10MP-07-04MP-07-08

MP -07-01

MP -07-25

MP -06-60

MP -07-23

MP -06-53

MP -07-22

MP -06-48

MP -07-21

MP -06-47

MP -07-21

MP -06-46

MP -07-15

MP -06-41

MP -07-12

MP -06-38

MP -07-14

MP -06-30

MP -07-13

MP -06-15

MP -06-01Section

1EP 5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness WeaknessesSample of

EP Related

CR s from January 2006 - September 2007"

EP Assessment of 04/25/07 Unusual Event"

All CRs related to the 04/25/07 Unusual Event

50.54(t) Audits from 2006 and 2007

Sample of

EP self-assessments from 2006 and 2007Drill Reports:

CFD 07-01,

CFD 07-02,

CFD 07-03,

CFD 06-01,

CFD 06-02,

CFD 06-03,

CFD 06-04,

CFD 06-05,

CFD 06-06,

CFD 06-07,

CFD 06-08Section

1EP 6: Drill EvaluationOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Training Drills

CFD 07-04

A-8AttachmentSection

2OS 3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective EquipmentProcedures:

RPM 1.3.7, Rev 7Lost, Off-Scale, or Questionable DosimetryRPM 1.3.14, Rev 7Personnel Dose Calculations and Assessments

RPM 1.6.4, Rev 4Siemens Electronic Dosimetry System

RPM 4.1.6, Rev 4

HD -29A,

HD -66A, and

AVS -28A Air Sampler Calibration

RPM 4.3.7, Rev 4

RO-20 Dose Rate Meter Calibration

RPM 4.6.6, Rev 4Electronic Dosimeter Calibration Verification & Response Check

RPM 4.6.12, Rev 2

PCM-1B Contamination Monitor Calibration

RPM 4.6.24, Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Calibration

RPM 4.6.26, Rev 0Eberline Personnel Monitor

PM-7 Calibration

RPM 4.7.3 Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Operation

RPM 4.7.8, Rev 7Whole Body Counting System Operation

CP 2801/3801Rev 0Abacos Plus Whole Body Counting System Maintenance

RPM 4.8.1, Rev 6Measuring the Radiation Intensity of the J. L. Shepard Calibrator

RPM 4.8.11, Rev 7Response Checking Whole Body Contamination Monitors

RPM 4.8.14, Rev 5Instrumentation Quality Assurance Program

RPM 4.8.9, Rev 9Source Checking Health Physics Instruments

SFP 24, Rev 3Inspection & Inventory of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

FPI 18, Rev 8Site Fire Protection Emergency Response Vehicle EquipmentInspection

IC 3490B10, Rev 6Calibration and Functional Test for Kaman Science AreaRadiation MonitorCondition Reports:04-08430, 04-08493, 04-09221, 04-10790, 04-01095, 05-01957, 05-02974, 05-06283,

05-06941, 05-09428, 05-13711, 06-00894, 06-02421, 06-03004, 06-07494, 06-09584,

06-10204, 06-11210, 06-12054, 06-12096, 06-12121Department Self-AssessmentsMP-SA-06-56, Portal Monitor and Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration ChecksMP-SA-06-69, Respiratory Protection Equipment for Emergency Response

MP -

SA -06-74, Review of Portable

HP Instrument Calibration ProceduresNuclear Oversight Audits05-06,

RP/PCP/ Chem Programs06-04, Fire Protection Program

06-08, Radiological Protection and Process Control Program

07-06, Radiological Protection, Process Control Program, and ChemistrySCBA's Inspected:Pack Nos. 077,110, 021, 112, 084, 035, 434, 032, 039

Instrument Calibration Verification & Response Checks:Electronic Dosimeters: Nos. 64745, 66620, 63693, 15501,

7051ARG [[]]

OS 4A/B: Nos. 121, 123, 095

SAM-11 Nos. 498, 493, 494, 495, 135

A-9AttachmentBC-4: Nos. 804, 805, 800, 1022Gamma Spectrometers: Nos. 07, 08, 15, 16SAC-4: Nos. 879

Ludlum 177: Nos, 208754, 208750, 208766

Ludlum 2241: Nos. 195206, 21374

Teleprobes: Nos. 454, 169

RO -2 Nos. 1206, 2870, 2885, 350Other:Unit 2 and Unit 3 Student Qualification/Training Status Records for

SCBA training2007 2nd Quarter Radiation Monitoring System Health ReportsARGOS-4AB & SAM-11 Response to Unit 3 Plant Mix Evaluation

2007 Annual Validation of

J. L. Shepherd Calibrators Nos. 9068, 9155Section 4

OA 1 - Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationOther DocumentsMP2 Cycle 17 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007MP3 Cycle 10 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007

ERO Drill Participation

PI data, April 2006 - June 2007

Public Notification System

PI data, April 2006 - June 2007

DEP [[]]

PI data, April 2006 - June 2007Section

4OA 2 - Identification and Resolution of ProblemsProcedures

SP 3608.4, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 005-01SP

3610A. 3,

RHR System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 007-01

MP -16-

CAP -FAP01.1, Condition Report Screening and Review, Rev. 008-04Completed TestsSP

3610A. 3-001,

RHR System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train A, 7/13/07, 7/27/07SP

3610A. 3-003,

RHR System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train B, 7/27/07

SP 3608.4-001, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train A and Common Header, 7/13/07, 8/10/07

SP 3608.4-003, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train B, 7/27/07, 8/27/07Drawings12179-EM-113A, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 2612179-EM-113B, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 32

2179-EM-112A, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 44

2179-EM-112B, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 21

2179-EM-102A, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 1, Rev. 26

2179-EM-102B, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 2, Rev. 21

2179-EM-102D, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 4, Rev. 18

2179-EM-102E, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 5, Rev. 21

A-10AttachmentOther DocumentsSystem Health Report, Safety Injection Accumulators, 2nd Quarter 2007Condition Reports05-14026, 06-01813, 06-03781, 06-04097, 06-08164, 06-09518, 07-00792, 07-05639, 07-08553LIST

OF [[]]

ACRONY MS3R11Unit 3 refueling outageADAMSAgencywide Documents Access and Management System

AN [[]]

SAlert and Notification System

AOP abnormal operating procedure

ASM [[]]

EAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers

CCP component cooling water

CF [[]]

RCode of Federal Regulations

CR condition report

CR [[]]

AC control room air conditioning

DE [[]]

PD rill and Exercise Performance

DR [[]]

PD ivision of Reactor Projects

DR [[]]

SD ivision of Reactor Safety

EA [[]]

LE mergency Action Level

EB [[]]

FSenclosure building filtration system

EDGemergency diesel generator

EP Emergency Preparedness

ER [[]]

OEmergency Response Organization

ESF engineered safety features

HPS [[]]

IH igh Pressure Safety Injection

I& [[]]

CInstrumentation and Control

IMCinspection manual chapter

MR maintenance rule

NE [[]]

IN uclear Energy Institute

NR [[]]

CNuclear Regulatory Commission

OAO ther Activities

PAR [[]]

SPublicly Available Records System

PIperformance indicator

PMSpreventive maintenance tasks

PMT post maintenance testing

PO [[]]

RVpower operated relief valve

QSS quench spray system

RE [[]]

COreasonable expectation of confirmed operability

RPSreactor protection system

RSSrecirculation spray system

SAM small articles monitor

SC [[]]

BAself-contained breathing apparatus

SDPsignificance determination process

SIHhigh pressure safety injection system

A-11AttachmentSISsafety injection systemSITsafety injection tank

SO [[]]

RCsite operations review committee

SW service water

TDA [[]]

FW turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater

TPC [[]]

CWturbine plant component cooling water

TS technical specification

UFS [[]]

ARupdated final safety analysis report

WO work order