ML18064A422

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Forwards Rev 2 of Page 2.3-18 & Page I of Table of Contents for Section 2.3 of IPE Rept,Submitted by Util 930129 Ltr
ML18064A422
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/1994
From: Haas K
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9410200289
Download: ML18064A422 (4)


Text

consumers Power KurtM. Haas Plant Safety and Licensing Director l'Ot/llERIN&

MIClll&AN"S l'RO&llESS Palisades Nuclear Plant: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert, Ml 49043 Obtober 11, 1994 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION (IPE) REPORT - PAGE REVISION Consumers Power Company letters dated January 29, 1993 and July 22, 1994 submitted the Palisades IPE report and Revision 1 to the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) section of that report. Further review has determined that Section 2.3.2.3.3 on page 2.3-18 of Revision 1 has a title which can be easily misinterpreted. Therefore the title of Section 2.3.2.3.3 has been changed.

This letter submits Revision 2 of page 2.3-18 and page i of the Table of Contents for Section 2.3 of the IPE as Attachment 1.

Kurt M. Haas Plant Safety and Licensing Director CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment A CMS' ENERGY COMPANY

ATTACHMENT Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PALISADES IPE REVISED PAGES Date October 11, 1994 2 Pages

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 2.3 2.3 SEQUENCE QUANTIFICATION . . . 2.3-1 2.3.1 DATA ANALYSIS ** . . . .

  • 2.3-1 2.3.2 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 2.3-8 2.3.3 DEPENDENT FAILURE ANALYSIS 2.3-22 2.3.4 SEQUENCE QUANTIFICATION METHODOLOGY
  • 2.3-26 2.3.5 FIGURES AND TABLES FOR SEQUENCE QUANTIFICATION 2.3-35 Revision 2, dated 10/6/1994 i

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probable. The screening values are conservative with respect to the values that would be expected if detailed evaluations were

.performed for the human error.

2.3.2.3.3 Determination of Important Recovery Actions Development of HEPs is difficult, especially if the operator has to perform an action outside of the control room. To reduce the reliance on operator actions following an initiating event, the human reliability analyst identified post-accident human errors that are performed outside the control room and are either a backup to an automatic action or a bypass for a failed component.

These human errors (and their associated logic) were not included in the preliminary quantification. For example, the operator action to isolate the air to the ADVs when the ADVs fail to close was removed from the quantification process.

A review of the results of the preliminary quantification identified where an operator action not included in the quantification process may significantly reduce the core damage frequency. These significant operator actions were included in final quantification of the PRA for the IPE. This approach resulted in a conservative core damage frequency since the PRA did not credit some operator actions that could be performed following an accident. All of the pre-accident human errors identified were included in the final PRA quantification for the IPE.

2.3.2.3.4 Refinement of Human Error Probabilities A preliminary quantification of the PRA was performed to identify human errors that are not screened out by the truncation limit (i.e., those that appear in the cutsets). These human.errors and HEPs were reviewed for possible refinement. The review considered the impact of the human errors on the core damage frequency and the available resources for refining human error probabilities. The review resulted in no refinement to the HEPs from the those developed for the PRA and used in the preiiminary quantification. This is conservative given:

1) the screening values chosen have a higher human error probability than those that would result from detailed evaluations; and
2) the generic THERP evaluations used are considered bounding and representative of similar actions *and, therefore, somewhat conservative versus a specific THERP evaluation.
  • This review also resulted in identifying two new operator actions for inclusion in the PRA: AAVOBAFW-A and POPREDUClD. AAVOBAFW-A represents failure of the operator to isolate AFW flow to SG A Revision 2, 10/6/1994 2.3-18