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MONTHYEARML20253A0092020-09-0202 September 2020 NRC-2020-000291/000292 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed ML20162A0472020-06-0303 June 2020 NRC-2020-000181 - Resp 1 - Final. Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed ML19261A0962019-09-12012 September 2019 NRC-2019-000288 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed (Decommissioning Funding Status Reports & Related Information) ML19261A1172019-09-12012 September 2019 NRC-2019-000288 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed (Spot Check SONGS 2 and 3 - 2008) ML18192A3912018-07-11011 July 2018 Restated Articles of Incorporation Are Executed Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 32 of Chapter 64, Laws 1975, Being Section 51-26-7 N,M.S.A. 1953, as Amended ML18192A4032018-07-11011 July 2018 Study Case 1986 MX-S3 ML18192B8112018-07-11011 July 2018 Prospectus, Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Southern California Edison Company ML17207A1002017-07-26026 July 2017 FAQ 17-02: Palo Verde Unit 3 Scram (Final NRC Response) ML17030A3232017-01-30030 January 2017 LTR-17-0038-1-Ticket - Roy Mathew, E-mail 2.206 Petition on Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment Nos. 199 and 200 Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Alternating Current Source-Operating ML17026A3122017-01-23023 January 2017 LTR-17-0038-Ticket Roy Mathew, E-mail 2.206 Petition on Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment Nos. 199 and 200 Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Alternating Current Source-Operating ML16054A0072016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Final Response #2, Records Already Publicly Available ML16054A0132016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 5 of 8 ML16054A0122016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 4 of 8 ML16054A0102016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 2 of 8 ML16054A0092016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 8 of 8 ML16054A0152016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 7 of 8 ML16054A0082016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 1 of 8 ML16054A0142016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 6 of 8 ML16054A0112016-02-12012 February 2016 FOIA/PA-2015-0294 - Resp 2 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 3 of 8 ML15252A1112015-09-11011 September 2015 Newspaper Notice, Exigent License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.5.3 for Control Element Assembly 88 for the Remainder of Cycle 19 ML15014A1602015-01-14014 January 2015 Attachment 2 - NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process ML15014A1532015-01-14014 January 2015 Attachment 1- NEI Comments on NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process ML15027A1232014-12-19019 December 2014 Technical Specification (TS) Bases Revision 61, Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions ML13273A2282013-09-27027 September 2013 FOIA/PA-2013-0329 - Resp - 1 - Final. Group a, Records Already Publicly Available. ML13015A2562012-12-17017 December 2012 Draft Submittal February 2013 FLEX Integrated Plan - Palo Verde ML12056A0522012-03-12012 March 2012 Enclosure 6 - List of Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status ML1127100332011-09-28028 September 2011 ROP Tabletop Examples and Results ML1027102822010-09-27027 September 2010 Draft Supplemental Information Required ML1019304602010-03-25025 March 2010 List of Historical Leaks and Spills at Us Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ML0906500232009-03-0606 March 2009 Safety Culture Policy Statement (Safety & Security) Comments ML0814805442008-05-23023 May 2008 Comments on Draft IP95003, IMC0305 and Lesson Learned Recommendations ML0808000362008-03-13013 March 2008 List of Attendees, 03/13/2008 Summary of Meeting with Eight Operating Nuclear Power Plant Licensees to Discuss Emerging Metallurgical Issues Certain Welds in Reactor Coolant System for Pressurized-Water Reactors ML0811305312008-02-15015 February 2008 Post Reg. Conference Reference Material - Simulator Review of JPM EP009-CR-001. ML0732400242007-10-25025 October 2007 Examples of Max Thermal Power License Conditions ML0729205572007-10-17017 October 2007 EA-07-162, Arizona Public Service Company, Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Effective Immediately) Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2007-009, Consent and Hearing Waiver Form ML0729205382007-10-16016 October 2007 IA-07-039, Mr. Mark Sharp, Confirmatory Order, NRC Office of Investigation Report No. 4-2007-009, Consent and Hearing Waiver Form ML0726303192007-09-14014 September 2007 P. Paquin Ltr Amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 6574 for the Model No. 3-82B Package (TAC L24116)/ Register User List ML0726301142007-09-14014 September 2007 / P. Paquin Ltr Amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 9208 for the Model No. 10-142B Package (TAC L24117)/S121170 ML0634705992006-12-14014 December 2006 Plant Service List ML0627201202006-09-29029 September 2006 Management Directive 8.3 Evaluation for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PV 06-19) ML0626503122006-09-0101 September 2006 Liquid Radiation Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report (Enclosure) ML0532204562005-11-15015 November 2005 Table Titled Palo Verde Unit 2 - June 14, 2004 Loss of Offsite Power Event - June 24, 2004 (8:04am) ML0532504172005-11-15015 November 2005 Preliminary Issue List, with Handwritten Notes ML0532504152005-11-15015 November 2005 Preliminary Issue List ML0532501252005-11-15015 November 2005 AIT Status ML0532204572005-11-15015 November 2005 Table Titled Palo Verde Unit 2 - June 14, 2004 Loss of Offsite Power Event - June 25, 2004 (9:49) ML0531300702005-11-0202 November 2005 Fault Description Document ML0531300792005-11-0202 November 2005 Loop Risk Assessment ML0613105192005-08-0101 August 2005 PV-08-2005-Outline Comments ML1015400272005-04-27027 April 2005 APS 2005a Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 2004 Air Emissions Inventory. PVNGS (1-1-PV-241) 2020-09-02
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Ta~o\+-~ on e 4-r~e . do r-The 500 kv system upset at the PVNGS switchyard originated with a fault across a degraded insulator on the 230 KV Liberty line from the Westwing substation.
Protective relaying detected the fault and isolated the line from the Liberty substation. The protective relaying scheme at the Westwing substation received a transfer trip signal from Liberty actuating the AR relay in the tripping scheme for circuit breakers 1022 and 1126. The AR relay had four output contacts, all of which were actuated by a single lever arm. The tripping schematic showed that contacts 1-10 and 2-3 should have energized redundant trip coils in PCB 1022, while contacts 4-5 and 6-7 should have energized redundant trip coils in PCB 1026.
PCB 1126 tripped, demonstrating that the AR relay coil picked up, and least one of the AR relay contacts, 1-10 or 2-3, closed. PCB 1022 did not trip. Bench testing by APS showed that, even with normal voltage applied to the coil, neither of the tripping contacts for PCB 1022 closed. The breaker failure scheme for PCB 1022 featured a design where the tripping contacts for the respective redundant trip coils also energized redundant breaker failure relays. Since the tripping contacts for PCB 1022 apparently did not close, the breaker failure scheme for PCB 1022 also was not activated, resulting in a persistent uncleared fault on the 230 kV Liberty line.
Various transmission system events recorders show that during approximately the first 12 seconds after fault inception, several transmission lines on the interconnected 69 kv, 230 kv, 345, and 525 kv systems tripped on overcurrent, including lines connected to the Westwing, Hassayampa substations. Also during the first 12 seconds, two Red Hawk combustion turbines and one Red Hawk steam turbine power plants tripped, and the fault alternated between a single line to ground fault to a two line to ground fault, apparently as a result of a failed shield wire falling on the faulted line. After 12 seconds, the fault became a three phase to ground fault, and additional 525 kv lines tripped.
At approximately 17 seconds after fault inception, the three tie lines between the PVNGS switchyard and the Hassayampa substation tripped simultaneously due to action of their negative sequence relaying, thereby isolating the fault from the several co-generation plants connected to the Hassayampa substation.
Approximately 24 seconds after fault inception the last two 525 kv lines connected to the PVNGS switchyard tripped, isolation the switchyard from the transmission system. At approximately 28 seconds after fault inception, the three PVNGS generators were isolated from the switchyard, and by approximately 38 seconds all remaining lines feeding the fault had tripped and the fault was isolated.
Reliability Issues.
The degraded insulator was caused by external contamination and did not represent a concern relative to the reliability of the insulation of the 230 kv transmission system. The failed AR relay and the lack of a robust tripping Information in this record was deleted inaccordance with the Freedoma of InfoumatiOn AZ ex~pOXfgl
scheme raised concerns relative to the maintenance, testing, and design of 230 kv system protective relaying. Interviews with APS T&D personnel indicated that the Westwing substation where the relay failure occurred was subject to annual maintenance and testing. Following the event, the failed AR relay was removed from service by APS and visually inspected by the NRC team at PVNGS. The relay showed no apparent signs of contamination or deterioration. Although the team considered the maintenance interval to be reasonable, the team did not determine the degree of rigor applied in testing the relaying scheme. For instance, it is doubtful that the testing included methods common in the nuclear industry such as verifying that each contact in the tripping scheme functioned properly. As noted earlier, the tripping scheme lacked redundancy that may have prevented the failure of the protective scheme to clear the fault. APS reviewed the design of the Westwing substation as well as all other substations connected to the PVNGS switchyard, and found that only the Liberty and Deer Valley lines at the Westwing substation featured a tripping scheme with only one AR relay.
All of the newer lines featured two AR relays.7 hIfn order to improve reliability, APS modified the tripping schemes for the Liberty and Deer Valley lines to feature two AR relays enegizing separate trip coils.:
Independence of Offsite Power Supplies GDC 17 requires that power from the offsite transmission network be supplied by "two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions".
The uncleared fault resulted in tripping oF-tansmission lines both locally, anid at remote substations. Lines at several interconnected transmission voltage levels tripped, commencing a few cycles after fault inception, and continuing for another 38 seconds. Even remote lines were tripped by inverse time overcurrent relays, which were not intended to
protect against remote faults, but nevertheless succumbed to the fault because its duration-Another concern was raised by the simultaneous tripping of the three Hassyampa tie lines. The three Hassayampa tie lines featured negative sequence relaying intended to serve as pole mismatch protection. The scheme featured a 5 second definite time delay to avoid spurious tripping due to faults.
Although these individual lines could have been considered as separate sources of offsite power, this event demonstrated that the lines were subject to simultaneous failure resulting from unintended operation of the relaying scheme.
SRP has stated that the negative sequence relaying has been disabled and pole mismatch protection is being implemented by alternate relaying.