ML14007A002

NRR E-mail Capture - 10 CFR 2.206 Pre-Meeting Call and Requested Letter (G20130776; MF3031)

ML14007A002
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/06/2014
From:	Lyon F Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
To:	Clay Johnson
References
G20130776, MF3031
Download: ML14007A002 (7)

Text

NRR-PMDAPEm Resource From: Lyon, Fred Sent: Monday, January 06, 2014 2:11 PM To: johnsonc20@gmail.com Cc: washpsr@gmail.com; Banic, Merrilee

Subject:

10 CFR 2.206 Pre-Meeting Call and Requested Letter (G20130776; MF3031)

Attachments: 10-4-13 EN letter to NRC re USACE Dam Analysis.pdf; cgs-seismic 2 206(v3).docx Mr. Johnson, as you requested, attached is the EN letter to NRC requesting USACE assistance. It is publicly available.

Energy Northwest is requesting that the USACE perform dam failure analyses for all upstream dams listed in FSAR Table 2.4-1. Additionally, Energy Northwest is requesting that the USACE perform dam failure analyses for the following upstream dams, which are not addressed in FSAR Table 2.4-1:

Noxon Rapids Revelstoke Post Falls Middle Channel O Sullivan North Corra Linn In addition, I spoke with Merrilee regarding additional participants on the pre-meeting call with the Petition Review Board. Petitioners have had other participants on the phoncon, and the POC (thats you) typically coordinates them, e.g., names, sequence, time allotment. The phoncon is limited to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, with about 45-50 minutes total for the petitioners; the rest for NRC comments.

Ill need to know about how many participants you expect, so that I know the number of telephone lines to reserve. It was good to finally make contact with you.

Ive also been informed that I can provide you with the NRCs Determination of Immediate Safety Concerns, which Ive attached, regarding your 10/31/13 letter. It provides the NRCs reasoning for not immediately shutting down Columbia while your petition is considered. The determination was approved by the Deputy Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Jennifer Uhle, on December 23, 2013.

Thanks, Fred Lyon, NRR project manager for Columbia Generating Station, et al.

1

Hearing Identifier: NRR_PMDA Email Number: 988 Mail Envelope Properties (Fred.Lyon@nrc.gov20140106141100)

Subject:

10 CFR 2.206 Pre-Meeting Call and Requested Letter (G20130776; MF3031)

Sent Date: 1/6/2014 2:11:23 PM Received Date: 1/6/2014 2:11:00 PM From: Lyon, Fred Created By: Fred.Lyon@nrc.gov Recipients:

"washpsr@gmail.com" <washpsr@gmail.com>

Tracking Status: None "Banic, Merrilee" <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "johnsonc20@gmail.com" <johnsonc20@gmail.com>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1607 1/6/2014 2:11:00 PM 10-4-13 EN letter to NRC re USACE Dam Analysis.pdf 126333 cgs-seismic 2 206(v3).docx 115296 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Columbia Generating Station Seismic Hazard Considerations Determination of Immediate Safety Concerns G20130776

Background:

• Seismic designs at US nuclear power plants are developed in terms of seismic ground motion spectra, which are called the Safe Shutdown Earthquake ground motion response spectra (SSE).

• Each nuclear power plant is designed to a ground motion level that is appropriate for the geology and tectonics in the region surrounding the plant location.

• Currently operating nuclear power plants developed their SSEs based on a deterministic or scenario earthquake that accounts for the largest earthquake expected in the area around the plant.

• The SSE for operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. is based on that earthquake which produces the maximum vibratory ground motion for which key structures, systems, and components are designed to remain functional.

• Due to code requirements and design standards, nuclear power plants are designed and built to have seismic margins generally well beyond the SSE level.

Evaluation:

• The seismic design for the Columbia Generating Station (CGS) plant is represented by the SSE ground motion response spectrum, as shown in Figure 1 below (solid curve).

o The CGS SSE spectrum is anchored at an acceleration level of 0.25 g, but is much higher (up to 0.6 g) over the important frequency range of 2 to 10 Hz where plant structures and systems are most sensitive to earthquake ground motions.

• Since the CGS operating license was issued in 1984, the licensee has reevaluated the seismic hazards for the plant as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program in the early-to mid-1990s.

o Under the IPEEE program, the licensee conducted a full probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for the region around the CGS plant, including an evaluation of earthquake activity in the Columbia Basin (including the Yakima fold belt) and the Cascadia subduction zone.

o The licensee evaluated the impact on the CGS plant from potential seismic ground motions from several regional seismic sources over a wide range of hazard levels (the 1/10,000 mean hazard levels are shown as circles in Figure 1 below).

o The licensee evaluated the seismic capacity or ruggedness of the CGS plant and determined that the risk of core damage from a seismic event is very low (2x10-5

2 per year).

• The Department of Energy (DOE) evaluated the seismic hazards for the seismic design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site in 1995, 2005, and 2007.

o The most recent WTP seismic design spectra are shown below as the dashed (2005) and dotted (2007) curves.

o The most recent seismic hazard evaluation for the design of the WTP in 2007 is very similar to the CGS seismic design or SSE.

o In its letter to the Chairman dated October 31, 2013, the Oregon and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility (OWPSR) mistakenly compares the 3 to 5 Hz spectral acceleration level of 0.8g for the WTP 2005 seismic design with the CGS SSE 20 Hz and greater spectral acceleration value of 0.25g.

• Under Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (NTTF R2.1), the licensee (Energy Northwest) is currently reevaluating (along with DOE) the seismic hazards for the region surrounding the Hanford site using the latest data, models and methods, consistent with current NRC regulatory guidance.

o NTTF R2.1 specifies that the licensee will need to evaluate all of the potential seismic sources (including the Umtanum and Yakima Ridge faults) in the site region.

o All of the issues raised in the letter from OWPSR are known and are being evaluated as part of the seismic hazard reevaluation being conducted by DOE and Energy Northwest.

o If the reevaluated hazard is greater than the CGS plant seismic design or SSE, the licensee will perform a complete seismic risk evaluation for the plant as well as important interim actions while the risk evaluation is ongoing.

o The reevaluated hazard evaluation is due to the NRC in March 2015.

==

Conclusion:==

Based on the information discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that there is no immediate safety concern at CGS; however, the NRC will review the seismic hazard and risk evaluations conducted by Energy Northwest for potential regulatory action as part of its evaluation for NTTF R2.1.

3 Figure 1: SSE GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM Principal Contributors: Yong Li, NRR/DE/EMCB Cliff Munson, NRO/DSEA Date: December 18, 2013