05000335/FIN-2010005-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 17:50, 8 October 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality that Resulted in the 1C-AFW Pump Being Out of Service for Greater Than Its Allowed Outage Time |
Description | A self-revealing Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) that resulted in the 1C Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump being inoperable for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time (ACT). Specifically, in December 2009, the licensee identified a concern with housekeeping in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pump areas that could affect the pump motor, bearings, seals, and turbine controls and linkages. Then in June 2010, these same housekeeping issues combined with extended operation of the atmospheric dump valves (ADV5) caused failure of the 1 C AFW pump to reach rated speed during its scheduled surveillance test. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is similar to Example 4.f in IMC 0612, Appendix E, in that the failure to adequately correct a CAQ affected the 1C-AFW pumps operability and affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capacity of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 1 screening worksheets. Because it represented an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS ACT, SDP Phase 2 worksheets were evaluated. The phase 2 notebook produced an overly conservative result for a short exposure time (less than 2 week duration), and consequently a phase 3 SDP evaluation was performed. The resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <1E-6 Green. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity. |
Site: | Saint Lucie |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000335/2010005 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | S Walker R Aiello T Hoeg S Sanchez D Rich C Even R Patterson B Collins R Williams |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
' | |
Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2010005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||