05000361/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Degraded Fire Barrier Separating Unit 2 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Rooms |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(14) and the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis for the failure of the licensee to maintain the 3-hour penetration fire seal that separated redundant post-fire safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, prior to May 25, 2012, the licensee failed to maintain the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between fire areas 2-SE-(-15)-138 and 2-SE-(- 15)-139. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 202003184. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the external factors attribute (i.e. fire) of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to require additional evaluation under Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Table A2.2, the inspectors concluded the penetration fire seal represented a moderate A degradation of the fire confinement element of the fire protection program. Using the supplemental screening for fire confinement findings, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded penetration fire seal provided a minimum of 20 minutes of fire protection and no fire ignition sources or combustible materials would have caused direct flame impingement on the fire barrier. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel were adequately trained to inspect this type of penetration |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2012003 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Clayton R Lantz J Reynoso J Laughlin G Warnick B Parks M Young B Correll S Achen |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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