05000361/FIN-2012002-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 15:06, 30 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Seismic Controls in Safety-Related Areas |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to follow Procedure SO123-XV-1.20, Seismic Controls, Revision 4. Specifically, between March 2 and March 6, 2012, operations personnel failed to follow Procedure SO123-XV-1.20, and allowed tools and equipment in the vicinity of safety-related shutdown cooling components in the room for shutdown cooling heat exchanger train B that could have become an operability hazard during a seismic event. The issue was entered into licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notifications NNs 201884141 and 201910392. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for protection against external events and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, was used since Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, does not specifically address the particular condition in cold shutdown, in which time to boil is greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The management review was performed using the Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 guidance, to establish a bounding analysis. Using the bounding analysis, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a potential loss of both trains of the shutdown cooling system. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because operations and Project Management Organization personnel failed to have an appropriate threshold to identify that tools and equipment in the vicinity of safety-related shutdown cooling components needed to be addressed to ensure there would be no adverse impact to system operability |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2012002 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz L Carson J Melfi J Reynoso J Laughlin G Warnick I Anchando N Greene D You |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||