05000458/FIN-2012002-08
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Control Access to a High Radiation Area |
| Description | Inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1(c), resulting from the licensees failure to control access to a high radiation area. Specifically, a carpenter entered a high radiation area in the main steam tunnel near valve V112 without proper authorization before a health physics technician completed radiation surveys and received an unexpected alarming dosimeter reading of 110 millirem per hour. The carpenter had not been briefed that dose rates in the area measured 140 millirem per hour. He had been instructed not to perform any work before the health physics technician surveyed the area, but River Bend did not make it clear enough that he was to follow all health physics instructions. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective actions program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2011-01426 and the worker was counseled. The failure to control access to a high radiation area was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective in that not controlling a high radiation area could increase personal exposure. In addition, this type of issue is addressed in Example 6.h of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding has a Human Performance cross-cutting component associated with the aspect of work practices because expectations regarding supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors to ensure that safety is supported were not met |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2012002 Section 2RS2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.02 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | W Sifre R Hagar G Larkin V Gaddy S Makor D Reinert C Alldredge L Carson S Garchow A Barrett |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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