05000352/FIN-2012004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure To Enter Technical Specifications In A Timely Manner |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of very low safety significance (Green) of TS 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, because Limerick operators did not enter the required TS action in a timely manner in response to an RPS instrumentation line failure. Specifically, following the main control room (MCR) receipt of the Unit 1 Turbine Control Valve / Stop Valve Scram Bypassed alarm and equipment operator verification that the C and D channels of RPS circuitry were potentially bypassed indicating a possible loss of RPS function, action by the MCR operators to enter the applicable TS action statement was delayed by over an hour while RPS electrical prints were reviewed to verify inputs to the RPS circuitry. This issue was entered into Exelons CAP as IR 1387851 and an apparent cause evaluation was conducted. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operators did not reduce thermal power within 15 minutes as required for reactor protection. The inspectors determined this finding did affect a single RPS trip signal but did not affect the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown, did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity, and did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision-Making, because operators did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and promptly apply readily available information contained in the ARC, TS Bases, and equipment operator reports to determine TS applicability for the alarm condition |
| Site: | Limerick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000352/2012004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Burket E Dipaolo J Hawkins J Laughlin P Krohn R Nimitz |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Limerick - IR 05000352/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Limerick) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Limerick)
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