05000352/FIN-2012004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Immediately Reduce Reactor Power Per Alarm Response Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a cited violation of very low safety significance (Green) of TS 6.8, Procedures and Programs, because Limerick operators did not adequately follow an alarm response procedure when responding to a MCR alarm on July 11, 2012. Specifically, the operators failed to immediately reduce power per the alarm response card (ARC) procedure, ARC-MCR-107-A2, Turbine Control Valve / Stop Valve Scram Bypassed, after the MCR received the alarm condition. The operators decided to delay the immediate reduction in reactor power to validate the control room alarm indication. Overall, it took operators one hour and forty-nine minutes to commence reducing reactor power per procedure. This finding is being cited because not all of the criteria specified in Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy for a non-cited violation were satisfied in that Exelon failed to restore compliance within a reasonable amount of time after the violation was identified. Specifically, the violation was communicated to Exelon Management by the inspectors on August 22, 2012. However, this violation was not entered into the Exelon CAP, as IR 1429761, until October 22, 2012 and no interim corrective actions were identified until Standing Order 12-08 was issued on October 22, 2012 to provide operator guidance, 103 days after the initial event. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it resulted in operators not reducing reactor power immediately as required for reactor protection. The inspectors determined this finding did affect a single RPS trip signal but did not affect the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown, did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity, and did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because operators did not follow procedures |
| Site: | Limerick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000352/2012004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Burket E Dipaolo J Hawkins J Laughlin P Krohn R Nimitze Dipaoloj Ayala J Hawkins J Tomlinson M Gray O Masnyk Bailey R Nimitz S Hammann T Burns |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Limerick - IR 05000352/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Limerick) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Limerick)
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