05000416/FIN-2011002-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Design Control for the Mitigation Monitoring System Modification |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green finding of EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, involving the failure to maintain adequate design control measures associated with the installation of the mitigation monitoring system. On November 8, 2010, a reactor coolant pressure boundary failure occurred at the skid mounted Online Noble Chemical - Mitigation Monitoring System pump inside primary containment. The positive displacement sample pump ejected the pump piston from the housing, resulting in an approximate 7 gpm leak of reactor coolant. The steam leak resulted in a reactor recirculation system flow control valve lockup (due to hydraulic power unit motor failure) and approximately 15,000 square feet of contaminated area in the primary containment structure. The licensee failed to ensure proper validation testing for the pump prior to installation. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that the pump could withstand the operating pressures and temperatures of the system in which it was installed. The licensee removed the mitigation monitoring system from service and isolated the skid from the reactor water cleanup system. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2010-07852. The finding is more than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Therefore, using inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet for LOCA initiators, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the failure of the mitigation monitoring system would not have exceeded technical specifications limits for identified leakage in the reactor coolant system. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area; because the licensee failed to adequately oversee the design of the mitigation monitoring system such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
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| Report | IR 05000416/2011002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson C Graves R Smith V Gaddy A Fairbanks E Uribe M Baquera |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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