05000348/FIN-2011010-08
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Develop an Adequate Procedure to Test the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Check Valves |
Description | The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to establish an adequate test procedure used to demonstrate that the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump discharge check valves were capable of performing their design basis function. The test procedure was inadequate in providing assurance that the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system was capable of providing the required design basis flow rates to the Steam Generators (SGs) with reverse flow into an idle TDAFW pump via the discharge check valves. This issue was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 348795. The failure to develop an adequate test procedure which demonstrated that TDAFW pump discharge check valves were capable of performing their design basis function was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the acceptance criteria used in the test procedure was non-conservative when compared to the flow rates required by the accident analyses, and the test procedure was performed at lower system pressures (which were not representative of actual design conditions). In accordance with NRC IMC 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column to perform a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function, did not represent an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. Because the test procedure did not contain complete, accurate, and up-to-date information consistent with the system design basis safety analysis, this finding is assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area. |
Site: | Farley ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000348/2011010 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones M Shlyamberg S Sandal R Nease J Eargle P Wagner |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2011010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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