05000348/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Safety-Related Cables in a Non-Submerged Environment |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to implement measures to assure safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were certified. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as CR 2010100512, which included the action to increase the frequency of measuring water level in pull boxes and removing excess water to ensure cables are not submerged. Despite the increased frequency of the preventative maintenance, electrical pull box B1M53 was observed by NRC inspectors to contain safety-related cables completely submerged in water on four separate occasions in the first quarter of 2011. Upon discovery of this condition, the licensee wrote CR 2011103553. Failure to maintain safety-related electrical cables in a physical environment for which the cables are designed to operate, is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems (MS) cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems responding to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The design control attribute of the MS cornerstone was determined to be adversely affected; because 1) testing of these cables has not been performed, 2) the cables have not been maintained within the parameters for which they are designed, 3) the corrective action to increase frequency of preventative maintenance was ineffective in preventing submergence of safety-related cables, and 4) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because of the licensees evaluation of the problem failed to identify a resolution that addressed the cause and extent of conditions (P.1(c)). Specifically, the inspectors determined the increased pull box preventative maintenance was ineffective in preventing safety related cable exposure to unqualified conditions, and the corrective actions were inadequate in ensuring the problem was resolved. |
| Site: | Farley  |
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| Report | IR 05000348/2011002 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Crowe S Shaeffer A Vargas J Sowa |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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