05000348/FIN-2011010-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving two examples. In the first example, the licensee failed to translate the minimum Component Cooling Water (CCW) flow for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) seal coolers into Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs). In the second example, the licensee failed to translate the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump minimum flow requirements into applicable ARPs. The licensee entered these issues into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Reports (CRs) 348613 and 352485. The failure to correctly translate the applicable design bases information for the RHR pump seal coolers and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps into procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to translate the appropriate minimum flow requirements into ARPs adversely affected the quality of procedures used to respond to alarm conditions that are required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements. The inadequate procedures adversely affected the ability of operators to assess operability and to combat deficiencies associated with risk significant equipment. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column to perform a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function, did not represent an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the finding did not represent current performance. |
| Site: | Farley  |
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| Report | IR 05000348/2011010 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones M Shlyamberg S Sandal R Nease J Eargle P Wagner |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2011010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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