05000348/FIN-2011010-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Implement Design Control Measures to Verify the Adequacy of AFW Design |
Description | The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to implement design control measures to verify the adequacy of design inputs, assumptions, or limiting plant conditions which were relied upon in the design basis analyses used to demonstrate the capability of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system to deliver the required flowrates to the Steam Generators (SGs). The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Reports (CRs) 352210, 353743, 355898, 363850, and 369676. Additionally, the licensee performed an operability determination which concluded that the AFW system remained capable of performing its safety function because actual AFW pump performance was not degraded as assumed in the accident analyses. The failure to conservatively model AFW system friction losses when implementing design control measures to verify the capability of the AFW system to deliver the flowrates required by accident analyses was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding challenged the assurance that the AFW system would be capable of delivering the required flow during worst case accident conditions due to non-conservative modeling of system friction losses. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column to perform a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function, did not represent an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in exceeding a Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the design basis calculation associated with the finding was approved on March 25, 1999, and did not represent current licensee performance. |
Site: | Farley |
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Report | IR 05000348/2011010 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones M Shlyamberg S Sandal R Nease J Eargle P Wagner |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2011010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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