05000456/FIN-2012005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Watertight Door Safety Function Maintained After Routine Passage |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensees Plant Barrier Impairment (PBI) control program permitted the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Diesel Oil Storage Tank (DOST) room watertight doors to be left open and unattended following normal ingress into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST rooms. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as IR 1449644. Corrective actions included the creation and implementation of Operations Department Standing Order (SO)12-004 on December 18, 2012, until BwAP 1110-3 was formally revised on December 21, 2012 to suspend the practice of permitting the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST watertight doors to be left open and unattended to perform tours, inspections, walkdowns, sampling, or other routine tasks in the DOST rooms. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, from August 1986 until December 7, 2012, the licensee permitted the practice of removing safety-related flood barriers from service for individually short periods of time, multiple times of day, without ensuring that the described barrier would be both available and capable of performing its safety function during an internal turbine building flooding event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance following a detailed risk evaluation by an NRC senior reactor analyst (SRA). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area since the licensee failed to ensure that an adequate procedure was maintained following a recent October 2011 revision to BwAP1110-3 that added specific requirements and expectations for normal passage through barrier doors. Specifically, the licensee specified new requirements for using safety-related doors in Section D.2.e of BwAP 1110-3, but failed to adequately apply these requirements to Section D.2.b of the same procedure. |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2012005 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg M Perry N Feliz _Adorno R Ng T Go V Meghani A Garmoe B Bartlett C Moore C Zoia D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Jandovitz J Laughlin J Robbin |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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