Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 44746 | 30 December 2008 17:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Non-Functional Steam Exclusion / Control Room Exclusion Zone (Crez) Barrier | On 12/30/08 at 1113 an Operator transiting though a steam exclusion / CREZ door found the door sweep separated from the door. This prevented the door from performing its Steam Exclusion and CREZ boundary functions as the opening, due to the missing sweep, exceeded the allowable opening size for the respective functions. Repairs were completed on the door at 1157 on 12/30/08. While the door sweep was not intact, the barrier was non-functional. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9 Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of Control Room Post Accident Recirculation and the Control Room itself. TS 3.0.c was entered when the sweep was identified degraded and exited following repairs. Therefore, this is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function', and under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000305/LER-2008-003 | |
| ENS 44812 | 28 January 2009 18:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Steam Exclusion Door Inappropriately Held Open by a Door Chock | At 0834 on 01/28/2009 it was identified that a Steam Exclusion door was held open by a door chock installed on the door for less than 15 minutes. The door was open to ventilate the room during venting of carbon dioxide piping for routine maintenance. A Maintenance Mechanic was stationed at the door as per procedure. This door would have allowed steam into the emergency safeguards bus area from the Carbon Dioxide Tank room. This could have resulted in both Trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions. Upon discovery the door chock was disengaged to allow the door to self-close if required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000305/LER-2009-002 | |
| ENS 44832 | 5 February 2009 21:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Steam Exclusion Door Gap | At 1539 on 02/05/2009 it was identified that a Steam Exclusion door seal was not flush with the door. The door seal gap was noted during a Fire Zone Inspection. It was determined that the door exceeded the allowed limit. This could have allowed steam from the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. This could have resulted in both trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions. Upon discovery Specification 3.0.c was entered at 1539. Work was completed on the door to return it to functional status at 1601, and Technical Specification 3.0.c was exited at that time. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.
Retraction of EN 44832, both trains of Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) equipment inoperable due to a degraded steam exclusion boundary door. EN 44832 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room on February 5, 2009. Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the period when it was degraded. A degraded door seal had resulted in a slight gap to exist between the door and the sill. This gap could have allowed steam from the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. However, the force that would be exerted on the door by steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions, would compress the door seal sufficiently to reduce the gap such that the total allowed leak path criteria would not be exceeded. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the emergency safeguards bus area remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportabllity criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 02/05/2009 (EN 44832) is hereby retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Peterson). | Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 44929 | 23 March 2009 12:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Non-Functional Steam Exclusion Barrier | On 3/23/09 at 0731 an I&C Supervisor transiting though a steam exclusion double door found the door sweep misaligned causing one side to catch and stick open. This prevented the door from closing automatically until the sweep was readjusted back to its original position. The door was then closed and monitored while permanent repairs took place. While the door was open and could not close automatically, the barrier was Non-Functional for Steam Exclusion. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9 Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of ECCS and support equipment (i.e., SI, RFIR, ICS, CCW, etc ). TS 3.0.c was entered and exited during the time the door could have stuck open (6 minutes) with both trains of ECCS inoperable. Permanent repairs were completed on the door at 0809 on 3/23/09. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' The licensee is also reporting this event under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Accident Mitigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
05/18/2009 - Retraction of EN # 44929. Non�Functional Steam Exclusion Barrier. EN # 44929 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g. SI, RHR, CCW, etc ) were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the auxiliary building on March 23, 2009. Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the brief (eight minute) period when it was degraded. The door had become degraded while being used for routine transit when the lower door sweep became misaligned, thereby preventing the door from completely closing. However, an engineering evaluation determined that the resulting gap was sufficiently small such that the total allowed leak path criteria were not exceeded. Additionally, the door swing was in the direction of postulated steam flow, such that the door would have been held in the closed direction by any steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the auxiliary building remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 03/23/2009 is hereby retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO(R. Skokowski). | ||
| ENS 44938 | 26 March 2009 17:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Non-Functional Steam Exclusion Barrier | This event was additionally reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' On 03/26/2009 at 1226 CDT, an engineering analysis determined that a steam exclusion door would not provide adequate steam exclusion protection. A metal plate, that had been installed over the door's glass window, would fail under the steam overpressure postulated during a high energy line break. The metal plate was replaced with one of a stronger design. Permanent repairs were completed on the door at 1549 on 03/26/2009. While the original plate was installed, the barrier was non-functional. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9, Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of ECCS and support equipment (i.e., SI, RHR, ICS, CCW, etc.). TS 3.0.c was entered and exited during the time the door issue was identified and repaired. All 3 trains of Auxiliary Feedwater were declared inoperable due to AFW low suction pressure trip channels were declared inoperable per TS 3.4.b.5. Power was reduced to less than 1673 MWt per TS 3.4.b.3. All mode changes were suspended per TS 3.4.b.2. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function,' and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' Containment Fan Coil Unit A was not operational during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION FROM JACK GADZALA TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/9/09 AT 1718 * * * On March 26, 2009 EN # 44938 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g. SI, RHR, ICS, CCW, etc.) were inoperable based on an engineering analysis, which determined that a steam exclusion door in the auxiliary building would not provide adequate steam exclusion protection. Subsequent physical pressure testing of equivalent doors and engineering evaluation of the test results determined that the door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function. A series of pressure tests demonstrated that the door (including a metal plate that had been installed over the door's glass window) would withstand the steam overpressure postulated during a high energy line break. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the auxiliary building remain operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 3/26/09 is hereby retracted. This condition was also reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 2009-005-00 on May 21, 2009." The licensee is planning on retracting this LER. | Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 44994 | 16 April 2009 23:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Reactor Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | At 1828 (CDT) on 4/16/09, it was discovered that the procedure for calibrating Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection Lead/Lag units may not ensure that the Tech Spec setpoint requirements were met. Calibration methodology used a ratio of lead over lag time constants to determine acceptance criteria. KPS (Kewaunee Power Station) Tech Specs Table 3.5-1 item 4 requires that the lead and lag time constants have individual ESF initiation instrument setting limits. When the error was discovered, data was reviewed from the most recent calibrations of the pressure channels. While the ratios met acceptance criteria per the calibration procedure, the individual lag time constants did not meet acceptance criteria per Tech Specs. Per TS Table 3.5-3 item 1c, all channels of the Low Steam Pressure/Line Safety Injection signal were declared inoperable. Per KPS Tech Spec 3.5.c., the plant must be placed in Hot Shutdown, as soon as practicable. Negative reactivity insertion began at 2004 (CDT) on 4/16/09. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) 'Initiation of a shutdown required by Tech Specs.' Since both trains of Steam Line Low Pressure SI channels are affected this is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' At 2140 CDT, the reactor was at 56% power and hot shutdown is expected to be achieved at 2330 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45004 | 21 April 2009 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Activation of One Emergency Siren | At 0300 on 4/21/09, Emergency Siren K-008, which had a population coverage of 1%, inadvertently actuated and required Emergency Planning Personnel to deactivate (it). Currently Siren K-008 is non-functional and required population coverage of KPS (Kewaunee Power Station) emergency sirens is acceptable. Due to Siren Activation, local offsite agencies have been notified of the failure as follows: Kewaunee Sheriff Department and Kewaunee EOC are aware of the local activation and disconnect so compensatory measures can be initiated if required. Point Beach has been notified. Manitowoc EOC has been notified. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45136 | 17 June 2009 13:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to Fish and Wildlife Agent | On 06/17/2009 at 0825 CDT, Kewaunee Power Station notified US Fish and Wildlife Agent that a Peregrine Falcon died onsite. Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) had a breeding pair of Peregrine Falcons nesting on top of the Containment structure with four fledglings. On 6/16/09, one of the fledglings landed on the ground under the nest. The fledgling was found dead from natural causes when checked the morning of 6/17/09. The local US Fish and Wildlife Agent was notified by phone message and e-mail at 0825 hrs on 6/17/09. The carcass will be stored frozen at KPS until it is delivered to the local USFWS Agent per USFWS request. This is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi),'Offsite Notification'. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45438 | 15 October 2009 17:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Momentary Loss of Shutdown Cooling with Autostart of Emergency Diesel Generator | At 1204 power was lost to Safeguards Bus '5' and Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started and re-energized Bus '5.' Event was caused by starting SI Pump 'A' to fill SI Accumulator 'A' which resulted in a Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer trip and lockout. At the time RHR Pump 'A' was in operation and tripped, RHR Pump 'B' was started within 2 minutes using the Abnormal Operating Procedure and flow restored to the RCS. RCS temperature decreased initially due to an increase in service water cooling and actions were taken to stabilize RCS Temperature. All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus '5.' Both trains of RHR were declared inoperable as of 1204 (CDT) due to the loss of normal power supplies per Technical Specification 3.7. Emergency Busses were energized and both trains of RHR remained available for decay heat removal during this event. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Cooling Decay Heat Removal | |
| ENS 45511 | 27 September 2009 22:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Optional 60-Day Telephonic Notification for Invalid Specified System Actuation | (This is a) telephone notification made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of submitting written Licensee Event Report. On September 27, 2009, following reactor shutdown and cooldown for a planned refueling outage, 4160 VAC Safeguard Bus 5 was being restored to normal electrical lineup. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) A was powering Bus 5 following successful completion of planned testing to satisfy Technical Specification requirements for testing of EDG automatic start, load shedding, and restoration, initiated by a simulated loss of all normal AC power. At 1648, while restoring Bus 5 to normal electrical lineup, breaker 1-503, Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer (TAT) supply to Bus 5, reopened after being closed. EDG A continued to supply Bus 5 without interruption. The following equipment tripped when breaker 1-503 opened: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A, Containment Fan Coil Units (CFCUs) A & B, Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) Fan A, and Service Water (SW) Pump A1. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump A, Component Cooling (CC) Pump A, and SW Pump A2 were tripped and restarted by the blackout sequencer. All actuations were completed as designed and the components started and functioned successfully. AFW Train A had been properly removed from service for the EDG test and operated on minimum recirculation following AFW Pump A start. The equipment actuations resulted from an invalid signal caused by an electrical jumper for the blackout signal remaining installed during Bus 5 restoration. The jumper continued to inject a simulated loss of voltage (blackout) signal, causing the TAT supply breaker opening and load shedding and sequencer operation as designed. Inspection of breaker 1-503 was completed with no abnormalities noted. The jumper was removed and Bus 5 was restored to normal lineup. Corrective actions were initiated to revise the test procedure to more appropriately control bus restoration. Although the actuating signal that caused this event was invalid and the electrical bus had been appropriately aligned for the EDG test, this event is being reported because of the multiple and diverse components that were inadvertently actuated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Residual Heat Removal Shield Building | |
| ENS 45551 | 9 December 2009 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Blizzard Results in Greater than 50% Siren Coverage Loss | On December 9 at 0800 CST, seven emergency notification system sirens in Kewaunee Power Station Emergency Planning Zone were reported out of service. It is expected the cause of the sirens to be out of service is the severe winter weather. The loss of these emergency notification sirens results in a lost population coverage of 56%. As a result, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and guidance in NUREG-1022 as a major loss of off-site communications capability. It is unknown, at this time, when the sirens will be returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45554 | 9 December 2009 18:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Blizzard Results in Spurious Actuation of Emergency Siren | At 1231 CST on 12/09/2009 Emergency Siren P-007 located in Mishicot, WI area inadvertently actuated. This siren accounts for a population coverage of 2.3%. Therefore, the KPS (Kewaunee Power Station) emergency siren coverage remains acceptable with P-007 non-functional. Point Beach Nuclear Plant notified the Manitowoc County Sheriff department of the actuated siren (See EN# 45553). At 1350 CST Point Beach performed a siren test and reset the siren. The siren is no longer alarming. A repair team has been sent to the siren location to determine the cause of the actuation. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 45883 | 30 April 2010 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss Safety Parameter Display System (Spds) Due to Computer Problems | At 0300 (CDT) on 04/30/2010, the Plant Computer Group identified that the SPDS stalled and was not updating data points as required. The SPDS also supplies data to several Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) points. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore, reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). SPDS was restored at 0356 (CDT) on 4/30/2010. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 46056 | 30 June 2010 14:10:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report - Confirmed Positive Test for Alcohol | A licensed senior operator had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random test. The employees access has been suspended. Contact the headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. | ||
| ENS 46242 | 9 September 2010 20:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Emergency Sirens Inadvertently Actuate | Spurious siren activation at Point Beach affects associated sirens (P001 - P010) at Kewaunee Power station. A separate 50.72 notification is to be made for Kewaunee per procedure GWP-11.08.04. At 1216 CDT, 09/10/10 station EP personnel notified the control room staff that an inadvertent activation of EP sirens occurred for the Point Beach Station at 1520, 09/09/10. This information was relayed to the EP personnel via Manitowoc County EP personnel, who had received the information from Point Beach personnel previously. Below is the information from the Point Beach notification: At 1520 CDT, Point Beach was notified by Manitowoc County Sherriff's Department (MCSD) and citizens of audible EP siren actuation in the city of Two Rivers and the town of Two Creeks, WI. System troubleshooting was in progress at the time of actuation. Alert and Notification System siren configuration was restored to normal at approximately 1630 CST, 09/09/10. All required ANS sirens were 'poll tested' and are fully functional. Further reviews indicated that sirens P-001 through P-013 (13 sirens) had each simultaneously received a 180 second activation. At this time the cause of the activation signal is unknown. All troubleshooting and testing are currently suspended; event investigation has commenced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46527 | 10 January 2011 15:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unavailability of Tsc and Eof Functions Due to Scheduled Maintenance | At 0921 CST on Monday January 10, 2011, the Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) disabled electrical power to the KPS Technical Support Center (TSC) to perform motor control center maintenance. The major TSC components that were disabled include plant process control system (PPCS) workstations, primary lighting, and ventilation. In the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), PPCS workstations have been disabled. Additionally, the dose projection program (MIDAS) does not have the capability to automatically populate with plant data. The safety parameter display system (SPDS) and emergency response data system (ERDS) remain operational. This activity has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to ensure that KPS will be able to deal with an accident or emergency should one occur. If required, existing procedural guidance will be utilized to relocate TSC personnel to predetermined alternate locations. A copy of emergency procedures and emergency telephone directories are staged in the alternate locations. The maintenance is scheduled to be completed by 1400 CST on January 10, 2011. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM GARY AHRENS TO PETE SNYDER AT 1701 EST ON 1/10/11 * * * At 1545 CST all of the functionality that was removed from service per the above notification was restored to service. Notified R3DO (Kunowski). | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 46562 | 21 January 2011 21:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Steam Exclusion Door Declared Inoperable | On 1/21/2011 at 1539 CST, the NRC Resident Inspector informed the Control Room that the lower Cane bolt was disengaged on Steam Exclusion Door 3, between Emergency Diesel Generator Room B and the Cardox Room. While the Cane bolt was not engaged, the barrier was Non-Functional and, in accordance with TRM 3.0.9, all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This included both Emergency Diesel Generators A & 8, safety-related 4160 V Busses 5 & 6, Service Water Trains A & B, and safety-related 480 V Busses 51, 52, 61. & 62. In addition, with Service Water inoperable, the following equipment was also inoperable in accordance with TRM 3.3.1: Component Cooling Trains A & B, Safety Injection Trains A & B, Residual Heat Removal Trains A & B, Containment Spray and Cooling Trains A & B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps A & B, and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. With all three AFW pumps inoperable. TS 3 A.b.2 was entered to immediately initiate action to restore one AFW Train to operable status and suspend all LCOs requiring mode changes until one AFW Train is restored to operable status. Steam Exclusion Door 3 was properly secured at 1545 CST on 1/21/2011, and LCO 3.0.c and TS 3 A.b.2 were exited at that time. All equipment affected by the steam exclusion barrier is operable. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function,' and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Retraction of EN #46562 Non-Functional Steam Exclusion Door. On January 21, 2011, EN #46562 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g., SI, RHR, ICS, etc ) were inoperable following discovery that the lower cane bolt was disengaged on steam exclusion Door 3, between emergency diesel generator Room B and an adjacent equipment room in the turbine building. With the lower cane bolt disengaged, the steam exclusion barrier was considered non-functional. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the Door 3 lower cane bolt was not required for Door 3 to fulfill its function as a steam exclusion barrier. The previously reported condition would not have resulted in an environment that would have adversely impacted the equipment protected by Door 3. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10CFR50.72. As a result, the notification made on January 21, 2011, in EN #46562 is hereby retracted. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO(Cameron). | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Residual Heat Removal Containment Spray | |
| ENS 46666 | 10 March 2011 21:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Inadvertant Opening a Substation Breaker Causing Loss of Station Power | At 1549 on 03/10/2011 with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, power was lost to Safeguards 4160 Volt Bus 6. Diesel Generator B started and re-energized Bus 6. At the time of the event, Bus 6 was energized from the Main Auxiliary Transformer (MAT) on backfeed. The event was caused by opening of substation breaker TA2066 as the result of an error by technicians working In the substation. All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus 6. Safeguards Bus 5 remained energized from offsite power through the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer during the event. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train A remained In operation during the event. Spent Fuel Cooling Train B was restarted following restoration of power to Bus 6. The loss of the MAT also resulted in the loss of non-safeguards 4160 V Buses 1-4. In response to the loss of power to Bus 4, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel started and failed to load onto 480 Volt Bus 46. This resulted in a loss of power to the Technical Support Center. The loss of power to the TSC is being reported as a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. At 1632, the TSC/SBO Diesel Generator tripped due to the failure of the output breaker to close and provide power to its support equipment. The cause of the failure of the TSC/SBO output breaker to close is unknown at this time. The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker being opened and failure of the TSC/SBO diesel to load. One Spent Fuel Pool cooling train was in service throughout the event and no pool heatup occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000305/LER-2011-002 | |
| ENS 46930 | 6 June 2011 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report Involving a Contractor Supervisor | A contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47125 | 3 August 2011 22:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | 24-Hour Fitness-For-Duty Report | A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee was in possession of and had used a prescription drug for which the employee did not have a valid prescription. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for further details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident. | ||
| ENS 47355 | 19 October 2011 17:44:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Opened Alcoholic Beverage Container in Protected Area | At 1244 CST a prohibited substance (can of beer) was discovered open in the protected area. The non-supervisory, non-licensed individual involved did not consume any alcohol and was tested under the FFD program. The prohibited substance (alcohol) has been confiscated and FFD test results were negative for consumption. The can of beer was inadvertently brought in the person's lunch box and opened before the individual realized the error. This report is being made in accordance Significant Fitness-Far-Duty Events 10 CFR 26.719 (b) Significant FFD policy violations or programmatic failures. The following significant FFD policy violations and programmatic failures must be reported to the NRC Operations Center by telephone within 24 hours after the licensee or other entity discovers the violation: '(1) The use, sale, distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47476 | 24 November 2011 09:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Emergency 4160 Volt Ac Busses Declared Inoperable | On Thursday, November 24, 2011, at 0315 CST, with the reactor at 100% steady state thermal power, Kewaunee Power Station declared both emergency 4160 Volt AC busses inoperable due to voltages being high outside of the procedurally directed voltage band. As a result, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.9, Distribution Sources - Operating, Kewaunee entered Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 to, within 1 hour, initiate shutdown of the unit. At 0410 (CST), per management direction, the load tap changers for the supply transformers were adjusted to reduce the emergency bus voltages to within their procedural operating band. At this time, both emergency busses were declared Operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Minimum required accident voltages were met at all times. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On November 24, 2011, EN # 47476 provided notification that both emergency 4160 Volt AC busses were inoperable based on voltages being high outside of a procedurally directed voltage band. Subsequent investigation and analysis determined that unnecessary conservatisms were used in the development of the voltage values used in procedure, OSP-MISC-002, Electrical Power System Weekly Surveillance Test. Review of the actual voltages present during the event determined that the voltages did not exceed the required values to support bus operability. Therefore, the busses remained operable and this condition did not meet the reportability criteria identified in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 11/24/2011 is hereby retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47572 | 7 November 2011 15:44:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Report Involving an Invalid Edg Actuation Due to Technician Error | This 60-day telephone notification is being made pursuant to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report due to invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system while removed from service for testing. On November 7, 2011 with the Station at 100% power, the Emergency Diesel Generator 'B' (EDG 'B') output breaker closed unexpectedly resulting in the EDG being paralleled to the grid out of phase during the performance of the semi-annual fast start test required by Technical Specifications. The actuation of the EDG 'B' output breaker to close was determined to be invalid as it occurred while a technician was performing a required voltage check across a set of contacts in the output breaker circuit. The individual switched an analog multi-meter from the DC voltage range to resistance range while test leads were still in place across the test points. This action actuated the breaker closure relay, which caused the output breaker to close, placing the EDG 'B' in parallel to the grid. The EDG picked up load as expected until the output breaker was opened approximately 52 seconds later by an operator in the control room. A review of data from the event verified that the maximum rating of the EDG was not exceeded. Subsequent inspection and testing of the EDG 'B' and output breaker found no abnormalities as a result of the out of phase paralleling of the EDG 'B' to the grid. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 47686 | 22 February 2012 19:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition Related to Certain Postulated Fire Conditions | At 1307 CST on February 22, 2012, it was identified that under certain fire conditions, the ability to meet the performance criteria of the approved fire protection program may be challenged. Specifically the cabling for Train A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief valve and Train B Pressurizer Power Operated Relief valve alternate circuits may be affected under certain fire conditions affecting the relay room. The ability to maintain pressurizer level within the indicated range may be challenged due to a spurious opening of a pressurizer power operated relief valve during these postulated conditions. Compensatory actions to address the fire in the area of concern are in place. This condition is reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). A similar condition was previously reported (by the licensee) in EN #44482. The compensatory measures that had been put in place for that earlier condition remain applicable to this current condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000305/LER-2012-001 | |
| ENS 47707 | 28 February 2012 21:44:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition Related to Certain Postulated Fire Conditions | At 1544 CST on February 28. 2012, it was identified that under certain fire conditions, the ability to meet the performance criteria of the approved Fire Protection Program may be challenged. Specifically the cabling within the Dedicated Fire Zone may be affected under certain fire conditions resulting in fire induced spurious operation of valves RC-46 (pressurizer/reactor head vent), PR-33A (pressurizer head vent) and RC-45A (reactor head vent). The ability to maintain pressurizer level within the indicated range may be challenged due to these spurious valve openings during these postulated conditions. Contingency actions per the Fire Protection Program to address the fire in the area of concern have been established (hourly fire watch). This condition is reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). Similar conditions have been previously reported by the licensee in EN #44482 and EN #47686. The compensatory measures that had been put in place for those earlier conditions remain applicable to this current condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector | 05000305/LER-2012-001 | |
| ENS 47755 | 19 March 2012 21:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Potential for Aerial Lift to Impact Service Water Piping During Seismic Event | At 1612 on 3/19/12 it was identified that an aerial lift was located in the Auxiliary Building stored in a seismic storage area near Train A and Train B safety related service water piping to Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) Alternate Cooling System. This resulted in both trains of Service Water being INOPERABLE per TS 3.7.8 and both trains of CRAC Alternate Cooling system per TS 3.7.11. At this time, there is no conclusive information that would support the OPERABILITY of the Service Water System during a seismic event therefore this event is being conservatively reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'The nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structure systems that are needed for: (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The aerial lift was removed and the plant is no longer in the condition noted above. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
On March 19, 2012, EN #47755 provided notification that both service water trains were potentially inoperable based on the potential for an improperly stored aerial lift to tip onto the adjacent service water piping during a seismic event. The notification was conservatively made due to the lack of conclusive information regarding any potential interaction between the aerial lift and the service water piping during a seismic event. Subsequent investigation and analysis determined that physical characteristics of the aerial lift are such that it would not have adversely interacted with the service water piping. Therefore, both service water trains remained operable and this condition did not meet the reportability criteria identified in 10CFR50.72. As a result, the notification made on 3/19/2012 (EN #47755) is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone). | Service water | |
| ENS 47849 | 19 April 2012 00:55:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty | A non-supervisor licensed operator had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The operator's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarter Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47871 | 27 April 2012 22:42:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal Declared Inoperable | At 1742 EDT on 04/27/2012, while in Mode 5, both trains of RHR (Residual Heat Removal) were declared inoperable due to a through wall leak on a socket welded connection of ASME code class piping. Currently, with both trains of RHR in service for decay heat removal, the leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.7, 'RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled'. The leakage is isolable from the reactor coolant system and is therefore not considered RCS pressure boundary leakage per LCO 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage'. This event is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) remove residual heat'. Action has been initiated in accordance with TS 3.4.7 required action C.2 to restore one RHR loop to operable status. The licensee is performing engineering analysis to determine the most appropriate repair method. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Decay Heat Removal | |
| ENS 47873 | 30 April 2012 11:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal System Declared Inoperable | At 1742 CDT on 04/27/2012, while in Mode 5, both trains of Residual Heat Removal were declared inoperable due to a through wall leak in a 3/4-inch pipe socket weld connection. The leak developed in an ASME Section XI, Code Class 2 weld upstream of a sample isolation valve. The leak is not isolable from the common 10-inch Residual Heat Removal discharge piping. However, the leakage is isolable from the Reactor Coolant System and is therefore not considered RCS pressure boundary leakage per Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage. Currently, with both trains of RHR in service for decay heat removal, the leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled. This event was reported per EN #47871. At 0600 CDT on 04/30/2012 during the subsequent repair of the leaking weld a second leak of approximately 0.03 gallons per minute developed. The second leak occurred down stream of the original leak while welding a temporary clamp to the 3/4-inch sample line. The cause of the second leak is being directly attributed to the welding activity and not degradation of the pipe. The structural integrity of the pipe in the area of the second leak was verified to be acceptable. Both trains of Residual Heat Removal remain in service removing decay heat from the core. No other equipment is being affected by the leak. Repair options are currently being evaluated. The new leak is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) Remove residual heat.' Actions continue in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.7 Required Action C.2 to restores one RHR loop to operable status. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Decay Heat Removal | |
| ENS 47905 | 8 May 2012 04:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Pressure Boundary Leakage | On May 7, 2012, at 2357 CDT, with the plant in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, leakage from a transmitter manifold test valve diaphragm seal was determined to be pressure boundary leakage per TS 3.4.13. The manifold test valve is associated with pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-430. It has been determined that the most likely cause of the leakage is a cracked manifold diaphragm and that this is classified as part of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary per 10 CFR 50.2. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) because the defect is associated with the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. Isolation and repair of the leakage is being pursued. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee closed the root isolation valves for the pressure transmitter to allow repair of the diaphragm, however there is still leakage past these valve. This leakage is quantified as a few drops per minute.
On May 8, 2012, EN #47905 provided notification of leakage from a pressurizer manifold valve that was potentially pressure boundary leakage. Since the leak could not quickly be determined to be otherwise, it was conservatively reported as pressure boundary leakage. Subsequent investigation and evaluation determined that the identified leakage originated from the mechanical components of the valve and not the pressure boundary. The leak has been isolated and the affected manifold valve is being repaired. Therefore, the leakage did not constitute pressure boundary leakage and this condition did not meet the reportability criteria identified in 10CFR50.72. As a result, the notification made on May 8, 2012 is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Giessner). | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 48016 | 12 June 2012 16:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Taken Out of Service for Maintenance | On June 12, 2012, at approximately 1121 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to allow TSC electrical distribution system repairs. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 2 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. TSC work was completed and the TSC was returned to service at 1326 CDT. | ||
| ENS 48051 | 27 June 2012 19:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Suction Pipe Voiding | On 06/27/2012, it was identified that a void existed in the common suction header for Safety Injection. The void was of the size such that operability was maintained. However, this was nonconforming to the Kewaunee Power Station licensing basis. At 1446 on 06/27/2012, the Kewaunee Power Station declared both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B Inoperable due to venting of the common suction line to remove the void. LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.5.2. ECCS Operating. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The void in question has been reduced to an acceptable size with the common Safety Injection suction piping full. Both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B have been restored to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1500 on 06/27/2012. The condition was detected by ultrasonic testing as part of a surveillance for RHR pump and valve testing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000305/LER-2012-005 | |
| ENS 48209 | 20 August 2012 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Minor Thru-Wall Leak at Weld in Safety Injection Suction Piping | While working In the vicinity of valve SI-3, the isolation valve between the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the common Safety Injection (SI) pump suction piping header, plant staff discovered a thru-wall leak at the weld between the SI-3 valve body and the piping upstream of SI-3. Minor leakage (less than 1 drop per minute) was observed at the flaw location. Upon being informed of this condition, plant operators closed SI-3 at 1109 (CDT) to isolate the affected portion of the piping from the SI suction piping. The time period from when the leak was discovered until it was isolated from the SI piping was less than 10 minutes. As part of the immediate operability determination, plant staff attempted to characterize the flaw to determine the degradation mechanism. Because the flaw could not be readily characterized, the common SI suction piping exposed to the leakage was considered to have been inoperable from the time of discovery until valve SI-3 was closed. This condition resulted in both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B being inoperable per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, Condition A, due to an inoperable common suction line. Since the flaw could not be readily characterized, required ECCS flow was conservatively deemed to not be available and LCO 3.0.3 was conservatively entered per Condition C of LCO 3.5.2 during this brief period (less than 10 minutes) until valve SI-3 was closed. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Closing SI-3 restored both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1109 CDT on 8/20/2012. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000305/LER-2012-007 | |
| ENS 48364 | 1 October 2012 12:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out-Of-Service for Planned Maintenance | On October 1, 2012, at approximately 0740 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On October 2, 2012, at approximately 0828 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Passehl). | ||
| ENS 48397 | 10 October 2012 21:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reduced Radiation Monitoring Capability for Auxiliary Building and Containment Vent Stacks | On October 10, 2012, at 1633 (CDT), Kewaunee Power Station staff identified (in response to concerns raised by the NRC Resident Inspector) that the Containment and Auxiliary Building SPING (Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas) units could likely not have been relied upon to determine Emergency Classifications based on the Kewaunee Emergency Action (EAL) Level Matrix. This was due to these SPINGs having been nonfunctional during the period from 2/28/2011 at 0150 (CDT) until 3/30/2011 at 1845 (CDT). Alternate radiation monitoring capability remained available to provide indication of radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building and Containment vent stacks; however, they would not have been sufficient to identify the upper two emergency action levels. Alternate means (e.g., grab samples) could also have been used to make the appropriate declarations. However, use of the alternate means could potentially impair the plant's ability to declare an emergency in a timely manner. These SPING units had been returned to service on 3/30/2011 and were subsequently available for EAL classifications. However, the ramification of this condition was not fully recognized until today. This condition is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48431 | 22 October 2012 18:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Planned Decommissioning | At 0745 CDT on 10/22/2012, Dominion announced its plan to permanently shutdown and decommission the Kewaunee Power Station. A local press release was made at 1100 (CDT) on 10/22/2012. At 1139 (CDT), security reported that members of the local media were gathering on company property at the plants training facility which is located outside the Owner Controlled Area. At this time security reports no security issues and no other press releases are planned at this time. This event is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for offsite notifications based on the press release and the notification to Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) of the planned shutdown of the Kewaunee Power Station. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48605 | 19 December 2012 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance Affecting the Ability to Assess an Emergency Classification | Voluntary ENS Notification Regarding Maintenance Affecting the Ability to Assess an EAL Classification. Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is preparing to perform routine planned calibrations on Wednesday, December 19, and Thursday, December 20, 2012, on the forebay level indication. This maintenance will impact the forebay level computer and Control Room indication normally used to make the Unusual Event or Alert emergency classifications in the event the lake or forebay threshold is exceeded for greater than 15 minutes. The maintenance is planned to occur from 0800 (CST) on 12/19/12 until 1230 (CST) on 12/20/12. There are four level transmitters each with local indication. Each transmitter will be calibrated, but only one at a time, so that the capability to locally determine forebay level using the other three transmitters will remain. This activity has been evaluated against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and it has been determined that the condition does not rise to the significance necessitating an event notification since Kewaunee retains the capability to make the necessary emergency classifications. However, this information is being conservatively provided so that NRC may be aware of the condition should an emergency develop. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48626 | 26 December 2012 15:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Used for Assessment and Response Inoperable Due to Pre-Planned Maintenance | At 0922 on 12/26/2012, R-16, Service Water System Effluent Line Radiation Monitor (for Containment Fan Cooling service water) was removed from service for scheduled maintenance. R-16 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The maintenance was completed and R-16 restored at 1308 on 12/26/2012. R-16 is also scheduled to be removed from service for calibration on 12/27/2012 from 0800 -1400 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
| ENS 48830 | 19 March 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Ventilation Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On March 19, 2013, at 0830 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48881 | 3 April 2013 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas Monitor Out of Service | On April 3, 2013, at 0800 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station discovered that the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor (Mid and hi Range) was Non-Functional due to an external failure. The SPING is used to aid in assessing Emergency Action Levels. The expected out of service time is unknown at this time. Trouble shooting is currently in progress. Work will be performed with high priority. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor was recalibrated and returned to service at 1257 CDT on 4/03/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified. | ||
| ENS 48891 | 5 April 2013 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On April 5, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Reactor Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of this Reactor Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently indentify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48900 | 9 April 2013 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | On April 9, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Auxiliary Building Vent Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Radiation Monitor (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See similar EN #48881 and 48891.
SPING was returned to service at 0819 CDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl). | ||
| ENS 48920 | 13 April 2013 16:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water System Effluent Line Non-Functional | At 1109 CDT on 4/13/13, R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to low SW (Service Water) sampling flow. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore, being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
| ENS 49026 | 12 May 2013 22:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water Effluent Lines Non Functional | At 1755 (CDT) on 05/12/13, R-16, Service Water System Effluent Line (Containment Fan Cooling) and R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) were declared NON-FUNCTIONAL due to low SW (Service Water) sampling flow. R-16 and R-20 are used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The Licensee is investigating to determine an appropriate recovery plan. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
| ENS 49088 | 4 June 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On June 4, 2013, at 0830 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' (Mid and Hi Range) and the Reactor Building 'SPING' (Mid and Hi Range) non-functional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING and Reactor Building Vent SPING non-functionality due to planned maintenance. The SPINGs are expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 49202 | 18 July 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On July 18th, 2013 at approximately 0830 hours CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station will render the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' (Mid- and Hi-Range) non-functional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 49223 | 30 July 2013 11:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out of Service for Pre-Planned Maintenance | On July 30th, 2013 at 0635 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Maintenance was completed and the TSC was returned to service at 1430 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth). | ||
| ENS 49247 | 7 August 2013 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Power to Emergency Sirens Due to Severe Weather | On August 7, 2013, at 0345 (CDT), Kewaunee Power Station was notified that a loss of alert sirens impacting greater than 50% of the Emergency Planning Zone population are non-functional due to a loss of power. The sirens are used to provide a public prompt notification. The sirens lost are those that Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant takes primary responsibility. Power was lost to them during a severe thunderstorm and the expected out of service time is unknown at this time. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See related EN #49246 * * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT CIESLEWICZ TO PETE SNYDER AT 1652 EDT ON 8/7/13 * * * Most emergency sirens have been returned to service such that the lost coverage is now only 24%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). | ||
| ENS 49294 | 22 August 2013 02:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Siren Actuation | On 08/21/2013, the Kewaunee Power Station was notified by Kewaunee County Emergency Management of the inadvertent actuation of siren K-005 at 2100 (CDT). At the time of the actuation, there was severe weather in the area. The siren stopped actuating at 2125. Kewaunee Power Station requested maintenance crews remove power from the siren to prevent additional actuation until repairs can be made. The resulting loss of siren coverage is 4%. Siren K-005 is a shared siren with Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. Point Beach control room has been notified. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49365 | 20 September 2013 11:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (Sping) Maintenance | On September 20th, 2013 at approximately 0645CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' both Mid and High Range (radiation monitors) non-functional for maintenance on the Mid range. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality due to the maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The maintenance required the replacement of the Geiger Muller (GM) detector. The GM detector requires a 12-hour burn in time. The detector is expected to be returned to service at approximately 1900 CDT on 9/21/13. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Riemer).
At 2019 CDT on 9/21/13 the SPING system has been returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer). |