ENS 44832
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
21:39 Feb 5, 2009 | |
| Title | Steam Exclusion Door Gap |
| Event Description | At 1539 on 02/05/2009 it was identified that a Steam Exclusion door seal was not flush with the door. The door seal gap was noted during a Fire Zone Inspection. It was determined that the door exceeded the allowed limit. This could have allowed steam from the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. This could have resulted in both trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions. Upon discovery Specification 3.0.c was entered at 1539. Work was completed on the door to return it to functional status at 1601, and Technical Specification 3.0.c was exited at that time.
The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.
Retraction of EN 44832, both trains of Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) equipment inoperable due to a degraded steam exclusion boundary door. EN 44832 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room on February 5, 2009. Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the period when it was degraded. A degraded door seal had resulted in a slight gap to exist between the door and the sill. This gap could have allowed steam from the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. However, the force that would be exerted on the door by steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions, would compress the door seal sufficiently to reduce the gap such that the total allowed leak path criteria would not be exceeded. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the emergency safeguards bus area remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportabllity criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 02/05/2009 (EN 44832) is hereby retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Kewaunee  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.05 h-0.00208 days <br />-2.97619e-4 weeks <br />-6.849e-5 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Gary Ahrens 21:36 Feb 5, 2009 |
| NRC Officer: | Vince Klco |
| Last Updated: | Mar 26, 2009 |
| 44832 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |