ML14365A055
ML14365A055 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Sequoyah |
Issue date: | 12/22/2014 |
From: | Shea J W Tennessee Valley Authority |
To: | Document Control Desk, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
References | |
CNL-14-211 | |
Download: ML14365A055 (64) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 CNL-14-211
December 22, 2014 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 NRC Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328
Subject:
Tennessee Valley Authority's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
References:
NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"
dated March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046) On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the referenced letter to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1 of the referenced letter requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation that includes "an interim evaluation and actions taken or planned to address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior to completion of the risk evaluation."
In accordance with the referenced letter above, TVA is enclosing the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
Enclosure 2 provides a list of new regulatory commitments as described in Section 8.0 of the enclosed ESEP Report.
ENCLOSURE 1 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
Page1 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page2 TableofContentsPageLISTOFTABLES............................................................................................................................................4LISTOFFIGURES..........................................................................................................................................51.0PURPOSEANDOBJECTIVE...............................................................................................................62.0BRIEFSUMMARYOFTHEFLEXSEISMICIMPLEMENTATIONSTRATEGIES......................................63.0EQUIPMENTSELECTIONPROCESSANDESEL..................................................................................83.1EquipmentSelectionProcessandESEL..............................................................................83.1.1ESELDevelopment...............................................................................................93.1.2PowerOperatedValves.....................................................................................103.1.3PullBoxes...........................................................................................................103.1.4TerminationCabinets.........................................................................................103.1.5CriticalInstrumentationIndicators....................................................................103.1.6Phase2and3PipingConnections.....................................................................103.2JustificationforUseofEquipmentThatisNotthePrimaryMeansforFLEXImplementation................................................................................................................114.0GROUNDMOTIONRESPONSESPECTRUM(GMRS)......................................................................114.1PlotofGMRSSubmittedbytheLicensee.........................................................................114.2ComparisontoSSE............................................................................................................135.0REVIEWLEVELGROUNDMOTION(RLGM)...................................................................................145.1DescriptionofRLGMSelected..........................................................................................145.2MethodtoEstimateInStructureResponseSpectra(ISRS)..............................................156.0SEISMICMARGINEVALUATIONAPPROACH.................................................................................176.1SummaryofMethodologiesUsed....................................................................................176.2HCLPFScreeningProcess..................................................................................................186.3SeismicWalkdownApproach...........................................................................................196.3.1WalkdownApproach..........................................................................................196.3.2ApplicationofPreviousWalkdownInformation...............................................206.3.3SignificantWalkdownFindings..........................................................................206.4HCLPFCalculationProcess................................................................................................216.5FunctionalEvaluationsofRelays......................................................................................216.6TabulatedESELHCLPFValues(IncludingKeyFailureModes)..........................................227.0INACCESSIBLEITEMS.....................................................................................................................227.1IdentificationofESELItemInaccessibleforWalkdowns..................................................227.2PlannedWalkdown/EvaluationSchedule/CloseOut....................................................238.0ESEPCONCLUSIONSANDRESULTS...............................................................................................248.1SupportingInformation....................................................................................................24 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport TableofContents(continued)Page Page3 8.2IdentificationofPlannedModifications...........................................................................258.3ModificationImplementationSchedule...........................................................................258.4SummaryofRegulatoryCommitments............................................................................2
69.0REFERENCES
..................................................................................................................................27ATTACHMENTA-SEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANTESEL.............................................................................A1ATTACHMENTB-ESEPHCLPFVALUESANDFAILUREMODESTABULATIONFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT.........................................................................................................B1 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page4 List of Tables PageTABLE41:GMRSFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT...............................................................................11TABLE42:SSEFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT...................................................................................13TABLE51:2XSSEFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT..............................................................................15TABLE81:SUMMARYOFREGULATORYCOMMITMENTS......................................................................26TABLEA1:EXPEDITEDSEISMICEQUIPMENTLIST(ESEL)FORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT................A2TABLEB1:ESEPHCLPFVALUESANDFAILUREMODESFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT...................B2 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page5 List of Figures PageFIGURE41:GMRSFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT.............................................................................12FIGURE42:GMRSTOSSECOMPARISONFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT.........................................14FIGURE51:2XSSEFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT............................................................................15FIGURE52:NUREG/CR0098(0.3G)VERSUSSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANTSSE....................................16FIGURE61:84THPERCENTILEOFTHEENSEMBLEOFTHE30RESPONSESPECTRA..............................18FIGURE62:SEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANTIPEEEADJUSTEDHCLPFVSESEPTARGETHCLPF..................18 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page6 1.0 PURPOSEANDOBJECTIVEFollowingtheaccidentattheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplantresultingfromtheMarch11,2011,GreatTohokuEarthquakeandsubsequenttsunami,theNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)establishedaNearTermTaskForce(NTTF)toconductasystematicreviewofNRCprocessesandregulationsandtodetermineiftheagencyshouldmakeadditionalimprovementstoitsregulatorysystem.TheNTTFdevelopedasetofrecommendationsintendedtoclarifyandstrengthentheregulatoryframeworkforprotectionagainstnaturalphenomena.Subsequently,theNRCissueda50.54(f)letteronMarch12,2012[1],requestinginformationtoassurethattheserecommendationsareaddressedbyallU.S.nuclearpowerplants.The50.54(f)letterrequeststhatlicenseesandholdersofconstructionpermitsunder10CFRPart50reevaluatetheseismichazardsattheirsitesagainstpresentdayNRCrequirementsandguidance.Dependingonthecomparisonbetweenthereevaluatedseismichazardandthecurrentdesignbasis,furtherriskassessmentmayberequired.Assessmentapproachesacceptabletothestaffincludeaseismicprobabilisticriskassessment(SPRA),oraseismicmarginassessment(SMA).Basedupontheassessmentresults,theNRCstaffwilldeterminewhetheradditionalregulatoryactionsarenecessary.ThisreportdescribestheExpeditedSeismicEvaluationProcess(ESEP)undertakenforSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2.TheintentoftheESEPistoperformaninterimactioninresponsetotheNRC's50.54(f)lettertodemonstrateseismicmarginthroughareviewofasubsetoftheplantequipmentthatcanbereliedupontoprotectthereactorcorefollowingbeyonddesignbasisseismicevents.TheESEPisimplementedusingthemethodologiesintheNRCendorsedguidanceinElectricPowerResearchInstitute(EPRI)3002000704,SeismicEvaluationGuidance:AugmentedApproachfortheResolutionofFukushimaNearTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic[2].TheobjectiveofthisreportistoprovidesummaryinformationdescribingtheESEPevaluationsandresults.ThelevelofdetailprovidedinthereportisintendedtoenabletheNRCtounderstandtheinputsused,theevaluationsperformed,andthedecisionsmadeasaresultoftheinterimevaluations.ThisESEPreportisforbothSequoyahUnit1andUnit2whichareidentical.Unlessnotedotherwise,alldescriptionsinthisreportapplytobothUnit1andUnit2structures,systems,andcomponents.Forthisreason,unitdesignationsarenotincludedonequipmentunitidentificationsintheFLEXstrategyorExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)descriptions.2.0 BRIEFSUMMARYOFTHEFLEXSEISMICIMPLEMENTATIONSTRATEGIESTheSequoyahFLEXstrategiesforReactorCoreCoolingandHeatRemoval,ReactorInventoryControl,andContainmentFunctionaresummarizedbelow.ThissummaryisderivedfromtheSequoyahOverallIntegratedPlan(OIP)inResponsetotheMarch12,2012,CommissionOrderEA12049submittedinFebruary2013[3][]andisconsistentwiththethirdsixmonthstatusreportissuedtotheNRCinAugust2014[5].ForAtPowerConditionsCoreCoolingandHeatRemovalReactorcorecoolingandheatremovalisachievedviasteamreleasefromtheSteamGenerators(SGs)withSGmakeupfromtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump(TDAFWP)duringFLEXPhase1withsuctionfromtheCondensateStorageTank(CST)[5].LocalcontrolandoperationoftheSG SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page7 AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)andtheTDAFWPsystemisavailableandproceduralizedsothatoperationfromthemaincontrolroomisnotrequired.ToprovideanunlimitedsupplyofwaterforcorecoolingduringPhase2,lowpressureFLEXPumpswillbestagedattheIntakePumpStation(IPS)andtakesuctionfromtheintakechannelanddischargetofour,EmergencyRawCoolingWater(ERCW)FLEXconnectionsinsidetheIPS.TheywillbeusedtopressurizetheERCWheaders,whichcanthenbeusedfordirectsupplytotheTDAFWPsuction.WhentheTDAFWPbecomesunavailableduetoreductioninavailablesteampressure,aportableintermediatepressureFLEXpumpwillbeusedtocontinuetosupplyfeedwatertotheSGs.SuctionwouldbefromanERCWFLEXconnection.ThedischargeisroutedbyhosetotheTDAFWPdischargeFLEXconnectionsdownstreamofFlowElement3142.ReactorInventoryControlForPhase1,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupwillbeprovidedbythecoldlegaccumulators.RCSdepressurizationandcooldownwillbeinitiatedassoonaspossibletoreducetheReactorCoolantPump(RCP)sealleakagerate.InPhase2,RCSmakeupwillbeprovidedbyrepoweringexistingSafetyInjection(SI)pumpsandusingthepumpstoinjectboratedwaterasneededintotheRCS.TheSIpumpswillberepoweredwitha6.9kVAFLEXDieselGenerator.TheSIpumpscanbemanuallycontrolledwithhandswitchesonPanelM6.ThesourceofRCSmakeupwillbetheRefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST).LaterinPhase2,whentheRCSisdepressurizedsufficiently,ahighpressureFLEXpumpwillbeusedtoinjectboratedwaterintotheRCSthroughSIpiping.ThesepumpswouldbealignedwithasuctionhosefromRWSTFLEXconnectionsandadischargehoseroutedtoaSIpumpdischargeFLEXheaderconnection.ThehighpressureFLEXpumpsarefedfromandoperatedfromthe480vControlandAuxiliaryBuilding(C&A)VentBoards1A1Aand2A1A.ContainmentFunctionTherearenoPhase1FLEXactionstomaintaincontainmentintegrity.TheprimaryPhase2FLEXstrategyforcontainmentintegrityentailsrepoweringonetrainofhydrogenigniters.Phase2mayentailrepoweringtheContainmentAirReturnFansinsideofcontainment.SupportSystemsKeyreactorparameterstobemonitoredduringFLEXimplementationaremeasuredandindicatedbyinstrumentationthatispoweredbythe125VDCvitalbattery.DuringPhase1,thevitalbatteriesprovidepowertoneededinstrumentationthroughthevitalbatteryboards,vitalinvertersandvitalinstrumentpowerboards.DuringPhase2,powertovitalinstrumentationwillbemaintainedbysupplying480VACpowertothevitalbatterychargersthroughnew,fused,FLEXdistributionpanels,whichwillbeconnecteddirectlytothebatterychargers.480VACpowerwillbesuppliedtothedistributionpanelsbyprestaged,480VACFLEXdieselgeneratorsthatwillbelocatedontheroofoftheauxiliarybuilding.DuringtheearlyportionofPhase2,the6.9kVswitchgearand6.9kVShutdownBoardswillbeenergizedwithaprestaged6.9kVFLEXdieselgeneratorthatwillbelocatedintheadditionaldieselgeneratorbuilding.ThiswillallowreenergizingtheSIpumpsforinventorycontrol.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page8 ForShutdownConditionsDuringshutdown,bothsafetyfunctions(maintainingcorecoolingandheatremovalandmaintainingRCSinventorycontrol)areaccomplishedbythesameFLEXstrategyandrelyonthesameFLEXequipmentneededfortheatpowercondition.Corecoolingandheatremovalisachievedbycoolantboiloff.InjectionofboratedwatertotheRCSisneededtoreplenishthecoolantlosttoboiling.ForshutdownconfigurationswheretheRCSisdepressurizedandopenbutthecavityisnotflooded,gravityfeedfromtheRWSTmaybeusedtomaintainRCSinventoryinPhase1.AflowpathfromtheRWSTtotheRCSwouldbeestablished.IfgravityfeedisnotsufficienttomakeupcoolanttotheRCS,aprestaged,intermediatepressureFLEXpumpwillbeusedtomaintainRCSinventory(inPhase2).Sufficientflushingflowwillbeneededtopreventboronprecipitation.ConnectionoftheFLEXpumpdischargehoseswillbetothesafetyinjectionpipingusingthesameFLEXconnectionsplannedforRCSinventorycontrolunderatpowerconditions.TheFLEXconnectionsareshownin[]ForshutdownconfigurationswheretheRCSheadisoffandthecavityisfilled,therewillbesufficienttimetomobilizeportableFLEXpumpstoprovideRCSmakeupfromtheBATsoranalternateboratedwatersource.ThesameFLEXconnectionstothesafetyinjectionsystempipingwillbeusedinthismode.Inaccordancewith[7](footnotetoTableD1),someshutdownconfigurationswheretheRCSisclosedorpressurizedsothatinjectionofboratedwatercannotbeaccomplishedareconsideredoutsideofESEPbecausetheseconfigurationshaveshortdurations.3.0 EQUIPMENTSELECTIONPROCESSANDESELTheselectionofequipmentfortheESELfollowedtheguidelinesofEPRI3002000704[2].TheESELforSequoyahUnits1and2ispresentedinAttachmentA.InformationpresentedinAttachmentAisdrawnfrom[8].3.1 EquipmentSelectionProcessandESELTheselectionofequipmenttobeincludedontheESELwasbasedoninstalledplantequipmentcreditedintheFLEXstrategiesduringPhase1,2and3mitigationofaBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvent(BDBEE),asoutlinedintheSequoyahOIPinResponsetotheMarch12,2012,CommissionOrderEA12049[3]andisconsistentwiththesecondandthirdsixmonthstatusreportsissuedtotheNRC[4][5].TheOIPprovidestheSequoyahFLEXmitigationstrategyandservesasthebasisforequipmentselectedfortheESEP.Thescopeof"installedplantequipment"includesequipmentrelieduponfortheFLEXstrategiestosustainthecriticalfunctionsofcorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityconsistentwiththeSequoyahOIP.FLEXrecoveryactionsareexcludedfromtheESEPscopeperEPRI3002000704[2].TheoveralllistofplannedFLEXmodificationsandthescopeforconsiderationhereinislimitedtothoserequiredtosupportcorecooling,reactorcoolantinventoryandsubcriticality,andcontainmentintegrityfunctions.PortableandprestagedFLEXequipment(notpermanentlyinstalled)areexcludedfromtheESELperEPRI3002000704.TheESELcomponentselectionfollowedtheEPRIguidanceoutlinedinSection3.2ofEPRI3002000704.1. ThescopeofcomponentsislimitedtothatrequiredtoaccomplishthecorecoolingandcontainmentsafetyfunctionsidentifiedinTable32ofEPRI3002000704.Theinstrumentationmonitoringrequirementsforcorecooling/containmentsafetyfunctions SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page9 arelimitedtothoseoutlinedintheEPRI3002000704guidance,andareasubsetofthoseoutlinedintheSequoyahOIP.2. ThescopeofcomponentsislimitedtoinstalledplantequipmentandFLEXconnectionsnecessarytoimplementtheSequoyahOIP,asdescribedinSection2.3. ThescopeofcomponentsassumesthecreditedFLEXconnectionmodificationsareimplemented,andarelimitedtothoserequiredtosupportasingleFLEXsuccesspath(i.e.,either"Primary"or"Backup/Alternate").4. The"Primary"FLEXsuccesspathistobespecified.Selectionofthe"Backup/Alternate"FLEXsuccesspathmustbejustified.5. Phase3copingstrategiesareincludedintheESEPscope,whereasrecoverystrategiesareexcluded.6. Structures,systems,andcomponentsexcludedpertheEPRI3002000704guidanceare: Structures(e.g.containment,reactorbuilding,controlbuilding,auxiliarybuilding,etc.). Piping,cabling,conduit,HVAC,andtheirsupports. Manualvalvesandrupturedisks. PoweroperatedvalvesnotrequiredtochangestateaspartoftheFLEXmitigationstrategies. Nuclearsteamsupplysystemcomponents(e.g.RPVandinternals,reactorcoolantpumpsandseals,etc.).7. Forcasesinwhichneithertrainwasspecifiedasaprimaryorbackupstrategy,thenonlyonetraincomponent(generally'A'train)isincludedintheESEL.3.1.1 ESELDevelopmentTheESELwasdevelopedbyreviewingtheSequoyahNuclearPlantOIP[3][4][5]todeterminethemajorequipmentinvolvedintheFLEXstrategies.Furtherreviewsofplantdrawings(e.g.,PipingandInstrumentationDiagrams(P&IDs)andElectricalSingleLineDiagrams)wereperformedtoidentifytheboundariesoftheflowpathstobeusedintheFLEXstrategiesandtoidentifyspecificcomponentsintheflowpathsneededtosupportimplementationoftheFLEXstrategies.Boundarieswereestablishedatanelectricalormechanicalisolationdevice(e.g.,isolationamplifier,valve,etc.)inbranchcircuits/branchlinesoffthedefinedstrategyelectricalorfluidflowpath.P&IDsweretheprimaryreferencedocumentsusedtoidentifymechanicalcomponentsandinstrumentation.TheflowpathsusedforFLEXstrategieswereselectedandspecificcomponentswereidentifiedusingdetailedequipmentandinstrumentdrawings,pipingisometrics,electricalschematicsandonelinedrawings,systemdescriptions,designbasisdocuments,etc.,asnecessary.Hostcomponentswereidentifiedforsubassemblies.Cabinetsandequipmentcontrolscontainingrelays,contactors,switches,potentiometers,circuitbreakersandotherelectricalandinstrumentationthatcouldbeaffectedbyhighfrequencyearthquakemotionsandthatimpacttheoperationofequipmentintheESELarerequiredtobeontheESEL.ThesecabinetsandcomponentswereidentifiedintheESEL.ForeachparametermonitoredduringtheFLEXimplementation,asingleindicationwasselectedforinclusionintheESEL.Foreachparameterindication,thecomponentsalongtheflowpathfrom SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page10 measurementtoindicationwereincluded,sinceanyfailurealongthepathwouldleadtofailureofthatindication.ComponentssuchasflowelementswereconsideredaspartofthepipingandwerenotincludedintheESEL.3.1.2 PowerOperatedValvesPage33ofEPRI3002000704[2]notesthatpoweroperatedvalvesnotrequiredtochangestateaspartoftheFLEXmitigationstrategiesareexcludedfromtheESEL.Page32alsonotesthat"functionalfailuremodesofelectricalandmechanicalportionsoftheinstalledPhase1equipmentshouldbeconsidered(e.g.AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)trips)."Toaddressthisconcern,thefollowingguidanceisappliedintheSequoyahESELforfunctionalfailuremodesassociatedwithpoweroperatedvalves: PoweroperatedvalvesthatremainenergizedduringtheELAPevents(suchasDCpoweredvalves),wereincludedontheESEL. PoweroperatedvalvesnotrequiredtochangestateaspartoftheFLEXmitigationstrategieswerenotincludedontheESEL.TheseismiceventalsocausestheELAPevent;therefore,thevalvesareincapableofspuriousoperationastheywouldbedeenergized. PoweroperatedvalvesnotrequiredtochangestateaspartoftheFLEXmitigationstrategiesduringPhase1,andarereenergizedandoperatedduringsubsequentPhase2and3strategies,werenotevaluatedforspuriousvalveoperationastheseismiceventthatcausedtheELAPhaspassedbeforethevalvesarerepowered.3.1.3 PullBoxesPullboxesweredeemedunnecessarytobeaddedtotheESELsasthesecomponentsprovidecompletelypassivelocationsforpullingorinstallingcables.Nobreaksorconnectionsinthecablingwereincludedinpullboxes.Pullboxeswereconsideredpartofconduitandcabling,whichwereexcludedinaccordancewithEPRI3002000704[2].3.1.4 TerminationCabinetsTerminationcabinets,includingcabinetsnecessaryforFLEXPhase2andPhase3connections,provideconsolidatedlocationsforpermanentlyconnectingmultiplecables.Theterminationcabinetsandtheinternalconnectionsprovideacompletelypassivefunction;however,thecabinetsareincludedintheESELtoensureindustryknowledgeonpanel/anchoragefailurevulnerabilitiesisaddressed.3.1.5 CriticalInstrumentationIndicatorsCriticalindicatorsandrecordersaretypicallyphysicallylocatedonpanels/cabinetsandareincludedasseparatecomponents;however,seismicevaluationoftheinstrumentindicationmaybeincludedinthepanel/cabinetseismicevaluation(ruleofthebox).3.1.6 Phase2and3PipingConnectionsItem2inSection3.1abovenotesthatthescopeofequipmentintheESELincludes"-FLEXconnectionsnecessarytoimplementtheSequoyahOIP[3][4][5]asdescribedinSection2."Item3inSection3.1alsonotesthat"ThescopeofcomponentsassumesthecreditedFLEXconnectionmodificationsareimplemented,andarelimitedtothoserequiredtosupportasingleFLEXsuccesspath(i.e.,either"Primary"or"Backup/Alternate")."
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page11 Item6inSection3.1abovegoesontoexplainthat"Piping,cabling,conduit,HVAC,andtheirsupports"areexcludedfromtheESELscopeinaccordancewithEPRI3002000704[2].Therefore,pipingandpipesupportsassociatedwithFLEXPhase2andPhase3connectionsareexcludedfromthescopeoftheESEPevaluation.However,anyactivevalvesinFLEXPhase2andPhase3connectionflowpathareincludedintheESEL.3.2 JustificationforUseofEquipmentThatisNotthePrimaryMeansforFLEXImplementationTheSequoyahNuclearPlantESELisbasedontheprimarymeansofimplementingtheFLEXstrategy.Therefore,noadditionaljustificationisrequired.4.0 GROUNDMOTIONRESPONSESPECTRUM(GMRS)4.1 PlotofGMRSSubmittedbytheLicenseeTheSafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)controlpointelevationisdefinedatthebaseoftheContainmentStructures,whichcorrespondstoadepthof64ft.(Elevation641ft.)andisthedeepeststructurefoundationelevationcontrolpoint.Table41showstheGMRSaccelerationsforarangeoffrequencies.TheGMRSatthecontrolpointelevationisshowninFigure41[9].Table41: GMRSforSequoyahNuclearPlantFrequency(Hz)GMRS(g)1003.79E01903.83E01803.89E01703.98E01604.18E01504.65E01405.54E01356.14E01306.72E01257.41E01207.59E01157.57E0112.57.49E01107.06E0196.82E0186.53E0176.11E0165.58E0155.00E01 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page12 Table41:GMRSforSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)Frequency(Hz)GMRS(g)44.05E013.53.78E0133.13E012.52.50E0122.30E011.51.92E011.251.68E0111.42E010.91.36E010.81.25E010.71.14E010.69.98E020.58.34E020.46.67E020.355.84E020.35.00E020.254.17E020.23.34E020.152.50E020.1252.08E020.11.67E02 Figure41:GMRSforSequoyahNuclearPlant SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page13 4.2 ComparisontoSSETheSSEwasdevelopedinaccordancewith10CFRPart100AppendixAthroughanevaluationofthemaximumearthquakepotentialfortheregionsurroundingthesite.Consideringthehistoricseismicityofthesiteregion,themaximumpotentialearthquakewasdeterminedtobeanintensityVIIIontheModifiedMercalliIntensityScaleof1931.TheSSEisdefinedintermsofaPeakGroundAcceleration(PGA)andadesignresponsespectrum.ConsideringasiteintensityofVIII,aPGAof0.18gwasestimated.TobeconsistentwithEPRIReportNos.EPRI3002000704[2]andEPRI1025287[22]thesitelicensingbasisearthquakeisusedfortheSSEtoGMRScomparisoninthisreport.ThedesignbasisearthquakewasusedinthepriorTVAsubmittal[9]whichconcludedthatariskanalysiswouldbeperformed.However,theapplicationofeitherthedesignbasisorthelicensingbasisSSEcurvetothepriorevaluationwillnotaltertheconclusion.TheSequoyahlicensingbasisSSEisbasedonapeakgroundaccelerationof0.18gwithaHousnerspectralshape.Table42showsthespectralaccelerationvaluesasafunctionoffrequencyforthe5%dampedhorizontalSequoyahlicensingbasisSSE.Table42:SSEforSequoyahNuclearPlantFrequency(Hz)SpectralAcceleration(g)1000.18250.18100.1950.272.50.261.00.140.50.08
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page14 Figure42: GMRStoSSEComparisonforSequoyahNuclearPlantTheSSEandtheGMRSinthelowfrequencyrangeuptoabout2.5Hzareessentiallythesameamplitude.TheGMRSexceedstheSequoyahNuclearPlantSSEbeyondabout2.5Hz.AstheGMRSexceedstheSSEinthe1to10Hzrange,theplantdoesnotscreenoutoftheESEPaccordingtoSection2.2ofEPRI3002000704[2].ThetwospecialscreeningconsiderationsasdescribedinSection2.2.1ofEPRI3002000704,namelya)LowSeismicHazardSiteandb)NarrowBandExceedancesinthe1to10HzrangedonotapplyforSequoyahNuclearPlantandhenceHighConfidenceofaLowProbabilityofFailure(HCLPF)evaluationsarerequired.5.0 REVIEWLEVELGROUNDMOTION(RLGM)5.1 DescriptionofRLGMSelectedSection4ofEPRI3002000704[2]presentstwoapproachesfordevelopingtheRLGMtobeusedintheESEP:1. TheRLGMmaybederivedbylinearlyscalingtheSSEbythemaximumratiooftheGMRS/SSEbetweenthe1and10Hzrange(nottoexceed2xSSE).InstructureRLGMseismicmotionswouldbederivedusingexistingSSEbasedinstructureresponsespectra(ISRS)withthesamescalefactor.2. Alternately,licenseeswhohavedevelopedappropriatestructural/soilstructureinteraction(SSI)modelscapableofcalculatingISRSbasedonsiteGMRS/uniformhazardresponsespectrum(UHRS)inputmayopttousetheseISRSinlieuofscaledSSEISRS.BasedonareviewoftabulateddatainTable41andtheSSEvaluesinTable42,intherangebetween1and10HzthemaximumratioofGMRStotheSSEiscalculatedtobe:SFmax=SAGMRS(10HZ)/SASSE10Hz)=0.71g/0.19g=3.7 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page15 Sincethecomputedscalefactorisgreaterthan2.0,theRLGMwouldbesetalevelof2xSSE.ThisisshowninTable51andFigure51.Table51: 2xSSEforSequoyahNuclearPlantFrequency(Hz)SpectralAcceleration(g)1000.36250.36100.3850.542.50.521.00.280.50.16Figure51: 2xSSEforSequoyahNuclearPlant 5.2 MethodtoEstimateInStructureResponseSpectra(ISRS)AfullscopeSMAwasperformedtosupporttheIPEEEforSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2[11].TheReviewLevelEarthquake(RLE)isdefinedastheNUREG/CR0098[10]medianspectralshapeforrock,anchoredto0.3gPGA.TheRLEISRSweredefinedatthe84%NonExceedanceProbability(NEP).Todeterminethe84%NEPresponse,aprobabilisticmethodofgeneratingISRSwasusedwhichaccountsfortheuncertaintyinboththegroundmotiondescriptionandinthestructuralandsoilparameters.UncertaintiesinthestructuralpropertiesareaccountedforbyrepresentingstructuralnaturalfrequenciesanddampingratiosasalognormallydistributedrandomvariablewithspecifiedmedianandCoefficientofVariation(COV)values.Atotalofthirty(30)earthquaketimehistories(eachwith00.10.20.30.4 0.5 0.60.1110100Acceleration(g)Frequency(Hz)SQN2xSSEDesignSpectra,5%Damping2xSSE SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page16 threecomponents)weregeneratedsuchthatthespectralordinateswerelognormallydistributedwithaCOVequalto0.25,andthe84%NEPvaluematchestheNUREG/CR0098medianrockshape.TheresultsoftheIPEEEforSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2weresubmittedtotheNRC[11].ItshouldbenotedthattheNRC[12]tookexceptiontotheapproachusedforSequoyahNuclearPlantinthatTennesseeValleyAuthority(TVA)definedtheRLEasbeinginthefreefieldatthetopofthesoilsurface,whereastheNRCconcludedtheRLEshouldhavebeendefinedonarock.TVAreviewedtheNRCRequestforAdditionalInformation(RAI)andmadeadjustmentstotheoriginallydefiedHCLPFcapacityof0.3g.TheresultsoftheadjustmentsofthefullscopeseismicmarginassessmentweresubmittedtotheNRC[13],concludingthatSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2hadaplantlevelHCLPFcapacityof0.23g.SubsequenttoTVA'sdocketedresponse[13]theNRCissuedtheirStaffEvaluationReport(SER)[14].IntheSER,theNRCrecognizedtheTVAHCLPFcapacityvalueof0.23gforSequoyahNuclearPlant,butalsoacknowledgedalowerHCLPFvalueof0.2gthatwasdevelopedbythestaffconsultant.DuringtheIPEEEadequacyreview,TVAreviewedtheNRCstaffconsultant'sopinionregardingalowerHCLPFcapacityof0.2gforSequoyahNuclearPlantandconcludedthatthetechnicalbasisdescribedbytheNRCstaffconsultantintheSERistechnicallycorrect.Consequently,TVAdecidedthattheassignmentof0.2gHCLPFcapacitywasappropriate.BecauseofthesignificanteffortexpendedbyTVAtodevelopanupdateddynamicanalysisofthesafetyrelatedstructuresforSequoyahNuclearPlantdescribedaboveandintheIPEEEsubmittal[11],TVAfeltthismodelprovidedimproveddynamicbehaviorofSequoyahNuclearPlantstructures.Consequently,forthepurposeofevaluatingseismiccapacityofESEPcomponents,TVAchosetoscalethe84thpercentilevaluesbyanincreasescalefactorof1.5(0.3g/0.2g)toachievearesponseequivalenttoa0.3gNUREG/CR0098shapedresponse. Figure52demonstratesthattheuseofa0.3gNUREG/CR0098shaperesponsebounds2xSSEforSequoyahNuclearPlantfrom1to10Hz. Figure52:NUREG/CR0098(0.3g)versusSequoyahNuclearPlantSSE00.10.20.30.4 0.5 0.60.70.010.1110100Acceleration(g)Frequency(Hz)2xSSECR00980.3gSSE(.18g)
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page17 6.0 SEISMICMARGINEVALUATIONAPPROACHItisnecessarytodemonstratethatESELitemshavesufficientseismiccapacitytomeetorexceedthedemandcharacterizedbytheRLGM.TheseismiccapacityischaracterizedasthePGAforwhichthereisaHCLPF.ThePGAisassociatedwithaspecificspectralshape,inthiscasethe5%dampedRLGMspectralshape.TheHCLPFcapacitymustbeequaltoorgreaterthantheRLGMPGA.ThecriteriaforseismiccapacitydeterminationaregiveninSection5ofEPRI3002000704[2].TherearetwobasicapproachesfordevelopingHCLPFcapacities:1. Deterministicapproachusingtheconservativedeterministicfailuremargin(CDFM)methodologyofEPRINP6041SL,AMethodologyforAssessmentofNuclearPowerPlantSeismicMargin(Revision1)[15].2. ProbabilisticapproachusingthefragilityanalysismethodologyofEPRITR103959,MethodologyforDevelopingSeismicFragilities[16].6.1 SummaryofMethodologiesUsedSequoyahNuclearPlantcompletedSMAforUnits1and2in1995.TheSMAisdocumentedin[11]thatconsistedofdevelopmentofaSafeShutdownEquipmentList(SSEL),probabilisticapproachfordeterminingseismicdemandbasedon84%NEP,newbuildingmodels,associatedgenerationofISRS,screeningwalkdowns,andHCLPFcapacitycalculations.ThescreeningwalkdownsusedthescreeningtablesfromChapter2ofEPRINP6041SL[15].ThewalkdownswereconductedbyengineerstrainedinEPRINP6041SL(theengineersattendedtheEPRISMAAddOncourseinadditiontotheSQUGWalkdownScreeningandSeismicEvaluationTrainingCourse),andweredocumentedonScreeningEvaluationWorkSheetsfromEPRINP6041SL.AnchoragecapacitycalculationsusedtheCDFMcriteriafromEPRINP6041SL.Theseismicdemandisbasedonaprobabilisticapproachthatinvolvesthegenerationofanensembleofartificialearthquake(groundmotion)timehistoriesaswellasstructuralandsoilparametersvalues.TheprobabilisticapproachofdeterminingseismicdemandisbasedonguidancefromEPRINP6041SL:"FortheSpecifiedSME,theelasticcomputedresponse(SMEdemand)ofstructuresandcomponentsmountedthereonshouldbedefinedatthe84%nonexceedanceprobability(NEP)."TheresultsoftheprobabilisticapproachfordevelopmentofseismicdemandforSequoyahNuclearplantisdocumentedin[11].Figure61showsthefitofthe84thpercentileoftheensembleofthe30responsespectra(ofthe30generatedtimehistories)tothetargetspectralshape(NUREG/CR0098medianrockspectrum).Notethisfigurerepresentstheinputmotionassumingthetargetspectrumisatthetopoffreefieldonthesoilsurface.Figure62showstheadjustedSequoyahNuclearPlantIPEEEHCLPFRLEresponsespectrumadjustedto0.2g,comparedtotheESEPRLGMresponsespectrumusedfortheSequoyahNuclearPlantESEP.Notebothspectraarerockinputmotionsatthebaseofthecontainmentstructure.ThisdemonstratesthattheESEPRLGMenvelopestheRLGMusedforSMAatallfrequenciesbyanamplitudefactorof1.5.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page18 Figure61:84thPercentileoftheEnsembleofthe30ResponseSpectraFigure62:SequoyahNuclearPlantIPEEEadjustedHCLPFvsESEPTargetHCLPF6.2 HCLPFScreeningProcessForESEP,thecomponentsarescreenedatRLGM(NUREG/CR0098curve)anchoredat0.3gPGA.ThescreeningtablesinEPRINP6041SL[15]arebasedongroundpeakspectralaccelerationsof0.8gand1.2g.ThesebothexceedtheRLGMpeakspectralacceleration.Theanchoragecapacitycalculations SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page19 wereonbasedfloorresponsespectradevelopedfortheSequoyahNuclearPlantIPEEEandscaledtotheadjustedRLGM.EquipmentforwhichthescreeningcaveatsweremetandforwhichtheanchoragecapacityexceededtheRLGMseismicdemand,canbescreenedoutfromESEPseismiccapacitydeterminationbecausetheHCLPFcapacityexceedstheRLGM.TheUnit1ESELcontains182items.Ofthese,27arevalves,bothpoweroperatedandrelief.InaccordancewithTable24ofEPRINP6041SL[15],activevalvesmaybeassignedafunctionalcapacityof0.8gpeakspectralaccelerationwithoutanyreviewotherthanlookingforvalveswithlargeextendedoperatorsonsmalldiameterpiping,andanchorageisnotafailuremode.Therefore,valvesontheESELmaybescreenedoutfromESEPseismiccapacitydetermination,subjecttothecaveatregardinglargeextendedoperatorsonsmalldiameterlines.ThenonvalvecomponentsintheESELaregenerallyscreenedbasedontheSMAmethodology.IftheSMAshowedthatthecomponentmettheEPRINP6041SLscreeningcaveatsandtheCDFMcapacityexceededtheRLEdemand,thenthecomponentcanbescreenedoutfromtheESEPcapacitydetermination.6.3 SeismicWalkdownApproach6.3.1 WalkdownApproachWalkdownswereperformedinaccordancewiththecriteriaprovidedinSection5ofEPRI3002000704[2],whichreferstoEPRINP6041SL[15]fortheSeismicMarginAssessmentprocess.Pages226through230ofEPRINP6041SLdescribetheseismicwalkdowncriteria,includingthefollowingkeycriteria."TheSRT[SeismicReviewTeam]should"walkby"100%ofallcomponentswhicharereasonablyaccessibleandinnonradioactiveorlowradioactiveenvironments.Seismiccapabilityassessmentofcomponentswhichareinaccessible,inhighradioactiveenvironments,orpossiblywithincontaminatedcontainment,willhavetorelymoreonalternatemeanssuchasphotographicinspection,morerelianceonseismicreanalysis,andpossibly,smallerinspectionteamsandmorehurriedinspections.A100%"walkby"doesnotmeancompleteinspectionofeachcomponent,nordoesitmeanrequiringanelectricianorothertechniciantodeenergizeandopencabinetsorpanelsfordetailedinspectionofallcomponents.ThiswalkdownisnotintendedtobeaQAorQCrevieworareviewoftheadequacyofthecomponentattheSSElevel.IftheSRThasareasonablebasisforassumingthatthegroupofcomponentsaresimilarandaresimilarlyanchored,thenitisonlynecessarytoinspectonecomponentoutofthisgroup.The"similaritybasis"shouldbedevelopedbeforethewalkdownduringtheseismiccapabilitypreparatorywork(Step3)byreferencetodrawings,calculationsorspecifications.Theonecomponentoreachtypewhichisselectedshouldbethoroughlyinspectedwhichprobablydoesmeandeenergizingandopeningcabinetsorpanelsforthisverylimitedsample.Generally,asparerepresentativecomponentcanbefoundsoastoenabletheinspectiontobeperformedwhiletheplantisinoperation.Atleastfortheonecomponentofeachtypewhichisselected,anchorageshouldbethoroughlyinspected.Thewalkdownprocedureshouldbeperformedinanadhocmanner.ForeachclassofcomponentstheSRTshouldlookcloselyatthefirstitemsandcomparethefieldconfigurationswiththeconstructiondrawingsand/orspecifications.Ifaonetoonecorrespondenceisfound,thensubsequentitemsdonothavetobeinspectedinasgreatadetail.Ultimatelythe SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page20 walkdownbecomesa"walkby"ofthecomponentclassastheSRTbecomesconfidentthattheconstructionpatternistypical.Thisprocedureforinspectionshouldberepeatedforeachcomponentclass;although,duringtheactualwalkdowntheSRTmaybeinspectingseveralclassesofcomponentsinparallel.Ifseriousexceptionstothedrawingsorquestionableconstructionpracticesarefoundthenthesystemorcomponentclassmustbeinspectedincloserdetailuntilthesystematicdeficiencyisdefined.The100%"walkby"istolookforoutliers,lackofsimilarity,anchoragewhichisdifferentfromthatshownondrawingsorprescribedincriteriaforthatcomponent,potentialSI[SeismicInteraction]problems,situationsthatareatoddswiththeteammembers'pastexperience,andanyotherareasofseriousseismicconcern.Ifanysuchconcernssurface,thenthelimitedsamplesizeofonecomponentofeachtypeforthoroughinspectionwillhavetobeincreased.Theincreaseinsamplesizewhichshouldbeinspectedwilldependuponthenumberofoutliersanddifferentanchorages,etc.,whichareobserved.ItisuptotheSRTtoultimatelyselectthesamplesizesincetheyaretheoneswhoareresponsiblefortheseismicadequacyofallelementswhichtheyscreenfromthemarginreview.AppendixDgivesguidanceforsamplingselection."6.3.2 ApplicationofPreviousWalkdownInformationSeveralESELitemswerepreviouslywalkeddownduringtheSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2seismicIPEEEprogram.Thosewalkdownresultswerereviewedandthefollowingstepsweretakentoconfirmthatthepreviouswalkdownconclusionsremainedvalid. Awalkbywasperformedtoconfirmthattheequipmentmaterialconditionandconfigurationisconsistentwiththewalkdownconclusionsandthatnonewsignificantinteractionsrelatedtoblockwallsorpipingattachedtotanksexist. IftheESELitemwasscreenedoutbasedonthepreviouswalkdown,thatscreeningevaluationwasreviewedandreconfirmedfortheESEP.ExceptforinaccessibleitemsasdescribedbelowinSection7,inallcasesitwasdeterminedthattheHCLPFcapacitiesestablishedfortheseitemsundertheseismicIPEEEprogramremainedvalid.Thus,allESELcomponentsthatwerepartoftheIPEEEprogramhaveaHCLPFcapacityof0.3gorgreaterandarethusadequateforESEP[9].6.3.3 SignificantWalkdownFindingsConsistentwiththeguidancefromEPRINP6041SL[15],nosignificantoutliersandonlyone(1)anchorageconcernwasidentifiedduringtheSequoyahNuclearPlantseismicwalkdowns.Thefollowingfindingswerenotedduringthewalkdowns.OneanchorforSequoyahUnit2TDAFWPumpControlPanel2L381wasobservedtobesignificantlycorroded.Anevaluationwasperformedoftheconfigurationassumingthattheanchorwasinactive.Theevaluationdeterminedthattheconfiguration(using3of4anchors)satisfieddesignrequirements.ThecorrodedanchoredisscheduledtobereplacedinupcomingU2R20outage.Basedonwalkdownresults,HCLPFcapacityevaluationswererecommendedforthefollowingtwelve(12)components,onaboundingbasis: TurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump InstrumentRack SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page21 RPanels BenchboardMPanels VerticalMandLPanels MainControlRoomCeiling WallMountedPanel BoricAcidStorageTank TDAFWPControlPanel PHMSTransformersandDistributionPanel Valves BlockWalls6.4 HCLPFCalculationProcessESELitemsnotincludedinthepreviousIPEEEevaluationsatSequoyahwereevaluatedusingthecriteriainEPRINP6041[7].Thoseevaluationsincludedthefollowingsteps: Performingseismiccapabilitywalkdownsforequipmentnotincludedinpreviousseismicwalkdowns(SQUG,IPEEE,orNTTF2.3)toevaluatetheequipmentinstalledplantconditions PerformingscreeningevaluationsusingthescreeningtablesinEPRINP6041asdescribedinSection6.2and PerformingHCLPFcalculationsconsideringvariousfailuremodesthatincludebothstructuralfailuremodes(e.g.anchorage,loadpathetc.)andfunctionalfailuremodes.AllHCLPFcalculationswereperformedusingtheCDFMmethodologyandaredocumentedinaTVACalculation:CDQ9992014000140"SQNExpeditedSeismicEvaluationProcess(ESEP)HCLPFCapacityCalculation"[17].6.5 FunctionalEvaluationsofRelaysESEPconsiderscabinetsandequipmentcontrolscontainingrelays,contactors,switches,circuitbreakersandotherelectricalandinstrumentationcomponentsthatcouldbeaffectedbyhighfrequencyearthquakemotionsandthatimpacttheoperationofequipmentintheESEL.AfullscopeSMAwasperformedtosupporttheIPEEEforSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2assummarizedintheIPEEEsubmittal[11].AslightlymodifiedversionoftheEPRINP6041SL[15]recommendedapproachwasimplementedfortheSequoyahNuclearPlantIPEEEinordertoincreaseefficiency.Allrelayswerescreenedoutby:(1)groundrulesandassumptions;(2)comparisonofdesignqualificationtestspectrum(orgenericequipmentruggednessspectra)withSeismicMarginEarthquake(SME)incabinetresponsespectrum;or(3)analysisshowingthatrelaychatterdoesnotdisablesafeshutdownequipmentwithoutthepossibilityofrecovery.Inallcases,equipmentactuationwasdeterminedtonotaffectthesafeshutdowncapabilityoftheequipmentintheSSEL.Lowruggednessrelayswerescreenedoutonlyiftheeffectsofchattercouldberesetbyoperatoraction.Allbuttwolowruggednessrelaysfellintothiscategory.TheremainingtworelayswerefoundtonotbeusedinsafeshutdownequipmentatSequoyahNuclearPlant.Theprincipalconclusionfromthe SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page22 IPEEErelayevaluationwasthatsafeshutdownsystemswillnotbeadverselyaffectedbyrelaymalfunctionduringorafteranSME.FortheSequoyahNuclearPlantESEPanalysis,anevaluationwasperformedtoidentifycomponentsthatare(1)neededforFLEXimplementation,(2)notontheSequoyahIPEEESSEL,and(3)thathavethepotentialforrelaychatterissues.TheonlycasesidentifiedaretheFCV117andFCV118steamisolationvalvesthatcanisolatethesteamsupplytotheTDAFWpump.Intheeventofasteamlinebreak,bothofthesevalvescanreceiveaclosesignalifhightemperatureisdetectedintheTDAFWpumproom.However,becausethesevalvesaremotoroperatedvalves(MOVs),withaLossofOffsitePower(LOOP)thevalveswillnotisolateevenwithaspurious"close"signal.Therefore,thesevalvesdonotpresentaproblemforsuccessfulFLEXimplementation.Nootherrelaychattercaseswereidentified.NoseismiccapacitytodemandrelayevaluationswerenecessaryforESEP.6.6 TabulatedESELHCLPFValues(IncludingKeyFailureModes)TabulatedESELHCLPFvaluesareprovidedinAttachmentB.Thefollowingnotesapplytotheinformationinthetables. ItemspreviouslyincludedintheseismicIPEEEprogramsarenotlisted.WalkbyverificationsreconfirmedtheHCLPFcapacitiesfromtheIPEEE,andtheIPEEE0.3gRLEHCLPFcapacityexceedstheRLGM[18]. HCLPFcapacityevaluationswereperformedforthenonIPEEEitemsontheESEL,addressingbothstructural/anchorageandfunctionalfailuremodes.TheHCLPFcapacityofeachitemislistedinthetables,withassociatedgoverningfailuremode. Ruggeditemsnotspecificallyevaluatedareconservativelyassigneda0.50gHCLPFcapacitybasedontheEPRIscreeningtablesorbyengineeringjudgment. NewprestagedandpermanentlyinstalledFLEXitemsarenotlisted.TVAdesigncriteriaSQNDCV48.0[19]requiresthatnewFLEXitemshaveHCLPFcapacityexceedingtheRLGM.AllESEPcomponentshaveaHCLPFcapacitygreaterthantheRLGMforthefrequencyrangeof1to10Hz.7.0 INACCESSIBLEITEMS7.1 IdentificationofESELItemInaccessibleforWalkdownsTherearefour(4)valvesandseven(7)instrumentracksthatcouldnotbewalkeddownsincetheyareintheUnit1ReactorBuilding(inaccessiblearea).Thesecomponents'Unit2counterpartswerewalkeddownduringtherecentUnit2outage.TheUnit2componentsweredeterminedtobeacceptable.ItisexpectedthatthesameconclusioncanbemadefortheUnit1components.ThefollowingisalistoftheUnit1componentslocatedintheReactorBuildingthatwerenotwalkeddown: 1FCV63118ColdlegAccumulatorIsolationValve#1 1FVC6367ColdlegAccumulatorIsolationValve#4 1FCV6380ColdlegAccumulatorIsolationValve#3 1FCV6398ColdlegAccumulatorIsolationValve#2 InstrumentRack1L182locatedinFanRoom2 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page23 InstrumentRack1L183locatedinFanRoom1 InstrumentRack1L179 InstrumentRack1L185 InstrumentRack1L704 InstrumentRack1L706 InstrumentRack1L194Alsotherearetwo(2)panelsthatcouldnotbewalkeddownintheUnit1AuxiliaryBuildingbecausethecomponentsareinaContaminatedandRadiationArea.Theyare: InstrumentRack1L196 InstrumentRack1L216Inaddition,awalkbyinsideUnit1containmentwasnotpossible.7.2 PlannedWalkdown/EvaluationSchedule/CloseOutThefollowingUnit1componentswillbewalkeddowninupcomingUnit1outage: FCV63118ColdLegAccumulatorIsolationValve#1 FVC6367ColdLegAccumulatorIsolationValve#4 FCV6380ColdLegAccumulatorIsolationValve#3 FCV6398ColdLegAccumulatorIsolationValve#2 InstrumentRack1L182locatedinFanRoom2 InstrumentRack1L183locatedinFanRoom1 InstrumentRack1L179 InstrumentRack1L185 InstrumentRack1L704 InstrumentRack1L706 InstrumentRack1L194 InstrumentRack1L196 InstrumentRack1L216Inaddition,asperformedinsidetheUnit2containment,awalkbywillbeconductedtoverifythatHCLPFcapacityofatleast0.3gismaintainedforIPEEEitemsontheESEL.ItisexpectedthatthesameconclusionswillbemadefortheUnit1componentsthatwerecompletedforthecounterpartcomponentsinUnit2.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page24 8.0 ESEPCONCLUSIONSANDRESULTS8.1 SupportingInformationSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2haveperformedtheESEPasaninterimactioninresponsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letter[1].ItwasperformedusingthemethodologiesintheNRCendorsedguidanceinEPRI3002000704[2].TheESEPprovidesanimportantdemonstrationofseismicmarginandexpeditesplantsafetyenhancementsthroughevaluationsandpotentialneartermmodificationsofplantequipmentthatcanbereliedupontoprotectthereactorcorefollowingbeyonddesignbasisseismicevents.TheESEPispartoftheoverallSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2inresponsetotheNRC's50.54(f)letter.OnMarch12,2014,NEIsubmittedtotheNRCresultsofastudy[21]ofseismiccoredamageriskestimatesbasedonupdatedseismichazardinformationasitappliestooperatingnuclearreactorsintheCentralandEasternUnitedStates(CEUS).Thestudyconcludedthat"sitespecificseismichazardsshowthattherehasnotbeenanoverallincreaseinseismicriskforthefleetofU.S.plants"basedonthereevaluatedseismichazards.Assuch,the"currentseismicdesignofoperatingreactorscontinuestoprovideasafetymargintowithstandpotentialearthquakesexceedingtheseismicdesignbasis."TheNRC'sMay9,2014NTTF2.1ScreeningandPrioritizationletter[20]concludedthatthe"fleetwideseismicriskestimatesareconsistentwiththeapproachandresultsusedintheGl199safety/riskassessment."Theletteralsostatedthat"Asaresult,thestaffhasconfirmedthattheconclusionsreachedinGl199safety/riskassessmentremainvalidandthattheplantscancontinuetooperatewhileadditionalevaluationsareconducted."AnassessmentofthechangeinseismicriskforSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2wasincludedinthefleetriskevaluationsubmittedintheMarch12,2014NEIletter[21];therefore,theconclusionsintheNRC'sMay9letteralsoapplytoSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Inaddition,theMarch12,2014NEIletterprovidedanattached"PerspectivesontheSeismicCapacityofOperatingPlants,"which(1)assessedanumberofqualitativereasonswhythedesignofSSCsinherentlycontainmarginbeyondtheirdesignlevel,(2)discussedindustrialseismicexperiencedatabasesofperformanceofindustryfacilitycomponentssimilartonuclearSSCs,and(3)discussedearthquakeexperienceatoperatingplants.Thefleetofcurrentlyoperatingnuclearpowerplantswasdesignedusingconservativepractices,suchthattheplantshavesignificantmargintowithstandlargegroundmotionssafely.Thishasbeenborneoutforthoseplantsthathaveactuallyexperiencedsignificantearthquakes.Theseismicdesignprocesshasinherent(andintentional)conservatismswhichresultinsignificantseismicmarginswithinSSCs.Theseconservatismsarereflectedinseveralkeyaspectsoftheseismicdesignprocess,including: Safetyfactorsappliedindesigncalculations DampingvaluesusedindynamicanalysisofSSCs BoundingsynthetictimehistoriesforISRScalculations BroadeningcriteriaforISRS ResponsespectraenvelopingcriteriatypicallyusedinSSCanalysisandtestingapplications SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page25 Responsespectrabasedfrequencydomainanalysisratherthanexplicittimehistorybasedtimedomainanalysis Boundingrequirementsincodesandstandards Useofminimumstrengthrequirementsofstructuralcomponents(concreteandsteel) Boundingtestingrequirements Ductilebehavioroftheprimarymaterials(thatis,notcreditingtheadditionalcapacityofmaterialssuchassteelandreinforcedconcretebeyondtheessentiallyelasticrange,etc.)ThesedesignpracticescombinetoresultinmarginssuchthattheSSCswillcontinuetofulfilltheirfunctionsatgroundmotionswellabovetheSSE.TheintentoftheESEPistoperformaninterimactioninresponsetotheNRC's50.54(f)lettertodemonstrateseismicmarginthroughareviewofasubsetoftheplantequipmentthatcanbereliedupontoprotectthereactorcorefollowingbeyonddesignbasisseismicevents.InordertocompletetheESEPinanexpeditedamountoftime,theRLGMusedfortheESEPevaluationisascaledversionoftheplant'sSSEratherthantheactualGMRS.TomorefullycharacterizetheriskimpactsoftheseismicgroundmotionrepresentedbytheGMRSonaplantspecificbasis,amoredetailedseismicriskassessment(SPRAorriskbasedSMA)istobeperformedinaccordancewithEPRI1025287[22].AsidentifiedintheSequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2SeismicHazardandGMRSsubmittal[9],SequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2screensinforariskevaluation.Thecompleteriskevaluationwillmorecompletelycharacterizetheprobabilisticseismicgroundmotioninputintotheplant,theplantresponsetothatprobabilisticseismicgroundmotioninput,andtheresultingplantriskcharacterization.SequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2willcompletethatevaluationinaccordancewiththescheduleidentifiedinNEI'sletterdatedApril9,2013[23]andendorsedbytheNRCintheirMay7,2013letter[24].8.2 IdentificationofPlannedModificationsOnemodificationwasidentifiedinunit2,torepairacorrodedanchorobservedforTDAFWpumpControlPanel2L381.8.3 ModificationImplementationSchedulePlantmodificationswillbeperformedinaccordancewiththescheduleidentifiedinNEIletterdatedApril9,2013[23],whichstatesthatplantmodificationsnotrequiringaplannedrefuelingoutagewillbecompletedbyDecember2016andmodificationsrequiringarefuelingoutagewillbecompletedwithintwoplannedrefuelingoutagesafterDecember31,2014.TheplantmodificationidentifiedinSection8.2requiresarefuelingoutagethatwillbeperformedintheupcomingunit2refuelingoutage(U2R20)andwillbecompletedbytheendofDecember2015.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page26 8.4 SummaryofRegulatoryCommitmentsThefollowingactionswillbeperformedasaresultoftheESEP.Table81:SummaryofRegulatoryCommitmentsAction#EquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionActionDescriptionCompletionDate1NAN/APerformseismicwalkdowns,generateHCLPFcalculations,anddesignandimplementanynecessarymodificationsforUnit1inaccessibleitemslistedinSection7.1NolaterthantheendofthesecondplannedUnit1refuelingoutageafterDecember31,201422L381TDAFPControlPanelModifyanchoragetoreplacecorrodedanchorsuchthatHCLPF>RLGMNolaterthantheendofU2R20RefuelingOutage,December31,20153N/AN/ASubmitalettertoNRCsummarizingtheHCLPFresultsofItem1andconfirmingimplementationoftheplantmodificationsassociatedwithItem2Within60daysfollowingcompletionofESEPactivities,includingItems1through2 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page27
9.0 REFERENCES
1.NRC(ELeedsandMJohnson)LettertoAllPowerReactorLicenseesetal.,"RequestforInformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations50.54(f)RegardingRecommendations2.1,2.3and9.3oftheNearTermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDaiIchiAccident,"March12,2012.2.EPRI3002000704,"SeismicEvaluationGuidance,AugmentedApproachfortheResolutionofFukushimaNearTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic,"May2013.3.TVALettertoU.S.NRC,"TennesseeValleyAuthority-OverallIntegratedPlaninResponsetoMarch12,2012,CommissionOrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoRequirementsforMitigationStrategiesforBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvents(OrderNumberEA12049),"February28,2013.4.TVALettertoU.S.NRC,"SecondSixMonthStatusReportandRevisedOverallIntegratedPlaninResponsetotheMarch12,2012,CommissionOrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoRequirementsforMitigationStrategiesforBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvents(OrderNumberEA12049)forSequoyahNuclearPlant,"February28,2014.5.TVALettertoU.S.NRC,"ThirdSixMonthStatusReportinResponsetotheMarch12,2012,CommissionOrderModifyingLicenseswithRegardtoRequirementsforMitigationStrategiesforBeyondDesignBasisExternalEvents(OrderNumberEA12049)forBrownsFerryNuclearPlant(TACNos.MF0864andMF0865),"August28,2014.6.TVADrawing147W8111FLEX,"FlowDiagramSafetyInjectionSystem,"Revision74(ModifiedforFLEX).7.NEI1206,"DiverseandFlexibleCopingStrategies(FLEX)ImplementationGuide,"Revision0,August2012.8.AREVANPDocument519217523005,"ESEPExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)-SequoyahNuclearPlant."9.TVALettertoU.S.NRC,letternumberCNL14038,"TennesseeValleyAuthority'sSeismicHazardandScreeningReport(CEUSSites),responsetoNRCRequestforInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regardingRecommendation2.1oftheNearTermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDaiichiAccident",March31,201410.U.S.NRCNUREG/CR0098,"DevelopmentofCriteriaforSeismicReviewofSelectedNuclearPowerPlants,"May1978.11.TVALetterfromR.H.ShelltoU.S.NRC,"SequoyahNuclearPlant(SQN)-GenericLetterGL8820,SupplementNo.4,IndividualPlantExaminationofExternalEvents(IPEEE)forSevereAccidentVulnerabilities-10CFR50.54(f),"June29,1995.12.NRCLettertoTVA,"SequoyahNuclearPlant,Units1and2-RequestforAdditionalInformationonIndividualPlantExaminationofExternalEvents(TACNos.M86374andM86375),"August2,2000.13.LetterfromPedroSalastoNRC,"SequoyahNuclearPlantUnits1and2-ResponsetoRequestforAdditionalInformationoftheIndividualPlantExaminationofExternalEvents(IPEEE)(TACNos.M83674andM83675),"December5,2000.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport Page28 14.LetterfromNRCtoJ.A.Scalice,"SequoyahNuclearPlant,Units1and2-ReviewofSequoyahIndividualPlantExaminationofExternalEventsSubmittal(TACNos.M83764andM83675),"February21,2001.15.EPRINP6041SL,"MethodologyforAssessmentofNuclearPowerPlantSeismicMargin,"Revision1,August1991.16.EPRITR103959,"MethodologyforDevelopingSeismicFragilities,"July1994.17.TVACalculationCDQ9992014000140,"SQNExpeditedSeismicEvaluationProcess(ESEP)HCLPFCapacityCalculation."18.TVAlettertoU.S.NRC,LetternumberCNL14013,"HighlightsofImprovementstotheSequoyahNuclearPlantIPEEESeismicAnalysisResultsandSupplementalResponsetoNRCRequestforInformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations50.54(f)regardingtheSequoyahNuclearPlantUnit1SeismicWalkdownResultsofRecommendations2.3oftheNearTermTaskForceReviewofInsightsfromtheFukushimaDaiichiAccident",January31,2014.19.TVADesignCriteria,SQNDCV48.0,Revision4,"FLEXResponseSystem."20.NRC(E.Leeds)LettertoAllPowerReactorLicenseesetal.,"ScreeningandPrioritizationResultsRegardingInformationPursuanttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations50.54(F)RegardingSeismicHazardReEvaluationsforRecommendation2.1oftheNearTermTaskForceReviewofInsightsFromtheFukushimaDaiIchiAccident,"May9,2014.21.NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI),A.Pietrangelo,LettertoD.SkeenoftheUSNRC,"SeismicCoreDamageRiskEstimatesUsingtheUpdatedSeismicHazardsfortheOperatingNuclearPlantsintheCentralandEasternUnitedStates,"March12,2014.22.EPRI1025287,"SeismicEvaluationGuidance:Screening,PrioritizationandImplementationDetails(SPID)fortheResolutionofFukushimaNearTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic.ElectricPowerResearchInstitute,"February2013.23.NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI),A.Pietrangelo,LettertoD.SkeenoftheUSNRC,"ProposedPathForwardforNTTFRecommendation2.1:SeismicReevaluations,"April9,2013.NRCAdamsAccessionNo.ML13101A379.24.NRC(ELeeds)LettertoNEI(JPollock),"ElectricPowerResearchInstituteFinalDraftReportxxxxx,"SeismicEvaluationGuidance:AugmentedApproachfortheResolutionofFukushimaNearTermTaskForceRecommendation2.1:Seismic,"asanAcceptableAlternativetotheMarch12,2012,InformationRequestforSeismicReevaluations,"May7,2013.
SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA1ATTACHMENTA-SEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANTESEL SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA2TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlantESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState1VLV1512SteamGenerator#3MainSteamSafetyValveOperationalOperational2VLV1517SteamGenerator#2MainSteamSafetyValveOperationalOperational3VLV1522SteamGenerator#1MainSteamSafetyValveOperationalOperational4VLV1527SteamGenerator#4MainSteamSafetyValveOperationalOperational5PCV15SteamGenerator#1ARV(SGPORV)OperationalOperationalFailclosedonlossofTrainAessentialair6PCV112SteamGenerator#2ARV(SGPORV)OperationalOperationalFailclosedonlossofTrainBessentialair7PCV123SteamGenerator#3ARV(SGPORV)OperationalOperationalFailclosedonlossofTrainAessentialair8PCV130SteamGenerator#4ARV(SGPORV)OperationalOperationalFailclosedonlossofTrainBessentialair9PCV15SteamGenerator#1ARV(SGPORV)HandwheelOperationalOperationalLocalcontrolofsteamgeneratorPORVduringELAP10AirBottlesSteamGenerator#2ARV(SGPORV)LocalControlStationOperationalOperationalEmergencycontrolstationperEA12FLEXcompressedaircylinders11AirBottlesSteamGenerator#3ARV(SGPORV)LocalControlStationOperationalOperationalEmergencycontrolstationperEA12FLEXcompressedaircylinders12PCV130SteamGenerator#4ARV(SGPORV)HandwheelOperationalOperationalLocalcontrolofsteamgeneratorPORVduringELAP SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA3 TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState13L501PCV112LocalControlStationOperationalOperationalEmergencycontrolstationperEA1214L502PCV123LocalControlStationOperationalOperationalEmergencycontrolstationperEA1215PMP3142TurbineDrivenAFWPumpStandbyOperatingAutomaticstartonLOOP16FCV151TDAFWPumpTripandThrottleValveClosedOpenNormalpowersupplyisfrom125VVitalBatteryBoardIII17FCV152TDAFWPumpGovernorValveClosedOpenFailsopenonlossofDCcontrolpower18XS4657AFWTASBackupControlTransferSwitchOperationalOperationalThesecomponentsareontheESELifmanualoperationofTDAFWisimplemented19HS151BTDAFWPumpTripandThrottleValveHandswitchOperationalOperational20SI4656BTDAFWPumpSpeedIndicatorOperationalOperational21FIC4657TDAFWPumpMasterSpeedControllerOperationalOperational22L381TDAFWPumpControlPanelOperationalOperational23PI3138TDAFWPumpDischargePressureIndicatorOperationalOperational24L215AFWFlowMonitoringPanelOperationalOperationalPortabledeltapressgaugecanbeusedforlocalmonitoringofAFWflow SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA4TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState25FT3147AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#3FlowTransmitterOperationalOperational26FT3155AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#2FlowTransmitterOperationalOperational27FT3163AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#1FlowTransmitterOperationalOperational28FT3170AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#4FlowTransmitterOperationalOperational29FI3147BAFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#3FlowIndicationOperationalOperational30FI3155BAFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#2FlowIndicationOperationalOperational31FI3163BAFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#1FlowIndicationOperationalOperational32FI3170BAFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#4FlowIndicationOperationalOperational33L341AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#3FlowTransmitterRackOperationalOperational34L217AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#2FlowTransmitterRackOperationalOperational35L216AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#1FlowTransmitterRackOperationalOperational36L703AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#4FlowIndicationRackOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA5TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState37LCV3172SteamGenerator#3LevelControlValveClosedOpenFailsopenonlossofAXpowerorcontrolair.Backupairsupplybottlesavailable.Manualoperationwithhandwheelisavailable.38LCV3173SteamGenerator#2LevelControlValveClosedOpenFailsopenonlossofACpowerorcontrolair.Backupairsupplybottleavailable.Manualoperationwithhandwheelisavailable.39LCV3174SteamGenerator#1LevelControlValveClosedOpenFailsopenonlossofACpowerorcontrolair.Backupairsupplybottlesavailable.Manualoperationwithhandwheelisavailable.40LCV3175SteamGenerator#4LevelControlValveClosedOpenFailsopenonlossofACpowerorcontrolair.Backupairsupplybottlesavailable.Manualoperationwithhandwheelisavailable.41XS3172SteamGenerator#3LevelControlValveTransferSwitchOperationalOperational42XS3173SteamGenerator#2LevelControlValveTransferSwitchOperationalOperational43XS3174SteamGenerator#1LevelControlValveTransferSwitchOperationalOperational44XS3175SteamGenerator#4LevelControlValveTransferSwitchOperationalOperational45L11ASteamGeneratorLevelControlPanelOperationalOperational46L11BSteamGeneratorLevelControlPanelOperationalOperational47HS3172BSteamGenerator#3LevelControlValveHandSwitchOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA6TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState48HS3173BSteamGenerator#2LevelControlValveHandSwitchOperationalOperational49HS3174BSteamGenerator#1LevelControlValveHandSwitchOperationalOperational50HS3175BSteamGenerator#4LevelControlValveHandSwitchOperationalOperational51L661SteamGenerator#2LevelControlValveFLEXBackupAirStationOperationalOperational52L662SteamGenerator#1LevelControlValveFLEXBackupAirStationOperationalOperational53L663SteamGenerator#3LevelControlValveFLEXBackupAirStationOperationalOperational54L664SteamGenerator#4LevelControlValveFLEXBackupAirStationOperationalOperational55LT343SteamGenerator#1WideRangeLevelTransmitterOperationalOperational561LT356SteamGenerator#2WideRangeLevelTransmitterOperationalOperational572LT356SteamGenerator#2WideRangeLevelTransmitterOperationalOperationalUnit2SG3LevelTransmitteronRackL182Unit1SG3LevelTransmitteronRackL70658LT398SteamGenerator#3WideRangeLevelTransmitterOperationalOperational59LT3111SteamGenerator#4WideRangeLevelTransmitterOperationalOperational60L183SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRackOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA7TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState61L706SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack(Unit1)OperationalOperational62L704SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRackOperationalOperational63L185SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRackOperationalOperational64L182SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack(Unit2)OperationalOperational65LI343SteamGenerator#1WideRangeLevelIndicatorOperationalOperational66LI356SteamGenerator#2WideRangeLevelIndicatorOperationalOperational67LI398SteamGenerator#3WideRangeLevelIndicatorOperationalOperational68LI3111SteamGenerator#4WideRangeLevelIndicatorOperationalOperational69PT12ASteamGenerator#1DischargePressureTransmitterOperationalOperational120VVIPBIRack370PT19ASteamGenerator#2DischargePressureTransmitterOperationalOperational120VVIPBIRack371PT120ASteamGenerator#3DischargePressureTransmitterOperationalOperational120VVIPBIRack472PT127ASteamGenerator#4DischargePressureTransmitterOperationalOperational120VVIPBIRack473L194SteamGeneratorDischargePressureTransmitterRackOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA8TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState74L196SteamGeneratorDischargePressureTransmitterRackOperationalOperational75PI12DSteamGenerator#1DischargePressureIndicatorOperationalOperationalChannelAinput76PI19DSteamGenerator#2DischargePressureIndicatorOperationalOperationalChannelAinput77PI120DSteamGenerator#3DischargePressureIndicationOperationalOperationalChannelAinput78PI127DSteamGenerator#4DischargePressureIndicationOperationalOperationalChannelAinput791TNK0020229Unit1CondensateStorageTankOperationalOperationalDCN23191willseismicallyqualifyCSTto2xSSEHCLPF802TNK0020232Unit2CondensateStorageTankOperationalOperationalDCN23191willseismicallyqualifyCSTto2xSSEHCLPF81FCV3179AERCWHeaderBAFWSupplyValveClosedOpenSwitchovertoERCWheader480VMOVBoard1(2)B2B/11Eorhandwheel82FCV3179BERCWHeaderBAFWSupplyValveClosedOpenSwitchovertoERCWheader480VMOVBoard1(2)B2B/11Borhandwheel83FCV3136AERCWHeaderAAFWSupplyValveClosedOpenSwitchovertoERCWheader480VMOVBoard1(2)A2A/2Eorhandwheel84FCV3136BERCWHeaderAAFWSupplyValveClosedOpenSwitchovertoERCWheader480VMOVBoard1(2)A2A/2Borhandwheel85FCV63118ColdLegAccumulator#1IsolationValveOpenClosed86FCV6398ColdLegAccumulator#2IsolationValveOpenClosed SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA9TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState87FCV6380ColdLegAccumulator#3IsolationValveOpenClosed88FCV6367ColdLegAccumulator#4IsolationValveOpenClosed891PMP6310ASafetyInjectionPumpStandbyOperational902PMP6310ASafetyInjectionPumpStandbyOperational91HS6310ASafetyInjectionPumpHandSwitchOperationalOperational92M6PanelM6OperationalOperational931TNK0620239BoricAcidTank(BAT)AAvailableAvailable942TNK0620239BoricAcidTank(BAT)BAvailableAvailable950TNK0620243BoricAcidTank(BAT)CAvailableAvailable96HEX0740015RHRHeatExchanger1AIntactIntactRWSTgravityfeedpath97TNK063044RWSTOperationalOperational98PCV0680340ARCSPressurizerPowerReliefValveOperationalOperational125VDCVitalBatteryBoardI99HS68340AAPressurizerPORVHandSwitchOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA10TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState100PDT3044ContainmentPressureDifferentialTransmitterOperationalOperational101PDI3044ContainmentPressureDifferentialIndicatorOperationalOperational1021FAN0300038Unit1ContainmentAirReturnFanAStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VSDB1A11032FAN0300038Unit2ContainmentAirReturnFanAStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VSDB2A1104HS3038AContainmentAirReturnFanAHandSwitchOperationalOperational105M9PanelM9OperationalOperational1061XFA2681AAPHMSXfrm1AOperationalOperationalPowersupplytohydrogenigniters1072XFA2682AAPHMSXfrm2AOperationalOperationalPowersupplytohydrogenigniters1081PNL268YA120VACPHMSDistributionPanel1AOperationalOperationalPowersupplytohydrogenigniters1092PNL268YC120VACPHMSDistributionPanel2AOperationalOperationalPowersupplytohydrogenigniters110TNK018381AA7DayOilSupplyTankAvailableAvailableUsetosupplydieselpoweredFLEXequipment111TNK018401BB7DayOilSupplyTankAvailableAvailableUsetosupplydieselpoweredFLEXequipment112TNK018392AA7DayOilSupplyTankAvailableAvailableUsetosupplydieselpoweredFLEXequipment SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA11TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState113TNK018412BB7DayOilSupplyTankAvailableAvailableUsetosupplydieselpoweredFLEXequipment1141BDB201DJ480VShutdownBoardA1AOperationalOperational1151BDB201DK480VShutdownBoardA2AOperationalOperational1161BDB201DL480VShutdownBoardB1BOperationalOperational1171BDB201DM480VShutdownBoardB2BOperationalOperational1182BDB201DN480VShutdownBoardA1AOperationalOperational1192BDB201DO480VShutdownBoardA2AOperationalOperational1202BDB201DP480VShutdownBoardB1BOperationalOperational1212BDB201DQ480VShutdownBoardB2BOperationalOperational1221BDC201GG480VReactorMOVBoard1A1AOperationalOperationalPowertosafetyinjectionaccumulatorisolationMOVs1231BDC201GJ480VReactorMOVBoard1B1BOperationalOperationalPowertosafetyinjectionaccumulatorisolationMOVs1242BDC201GL480VReactorMOVBoard2A1AOperationalOperationalPowertosafetyinjectionaccumulatorisolationMOVs1252BDC201GN480VReactorMOVBoard2B1BOperationalOperationalPowertosafetyinjectionaccumulatorisolationMOVs SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA12TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState1261BDC201JE480VC&AVentBoard1A1AOperationalOperationalPowertohighpressureFLEXpumpRepoweredby6.9kVFLEXdieselgenerator1271BDC201JF480VC&AVentBoard1A2AOperationalOperationalPowertointermediatepressureFLEXpumpRepoweredby6.9kVFLEXdieselgenerator1282BDC201JJ480VC&AVentBoard2A1AOperationalOperationalPowertohighpressureFLEXpumpRepoweredby6.9kVFLEXdieselgenerator1292BDC201JK480VC&AVentBoard2A2AOperationalOperationalPowertointermediatepressureFLEXPumpRepoweredby6.9kVFLEXdieselgenerator130BDG250KE125VDCVitalBatteryBoardIOperationalOperational131BDG250KF125VDCVitalBatteryBoardIIOperationalOperational132BDG250KG125VDCVitalBatteryBoardIIIOperationalOperational133BDG250KH125VDCVitalBatteryBoardIVOperationalOperational1341BDE250NCD120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard1IOperationalOperational1351BDE250NEE120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard1IIOperationalOperational1361BDE250NGF120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard1IIIOperationalOperational1371BDE250NJG120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard1IVOperationalOperational1382BDE250NDD120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard2IOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA13TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState1392BDE250NFE120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard2IIOperationalOperational1402BDE250NHF120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard2IIIOperationalOperational1412BDE250NKG120VACVitalInstrumentPowerBoard2IVOperationalOperational1420BATB250QV125VDCVitalBatteryIOperationalOperational1430BATB250QW125VDCVitalBatteryIIOperationalOperational1440BATB250QX125VDCVitalBatteryIIIOperationalOperational1450BATB250QY125VDCVitalBatteryIVOperationalOperational1460CHGB250QE125VDCVitalBatteryChargerIOperationalOperational1470CHGB250QG125VDCVitalBatteryChargerIIOperationalOperational1480CHGB250QH125VDCVitalBatteryChargerIIIOperationalOperational1490CHGB250QJ125VDCVitalBatteryChargerIVOperationalOperational1501INVB250QL120VACVitalInverter1IOperationalOperational1511INVB250QN120VACVitalInverter1IIOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA14TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState1521INVB250QR120VACVitalInverter1IIIOperationalOperational1531INVB250QT120VACVitalInverter1IVOperationalOperational1542INVB250QM120VACVitalInverter2IOperationalOperational1552INVB250QP120VACVitalInverter2IIOperationalOperational1562INVB250QS120VACVitalInverter2IIIOperationalOperational1572INVB250QU120VACVitalInverter2IVOperationalOperational1581XE925001N31NeutronDetectorOperationalOperationalUnit1NISChannel11591XM925001AN31NeutronSourceRangeAmplifierOperationalOperational1601XM925001BN31NeutronSourceRangeOpticalIsolatorOperationalOperational1611XI925N31SignalProcessorAppROperationalOperational1621XX925001N31SourceRangeIndicatorOperationalOperational1631XI925001AN31BSourceRangeIndicatorOperationalOperational1642XE925002N32NeutronDetectorOperationalOperationalUnit2NISChannel2 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA15TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState1652XM925002AN32NeutronSourceRangeAmplifierOperationalOperational1662XE925002BN32NeutronSourceRangeOpticalIsolatorOperationalOperational1672XI925N32SignalProcessorAppROperationalOperational1682XX925002N32SourceRangeIndicatorOperationalOperational1692XI925002BN32BSourceRangeIndicatorOperationalOperational170L10InstrumentRackOperationalOperational171M4InstrumentPanelOperationalOperational172M13InstrumentPanelOperationalOperational173PT6869RCSLoopWRPressureTransmitterLoop1OperationalOperational174PT6866RCSLoopWRPressureTransmitterLoop3OperationalOperational175PI6869RCSLoopWRPressureIndicationLoop1OperationalOperational176PI6866ARCSLoopWRPressureIndicationLoop3OperationalOperational177L388InstrumentpanelOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA16TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState178L340InstrumentPanelOperationalOperational179L649InstrumentPanelOperationalOperational180R4InstrumentRackOperationalOperational181R5InstrumentRackOperationalOperational182TE6818ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop1OperationalOperational183TE6841ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop2OperationalOperational184TE6860ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop3OperationalOperational185TE6883ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop4OperationalOperational186TI6818ColdLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop1OperationalOperational187TI6841ColdLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop2OperationalOperational188TI6860ColdLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop3OperationalOperational189TI6883ColdLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop4OperationalOperational190TE681HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop1OperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA17TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState191TE6824HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop2OperationalOperational192TE6843HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop3OperationalOperational193TE6865HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop4OperationalOperational194TI681HotLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop1OperationalOperational195TI6824HotLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop2OperationalOperational196TI6843HotLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop3OperationalOperational197TI6865HotLegWRTemperatureIndicationLoop4OperationalOperational198M5InstrumentPanelOperationalOperational199R2InstrumentRackOperationalOperational200R6InstrumentRackOperationalOperational201LT68325CRCSPressurizerLevelTransmitterOperationalOperational202LI68325CRCSPressurizerLevelIndicationOperationalOperational203L179InstrumentationPanelOperationalOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA18TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState2040DG360000A480VFLEXDieselGeneratorStandbyOperational2050DG360003A6.9kVFLEXDieselGeneratorStandbyOperational2061PNLA082TUDieselGenerator1BBControlPanelStandbyOperational2071PNLA082TTDieselGeneratorG1AAControlPanelStandbyOperational2082PNLA082TVDieselGenerator2AAControlPanelStandbyOperational2092PNLA082TWDieselGenerator2BBControlPanelStandbyOperational2100BD3600003AFLEXDieselGenerator3ASwitchgearStandbyOperational2110BKR3600003A/1/A2FLEXDG3ASwitchgearBreakerA2StandbyOperationalDCN231972120TANK3601136900V3MWFLEXDGFuelOilStorageTank3AStandbyOperationalDCN231972130SW3600003A/16900V3MWFLEXDieselGEN3AFusedDisconnectSwitchStandbyOperationalDCN231972140XFMR3603A/16900V480V3MWFLEXDieselGEN3A20KVADryTypeTransformerStandbyOperationalDCN231972150XFMR3603A/2480V120/240V3MWFLEXDieselGEN3A5KVADryTypeTransformerStandbyOperationalDCN231972160DPL3600003A/1480VoltDistributionPanelwith100AMainCircuitBreakerStandbyOperationalDCN23197 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA19TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState2170DPL3600003A/2120/240VACPanelboardStandbyOperationalDCN231972180FU13600103APrimaryCntrlFuseforFuelOilPumpAStarterStandbyOperationalDCN231972190FU13600103BSecondaryCntrlFuseforFuelOilPumpAStarterStandbyOperationalDCN231972200FU13600103CPrimaryCntrlFuseforFuelOilPumpAStarterStandbyOperationalDCN231972210HS360103CFuelOilTransferPmpAEmerStopSWStandbyOperationalDCN231972220PMP360103FuelOilSystemTransferPump3AStandbyOperationalDCN231972230RES360003A3MWFLEXDieselGeneratorANeutralGroundingResistorStandbyOperationalDCN231972240STR36001033MWFLEXDieselGeneratorFuelOilTransferPumpStarterStandbyOperationalDCN231972250LS36001033MWFLEXDieselGeneratorFuelOilFloatSwitch(FillPumpControl)StandbyOperationalDCN231972260XSW0820001ATransferSwitch1AStandbyOperationalDCN231972270XSW0820002ATransferSwitch2AStandbyOperationalDCN231972280XSW0820003BTransferSwitch2BStandbyOperationalDCN231972290XSW0820004BTransferSwitch1BStandbyOperationalDCN23197 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA20TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState2301BDA202CMA6.9kVShutdownBoard1AAOperationalOperational2312BDA202COA6.9kVShutdownBoard2AAOperationalOperational2321BDA202CN6.9kVShutdownBoard1BBOperationalOperational2332BDA202CP6.9kVShutdownBoard2BBOperationalOperational2341OXF202DL480VShutdownTransformer1B1OperationalOperationalListedas1XFA2020317inIPEEE2351OXF202DM480VShutdownTransformer1B2OperationalOperationalListedas1XFA2020319inIPEEE2361OXF202DJ480VShutdownTransformer1A1OperationalOperationalListedas1XFA2020313inIPEEE2371OXF202DK480VShutdownTransformer1A2OperationalOperationalListedas1XFA2020315inIPEEE2382OXF202DN480VShutdownTransformer2A1OperationalOperationalListedas2XFA2020315inIPEEE2392OXF202DO480VShutdownTransformer2A2OperationalOperationalListedas2XFA2020313inIPEEE2402OXF202DP480VShutdownTransformer2B1OperationalOperationalListedas2XFA2020319inIPEEE2412OXF202DQ480VShutdownTransformer2B2OperationalOperationalListedas2XFA2020317inIPEEE2421PMP360IP01U1IntermediatePressureFLEXPumpStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VC&AVentBD1A2,DCN23193 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA21TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState2432PMP360IP01U2IntermediatePressureFLEXPumpStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VC&AVentBD2A2,DCN231932441PMP360HPCSU1HighPressureFLEXPumpStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VC&AVentBD1A1,DCN231932452PMP360HPCSU2HighPressureFLEXPumpStandbyOperationalPoweredby480VC&AVentBD2A1,DCN23193246SQN1IGN2680142AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational247SQN1IGN2680130AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational248SQN1IGN2680125AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational249SQN1IGN2680123AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational250SQN1IGN2680116AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational251SQN1IGN2680128AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational252SQN1IGN2680129AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational253SQN1IGN2680114AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational254SQN1IGN2680133AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational255SQN1IGN2680102AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA22TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState256SQN1IGN2680115AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational257SQN1IGN2680132AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational258SQN1IGN2680108AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational259SQN1IGN2680127AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational269SQN1IGN2680155AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational270SQN1IGN2680136AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational271SQN1IGN2680131AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational272SQN1IGN2680121AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational273SQN1IGN2680122AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational274SQN1IGN2680135AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational275SQN1IGN2680159AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational276SQN1IGN2680126AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational277SQN1IGN2680107AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA23TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState278SQN2IGN2680226AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational279SQN2IGN2680235AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational280SQN2IGN2680202AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational281SQN2IGN2680223AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational282SQN2IGN2680222AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational283SQN2IGN2680231AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational284SQN2IGN2680206AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational285SQN2IGN2680205AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational286SQN2IGN2680234AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational287SQN2IGN2680214AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational288SQN2IGN2680208AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational289SQN2IGN2680259AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational290SQN2IGN2680250AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA24TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState291SQN2IGN2680232AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational292SQN2IGN2680201AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational293SQN2IGN2680230AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational294SQN2IGN2680249AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational295SQN2IGN2680254AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational296SQN2IGN2680224AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational297SQN2IGN2680233AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational298SQN2IGN2680255AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational299SQN2IGN2680207AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational300SQN2IGN2680236AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational301SQN2IGN2680221AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational302SQN2IGN2680213AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational303SQN2IGN2680228AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA25TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState304SQN2IGN2680216AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational305SQN2IGN2680229AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational306SQN2IGN2680242AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational307SQN2IGN2680227AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational308SQN2IGN2680215AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational309SQN2IGN2680225AUnit2TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational310SQN1IGN2680105AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational311SQN1IGN2680154AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational312SQN1IGN2680106AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational313SQN1IGN2680113AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational314SQN1IGN2680149AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational315SQN1IGN2680101AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational316SQN1IGN2680150AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageA26TABLEA1:ExpeditedSeismicEquipmentList(ESEL)forSequoyahNuclearPlant(Continued)ESELItemNumberEquipmentOperatingStateNotes/CommentsIDDescriptionNormalStateDesiredState317SQN1IGN2680124AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational318SQN1IGN2680134AUnit1TrainAHydrogenIgniterStandbyOperational SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB1ATTACHMENTB-ESEPHCLPFVALUESANDFAILUREMODESTABULATIONFORSEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB2TABLEB1:ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes for Sequoyah Nuclear PlantEquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionEquipmentClassBuildingFloorElevationFailureModeHCLPFCapacity(g)1PCV152PCV15SteamGenerator#1ARVHandwheel7ACB734Screen0.501PCV1302PCV130SteamGenerator#4ARVHandwheel7ACB734Screen0.501L5012L501PCV112LocalControlStation18ACB714Functional0.621L5022L502PCV123LocalControlStation18ACB714Functional0.621PMP31422PMP3142TDAFWPump5ACB669Functional1.011FCV1512FCV151TDAFWPumpTripandThrottleValve8AACB669Screen0.501FCV1522FCV152TDAFWPumpGovernorValve7ACB669Functional1.011XS46572XS4657AFWTASBackupControlTransferServiceWater14ACB669Functional0.881HS151B2HS151BTDAFWPumpTripandThrottleValveHS20ACB669Functional0.881L3812L381TDAFWPumpControlPanel20ACB669Functional0.851L2152L215AFWFlowMonitoringPanel18ACB669Functional0.621L3412L341AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#3FTRack18ACB714Functional0.621L2172L217AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#2FTRack18ACB714Functional0.621L2162L216AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#1FTRack18ACB690Functional0.621L7032L703AFWFlowtoSteamGenerator#4FlowIndicationRack18ACB690Functional0.621L11A2L11ASteamGeneratorLevelControlPanel20ACB734Functional0.751L11B2L11BSteamGeneratorLevelControlPanel20ACB734Functional0.75 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB3TABLEB1:ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Continued)EquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionEquipmentClassBuildingFloorElevationFailureModeHCLPFCapacity(g)1L1832L183SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack18RB697Functional0.621L7062L182SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack18RB697Functional0.621L7042L704SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack18RB697Functional0.621L1852L185SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitterRack18RB697Functional0.621L1942L194SteamGeneratorDischargePressureTransmitterRack18ACB690Functional0.621L1962L196SteamGeneratorDischargePressureTransmitterRack18ACB690Functional0.621TNK0020229Unit1CondensateStorageTank21YARD705DCN23191>2xSSE2TNK0020232Unit2CondensateStorageTank21YARD705DCN23191>2xSSE1FCV631182FCV63118ColdLegAccumulator#1IsolationValve8aRB693Screen0.501FCV63982FCV6398ColdLegAccumulator#2IsolationValve8aRB693Screen0.501FCV63802FCV6380ColdLegAccumulator#3IsolationValve8aRB693Screen0.501FCV63672FCV6367ColdLegAccumulator#4IsolationValve8aRB693Screen0.501M62M6MCRBenchboardM620ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.4251TNK0620239BoricAcidTank(BAT)A21ACB690OverturningMoment0.782TNK0620239BoricAcidTank(BAT)B21ACB690OverturningMoment0.780TNK0620243BoricAcidTank(BAT)C21ACB690OverturningMoment0.781M92M9MCRVerticalPanelM920ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.425 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB4TABLEB1:ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Continued)EquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionEquipmentClassBuildingFloorElevationFailureModeHCLPFCapacity(g)SQN1IGN268(MANY)HydrogenIgniters0RBSCVScreen0.501XFA2681AAPHMSXfrm1A4ACB759Functional0.362XFA2682AAPHMSXfrm2A4ACB759Functional0.361PNL268YA120VACPHMSDistributionPanel1A14ACB759Functional0.362PNL268YC120VACPHMSDistributionPanel2A14ACB759Functional0.36TNK018381AA7DayOilSupplyTank21DGB719Screen0.50TNK018401BB7DayOilSupplyTank21DGB719Screen0.50TNK018392AA7DayOilSupplyTank21DGB719Screen0.50TNK018412BB7DayOilSupplyTank21DGB719Screen0.501XE925001N31NeutronDetector18RB697Screen0.501XM925001AN31NeutronSourceRangeAmplifier20ACB734Screen0.501XM925001BN31NeutronSourceRangeOpticalIsolation20ACB734Screen0.502XE925002N32NeutronDetector18RB697Screen0.502XM925002AN32NeutronSourceRangeAmplifier20ACB714Screen0.50 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB5TABLEB1:ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Continued)EquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionEquipmentClassBuildingFloorElevationFailureModeHCLPFCapacity(g)2XM925002BN32NeutronSourceRangeOpticalIsolation20ACB714Screen0.501L102L10RemoteControlPanelL1020ACB734Functional0.4251M42M4MCRBenchboardM420ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.4251M132M13MCRVerticalPanelM1320ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.4251L3882L388RCSLoopWRPTLoop1InstrumentRack28ACB690Functional0.621L3402L340RCSLoopWRPTLoop3InstrumentRack28ACB690Functional0.621R42R4AIRPanelR420ACB685Functional0.641R52R5AIRPanelR520ACB685Functional0.641TE68182TE6818ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop119RB693Screen0.501TE68412TE6841ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop219RB693Screen0.501TE68602TE6860ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop319RB693Screen0.501TE68832TE6883ColdLegWRTemperatureElementLoop419RB693Screen0.501TE6812TE681HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop119RB679Screen0.501TE68242TE6824HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop219RB679Screen0.501TE68432TE6843HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop319RB679Screen0.501TE68652TE6865HotLegWRTemperatureElementLoop419RB679Screen0.501M52M5MCRBenchboardM520ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.425 SequoyahNuclearPlantESEPReport PageB6TABLEB1:ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Continued)EquipmentIDEquipmentDescriptionEquipmentClassBuildingFloorElevationFailureModeHCLPFCapacity(g)1R22R2AIRPanelR220ACB685Functional0.641R62R6AIRPanelR620ACB685Functional0.641L1792L179RCSPressurizerLevelTransmitterInstrumentRack18RBFunctional0.622XM925002BN32NeutronSourceRangeOpticalIso.20ACB714Screen0.501M2CabinetM220ACB732MainControlRoomCeiling0.4251FCV3136A2FCV3136AERCWHeaderAAFWSupplyValve8aACB669Screen0.501FCV3136B2FCV3136BERCWHeaderAAFWSupplyValve8aACB669Screen0.501FCV3179A2FCV3179AERCWHeaderBAFWSupplyValve8aACB669Screen0.501FCV3179B2FCV3179BERCWHeaderBAFWSupplyValve8aACB669Screen0.50 E2-1 of 1 ENCLOSURE 2 LIST OF COMMITMENTS
- 1. Perform seismic walkdowns, generate HCLPF calculations, and design and implement any necessary modification for the following Unit 1 inaccessible items no later than the end of the second planned Unit 1 refueling outage after December 31, 2014:
- a. FCV 63-118 - Cold Leg Accumulator Isolation Valve #1
- b. FCV 63-067 - Cold Leg Accumulator Isolation Valve #4 c. FCV 63-080 - Cold Leg Accumulator Isolation Valve #3 d. FCV 63-098 - Cold Leg Accumulator Isolation Valve #2
- e. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 182 located in Fan Room 2
- f. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 183 located in Fan Room 1
- g. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 179 h. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 185 i. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 704
- j. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 706
- k. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 194
- l. Instrument Rack 1 - L - 196