ML22112A052
| ML22112A052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle, 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1997 |
| From: | ABB Combustion Engineering |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148A597 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705090171 | |
| Download: ML22112A052 (1) | |
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i . System 80+ . standardplant i , 1 t l i Design ControlDocument . i O j Volume 12 ) 4 Combustion Engineering, Inc.
O l l l Copyright C 1997 Combustion Engineering, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Warning, Legal Notice and Disclaimer of Liability The design, engineering and other information contained in this document have been prepared by or for Combustion Engineering, Inc. in connection with its application to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) for design certification of the l System 80+ nuclear plant design pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 52. No use of any such information is authorized by Combustion Engineering, Inc. except for use by the US NRC and its contractors in connection with review and approval of such application. Combustion Engineering, Inc. hereby disclaims all responsibility and liability in connection with unauthorized use of such information. l Neither Combustion Engheering, Inc. nor any other person or entity makes any warranty or representation to any person or entity (other than the US NRC in connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) conceming such information or its use, except to the extent an express warranty is made by Combustion Engineering, Inc. to its customer in a written contract for the sale of the goods or services described in this document. Potential users are hereby warned that any such information may be unsuitable for use except in connection with the performance of such a written contract by Combustion Engineenng, Inc. Such information or its use are subject to copyright, patent, trademark or other rights of Combustion Engineering, Inc. or of others, and no license is granted with respect to such nghts, except that the US NRC is authorized to make such copies as are necessary for the use of the US NRC and its contractors in connection with the Combustion Engineering, Inc. application for design certification. Publication, distnbution or sale of this document does not constitute the performance of engineering or other professional services and does not create or establish any duty of care towards any recipient (other than the US NRC in connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) or towards any person affected by this document. For information address: Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Systems Licensing, 2000 Day Hill Road; Windsor, Connecticut 06095 0
System 80+ oesion controlDocument fd Introduction Certified Design Material l 1.0 Introduction 2.0 System and Structure ITAAC , 3.0 Non-System ITAAC : 4.0 Interface Requirements 5.0 Site Parameters , Approved Design Material - Design & Analysis 1.0 General Plant Description t 2.0 Site Characteristics 3.0 Design of Systems, Structures & Components 4.0 Reactor
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5.0 RCS and Connected Systems 6.0 Engineered Safety Features . 7.0 Instrumentation and Control ; 8.0 Electric Power : 9.0 Auxiliary Systems 10.0 Steam and Power Conversion ; 11.0 Radioactive Waste Management A 12.0 Radiation Protection , V 13.0 14.0 Conduct of Operations Initial Test Program
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15.0 Accident Analyses 16.0 Technical Specifications : 17.0 Quality Assurance ! 18.0 Human Factors l 19.0 Probabilistic Risk Assessment !'
-20.0 Unresolved and Generic Safety Issues Approved Design Material - Emergency Operations Guidelines 1 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Standard Post-Trip Actions >
3.0 Diagnostic Actions 4.0 Reactor Trip Recovery 5.0 Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery 6.0 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recevery . 7.0 Excess Steam Demand Event Recovery 8.0 Loss of All Feedwater Recovery , 9.0 Loss of Offsite Power Recovery ! 10.0 Station Blackout Recovery ! 11.0 Functional Recovery Guideline A (,) , 1 i conwns i
lO the System 80+ standardplant Approved Design Material O Design & Analysis l l I Combustion Engineering, Inc. l
System 80+ Denian controlDocssnent
!Q V
Effective' Page Listing Chapter 9 Page Date Pages Date i,ii I/97 9.4-1 through 9.4-4 Original lii Original 9.4-5 2/95 iv 2/95 9.4-6 through 9.4-20 Original v, vi Original 9.4-21 2/95 9.4-22 through 9.4-51 Original 9.1-1 through 9.1-5 Original 9.4-52 through 9.4-67 2/95 9.1-6 11/% 9.4-69 through 9.4-91 Original 9.1-7 through 9.1-42 Original 9.1-43 11/% 9.5-1 through 9.5-35 Original
- 9.1-44 through 9.1-86 Original 9.5-36 1/97 9.5-37 through 9.5-39 Original 9.2-1 through 9.2-167 Original 9.5-40 1/97 9.5 41 through 9.5-45 Original 9.31 through 9.3-5 Original 9.5-46 2/95 9.3-6 2/95 9.5-47 through 9.5-61 Original 9.3 7 through 9.3-15 Original 9.5-62 2/95 9.3-16 2/95 9.5-63 through 9.5-121 Original 9.3-17 through 9.3-25 Original 9.3-26, 9.3-27 11/%
9.3-28 2/95 9.3-29, 9.3-30 11/96 9.3-31 through 9.3-36 Original 9.3-37 11/% 9.3-38 through 9.3-43 Original 9.3-44 11/% 9.3-45 through 9.3-66 Original 9.3-67, 9.3-68 2/95 9.3-69, 9.3-70 11/% 9.3-71 through 9.3 73 Original 9.3-74 11/% 9.3-75 through 9.3-79 Original 9.3-80 2/95 9.3-81 through 9.3-93 Original 9.3-95 11/% 9.3-97 through 9.3-115 Original
- /G 9.3-117, 9.3-119 11/%
- O- 9.3 121, 9.3-123 Original L =:ampn noneww Aumeur sresome tusn rope 1.s
Sy~ tem 80 + oesign controlDocument
. n$ Chapter 9 Contents -(L )
Page 9.0 Auxiliary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. . .. . . 9.1-1 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling ................... . ... ..... .... 9.1-1 9.1.1 New Fuel Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ......... ..... ..... 9.1-1 9.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage .............. .................. ....... 9.1-6 9.1.3 Pool Cooling and Purification System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9.1-12 9.1.4 Fuel Handling System ............... . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 -22 9.2 Water Systems .............. .. .. ..... . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . 9.2-1 9.2.1 Station Service Water System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2-2 9.2.2 Component Cooling Water System .. . . ....................... 9.2-16 1 9.2.3 Demineralized Water Makeup System ... .... . ............... . 9.2-42 ) 9.2.4 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems . . . . . . .......... ......... 9.2-45 I 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink ... ... .... ... .... . .. ....... 9.2-47 9.2.6 Condensate Storage System . . . . . . . . ..... . ... .............. 9.2-49 9.2.7 Refueling Water System . . . ..... ... ....... . .... ... .. 9.2-51 9.2.8 Turbine Building Cooling Water System . . ... ..... . ... ... . 9.2-53 9.2.9 Chilled Water System ............... ......... . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2-5 5 , 9.2.10 Turbine Building Service Water System .... ........ ...... . . 9.2-58 l n i 9.3 Process Auxiliaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3-1 ( ") 9.3.1 Compressed Air Systems ....... .. .......
. .... 9.3-2 9.3.2 Process and Post-Accident Sampling Systems . . . .......... .......... 9.3-5 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Drainage System . . .................. ...... 9.3-18 i 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 9.3-25 9.4 Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systems .. .. ...... 9.4-1
-9.4.1 Control Complex Ventilation System . . ...... .... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 9.4-3 9.4.2 Fuel Building Ventilation System .......... ...... ..... ..... 9.4-10 9.4.3 Radwaste Building Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. .. 9.4-14 9.4.4 Diesel Building Ventilation System ... .... ... .. .. .. ... . ... ... 9.4-17 9.4.5 Subsphere Building Ventilation System ................ ... ... 9.4-20 9.4.6 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System . .................... 9.4-24 9.4.7 Turbine Building Ventilation System ........................ .. 9.4-30 9.4.8 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System . . . . . . . ........ 9.4-31 9.4.9 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System . . ... . ..... . .... . .... . ... 9.4-34 9.4.10 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems .... 9.4-38 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5-1 9.5.1 Fire Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ..... 9.5 2 9.5.2 Conununications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. ... 9.5-57 9.5.3 Lighting System . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ..... ... ..... 9.5-61 9.5.4 Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System . . . . . .................... 9.5-67 A 9.5.5 ' Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System . . . . . . . . .. . ........ 9.5-74 T _) 9.5.6 Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ... 9.5-77
' ANweved Doespn A0atenel. Aunnery 5ystems Page in
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Chapter 9 Contents (Cont'd.) g - Page 9.5.7 Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System . .. .... . . .. 9.5-81 9.5.8 Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System .. .... . 9.5-87 9.5.9 Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System ..... .. ... . 9.5-90 9.5.10 Compressed Gas Systems . . ..... . .. ... ... . . .. 9.5-91 Chapter 9 Tables Page 9.1-1 Major Tools and Servicing Equipment for Refueling Functions . . . . .. . 9.1-44 9.1-2 Failure Mode Analysis of Fuel Handling Equipment . . . .... . .... 9.1-45 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System . . .. 9.1-46 9.1-4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Principal Component Data Summary .. ... . 9.1-60 9.2.1-1 Station Service Water System Single Failure Analysis . . . . . . . 9.2-60 9.2.1-2 System Component Design Parameters . .. .. .. . . ..... 9.2-61 9.2.1-3 Active Valves, Station Service Water System . . .. 9.2-62 9.2.1-4 Station Service Water System Emergency Power Requirements . .. 9.2-63 9.2.2-1 CCWS Water Quality Specifications .. ... . . . . 9.2-66 9.2.2-2 Component Cooling System Single Failure Analysis . . . . 9.247 9.2.2 3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Floiv Requirements 9.2-69 9.2.2-4 System Component Design Parameters . . .. . . . 9.2-77 9.2.2-5 Active Valves, Component Cooling Water System . . . . 9.2-79 9.2.2-6 Component Cooling Water System Emergency Power Requirements . .. . 9.2-81 9.2.3-1 Primary and Secondary Makeup Water Limits . . ... . . . . .. 9.2-83 9.2.3-2 Process Monitoring Parameters . . . .. . ... .. .. . 9.2-83 9.3.1-1 Active Safety-Related Components Serviced by Instrument Air .. .. 9.3-52 9.3.2-1 Process Sampling Requirements Normal Operation .. .. .. . 9.3-64 9.3.2-2 Process Sampling Requirements Post-Accident Operation . .. . 9.3-67 9.3.4-1 A Reactor Coolant Operating Limits . .... .. . . . . . 9.3-68 9.3.4-18 Reactor Coolant Detailed Startup and Power Operation Specifications . .. . . 9.3-69 9.3.4-2 Design Transients for CVCS Code Class 2 Components which are Part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary .. . . . . ... . ... 9.3-70 9.3.4-3 Excess Reactor Coolant Generated During Typical Plant Operations . . .. 9.3-72 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary . ... . . . . .... . . 9.3-72 9.3.4-5 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters . . . .. ...... ... 9.3-81 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data Number .. 9.3-82 9.3.4-7 Chemical and Volume Control System List of Active Valves .. . . 9.3-86 9.4-1 HVAC System Design Parameters . . ..... ... . ..... 9.4-41 9.4 2 RCS Insulation Heat Loads . . . . .. .. . . . .. . 9.4-49 9.4-3 Input for Release Analysis Filter Efficiencies . ....... ..... .... . 9.4-50 9.4-3A Minimum Instrumentation, Readout, Recording and Alarm Provisiotts fcr ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems . . . . . . . . . . 9.4-51 9.4-4 Heat Loads from NSSS Support Structures .. ... . .. 9.4-52 9.4-5 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 9.4-53 l 9.4-6 Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regulato / Guide 1.140. 9.4-62 9.5.3-1 Typical Illuminance Ranges for Normal Lighting . . . . . . . 9.5-95 Approwd Desiga Meterial Auxmary Systems (2/95) Pageiv
Sr tem 80 + Design ControlDocument (~') Chapter 9 Figures v Page 9.1-1 New and Spent Fuel Storage Rack . . . . ... . . . .. ... . 9.1-61 9.1-2 Cell Details of "L" Insert Box ...... . . . ... ... .. 9.1-62 9.1-3 Pool Cooling and Purification System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram .. . 9.1-63 9.1-4 Refueling Machine . ........... .. . ... . . .... ... 9.1-65 9.1-5 CEA Change Platform . . . .. . . .. .. .. . .... . .... 9.1-66 9.1-6a Fuel Transfer System Carriage and Upender (Fuel Building) .... .... 9.1-67 9,1-6b Fuel Transfer System Carriage and Upender (Containment Building) .. .. . . 9.1-68 9.1-7 CEA Elevator ... .... . ... ... .... ... .... 9.1-69 9.1 8 Typical New Fuel Elevator . . ... . .... ..... . .. 9.1-70 9.1-9 Typical Hydraulic Power Unit . . . .. . . . . ....... 9.1-71 9.1-10 Typical Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly . . . ... .. .. . . 9.1-72 9.1-11 Typical Fuel Handling Tools . ...... . . . . .... 9.1-73 9.1-12 Closure Head Lifting Rig Assembly . .. . . . .... 9.1-74 9.1-13 Typical Core Support Barrel Lift Rig Assembly . . ... . .... . 9.1-75 9.1-14a Typical Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig Assembly . . . . . .. . . 9.1-76 9.1-14b Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig Configuration .. ... .. .. . 9.1-77 9.1-15 Typical Underwater TV System . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 9.1-78 9.1-16 CEA Cutter . . .... .. ... . .. .. ... 9.1-79 9.1-17 Reactor Head Area . ..... . .. . . ... . .. . 9.1-80 n 9.1-18 Multiple Stud Tensioner Installed on Reactor Head ... .. ... ... ... 9.1-81 (',) 9.1-19 Containment Building Major Load Handling Paths . . . .. . . . .. 9.1-82 9.1-83 9.1-20 Fuel Building Major Load Handling Paths .. . . 9.1-21 Fuel Building Genera! Arrangements . ... .... .. .. . 9.1-84 9.1-22 Spent Fuel Storage Area . . . ..... ...... . .. . .. . . . 9.1-85 9.1 23 Spent Fuel Handling Machine .. . . . ... 9.1-86 9.2.1-1 Station Service Water System . . .. ....... .. . .... .. 9.2-85 9.2.2-1 Component Cooling Water System . . ... . . .. . . 9.2-93 9.2.3-1 Demineralized Water Makeup System . . . . .. ..... . 9.2-129 9.2.4-1 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems . .. . . .. .. 9.2-131 9.2.6-1 Condensate Storage System . .... . .. .... . 9.2-133 9.2.8-1 Turbine Building Component Cooling Water System ... .... ... . ... 9.2-135 9.2.9--l Chilled Water System . ......... ...... . .. ... ... . . 9.2-137 9.2.10-1 Turbine Building Service Water System . . .... . ..... .. . 9.2-169 9.3.1-1 Instrument Air System .. .. ..... . .. . . . . . 9.3-88 9.3.1-2 Station Air System ........ .... ... . .. ... . .... . 9.3-92 9.3.1-3 Breathing Air System ...... .. .......... .... .... . .. 9.3-94 9.3.2-1 Primary Sampling System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram . . . . . . 9.3-96 9.3.2-2 Post-Accident Sampling System Functional Flow Diagram .. .... 9.3-98 9.3.3-1 Flow Diagram, Containment Building Floor Drain System . . . ... ... 9.3-100 9.3.3-2 Reactor Building Subsphere Floor Drain System . . ... ... . ... 9.3-102 9.3.3-3 Nuclear Annex Radioactive Floor Drain System . . .... ..... ... 9.3-106 9.3.3-4 Nuclear Annex Non-radioactive Floor Drain System .. .. ..... 9.3-110 9.3.3-5 CVCS Area Floor Drain System . . . ... ..... .. . .. . 9.3-114 (3 9.3.4-1 Chemical & Volume Control System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram . . . 9.3-118 () 9.4-1 Graphical Symbols for Air Flow Diagrams . ..... . . .... .... 9.4-70 9.4-2 Control Complex Ventilation System . . . . ........... . .. .... 9.4-72 Approved Design Metenal Auxikary Systems Pagev
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Chapter 9 Figures (Cont'd.) g Page 9.4-3 Fuel Building Ventilation System . .. . .. ... .. .......... 9.4-76 9.4-4 Air Flow Diagram, Subsphere Building Cooling .. ..... ..... .. .. 9.4-78 9.4-5 Subsphere Building Ventilation System . ... ... . .. .. .... .... 9.4-80 9.4-6 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System . ...... .. ... .. . .. 9.4-82 9.4-7 Diesel Building Ventilation System . ...... ...... . ..... 9.4-84 94-8 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System ..... ..... .... .......... 9.4-88 9.4-9 Flow Diagram, Radwaste Building Ventilation System .. . . . .. 9.4-90 9.4-10 Flow Diagram, CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . 9.4-92 9.5.1-1 Fire Protection Water Distribution System . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . 9.5-97 9.5.1-2 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El. 50+0 ...... . . . . 9.5-99 9.5.1-3 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El. 70+0 . ... .. .... . 9.5-101 9.5.1-4 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El. 81+0 .... . . .. 9.5-103 9.5.1-5 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El. 91+9 ....... . .. 9.5-105 9.5.1-6 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El. I15+6 . . . . . .... .. 9.5-107 9.5.1-7 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El.130+6 . . . . . ...... 9.5-109 9.5.1-8 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El.146+0 . .. .. . 9.5-111 9.5.1-9 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El.170+0 ... .. . . 9.5-113 9.5.1-10 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Plan at El.191 +0 . . ... .... 9.5-115 9.5.1-11 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Section A-A . . . .. . 9.5-117 9.5.1-12 Nuclear Island Fire Barrier Locations; Section B-B . .. .. . . 9.5-119 9.5.4-1 Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System ....... . . . . . 9.5-121 9.5.5-1 Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System . ... . .. ... 9.5-125 9.5.6-1 Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System . . . . ... . 9.5-127 9.5.7-1 Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System .. ... . . . . 9.5-131 9.5.8-1 Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System . ... . . . 9.5-139 9.5.9-1 Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System . ... . ... .. 9.5 141 O Approved Deseper Materra! Aunidiary Systems Page vi
L. : i, 1 (_ Svssam 80+ Densen concer Docannant j 't . L .; ,' 9.0 Auxiliary Systems 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling j 9.1.1 New Fust Stornse l 9.1.1.1 Design Bases ! The following design bases are imposed on the storage of new fuel assemblies:
- e. _ Accidental criticality shall be prevented for the most reactive arrangement of new fuel stored, j For normal operation and postulated. accident conditions identified in Section 9.1.1.3.1.1 (1, 3, j
- 4), Ke rr shall be maintained less than 0.95. For the postulated accident condition identified in Section 9.1.1.3.1.1(2), K.fr hall s be maintained less than 0.98. ;
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'e All requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 are met excluding those regarding the spent fuel pool _i water supply, since new fuel storage is dry. The new fuel storage area is designed to ensure that j any light load, as described in Section 9.1.4.2.1. when handled over the fuel racks, will not exceed the design impact energy capacity of the rack if the load is postulated to fall from its operating height. _ in addition, all heavy loads, as described in Section 9.1.4.2.1, are prevented r from travel over the new fuel racks by the use of nwh==ical and electrical interlocks on the cask handling hoist. The new fuel handling hoist incorporates load limiting devices to preclude fuel damage during handling. !
i C- e The storage racks and facilities are qualified as Seismic Category I per Regulatory Guide 1.29 (See Section 9.1.1.3.3). 1 e The new fuel storage racks provide on-site storage for at least 121 new fuel assemblies. This ! capacity, which represents 50% of the fuel assemblies in the core, envelops any reload batch size j that would occur for refueling cycle lengths up to and including 24 months. i e The fuel handling equipment located in the new fuel storage area meets the requirements of ANS 57.1. The new fuel racks meet the requirements of ANS 57.3. e The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed to meet the requirements of SRP 3.8.4 Appendix D which. addresses appropriate combinations of seismic and dropped loads with allowable stress / deformation limits. 9.1.1.2 ~ Ful4*ia= Description
'!he new fuel racks are typically made up of two 11x11 individual rack modules (see Figures 9.1-1 and 9.1-21), each module containing 121 storage cells. A module is an array of fuel storage cells similar to that shown in Figure 9.1-1. The storage racks are stainless steel honeycomb structures with rectangular fuel storage cells. Cell blockers are installed in alternate cells to limit new fuel storage to 121 fuel assemblies total.
Tha 1.-insett slots are provided in the wall of the fuel rack cavity (box) to permit the I< insert to be locked
- g 'to the fuel cavity by its locking tab after it has been installed. The design of the locking tab and slot is 3 a such th. s the leinserts can be remotely removed from the fuel racks, if required.
Asswoved aseen assenW. Ammehrr Syogusw Aspe 9.F.7
System 80+ Design ControlDocument leinserts are utilized to provide additional metal thickness for neutron absorption and to limit the g displacement allowed between the fuel assemblies and the rack wall to minimize loads due to seismic W acceleration. The cell blockers are installed in the fuel racks before the fuel assemblies are placed in the fuel rack. The design is basically two concentric tubes with end restraints that limit the engagement of the tubes in the rack cavity wall (to avoid protrusion into an adjacent fuel rack cavity). The tubes are collapsed, installed into the fuel rack cavity, expanded into the holes in the fuel rack cavity wall, then locked together with a captured pin. In this manner the cell blockers are positively locked to the fuel racks but can be remotely removed should poison inserts be 'nstalled. The stainless steel construction of the storage racks is compatible with fuel assembly materials and the fuel storage environment. The clearance between the fuel rack module and the walls of the storage cavity is less than the width of a fue3 assembly to preclude the inadvertent placement of a fuel assembly outside of the rack module. The racks are bolted to embedments at the bottom of the rack storage cavity to preclude tipping. The new foel inspection area is provided for the inspection of new fuel assemblies after they have been removed from their shipping container and before they have been placed in the new or spent fuel racks. It will contain a Seismic Category II inspection device to ascertain if the fuel assemblies meet the dimensional requirements for installation into the reactor vessel. Visual inspections will also be performed to check for shipping damage and to ensure that all protective wrapping material has been removed. 9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation O The new fuel storage rad design. discussed in Section 9.1.1.2, ensures that the design bases of Section 9.1.1.1 are met. The capaleility of new fuel storage is described below. 9.1.1.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1.1.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents ; The following postulated accidents are considered in the design of the new fuel storage racks:
- 1. Flooding; com)lete immersion of the entire storage array in pure, unborated water.
- 2. Envelopment of the entire array in a uniform density aqueous foam or mist of optimum density that maximizes the reactivity of the finite array as described in Section 9.1.1.3.1.2.(4) of the criticality safety assumptions. It is postulated that these conditions could be present as a result of fire fighting.
- 3. Dropping a load on the loaded fuel racks whose impact energy, if dropped from the operating elevation. will not exceed the impact energy of the postulated dropped fuel handling tool or the combination of the dropped fuel handling tool, fuel assembly, and any other handling component supported by the hoist cabling associated with the lifting of a fuel assembly.
O Altwoved Desspn Material- Auxnery Systems Page 9.12
l Syrtem 80+ Deslan ControlDocument ; I
/ 4. Tensile load on the new fuel rack of $000 pounds (limited by adjustment of the motor stall torque or load-limiting device of the hoist used to remove fuel from the racks). (See Section 9.1.4.2.1.7)
Although the above accident conditions have been postulated, the fuel handling equipment, new fuel [ racks, and the building arrangement are designed to minimize the possibility of these accidents or the ; 1 effects resulting from these accidents by-e- Maintaining K en less than 0.95 in the event the fuel area becomes flooded with pure, unborated i water. e Maintaining K,n less than 0.98 in the event of envelopment of the entire array in a uniform l i density aqueous foam or mist of optimum density that maximizes the reactivity of the finite array as described in Section 9.1.1.3.1.2.(4) of the criticality safety assumptions.
- Providing positive hoist travel limits and interlocks to ensure proper equipment operation and sequencing.
I e Limiting the insertion loads when installing fuel into the new fuel racks by load measuring devices or hoist underload interlocks. j , e Designing the new fuel racks for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) conditions and dropped fuel ; assembly conditions, considered separately, e ! Designing the new fuel handling hoist to preclude the hoist, or any part thereof, from falling into j the new fuel handling area. I o Providing a drain line at the bottom of the storage cavity to direct any fluid to the floor drain l
- sump. The drain incorporates a non-return check valve. l l i e Designing the building with no water source in the immediate area of the new fuel storage racks. .
The fixed fire fighting water supply standpipes are seismically designed (SSE). e Restricting the lifting capacity of the new fuel handling hoist that is used to remove new fuel assemblies from the new fuel rack by either adjusting the motor stall torque or using load limiting devices. (See Paragraphs 9.1.1.3.1.1.(4) and 9.1.4.2.1.7). Therefore excessive uplifting force ! cannot be applied. e Locating the new fuel storage racks at the opposite end of the fuel building from the spent fuel f pool to eliminate the ' possibility of moving heavy loads near the new fuel storage area. Movement of heavy loads over the fuel racks is restricted by the use of electrical interlocks on ! the cask handling hoist. ; e Locating the new fuel storage racks in a concrete vault at the opposite end of the fuel area of the i nuclear annex from the spent fuel pool area to preclude passage of the cask handling hoist over ! the new fuel racks during the handling operations associated with spent fuel inspection, handling, l and shipping. This location minimizes the number of systems or structures located in the vicinity Q Q. of the new fuel storage facility. All systems or structures in the vicinity will be designated as Seismic Category 11 to preclude their failure and entry into the new fuel storage area. 1 Approcesf W AgosenInf- AamuEary Syssenes Pepe S. 7 .7 , i 4
-w- I
,, ,_ - - . . r ,-m .-. - ,. _ e,,c, .-
System 80+ Design Control Document
- Permitting no load to be carried over the loaded fuel racks whose impact energy, if dropped from the operating elevation, will exceed the impact energy of the postulated dropped fuel handling tool or the combination of the dropped fuel handling tool, fuel assembly, and any other handling component supported by the hoist cabling when lifting fuel assemblies. The Technical Specification incorporates the requirement that the impact energy of all loads carried over the loaded fuel racks will not exceed this condition.
- Designing the refueling machine and spent fuel handling machine to hold their loads during a safe shutdown earthquake or a loss of power condition (See Section 9.1.4).
9.1.1.3.1.2 Criticality Safety Assumptions The following assumptions are made in evaluating criticality safety:
- 1. Under postulated conditions of complete flooding by unborated water, the storage array is treated as a finite array of assemblies having an infinite fuel length.
- 2. Under postulated conditions of envelopment by aqueous foam or mist, a range of foam or mist densities is examined to ensure that the maximum reactivity of the array is established. The foam or mist is assumed to be pure water.
- 3. The poisoning effects of rack structure are neglected. Prior calculations have shown this to be a conservative assumption, where the degree of conservatism depends on the exact rack structure design. It is also assumed that no supplemental fixed poisons are utilized in the storage array.
- 4. A concrete storage cavity is utilized for new fuel storage. Two lixll rack modules are located O
in the cavity with cell blockers installed in alternate cells to limit new fuel storage to 121 fuel assemblies. The criticality analyses for the new fuel racks assume a close-fitting, 2-foot thick concrete reflector on all six sides of the new fuel rack array. In actuality, the concrete walls surrounding the new fuel racks are separated from the racks by several inches, with the floor and material above the fuel also several inches away from the racks. A close fitting, thick concrete wall provides better neutron reflection than both the reflector consisting of a concrete wall separated from the array by several inches and the reflector consisting of the actual materials above the active fuel. Therefore, the configuration assumed for the criticality analyses is conservative with respect to the actual configuration of the new fuel rack array.
- 5. The rack is assumed to be filled to design capacity with fuel assemblies.
- 6. No burnable poison shims or other supplemental neutron poisons (e.g., CEAs) are assumed to be present in the fuel assemblies.
9.1.1.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins Criticality safety margins for initial on-site storage are maintained by:
- Limiting the capacity to 121 fuel assemblies.
- Defining an overall array configuration. 1 l
l Approwd Deslyrr Atarenial. Ausmary Systems Page 9.14 j j
i i System 80+ Deslan ControlDocmunt o Providing adequate mechanical separation of fuel assemblies in the array, even under postulated
, l accident conditions. :
1 The mechanical separation provided is discussed in Section 9.1.1.2. In evaluating criticality safety, the ! three-dimensional Monte Carlo computer code KENO-IV (Reference 2) is used to perform the criticality. calculations for the new fuel storage racks for the postulated accident condition of flooding with pure, ; 4 unborated water for the full range of water densities. The calculations are performed for a typical i repeating lattice unit of the new fuel storage racks and a fuel enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U-235, which . ! envelops the design requirements for any fuel management scheme. The calculations _ include an ; allowance in K, for uncertainties due to deviations from nominal conditions (e.g., variations in water ! temperature) and calculational uncertainties. Including uncertainties, the maximum Kg is less than 0.95
.{
for flooding with pure, unborated water and less than 0.98 for immersion in a foam or mist of the j
- optimum moderation dens?ty. l The rack structure provides a separation of at least 10 inches, which is greater than the separation l I
between fuel assemblies within the rack, between the top of the active fuel and the top of the rack to l preclude criticality in the event a fuel assembly is dropped into a horizontal position on the top of the ; rack. i , i The new fuel storage area is protected from the effects of missiles or natural phenomena as discussed in 1 Section 3.5. ! i 9.1.1.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 i- l 4 ( All requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 are met excluding those regarding the spent fuel pool water supply, since new fuel storage is dry. The new fuel storage area is designed to ensure that any light load,
~
when handled over the fuel racks, will not exceed the design impact energy of the rack if the load is postulated to fall from its operating height. In addition, all heavy loads are prevented from travel over the new fuel racks by the use of mechanical and electrical interlocks on the cask handling hoist and the ;
. new fuel handling hoist incorporates load limiting devices to preclude fuel damage during handling.
9.1.1.3.3 hianic Classification
- a. ,
The New Fuel Storage Racks, Storage Vault, and the Rack Restraint System are qualified as Seismic l Category I. The seismic category of other building components associated with handling fuel assemblies ! is noted in Table 3.2-1. Those items in the immediate vicinity of the new fuel storage area that are not ! qualified as Seismic Category I are designed such that their failure will not result in damage to the fuel #
- racks or fuel (See Section 9.1.1.3.1.1). !
9.1.1.3.4 Storage Capacity .
- Storage is typically provided for a total of 121 new fuel assemblies in two 50% density 11x11 racks. !
l t O , Approwd aeste munder. Ameswy aywommes Pepe 9.F.5 , i 5 I
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage 9.1.2.1 Design Bases The following design bases are imposed on the storage of fuel within the spent fuel pool:
- Accidental criticality shall be prevented for the most reactive arrangement of stored spent fuel by avoiding a Ker greater than 0.95. This design basis shall be met under any normal operation and postulated accident conditions identified in Section 9.1.2.3.1.1.
- The requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.13,1.29,1.115, and 1.117 shall be met. The spent fuel pool area is designed to prevent a loss of water in the fuel pool from uncovering the fuel, prevent heavy loads from traversing over the fuel racks when the racks contain fuel assemblies, withstand the impact of a fuel aasembly or a handling tool or a combination of both falling from the maximum handling elevation, incorporate components meeting the seismic classification designated in Table 3.2-1, and incorporate water level and radiation monitoring instrumentation.
- The storage racks and facilities shall be Seismic Category I.
- The noent fuel storage racks provide on-site storage for at least 907 spent fuel assemblies. All components within the area of the fuel racks meet the requirements of Table 3.2-1 to preclude rack damage.
- The racks shall not be anchored to the pool floor or wall. Clearances shall be allowed for rack tipping but the rack design and loading shall preclude rack overturning.
9.1.2.2 Facility Description 9.1.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool The spent fuel pool consists of three separate water filled fuel storage and handling areas; the spent fuel cask laydown area, the spent fuel storage rack area, and the fuel transfer system canal area (See Figure 9.1-21). Each area can be sealed from its adjacent area by a hinged gate equipped with elastomer seals. The gates allow the spent fuel cask laydown area and the fuel transfer system canal area to be drained without affecting the water level within the spent fuel storage rack area. These gates are designed so that water pressure in the spent fuel storage area will maintain them closed when the adjacent areas are dewatered. The fuel transfer system canal area contains the fuel transfer system that is used for transporting fuel assemblies to and from the containment building. The spent fuel cask laydown area contains the spent fuel cask that is used for the transport of spent fuel assemblies from the nuclear annex. All of the above areas are stainless steel lined, concrete walled pools that are an integral part of the nuclear annex. The depth of the spent fuel pool is such that when the irradiated fuel assembly is being carried over the spent fuel racks by the spent fuel handling machine at its maximum lift height, there is sufficient water coverage to ensure that personnel on the spent fuel handling machine or on the operating floor around the pool are not exposed to radiation levels exceeding 2.5 mrem per hour. Awroved Deshyn Material AuxMary Systems (11/96) Page 9.16
--h - ei ,.,LJ.Ji,am 4 m.. o. J m .p.2.:. Ju eamA .m ag4 ..; ,i .itaA.4,_ 4__. Jg 43 u_-.edz - ,44 m-+4.asa* m A M,3,4 -- ,_
Syrtem 80+ Deskn controlDocann_nt 1 m Piping penetrations to the spent fuel pool are at least 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies when
- the assemblies are seated in the spent fuel racks. The bottom of the gates that lead from the spent fuel pool to the fuel transfer system canal and the spent fuel shipping cask laydown area are above the top of the stored fuel assemblies. The spent fuel racks and the pool floor are designed to withstand the i maximum impact energy of a dropped fuel handling tool or a dropped fuel assembly with its handling ,
~i tool from the maximum lift height. Redundant low and high level water alarm and temperature : measurement systems, as described in Section 9.1.3.5, in conjunction with the pool skimmer system, minimizes the potent!:.! for overfilling the pool. The ventilation system for the spent fuel pool area is described in Section 9.1.3.1.6. 3 9.1.2.2.2 Spent Fuel Pool Ste age Racks j
- The spent fuel pool storage racks are typically made up of twelve 11xil individual modules containing 121 storage cells each (see Figures 9.1-21 and 9.1-22). A module is an array of fuel storage cells similar
.to that shown in Figure 9.1-1. The storage racks are stainless steel honeycomb structures with ,
rectangular fuel storage cells. The stainless steel construction of the racks is compatible with fuel ; assembly materials and the spent fuel borated water environment. q The. spent fuel is stored in two regions of the pool. Region I provides core off-load capability for
. approximately 363 spent fuel assemblies (equivalent to one and one-half cores). This is achieved with 50% density storage in a checkerboard array using "L" insens in the usable cells (Figure 9.1-2). The i "L" insert is a non-poisoned stainless steel insen which provides the needed flux trap water gap. Region i II provides 75% density storage for approximately 544 spent fuel assemblies. The cells that are not used are blocked to prevent improper storage. A total of approximately 907 usable spaces for spent fuel
'O storage is thus provided. if new fuel assemblies are placed in the spent fuel pool in preparation for a refueling outage, they are - located in Region I. Space in Region I is also provided for the storage of failed fuel assemblies. i The two regions permit increased spent fuel storage by the use of a denser fuel storage array for full ~ burnup fuel assemblies. This allows increased storage capacity within the pool without the use of neutron poison insens. Both Region I and Il storage areas are designed to accommodate fuel assemblies with initial enrichment up to 5 weight percent U-235. Region I has no restriction on burnup history of stored fuel assemblies. Region 11 is restricted for storage of fuel having a minimum cumulative burnup which is dependent on
- the initial enrichment for each fuel assembly. ((This restriction on fuel storage in Region II will be imposed by administrative controls developed and implemented by the COL Applicant.))!
The division of the spent fuel storage area into two regions provides an increased storage capacity (75% density vs. 50% density) without the use of poison inserts while at the same time providing a large storage capability for spent fuel assemblies with no restrictions on their burnup history. Total spent fuel storage capacity represents approximately 376% of a full core. Region 11 represents approximately 226% of a full core.
- O ;
3 COL information item; see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. Awmatoneten naneerw Aumnery spenome rose s. t.1
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument The structural design of the spent fuel rack and pool includes provisions for accepting loads associated with 100% storage with neutron poison inserts in order to meet future expansion potential. 9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation The spent fuel pool storage rack design and location, discussed in Section 9.1.2.2, provides assurance that design bases of Section 9.1.2.1 are met as noted in the following sections. 9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1.2.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents The following postulated accidents are considered in the design of the spent fuel pool storage racks:
- A load dropped on the loaded fuel racks whose impact energy, if dropped from the operating elevation, will not exceed the impact energy of the postulated dropped fuel handling tool or the combination of the dropped fuel handling tool, fuel assembly, and any other fuel handling component supported by the hoist cabling. Storage locations for tools and equipment are designed to preclude damage to safety related equipment as described in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3.
- Tensile load on the rack of 5000 pounds (limited by adjustment of the motor stall torque or load-limiting device of the crane used to load fuel into the racks). (See Section 9.1.4.2.1.3)
- A fuel assembly accidentally located in either a blocked off fuel storage cavity or adjacent to the outside of the fuel rack.
Although the above accident conditions have been postulated, the fuel handling equipment, fuel racks, and the building arrangement are designed to minimize the possibility of these accidents or the effects resulting from these accidents by:
- Providing positive mechanical travel hoist limits and interlocks to ensure proper equipment operation and sequence.
- Limiting the handling of loads when installing fuel into or removing fuel from the fuel rack.
- Designing the fuel racks for (1) SSE conditions and (2) a dropped fuel assembly handling tool or the combination of the dropped fuel handling tool, fuel assembly, and any other component supported by the hoist cable (conditions (1) and (2) considered separately).
- Designing the fuel handling machine as Seismic Category II to preclude the fuel handling machine, or any part thereof, from falling into the spent fuel pool.
- Meeting regulatory positions C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and regulatory positions C.1 and C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.13, as these positions relate to the ability of the components to withstand the effects of earthquakes.
O Approved Design Materia!- AuniGary Systems Page 9.1-8
l l r System 80+ oestan cenerarcoeument l l 1 4 . Examples of compliance are demonstrated by the assignment of the various Seismic Categories lf to the building structures, fuel handling equipment, and other components as noted in Table 3.2-1 i i and the design of the equipment and components meeting these requirements. Fuel handling
- ' equipment that moves over the reactor core and spent fuel racks is also provided with seismic <
d restraims to ensure that the components do not become disengaged from their operating rails and fall imo the pool during a seismic event.
- e Meeting regulatory positions C.1, C.2 and C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.13, ANS 57.1/ ANSI- i N208, ANS 57.2/ ANSI-N210. and NUREG-0612 as they relate to radioactive release as a resuh 1 . of fuel damage. .
Examples of compliance are demonstrated by the design of the fuel building which precludes l movement of the spent fuel cask handling hoist over the new and spent fuel storage racks when they comain fuel assemblies, designation of load paths for all heavy lifts, limiting the weight and . lift height of any load that is moved over the fuel racks such that its impact energy, if dropped, will not exceed the design impact energy of the fuel racks or fuel pool, and ensuring that the lift height of the spent fuel shipping cask does not exceed 30 feet which limits the cask from bemg i raised above the operating floor elevation.- :; e Permitting no load to be carried over the loaded fuel racks whose impact energy, if dropped from , the operating elevation, will exceed the impact energy of the postulated dropped fuel handling tool, fuel assembly, and any other handling component supported by the hoist cabling when lifting fuel assemblies. The Technical Specification incorporates the requirement that the impact energy of all loads carried over the loaded fuel racks will not exceed this condition.
* . Providing mechanical and electrical interlocks on the nuclear annex overhead hoists to preclude movement of fuel shipping containets or casks and other heavy loads from being transported over ;
the spent fuel pool. (See Section 9.1.4.2.1.7) l' ~
- Designing the refueling machine and spent fuel handling machine to hold their loads during a safe }
shutdown earthquake or a loss of power condition (See Section 9.1.4). [ 1 9.1.2.3.1.2 Criticality Safety Assumptions The following assumptions are made in evaluating criticality safety: ,
- No control element assemblies (CEAs) are assumed to be present in the fuel assembhes.
. e The rack is assumed to be filled to the initial on-site storage capacity with fuel assemblies of the b type whose criticality safety is evaluated with the apent fuel pool filled with water, j
* : For normal operation, no credit is assumed for the. boron normally found in the spent fuel pool water. For the flooded spent fuel pool criticalhy analysis, an optimum temperature is assumed ,
- . for the water moderator. In evaluating the criticality limits of a dropped fuel assembly and tool accident, it is assumed that boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water is less than one-half !
of normal (see Section 9.1.3.1.4) and well below the minimum defined by Technical Specifications. i e An infinite fuel assembly array is assumed for the flooded spent fuel pool analysis. Awe owe # Deep assewdeb AassNory Speessw Aspe 9.f-9 { I
- 1. . . . . . - - .
Design ControlDocument S[ tem 80+ l
- Only one fuel assembly is assumed to be dropped in a fuel handling accident.
- It is conservatively assumed that four rows of fuel rods are damaged during a fuel assembly I handling accident. l
- Eighty-five percent (85 %) of the actual burnup for a given initial enrichment is used for each fuel assembly in the spent fuel rack criticality analysis.
1 9.1.2.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins Criticality safety margins for initial on-site storage are assured by:
- Neglecting the neutron absorption effects associated with the boron normally in the spent fuel pool water during normal operations and assuming that spent fuel pool boron concentratio n during a fuel assembly drop accident is less than one-half of normal (see Section 9.1.3.1.4) and well below the minimum defined by Technical Specifications.
- When fuel is stored in the borated or mixed modes (freshly burned fuel assembly is inadvertently placed in Region II), the minimum boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water is that defined by Technical Specifications that apply whenever fuel is to be moved in the storage pool.
- Lhuting the capacity to 907 fuel assemblies.
In evaluating criticality safety, the two-dimensional transport code DOT-4 (Reference 1) is used to calculate the K,g in the spent fuel storage racks for Region I and Region II for normal design conditions. The calculations are performed for a typical repeating lattice unit for Region I and Region II of the spent fuel storage racks. No credit is assumed for the boron normally found in the spent fuel pool water. For Region I, K,g is calculated for fresh fuel with an enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U-235, with allowance for uncertainties due to deviation from nominal conditions (e.g., variations in fuel rack pitch, rack steel uncertainties). Including all uncertainties, the maximum K,g for Region I is less than 0.95. For Region II, K,y is calculated for various combinations of fuel enrichments and fuel burnups, with allowance for uncertainties due to deviations from nominal conditions and calculational uncertainties. The initial enrichments range up to and including 5 wt.% U-235. These results conservatively establish the minimum cumulative burnup as a function of initial enrichment for Region II fuel necessary to maintain K,y less than 0 95. (For conservatism, the minimum cumulative burnup represents 0.85 of the actual fuel bumup.) The three-dimensional Monte Carlo Computer code KENO-IV (Reference 2) is used to calculate K,y for the postulated accident condition of a dropped fuel assembly in Region II. The dropped fuel assembly is conservatively assumed to be a fresh fuel assembly with 5.0 wt.% U-235 initial enrichment. The assumed boron concentrations are significantly conservative (less than one half of the minimum boron concentration required by the Technical Specifications) with respect to the actual boron concentrations that could occur during the postulated dropped fuel assembly accident. With these assumed boron concentrations, the maximum K,g (including uncertainties) for the postulated dropped fuel assembly accident condition is substantially less than 0.95. Thus, for normal operation and postulated accident conditions, K,g is shown to be less than 0.95. The Kg values are substantially below the limiting values allowed by ANS/ ANSI 51.1-1983 and provide adequate margin for calculation uncertainty. AAerovmf Design Material. Auxmary Systems Page 9.1 10
System 80+ Design controlDocument O d The spent fuel storage area is protected from the effects of missiles or natural ; Category I structure, as discussed in Section 3.5. omena by a Seismic l 1 9.1.2.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 l The spent fuel storage facility conforms with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13. 9.1.2.3.3 Seismic Classification i The spent fuel storage racks, the spent fuel pool concretc structure, the spent fuel rack support system, and the poolliner are Seismic Category I. Refer to Table 3.2-1 for a tabulation of the designated seismic categories for the fuel handling and nuclear annex components related to fuel handling. 9.1.2.3.4 Storage Capacity ; l Storage is provided for at least 907 spent fuel assemblies. This provides storage for approximately 10. years of unit operation. , 9.1.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly Cooling The spent fuel pool storage racks are designed to prevent extensive bulk boiling in the racks as well as : maintain fuel cladding temperatures well below 650'F for the following collective conditions: p
- Natural convection water circulation within the spent fuel pool, j
(.'
- Maximum pool water temperature of 150*F at the fuel rack inlet flow passages, and
- Maximum fuel pool heat load as described in Section 9.1.3.
9.1.2.3.6 Compliance with ANS 57.2 4 The design of the Spent Fuel Storage facility conforms with the guidelines of paragraph 5.4 of ANS 57.2. As an example, the facility incorporates monitoring systems to verify pal water temperature to insure adequate fuel assembly cooling, radiation detectors to determine if radiation levels exceed predetermined setpoints and alarms to notify plant personnel of abnormal conditions. l The features include:
- A radiation monitor with audible alarm on the spent fuel handling machine adjacent to the operator control console.
- Radiation monitors, including a continuous air monitor, within the spent fuel pool area. At least one monitor indicates and alarms in the control room.
- Uninterruptible communications by the use of sound powered phones or a separate communication system.
- Redundant alarm and actuation system for the pool ventilation system during those periods it is p/
y . not in use.
= . m an.w w . m . ,snn r.o. s. t.1 r
l System 80+ Design ControlDocument , l e Ventilation sampling provisions. To facilitate use, all monitoring systems are capable of being calibrated. 9.1.2.3.7 Shielding Concrete and water shielding are provided that attenuates radiation from the maximum design loading of stored fuel assemblies such that radiation zone criteria are met. 9.1.3 Pool Coollag and Purification System The pool cooling and purification system (PCPS) consists of the spent fuel pool cooling system and the pool purification system. The pool cooling and purification system is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the stored spent fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool water, and purify the contents of the refueling pool during refueling operations. Pool cooling is accomplished by taking heated water from the pool, pumping it through a heat exchanger, and returning the cooled water to the pool. The pool cooling and purification system is also used to clarify and purify the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer canal, and refueling pool water. Piping does not interfere with the spent fuel racks in the spent fuel pool. The PCPS is capable of maintaining the spent fuel pool water at a low enough temperature to prevent excessive vapor formation or evaporation from the water surface, or cause excessive discomfort to personnel during fuel handling operations. 9.1.3.1 Design Bases I 9.1.3.1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to remove the amount of decay heat that is produced by the number of spent fuel assemblies that are stored in the spent fuel pool following a unit refueling complete core offload, and the accumulated assemblies resulting from prev 6us refuelings. Two cooling trains are capable of maintaining the spent fuel pool bulk water temperature at or below 120*F when the heat exchangers are supplied with component cooling water at the design flow and temocrature. The flow through the spent fuel pool provides sufficient mixing to maintain uniform pool water conditions. 9.1.3.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering Prottdion System piping is arranged so that failure of any one pipeline cannot drain the spent fuel pool below the water level required for radiation shielding. 9.1.3.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup The pool purification system filters, demineralizers and strainers are designed to provide adequate purification to permit unrestricted spent fuel pool area access for plant personnel, to maintain a spent fuel pool surface dose rate below 2.5 mrem /hr during fuel storage in the spent fuel pool, and to maintain optical clarity of the spent fuel pool water. The optical clarity of the spent fuel pool water surface is maintained by use of the system's skimmers. The cleanup system is designed for a flow rate sufficient to ensure adequate circulation of the entire spent fuel pool water volume, and to maintain the specified water chemistry. Approved Desipre Meterial Auxniary Systems Page 9.1-12
Sv' tem 80+' Desfort ControlDocanwrt , s The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water is maintamed at approximately the same f) j s/ concentration as in the refueling water. l i Provisions are made to make up water to the spent fuel pool. The makeup water meets all specified water ; chemistry requirements. , 9.1.3.1.4 System Capacity Bases ; For all normal plant operations and normal spent fuel pool heat load conditions, the maximum spent fuel pool bulk water temperature is 120'F. Under heat load conditions of spent fuel in all usable rack spaces , (Section 9.1.2.2.2), which includes, as a minimum, a full core offload with 10 years of irradiated fuel in the pool, the maximum bulk water temperature is 140*F. Given a single active failure, the maximum . temperatures for normal conditions or a full core offload are 140*F or 180'F respectively. The normal , heat load is the decay heat which occurs when an accumulation of spent fuel equal to 10 full power years ; is in the spent fuel pool, with the newest spent fuel batch having just been placed in the pool during
, refueling at 120 hours after shutdown. The resultant heat load for this condition is 19.19 x 106 bru/hr.
The full :are offload heat load is equal to the normal heat load plus the addition of the decay heat from 6 - a full core offload 120 hours after shutdown. The resultant heat load for this condition is 67.25 x 10
' btu /hr. The heat load from any other combination of spent fuel within the pool will result in heat loads i lower than 67.25 x 106 btu /hr.
- A Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 (SC-3) borated makeup water source from the Chemical and j Volume Control System (Section 9.3.4) is provided to the spent fuel pool. Nonborated water from a non- i seismic source is used to make up for the evaporation losses from the spent fuel pool during normal !
j operation, j The demineralized water makeup system (Section 9.2.3) is the source of non-borated makeup water to the spent fuel pool. There is no effect on criticality as a result of the addition of non-borated makeup ;
- to the spent fuel pool due to the following design features
o Adequate margin to criticality achieved by requiring a boron concentration in the range of 4000-4400 ppm. e .Two locked closed valves with administrative controls to assure that non-borated makeup operation is intentional and closely monitored. o Spent fuel pool instrumentation with alarms on high level. j l e Sampling for proper boron concentration. l
\
9.1.3.1.5 1Aakage Detection and Isolation Capabilities l The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) design includes the following features: 1 o- A means for detecting leakage from the system (or components of the system). o Components aml headers designed to provide individual isolation capability to assure system j
' function, control system leakage, and allow system maintenance, i l
Annmed onow anemow. Aummay spenne rose s.s.ss ,
1 i System 80+ Design ControlDocument 1 i e A means for detecting radioactive leakage and chemical contamination from interfacing systems, i I and the ability to preclude the long term effects of chemical contamination or the spreading of radioactivity. Component or system leakage from the PCPS is detected by several means, including area sump and floor drain level monitoring, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) equipment drain tank level monitoring, Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) radiation monitors, spent fuel pool level monitoring, and, during refueling operations, refueling pool level monitoring. The nuclear annex floor drains are provided with adequate capacity for anticipated leakage and their levels are monitored. The CVCS equipment drain tank is designed to receive leakage from PCPS valves and components. The tank is used to monitor PCPS leakage. High level is alarmed in the control room. RMS radiation monitors in the reactor building and nuclear annex are provided to detect radioactive system leakage and are alarmed for high or increasing radiation levels. A high leakage rate is detected by a change in spent fuel pool level, and, during refueling operations, a change in refueling pool level. Both pools have low level alarms in the control room. The PCPS is composed of two independent cooling trains used to remove heat from the spent fuel pool and two independent purification trains used to purify water in the spent fuel pool, and, in refueling operations, the fuel transfer canal and refueling pool. In order that system function may be assured, system leakage controlled, and system maintenance performed, all components and headers in this system are capable of being individually isolated. To prevent a loss of system function when individual components are isolated, the independent trains are cross-connected. The pool cooling system cross-connect line has two normally closed isolation valves that are physically separated from each other in order to prevent a common failure. Normally closed valves are opened to allow the cooling or purification flow to bypass the isolated components in a train and flow through the identical components in the redundant train. If required, an entire train can be isolated and the redundant train used to fulfill system requirements. In addition, the filters and ion exchangers in the system can be isolated and bypassed without the need to divert flow to the second train. System leakage can be controlled by isolating the leak and rerouting flow through the redundant train so that the required cooling or purification function remains available. System maintenance is performed by isolating the equipment needing service and bypassing flow to the redundant train. If necessary, an entire train can be isolated and shut down for limited periods of time while the second train performs the required system functions. Intersystem leakage is detected in several ways. PCPS leakage to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) through a failure of the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers is detected by radiation monitors present in the CCWS which detect PCPS to CCWS leakage. Leakage to the CVCS is detected by monitoring the equipment drain tank level. Leakage from the PCPS to the Solid Waste Management System is detected by changes in spent resin storage tank levels. Leakage to the Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) from the PCPS is detected through monitoring of the spent fuel pool, refueling pool, and IRWST levels. Leakage to the PCPS from other systems is detected by changes in spent fuel pool and refueling pool levels and analysis of samples taken from the PCPS. PCPS filters and ion exchangers preclude long term corrosion, organic fouling, and the spread of radioactivity in the system. 9.1.3.1.6 Radiological Contiels The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) provides the capability to remove radioactive materials from the spent fuel pool water. The operation of the PCPS and the provision of adequate shielding permit unrestricted access of plant personnel to the spent fuel pool area by maintaining the radiation level as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) (<2.5 mrem /hr). The PCPS equipment includes Approved Design Material. Auxmery Systems page 9.1 14
System 80+ Desinn contraroccument demineralizers, filters and strainers which provide for the removal and retention of radioactive material, : such as corrosion products. The PCPS's design features include.
- o Provisions for the transfer of spent filter cartridges and resins to the Solid Waste Management F System (SWMS) for processing and disposal. ;
'o Routing of spent resin transfer lines through shielded pipe chases to the SWMS. l i
e Provision of a flushing capability for spent resin transfer lines to prevent clogging, which would create hot spots and require additional maintenance. , i l
~
- Floor drains in the spent fuel pool area are provided to collect and route radioactive liquid to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS) for processing. The floor drain system's design features, discussed ;
in Section 9.3, include:
'e- Floor drain piping are sloped to permit gravity flow of liquids to the sumps. ;
e e Floors are sloped to facilitate the collection of leakage from equipment or spills. e U bends are provided to prevent migration of noble gases between elevations. ! o- Curbing is provided to facilitate the collection of spills from equipment. The Fuel Building Ventilation System (Section 9.4-2), which is Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 (SC- ; i 3), provides for a controlled, monitored release pathway for gaseous effluent from the Fuel Building, as well as environmental control for the operation of equipment. The Fuel Building Ventilation System i consists of two 100% capacity exhaust systems. Each system is provided with a radiation monitor 4 upstream of the filter beds. The Fuel Building Ventilation System is automatically switched to the filtered mode and an alarm signal is received in the Control Room. The exhaust is then vented through the unit, where it is monitored prior to release to the environment. This mitigates the dose consequences to plant l personnel and the general public due to a fuel handling accident. System 80+"") ventilation systems 3 - are designed to provide air flow from areas of lower potential activity to areas of higher potential activity. This minimizes the potential for the spread of airborne contamination. Areas that have a high potential for contamination, such as fuel storage areas, are kept at a slightly negative pressure to prevent the spread l ! of airborne contamination to noncontaminated areas of the plant. ; i i 9.1.3.2 System Description , 9.1.3.2.1 General Description A flow diagram of the Pool Cooling and Purification System is shown in Figure 9.1-3. Design i parameters for the major safety-related components are shown in Table 9.1-4. The safety-related spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two independent cooling trains.- The system :
- is located in a Seismic Category I building which provides protection from the effects of. natural ,
phenomena and missiles._ The spent fuel pool cooling system (piping, pumps, valves, and heat _{ exchangers) is safety related, Safety Class 3 '(SC-3). The spent fuel pool receives normal borated j F i-i' System 80+ is a trademark of Combustion Engineering. Inc. l 4preved assen assearW- Aussary sysseau pape S. f.75 I
. = - . -
i I l Sys~m 80 + Design ControlDocument 1 makeup water from the Chemical and Volume Control System which is Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 (SC-3). The demineralized water makeup system is the source of non-borated makeup water to the i spent fuel pool. ! Each cooling train incorporates one heat exchanger and pump and associated piping, valving, and instrumentation. Each cooling train is designed to service the spent fuel pool, with designed spent fuel assembly loading, and to maintain the bulk fluid temperature of the spent fuel pool below 120*F during normal operation. The spent fuel pool cooling system removes decay heat from fuel stored in the spent fuel pool. Spent fuel is placed in the pool during the refueling sequence and stored there for decay heat removal. Heat is transferred from the spent fuel pool cooling system, through one of two heat exchangers, to the component cooling water system. When either cooling train is in operation, water flows from the spent fuel pool to the spent fuel pool c.ooling pump suction, is pumped through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and is retumed to the pool. The spent fuel pool suction connections enter near the normal water level so that the pool cr.anot be gravity drained. The return line contains an antisiphon device, also to prevent gravity drainage of the pool. To assist in maintaining spent fuel pool water clarity, pool surface is cleaned by a sbmmer. Each of the two pool purification trains consists of a strainer, a pump, a filter and a demineralizer to maintain spent fuel pool, or refueling pool, water clarity and purity. This purification loop is sufficient for removing fission products and other contaminants which may be introduced if a leaking fuel assembly is transferred to the spent fuel pool. Either cleanup train may be used to clean and purify the refueling water while spent fuel pool heat removal operations proceed. The spent fuel pool water is separated from the water in the transfer canal by a gate. The gate is installed so that the transfer canal may be drained to allow maintenance of the fuel transfer equipment. 9.1.3.2.2 Component Description The PCPS cooling pumps and heat exchangers are Safety Class 3 and are designed to ASME B&PV Code, Section 111, Subsection ND rules. The pool purification pumps, filters, strainers, and demineralizers are designed as non-nuclear safety. All PCPS containment isolation valves and associated piping are Safety Class 2, and are designed to ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Subsection NC rules. 9.1.3.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps Two identical pumps are installed in parallel in the spent fuel pool cooling system. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient coolant flow through a spent fuel pool heat exchanger to meet the system cooling requirements. The pumps are horizontal, centrifugal units, with all wetted surfaces being stainless steel or an equivalent corrosion-resistant material. The NPSli available from the system exceeds each pump's required NPSil. This is based on the minimum pool level and the maximum pool temperature of 180*F. The pumps are controlled manually from a local station. Each pump is powered from the Class IE electrical system. 9.1.3.2.2.2 Skimmer The skimmers are designed to circulate surface water through the spent fuel pool cleanup system and return it to the pool via the spent fuel pool cleanup pumps. Approved Desipes Meterial. Auxmary Systems Page 9.1 16
--_ _ -. . _ - _ ___ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ ~ ._ __
System 80+ oestan controlDocument ; I
- 9.1.3.2.2.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers The heat exchangers are shell-and-tube type. Spent fuel pool water circulates through the tubes while ;
component cooling water circulates through the shell. The use of two independent heat exchangers ' provides redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assuming a single active failure. The
- . tubes and other surfaces in contact with the pool water are austenitic stainless steel and the shell is carbon steel. The tubes are welded to the tubesheet to prevent leakage of pool water.
- 9.1.3.2.2.4 Pool Pudfication Pumps !
- Two refueling pool purification pumps are used to circulate water from the refueling pool, through refueling pool demineralizers and filters. The refueling pool purification pumps are also used to circulate water from the spent fuel pool in the same fashion.
- 9.1.3.2.2.5~ Pool Denninerall=3 1
- Each demineralizer is designed to provide adequate spent fuel pool or refueling pool water purity for _
unrestricted access to either pool working area. In addition, the demineralizers maintain pool water visual i clarity. l Each demineralizer contains a flow distributor on the influent to prevent channeling of the resin bed and - a resin retention element on the effluent to preclude discharge of resin with the effluent process fluid. ; Connections are provided to replace resins by sluicing to the SWMS. j Demineralizer resin replacement is to be based on three criteria: l e Breakthrough of cesium, cobalt, chloride, or fluoride. , o Pressure drop not to exceed demineralizer and resin vendors' recommended limit for the as ' i procured equipment. i i e Thermal excursion approaching the resin vendors' recommended limit for the as procured ! equipment. ! 4 Overtemperature protection is provided for the refueling pool demineralizers by automatically bypassing ) the demineralizers on a high temperature signal to valves PC-400 and PC-401, in the event that the l temperature of the spent fuel cooling water exceeds the temperature at which the ion removal capability ) of the resin is adversely affected. 9.1.3.2.2.6 Pool Filters I The refueling pool filters contain filter cartridges which are used to improve the pool water clarity by removing insoluble particles which obscure visibility.
- Filters require replacement and are not backflushable preventing the possibility of inadvertent transfer of spent filter media or trapped particles into the process fluid. Filter units are designed for remote replacement of the filter cartridge.
5 Anwoweef Dee6n asneerd. Aunnery Spesome Page 9.1 17 _ .m -
System l'O + Design ControlDocument 9.1.3.2.2.7 Pool Strainers Strainers are located in each pool purification pump suction line for removal of relatively large particles which might otherwise clog the demineralizers or damage the pumps. Strainers are also located in the pool purification system downstream of each ion exchanger. These strainers are the "Y" type and are located to prevent any resin from entering the spent fuel pool or refueling pool due to ion exchanger lower retention element failure. Dedicated lines run from the "Y" section of the strainer directly to the SWMS assuring resin will be directed to the radwaste facility. 9.1.3.2.2.8 Valves Manual stop valves are used to isolate equipment. Manual throttle valves provide flow control. Valves in contact with spent fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant material. 9.1.3.2.2.9 Piping All piping in contact with pool water is austenitic stainless steel. The piping is welded except where flanged connections are used to facilitate maintenance. 9.1.3.2.3 System Operation The PCPS is not directly associated with plant startup. normal operation, or shutdown, but is operated when there is a need to cool, clarify, or purify the pool water. All situations are dependent upon the fuel loading and refueling cycle. Components for each cooling and purification train can be interchanged while in service using bypass lines. The cooling pumps are started manually from the main control room via the ESF-CCS. The purification pumps are started manually from a local control panel. The cooling heat exchangers are provided with local temperature indicators to indicate a cooling water loss. The spent fuel pool water chemistry can be checked at local sample points. If purification is required, the PCPS may be used to demineralize and filter the water, and return it to the pool. Local sample connections are provided in the purification return line so that the effectiveness of the filter and/or the demineralizer may be checked, as well as the pool boron concentration. The PCPS has its maximum duty during refueling operations. when the decay heat from the spent fuel is the highest (see Section 9.1.3.4) and water clarity is required to facilitate refueling operations. The system is normally placed in operation prior to the transfer of any fuel, and is continued in operation as long as required to maintain temperature and/or water purity. 9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1.3.3.1 Availability and Reliability The safety function of the PCPS is to transfer heat from the spent fuel pool to the Component Cooling Water System according to the design parameters established in Section 9.1.3.1. Thit ' xtion is achieved under both normal and accident conditions. Suitable redundancy is provided to er.,u - 'this function can be achieved assuming a single failure of a component coincident with the loss of eithu .4 site AMwonef Desbyn Motorial Auxmary Systems Page 9.1 18
Srtem 80+ Design controlDocument l 1 I or offsite power. In the event of a failure of a pool cooling pump or loss of cooling to a heat exchanger, d the second cooling train provides backup capability, thus assuring continued cooling of the spent fuel pool. The pool cooling pumps and heat exchangers are physically separated by the divisional wall in the nuclear annex as shown in Section 1.2, Figure 1.2-5A. A cooling train may be shut down for limited i periods of time for maintenance or replacement of malfunctioning components. A nonsafety-related pool purification system component failure will not affect the functional performance of any safety-related components. The pool purification system has independent flow paths along with components that are physically separated from the spent fuel pool cooling system. A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is presented in Table 9.1-3. 9.1.3.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering The most serious failure of this system would be complete loss of water in the spent fuel pool. To protect against this possibility, the pool is designed to maintain a minimum of 10 feet of water above the top of the spent fuel for proper shielding and cooling. All piping which penetrates the pool is located above the required 10 foot water level and all piping extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holes at or above this level. Pool purif. cation system piping in the spent fuel pool is arranged so that any one pipe failure cannot drain the spmt fuel pool below the minimum water level. Pool purification lines that penetrate the safety-related spent fuel pool each incorporate an isolation valve. The CVCS provides a manual makeup capability of borated water to the PCPS refueling pool and spent fuel pool sufficient to make up for a 100 gpm leakage rate out of the spent fuel pool. 9.1.3.3.3 Water Quality Only a very small amount of water is interchanged between the refueling canal and the spent fuel pool as fuel assemblies are transferred in the refueling process. Whenever a fuel assembly with defective cladding is transferred from the fuel transfer canal to the spent fuel pool, a small quantity of fission products may enter the spent fuel pool water. The cleanup loops remove fission products and other contaminants from the water. Radioactivity concentrations will be maintained such that the dose at the surface of the spent fuel pool will be 2.5 mrem /hr or less. The design flow rate and filtering capability of the PCPS shall be such that the refueling pool water chemistry and clarity are stificient for an operator to read fuel assembly identification numbers that are 3/8 inches high, 3/16 inches wide and 1/16 inches thick from the refueling machine at the time the operators and refueling equipment are ready to move fuel (i.e., designed such that water clarity problems do not cause refueling delays). PCPS piping located in the pool will be oriented to ensure proper circulation of pool water and refueling canal water to meet the above requirements. Approved Design Material Auxiniary Systems Pope 9.1 19
System 80+ Design ControlDocument The PCPS shall maintain the refueling pool and spent fuel pool water chemistry and clarity within the limits specified below:
- pH between 4.5 and 10 @ 25'C; e chlorides less than 0.15 ppm; and
- optical clarity consistent with the requirements as described above The refueling pool and spent fuel pool will be monitored via grab samples to ensure the water quality is maintained within these limits. The PCPS demineralizer effluent will also be monitored by grab samples in order to determine when resin breakthrough has occurred.
Spent fuel pool and demineralizer effluent will be monitored by grab samples with laboratory analysis. The fuel pool will be monitored to ensure that the water quality is maintained within the above limits. Demineralizer replacement is to be based on three criteria:
- Breakthrough of cesium, cobalt, chloride, or fluoride.
- Pressure drop not to exceed demineralizer and resin vendors' recommended limits for the as-procured equipment.
- Thermal expansion approaching resin vendors' recommended limit for the as-procured equipment.
9.1.3.3.4 System Isolation Oll 9.1.3.3.4.1 Containment Isolation There are two penetrations through the containment structure to accommodate PCPS piping. One penetration allows flow from the purification loop into the refueling pool. The other penetration allows flow from the refueling pool back into the purification loop. The penetration for the purification loop to the refueling pool consists of a Seismic Category I. Safety Class 2 manually operated gate valve (PC-291) outside containment and a Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 manually operated gate valve (PC-292) inside containment. The penetration for the refueling pool to the purification loop consists of a Seismic Category I. Safety Class 2 manually operated gate valve 1 (PC-257) inside containment and a Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 manually operated gate valve (PC- l 258) outside containment. The containment isolation valves are normally closed during power operations. The valves are opened in the refueling mode when the refueling pool requires filling and purification. 9.1.3.4 Tests and Inspections Components of the PCPS may be in either continuous or intermittent use during normal system operation. j Periodic visual inspection and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice. The i Seismic Category I portions will be inspected in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI. (
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I Approved Design Material Ausmary 5ystems Page 9.1-20 i i
t l 1 ~ System 80+ Deslan ControlDocument l j i i No special equipment tests are required since system components are normally in operation when spent
/ fuel is stored in the fuel pool. l l
Sampling of the fuel pool water is performed for gross activity and particulate matter concentration. The ! i layout of the components of the PCPS is such that periodic testing and inservice inspection of this system '! 4 are possible. 9.1.3.5 Instru===# melan Application : The instrumentation provided for the PCPS is discussed in the following paragraphs. Alarms and indications are provided as noted. Spent fuel pool cooling system temperature, pressure and level instrumentation are powered from the Class IE electrical system. 9.1.3.5.1 Tesaperature Instrumentation is provided to measure the temperature of the water in the spent fuel pool and the ! refueling pool, and to give local indication as well as annunciation in the control room when there is a deviation from normal temperatures. ; Instmmemation is also provided to give local indication of the temperature of the spent fuel pool water j j as it leaves either heat exchanger. ! t 3 If the spent fuel pool water is being purified, instrumentation is provided at the inlet of the ion exchanger. l A high purification fluid temperature is alarmed in the control room, and purification flow is diverted if l . it is above ion exchanger resin limits. l
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- I i- 9.1.3.5.2 Pressure !
i Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication of the pressures in the PCPS pump l l suction and discharge lines. A deviation from normal pressure in the spent fuel pool cooling pumps i ! discharge lines is alarmed in the control room. Instrumentation connections are also provided at locations upstream and downstream of each purification train filter, strainer, and demineralizer/ strainer so that the
- pressure differential across the filters, strainers, and demineralizers/ strainer can be determined.
9.1.3.5.3 Level I instrumentation is provided to give an alarm in the control room when the water level in the spent fue! !
- - pool or the refueling pool reaches either the high or low level setpoint. The spent fuel pool low water i level setpoint is also alarmed locally. l 1
9.1.3.5.4 Radiation Gamma-radiation is continuously monitored in the fuel building. A high level signal is alarmed locally + and annunciated in the control room. , I
-l C i Anwomed Dee6n neeenner- Aamnery snesman rose s.r 2r i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.1.4 Fuel IIandling System 9.1.4.1 Design Bases 9.1.4.1.1 System The fuel handling system is designed for the handling and storage of fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs). Associated with the fuel handling system is the equipment used for assembly, disassembly, and storage of the reactor closure head and internals. As appropriate, the fuel handling equipment includes interlocks, travel-limiting features, and other protective devices to minimize the possibility of mishandling or equipment malfunction that could result in inadvertent damage to a fuel assembly and potential fission product release. The refueling water provides the coolant medium during spent fuel transfer. The spent fuel pool is provided with a cooling and cleanup system. All spent fuel transfer and storage operations are designed to be conducted underwater to ensure adequate shielding during refueling and to permit visual control of the operation at all times. 9.1.4.1.2 Fuel llandling Equipment The principal design criteria for the fuel and CEA handling equipment (refueling machine, fuel transfer equipment, spent fuel handling machine, CEA change platform, new fuel elevator, and CEA elevator) are as follows:
- For non-seismic operating conditions, the bridges, trolleys, hoist units, hoisting cable, grapples, O
and hooks conform to the requirements of ASME NOG-1.
- For seismic design, the combined dead loads, live loads, and seismic loads do not cause any portion of the equipment to disengage from its supports and fall into the pool.
- Grapples and mechanical latches which carry fuel assemblies or CEAs are mechanically interlocked against inadvertent opening.
- All loose components are either removed from equipment in the reactor building and the fuel area of the nuclear annex or are seismically restrained during equipment operation. Fuel handling procedures require that Inf ards be used for loose components that are brought onto the equipment for a particular short term application such as rcpair tooling.
All permanently installed components are secured with bcking devices or restraints to prevent them from becoming loose and falling into the refueling pool or the spent fuel pool.
- A positise mechanical stop is provided to prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth and it will not cause damage or distortion to the fuel or the refueling machine when engaged at full operating hoist speed.
- The fuel hoists are provided with load-measuring devices and interlocks to interrupt hoisting if the load increases above the overload setpoint and to intermpt lowering if the load decreases below the underload setpoint.
Approwd Design Maternal AuxiGary Systems Page 9.1-22
I 1 iSystem 80+ Deslan ControlDocument I i e' In the event of loss of power, the equipment and its load remam in a safe condition. . I e Equipment located within the reactor building during plant operation is capable of withstandmg,. ! without damage,' the internal building test pressure. e Electrical interlocks are provided to ensure the reliability of system components, to simplify the ! performance of sequential operations, and to limit travel and loads such that design conditions - will not be exceeded. In no case will they be utilized to prevent inadvertent criticality or the i reduction of the minimum water coverage for personnel protection. No single interlock failure will result in a condition which will allow equipment malfunction, damage to the fuel, or the reduction of shielding water coverage. Where these results are considered possible, redundant switches, mechanical restraints, and physical barriers are employed as well as limiting the hoist stall torque and loading capability to values below those which would result in damage to the fuel, j
- 9.1.4.1.3 Nuclear Annex Overhead Holsts and Reactor Buildag Polar Crane l
' The fuel related hoists in the nuclear annex, i.e., the cask handling hoist and the new fuel handling hoist, +
are used to handle equipment, tools, and fuel assemblies from the receipt of the new fuel containers to ; the shipment of the spent fuel cask. A description of these hoist is contained in Section 9.1.4.2.1.7. The reactor building polar crane is used to handle the reactor vessel head, reactor vessel internals, and other equipment located within the reactor building. A description of the reactor building polar crane is ' conscined in Section 9.1.4.2.1.8.
' Provisions are incorporated to prevent heavy load drops which would result in damaging safety-related systems, components, structures, and/or equipment. These provisions include mechanical stops, electrical interlocks, defined load paths, and procedural and administrative controls. The design of the hoists and cranes conforms to the requirements of ASME NOG-1. The fuel related hoists and the reactor building polar crane comply with the requirements of NUREG-0612. .
The reactor building polar crane, the cask handling hoist, the new fuel handling hoist, the refueling l
- machine and the spent fuel handling machine are not classified as single failure proof cranes / hoists where 4
single failure proof is defined as the ability to safely retain the load during the failure of any single component within the hoist system. However, the requirements of Section 5 of NUREG-0612 are incorporated into the design of these items as noted below even though the refueling machine and the
. spent fuel handling machine are not considered heavy load cranes. ;
! Section 5.1 describes in general the alternate approaches to provide acceptable measures for the control l of heavy loads. These approaches are amplified in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.5. These j approaches are as follows: r
- 1. Provide sufficient operator training, handling, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system,
- 2. Define safe load paths through procedures and operator training so that to the maximum extent {
practical heavy loads avoid being carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment, . and Appmod Oss(ps aAsewdef AmuMwy Sysemme repr 9.f.23 l
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 3. Provide mechanical stops or interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in the proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
Compliance with these approaches is documented in Sections 9.1.4.3.1,9.1.4.2.1, and 9.1.4.6. 9.1.4.2 System Description 9.1.4.2.1 System and Interlocks The fuel handling system is an integrated system of equipment, tools, and procedures for refueling, handling and storage of fuel assemblies from receipt of a new fuel container to shipment of a spent fuel cask. The equipment is designed to handle the fuel assemblies from the time they arrive at the site until they are placed in a cask for shipment from the site. Underwater transfer of fuel assemblies provides a transparent radiation shield, as well as a cooling medium for removal of decay heat. Boric acid is added to the spent fuel pool (SFP) water in the quantity required to assure subcritical conditions. The major components of the system are the refueling machine (Figure 9.1-4), the CEA change platform (Figure 9.1-5), the fuel transfer system (Figures 9.1-6a and 9.1-6b), the spent fuel handling machine, the CEA elevator (Figure 9.1-7), the new fuel elevator (Figure 9.1-8), nuclear annex overhead cranes and the reactor building polar crane. The refueling machine moves fuel assemblies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer system. The CEA change platform is used to move the CEAs within the upper guide structure (UGS) or between the UGS and the CEA elevator. The CEA elevator is used to assemble and introduce new CEAs into the refueling pool and to hold the spent CEAs while they are being disassembled for disposal. The fuel transfer system moves the fuel between the reactor building and the nuclear annex through the transfer tube. The spent fuel handling machine transports fuel between the transfer system, the spent fuel storage racks, the new fuel elevator, and the spent fuel shipping cask. The new fuel elevator is used to introduce new fuel into the spent fuel pool so that it can be moved to the spent fuel storage racks or the transfer system by the spent fuel handling machine. The cask handling hoist is used to transfer the spent fuel shipping cask between the cask laydown area, cask washdown area, and the nuclear annex loading bay. The fuel handling hoist is used for handling the new fuel container and new fuel assemblies during transfer from the new fuel shipping container to the new fuel elevator, the new fuel storage racks, or the new fuel inspection station. The fuel handling hoist and the cask handling hoist are mounted on the same trolley assembly. An intermediate fuel storage rack is located within the refueling cavity for the temporary storage of fuel assemblies if required, during the refueling operation. Any stored assemblies are removed from the rack prior to reinstallation of the reactor vessel internals. A storage rack for holding the ICI/CEA transport container during ICI and CEA disposal operations is also located within the refueling cavity. Since the transport container is essentially the same size as a fuel assembly for compatibility with the transfer system, the rack is designed to contain a fuel assembly in the event a fuel assembly is inadvertently placed within it. Special tools and lift rigs are also used for disassembly of reactor components. Major tools and servicing equipment utilized for refueling are listed in Table 9.1-1. The major components of the fuel handling system are described below. In the design of this equipment, mechanical stops and positive locks have been provided to prevent damage to or dropping of the fuel assemblies. In the design of the refueling machine, positive locking l Amroved Design Material- Auxiliary Systems Page 9.124 l
System 80+ oestan controlDocument , 4 between the grapple and the fuel assemblies is provided by the engagement of the actuator arm in vertical , channels in the hoist assembly so that relative rotational movement and uncoupling is not possible, even with inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. Therefore, failure of an electrical interlock will not result in the dropping of a fuel assembly. t The fuel handling control system is based upon modern, state-of the-art equipment and techniques, with y each machine having either a programmable logic controller or a computer as the heart of the control system. Signals are transmitted between the fuel handling machines to preclude actions that are ' detrimental to the fuel assemblies or the machines.
. The new fuel elevator, fuel transfer system. CEA change platform, and the CEA elevator are controlled by programmable logic controllers. The refueling machine and the spent fuel handling machine and the simulator are computer controlled. All machines in each refueling system are networked together to i provide a simple, powerful method for communicating machine status and other pertinent information l from one machine to another.
1 The refueling machine computers perform the following functions: hoist motion interlocks; hoist speed control, including acceleration / deceleration parameters, maximum speed setting and speed restrictions; j bridge and trolley motion interlocks; bridge and trolley speed control, including acceleration / deceleration parameters, maximum speed setting, and speed restrictions; automatic fuel spreader control; automatic i ! I hoist latch control; operating zone boundary monitoring; load weighing interlocks; grapple zone control;
- computer and underwater tv camera display; security access to . data files; data logging of movements and 1 fuel serial numbers; resolver verification and trending; core mapping; automatic compensation; report
generation; manual / automatic control; help / diagnostics menus; and graphic displays. Security access to the data files is controlled to preclude unapproved changes being made to the files by the machine operators. Sections 9.1.4.2.1.1 through 9.1.4.2.1.6 identify and define the functions of the major interlocks contained in the fuel handling equipment. For bridge, trolley, and hoist positions interlocks, the computer system infonns the operator that the interlock is inoperative. For the other interlocks described in the following paragraphs, redundant systems or devices have been provided to perform the same function as the interlock or to provide information to allow the operator to deduce that an interlock has malfunctioned. The interlock functions required by ANS 57.1 are included in the fuel handling > equipment design. !
- - The fuel and CEA handling machines do not fully fall within the framework of an overhead or gantry crane as described in OSHA Subpart N, Materials Handling and Storage, of 29 CFR 1910, Section ;
1910.179. However, this document has been used for guidance. More than 95% of the fuel handling machine does conform to the OSHA regulations. Both machines have additional features to protect the - 4 safety of the operator and facility, and the features are a pr.rt of appropriate operational procedures. 3 The two cavity transfer system fuel carrier, the reactor building intermediate fuel storage rack and the j transport container storage rack are designed to meet the same criticality considerations as the spent fuel , storage racks (Section 9.1.2). , The design of the Fuel Handling System limits the impact energy of postulated dropped loads on the new i
- 4. fuel storage racks, the spent fuel storage racks, the fuel transfer system fuel carrier, and the spent fuel l e pool. The spent fuel shipping cask is prevented from travelling over the new fuel storage racks and the spent fuel storage racks by mechanical stops and electrical interlocks. The defined load path prevents ,
the shipping cask from traveling within 15 feet of the edge of the spent fuel pool and requires that the i Anwed Deeen neneerder. Aummery spesome rope s.r 25 ,
System 80+ Design ControlDocument shipping cask not be lifted above the operating floor elevation. This restriction on the lift height also precludes passage of the shipping cask over the new fuel racks. Loads that are , defined as light loads are heavy loads. All loads that may be handled over the new fuel storage racks, the spent fuel storage racks, the spent fuel pool and the fuel transfer system fuel carrier are limited in weight and lift height such that, if they fall, the resultant impact energy will not exceed the design impact energy of the fuel storage racks and the spent fuel pool. These loads are defined as light loads. The design impact energy shall be equal to the postulated drop of a fuel assembly, its handling tool or a coinbination of both the tool and the fuel assembly, and any other fuel handling component attached to tb noisting cable during fuel assembly handling, from their maximum lifted elevation above the fuel racks during normal handling. The elevation to which the fuel assembly may be lifted is limited by interlocks on the spent fuel handling machine and the new fuel handling hoist (Section 9.1.4.2.1) and the design of the handling tools. The weight that my be lifted is limited by load interlocks and/or hoist motor stall torque. 9.1.4.2.1.1 Refueling Macidne The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks which will be contained in the refueling machine.
- Refueling Machine Hoist Overload Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a fuel assembly if the load increases above the overload setpoint. The hoisting load is visually displayed so that the operatot can manually terminate the withdrawal operation if an overload occurs and the hoist continues to operate. The hoist motor stall torque is limited such that the cable load is less than the allowable fuel assembly tensile load.
- Refueling Machine Hoist Up-Stop Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a fuel assembly when the correct (full up) vertical elevation is reached. A mechanical up-stop has also been provided to physically restrain the hoisting of a fuel assembly alsove the elevation which would result in less than the minimum shielding water covetage.
- Refueling Machie Hoist Underload Interlock This interlock int'errupts insertion of a yet assembly if the load decreases below the underload setpoint. The load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the insertion operation if an underload occurs and the hoist continues to operate. This interlock is independent of item D below.
- Refueling Machine Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock This interlock interrupts lowering of the hoist under a no-load condition. The weighing system interlock is backed up by an independent slack cable switch which also terminates lowering under a no-load condition.
O Atyweved Design Atatorial Ausnery $ystems Page 9.1-26
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. System 80 + oesian contrat Document l
- Refueling Machine Hoist ak-Out Interlock -
This interlock prevents hoisting during translation of the bridge and/or trolley. No backup or ;
- additional circuitry is provided for this interlock. t i
e Refueling Machine Translation Interlock .[; This' interlock prevents translation of the bridge and/or trolley with the spreader or grapple ! 4- extended or when the grappled fuel assembly is still in the core. An additional circuit is provided , which, after initiation of a hoisting operation, requires that a separate switch be actuated before ~
.nonnal operation of the translation drives is possible. The underwater TV system can be used
, by the operator to determine whether the spreader or grapple has been raised, and lights on the j control console indicate whether they are withdrawn or extended. l t o Refueling Machine Mast Anti-collisionInterlock f a
- This interlock stops translation of the bridge and/or trolley when the collision ring on the mast l l is contacted and deflected. !
Redundant switches are provided to minimize the possibility of this interlock becoming inoperative. Slow bridge speeds are provided for movement of the refueling machine in areas l other than its normal travel route which might contain obstructions. Travel limits are also ! provided to prevent machine contact with obstructions within the pool area. j e Refueling Machine Hoist Speed Interlock ! l' ! This interlock provides restriction on maximum hoisting speed when the fuel is within the core. ! During insertion and withdrawal the change in hoist speed can be monitored by observation of l the hoist vertical position indicator. A change in the sound of the hoist will accompany the l change in hoist speed. ; i 9.1.4.2.1.2 Transfer Systeen The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks which will be contained in the transfer system. ;
- Transfer System Winch Overload Interlock j s t Terminates movement of the fuel carriage through the transfer tube if the load increases above l the overload setpoint. ;
The transfer system winch overload interlock will terminate movement of the fuel carriage ! through the transfer tube in the event the fuel carriage contacts a partially closed transfer tube l valve. Testing has shown that there is no damage to the fut.1 carrier or the fuel assembly under j this condition. Administrative controls restrict operation of the fuel transfer tube valve during j normal fuel handling operations. ! i: O ! [ Assessef Deste Adeserist. Amadlary Spremsw Pops 9.f.27 f
r System 80+ Design ControlDocument The winching load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the transfer operation if an overload occurs and the interlock fails. The motor stall torque is also controlled to preclude equipment damage during normal transfer operations should the overload setpoint fail. An overload is indicated by a light on the control panel and by an audible alarm.
- Transfer System Fuel Carrier Interlock Prevents the winch from attempting to pull the fuel carriage through the transfer tube with an upender in a vertical position. If this interlock fails and a transfer signal is initiated, winching wi'l be terminated when the load increases above the overload setpoint.
- Transfer System Upender Rotation Interlock This interlock prevents rotation of the upender while the refueling machine and spent fuel handling machine (SFIIM) are at tteir upender stations.
Failure of this interlock while the machines are at the upending station will allow the transfer equipment operator to initiate rotation of the fuel carrier. In the event that this signal is e mneously initiated while the fuel assembly is being lowered from or raised into the refueling machine, a bending load would be applied to the fuel bundle. This load would stall equipment operation and not result in fuel assembly failure in excess of the conditions described in Chapter 15.
- Transfer System Upender Interlock This interlock prevents rotation of the upender unless the fuel carrier is correctly located for O
upending. Failure of this interlock will:
- 1. With the fuel carrier in the transfer tube allow the upender to rotate with no effect on the carrier or fuel bundle.
- 2. With the fuel carrier partially in the upender, attempt to but not be successful in, rotating the carrier since a mechanical lock prevents premature carrier rotation.
- Fuel Carrier Rotational Interlock This interlock prevents rotation of the fuel carrier unless the fuel carrier is correctly located in the upender.
Failure of this interlock may cause contact between the fuel carrier and the transfer tube assembly which will result in an overload signal and termination of motion of the transfer carriage. No damage to the fuel assembly will result since the fuel assembly is enclosed in the carrier. ((The COL applicant will prepare and implement administrative controls to restrict operation of the fuel transfer tube valve during fuel handling operations.))l O 3 COL information item; see L)CD Introduction Section 3.2. Approved Dosegre Atatorial Auxmary Systems Page 9.1-28
System 804 Design controlDocument ~O-G 9.1.4.2.1.3 Spent Fuel Handling Machine The spent fuel handling machine will be a refueling machine adapted for use in the spent fuel pool area. ; - It will contain the same interlock features as described in Section 9.1.4.2.1.1, except as noted below for the Spent Fuel Handling Machine Translation Zone Interlock:
- Zone interlocks protect against running the load into walls or the gate of the storage area.
- If these interlocks fail, the spent fuel handling machine mast will protect the fuel assembly from !
damage in the event of wall or gate contact. ; 9.1.4.2.1.4 New Fuel Elevator l The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks that are part of the new fuel-elevator. The new fuel elevator controls are located on the spent fuel handling machine control console.
- New Fuel Elevator Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock Stops the elevator motor should the cable become slack.
if this interlock fails, the operator can stop the elevator motion Nm the spent fuel handling machine console.
- New Fuel Elevator Hoist Lock-Out Interlock -
f-Prevents raising of the elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator box. This interlock is a backup for the administrative control, which prohibits the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator.
- New Fuel Elevator Hoist Limit Interlock Interrupts hoistirg when "up" or "down limits are reached. :
9.1.4.2.1.5 CEA Elevator The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks that are part of the CEA elevator.
- CEA Elevator Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock Stops the elevator motor should the cable become slack.
- CEA Elevator Hoist lock-Out Interlock !
Prevents raising of the CEA elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator above the mimmum safe water level for shielding water coverage. This interlock is a backup for the administrative control. which prohibits the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the CEA elevator. - NI L . ::Dee> Menenfel. AunBary Systems Page 9.129
System 80+ Design ControlDocument i 9.1.4.2.1.6 CEA Change Platfonn 1 The following identifies and describes the function of the interlocks that are part of the CEA change platform.
- CEA Change Platform Hoist Up-Stop Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a CEA assembly when the correct (full-up) elevation is reached. A mechanical up-stop has also been provided to physically restrain the hoisting of a CEA assembly above the elevation which would result in less than the minimum shielding water coverage.
- CEA Change Platform Hoist Overload Interlock This interlock interrupts hoisting of a CEA if the load increases above the overload setpoint. The hoisting load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the withdrawal operation if an overload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
- CEA Change Platform Hoist Underload Interlock Interrupts insertion of a CEA assembly if the load decreases below the underload setpoint. The insertion load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the insertion operation if an underload occurs and the hoist continues to operate, 9.1.4.2.1.7 Nuclear Annex Overhead Cranes
- Cask Handling Hoist The cask handling hoist is used to unload and transport new fuel shipping containers from the receiving bay area to the new fuel shipping container laydown area. It is also used for movement of the empty spent fuel cask from the truck / rail car unloading area to the cask laydown area and for the return of the loaded cask. The unloading area has sufficient room to permit the cask to be upended with the cask transporter locked in place. The hoist is equipped with a continuously variable speed hoist controller.
The hoist accesses the spent fuel pool area during building construction to facilitate construction and the installation of the spent fuel storage racks. After the fuel racks have been installed, and before the fuel assemblies are placed in the racks, mechanical stops are installed on the bridge rails to prohibit the hoist from traveling over the spent fuel pool area. The hoist is also provided with electrical interlocks to control bridge, trolley, and hoist travel and to minimize possible damage to the spent fuel shipping cask and the spent fuel pool during cask handling. The interlocks also prevent movement of the spent fuel cask over the new fuel racks. The cask handling procedures, coupled with the lifting equipment design and interlocks, restrict the height that the cask can be lifted to ensure that the bottom of the cask is never above the operating floor. This restriction on the lift height precludes passage of the shipping cask over the new fuel racks. O Appromect Design Natorint Aux 6ery Systems Page 9.130
System 80+ Design controlDocument
- New Fuel Handling Hoist
[ The new fuel handling hoist is used to move new fuel from the new fuel unloading area to the new fuel storage racks, the new fuel inspection stand, and the new fuel elevator. The hoist is l provided with electrical interlocks to control the transfer path of the new fuel assemblies and to restrict fuel handling loads by either limiting the hoist motor stall torque or incorporation of load limiting devices. The hoist is restricted mechanically from allowing movement of new fuel over the spent fuel racks. 9,1.4.2.1.8 Reactor Building Polar Crane The polar crane is mounted on a circular crane wall and travels 360 degrees. The reactor building polar , T crane has a main hoist and an auxiliary hoist to handle the various loads during an outage. Provisions ' are made to ensure safe load handling. These provisions include two independent automatic upper and two independent lower hoist limits, overload limits, slow speed hoist operation, and a load handling path to prevent damage to any safety related equipment from a heavy load drop. The polar crane is used to i move the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel internals between the reactor vessel and various storage areas during outages, as described in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3. The polar crane hoist is able to operate at fast speed with an empty hook. 9.1.4.2.2 Components , 9.1.4.2.2.1 Refueling Machine t
/N !
t The refueling machine is shown in Figure 9.!-4. The refueling machine is a traveling bridge and trolley which is located above the refueling pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the refueling pool. Motors on the bridge and trolMy position the machine over each fuel assembly location within the reactor core or fuel transfer carrier. The controls for the refueling machine are mounted on a console which is located on the refueling machine trolley. Coordinate location of the bridge and trolley i is indicated at the console by digital readout devices which are driven by encoders coupled to the guide rails through rack and pinion gears. i 1 During withdrawal or insertion of a fuel assembly, the load on the hoist cable is monitored at the console to assure that movement is not being restricted. Limits are such that damage to the assembly is prevented. Locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is provided by the engagement of the grapple maator arm in axial channels running the length of the fuel hoist assembly. Therefore, it is not possible to uncouple even with inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. The drives for both the bridge and the trolley provide close control for accurate positioning, and brakes are provided to maintain the position once achieved. In addition, interlocks are installed so that movement of the l refueling machine is not possible when the hoist is withdrawing or inserting an assembly. After operation l of the hoist, a console-mounted interlock button must be actuated to allow movement of the bridge or trolley. i For operations above the core, the bottom of the hoist assembly is equipped with a spreading device to align the surrounding fuel assemblies to their normal core spacing to assure clearance for fuel assemblies being installed or removed. An anticollision device at the bottom of the mast assembly prevents damage W2 Dukn neeenrinh Auneinry Systems Page 9.1 31 \ i l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l should the mast be inadvertently driven into an obstruction, and a positive mechanical up-stop is provided to prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth. A system of pointers and scales serves as a backup for the remote positioning readout equipment. Manually operated handwheels are provided for bridge, trolley and winch motions in the event of a power loss. Manual operation of the grappling device is also possible in the event that air pressure is lost. The refueling machine is designed to hold its load during an SSE, loss of power, or loss of air. 9.1.4.2.2.2 Transfer System j The major components of the transfer system are a carriage with a carrier for two fuel assemblies, two upenders, two hydraulic power packages, and a winch as described below.
- Transfer Carriage A transfer carriage as shown on Figure 9.1-6 conveys the fuel assemblies through the transfer tube. Two fuel assembly cavities are provided in the fuel carriage to reduce overall fuel handling time. After the refueling machine deposits a spent fuel bundle in the open cavity, it only has to move approximately 1 foot to pick-up the new fuel assembly which was brought from the nuclear annex in the other cavity. The handling operation in the nuclear annex is similar. The dual cavity arrangement permits both fuel handling machines to travel fully loaded at all times. Fuel assemblies are placed in the transfer carriage in a vertical position, lowered to the horizontal position, moved through the fuel transfer tube on the transfer carriage, and then restored to the vertical position.
Wheels support the carriage and allow it to ride on tracks within the transfer tube. The track sections at both ends of the transfer tube are mounted on the upending machines to permit the carriage to be properly positioned at the limits of its travel. The carriage is driven by steel cables connected to the carriage arid through sheaves to its driving winch mounted on the operating floor. The design of the carriage is such that the drive cables do not enter the transfer tube. The load in the transfer cables is displayed at the control console. A cable overload condition will interrupt the transfer operation. Manual override of the overload cutout allows completion of the transfer. The supports for the replaceable rails on which the transfer carriage rides are welded to the 36-inch diameter transfer tube. The rail assemblies are fabricated to a length which will allow them to be lowered for installation in the transfer tube. No rails need be installed in the valve on the spent fuel pool side of the transfer tube. The transfer carriage is stored in the nuclear annex during reactor operation to allow the fuel transfer tube valve to be closed and the penetration sleeve closure to be installed.
- Upending Machine Upending machines as shown on Figures 9.1-6a and 9.1-6b are provided at each end of the transfer tube. Each machine consists of a structural support base from which is pivoted an upending straddle frame which engages the two-cavity fuel carrier. When the carriage with its fuel carrier is in position within the upending frame, the pivots for the fuel carrier and the upending frame are coincident. Ilydraulic cylinders, attached to both the upending frame and the support base, rotate the fuel carrier between the vertical and horizontal position as required by the fuel transfer procedure. Each hydraulic cylinder can perform the upending operation alone Approwd Desiger Atatorial. Auanary Systems Page 9.142
System 80+ Deslan controloocarnant ; r and can 3e isolated in the event of its failure. A long tool is also provided to allow manual '( rotation of the fuel carrier in the event that both cylinders fail or hydraulic power is lost. l i e Hydraulic Power Unit j The hydraulic power unit as shown on Figure 9.1-9 provides the motive force for raising and { lowering the upender with the fuel carrier. It consists of a stand containing a motor coupled to j a hydraulic pump, a pump reservoir, valves and the necessary hoses to connect the power !
- package to the hydraulic cylinders on the upender. The valves can be aligned to actuate either. j i or both upender cylinders. The hydraulic fluid is distilled water. i
)
9.1.4.2.2.3. Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly
- A fuel transfer tube extends through the containment wall. During reactor operation, the transfer tube
- is sealed by means of a blind flange and closure tube located inside the reactor building. Prior to filling ;
the refueling cavity, the blind flange is removed. After a common water level is reached between cavity l and the spent fuel pool, the transfer tube valve is opened The valve is closed during all heavy lifts { (reactor vessel internals and reactor closure head) over the reactor vessel when the pool is flooded. ! The procedure is reversed after refueling is completed. ! i 4 The transfer tube arrangement as shown on Figure 9.1-10 consists of a 36-inch diameter transfer tube ! contained within a penetration sleeve which is sealed to the reactor building. The transfer tube and l penetration sleeve are sealed to each other by bellows-type expansion joints to allow for' relative b movement between the tube and penetration sleeve. A quick opening closure is attached to the penetration sleeve and sealing is accomplished through O-rings which can be tested for adequacy by l pressurizing the annulus between the seals, in this arrangement the transfer tube does not see containment pressure during reactor operation. j 9.1.4.2.2.4 CEA Change Platform The CEA change platform is shown in Figure 9.1-5. This platform operates above the upper guide ; structure (UGS) after the UGS has been placed in the storage area and the UGS lifting rig removed. The platform travels on the same rails as does the refueling machine. , i The platform locates the operator over the CEA to be moved. The CEA handling tool, attached to the CEA change platform hoist, is then lowered, grappled to the CEA and the CEA relocated, as required. i 9.1.4.2.2.5 Fuel Handling Tools ! i Two fuel handling tools as shown on Figure 9.1-11 are used to move fuel assemblies in the spent fuel l pool area. A new fuel handling tool is provided for dry transfer of new fuel, and a spent fuel handling i tool is provided for underwater movement of both spent and new fuel handling in the spent fuel pool. j The spent fuel handling tool is operated manually from the trolley on the spent fuel handling machine. The new fuel handling tool is attached to the fuel bandling hoist and is manually controlled. I l 4 l - '( i Anwewed Deepr noneuw Aunnuv spesenn rene s.r.ss l i i w
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.1.4.2.2.6 Reactor Vessel Head Lift Rig The reactor vessel head lift rig is shown in Figure 9.1-12. This lift rig is composed of a removable lifting frame and a column and skirt assembly which is attached to the reactor vessel head assembly. It also incorporates a manifold system for drawing cooling air past the CEDMs to maintain them within their proper operating temperature range. 9.1.4.2.2.7 Reactor Internals Handling Equipment The reactor internals lift rig is a structure used to remove either the upper guide structure assembly or the core support barrel from the reactor vessel. Figure 9.1-13 shows the lift rig in the configuration provided for withdrawal of the core support barrel from the vessel for inspection purposes. The tie rod assembly is a tripod-shaped structure connecting the lift rig to the reactor building polar crane lifting hook. The lift rig includes a spreader beam providing three attachment points that are bolted to the core support barrel flange. This is accomplished manually from the refueling machine bridge. Correct positioning of the lift rig is assured by attached guide bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins. Figure 9.1-14 shows the lift rig in the configuration provided for removal of the upper guide structure assembly. In this configuration, the spreader beam supports three columns providing attaclunent points to the upper guide structure assembly. Attachment to the upper guide structure assembly is accomplished manually from the working platform. Correct positioning is assured by attached bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins. The clevis assembly, tie rod assembly, and spreader beam assembly which are common to this and the core support barrel lifting rig, are installed prior to lifting of the structure by the crane hook. The working platform also incorporates the holding fixtures for the extension shafts and CEAs. 9.1.4.2.2.8 Spent Fuel Handling Machine The spent fuel handling machine as shown on Figure 9.1-23 is a refueling machine modified for use in the nuclear annex. The major differences are the longer bridge span and the interlocks to protect the equipment during movement within the pool, canal and cask laydown area. 9.1.4.2.2.9 New Fuel Elevator A fuel elevator as shown on Figure 9.1-8 is utilized to lower new fuel from the operating floor to the bottom of the pool where it is grappled by the spent fuel handling tool. The elevator is powered by a cable winch and fuel is contained in a simple support structure whose wheels are captured in two rails. New fuel is loaded into the elevator by means of the new fuel handling hoist and new fuel handling tool. A manually operated handwheel is provided for elevator operation in the event of a power loss. 9.1.4.2.2.10 Underwater Television A closed circuit television system as shown on Figure 9.1-15 monitors the fuel handling operations within the refueling cavity. The camera is mounted on the refueling machine fuel hoist box (see Figure 9.1-4) Approved Design MaterAel- Auunery Systems Page 9.1-34
v System 80+ Desian contrat oocanmat , ( so that the fuel assembly can be sighted prior to and during grappling and removal from the core. The system may also be used to initially align the refueling machine position indication system with the actual
- i. . core location of the fuel assemblies. A monitor is provided at the refueling machine control console.
- The camera, if required for remote surveillance, or inspection, can be removed from its mous on the
- fuel hoist and handled separately. It is also used for core mapping after core loading before upper guide structure installation to confirm and record loaded core. 3 9.1.4.2.2.11 CEA Elevator 1
- A CEA elevator as shown on Figure 9.1-7 is utilized to assemble new CEAs and to disassemble irradiated l CEAs. The elevator is powered by a cable winch and the CEAs are contained in a simple support ,
i structure whose wheels are captured at the two rails. Tooling used to handle CEAs within the elevator l l is supported from the CEA change platform. j l
- 9.1.4.2.2.12 Transport Contal=r j 1 :
The transport container is used to store and move cut up pieces of spent CEAs and in-core instruments { (ICis). The container has the same outside dimensions as a fuel assembly and is provided with a top l fitting to mate with the fuel grapple enabling it to be moved by the fuel handling equipment. j 1 9.1.4.2.2.13 Refue'ing Pool Seal l 1 The refueling pool seal is designed to connect the reactor pressure vessel upper flange to the floor of the j refueling cavity to permit filling of the refueling cavity for fuel handling activities, j The pool seal is designed to function when subjected to the normally occurring loading conditions as well as the loads resulting from credible r-fueling errors or equipment malfunctions. During normal plant ! e operation, the pool seal is subjected to heatup and cooldown of the reactor pressure vessel. These loads result from the thermal growth of the reactor pressure vessel relative to the surrounding building
' structures and translation of the vessel relative to the building structure. The pool seal is designed to meet the requirements for Seismic Category I equipment during plant operation.
l During normal refueling operations, the pool seal is designed to withstand the pressure resulting from a p water head that is the full depth of the refueling cavity from the elevation of the operating floor. This ! represents the maximum possible water head and it is two (2) feet greater than the normal water level. 1 4 During refueltag operations with the refueling cavity flooded, the heavy lift components that pass over the pool seal are the reactor vessel closure head, the uppr guide structure assembly with its lift rig, and ' the upper guide structure lift rig with the CEA extension shafts. (( Administrative controls will be prepared by the COL applicant that require the fuel transfer tube valve or the gate between the spent fuel pool and the transfer canal to be closed prior to the transfer of heavy loads over the pool seal.))' This is done to preclude any change to the spent fuel pool water level during a postulated heavy load drop on ! the pool seal which could result in refueling cavity drain down. In addition, administrative controls preclude the movement of heavy loads over the pool seal if the refueling machine contains a fuel ; assembly. The refueling machine is designed as a Seismic Category II structure so that it will not fall on the pool seal during seismic events. 3 COL information item: see DCD Introduction Section 3.2.' 4pmeer ese4pn afenwder . AmmWory Sysseau page D.1-35
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Pool seal welds required for structural integrity or sealing integrity are inspectable. The access ports, for ex-core detector servicing and inspection, and the openings required for cavity ventilation are designed to permit pressure testing to verify their integrity before filling the refueling cavity. A fuel assembly in transit may be lowered into either the reactor pressure vessel or the end of the refueling cavity containing the transfer system upender and core support barrel (CSB) storage stand if the pool seal developed a leak. Both of these locations provide sufficient water depth 'oelow the pool seal elevation to maintain water coverage over the fuel assembly. The time required ta posinon the fuel over one of these areas and lower the fuel assembly is less than four (4) minutes. The normal rafueling cavity makeup capacity is sufficient to maintain the fuel refueling cavity water height for the maximum postulated leak size. In the event that no makeup water is available, the time to drain down to the reactor pressure vessel flange is four (4) hours. There is sufficient time to safely secure a fuel assembly being transferred in the event of the maximum credible pool seal leak rate. The maximum postulated pool seal leak rate resulting from damage due to a dropped fuel assembly or deformation resulting from an SSE is approximately 93,500 gallons per hour. With the water level at the reactor flange level, the radiation dose rate in reactor building from the spent fuel assemblies in the reactor core will not be significantly higher than when the refueling cavity is flooded. The pool seal is designed to function during seismic events when the refueling cavity is full. The pool seal is designed for the impact of a fuel assembly dropped from the maximum height that it is raised above the pool seal by the refueling machine during transit. This is the maximum credible load resulting from refueling errors or malfunctions. Transfer of heavy loads over the reactor pressure vessel are prohibited during fuel handling operations. Therefore, the drop of such loads are not considered credible in the design of the pool seal. 9.1.4.2.2.14 In-core Instrumentation and CEA Cutters A portable underwater hydraulic cutter similar to that shown on Figure 9.1-16 is provided to cut the expended CEAs into lengths necessary to permit transfer to the spent fuel building in the transport container. A second cutter is used for disposal of the incore instrumentation leads. 9.1.4.2.2.15 Gripper Operating Tool This tool is approximately seventeen feet long and consists of two concentric tubes with a funnel at the end to facilitate engagement with the CEA extension shafts. When installed, pins attached to the outer tube are engaged with the extension shaft. The inner tube of the tool is then lifted and rotated relative to the outer tube which compresses a spring allowing the gripper to release, thus separating the extension shaft from the control element assembly. 9.1.4.2.2.16 Cask IIandling Iloist The cask handling hoist is capable of servicing the truck and rail car loading / unloading bay area, new fuel shipping container laydown area, the cask washdown area, the cask laydown area and the spent fuel pool. Before fuel assemblies are placed in the spent fuel racks, mechanical stops are installed on the hoist bridge rails to prevent passage of the hoist over the spent fuel pool. The hoist has a minimum capacity of 150 tons and incorporates a variable speed hoist and electrical interlocks to control bridge and trolley travel. The major load handling paths of the cask handling hoist are shown on Figure 9.1-20. Approved Design historial Auxnary Systems Page 9.136
l System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.1.4.2.2.17 New Fuel HapJling Holst The new fuel handling hoist is c:p .bh of servicing the new fuel shipping container laydown area, the new fuel stomge area, and the new fuel elevator. The hoist has a minimum capacity of 10 tons and incorporates electrical interlocks to control the transfer path of the new fuel assemblies and to restrict fuel , handling loads. The hoist is mechanically restricted from passing over the sput fuel racks. The major load handling paths for the hoist are shown on Figure 9.1-20. 9.1.4.2.2.18 Reactor Building Polar Crane The reactor building polar crane is capable of servicing all major components requiring movement during a refueling outage. It incorporates, as a minimum, a 225 ton main hoist for handling the reactor vessel head and a 25 ton auxiliary hoist for lighter load handling. The hoist incorporates automatic upper and lower travel limits, overload limits and low speed operation to insure safe load handling. Crane control is from a trolley-mounted cab. The major load handling paths for the crane are shown on Figure 9.1-19. 9.1.4.2.3 System Operation 9.1.4.2.3.1 New Fuel Transfer After arrival of the new fuel shipping containers, the container covers are removed and the fuel assembly strongback raised to the vertical position and locked. The new fuel handling tool, attached to the new , fuel handling hoist, is then locked to the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly clamping fixtures removed and (q1 fuel assembly removed from the shipping container. Next, the protective wrapping is removed and the fuel assembly is moved over to the new fuel storage racks where it is placed into its designated cavity. l New fuel may be inspected by a ner fuel inspection device before placement into the new fuel racks. The tool is unlocked from the asser Q and the operation repeated until all assemblies have been placed ) in the racks. During initial core loading, all or a portion thereof of the new fuel assemblies may be I placed into Region I of the spent fuel storage racks. Prior to reactor refueling operations, the new fuel is removed from the new fuel storage racks and transferred to the new fuel elevator by using the new fuel handling hoist and the short fuel handling tool. The new fuel elevator lowers the fuel assembly into the spent fuel pool to allow the spent fuel handling machine to transfer the fuel assembly to the spent fuel racks in Region I of the spent fuel pool or to the l transfer system upender. During reactor refueling operations, the new fuel assembly is placed in the upending mechanism, a spent fuel assembly is removed from the other position of the fuel carrier and transferred to a designated position in the spent fuel storage racks using the spent fuel handling machine and the spent fuel handling tool. The new fuel is then transferred to the reactor building. ; i 9.1.4.2.3.2 Spent Fuel Transfer i Spent fuel transfer during refueling is discussed in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3. The spent fuel handling machine transfers the spent fuel assemblies from the storage racks to the spent ; p fuel shipping cask. This operation will be implemented when the spent fuel shipping cask loading pit is ( filled with spent fuel pool water and the gate between the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel shipping cask ! laydown area is opened. When the spent fuel assemblies are loaded into the cask, the cask will be sealed ! 1 I Anweseef Dee4n nie0 erie! Amnhary Systems Page 9.137
SyTrem 80+ Design ControlDocument and transferred to the cask washdown area with the cask handling hoist. In the washdown area, the cask surface will be washed off with an applicable-grade demineralized-water hydro-jet. Then it will be transferred to the nuclear annex loading bay with the cask handling hoist through the fuel building transfer hatch for intermediate and/or ultimate storage. Filling and draining of the cask laydown area will be implemented by the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. Cleaning and purification of this area will be carried out by the same system. 9.1.4.2.3.3 Refueling Procedure During reactor cooldown, preparations are begun for the refueling operation. The control element drive mechanisms (CEDMs) are disengaged from their drive shaft extensions by deenergizing the moter coils, and the CEDM and 11eated Junction Thermocouple (HJTC) cabling is disconnected in preparation for teactor vessel head removal. The head area cable trays with the integral missile shield at: lifted to the storage area. The CEDM cooling shroud is disconnected from its ductwork and the reactor gas vent line removed. The multiple stud tensioner (Figure 9.1-18) is employed to remove the preload on the reactor vessel head studs. The nuts and studs are removed and plugs are installed to minimize contamination of the empty stud holes. Two head alignment pins are inserted to assist in subsequent operations. The ICI assemblies are then disconnected and withdrawn from the core region to allow the fuel bundles to be moved. Next, the transfer tube penetration sleeve quick epening closure is removed. The lifting frame is attached to the reactor head lifting rig. The polar crane is connected to the closure head lift rig lifting frame and the reactor vessel head is removed to its storage location while the refueling cavity is filled. The reactor vessel head assembly is shown in Figure 9.1-17. The upper guide structure lifting rig is installed on and locked to the upper guide structure. The O extension shafts and CEAs are withdrawn into the lift rig and the extension shafts latched to the work platform. The upper guide structure is removed from the reactor vessel and placed on its storage stand. During transfer of the CSB or UGS internals and their lift rigs over the reactor vessel pool seal, the spent fuel pool will be isolated from the refueling cavity. After the reactor internals are moved to their storage areas, water levels are equalized in the refueling cavity and spent fuel pool, and the transfer tube is opened. Components are not lifted over the refueling pool seal when the refueling machine contains a fuel assembly. The refueling machine hoist mechanism is then positioned at the desired location over the core. Alignment of the hoist to the top of the fuel assembly is accomplished through the use of a digital readout system and is monitored by closed circuit television. After the fuel hoist is lowered minor adjustments can be made to properly position the hoist if misalignment is indicated on the monitor. The operator then ; energizes the actuator assembly which rotates the grapple at the bottom of the hoist and locks the fuel assembly to the hoist. The hoist motor is started and the fuel assembly is withdrawn into the fuel hoist box assembly which protects the fuel during transportation to the upending machine. After removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is moved underwater to the transfer area of the refueling cavity. The spent fuel assembly is lowered into the empty cavity of the transfer carriage in the refueling cavity. The upending machine then lowers the spent fuel assembly to the horizontal position after which a cable drive transports the transfer carriage on tracks through the transfer tube. After the fuel has passed through the transfer tube, another upending machine returns the transfer carrier to the vertical position. The spent fuel handling machine normally installs a new fuel assembly into the fuel carrier then removes the spent fuel assembly from the transfer carriage and transports it to the spent fuel storage rack. The operations would vary slightly under complete core offload conditions. l Approved Desben Material- Audary Systems Page 9.1-38
System 80+ oestan core.J occument i.
- During and after spent fuel discharge from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool, spent fuel assemblies may be exammed by visual inspection and ultrasonic test. After completion of fuel examination, the new fuel assemblies and acceptable spent fuel assemblies are reloaded into the transfer carnage and carried through the transfer tube to the refueling cavity where they are upended to allow the refueling machine to pick them up and place them in their proper core position. The refueling machme can also be used to shuffle fuel within the core in accordance with the fuel management scheme In parallel with the !
i refueling operation, the ICI changeout operation can be carried out. .This operation may not be l performed each refueling. . Also in parallel, and at a location separate from the fuel handling operations, l the CEAs are relocated, as required, within the upper guide structure utilizing long handling tools and j the CEA change platform. This operation may not be peiformed at each refueling. If new CEAs are ; l requireJ, they may be introduced into the upper guide structure at this time. The expended CEAs are moved to the CEA elevator, adjacent to the upper guide structure storage area, where the upper CEA casting is removed from the CEA rods utilizing special tooling.: Each rod is picked up individually and , a placed into the transpon container where the lower 15-foot section is cut off utilizing the ponable underwater hydraulic CEA cutter. The upper 5-foot section of the CEA rod is then placed into the , transport container and the operation is repeated until all rods have been cut. The transpon container is !
. CEA thenrodmoved disposal.
to the transfer carriage where it is transponed to the spent fuel area of th
. At the completion of the refueling operation, the fuel transfer tube valve is closed. The upper guide structure is reinserted in the reactor vessel, the CEDM extension shaft assemblies and CEAs are lowered ;
into position, and the lift rig is removed. The water in the refueling cavity is lowered to the top of the extension shafts. The reactor vessel head is then lowered until the CEDM extension shaft assemblies are i engaged by the control element drive mechanism nozzle funnels. Lowering of the head and the water level is continued until the head is seated. The remainder of the refueling pool water is then removed. 4O Then the studs are installed, the head is bolted down, and the transfer tube penetration sleeve is sealed. The ICI assemblies are reinserted into the core region and reconnected to their cabling. I The head area cable tray is replaced, CEDM and HJTC cabling is connected, cooling ducts are . reconnected to the CEDM cooling manifold, and the vessel vent piping is installed, f At the completion of refueling, all tools and equipment are either returned to storage locations or removed from the area of the refueling cavity and fuel storage area. Storage locations are designed to preclude : damage to safety related equipment in the event of a seismic event. l 1 i 9.1.4.3 Safety Evaluation ( 9.1.4.3.1 Nuclear Annex Overhead Cranes and Reactor Building Polar Crane j The reactor building polar crane, the cask handling hoist, and the new fuel handling hoist are designed
- to prevent the drop of a heavy load such as the reactor vessel head or the spent fuel shipping cask. In !
I addition, predetermined load paths for major lifts (see Figures 9.1-19 and 9.1-20), operator training, and regular crane maintenance minimize the possibility ofload mishandling. ((The COL applicant's operating procedures will control the load paths and height of the reactor vessel closure head, the core support barrel and the upper guide structure above the pool floor.))l
- O l 3 ' COL information item; see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. j l
Page S. 7JS j Apoweef Deste A$semnisi. AasmAlary Systems l 2 I -- -- _ __ __. _
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Limit switches, electrical interlocks and mechanical interlocks prevent improper crane and hoist operations which might result in a fuel handling accident. This is also discussed in Section 9.1.4.2.1.7. The cask handling hoist is restricted from movement over the new and spent fuel storage areas when the fuel racks contain fuel assemblies. The new fuel handling hoist is restricted from movement over the spent fuel storage area when the spent fuel racks contain fuel assemblies. The spent fuel cask laydown area is separated from the spent fuel pool by a gate and a structurally reinforced concrete wall. The gate is closed, sealed, and locked during all cask handling operations. The floor in the laydown area has been designed to withstand the impact of a shipping cask dropped from a height of 30 feet without broaching the integrity of the floor plate. ine spent fuel pool gates are designed to open into the pool area so that they will be maintained closed by the water pressure when either the transfer system canal or the cask laydown area is drained. Any small water loss as a result of local damage to the laydown area wall liner cannot be communicated to the spent fuel pool due to the cloud gate and the integrity of the independent spent fuel pool liner. Damage to the gate is prevented Juring cask handling by stops on the bridge crane rail that limit cask travel and by the recessed gate de sign. In accordance with the regulatory position of Regulatory Guide 1.13 and General Design Criteri(n 61 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, the hoists are also restricted from passing over the spent fuel pool cooling system for ESF systems which could be damaged by dropping the load. Set points for the hoist interlocks are set to prevent falling or tipping of the loads into the fuel storage areas. Administrative controls will preclude movement of heavy loads within the reactor building refueling cavity when the refueling machine contains a fuel assembly. Prior to heavy load movement, the fuel transfer tube valve or the gate between the spent fuel pool and the transfer system canal shall be closed to avoid water level changes in the spent fuel pool in the nuclear annex during postulated accident conditions such as dropping the heavy load on the reactor vessel pool seal. The nuclear annex hoists related to fuel handling and the reactor building polar crane conform with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Positions C.1 and C.2 and Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.1 and C.6 as they relate to the ability of the cranes to withstand the effects of earthquakes. With respect to radioactive release as a result of fuel damage, the cranes conform with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.1 and C.2, and 57.1/ ANSI-N208, ANS 57.2/ ANSI-N210, and NUREG-0612. 9.1.4.3.2 Fuel IIandling A failure modes and effects analysis is described in Table 9.1-2. Direct voice and/or electronic communication between the control room and the refueling machine console and the spent fuel handling machine console is available whenever changes in core geometry are taking place. The communications will be independent of other communications channels to the control room. This provision allows the control room operator to inform the refueling machine operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement. Opeability of the fuel handling equipment including the bridge and trolley, the lifting mechanisms, the upendh:3 machines, the transfer carriage, and the associated instrumentation and controls is assured through the implementation of preoperational tests and routines. Prior to the first actual fuel loading, the Approved Design Materia! Aumtiary Systems Page 9.1-40
t System 80+ oestan contmloccamart : i D - equipment is cycled through its operations using a dummy fuel assembly. In addition to the interlocks t described in Section 9.1.4.2.1, the equipment has the following special features: l
. *. The major systems of the fuel handling system are electrically interlocked with each other to '
assist the operator in properly conducting the fuel handling operation. Failure of any of these interlocks in the event of operator error will not result in damage to more than one fuel assembly.
- i
-* Miscellaneous special design features which facilitate handling operations include: ,
- 1. Backup hand operation of the refueling machine hoist and drives and CEA change i platform traverse drives in the event of power failure. ,
- 2. Transfer system motor and gearbox to permit applying an increased pull on the transfer !
- . carriage in the event it becomes stuck. l
- 3. Viewing port in the refueling machine trolley deck to provide visual access to the reactor l 3 for the operator. !
- 4. Electronic and visual indication of the refueling machine position over the core.
- 5. Protective shroud into which the fuel assembly is drawn by the refueling machine. i
- 6. Manual operation of transfer system upenders by a special tool in the event that the hydraulic system becomes inoperative.
- 7. Removal of the transfer system components from the refueling pool for servicing without l l draining the water from the pool.
- 8. Computer control system to monitor refueling operation and facilitate control and l implementation of the refueling procedure.
[
- The fuel transfer tube is sufficiently large to provide natural circulation cooling of a fuel assembly [
in the unlikely event that the transfer carriage should be stopped in the tube. The manual ; 1 operator for the fuel transfer tube valve extends from the valve to the operating deck. Also, the l l valve operator has enough flexibility to allow for operation of the valve even with thermal l expansion of the fuel transfer tube. ;
* -Mechanical stops in both the refueling and spent fuel handling machines restrict withdrawal of the spent fuel assemblies. This results in the maintenance of a minimum water cover of 9 feet
- - over the active portion of the fuel assembly. The resulting radiation level from the spent fuel is 3 4
2.5 mrem /hr or less in the work area when the shielding of the fuel handling machine is taken l into account. The spent fuel pool shielding has been designed for the maximum anticipated ; enrichment and burnup of the fuel assemblies. ] l The refueling machine and the spent fuel handling machine meet Regulatory Guide 1.29, Positions C.1 j . and C.2 and Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.1 and C.6 as they relate to the ability of the equipment j i' .to withstand the effects of earthquakes. With respect to radioactive release as a result of fuel damage, j the machines conform with the. guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.3 and C.5, j ANS 57.1/ ANSI-N208, ANS 57.2/ ANSI-N210, and NUREG-0612. l
.v 4provedf Des @n Afseerdsf. AmmSery Speasses Aspe 9. r-d F
Sy^ tem 80 + Design CcntrolDocument 9.1.4.3.3 Reactor Vessel Closure Ilead Handling The reactor vessel closure head lift rig is designed, tested, and inspected to meet NUREG 0612 and the design criteria of ANSI N14.6. Analyses for the postulated head drops is performed to assure that the reactor vessel suppon system and shutdown cooling supply flow paths remain functional, that the core will remain in a coolable configuration, and that the ke rr of the core will remain below 0.95. The reactor vessel closure head drop is the worst case load drop accident. The reactor vessel closure head lift rig and the reactor vessel internals lift rig meet Regulatory Guide 1.29, Positions C.1 and C.2 and Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.1 and C.6 as they relate to the ability of the lift rigs to withstand the effects of earthquakes. With respect to radioactive release as a result of fuel damage, the lift rigs conform with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Positions C.3 and C.5, ANS 57.1/ ANSI-N208, ANS 57.2/ ANSI-N210, and NUREG-0612. 9.1.4.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements During manufacture of the fuel and CEA Handling Equipment at the vendor's plant, various in-process inspections and checks are required including certification of materials and heat treating, and liquid-penetrant or magnetic-panicle inspection of critical welds. Following completion of manufacture, compliance with design and specification requirements is determined by assembling and testing the equipment in the vendor's shop. Utilizing a dummy fuel assembly having the same weight, center of gravity, exterior size and end geometry as an actual assembly, all equipment is run through several complete operational cycles. In addition, the equipment is checked for its ability to perform under the maximum limits of load, fuel mislocation and misalignment, and static and dynamic load conditions. All traversing mechanisms are tested for speed and positioning accuracy. All hoisting equipment is tested for vertical functions and controls, rotation, and load misalignment. Hoisting equipment is also tested to 125% of specified hoist capacity. Fuel handling tools are proof tested to 150% of the maximum handling load. Setpoints are determined and adjusted and the adjustment limits are verified. Equipment interlock function, and backup systems operations are checked. Those functions having manual operation capability are exercised manually. During these teus, the various operating parameters such as motor speed, voltage, and current, hydraulic system pressures and load measuring accuracy and setpoints are recorded. At the completion of these tests the equipment is checked for cleanliness, and the locking of fasteners by lockwire or other means ; is verified. j i Equipment installation and testing at the plant site are controlled by approved installation procedures and preoperational test procedures designed to verify conformance with procurement specifications. Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. Recommended maintenance, including any necessary adjustments and calibration, is performed prior to equipment operation. Preoperational tests also include checks of all control circuits including interlocks and alarm functions. The following testing and inspections will be used for both the reactor building polar crane and nuclear annex overhead hoists related to fuel handling. l l
- lloists and cable will be load tested at 125% of the rated load. I O
Approved Ortign Material- Ambery Systems Page 9.142 l
)
-. . . _ - . - - - -. .~. - . -~= - - .
I System 80+ oestan contrat Document O e The equipment will be assembled and checked for proper functional and running operation at the shop and prior to using the equipnent. i
- e. Inspection and maintenance will be performed in accordance with plant maintenance procedures.
((The COL. Applicant will provide plant operating procedures that specify detailed preoperational l checkouts that must be performed prior to equipment use to insure that equipment is in proper working t _ order.))l These checkouts include, but are not limited to, the following: interlocks, brakes, hoisting
- cable, control circuitry, lubrication, and load testing.
9.1.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 4 The refueling system instrumentation and controls are described in Section 9.1.4.2. No credit is taken I for instrurnentation or interlocks on components of the fuel handling equipment to either prevent or mitigate the consequences of the postulated accident. Thus, safety-related interlocks are not provided. 9.1.4.6 Operating Procedure GuiMi- . (( Site-specific guidelines will be established for component handling procedures and plant operating procedures. Component handling procedure guidelines will require the COL Applicant to establish the ' safe load path fcr lifting heavy loads and to perform special handling component inspections prior to lift.
?
I Plant operating procedure guidelines will require appropriate operation training and crane inspections. ( The guidelines will also require the COL applicant to prepare operating procedures for preoperational load testing and checkouts of interlocks, brakes, hoisting cables, control circuitry and lubrication of fuel l handling equipment.))! ! . References for Section 9.1 1
- 1. W. A. Rhoades and R.L. Childs, "An Updated Version of the DOT-4 One- and Two-Dimensional Neutron / Photon Transport Code," ORNL-5851, April 1982.
- 2. L.M. Petrie arxl N.F. Cross, " KENO-IV, An Improved Monte Carlo Criticality Program," ;
ORNL-4938, November 1975. 4 7 l {)g.
- x. t 3
COL information item: see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. itIns) rape s.t 42 Anweveer Deem annannet '% speanme l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-1 Major Tools and Servicing Equipment for Refueling Functions g Item No. Item Quantity 1 1 4-Finger CFA Handling Tool 1 2 12-Finger CEA Hawiling Tool 3 CEA Cutting Tool I 4 Transport Container Handling Tool I 1 5 Spent-Fuel Handling Tool 6 Surveillance Capsule Retrieval Tool ! 7 Neutron Source Handling Tool 1 8 CEA/lCI Transport Container i 1 9 Gripper Operating Tool 10 CEA Assembly / Disassembly Tool Set I 11 New Fuel Handling Tool 1 Dummy Fuel Assembly 1 12 1 13 Cutter for Incore Instrumentation O O Approved Desiger Material Auxnery Systems Page 9.1M
System 80+ Design Control Document Table 9.1-2 Failure Mode Analysis of Fuel Handling Equipment Component Detrimental Identification Failure Mode Effect on System Correcthe Action Remarks R. M. Fuel Hoist Electrical None . Continue refueling, repair Use visual load Weigh System overload trip fails oa non-interfering basis presentation on readout Complete system Hoist operation Move fuel to safe position Maximum stall torque of fails for the fuel and repair hoist motor will not assembly being damage bundle. Hoisting handled continues using manual handwheel at a slower speed may be required Fu 'ransfer Wheels lock in Transfer operation Shift gearbox from increased gearbox output Sy Fuel transfer tube - can be completed normal speed setting to force is sufficient to Canier at a slower speed low speed setting to exert move the carrier with the a higher pulling force. wheels locked. Hydraulic Power Line to upender None Valve off defective line Upender has two Supply for cylinder ruptures cylinders, each of which Upender is capable of raising upender Loss of hydraulic Process can Upend manually Use tool provided power continue on a slower basis Brake on R. M. Does not provide None Continue refueling, repair Redundant brake system p Fuellloist required brake on non-interfering basis provided load Fuel Carrier Cable Cable breaks Delays refueling Move fuel carrier to safe Remove fuel prior to position with manual tool repair R.M. Hoist Motor Power failure Delays refueling Repair Hoist using manual handwheel Bridge or Trolley Power failure Delays refueling Repair Move machine using Drive Motor manual handwheel R. M. Electronic Power failure None Repair on noninterfering Indexing can be Bridge & Trolley basis accomplished by backup Position Indication scale and pointer system Fuel Carrier Electrical failure None Repair on noninterfering Winch motor stalls on Position Sensing basis overload System Refueling Machine IAss of air None Repair Continue, using manual pressure mode Refueling Machine Electrical failure None Repair on noninterfering Nonmandatory for fuel TV Camera basis handling Refueling Machine Electrica! failure None Repair on noninterfering Redundant mechanical Electronic Holst basis counter provided Position Indication Reactor Vessel Mechanical Possible local Repair - Core maintained in a , Closure Head failure damage to vessel coolable array p Assembly Lift Rig head assembly and internals M::::Deehpr niesentini- Auxniary Systems Pope 9. r.45
a System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System g Inherent Name/ Number Failure Effects on Method of Compensating hi de Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. 1 Spent Fuel Pool a. Plugged Corrosion or Reduced flow in fligh pool temp Failed heat Complete Cooling Ilear tubes boron buildup, one system. alarm (T-420) in exchanger can plugging of all Exchangers foreign objects Gradual control room at be isolated by tubes is lleat Exchanger 1 in PCPS. increase in temp 180*F. valve unlikely. Ileat Exchanger 2 in pool. Local temp PC-212/211. Reduced flow indication Redundant heat would be (T-404/406 and exchanger is detected long T-405/407). available before complete Local flow through cross plugging occurs. indication connection (F-400/401). (valves PC-201 and PC-293). Redundant train is provided.
- b. Insufficient Corrosion or Reduced heat High pool temp Heat exchanger heat transfer boron buildup removal in one alarm (T-420) in can be isolated on tubes. system. control room at by valve Gradual 180'F. PC-212/211.
increase in temp Local temp Redundant heat in pool. indication exchanger is (T-405/407). available through cross connection (valves PC-201 and PC-293). Redundant train is provided.
- c. CCWS Casing crack, Reduced heat High pool temp Failed heat leakage welding removal in one alarm (T-420) in exchanger can failure, system. control room at be isolated by manufacturing Gradual 180'F. valve defect. increase in temp Local temp PC-212/211.
in pool. indication Redundant heat (T-405/407). exchanger is available through cross connectx>n (valves PC-201 and PC-293). Redundant train is provided. O Aptweved Design historia! . AuzRiary 5ystems page 9.146
l l Sy* tem 80 + Design ControlDocument r d Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of C'==;-=<a'ing go, Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks
- d. Cross Tube corrosion, Contamination High water level Failed heat . Water level in leakage vibration wear, of component alarm in CCWS exchanger can be fuel pool can be '
manufacturing cooling water surge tanks. isolated by valve returned to defect, system. Fuel peollow PC-212/211. normal with increase in pool level alarm Redundant heat manual makeup temp. Decrease (1 420) in exchanger is flow with in pool water control room. available through borated water level. High pool temp cross connection from the CVCS. alarm (T-420) in (valves PC-201 , control room at and PC-293). 180'F. Redundant train is local temp provided. indication (T405/407). Local flow indication (F400/401). 2 Spent Furl a. Fails to Electrical Fuel pool temp Motor status in Redundant train is Single train is Pool Coaling start malfunction, will gradually control room. provided for sufficient to g
'v} Pumps mechanical increase. High pool temp continued flow for maintain fuel pool semp at Pump I failure or alarm (T-420) in *. eat removal.
binding, loss of control room at l Stand-by pump is ; Pump 2 180'F for . power, 180'F. Low r.arted manually, abnormalloads discharge and 140'F for pressure alann normal loads. (P-403/404) in control room. Local pressure indication - (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F400/401). 14 cal temp indication (T-404/406 and T-405/407) I
- A - v Neuend w nennenw. Auuniery syurane rege s.1-ti
System 80+ Design Control Document Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) h Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No.
- b. Stops Electrical Loss of flow. Motor status in Redundant train is Single train is malfunction, Fuel pool temp control room. provided for sufficient to mechanical will gradually High pool temp continued flow for maintain fuel seizure, loss of increase. alarm (T-420) in heat removal. pool temp at power. control room at Stand-by pump is 180'F for 180*F. Low staned manually. abnormalloads discharge and 140'F for pressure alarm normal loads.
(P-403/4(4) in control room. Local pressure indication (P401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-$05/407)
- c. Fails to Excess seal Reduced flow. Motor status in Redundant train is Single train is deliver rated leakage, Fuel pool temp control room. provided for sufficient to flow mechanical will Eradually High pool temp continued flow for maintain fuel malfunction. increase. alarm (T-420) in heat removal. pool temp at control room at Stand-by pump is 180*F for 180*F. Low started manually. abnormal loads discharge and 140*F for pressure alarm normal loads.
(P-403/404) in control room. Local pressure indication (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-405/407). O Asywowd Des > Material. Ausnery Systems Page 9.1-48
System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument < l l m I'
, Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.)
Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. I
- d. Spurious Electrical Pool cooling Motor Status in No compensation Pumps are startup malfunction, will start. control room. needed, normally started spurious signal. Local flow manually. ;
indication , (F-400/401). Local pressure ' indication (P-401/402). Local temp indication i (T-404/406 and T-405/407). 3 Pump Suction a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of flow in High pool temp Redundant train is Single train is Valves mechanical one train, alarm (T-420) in provided from sufficient to i PC-202 failure Gradual control room at continued flow for maintain fuel ' PC-203 increase in temp 180'F. Low heat removal. pool temp at in pool, discharge alarm 180'F for (P-403/404) in abnormalloads control room. and 140*F for k, normal loads. ; Local pressure indication Valves are (P-401/402). normally open. l Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-405/407).
- b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check. None. Valves are ,
failure or cooling normally open. binding pumping impossible. l O V we w.% sy r r-a i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. 4 Pump a. Fails closed lluman error. Loss of flow in High pool temp Redundant train is Single train is Discharge mechanical one train. alann (T-420) in provided for sufficient to Valves failure Gradual control room at continued flow for maintain fuel PC-206 increase in temp 180*F. Low heat removal. pool ter..p at PC-207 in pool. discharge 180*F for PC-208 pressure alarm abnormalloads PC-209 (P-403/404). and 140*F for Local pressure normal loads. indication Valves are (P-401/402). normally open. Local flow indication (F-400/401). Iecal temp indication (T-4N/406 and T-405/407).
- b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of Periodic check. If both valves fail Valves are failure or cooling pumps open, the heat normally open.
bindu's impossible if exchanger inlet both valves in valves one train fail (PC-211/212) can open. be used to isolate pumps. 5 Pressure a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of Local Periodic check. Low /high Valves are
. indicator mechanical pressure pressure alarm normally open.
Valve failure indication (P-403/404) in PC-204 (P-401/402). control room. PC-205
- b. Fails open Mechanical Isolation of Periodic check. Pump suction Valves are failure or pressure valves normally open.
bindmg indicator (PC-202/203) and impossible. pump discharge valves (PC-208/209) can be used to isolate pressure indicator. 6 Pressure a. Fails closed liuman error, Loss of Periodic check. Local pressure Valves are Switch Valve mechanical low /high Low discharge indication normally open. PC-200 failure discharge pressure alarm (P-401/402). PC-210 pressure alarm (P-403/4N) in (P-403/404) in control room. control room. O ANweved Desiger historiet - Ausnary Systems Page 9.150
b System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument { Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) Inherent Name/ - Failure Effects on Method of Cosnpensating , Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. ,
- b. Fails open Mechanical Isolation of Periodic check. Pump discharge Valves are ,
i failure or pressure switch valves normally open. binding impossible. (PC-208/209) and ' heat exchanger inlet valves (PC-211/212) can be used to isolate pressure switch. 7 Heat a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of one High pool temp Redundant heat Single train is Exchanger mechanical heat exchanger, alarm (T-420) in exchanger is sutTicient to inlet Valves failure Gradual temp control room at available through maintain fuel PC-211 increases in 180*F. High cross connection pool temp at PC-212 pool. discharge (valves PC-201 180*F for pressure alarm and PC-293). abnormalloads (P-403/404) in Redundant train is and 140'F for control room, provided. normal loads. Local pressure Valves are indication normally open. O (P-401/402). V Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication T-405/407).
- b. Fails open Mechanical isolation of heat Periodic check. Pump discharge Wlves are failure or exchanger valves normally open.
binding impossible. (PC-208/209) can be used to isolate the heat exchanger. l l l l i l I l I O w l Annroseef Deehm neeenriel ^u=^Wy Systems Pope 9.1 51
1 System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) h Inherent Name/ Failure Errects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. 8 Heat a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of flow in High pool temp Redundant heat Single train is Exchanger mechanical one train. alarm (T-420) in exchanger is sufficient to Outlet Valves failure Gradual control room at available through maintain fuel PC-213 increase in temp 180'F. High cross connection pool emp at PC-214 in pool. discharge (valves PC-201 180*F for pressure alarm and PC-293). abnormalloads (P-403/404) in Redundant train is and 140'F for control room. provided. normal loads. Local pressure Valves are indication normally open. (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication T-405/407).
- b. Fails open Mechanical Isolation of heat Periodic check. None. Valves are failure or exchanger normally open.
binding impossible. 9 Cross a. Fails closed Human error, Switching from Periodic check. Pool cooling is Valves are Connection mechanical one heat available through normally closed. Valves failure or exchanger to either train. PC-201 binding the other one PC-293 impossible.
- b. Fails open Human error, None, flow will Periodk check. Coohng is Valves are mechanical be through both Local flow available, normally closed.
failure heat indication exchangers. (F-400/401) 10 Flow indicator a. Fails closed Human error, Loss of local Periodic check. Local flow Valves are Inlet Valves mechani'21 flow indicator indication normally open. PC-301 faizure (F-400/F-401). (F-400/401) PC-303 Possible by using the other redundant train. Redundant heat exchanger and flow indicator available through Cross Connection (valves PC-201 and PC-293) O Approved Designs Atatorial. Auxiiiery Systems Page 9.1-52
Sy tem 80 + Design ControlDocument
.I r
Table 9.1-3 Fr.ilure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System C)l (Cont'd.) Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No.
- b. Fails open Mechanical Isolation of Periodic check. Heat exchanger Valves are failure or local flow discharge valve normally open.
binding indicator (PC-214/213) can (F 400/401) be used to isolate impossible, flow indicator. 11 Flow Indicator a. Fails closed lluman error, Loss of local Periodic check. Local flow Valves are Outlet Valves mechanical flow indicator indication normally open. PC-300 failure (F-400/401). (F-400/401) PC-302 possible by using the other redundant train. Redundant heat exchanger and flow indicator available through Cross connection (valves PC-201 e and PC-293). l ( b. Fails open Mechanical Isolation of Periodic check. None. Valves are failure or local flow normally open. binding indicator (F400/401) impossible. 12 Prvi Cooling Inlet covered Foreign objects less of one High pool temp Redundant train is Single train is Fiping Suction in spent fuel cooling train, alarm (T-420) at provided for sufficient to the Inlet pool. Gradual 180*F. Low continued heat maintain fuel increase in temp discharge removal, pool temp at in pool. pressure alarm 180'F for (P403/404) in abnormalloads control room, and 140'F for Local pressure normal loads. indication (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F-400/401). Local temp indication (T-444/406 and T-405/407). r\ () L a:ouiser momer- Aouney systems rare s.1-52
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) ri Inherent Name/ Ihllure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Med? l Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. 13 Pool Cooling fireak Accident Loss of flow in High pool temp Redundant train is Piping Pump one train. Loss alarm (T 420) in provided for Suction Line of coolant. control room at continued heat Pool drained to 180*F. Fuel removal. If pool level of suction pool low level drains to level of line inlet, alarm (L-420) in pump suction Temp in pool control room. inlet, sufficient rises. Low discharge water remains to pressure alarm allow time to line , (P403/404) in up make up to control room. preclude reaching Local pressure the minimum indication shielding depth. (P-401/402). Local flow indication (F400/401). Local temp indication (T-404/406 and T-405/407). 14 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow in High pool temp Broken pipe is Single train is Piping Pump one train. Loss alarm (T 420) in isolated with sufficient to Discharge of coolant. control room at valves maintain fuel Line Gradual 180*F. Fuel PC-202/203 and pool temp at increase in temp pool low level PC-214/213. , 180*F for in pool. alarm (L-420) in Redundant train is abnormalloads control room. provided for and 140*F for local flow continued heat normals loads. indication removal. Water level in (F-400/401). If pool drains to fuel pool can be Local temp level of pump returned to indication suction inlet, normal with T-405/407). sufficient water manual make up Eventually low remains to allow flow with discharge alarm time to line up borated water (P403/404) in make up to from the CVCS. control room. preclude reaching Eventually local the minimum pressure shielding depth. indication (P-401/402). Eventually local temp indication (T-404/406). O Approved Desigwp Materin! AuxiGary Systems Page 9.154
i l Sy~ tem 80+ Design ConuolDocument l Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) l Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks l No. 15 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow in High pool temp Broken pipe is Single train is Prping Cross one train. Loss alarm (T-420) in isolated with sufficient to Connection of coolant. control room at valves maintain fuel Line Gradual 180*F. Fuel PC-208/209 and pool temp at increase in temp poollow level PC-212/211. 180*F for l in pool. alarm (L-420) in Redundant train is abnormalloads control room, provided for and 140'F for Local flow continued heat normals loads. indication removal. Water level in (F-400/401). If pool drains to fuel pool can be Local temp level of pump returned to indication suction inlet, normal with (T-405/407). sufficient water manual make up , remains to allow flow with time to line up borated water make up to from the CVCS. preclude reaching l the minimum p shieldmg depth. l 16 Pool Cooling Break Accident Loss of flow in High pool temp Broken pipe is Single train is Piping Return one train. Loss alarm (T-420) in isolated with sufficient to Line of coolant. control room at valves maintain fuel Gradual 180*F. Fuel PC-212/211 or pool temp at increase in temp pool low level PC-214/213. 180'F for in pool. alarm (L-420) in Redundant train is abnormalloads control room, provided for and 140*F for Eventually local continued heat normals loads. flow removal. Water level in (F-400/F401). If pool drains to fuel pool can be l level of pump returned to ; I suction inlet, normal with sufficient water manual make up retnains to allow flow with i time to line up borated water make up to from the CVCS. preclude reaching the minimum ] shielding depth. . 17 Pool Cooling Plugged Corrosion Reduced flow in High pool temp Redundant train is Complete ! Piping nozzles buildup, boron one train. alarm (T-420) in provided for plugging of all , Discharge buildup, foreign Gradual control room at continued heat nozzles is l Line Sparger objects in increase in temp 180*F. Local removal. unlikely. I I PCPS. m pool. temp indication Reduced flow (T 404/406). would be _ Local flow detected long [y indication (F-400/401). before plugging occurs. Anwevent Denign nietenief- Ausnary Sysms Pope .9.1-55
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) h Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. 18 Pump a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident Low discharge Discharge pressure mechanical impact on low discharge pressure alarm Pressure indication malfunction. system pressure alarm (P403/404). Indicator Setpoint drift. operation. (P403/404) with Redundant train is P401 low pressure provided. P402 gauge indication from P401/402. Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident Hign discharge pressure mechanical impact on high discharge lpsssure alarm indication malfunction. system pressure alan t i P403/404).
Setpoint drift. operation. (P-403/404) with Redundant train is high pressure provided. gauge indication from P-401/402. Periodic test. 19 Pump a. False low Electrical or No direct No coinciden: local pressure No direct Discharge pressure alarm mechanical impact on local low indication impact on Pressure malfunction. system pressure gauge (P401/402). system even if Switch Setpoirt drift. operation. indication Redundant train is the operator P403 (P401/402) with provided. closes one train P-404 low pressure and switches to alarm from the redundant P403/404. train. Single Periodic test. train is sufficient to maintain fuel pool temp at 180*F for abnormalloads and 140'F for normal loads. O Approvent Design Matenal Auxiniary Systems page 9, g.Sg
. - . . .. .- . - . - -. . ~
Sv' tem 80+ Design ControlDocunnnt i (' Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) ; Inherent Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating ~ Nmnher Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No. b.1alse high Electrical or No direct No coincident Local pressure No direct pressure alarm mechanical impact on local high indication impact on - malfunction, system pressure gauge (P-401/402). system even if , Setpoint drift. operation. indication Redundant train is the operator (P401/402) with provided, closes one train high pressure and switches to alarm from the redundant P403/a04. train. Periodic test. Single train is sufficient to ; maintain fuel ; 4 pool temp at 180'F for > abnormalloads ! and 140*F for normal loads. 20 Heat a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident Redundant train is Exchanger temp mechanical impact on local low temp provided. ' Inlet indication malfunction, system indication x Temperature Serpoint drift. operations. (T-405/407) or Indicator low pool temp T-404 alarm (T-420) T-406 with low temp gauge indication (T 408/406). Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident Redundant train is A high heat temp mechanical impact on local high temp provided. exchanger inlet indication malfunction, systern indication temp makes Setpoint drift. operations. (T-405/407) or increased high pool temp cooling alarm (T-420) necessary. A s with high temp false high temp gauge indication indication (T 404/406). results in lower l Periodic test. temp than necessary in pool.
21 Heat a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident Spent fuel pool Exchanger temp mechanical impact on low pool temp temp alarm Outlet indication malfunction. system alarm (T-420) (T-420). Temperature Setpoint drift. operation, with low temp Redundant train is Indicator gauge indication provided. 1 T-405 (T-405/407). i ,{ T407 Periodic test.
\
% :w menard. Aunnery syssena reges.t.57 l
l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (Cont'd.) Inherent Name/ Failure EITects on Method of Compensating Number Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks No.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident Spent fuel pool A high heat temp mechanical impact on high pool temp temp alarm exchanger inlet indication malfunction. system alarm (T420) (T-420). temp Inakes Setpoint drift. operation. with high temp Redundant train is increased gauge indication provided. cooling (T-405/407). necessary. A Periodic test. false high temp indication results in lower temp than necessary in pool.
22 IIcat a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident Redundant train is Exchanger flow mechanical impact on high pool temp provided. Outlet Flow indication malfunction, system alarm (T 420) Indicator Serpoint drift. operations. with low flow gauge indication {-400
-401 (F-400/401).
Periodic test.
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident Redundant train is flow mechanical impact on low pool temp provided.
indication malfunction. system alarm (T-420) Setpoint drift. operations, with high flow ! gauge indication (F-400/401). Periodic test. l 23 Spent Fuel a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident IAcal temp ; Pool temp alarm mechanical impact on local low temp indication Temperature malfunction. system gauge indication (T-404/406) when Indicator Serpoint drift. operation. (T 404/406) pump is running. T-420 with low temp j alarm (T 420) ! when pump is running. Periodic test. j
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident Local temp Low pool temp temp alarm mechanical impact on local high temp indication is desired. ;
malfunction. system gauge indication (T-404/406) when i Setpoint drift. operation. (T-404/406) pump is running. with high temp . alarm (T-420) when pump is l running. Periodic test. O; l l Approved Desipre Materia!- Auniniary Systems page 9.1-58 I i
I Sy~ tem 80+ Deska controlDocument n Table 9.1-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (] (Cont'd.) i Inherent ! Name/ Failure Effects on Method of Compensating ! go, Nmnber Mode Cause System Detection Provision Remarks 24 Spent Fuel a. False low Electrical or No direct No coincident None. No risk of ; Pool Level level alarm mechanical impact on high temp alarm overfilling of Switch malfunction. system (T-420) in pool since make IA20 Serpoint drift. operation. control room or up is manually local low flow provided. indication (F400/401) , with low level alarm (L420). Periodic test. *
- b. False high Electrical or No direct No coincident None. No risk of level alarm mechanical impact on indication of uncovering the malfunction. system loss of water spent fuel since ,
Setpoint drift. operation. from CCWS and the suction line l CVCS with high inlet is situated , level alarm near the normal (IA20). water level. Periodic test. O V 1 I
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.1-4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Principal Component Data Summary Cooling Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 210'F Rated licad 130 Ft. Normal Flow 3500 gpm Normal Operating Temperature 120'F NPSli required 19 Ft. Fluid Spent Fuel Pool Wa'er Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Code ASME III Class 3 Cooling IIcat Exchangers z. Quantity 2 Type Shell and tube, horizontal Code (tube and shell side) ASME 111 Class 3 Tube Side Fluid Spent Fuel Pool Water Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 210*F Operating Temperatures 120*F / Il4.46*F (inlet / outlet) Normal Flow 3500 gpm Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Shell Side Fluid Component Cooling Water Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 250'F Operating Temperatures 105'F /108.86'F (inlet / outlet) Normal Flow 5000 gpm Material Carbon Steel ___ l l l Annreved Design Material- Auxa%ery 5ystems Page 9.1-60
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1 Sy: tem 80+ Design controlDocument 3 ( 9.2 Water Systems 9.2.1 Station Service Water System The Station Service Water System (SSWS) is an open system that takes suction from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) and provides cooling water to remove heat released by plant systems, structures and components. The SSWS returns the heated water to the Ultimate Heat Sink. The SSWS cools the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) which in turn cools essential and non-essential reactor auxiliary loads. The SSWS is shown in Figure 9.2.1-1. 9.2.1.1 Design Bases 9.2.1.1.1 Safety Psign Bases Safety design bt 4pplicable to the SSWS are as follows:
- 1. The SSWS, in conjunction with the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) and Ultimate licat Sink (UHS), is capable of removing sufficient heat from the essential heat exchangers to ensure a safe reactor shutdown and cooling following a postulated accident coincident with a loss !
of offsite power.
- 2. The SSWS is capable of maintaining the component cooling water supply temperature of 120*F or less following the design basis accident under the most adverse historical meteorological conditions consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27.
- 3. A single failure of any component in the SSWS will not impair the ability of the SSWS to meet ,
its functional requirements. l
- 4. Adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the ability of the SSWS to meet its functional !
requirements.
- 5. The SSWS is designed to detect leakage from the system.
- 6. The SSWS is designed to minimize the effects of long-term corrosion, silt, mud and organic -
buildup.
- 7. The SSWS is designed to withstand the effects of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
- 8. Components of the SSWS are capable of being fully tested during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and components shall be accessible for inspection.
- 9. All essential SSWS components are fully protected from floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity.
10, The system is designed to minimize the potential for water hammer by providing for adequate filling and high point venting. f3
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis l Power generation design bases pertinent to the SSWS are as follows:
- The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS and SCS, is designed to cool the reactor coolant from 350"F to 140*F through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and the component cooling water heat exchangers. The reactor coolant can be cooled to 140*F within 24 hours after reactor ,
i shutdown by first cooling the reactor coolant to 350*F through the steam generators and then cooling to 140*F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS. The cooling rate 1 of the reactor coolant does not exceed the administrative limit of 75'F/hr.
- The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to provide a maximum component cooling water temperature of 120*F to all components required to operate during a normal shutdown.
- The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to provide a maximum component cooling water temperature of 105'F or less during normal operating modes.
- The SSWS through the CCWS is designed to provide cooling water to the RCPs, letdown heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers, normal chilled water condensers, and other non-essential reactor auxiliary cooling loads.
9.2.1.1.3 Codes and Standards The SSWS and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with General Design Criteria 2,4,5,44,45 and 46 and the intent of the Standard Review Plan. 9.2.1.1.4 Interface Requirements The Station Service Water System (SSWS) Pump Structure is an out of scope item which shall be J provided by the applicant. The licensee shall verify that the following interface requirements are met to ensure adequacy with the System 80+ Standard Design:
- The SSWS Pump Structure shall meet Seismic Category I requirements.
- The SSWS Pump Structure shall provide physical and fire barriers to maintain divisional separation of SSWS components. The divisional wall will be designed / constructed with no penetrations below the maximum probable flood elevation.
- The SSWS Pump Structure shall withstand the effects of the following events:
- 1. Natural phenomena, including SSE, floods, tornados, and hurricanes.
- 2. Externally and internally generated missiles.
- 3. Fire and sabotage.
- The SSWS Pump Structure shall be located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path as shown in Figure 1.2-1.
AsY=med pesq,n Material. Aunkery Systems Page 9.2 2
4 Sv' tem 80 + . Destan contrat Document i l O N./ e Trash racks shall be provided upstream of sta'. ion service water pumps susceptible to damage due to large debris. A safety grade traveling screen shall be installed downstream of trash racks and . upstream of station service water pumps. The screens shall be equipped for periodic cleaning and l' designed to limit ingestion of biofouling, crganics, and debris, consistent with the fouling design '
- limits of the piping system and CCWS heat exchanger and the need to limit any blockage of the ;
pump inlets. Provisions for physical access to the trash racks and the traveling screens shall be consistent with the design of security barriers and intrusion detection systems. Provisions for ,
- physical access and for debris removal shall not provide a potential path for covert penetration - l Into the protected area.
e . Design of the SSWS Pump Structure shall provide adequate accessibility for maintenance,- inspection, and testing of compone.nts located within the structure including sufficient equipment 4 lay down space, lifting equipment, and pathway for removal and replacement of major f components.
- The SSWS Pump Structure pump well shall be designed to prevent the formation of air vortices ;
over the complete range of anticipated operating water levels in the pump well. j $-
- The SSWS is designated as a vital system. The SSWS pump structure and all SSWS piping and cabling shall be located within the protected area that is common to the main plant.
((The COL applicant will take appropriate measures to prevent organic fouling arxl inorganic buildup, l and will provide site-specific aspects regarding the resolution of GSI 51 (See Sections 9.2.1.4 and 9.2.5.4).))l 9.2.1.2 Systeen Description The SSWS consists of two separate, redundant, open loop, safety-related divisions. Each division coc,is one of two divisions of the CCWS, which in turn cools 100% of the safety-related loads. The SSWS operates at a lower pressure than the CCWS to prevent contamination of the CCWS with raw water. Each division of the SSWS consists of two pumps, two strainers, two sump pumps, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The station service water pumps circulate cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchanger and back to the ultimate heat sink. Provisions are made to ensure a continuous flow of cooling water under normal and accident conditions. Valves SW-120, SW-121, SW-122, SW-123, SW-220, SW-221, SW-222, and SW-223 provide station service water flow isolation / initiation for the component cooling water heat exchangers. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and can be remotely operated from the control room. 9.2.1.2.1 Cosnponents Description Table 9.2.1-2 lists component design parameters. Each component is also described in the following ] sections. Table 9.2.1-3 lists the active valves for the SSWS. These valves are described in Section 9.2.1.2.1.8.
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System 80+ Design Contro1 Document 9.2.1.2.1.1 SSWS Pumps Four identical station service water pumps are provided, two pumps per division. Manual start and stop actuation of the station service water pumps is provided from the control room to override automatic actuation. Each pump provides 100% of the required flow for post-LOCA conditions. Typically, during normal operation only one pump per division is operating. The second pump in the respective division will automatically start on a low pump discharge pressure signal. This is indicative of a failure of the operating pump. The pumps are of the vertical centrifugal type and are i,nstalled in the station service water pump structure. The station service water pump motor coolers receive cooling water from their respective station service water pump discharge at all times while the pump is in operation. The pump motors and all other electrical equipment in the pump struct"re are located above the maximum flood elevation. The pump motors are connected to their associated 4160 volt Class IE Auxiliary Power System. In the event offsite power is lost, the pumps are stopped and restarted in accordance with the diesel generator's load sequencing. The sizing of the station service water pumps is based on the following operating mode requirements: Normal power operation -1 pump per division operating Normal shutdown -4 pumps operating (24 hours) Safety-grade shutdown -2 pumps required, in a single division O (24 hours) Post-LOCA -1 pump required, (corresponding with the operating CC1 heat exchanger) During normal power operation as cooling requirements increase, the additional pump in a division may be needed. The station service water pumps are provided with at least 7% margin in head at the pump design point. The head versus flow curve is continuously rising from the design point to shut-off. The minimum available NPSH is the smaller of (1) 25 percent greater than, or (2) 10 feet greater than the required NPSli specified by the pwnp vendor. The available NPSH is calculated at the highest expected operating temperature and flow, at the normal water elevations, and asstuning the travelling screens are 50% clogged. The available NPSH exceeds the required NPSH for worst case UHS water elevations for all operation, flow, and temperature conditions. (Note: For worst case UHS water elevation, the margins previously specified need not apply.) O Alvvoved Desoger MaterW - AuxiGary Systems page 9.2 4
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.1.2.1.2 SSWS Pump Structure ((The pump structure is a Seismic Category I design. The UHS inlet to the station service water pumps is equipped with a safety grade screen system (see Section 9.2.1.2.1.4).))! ((The COL. applicant will provide a detailed description of the SSWS pump structure.))2 9.2.1.2.1.3 Piping, Valves, and Fittings Piping to and from the CCW heat exchangers is corrosion resistant. Materials are to be selected on a site-specific basis to be compatible with the ultimate heat sink makeup water chemistry and water treatment. All safety-related piping, valves, and fittings are supplied in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Class 3. All material exposed to the raw water will be tested at typical operating temperatures with similar station service water chemistry to evaluate the adequacy of the materials. The supply and return piping to and from system components in a division is physically separated from the supply and return lines in the redundant division. The nominal flow velocity in the SSWS pinnf coes not exceed 12 ft/sec nor is less than 8 ft/sec for nominal operating conditions. Vents are installed at all high points, and drains are installed at all low points in the SSWS. Vents are located to reduce the chances for water hammer after pump startups. Valve opening and closing times are selected to minimize water hammer effects. , i 9.2.1.2.1.4 SSWS Pump Structure Screens I
- ((A safety grade traveling screen with a screen wash system is provided for each pump structure. The traveling screens are located prior to station service water pump inlets. The screen mesh size is selected to prevent flow blockage of the pump inlets and to limit ingestion of biofouling. organics and debris.))l l
9.2.1.2.1.5 Station Service Water System Strainers l Each station service water pump is provided with a station service water strainer which is located at the pump discharge. This is to prevent clogging of the downstream heat exchangers. The strainers are of the automatic backwash type. The strainers backwash with station service water from their corresponding pumps. The strainers are designed to retain particles greater than 1/16 inch in diameter and to be ; consistent with the fouling design limits of the component cooling water heat exchangers. O i ! i Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. j G 2 COL information item: see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. Approved Deeign Meterial. Ausmary 5ystems Page 9.2-5
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.1.2.1.6 Station Service Water System Sump Pumps Each division has two station service water sump pumps, two for SSW Sump 1 and two for SSW Sump
- 2. During maintenance, station service water from the component cooling water heat exclamgers is drained to these sumps. The sump water is returned to the UHS by the sump pumps.
9.2.1.2.1.7 Station Service Water Radiation Monitors A radiation monitor is provided in each division downstream of the component cooling water heat exchangers. This will detect any leakage of radioactive component cooling water into the Station Service Water System. 9.2.1.2.1.8 Active Valves The following valves are required to perform a specific function in shutting down the reactor or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The active valves are listed in Table 9.2.1-3. e Station Service Water Pump Discharge Check Valves Valves SW-1302, SW-1303, SW-2302, and SW-2303 are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. In the event that one of the pumps ceases to produce flow and pressure head, these valves prevent flow reversal through the non-operating pump. e Station Service Water Strainer Backwash Valves Valves SW-100, SW-101, SW-102, SW-103, SW-104, SW-105, SW-106, SW-107, SW-108, O SW-109, SW-110, SW-111, SW-200, SW-201, SW-202, SW-203, SW-2M, SW-205, SW-206, SW-207, SW-208, SW-209, SW-210, and SW-211 are required for a safe unit shutdown. These valves are provided with electric motor operators. 9.2.1.2.1.9 Electric Power Supply Each division of essential SSWS equipment receives power from its associated 4,160 Volt Class IE Auxiliary Power System. In the event of loss of offsite power, this power system is supplied by the diesel generators. There are two diesel generators, either of which is capable of supplying power for the
]
operation of one division of the necessary safety equipment. Division 1 essential components are aligned 1 to Emergency Load Centers A or C and Division 2 essential components are aligned to Emergency Load j Centers B or D. The emergency load center and channel designation for the SSW pumps, valves, and controls are given
. in Table 9.2.14. (Note: each pump start /stop control is from a different channel.) i l
- Components Requiring Class IE Power
- l. Station Service Water Pumps: 1 A, IB,2A, and 2B. l l
- 2. Station Service Water Strainers: 1 A, IB,2A, and 2B.
O I Aporomrd Design Atatorial+ Auxmery Systems Page 9.2-6 I
System 80+ Deslan ControlDocument _ o Valves Requiring Class IE Power i 1.' [ SSW strainer backwash valves: SW-100, SW-101, SW-102, SW-103, SW-104, SW-105, SW-106, SW-107, SW-108, SW-109, SW-110, SW-111, SW-200, SW-201 SW-202, SW-203, SW-204, SW-205, SW-2%, SW-207, SW-208, SW-209, SW-210 and SW-211.
. 2. Component cooling water heat exchanger isolation valves: SW-120, SW-121, SW-122, l SW-123, SW-220, SW-221, SW-222, and SW-223.
9.2.1.2.2 Systen Operation and Controls ; The SSWS has two 100% capacity divisions, each with 100% redundancy. Each division supplies cooling to its corresponding CCWS division through the CCW heat exchanger. ; Each division has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain safe cold shutdown. The SSWS provides cooling to essential and non-essential components and equipment indirectly through the CCW heat exchangers. Cooling water for the SSWS is supplied from the UHS as described in Section 9.2.5.' The L., return flow from the CCW heat exchangers serviced by the SSWS is returned to the UHS for heat rejection. Upon low station service water pump discharge pressure, the idle station service water pump in the respective division will start automatically. ! f- The following sections describe the various modes of operation. 9.2.1.2.2.1 Unit Startup i Typically during a unit startup, four station service water pumps and four component cooling water heat exchangers are required. 9.2.1.2.2.2 Normal Operation Typically, during normal operation one station service water pump and one component cooling water heat i exchanger per division is in service. Station service water is supplied to the component cooling water , heat exchangers that are in service and receiving heat loads from the CCWS. . 9.2.1.2.2.3 Unit Shutdown
- . Both divisions of the SSWS (four station service water pumps and four component cooling water heat exchangers) are required to accomplish a normal reactor shutdown, that is, a reactor coolant temperature of 140*F in 24 hours. Although a normal reactor shutdown is accomplished by operation of both SSWS -
.' divisions, a safety grade shutdown over 24 hours is possible with use of a single division.
I 9.2.1.2.2.4 Refueling Ope 3tions l Both divisions of the SSWS (four station service water pumps and four component cooling water heat i
.. exchangers) are required to be in service during refueling. The RCS will be at a refueling temperature .;
of 120'F at % hours aRet reactor shutdown. ] 5
-l 4ewouenne@n nanauser. Amunary spenann roses.2 1; }
i l
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.1.2.2.5 Emergency Operation One station service water pump and corresponding conyonent cooling water heat exchanger is required to operate during post-LOCA. The SSWS will operate for the required nominal 30 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup water to the UIIS and without requiring any blowdown (that is, from non-open heat sinks such as a cooling pond) for salinity control. Provisions for non-essential makeup water and blowdown are discussed in Section 9.2.5. 9.2.1.2.2.6 Loss of Offsite Power A loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the station service water pumps in accordance with the diesel generator load sequencing. 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation Safety evaluations, numbered to conform to the safety design bases, are as follows:
- 1. The SSWS has the capability to dissipate the heat loads for safe reactor shutdown.
Loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the SSWS pumps in accordance with the diesel generator load sequencing. The diesel generator load capacity and sequencing times are commensurate with SSWS requirements. Thus, safe reactor shutdown is supported by the SSWS.
- 2. The SSWS maintains the component cooling water supply temperature at or below 120*F for the design basis accident.
- 3. The SSWS is comprised of two physically separate, independent, full capacity divisions, each of which is powered from separate emergency channels and a separate diesel generator. This ensures that a single failure does not impair system effectiveness. Refer to Table 9.2.1-1 for the single failure analysis.
- 4. The SSW pumps are located in Seismic Category I pump structures to protect the pumps against adverse environmental occurrences. Other required portions of the SSWS are either installed underground or are located in buildings that also protect against adverse environmental conditions.
- 5. Control room flow indication and alarms are provided to alert the operator of system leakage.
Since the SSWS operates at a lower pressure than the CCWS, leakage of raw water from the SSWS into the CCWS is precluded.
- 6. Wetted surfaces in the SSWS are of materials compatible with the UllS water chemistry. Organic fouling and inorganic buildups are controlled by proper water treatment (Refer to Section 9.2.5).
The capability to clean all SSWS surfaces is provided.
- 7. The essential portions of the SSWS are designed as Seismic Category I.
- 8. During normal plant operation, the SSWS is operating. The redundant features of the SSWS allow testing without violation of technical specifications.
Approved Desigrr Material. Auxmary Systems Pope 9.2-8
_ _ _ . . _ . _ ___ ~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ . . ._ __ ' System 80+ oestan controlDocument O 9. Components of the SSWS are located such that flooding, fire, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems from . any source will not prevent the system from performing its design function.
.i
- 10. To prevent damage to components and piping, the system is designed to minimize the potential for water hammer by providing adequate filling and high point venting.
9.2.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requiren=nts ((The COL applicant will provide site-specific aspects regarding the resolution of Generic Safety Issue
- 51, including maintenance and inspection programs.))8 P
During fabrication of the SSW components, tests and inspections are performed and documented in accordance with code requirements to assure high quality construction. As necessary, performance tests . ~ of components are performed at the vendor's facility. The SSWS is designed and installed to permit
- inservice inspection and tests in accordance with ASME Code Section XI. Buried SSWS piping is inspected by means of a leakage test that determines the rate of pressure loss or a test of differential flow
- between the ends of buried piping.
9.2.1.4.1 SSWS Performance Tests , Prior to initial plant startup, a comprehensive performance test as detailed in Section 14.2 will be performed to verify that the design performance of the system and individual components is attained. 9.2.1.4.2 Reliability Tests and Inspections ,
* ' System Level Tests I
- After the plant is brought into operation, periodic tests and inspections of the SSW components and subsystems are performed to ensure proper operation. Scheduled tests and inspections are necessary to verify system operability. A complete schedule of tests and inspections of the SSWS is detailed in Chapter 16, Technical Specifications.
- Component Testing
' In addition to the system level tests, tests to verify proper operation of the S5 / components are . also conducted. These tests supplement the system level tests by verifying acceptable l performance of each active component in the SSWS. - l Pumps and valves are tested in accordance with ASME Section XI. Various flow rate testing ur to and including the design point of the SSW pumps can be performed using the system loop. ; The station service water intake will be visually inspected, once per refueling cycle, for macroscopic biological fouling organisms, sediment, and corrosion. Inspections should be performed either by scuba
- divers or by dewatering the intake structure or by comparable methods. Any fouling accumulations should be removed, a.
.: L 8' COL information item: see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. , i Ammvowcos@s AssewW Ammmary Syssums Pope 9.2-9 ! i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements The SSW instrumentation facilitates automatic operation, remote control, and continuous indication of system parameters (UHS water temperature, station service water pump flow, UHS water level) both locally and in the control room. Process indications and alarms are provided to enable the operator to evaluate the SSWS performance and to detect malfunctions. Station service water pump discharge pressure is monitored and actuates alarms upon detecting an abnormally low pressure (pump "ailure, pipe break) or abnormally high pressure (pipe blockage, closed valves). UHS water levels and temperatures ne monitored to detect a low or high level, or a high temperature condition (see Section 9.2.5). The station service water discharge temperature from the component cooling water heat exchangers is monitored. A high temperature condition alarms to indicate either a reduced water flow to the heat exchanger or an abnormal heat input into the heat exchanger from the CCWS. The following test connections are provided at each component cooling water heat exchanger. These are used for determining the overall heat transfer coefficient with temporary instrumentation. e Component cooling water heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperature test connections on the SSWS side.
- Component cooling water heat exchanger inlet and outlet pressure test connections on the SSWS side.
- Component cooling water heat exchanger flow test connection on the SSWS side.
9.2.1.5.1 Pressure
- Local Indication Local indication is provided for the following process pressure parameters.
- 1. Station service water pumps l A, IB, 2A, and 2B discharge pressures.
- 2. Station service water sump pumps IA, IB,2A, and 2B discharge pressures.
- 3. Station service water pump strainers I A, IB,2A, and 2B differential pressures, a Control Room Indication Control room indication is proviJ~.1 for the station service water pumps I A, IB, 2A and 2B discharge pressures and station service water strainers I A, IB, 2A, and 28 differential pressures.
e Test Points Pressure test points are provided for the following process pressure parameters.
- 1. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB,2A, and 2B service water inlet and outlet pressures.
Apprend Design Materia! Auxaiary Systems Pope 9.2.r0
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' System 80+ Desier ControlDocument i
} 2. Station service water pump motor coolers 1Al, lA2, IB1, IB2, 2A1,2A2,2B1, and 2B2 and the motor upper bearing oil coolers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet j pressures. l t
7_ e Alarms l j- 1 l Control room alarms are provided for station service water strainer I A, IB,2A, and 2B high E differential pressures.- j i o Controls , i The respective idle station service water pump in each division will automatically start on a low
. station service water pump discharge pressure.
} .9.2.1.5.2 Tesaperature , e Local Indication i i ! Local indication is provided for the following process temperature parameters.
- 1. Station service water pumps 1 A, IB, 2A, and 2B outlet temperatures.
r j
- 2. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B service water outlet temperatures. ;
e Control Room Indication Control room indication is provided for the station service water pump 1A, IB,2A, and 2B discharge temperatures. Control room indication is also provided for component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB,2A, and 2B station service water outlet temperatures. e Test Points Temperature test points are provided for the following process temperature parameters.
- l. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B service water inlet and outlet temperatures. +
1
- 2. SSW pump motor coolers I A1, I A2, IB1, IB2, 2A1, 2A2, 2B1, and 2B2 and motor l upper bearing oil coolers 1A, IB,2A, and 2B outlet temperatures.
- i e . Alarms The following temperature alarms are provided in the Control Room.
- 1. SSW supply header high temperature. >
i Q 2. Component cooling water heat exchangers 1 A, IB,2A, and 2B high service water outlet ! Q temperatures. l 4 i Annemer Donen nenoorder. Ammary sesame , reen s.2 tt . t
- -.-System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2,1.5.3 Flow
- Local Indication Local indication is provided for the following process flow parameters.
- 1. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B service water outlet flows.
- 2. Station service water pump motor coolers I Al, I A2, IB1, IB2, 2Al, 2A2, 2B1, and 2B2 and motor upper bearing oil coolers I A, IB, 2A, and 2B outlet flows.
- 3. SSW supply headers I A, IB,2A, and 2B flows.
e Control Room Indication Control room indication is provided for the following process flow parameters.
- 1. SSW pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B flows.
- 2. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B service water outlet flows.
- Test Points Service water flow test points are provided for the component cooling water heat exchangers l A, IB,2A, and 2B.
e Alanns The following flow alarms are provided to the control room.
- 1. Component cooling water heat exchangers I A, IB, 2A, and 2B low and high service water outlet flows.
- 2. Station service water pump motor coolers I Al, I A2, IB1,1B2, 2Al, 2A2, 2B1, and 2B2 and motor upper bearing oil coolers I A, IB,2A, and 2B low outlet flows.
- 3. Station service water pumps lA, IB, 2A, and 2B low and high outlet flows.
- 4. Station service water radiation monitors 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- Controls The station service water strainer is backwashed continuously. The straining media is backwashed with six separate backwash compartments. Each compartment backwashes only a portion of the straining area. A backwash line and control valve is provided for each backwash compartment. The control valves are actuated by timers as backwashing proceeds from one compartment to the next, backwashing only one compartment at a time.
Asyveved Design hteterial . Aussary Systems page 9.2.r2
_-y i Sv' tem 80+ oeshm contrar Document L9.2.1.5.4 : Level ! i f
. e :. Station Service' Water Pump Structure Level j
. Indication of the station service water pump structure's level and high and low level alarms are i,
. provided in the control room.
- ' e Station Service Water Samp Level ;
3 A high level alarm is provided far each SSW sump. Each station service water sump pump is i automatically started at a specific sump level and automatically stopped at a predetermined sump
' low level. j z
s 9.2.1.5.5 Emuent Radiation Detection j 4 A radiation monitor is provided in each division downstream of the component cooling water heat l exchangers. If radiation is detected at a preset level above the background radiation, an alarm is sounded ! In the control room. Station service water radiation activity is indicated in the control room. 9.2.1.5.6 Current i . ' Staion service water pump motor current is indicated in the control room. ,
- 9.2.1.5.7 SSWS Operational Logic ,
The SSWS operational logic and the associated initiation and actuation controls and instrumentation are ] summarized as follows: l e Both divisions and all four station service water pumps are operationally actuated by any single I
- or any combination of the following signals or operations. ]
L i
- 1. Manual start by control room operator j
- 2. Low station service water pump discharge pressure l
Note: When a station loss of offsite power occurs, only one SSW pump per division can be powered off the Emergency Load Centers. A second divisional SSW ; pump may be added by operator action if enough loads have been removed from ; the Emergency Load Center. ; e Manual start and stop actuation from the control room overrides the automatic mode. Manual ! start and stop controls are provided for each SSWS division to permit the removal of a division i from operation after automatic operation actuation, if that division is not required. ; i e The only components that are actuated by manual control room operator initiation are the station i service water pumps, the station service water strainers, and the SSW component cooling water 1 heat exchangers isolation valves. . Valves (except check valves) in the supply lines from the , p v; pumps and in the return lines to the UHS are either locked open or locked closed depending on plant status and requirements. , 4 protest W aAssordsf. Amussry Syssenes - Page 9.2-F3 i v' de -. -- -
i l Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument l
- The SSW pumps operate in the following manner during emergency conditions:
- 1. Following an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS), the operating SSW pumps will remain running using normal power.
- 2. With one SSW pump in each division operating, a loss of offsite power or a loss of offsite power coincident with an ESFAS, will cause the operating SSW pumps to shut down and be sequenced onto the Emergency Diesel Generators. If two pumps in one of the divisions are operating prior to this event, the sequencer logic will prohibit the automatic loading of both divisions SSW pumps. The diesel generator sequencer will load only one SSW pump per division onto the emergency diesel generators. If the SSW pump chosen by the sequencer fails to start, the sequencer will start the other pump immediately.
- 3. Manual control of SSW pumps remains effective during emergency conditions.
9.2.2 Component Cooling Water System The Component Cooling Water System is a closed loop cooling water system that, in conjunction with the Station Service Water System (SSWS) and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), removes heat generated from the plant's essential and non<ssential components connected to the CCWS. Heat transferred by these components to the CCWS is rejected to the SSWS via the component cooling water heat exchangers. The CCWS is shown in Figure 9.2.2-1. Table 9.2.2-3 lists the essential and non-essential nuclear component heat loads for the CCWS. 9.2.2.1 Design Bases O 9.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases Safety design bases applicable to the CCWS are as follows:
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the Station Service Water System (SSWS) and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), is capable of removing sufficient heat from the essential heat exchangers to ensure a safe reactor shutdown and cooling following a postulated accident coincident with a loss of offsite power.
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is capable of maintaining the outlet temperature of the component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger within the limits of 65'F and 120*F during a design basis accident with loss of offsite power.
- A single failure of any component in the CCWS will not impair the ability of the CCWS to meet its functional requirements.
- The CCWS is designated as a vital system and therefore will be protected from sabotage. Also, adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the ability of the CCWS to meet its functional requirements.
- The CCWS is designed to detect leakage into the CCWS and to detect loss of component cooling water volume.
Approved Design Materiel. Asurmary 5ystems Page 9.214
System 80+ Design ControlDocument O *. The essential cooling loop piping and components are designed in accordance with Safety Class 3
\ requirements. Containment isolation valves and containment penetra: ion piping are designed in accordance with Safety Class 2 requirements.
- The CCWS is designed to withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
- Components of the CCWS are capable of being fully tested during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and components are accessible for inspection.
- There will be no flow degradation to safety components if the non-essential and the spent fuel pool headers fail to isolate when required.
- All essential CCWS components are fully protected from floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement, and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity.
- The system is designed to minimize the potential for water hammer by providing for adequate filling and high point venting.
- Components of the CCWS are located in buildings and structures which are located within the protected area that is common to the main plant.
9.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis o Power generation design bases pertinent to the CCWS are as follows:
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) and SSWS, is designed to cool the reactor coolant from 350'F to 140'F through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and the component cooling water heat exchangers. The reactor coolant can be cooled to 140*F within 24 hours after reactor shutdown by first cooling the reactor coolant to 350*F through the steam generators and then cooling to 140*F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS.
The cooling rate of the reactor coolant will not exceed the administrative limit of 75'F/hr. i
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide a maximum component j cooling water temperature of 120'F to all components required to operate during a normal shutdown.
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide cooling water to the reactor I coolant pumps, letdown heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers, normal chilled water l condensers, and other non-essential reactor auxiliary cooling loads.
l 1
- The CCWS is designed to acccmmodate a thermal expansion from 65'F to 200*F.
i
- The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide component cooling water !
temperature of 105'F or less during normal operating modes.
]
- The CCWS provides protection against station service water leakage into the reactor coolant system. !
V I AnnwdDeelen A0eterW. Amrniary Systems Pope 9.215 l l
Sy^ tem 80 + Design controlDocument
- The CCV/S provides protection against release of radiological contamination into the environment via the UllS.
- The CCWS is designed to minimize the effects of long-term corrosion.
9.2.2.1.3 Codes and Standards The CCWS and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with General Design Criteria 2,4, 5,44,45, and 46, and the intent of the Standard Review Plan. 9.2.2.1.4 Component Cooling Water Heat Eachanger Structure (s) Two separate CCW Heat Exchanger Structures, each housing one division of CCW heat exchangers (2 heat exchangers per division) are provided. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are constructed of reinforced concrete. Additional details on the CCW Heat Exchanger Stmetures are provided in Section 3.8.4.1.5. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures' general arrangement is shown on Figure 1.2-25. The following structural requirements ensure system adequacy:
- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are classified Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3.
- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are designed to withstand the effects of the following events:
- 1. Natural phenomena, including SSE, floods, tornados, and hurricanes.
- 2. Externally and intemally generated missiles.
- 3. Fire and sabotage.
- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are located to optimize the amount of SSWS piping and equipment surfaces exposed to the corrosion and fouling effects of the service water. An evaluation is performed to select the preferred location based on site specific conditions.
- The physical separation of the CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provide separation of CCWS divisional components.
- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provide compartmentalization of the heat exchangers such that service water leaks and spills can be kept out of floor drains which are processed through the Liquid Waste Management System.
- The design of each CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provides adequate accessibility for maintenance, inspection, and testing of components located within the structure including sufficient equipment lay down space, lifting equipment, and pathway for removal and replacement of major components.
- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are located within the plant protected area and outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path as shown in Figure 1.2-1.
ApprewdDesign Atatorial- Auxhory Systems Page 9.2-16
l System 80+ Deslan ControlDocwnent j
/ :* The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are provided'with adequate ventilation to allow personnel l
> access for operation, maintenance, and testing activities and to ensure equipment operability
. E during all modes of plant operation and postulated design basis accident conditions. Additional l
> details on- the CCW ~ Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems are contained in
' Section 9.4.10. The ventilation system is designed to meet the following requirements- ,
l.- The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems are designed as Seismic ! Category II, Safety Class NNS.
; 2. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems permits testing and inspection of components. l
- 3. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) Ventilation Systems fresh air intakes are located ,
a minimum of 20 feet above grade and away from plant discharges to minimize ; contaminants entering the system. l i
- 4. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures Ventilation Systems are controlled locally or from i- the main control room. Instrumentation and controls are pmvided in accordance with :
ANSI /ANS 59.2. . .. l 9.2.2.2 Systern Descdption ) The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed loop, safety related divisions. Either '_q. " division of the CCWS is capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for a safe reactor l 4 . shutdown. l i One component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with operating SSWS division) is required to operate during post-LOCA. Cooling water to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger (s) ] , and the non-essential header (s) is isolated on a SIAS. If these headers fail to isolate, the idle component ' cooling water pump in the respective division will automatically start on a low pump differential pressure ) j signal. This assures that there is no flow degradation to the essential components. 1 Heat is removed from the CCWS by the flow of station service water through the tube side of the component cooling water heat exchangers. The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS thus preventing the leakage of station service water into the CCWS in the event of a CCW heat exchanger tube ; leak. l Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge tank, two component cooling water pumps, a chemical addition tank, a component cooling water radiation monitor, two sump pumps, a : component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump pump, piping, valves, controls, and { instrumentation. No cross connections between the two divisions exist. , i The CCWS provides cooling water to the essential components and non-essential component listed in Section 9.2.2.2.2. Essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of Safety , Class 3 cooling loops. Non-essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of non-
' nuclear safety class cooling loops with the exception of the charging pump miniflow heat exchangers, the
' charging pump motor coolers, the instrument air compressors, and the diesel generator engine starting .
p air aftercoolers which are supplied component cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling loops. l . () Containment isolation valves and penetration piping are designed in accordance with Safety Class 2 i requirements, j w e as w . ,s,. ew j l
.i
._ _ . u . _ _ _ !
System l'O + Design ControlDocument The non<ssential headers and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers are isolated automatically on an SIAS. The non-essential headers and the RCP headers isolate on a low-low surge tank level signal. Makeup water to the CCWS is normally supplied by the Demineralized Water Makeup System, described in Section 9.2.3. If the Demineralized Water Makeup System is unavailable, such as during an accident, a backup makeup water line of Seismic Category I construction is provided. This essential safety-related makeup water source is from the Station Service Water System (SSWS). A removable spool piece is placed in this line to prevent inadvertent addition of station service water. Surge tanks, one per division, are connected to the suction piping of the component cooling water pumps. The surge tanks are located at the system's high point to facilitate venting and filling. System leakage is replaced with water from the Demineralized Water Makeup System. Both of the makeup water supplies, sump and demineralized water, are integrated and recorded. An assured Seismic Category I makeup source, which is not utilized during normal operation, is available to each surge tank from the corresponding division of the Station Service Water System. The CCWS serves as an intermediate cooling water system between the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the SSWS. A radiation monitor is provided at the outlet of the component cooling water pumps to detect any radioactive leakage into the CCWS. This monitor is indicated and alarmed in the control room. Grab samples are also used as a means of detecting leakage into the CCWS. The wetted surfaces in the CCWS are of materials compatible with the cooling water chemistry. The major portion of the CCWS is constructed with carbon steel. The system water chemistry is controlled for the prevention of long term corrosion. Organic fouling and inorganic buildups are controlled by proper water treatment. The use of demineralized water and corrosion inhibitors will minimize these problems. The water in the loop is sampled for quality on a scheduled basis and, if required, the pH is adjusted by the addition of chemicals. To minimize any makeup and waste handling problems associated with these chemicals, component drains are piped to the component cooling water sumps. The drain water is returned to the surge tanks by the component cooling water sump pumps. The component cooling water drain piping and associated valves, sump pumps, surge tanks, and chemical addition tanks are stainless steel due to their exposure to the atmosphere. The component cooling water heat exchangers are located in separate structure (s) to optimize the amount of piping exposed to station service water. The piping to the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) is routed through Seismic Category I, reinforced concrete pipe tunnels (one/ division) buried under the yard. Any CCW system leakage in this tunnel is collected such that if required, it can be processed by the Liquid Waste Management System, or routed to the industrial waste discharge. A component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump is provided in the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure (s) to collect water drained from shell side of the CCW heat exchangers. The sump is lined with stainless steel and protected by curb and covers to maintain cleanliness. After maintenance, this sump water is returned to the component cooling water heat exchangers by the component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump pump. Refer to Section 9.2.2.2.1.8 for additional information. A separate floor drains system collects miscellaneous leaks, spills, and equipment drainage, and routes them to a separate floor drain sump. Relief valves are provided on the component cooling water lines of each heat exchanger that is cooled by component cooling water. These relief valves are sized to provide protection against increased pressure due to thermal effects while portions of the system are isolated or to relieve the maximum Approved Design Material Ausniary Systems Page 9.218
-l System 80+ oestan controlDocument credible leakage from higher pressure sources. The discharge of these relief devices is routed to a ;
suitable location so that personnel and other nuclear safety related equipment are' adequately protected. ASME III Class 3 requires a minimum size of 3/4 inch for these thermal relief valves. Pressure relief is provided . for each reactor coolant pump to protect against the potential overpressurization of the CCWS due to a reactor coolant pump high pressure seal cooler tube rupture. ]4 The pressure relief is sized to accept the maximum expected in-leakage from a reactor coolant pump high
- pressure seal cooler tube rupture. The pressure relief discharge is directed to the containment floor drain ] '
, sump which is within the holdup volume. Electric motor operated valves are located on the component cooling water supply and return lines to each reactor coolant pump. These valves can be used to isolate the in-leakage due to a reactor coolant pump , high pressure seal cooler tube rupture.
~ In case of a major leak in one of the CCWS divisions, the affected division is removed from service and !
the other division is utilized. ! ! Water quality design parameters applicable to the CCWS are given in Table 9.2.2-1. > 9.2.2.2.1 Cosnponent Descriptions I Table 9.2.2-4 contains the component design parameters for the major components. Each component is described in the following subsections. The active valves are described in Section 9.2.2.2.1.9 and listed in Table 9.2.2-5. (
'9.2.2.2.1.1 Casaponent Cooling Water Heat FW7; . ,
m The CCW heat exchangers are designed to meet specific site conditions. A horizontal shell and tube heat ! exchanger is discussed in the following sections, however a plate type heat exchanger may be substituted. Sites. selecting- the plate type heat exchanger shall provide strainer protection against debris or arrangements which allow backflushing on the service water side. Four component cooling water heat exchangers are provided, two per division, to handle the essential and non-essential cooling requirements. The heat exchangers are sized to provide cooling water at no greater than 105'F during normal operation and at no greater than 120*F during shutdown or post-LOCA operating modes. Each operational mode requires a different alignment of component cooling water heat exchangers. These requirements are listed below: Normal Power Operation - 1 HX per division Normal shutdown (24 hours) - all 4 HXs Safety grade shutdown (24 hours) - 2 HXs required in a single division . Post-LOCA - 1 HX in either division During normal power operation as cooling requirements increase, the additional heat exchanger in a division may be needed. Valves CC-106, CC-107, CC-108, CC-109, CC-2%, CC-207, CC-208, and Aspe est poety, asseerdef. Asammary Sysenes Page 9.2-79
[ System 80+ Design ControlDocument CC-209 provide component cooling water flow isolation / initiation for the component cooling water heat exchangers. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and can be remotely operated from the control room. The componern .ooling water heat exchangers are horizontal, single pass, fixed tubesheet, counterflow heat exchangers with straight tubes. Heat is transferred from the component cooling water to the station service water through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Although a horizontal heat exchanger with straight tubes is specified for this design, specific stations can replace these heat exchangers with a plate type. Station service water flows through the tube side of the component cooling water heat exchangers to facilitate their cleaning and maintenance. Adequate tube pull space is provided. The tube side is operated at a lower pressure than the shellside as noted in Section 9.2.2.2. The shell side carries the component cooling water. This closed loop shell side water is initially supplied with demineralized water from the Demineralized Water Makeup System (Section 9.2.3). The heat exchanger fouling factors are based and documented for each heat exchanger in accordance with TEMA (Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association) standards and the system water chemistry. An appropriate margin in heat exchanger area is provided to allow for tube plugging. The maximum flow velocity for nominal flow conditions in the tubes is in accordance with Heat Exchange Institute (HEI) standards for power plaru heat exchangers. The tube velocity for nominal flow conditions is not less than 3 ftdsecond. The component cooling water heat exchanger ube and tubesheet materials are selected on a site specific basis to be compatible with the site Ultimate Heat Sink makeup water chemistry and water treatment. The material selected for the component cooling water heat exchanger tubes exposed to service water in a fresh water environment with a maximum chloride concentration of less than 200 ppm and less than 500 ppm is Type 3NL stainless steel and Type 316L stainless steel, respectively. An alternative material with improved corrosion resistance may be specified. For component cooling water heat exchanger tubes in a service water environment of salt or brackish water, titanium or AL-6XN stainless steel is specified. The component cooling water heat exchanger tubesheet materials are specified as follows:
- For 3NL stainless steel tubes: 304L stainless-c 41 carbon steel or solid stainless steel tube sheets.
- For 316L stainless steel tubes: 316L stainless-clad carbon steel or solid stainless steel tube sheets.
- For AL-6XN stainless steel tubes: solid 304L or 316L stainless steel tube sheets.
- For titanium tubes: solid titanium tube sheets are preferable, however, solid 3NL stainless steel or solid 316L stainless steel tube sheets can be specified.
AsywowedDesign Atatwelet Auxikary Systems Page 9.2 20
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[ t Sv tem 80+ oesten contrat oocument ; i 9.2.2.2.1.2 Component Cooling Water Pumps
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, Four identical component cooling water pumps are provided, two pumps per division. Manual start and stop actuation of the component cooling water pumps is provided from the control room to override i automatic actuation. Typically, during normal operation only one pump per division is in service. If cooling water flow requirements exceed the capacity of this one pump, the second pump in the same loop i will automatically start on a low pump differential pressure signal. This signal can be an indication of r either a failure of the running pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements. A. component cooling water pump high differential pressure signal opens the containment _ spray heat exchanger isolation valve associated with that division. This assures s' minimum flow path for the j j component cooling water pump. Pump sizing is based on the following: ~ Normal power operation - 1 pump in each division Nonnal shutdown (24 hours) - 4 pumps ! Safety-grade shutdown (24 hours) - 2 pumps required in a single division ! f Post-LOCA . - 1 pump required (matched with operating heat exchanger) During normal power operation as cooling requirements increase, the additional pump in a division may i be needed. The pumps are of a double suction centrifugal design with a horizontally split casing for case of ! maintenance. Mechanical seals are provided to minimize leakage. The component cooling water surge i tank is located at a higher elevation than the component cooling water pumps. This will ensure flooded t suction and maintain a constant pressure at the suction side of the pump. Each CCW pump motor is ! j connected to a separate Class IE Emergency Load Center. In the event offsite power is lost, the pumps are stopped and restarted in accordance with the diesel generators' load sequencing. The component cooling water pumps are provided with at least a 7 percent margin in head at the pump design point. The head versus flow curve is continuously rising from the design point to shut-off. i The minimum available NPSH is the smaller of (1) 25 percent greater than, or (2) 10 feet greater than ) the required NPSH specified by the pump vendor. The available NPSH is calculated at the highest i expected operating tenyc-.me, flow, and at the normal water elevation with all margins. 9.2.2.2.1.3 Comiponent Cooling Water Surge Tanks There are two component cooling water surge tanks, one per division. Each surge tank performs the
- . following functions
- 1. Ensures flooded suction and maintains a constant pressure at the suction side of the CCW pump.
Provides adequate NPSH for the CCW pumps. LO. <
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- 2. Provides a means of damping transient pressure developed in the system due to load changes and pump startup and shutdown.
- 3. Provides a means of monitoring fluid leakage from the system.
- 4. Allows for expansion and contraction of the fluid in the system due to temperature changes.
- 5. Provides a surge volume to accommodate fluid losses from a piping failure in the non-safety related pipicg and equipment.
- 6. Facilitates venting and filling of the system.
Leve! controls in each tank regulate the makeup water to the surge tank. An adequately sized overflow line protects the tank from overpressurization due to excessive inleakage. The surge tanks are installed on the suction side of the component cooling water pumps. l 9.2.2.2.1.4 Piping, Valves, and Fittings l Piping to and from the component cooling water heat exchangers is carbon steel and is protected from corrosion by chemical addition of corrosion inhibitors. The safety grade piping, valves, and fittings are supplied in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Class 3. The supply and return piping to and from system components in one division is physically separated from the supply and return lines in the other division. Relief valves are provided, as required, for personnel and equipment protection. Vents are installed in all high points, and drains are installed in all low points in the component cooling water system. Vents are located to ensure that the piping is filled with water so as to reduce the chances of water hammer after pump startups. Also, valve opening / closing times are selected to minimize water hammer effects and to ensure isolation of a leak before the component cooling water surge tank empties. 9.2.2.2.1.5 Component Cooling Water Sump Pumps There are four component cooling water sump pumps: two for Component Cooling Water Sump 1, and two for Component Cooling Water Sump 2. These pumps return the drain water and relief valve discharge to their respective component cooling water surge tank, if the component cooling water should become radioactively contaminated, the sump water is pumped to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS). 9.2.2.2.1.6 Component Cooling Water Chemical Addition Tank The component cooling water chemical addition tanks provide the capability of adding corrosion-inhibiting chemicals to the system. O AavowedDesign Atatorial- Audary Systems Page 9.2 22
Sy' tem 80 + ' oesian centrot Documnt
.9.2.2.2.1.7 Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitors A component cooling water radiation monitor, one per division, is provided at the outlet of the component cooling water pumps to detect any CCWS inleakage that contains radioactivity.
'9.2.2.2.1.8 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance Sump Pumps
'Two component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump pumps, one per division, are provided.'
Each division has a separate sump. The component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance sump collects the component cooling water drained from the CCW heat exchangers. The sump pumps return the sump water to the shell side of their respective heat exchangers. Alternate paths can direct the sump water to the component cooling water sump located in the Nuclear Annex or to the Liquid Waste Management System. 9.2.2.2.1.9 Active Valves The following valves are required to perform a specific function in shutting down the reactor or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The active valves are listed in Table 9.2.2-5. o Non-Essential Supply Header Isolation Valves
- Valves CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222 are pneumatically controlled valves that fail closed on loss of instrument air. These valves close to terminate component cooling water flow to the non-essential equipment in the event of an accident. These valves automatically close on an SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal. The valve closure times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank volume due to a break in the non-safety piping. These valves can be manually opened and closed from the control room.
- Non-Essential Return Header Isolation Valves Valves CC-103, CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223 isolate the non-essential return headers from the essential return headers in the event of an accident. These valves are pneumatically controlled and fail closed on loss of instrument air. They automatically close on an SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal. The valve closure times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank volume due to a break in the non-safety piping. These valves can
, be manually opened and closed from the control room. o Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Control Valves Valves CC-110 and CC-210 provide a constant component cooling water flow of 11,000 gpm to their respective heat exchangers. The valves are pneumatically controlled and fail open on loss l of instrument air. These valves are provided with travel stops to restrict maximum flow. L e Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Isolation Valves . Valves CC-111 and CC-211 provide component cooling water flow isolation for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and can be manumiy opened and closed frcm the control room. Appmost Desen Asseenet- AmnEsry Speesses Pepe 9.2-23
System C0 + Design ControlDocument
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers I and 2 Isolation Valves Valves CC-113 and CC-213 close to terminate component cooling water flow to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers in the event of an accident. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and automatically close on an SIAS. These valves can be manually opened and closed from the control room. A manual override is provided in the control room so that flow can be reestablished, heat load permitting, to the heat exchangers during a design basis accident.
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Control Valves Valves CC-112 and CC-212 provide constant flow to their respective heat exchangers. These valves are pneumatically controlled and fail open on loss of instrument air. Travel stops are provided to restrict the maximum flow.
- Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Isolation Valves Valves CC-114 and CC-214 provide component cooling water flow isolation for the containment spray heat exchangers. These valves are provided with electric motor operators. These valves open automatically on a high component cooling water pump differential pressure signal or on a CSAS. These valves can be manually opened and closed from the control room.
- Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 1 A, IB, 2A, and 2B Bypass Control Valves Valves CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201 regulate the component cooling water heat exchanger bypass flow. These valves modulate the component cooling water bypass flow to maintain a relatively constant component cooling water outlet temperature. The service water flow remains constant. These valves are pneumatically operated and are required to fail closed. These valves automatically close on an SIAS.
- Component Cooling Water Pump Discharge Check Valves Valves CC-1302, CC-1303, CC-2302, and CC-2303 are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. In the event that one of the pumps ceases to produce flow and pressure head, these valves prevent flow reversal through the non-operating pump.
- Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Vacuum Breakers The CCWS surge tank vacuum breakers are required to function during a safe plant shutdown.
- Containment Isolcion Valves The following containment isolation valves close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS):
Supply to the letdown heat exchanger: CC-240, CC-241 Return from the letdown heat exchanger: CC-242, CC-243 O Appened Design Material Ausmary Systems Page 9.2-24
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- System 80+ Deelan Conna!Docwnent !
The following containment isolation valves are automatically closed on a low-low CCW surge ! _ l _ CC-130, CC-131 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 1A and IB i CC-230 CC-231 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 2A and 2B [ t CC-136, CC-137 - Rerum from reactor coolant pumps I A and IB { CC-236, CC-237 - Return from reactor coolant pumps 2A and 2B _ ; These valves can be manually opentd or closed from the control room. ; i e Containment Penetration Piping Bypass Check Valves Valves CC-1507, CC-1548, CC-2507, CC-2548, CC-2622 and CC-2628 provide overpressure ; protection for containment penetration piping to prevent damage when the piping is isolated, j L9.2.2.2.1.10 Electric Power Supply Each division of essential CCWS equipment receives power from its associated 4,160 Volt Class IE
- Auxiliary Power System with the exception of containment isolation valves and associated containment !
isolation valve instrumentation and controls. In the event of loss of offsite power, the Auxiliary Power System is supplied by the diesel generators. ~ There are two diesel generators, either of which is capable ! of supplying 100% power for the operation of one division of the necessary safety equipment. Division 1 ; essential components are aligned to Emergency Load Centers A or C and Division 2 essential components ! are aligned to Emergency Load Centers B or D. The Emergency Load Center and channel designation for the CCW pumps, valves, and controls are given in Table 9.2.2-6. (Note: Each pump start /stop control is from a different channel.) ; i 9 9.2.2.2.2 System Operation and Control ; The'CCWS has two 100% capacity divisions, each with 100% redundancy of safety related components. ! Each division is connected to its corresponding SSWS division through the component cooling water heat exchanger. The component cooling water heat exchangers serve as a pressure-thermal barrier between _the SSWS and CCWS. Each division has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain safe cold shutdown. Heat is transferred from the shell side to the tube side of the CCW heat exchanger and dissipated by the SSWS to the UHS. 1 l
' At least one CCW pump is operational in each division for all operating modes. If cooling requirements exceed the capacity of one CCW pump, the second pump in that division will automatically start on a low pump differential pressure signal. This signal is indicative of a failure of the runmng pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements.
The temperature of the component cooling water leaving each component cooling water. heat exchanger iis regulated by the component cooling water heat exchanger bypass control valve (CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201). As the temperature of the component cooling water leaving the heat exchanger
'N rises, the bypass valve closes which allows more component cooling water to flow through the heat "(f exchanger and be cooled. The CCWS is designed to maintain a relatively constant component cooling water supply temperature to its heat loads.
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument Each division of the CCWS provides cooling for the fdlowing redundant safety related components.
- Shutdown cooling heat exchangers (2 total,1 per division).
- Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers (2 total, I per division).
- Safety injection pump motor coolers (4 total,2 per division).
- Containment spray heat exchangers (2 total, I per division).
- Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers (2 total, I per division).
- Containment spray pump motor coolers (2 total,1 per division).
- Containment spray mini-flow heat exchangers (2 total, I per division).
- Component cooling water pump motor coolers (4 total,2 per division).
- Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers (2 total,1 per division).
- Motor driven emergency feedwater pump motor coolers (2 total, I per division).
- Diesel generator engine jacket water cooler (2 total,1 per division).
- Essential chilled water condensers (2 total, I per division).
- Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers (2 total, I per division).
The non-essential components are divided between the two divisions of the CCWS. The split was based upon (1) creating similar flow and heat load requirements between the two divisions and (2) component locations. These components are listed below:
- Reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor air coolers (4 total, 2 per division). q
- RCP motor oil coolers (4 total, 2 per division). (Note: Each set of RCP motor oil coolers contains one upper and one lower bearing oil cooler).
- RCP oil coolers (4 total,2 per division).
- RCP high pressure coolers (4 total,2 per division). i l
- Letdown heat exchanger (1 total, serviced by division 2).
- Charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger (2 total, I per division).
- Sample heat exchangers (14 total, serviced by division 2 - 8 Primary Sample Heat Exchangers and 6 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat Excharigers).
O Alvvo& Des)pn Motorial Auskry Systems Page 9.2-26
System 80+ Design ControlDocument O . \.J
- Gas stripper (1 total, serviced by division 2).
- Boric acid concentrator (1 total, serviced by division 2).
- Normal chilled water condensers (4 total,2 per division)
- Charging pump motor coolers (2 total,1 per division).
- Instrinnent air compressor (4 total,2 per division). ,
- Diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers (4 total,2 per division).
9.2.2.2.2.1 Unit Startup Typically during a unit startup, cooling water is supplied to all equipment except for the containment spray heat exchangers and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. This requires the use of both divisions of the component cooling water system, four CCW heat exchangers, and four CCW pumps. Certain components will not be in service at all times therefore allowing for a reduction in CCWS load. 9.2.2.2.2.2 Normal Operation Generally during normal operation, one CCW pump and one CCW heat exchanger (matched with n operating pump) is required in each division. As the cooling requirements increase, additional system equipment may be needed. Cooling flow is supplied to all components except the containment spray heat {) exchangers, the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. The CCWS temperature is maintained at no greater than 105'F. 9.2.2.2.2.3 Unit Shutdown Both divisions of the CCWS (4 heat exchangers and 4 pumps) are required to accomplish a normal reactor shutdown, that is to cool the reactor coolant from normal operating temperature to 140'F within 24 hours of reactor rh.utdown. A normal reactor shutdown entails cooling the reactor coolant to 350'F through the steam generators and then cooling to 140*F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS. Cooling water flow to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers is manually aligned from the control room for normal or safety grade shutdown. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide a maximum component cooling water temperature of 120'F to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers during normal shutdown. Typically, during initial shutdown cooling, cooling water is supplied to all components except the containment spray heat exchangers and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. However, during final shutdown cooling, cooling water is supplied to all components except the containment spray heat exchangers and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. 9.2.2.2.2.4 Refueling Operations With both divisions of the CCWS supplying cooling water, (i.e., four CCW pumps and four CCW heat _'exchangers), the RCS will be at a refueling temperature of 120*F at % hours after reactor shutdown. (] The component cooling water temperature will peak at 120'F at the initiation of shutdown and decreases G/ 4prowerOne4 pre honeerw Ausnery systens rege s.2-27
System 80+ Design controlDocument to 100*F prior to refueling. Component cooling water flow is supplied to all components other than the containment spray heat exchangers. The heat load on the shutdown cooling heat exchanger is from the reactor decay heat. Both divisions of the CCWS are required to maintain the spent fuel pool bulk water temperature at or below 120*F. This requires that both spent fuel pool heat exchangers are supplied with component cooling water at the design flow rate. 9.2.2.2.2.5 Emergency Operation The non-essential supply and return header isolation valves, CC-102, CC-103, CC-122, CC-123, CC-202, CC-203, CC-222, and CC-223 isolate component cooling water ficw to the non-essential headers on a SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal. The isolation valves to the RCP supply and return headers isolate on a low-low component cooling water surge tank level signal. Only one component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with operating pump) is required to operate during post-LOCA. Cooling water to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers is automatically isolated on a SIAS by valves CC-113 and CC-213. Operator action is required to reestablish flow to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. The control valves, CC-114 a id CC-214, located downstream of the containment spray heat exchangers automatically open on CSA3 or high component cooling water pump differential pressure. These valves can also be manually opened and closed from the control room. The following containment isolation valves close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS): Supply to the letdown heat exchanger: CC-240, CC-241. Return from the letdown heat exchanger: CC-242, CC-243. A low pump differential pressure signal is indicative of a failure of the running pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements. The idle CCW pump will automatically start on this signal. This assures that there will be no flow degradation to the essential and non-essential component cooling water heat loads. 9.2.2.2.2.6 Loss of Offsite Power A loss of offsite power (LOOP) results in the shutdown and restarting of the CCWS in accordance with the diesel generators' load sequencing. For a Design Basis Accident with no concurrent loss of offsite power, the Component Cooling Water Pump in each division will remain operating. However, if Station Los.-of-Offsite Power occurs concurrently with a Design Basis Accident, the Diesel Generator Sequencer will function to load the Component Cooling Water Pump which was operating just prior to the event onto the Emergency Bus within 10 seconds after the sequencer completes the Accident Loading Sequence. For a Station Loss of-Offsite Power during which no Design Basis Accident occurs, the sequencer will load the Component Cooling Water Pump which was operatingjust prior to the event onto the Emergency Bus within 5 seconds after receiving a Diesel Generator running signal. If this pump fails to operate, the sequencer will attempt to load the other divisional Component Cooling Water Pump onto the Emergency Aptwosed Design Material. Auxnery Systems Page 9.2-28
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Svitam 80+ Design ControlDocument , c Bus immediately. The sequencer logic will also autostart the standby Component Cooling Water Pump when the operating Component Cooling Water Pump trips or is load shed. After initial loading by the ' sequencer, the Component Cooling Water Pump which remains on standby may still be manually activated when appropriate manual load shedding of the Emergency Buses is accomplished. ; During a' LOOP, the instrument air compressors are powered from the Alternate A/C (AAC) power source. The AAC power source for this design is a non-safety grade combustion gas turbine. If the non- , safety grade instrument air system is lost, all pneumatic control valves would fail to their failed positions. The following safety related valves will fail closed on loss of the instrument air system:
- Non-essential supply header isolation valves: CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222 }
t
- Non-essential return header isolation valves: CC-103, CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223 ;
- Component cooling water heat exchanger bypass control valves: CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and ,
- CC-201
( The following safety related valves will fail open on a loss of the instrument air system:
- Shutdown cooling heat exchanger control valves: CC-110 and CC-210
- Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger control valves: CC-112 and CC-212 The fall positions of the pneumatic valves assure safety of the plant. ,
O 9.2.2.3' Safety Evaluations i Safety evaluations conform to the safety design bases of Section 9.2.2.1.1 and are as follows: :
- The CCWS has the capability to dissipate the imposed heat loads within the safe reactor shutdown l time frame.
1 Loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the CCWS in accordance with the ! 1 diesel generators' load sequencing. The diesel generators' load capacity and sequencing times
' fulfill CCWS requirements. Thus, safe reac*or shutdown is supported by the CCWS.
- The CCWS flow and heat transfer capabilities are compatible with providing the required component cooling water within the limits of 65'F and 120*F during a design basis accident.
- The CCWS is composed of two physically separate, independent, full-capacity divisions each of which is powered from separate Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems and separate diesel generators. This ensures that a single failure does not impair the system's effectiveness. Refer to Table 9.2.2-2 for the single failure analysis.
*1 Components of the CCWS are installed in buildings and structures that protect against adverse environmental conditions. These buildings and structures are located within the vital protection area that is common to the main plant.
- Leakage into or out of the CCWS is detected by the surge tank high, low, and low-low level alarms in the control room. ,
l Appment Doeten nonauw- Aunauy syenema rene s.2-2s 1 j
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- The Safety Class requirements statement in Section 9.2.2.1.1 is self-explanatory.
- The essential portions of the CCWS are Seismic Category I.
- Components of the CCWS are capable of being fully tested during normal operation since one pump from each division is operating at full flow conditions. ASME Code Section XI, in service pump tests may be satisfactory performed without violation of Technical Specifications.
- Automatic start of the CCW pumps on a low CCW pump differential pressure signal ensures that flow degradation to the safety related components is prevented. This situation could occur if the non-essential header isolation valves and spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger isolation valves fail to close during a Design Basis Accident (DBA). This ensures adequate flow to the essential components when required.
- Components of the CCWS are located such that flooding, tornado missile damage, internal missile, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems from any source would not impair the system's functional requirements. The two divisions of the CCWS are physically separated and are routed such as to be protected from the above mentioned sources.
- To prevent damage to components and piping, the system is designed to minimize the potential for water hanuner by providing adequate filling and high point venting.
- The CCWS is designated as a vital system and therefore will be protected from sabotage.
9.2.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements O During fabrication of the CCWS components, tests and inspections are performed and documented in accordance with code requirements to assure high quality construction. As necessary, performance tests of components are performed in the vendor's facility. The CCWS is designed and installed to permit in-service inspections and tests in accordance with ASME Code Section XI. 9.2.2.4.1 CCWS Performance Tests Prior to initial plant startup, a comprehensive performance test, as detailed in Section 14.2, will be performed to verify system and individual component design perfonnance. 9.2.2.4.2 Reliability Tests and Inspections
- System Level Tests After the plant is brought into operation, periodic tests and inspections on the component cooling water system are performed to ensure proper operation. The scheduled tests and inspections are necessary to verify system operability. Chapter 16, Technical Specifications, contains the complete schedule for tests and inspections of the CCWS.
- Component Testing-In addition to the system level tests, tests to verify proper operation of individual CCWS components are conducted. These tests supplement the system level tests by verifying acceptable Approved Design historial Auxiliary Systems Page 9.240 l
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.Q 'V perfonnance of each active component in the CCWS. Pumps and valves are tested in accordance with ASME Section XI. Various flow rates up to and including the design point of the
. component cooling water pumps can be performed using the closed system loop.
, 9.2.2.5 Instru==atmeion Requimnents Sufficient instrumentation and controls are provided to adequately monitor and control the CCWS.
Appropriate metixxis are employed to ensure independent operation of the instrumentation and control l channels of the essential equipment. ~ All non-safety related instrumentation and controls are designed such ) that any failure will not cause degradation of any essential equipment function. j The CCWS instrumentation facilitates automatic operation, remote control, and continuous indication of
- system parameters locally and in the control room. Control room process indications and alarms are provided to enable the operator to evaluate the CCWS performance and to detect malfunctions.
1 The following test connections are provided at each CCW heat exchanger for determining the overall heat transfer coefficient with temporary instrumentation: i i e CCWS component cooling water heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperature test connections l e- CCWS component cooling water heat exchanger inlet and outlet pressure test connections a , e . CCWS component cooling water heat exchanger outlet flow test connection All CCW parameter measurements and indication instrumentations are described below. 9.2.2.5.1 Pressure Instrumentation e Local Indication .l
- l. Component cooling water sump pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B discharge pressures. i i 2. Component cooling water pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and discharge pressures. .
. i i
- 3. Component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump pumps 1 and 2 discharge pressures. .:
a
- 4. Component cooling water chemical addition tanks 1 and 2 vent and discharge line pressures.
t o Control Room Indication ; P Control room indication is pr avided for component cooling water pump differential presure and discharge pressure. e Test Points ! Pressure test points are provided for the following process pressure parameters:
- 1. Component cooling water heat exchangers I A, IB,2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressures.
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 2. Spent fuel pool cooling hat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 3. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 4. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 5. Safety injection pump motor coolers 1,2, 3, and 4 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 6. Containment spray pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 7. Letdown heat exchanger inlet and outlet pressures.
- 8. Gas stripper inlet and outlet pressures.
- 9. Reactor coolant pump 1 A coolers inlet and outlet header pressures.
- 10. Reactor coolant pump IB coolers inlet and outlet header pressures.
I1. Reactor coolant pump 2A coolers inlet and outlet header pressures.
- 12. Reactor coolant pump 2B coolers inlet and outlet header pressures.
- 13. Boric acid concentrator inlet and outlet header pressures.
14.- Diesel generator engine jacket water cooler 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 15. Diesel generator engine starting air aftercooler I A, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressures.
- 16. Component cooling water pump motor coolers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressures.
- 17. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 18. Charging pump mini-flow heat exchangers I and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 19. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 20. Instrument air compressor IA, IB,2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressures.
- 21. Normal chilled water condensers I A, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressun s.
- 22. Emergency feedwater pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 23. Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 24. Containment spray heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
- 25. Containment spray mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
Approved Design Matenal AuxiGary Systems Page 9.2-32
1 s System 80+ Desian ControlDocument [ 126. Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures. i
. 27. Sample heat exchangers (each) irdet and outlet pressures. !
c-
;. *- Controls - Component Cooling Water Pump Differential Pressure ';
p
~ When a low CCW pump differential pressure signal is actuated, the idle pump in that division ;
automatically starts. This signal is indicative of a failure of the operating pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements. l A component cooling water pump high differential pressure signal opens the containment spray , heat exchanger isolation valve associated with that division. This provides a minimum flow path i
. for the component cooling water pump.
l 9.2.2.5.2 Temperature - i 4 t < 'e' Local Indication '! Local indication is provided for the following process temperature parameters: l i
- 1. Component cooling water heat exchangers IA, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet i temperatures. j
. p . 2. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
- 3. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers I and 2 outlet temperatures. l
. i
- 4. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures, j l S. Safety injection pump motor coolers 1, 2, 3, and 4 outlet temperatures. ,
- 6. Containment spray pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
. 7. Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature.
- 8. Boric acid concentrator outlet header temperature.
i
- 9. Emergency feedwater pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
i
~
- 10. Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
' 11. Containment spray heat exchangers I and 2 outlet temperatures. l
- 12. Containment spray mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures. !
- 13. Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures. -
14 : Gas stripper outlet header temperature. I
- 15. Diesel generator engine jacket water cooler 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
4pesent W annenrint * ^==^=ry Systems Page 9.2-33 I
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i Sytem 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 16. Diesel generator engine starting aftercoolers 1A, IB,2A, and 2B outlet temperatures.
- 17. Component cooling water pump motor coolers l A, IB, 2A and 2B outlet temperatures.
- 18. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
- Control Room Indication Control room indication is provided for compone . cooling water heat exchangers I A, IB, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet temperatures.
- Test Points Temperature test points are provided for the following process temperature parameters:
- 1. CCW heat exchangers I A, IB,2A, and 2B inlet and outlet temperatures.
- 2. Sample heat exchanger outlet header temperatures.
- 3. Reactor coolant pump coolers inlet header temperature.
- 4. Reactor coolant pumps 1 A, IB,2A, and 2B high pressure cooler outlet temperatures.
- 5. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B oil cooler outlet temperatures.
- 6. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B motor lower bearing oil cooler outlet O
temperatures.
- 7. Reactor coolant pumps lA, IB,2A, and 2B motor air cooler outlet temperatures.
- 8. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B motor upper bearing oil cooler outlet temperatures.
- 9. s.narging pump mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
- 10. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet temperatures.
- 11. Instrument air compressor I A, IB, 2A, and 2B outlet temperatures.
- 12. Nonnal chilled water condensers I A, IB,2A, and 2B outlet temperatures.
- Controls
- 1. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Component cooling water heat exchanger bypass control valves, CC-100 CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201, are modulated to maintain a 95*F minimum heat exchanger outlet temperature.
Amroved Design Material. Auakery Systems Page 9.2 34
+.
^ System 80+ ~ Desian control Document l i ;r ' 2. Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Letdown heat exchanger valve, CC-244, is' modulated to control the letdown heat j J
exchanger outlet temperature on the CVCS side.
- 3. Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat Exchanger Temperature Control l 4
Charging pump mini. flow heat exchanger control valves, CC-145. and CC-245, are modulated to control outlet temperature of the CVCS side of the heat exchanger.
- Alarms - )
i Component' cooling water heat exchanger high and low outlet temperature is alarmed in the control room.
- .9.2.2.5.3 Mow
..*- Local Indication i Local indication is provided for the following process flow parameters:
i
- 1. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flows. ';
i >
- 2. Shittdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 3. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
2
- 4. Safety injection pump motor coolers 1, 2, 3, and 4 outlet flows. .
- 5. Containment spray pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 6. Letdown heat exchanger outlet flow.
- 7. Gas stripper outlet flow. .
L 8. Boric acid concentrator outlet flow. ;
- 9. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B high pressure coolers outlet flows. l
- 10. Reactor coolant pumps 1A, IB,2A, and 2B oil coolers outlet flows. ].
[ -11. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B motor lower bearing oil coolers outlet flows. l
- 12. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, '2A, and 2B motor air coolers outlet flows.
- 13. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B motor upper bearing oil coolers outlet flows. ;
'14. Emergency feedwater pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows. t
- 15. Containment spray heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flows, ,
4 prevent Doeten aseender. AunEnry Speanne Pnee 9.2 35 ,
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 16. Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 17. Containment spray mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 18. Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 19. Component cooling water sadiation monitors 1 and 2 inlet flows.
- 20. Sample heat exchangers (each) outlet flows.
- 21. Diesel generator enginejacket water cooler 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 22. Diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers IA, IB,2A, and 2B outlet flows.
- 23. Component cooling water pump motor coolers IA, IB,2A, and 2B outlet flows.
- 24. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 25. Charging pump mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet flow.
- 26. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 27. Instrument air compressor IA, IB,2A, and 2B outlet flows.
- 28. Normal chilled water condensers I A, IB,2A and 2B outlet flows.
- 29. Makeup water to surge tanks 1 and 2 inlet flows.
- Control Room Indication Control room iodication is provided for component cooling heat exchangers I A, IB,2A, and 2B outlet flows and component cooling water pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B discharge flows.
- Test Points Flow test points are provided for the component cooling water heat exchangers I A, IB,2A, and 2B outlet flows.
- Controls The following essential heat exchangers have control valves that modulate their outlet flow.
- 1. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2: CC-ll2 and CC-212.
- 2. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2: CC-110 and CC-210.
O Approved Design Materist- Aux &ary Systems Page 9.2-36
- . .~ .-. _
-- =_ -.-. - - _ . . . - -
4 , i Svetem 80+ Design ControlDocument e~ Alarms a The following low and high flows alarm to the control room: i t - 1. ' Spent fuel pool heat exchangers 1 and 2 low and high outlet flows. ! 4 l 2. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 low and high outlei flows. ;
- 3. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- 4. Safety injection pump motor coolers 1,2, 3, and 4 low outlet flows.
- 5. Containment spray pump motor coolers 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- 6. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B high pressure coolers low outlet flows.
- 7. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B oil coolers low outlet flows.
- 8. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B motor lower bearing oil coolers low outlet flows.
?
- 9. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB,2A, and 2B motor air coolers low outlet flows.
- 10. Reactor coolant pumps I A, IB, 2A, and 2B motor upper bearing oil coolers low outlet 110ws.
- 11. Emergency feedwater pump motor coolers 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- 12. Containment spray heat exchangers 1 and 2 low outlet flows. .
i
- 13. Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 low outlet flows. l Diesel generator engine jacket water cooler 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
14.
- 15. Diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers I A, IB,2A, and 2B low outlet flows.
r
- 16. Component cooling water pump motor coolers I A, IB,2A, and 2B low outlet flows.
- 17. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- 18. Charging pump motor coolers I and 2 low outlet flows.
' 19. - Instrument air compressor IA, IB,2A and 2B low outlet flows. ,
- 20. ' Normal chilled water condensers I A,1B, 2A, and 2B low outlet flows, 2
i
- .. L 21. . Component cooling water heat exchangers lA, IB, 2A, and 2B low and high outlet
' ,A , flows. ,
T 44prowest W Afssurdat. Amamary Syssene paye 9.2-37 4
SyOtem 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 22. Component cooling water pumps l A, IB,2A, and 2B low and high outlet flows.
- 23. Component cooling water radiation monitors 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
9.2.2.5.4 Level
- Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Level indication is provided in the control room for component cooling water surge tanks 1 and
- 2. Ifigh level, demineralized water automatic supply, low level, and low-low level alarms are provided in the control room.
A low-low level signal isolates the non-essential headers and the RCP headers from the remaining portion of the system.
- Component Cooling Water Sump Level The component cooling water sumps 1 and 2 water levels are indicated and a high level alarm is provided in the control room. Each component cooling water sump pump is automatically started at a specified sump level, and the pumps are automatically stopped at sump low level.
- Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure Sump Levels Component cooling water heat exchanger maintenance and floor drain sumps I and 2 water levels are indicated and a high Icvel alarm is provided in the control room. The component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump pumps are automatically stopped at a low sump level.
- Component Cooling Chemical Addition Tanks Level Local level indications are provided for the component cooling chemical addition tanks.
9.2.2.5.5 Radiation Monitors Radiation monitors are provided downstream of the component cooling water pumps. An alarm is sounded in the control room if radiation is detected at a preset level above background by one of the monitors. Component cooling water radiation activity is indicated in the control room. 9.2.2.5.6 Current Component cooling water pump motor current is indicated in the control room. 9.2.2.5.7 Interlocks The component cooling water sump pumps are automatically started when the sump level rises to a predetermined height. At this level in sump 1, valve CC-153 opens; and at this level in sump 2, valve CC-253 opens. The sump pumps pump component cooling sump water to their respective surge tank and are automatically stopped at a preset surge tank level or a sump low level. Valves CC-153 and CC-253 close when their respective sump pumps are automatically stopped. Approved Design Meterial- Ausnery Systems Page 9.2-38
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
/ Demineralized makeup water is automatically supplied to the component cooling water surge tanks when C] the tank level drops to a predetermined level below the point where the low level alarm sounds. The inlet valves to the component cooling water surge tanks, CC-152 and CC-252 (Division 1 and Division 2, respectively), are interlocked to the auto supply of demineralized makeup water. The surge tank inlet valves close when the respective surge tank reaches a predetermined level. Manual override is provided for these valves.
Upon loss of component cooling water to the letdown heat exchanger, letdown flow is terminated. 9.2.2.5.8 Time Delays The start of the second component cooling water pump is delayed by 10 seconds when a low differential pressure signal is actuated on the operating pump. 9.2.2.5.9 Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) The following valves close on an SIAS:
- 1. Non-essential supply header isolation valves: CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222.
- 2. Non-essential return header isolation valves: CC-103, CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223.
- 3. CCW heat exchangers IA, IB,2A, and 2B bypass valves: CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201.
O 4. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2 isolation valves: CC-113 and CC-213. , 9.2.2.5.10 Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) The following containment isolation valves close on a CIAS:
- 1. Component cooling water supply to the letdown heat exchanger: CC-240 and CC-241. l
- 2. Component cooling water return from the letdown heat exchanger: CC-242 and CC-243.
9.2.2.5.11 Contaimnent Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) Containment spray heat exchangers I and 2 isolation valves CC-114 and CC-214 open on a CSAS. 9.2.2.5.12 Component Cooling Water Low-Low Surge Tank Actuation Signal The following valves close on a Component Cooling Water Low-Low Surge Tank Actuation Signal:
- 1. Non-essential supply header isolation valves: CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222.
- 2. Non-essential return header isolation valves: CC-103, CC-123 CC-203, and CC-223.
' r'] 3. RCP supply headers containment isolation valves: CC-130, CC-131, CC-230, and CC-231. U 4. RCP return headers containment isolation valves: CC-136, CC-137, CC-236 end CC-237. Anwowdcoasn manww. Aunnars ymms roue s.2-3s
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.3 Demineralized Water Makeup System 9.2.3.1 Design Bases The Demineralized Water Makeup System (shown in Figure 9.2.3-1) supplies filtered, degasified, demineralized water to the Condensate Storage System for makeup and to other systems throughout the plant that require high quality, non-safety-related, makeup water. This system, therefore, serves no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function, and has no safety design bases. 9.2.3.2 System Description The Demineralized Water Makeup System demineralizer trains are located on the ground floor of the Station Services Building (Figure 1.2-20, Sheet 1), and the Demineralized Water Storage Tank is located in the yard (Figure 1.2-1). The Demineralizer Makeup Pumps take suction from the filtered water storage tanks and pump this water through a series of demineralizers to a vacuum degasifier. The resulting demineralized water provides condensate quality water to the following:
- Condensate Storage System
- Component Cooling Water Storage Tank
- Demineralized Water Storage Tank
- Reactor Water Storage Tank Makeup O
- Chilled Water Systems
- Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System
- Emergency Feedwater Storage System
- Turbine Building Cooling Water System
- Miscellaneous other systems 9.2.3.2.1 System Performance The following functional requirements ensure reliable performance of the system.
- The system provides demineralized makeup water of a quality and quantity which is suitable for long-term plant operation. This applies to all plant conditions including power operation, startup, shutdown, extended outages, and off-chemistry conditions.
- The makeup water produced meets the chemistry requirements of Table 9.2.3-1.
l
- The startup and off-chemistry conditions are evaluated together with storage capacity and l operating procedures to ensure that makeup water capacity is adequate and does not have to be l supplied from off-site sources.
AlyvevedDesign Acaterial. Ausafary Systems Page 9.2-40
b Sv' tem 80+ oeskn controlDocument
- Raw water quality is reviewed for any additional pre-treatment prior to entering the demineralized
'f' water makeup system.
- The Demineralized Water Storage Tank provides for holdup and sampling of water from the demineralizers prior to discharge. It is designed to maintain water purity and exclude oxygen.
- The following demineralizer system features are included:
- 1. Strainers in waste lines to eliminate resin carryover during backwash.
- 2. Use of inert resin in mixed bed vessels.
- 3. Full-flow recirculation.
- 4. Resin regeneration.
- 5. Sight glasses for viewing resin levels in mixed bed vessels. ,
- 6. Resin traps downstream of each demineralizer vessel.
- Two redundant demineralizer trains are provided.
- The Demineralized Water Makeup System is designed to prever.t radioactive material from entering the system.
V
- Regenerative waste is routed to the Regenerant Waste Neutralization Tank for reclamation. '
Chemical addition connections are provided for addition of neutralizing chemicals if discharge to the environment is required. : i
- The waste tank discharge piping is routed so that leaks can be detected.
- The waste tank discharge piping includes a valve (or valves) for isolation of the waste tank in the 1 event of a leak.
9.2.3.2.2 Components Description l 9.2.3.2.2.1 Demineralizer
- The demineralizer includes cation, anion, and mixed bed units. Depending on site-specific raw water quality, different arrangements, including decarbonators, may be necessary.
*' The design of the demineralizer may be based on either concurrent or countercurrent regeneration.-
1
*- Recirculation capability around the mixed bed demineralizer is provided.
D (a i Amewat Deewn nieterM. Auanery Syswns Page 9.2-41
Sy~ tem 80+ Design controlDocument
- The following materials are used:
JRg1 Material Demineralizer vessels Lined carbon steel. Demineralizer skid piping Polypropylene lined carbon steel Dilute acid piping Alloy 20 Demineralizer waste piping Alloy 20 (or other corrosion resistant material) In addition, the Regenerant Waste Neutralization Tank liner is able to withstand the corrosive effects of the regenerate waste over the complete range of expected pH values and chemical concentrations. The tank also includes provisions for chemical neutralization. 9.2.3.2.2.2 Vacuum Degasifier
- The degasifiers are d the packed spray tower type with the makeup water injected at the top of the bed through a distributor system. Two vacuum pumps for each degasifier are provided to maintain system vacuum.
- Two pumps are provided for transferring the degasified water to the demineralized water storage tank.
- The Vacuum Degasifiers may also be used to degasify the contents of the Condensate Storage Tank via a closed loop using one Vacuum Degasifier and one Vacuum Degasifier Transfer Pump.
- The degasifier vessel is constructed of rubber lined carbon steel. All piping and fittings are O
Type 304 SS. 9.2.3.2.2.3 Demineralized Water Storage Tank
- The capacity of the Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) is based on the design flow rate of the demineralizers and the makeup requirements of the plant systems.
- Two pumps are provided downstream of the DWST for recycling water back to the vacuum degasifiers, or for forwarding water to the Condensate Storage System and other systems requiring makeup, j 4
- The DWST is constructed of stainless steel. A stainless steel floating cover is provided to minimize air ingress.
9.2.3.3 Safety Evaluation i The Demineralized Water Makeup System does not perform any safety functions. Failure of this system l will not have any adverse effects on the safety analysis. 9.2.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 1 ( Prior to startup, all piping is hydrostatically tested and flushed to applicable codes and standards. System j l operability is verified by placing the system into operation pnor to fuel loading. After startup, routine l . i Asyvend Des}gn Material- Auxaiary Systems Page 9.2 42
1 , Sv' tem 80+ Deslan ControlDocwnent I visual inspection of the system components and instrumentation, and chemical sampling of the water is I adequate to verify system operability. 9.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements l eL Instruments and controls are selected to provide the minimum monitoring and control of the
- systems used to purify makeup water. The system is controlled and monitored locally. These ;
controls and displays are integrated to minimize the quantity of panels. e Manual controls for all steps of sequence control are provided as backup to the automatic / semi-automatic control, t ~ .
- The demineralizers are designed for automatic regeneration following manual pushbutton initiation.
I
- The parameters which are monitored throughout the demmeralizer system are tabulated'in }
< Table 9.2.3-2. Where possible, sequential sampling is utilized to minimize the number of process analyzers. 4 e The vacuum degasifiers controls and instrumentation include dissolved oxygen analyzers, level controllers, system vacuum gages and flow instrumentation. e Additional alarms / indication will be provided in the control room to alert the operator of abnormal conditions. .O 9.2.4 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems
- Those portions of the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (PSWS) that are within the Reactor Building, Nuclear Annex, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Service Building are within the scope of the Certified Design. Those portions of the PSWS that are not within the Reactor Building, Nuclear Annex, l Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Service Building are not within the scope of the Certified i- Design. Out of scope portions of the system are licensee supplied and are site specific.
(( Water from the Filtered Water System is processed by the PSWS for general plant use. Potential sources for the Filtered Water System include lakes, rivers, wells, and municipal water supplies. A backflow preventer is provided between the Potable Water System supply and the Filtered Water System Supply to other plant systems.))I Section 9.2.4.1 provides the interface requirements which must be met by the licensee supplied design. Subsequent sections of Section 9.2.4 contain descriptive information concerning a conceptual design for the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems. 9.2.4.1 Interface Requirements The PSWS shall be designed to meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of 10 CFR 50 ! I Appendix A, as related to provisions to control the release of liquid effluents containing radioactive material from contaminating the PSWS. The following specific requirements shall be met: 4
, . /' ,
1 I Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4 Annwowed Daehn aseenriat. Aunnuy Speemme Page 9.243_ >
l l l Design ControlDocument j System 80+
- There shall be no interconnections between the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems and systems having the potential for containing radioactive material.
I
- The Potable Water System shall be protected by an air gap, where necessary.
The licensee shall ensure that the sewage treatment facility design complies with applicable state and local regulations. Adequate treatment facility capacity shall be provided to accommodate the maximum number of personnel assigned to the site, with provisions for expansion as necessary. 9.2.4.2 System Description ((The Potable and Sanitary Water Systems consist of a Potable Water System and a Sanitary Drainage System. The Potable and Sanitary Water Systems are shown in Figure 9.2.4-1. The systems include all components and piping from the Filtered Water System to all points of discharge to sewage facilities.))3 ((The COL applicant will provide information on the potable and sanitary water systems design.))2 9.2.4.2.1 Potable Water System (( Water for drinking and sanitary services is supplied by the Potable Water System. Filtered water from the Filtered Water System is pumped to the potable water storage tank by two potable water pumps. The potable water chlorination pumps take suction from the hypochlorite day tank and chlorinate the potable water to the required chlorine residual. The potable water storage tank and distribution headers are kept pressurized by compressed air from the Station Air System so that water can be provided throughout the plant as needed. A branch sends potable water to a heater and to a hot water distribution system where it is distributed throughout the plant.))I 9.2.4.2.2 Sanitary Drainage System ((The Sanitary Drainage System collects liquid wastes and conveys them to the sewage treatment system. This system is installed in accordance with all applicable state and local codes.))3 9.2.4.3 Safety Evaluation The Potable and Sanitary Water Systems do not perform any safety functions and any malfunction has no adverse effect on any safety related system. 9.2.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Prior to startup all piping is hydrostatically tested and flushed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. Operability of the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems is verified by placing these systems into operation prior to fuel loading. Potable water quality and treatment are monitored in accordance with the requirements of state and local departments of health and environmental control. I Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. 2 COL information item; see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. Approwd Design Materie!* Aux %ery Systems Page 9.2-44
L Sv~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.4.5 Instrumentation Requimnents
. (( Sufficient instrumentation is provided to monitor system performance and to control the system :
automatically or manually under all operating conditions.))' 9.2.5 Ulti==t* Heat Sink ; 9.2.5.1 Design Bases l 9.2.5.1.1 . Safety Design Bases The Ultimate Heat Sink provides the source of cooling water and heat sink to the environment for the Station Service Water System (SSWS). The SSWS removes heat from the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) through the CCW heat exchangers. The CCWS removes heat from essential and non- l
- . essential reactor auxiliary loads during all modes of plant operation as listed in Table 9.2.2-3. l 9.2.5.1.2 Codes and Standards
] The Ultimate Heat Sink is designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 5,44, 45 arxl 46 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A and the intent of the Standard Review Plan 9.2.5 and Regulatory Guide 1.27. t 9.2.5.1.3 Interface Requirements 1 4 ((The Ultimate Heat Sink, which includes the SSWS intake and discharge, is an out of scope item which shall be discussed in the site-specific SAR supplement.))! A reference Ultimate Heat Sink is discussed I e in Section 9.2.5.2 below. The site-specific SAR shall verify that the following interface requirements are met to ensure adequacy with the System 80+ Standard Design: e The Ultimate Heat Sink shall meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27. i e The Ultimate Heat Sink shall meet Seismic Category I requirements, o The Ultimate Heat Sink shall be shown through analysis to provide a SSWS inlet temperature that does not exceed the maximum allowable temperature required for removing heat from the CCW : heat exchanger during a design basis accident concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power. The l analysis shall extend from the start of the accident through a 30 day time period, shall be based I on the worst case meteorological conditions for the site based on guidelines given in Regulatory l 2 Guide 1.27, and shall consider no water makeup to the Ultimate Heat Sink for 30 days. o The function of the Ultimate Heat Sink shall be demonstrated not to be lost during or after any , of the following events: l
- 1. Natural phenomena, including SSE, tornado, flood, and drought.
- 2. Non-current site related events, including transportation accidents, oil spills and fires.
O I Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. I w o +noe-w.aum-ysvamu r.o. s.us , i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- 3. Credible single failures of man-made structures.
- 4. Sabotage o in order to ensure the normal cooldown (two division cooldown) performance requirements given in Section 5.4.7.1.2, the Ultimate Heat Sink temperature at the SSWS inlet must remain at or below 95'F throughout the cooldown. One percent exceedance meteorologic conditions can be utilized in showing acceptability, since this is a performance requirement and not a safety requirement.
- For sites with severe winters, where ice formation of the Ultimate Heat Sink could occur, an analysis shall be provided showing the function of the Ultimate Heat Sink is not impaired during winter months. Where required, the intake structures shall be provided with a means of deicing, such as warm water recirculation, to prevent flow blockage of the SSW pump inlets.
- The site water chemistry for the Ultimate Heat Sink shall be analyzed to determine if a water treatment system is required to minimize corrosion and fouling of the SSWS.
- (( Water boundaries that form part of the protected area boundary shall be avoided, if at all possible.))!
9.2.5.2 System Description ((The Ultimate Heat Sink described here consists of a single passive independent cooling water pond connected to the SSWS through intake and discharge paths. However, it is recognized that site-specific conditions may require the use of two ponds to meet Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design brackets alternative Ultimate Heat Sinks which may be specified for a particular site if environmental restrictions limit the use of a cooling pond or if an alternative water supply is more reliable. Acceptable attemate ultimate heat sinks are an ocean, a large lake, a large river, a lake and a cooling pond, a river and a cooling pond, or a cooling tower and cooling pond. The cooling water pond is provided with makeup water pumps to maintain level. Water chemistry is maintained by a site-specific water treatment system (i.e., chemical injection). Salinity buildup in a pond is limited by blowdown. The Ultimate Heat Sink will operate for the required nominal 30 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup water to the source, and without requiring any blowdown from the pond for salinity control.))2 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation The Ultimate Heat Sink meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27. The cooling water pond is Seismic Category I and of sufficient volume to provide the required nominal 30-day cooling capacity without makeup and under worst case meteorological conditions. 3 COL information item; see DCD Introduction Section 3.2. 2 Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. AMrowd Destger Meterial. Auxmary Systems Page 9.246
Sy: tem 80+ Design ControlDocument O Ultimate IIcat Sink temperature will not exceed the maximum allowable temperature required for cooling V any safety-grade component through the component cooling water heat exchangers during a design basis accident concurrent with a loss of offsite power. , The function of the Ultimate Heat Sink is not lost during or after any of the following events: 1
- Natural phenomena, including SSE, tornado, flood, and drought.
- Non-concurrent site-related events, including transportation accidents, oil spills, and fires.
- Credible single failures of man-made structures.
- Sabotage.
9.2.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ((The COL applicant will provide site-specific aspects regarding the resolution of Generic Safety Issue 51, including maintenance and inspection programs.))1 (( Samples of water and substrate will be collected annually to determine if biological fouling organisms have populated the water source. Upon the detection of biological fouling organisms, appropriate corrective action, such as the modification of the chemical treatment program, should be taken. However, consideration must be given to environmental regulations.))2 9.2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements ((The level of each cooling water pond is monitored and controlled. Alarms are provided in the main control room which actuate if the level of the pond approaches minimum allowable value, or the temperature approaches the maximum allowable value.))2 9.2.6 Condensate Storage System 9.2.6.1 Design Bases 9.2.6.1.1 Overall Design Bases
- The Condensate Storage System provides demineralized water for initial fill of the condensate and feedwater systems. As dictated by the Hotwell Level Control System, the Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensate as necessary.
- The Condensate Storage System, along with other condensate volumes such as the condenser hotwell and the deaerator storage tank, is designed to enable the RCS to be maintained at hot standby for four hours and then to be cooled down and depressurized to shutdown cooling system entry conditions in the next twenty hours. 7 I COL information item; see DCD Introduction Section 3.2.
2 Conceptual Design information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.4. L .::Denipn Motonini. Amrniery systems Page 9.2-47
Syatem 80+ Design ControlDocument
- The Condensate Storage System is designed to maintain water purity and exclude oxygen.
9.2.6.1.2 Condensate Storage Tank / Structure , The Condensate Storage Tank structure is located in the yard (Refer to Figure 1.2-1). The design of the Condensate Storage Tank itself is discussed in Section 9.2.6.2. The Condensate Storage Tank Structure is designed to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.143,
" Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management Systems, Structures, and Components Installed in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." The Condensate Storage Tank is located within a seismically-designed structure capable of preventing runoff in the event of tank overflow / rupture.
The Condensate Storage Tank / Structure is designed to accommodate tank overflow, drain, and sample lines which are routed to the Turbine Building Sump System. The structure design complies with applicable state and local regulations. 9.2.6.2 System Description The Condensate Storage System (shown in Figure 9.2.6-1) provides a readily available source of deaerated condensate for makeup to the condenser and is one of the condensate sources of startup feedwater for makeup to the steam generators. It also serves to collect and store miscellaneous system drains. The Condensate Storage System provides condensate to or receives drains from, the following equipment:
- Condenser Hotwell
- Startup Feedwater Pump Suction
- Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks
- Miscellaneous Condensate Quality Drains The following functional requirements are met to provide a reliable system:
- The minimum capacity of the Condensate Storage Tank is based on the maximum condensate usage during startup (e.g., maximum steam generator blowdown x startup duration) plus a 100%
margin.
- The Condensate Storage System consists of a Condensate Storage Tank, piping and recycle pumps.
- The two recycle pumps are provided for recycling condensate back to the degasifiers located in the Demineralized Water Makeup System.
- The Condensate Storage Tank is constructed of stainless steel.
- A stainless steel floating cover is provided on the Condensate Storage Tank to minimize air ingress.
Approved Design Material Ausmary Systems Page 9.2 48
Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument
- A failure of a Condensate Storage System component connected to a safety-related system does f'
not affect the safe shutdown or accident mitigation function of the safety-related system.
- System leakage or storage tank failure will not result in unacceptable environmental effects. j Specifically, the Condensate Storage Tank has the following design features: J l
- Liquid-level monitors, with local and control room high-liquid-level alarms.
- Radiation monitors, with local and control room alarms. l
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- Tank overflow, drain, and sample lines routed to Turbine Building sump.
- A tank / structure is provided capable of preventing mnoff in the event of tank overflow / rupture.
- The Condensate Storage Tank is provided with an overflow line large enough to handle any storage tank overflow and route that overflow to the Turbine Building sump.
9.2.6.3 Safety Evaluation The Condensate Storage System is not safety-related because the assured source of water for the Emergency Feedwater System is provided by the Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks. The safety analysis is, therefore, not affected by the design of the Condensate Storage System. A Q 9.2.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Prior to startup, all piping is flushed and hydrostatically tested in accordance with applicable codes and standards. System operability is verified by placing the system into operation prior to fuel loading. After startup, routine visual inspection of the system components and instrumentation is adequate to verify system operability. 9.2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements Sufficient instrumentation is provided to monitor system performance. 9.2.7 Refueling Water System There is no unique system designated the Refueling Water System. The functions of filling, draining, and purifying the borated water used to flood the refueling pool are performed using components of other systems. These systems are:
- Containment Spray System (Section 6.5)
- Chemical and Volume Control System (Section 9.3.4)
- Pool Cooling and Purification System (Section 9.1.3)
- Shutdown Cooling System (Section 5.4.7)
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.7.1 Design Bases Means are provided to flood and drain the refueling pool, and to purify the water used for refueling prior to, during, and after the refueling operation. 9.2.7.2 System Description The procedures for filling, draining, and purifying the contents of the refueling pool are described below. 9.2.7.2.1 Refueling Cavity Filling and Draining Before the cavity is flooded for refueling operations, the blind flange on the containment end of the fuel transfer tube is removed. Consequently, the transfer canal is flooded simultaneously with the refueling cavity by opening the transfer tube valve. When the necessary prerequisites have been accomplished, flow is initiated from the IRWST, via the containment spray pumps, to the refueling pool. The filling operation continues until the proper level in the cavity has been reached, matching the spent fuel pool level. This level, which requires most of the contents of the IRWST, is a minimum of nine feet above the active portion of a raised fuel element. Refueling activities are then conducted. To drain the refueling cavity after refueling activities are concluded, initially, the shutdown cooling pumps are used. These pumps will take suction on the cavity via the operating shutdown cooling lines, and return the contents directly to the IRWST. This operation is terminated when the level in the refueling cavity reaches the reactor vessel flange elevation. Because of the geometry of the pool, some of the water will not be drained through the reactor vessel. The water which remains, between the reactor vessel flange and the lowest refueling pool purification suction line, is removed via the pool purification pumps. This water is also pumped directly to the IRWST. Final draining of the pool is by a gravity drain line which connects the lowest elevation in the pool directly to the IRWST. 9.2.7.2.2 Refueling Water Chemistry and Purification The refueling cavity is filled with refueling water supplied from the IRWST, at a boron concentration greater than 4000 ppm. To maintain pool clarity, the water flooded into the refueling cavity can be filtered during refueling, using the refueling cavity filtration system. The filtration system is a relatively small (approximately 500 gpm) skid mounted system, consisting of a submersible pump, cartridge type filters, hoses, and associated instrumentation. During refueling, the refueling pool contents are purified by passing the refueling water through the purification filters and ion exchangers in the pool cooling and purification system. This is accomplished , by recirculating flow from and directly back to the refueling pool. l 1 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation l The refueling water function serves no safe shutdown or accident mitigation purpose. l O Anwoved Design Material- Auskary 5ystems Page 9.2-50
Sy-tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 7~ 9.2.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements (d The tests and inspections of the components used to fill, drain, and purify the contents of the refueling cavity are discussed in sections which describe those components. 9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Requirements The instrumentation used to monitor the filling, draining, and purification of the contents of the refueling cavity is described in the various system sections. No instrumentation is specifically installed for the refueling water handling operation. 9.2.8 Turbine Building Cooling Water System The Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) provides cooling for the non-safery related components in the various turbine plant auxiliary systems. Cooling is effected through heat exchangers with heat rejected to the Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS). This closed cooling system is used in lieu of direct cooling by the TBSWS because the quality of the water being circulated in the TBSWS could result in a greater tendency for equipment fouling and corrosion. 9.2.8.1 Design Bases 9.2.8.1.1 Power Generation Design Basis The TBCWS is designed to cool the non-safety-related auxiliary components of the steam arxl power conversion system over the full range of normal plant operation.
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9.2.8.1.2 Codes and Standards The TBCWS is designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. 9.2.8.2 System Description The TBCWS is a single closed loop cooling water system. The TBCWS includes two 100% heat exchangers, two 100% pumps, one surge tank, one chemical addition tank, piping, valves,
! instrumentation and controls.
The following components are cooled by the TBCWS:
- Main turbine lube oil coolers
- Circulating water pump motor lube oil coolers
- Exciter air cooler (slipring cooler)
- Electro-hydraulic control fluid coolers
- Station air compressors l
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- Feedwater pump motor tube oil coolers i i
l AmaroM Design Atesenial- Aaanery Systems Page 9.2-51
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- Condensate pump motor lube oil coolers
- Feedwater booster pump seal water coolers
- Isolated phase bus cooling coils
- Main generator hydrogen coolers
- Main generator stator coolers
- Various non-safety-related sample coolers
- Condenser air removal pumps seal water coolers
- Air sealing oil coolers
- Breathing air compressors The TBCWS utilizes demineralized water to remove waste heat from the various non-safety-related components in the turbine building. Refer to Section 9.2.3 for the discussion of the demineralized water system. Discharge from the TBCWS pumps supplies cooling water to the system's component coolers and returns to the TBCWS heat exchangers where heat is rejected to the TBSWS. A schematic diagram of the TBCWS is provided in Figure 9.2.8-1.
9.2.8.2.1 System Operation The TBCWS is required for power generation operations and during shutdown. Normally, one TBCWS pump and heat exchanger are operating with a second pump and heat exchanger on standby. The standby pump is automatically brought on line whenever the pump discharge header pressure falls below a preselected value. The redundant TBCWS heat exchanger is placed in service manually. The surge tank is provided with a level control that signals a demineralized water makeup line control valve, which then actuates to maintain the required water level. Instrumentation is previded for automatic temperature control of some components and manual control is provided for the other components. 9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation The TBCWS has no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function. The TBCWS is located in buildings / yard areas that do not contain any safety-related components. 9.2.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Acceptance testing of this system is performed to demonstrate proper system and equipment function. 9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local temperature gauges and pressure / test points are provided for temperature and pressure determination. Indication of the surge tank level is provided locally. An alarm also is provided in the control room for high and low TBCWS pump discharge pressure and high and low 7,arge tank water level Approved Design Material Auxihnry Systems Pope 9.2-52
~ Synters 80+ Desfan ControlDocument l I
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- and pressure. Makeup water flow to the surge tank is initiated automatically by low surge tank water- !
level and is continued until the normal level is reestablished. Chlorine detection instruments are provided l to detect inleakage from TBSWS to TBCWS. l 9.2.9. Chined Water Systeen I The Chilled Water System (CWS) is designed to provide and distribute a sufficient quantity of chilled ; water, through a group of dedicated piping systems, to air handling units (AHUs) in specific plant areas. l The CWS is divided into two subsystems, an Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) that serves safety- { related HVAC cooling loads, and a Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) that serves non-safety-related ' ! HVAC cooling loads. { 9.2.9.1 Design Basis l The ECWS system is designed as follows: e The Essential Chilled Water System is a Safety Class 3 system. The components of the system ! are designed in accordance with applicable ASME Codes and IEEE Standards. e Safety-related portions of this system are protected from tornadoes, missiles, pipe whip, and i flooding. Safety-related components'and non-safety related components of the essential chilled { water system are identified separately in Figure 9.2.9-1. ; e The condensers of the chillers are cooled by the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) during all plant operating modes, including design basis events. ; I e Two 100 percent capacity equipment t' rains are provided to meet the single failure criteria. ) e The electrical equipment in each train is powered from independent Class 1E electrical buses. l e This system is designed to withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake, o The Essential Chilled Water System is designed to minimize the consequences of potential water 2 hammer. l The NCWS system is designed as follows: e The NCWS system is not a safety-related system. However, the containment cooling systems . serviced by this system are designed to operate during loss of offsite power. The power supply to the system pumps and chillers is transferred automatically to Alternate AC power when normal electric power is not available. e The normal chilled water piping components within the containment and other Seismic Category I buildings are designed in accordance with Seismic Category 11 criteria to preclude damage to
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safety-related systems during the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. 9.2.9.2 Systeen Description i The CWS consists of two closed loop, chilled water subsystems: the safety-related Essential Chilled
, Water System (ECWS) and the non-safety related Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS). The ECWS f
1 Appresusf Doetps Adesordet. AessNory syssenes Pope 9.2-53 y,-, 4c.4 -
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument subsystem is made up of two equally sized divisions. Each division is totally independent and separated both mechanically and electrically; therefore, single failure or lack of separation can not render the ECWS inoperable. The NCWS subsystem is comprised of two 100% capacity divisions. Each NCWS division is comprised of two 50% capacity chillers. Figure 9.2.9-1 illustrates the Chilled Water System configuration. A heat exchanger is provided in each division of the ECWS to transfer heat from the ECWS to the NCWS during normal operation. Upon failure of the exchanger to meet the cooling demand as detected by a high temperature of the essential chilled water leaving the heat exchanger, the ECWS aligns itself to supply chilled water through the essential chillers. Upon receipt of a high essential chilled water supply temperature, the essential chilled water pump associated with the essential chilled water heat exchanger is automatically stopped and the essential chiller and its associated chilled water pump are automatically actuated. 9.2.9.2.1 Essential Chilled Water System Each 100% capacity division consists of a chiller, a heat exchanger, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, a chemical addition tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. A makeup water line to the ECWS is connected to the Demineralized Water Makeup System (DWMS), which is the normal source of makeup. In case of a loss of demineralized water, makeup is supplied from the Station Service Water System (SSWS), via a Seismic Category I assured water line. A removable spool piece is placed in this line to prevent the inadvertent addition of station service water. The ECWS equipment design requirements are as follows:
- The system is designed to provide a sufficient quantity of chilled water to meet the cooling load O
demands of the full load of the essential HVAC chilled water coils at a normal 45'F water temperature from the chill.:r and a maximum of 10*F AT across the chiller.
- The evaporator tubes and the condenser tubes of the chiller are designed to include an allowance for tube fouling of 0.0005 hr-ft2 *F/Bru and 0.002 hr-ft2*F/Bru, respectively.
- Components of the system are designed in accordance with the Seismic Category I and Class IE requirements.
- Each chiller along with its pump, expansion tank, and control valves is physically separated from th- other chiller.
- Each chiller is provided with a reservoir of refrigerant and a level gauge or sight glass.
- A cross connection is provided between the two essential chilled water pumps to allow the pump that serves the essential chilled water heat exchanger to serve as a backup for the pump that serves the essential chiller.
9.2.9.2.2 Normal Chilled Water System Each 100% capacity division consists of two chillers, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, an air separator, a chemical addition tank, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The system operates during normal plant operation, hot standby, refueling or maintenance shutdown periods. Asywoved Design Meterial- Ausmery Systems Page 9.2-54
Sy' tem 80+ Desian controlDocument The NCWS equipment design requirements are as follows: (s
- The condenser of the chillers are cooled by the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) during all normal operating conditions.
- The system is designed to provide an adequate quantity of chilled water at a maximum temperature of 42*F and a maximum 10'F AT across the chiller. The essential chilled water heat exchanger is sized to provide a terminal temperature difference of 3*F which allows the heat exchanger to deliver 45'F water.
- The chiller / pump combinations are cross connected such that either of the two pumps can serve either of the two chillers in a given room.
- The two divisions of the NCWS are interconnected through normally closed and manually operated valves such that each division of the NCWS can supply chilled water to containment
. cooling systems. (i.e., CEDM Coolers and Containment Coolers). This interconnection assures that proper containment cooling can be maintained should one division of the NCWS fail.
- Redundant containment isolation valves are provided in each supply and return line from the air handling units at the point of containment penetrations. These valves are powered from the Class IE busses and can be operated from the control room. These valves are automatically activated to a close by a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS).
9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation
>O 9.2.9.3.1 Essential Chilled Water System The ECWS is designed to provide chilled water at the required temperature and flow rate.
The ECWS is divided into two divisions, each supplied with redundant power sources. No single failure can impair the ability of the system to function. 1 The ECWS is desiFned to Seismic Category I criteria. The ECWS is provided with sufficient access and removable insulation to permit visual inspection of the piping and equipment surfaces. The ECWS is protected from missiles by means of physical separation of redundant units and by use of adequate building structure where it is located. The Essential Chilled Water System shall be protected from pipe breaks, pipe whip, tornado whip missile ! damage, jet impingement or severe environmental conditions, ! 9.2.9.3.2 Normal Chilled Water System The NCWS has no safety function, j i
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System 80+ Design controlDocument 9.2.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The refrigerant suction and discharge pressures, refrigerant level in the reservoir compressor lubricant pressure, and water pressure differential across the condensers and chillers of each refrigeration unit are periodically monitored to assure that normally operating equipment is functioning properly. Equipment shall be factory inspected and tested in accordance with applicable equipment specifications and codes. System piping and erection of equipment are inspected during various construction stages. Construction tests are performed on mechanical components and the system shall be balanced for the design water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated acceptance test shall be conducted with equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A heat balance shall be made on all cooling components to verify specified capacity. Maintenance will be performed on a scheduled basis in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations and station maintenance procedures. 9.2.9.5 Instrumentation Requirements CWS control and instrumentation design requirements are supplied as follows:
- Each chiller unit is provided with built-in protection against freezing, high refrigerant pressure, low refrigerant pressme, high discharge temperature, motor overload, lubrication oil failure, and motor high tempetuare.
- If chilled water flow through an operating chiller is lost for any reason, the chiller and chilled water pumps are automatically shut down by interlocks to a flow switch in the chilled water line.
An alarm also is annunciated on the local control panel.
- If the plant CCWS water pressure at the inlet of any operating chiller is lost for any reason, the chiller is automatically shut down by interlocks after a time delay.
- The chilled water temperature leaving the NCWS chillers is controlled to a nominal design value of 42*F. The chilled water temperature for the ECWS leaving the heat exchanger or the essential chiller is 45'F. System capacity modulation is achieved by built-in inlet guide vanes at each compressor suction.
- Loss of water flow through the chiller is annunciated in the control room.
- High chilled water supply temperature is annunciated in the control room.
- Manual start and stop actuation of the essential chilled water pumps and the essential chiller is provided in the control room to override automatic actuation.
9.2.10 Turbine Building Service Water System The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) remc,ves heat from the TBCWS and rejects the heat to the cooling towers. O Approved Design Acateria! Auxniary Systems Page .9.2-56
Sy' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.10.1 Design Bases 9.2.10.1.1 Power Generation Design Bases The power generation design basis applicable to this system is as follows: , The TBSWS is designed to remove heat from the non-safety-related normally operating closed cooling water systems over the full range of normal plant operation. 9.2.10.1.2 Codes and Standards The TBSWS is designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. 9.2.10.2 System Descdption 9.2.10.2.1 General Description The TBSWS uses pumps to circulate from the plant cooling towers to remove heat from the TBCWS. j Condenser circulating water from the cooling towers, is pumped through the TBCWS heat exchangers (165 x 10 6BTU /hr, nominal) and is discharged back into the Condenser Circulating Water System at a : point between the main condenser cooling water outlet and the cooling tower inlet. Circulating water , quality is maintained as discussed in Section 10.4.5. Because of possible contamination of the TBCWS through leaks in various components in the system, the ' q Q design operating pressure of the TBSWS is lower than the design operating or transient pressures of the TBCWS. This pressure differential ensures against contamination of the TBCWS. I Piping and valves in the TBSWS are carbon steel and are coated with a suitable corrosion resistant material. The TBCWS heat exchangers are constmeted of corrosion resistant materials to minimize corrosion. A schematic diagram of the TBSWS system is provided in Figure 9.2.10-1. 9.2.10.2.2 Components Description 3 The TBSWS consists of two,100% capacity,22,000 GPM @ 150' TDH nominal vertical, wet pit pumps, (one on standby) which are located at the TBSWS intake structure. [ 9.2.10.2.3 System Operation Normally, one TBSWS pump is started manually from the main control room and is operated continuously during normal plant operating conditions. The standby TBSWS pump is staned automatically in the event the normally operating pump is tripped or the discharge header pressure drops below a preset limit. The flow through and pressure in the tube side of the TBCWS heat exchanger is regulated manually so that the TBSWS operates at a continuous, steady state during plant operating conditions. The redundant (~s , d heat exchangers are placed in service manually as required. l
^ Page 9.2 57
_,- :Deepr aseteniel- Aunalery Spetems i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 9.2.10.3 Safety Evaluation The TBSWS has no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function. The TBSWS is located in a building that does not contain any safety-related components. 9.2.10.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Acceptance testing of this system is performed to demonstrate proper system and equipment function. 9.2.10.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local pressure and temperature indicators are provided at selected points in the system. TBSWS pump discharge pressure indication is provided locally and in the main control room. Pressure switches are provided at the TBSWS pump discharge for standby pump auto start and for low pressure alarm in the main control room. Table 9.2.1-1 Station Service Water System Single Failure Analysis Inherent Compensating Components Failure Mode /Cause Effect on System Method of Detection Provision SSW pumps One pump inoperable / None-redundant Motor status and flow Two redundant pumps mechamcal or electrical pump is available indication in the are provided per failure control room division. SSW strainers One strainer None-redundant Strainer differential Two redundant pump inoperable / mechanical pump and strainer pressure indicated and strainer or electrical failure combination is locally and high combinations available differential pressure are provided per alarmed in control division. room Check valve Check valve stays None-redundant Pressure is indicated Two redundant pumps in pump closed / mechanical pump is available locally and in the are provided per discharge failure control room division. Piping Loss of pump discharge No flow in division Flow and pressure Two redundant dividons header / pipe rupture indica-ions are are provided. indicated in the control room Loss of return No flow in division Flow and pressure are Two redundant divisions header / pipe rupture indicated in the control are provided. room I O Approved Design Meterial- AuLary Systems Page 9.2-58
System 80+ Design ControlDocument g/ Table 9.2.1-2 System Component Design Parameters 1 1 Station Service Water Pumps Number Per Division 2 Design Code ASME III, Class 3 Type Centrifugal, Vertical Wet Pit Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 120'F Design licad Site-Specific NPSH Required Site-Specific Material of Consuuction Site-Specific Station Service Water Strainers Number Per Division 2 , Design Code ASME III, Class 3 Design Pressure 150 psig ("N Design Temperature 120' ( b) Retention Size 1/16 inch Material of Construction Site-Specific Station Service Water Sump Pumps Number Per Division 2 Design Code None Type Sump Pump Design Pressure 100 Psig Design Temperature 150'F Design Flow 75 gpm NPSH Required 2.5 ft at design point Material of Construction Cast Iron Casing Ductile Iron Impeller v 4preseef Dee# ateeerial- Auxmery Systems Pope 9.2-59 >
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.1-3 Active Valves, Station Service Water System h' ASME Valve Safety Valve Section III Actuator Number Function Type Code Class Type SW-100 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW 101 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-102 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-103 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW 104 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-105 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-106 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-107 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-108 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-109 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW 110 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW111 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-1302 Operate Swing Check 3 None SW-1303 Operate Swing Check 3 None SW-200 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-201 Operrte Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-202 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-203 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-204 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-205 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-206 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-207 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-208 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-209 Operate 4 Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-210 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-211 Operate Plug 3 Electric Motor SW-2302 Operate Swing Check 3 None SW-2303 Operate Swing Check 3 None O Approvmf Design Material Auaniary Systems Page 9.2 60
System 80+ Design ControlDocument ,O Table 9.2.1-4 Station Service Water System Emergency Power Requirements V Station Service Water System Emergency Power Requirments Motor Emergency Channel Station Service Water Pump A ; Motor 1 A Station Service Water Pump C Motor IB Station Service Water Pump B Motor 2A Station Service Water Pump D Motor 2B Station Service Water System Strainers Strainers Emergency Channel Station Service Water Strainers A Motor I A Station Service Water Strainers C Motor IB ; Station Service Water Strainers B Motor 2A Station Service Water Strainers D Motor 2B /n3 kJ l I l l l I 1 1 3 I (V ! l Apowand ouiero Meterw Aumanry systema roon s.2-sv l l l
Sy~ tem 80 + oesign controlDocument Table 9.2.1-4 Station Service Water System Emergency Power Requirements (Cont'd.) Station Senice Water System Motor Operated Valves Valve Emergency Channel SW-100 A SW-101 C SW-102 A SW 103 C SW-104 A SW-105 C SW-106 A SW-107 C SW-108 A SW-109 C SW 110 A SW-ill C SW-200 B SW-201 D SW-202 B SW-203 D SW-204 B SW-205 D SW-206 B SW-207 D SW-208 B SW-209 D SW-210 B SW-211 D SW-120 A SW-121 C SW-122 A SW-123 C SW-220 B SW-221 D SW-222 B SW-223 D O Amroved Design Meterial Authwy Systems Page 9.2-62
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument r
! Table 9.2.1-4 Station Service Water System Emergency Power Requirements (Cont'd.)
Station Service Water Systern Controls Controls Emergency Channel Station Service Water Pump 1 A A Start /Stop Station Service Water Pump IB C Stan/Stop Station Service Water Pump 2A B Stan/Stop , Station Service Water Pump 2B D Start /Stop Station Service Water Strainer I A A Start /Stop Station Service Water Strainer 1B C Start /Stop Station Service Water Strainer 2A B Start /Stop Station Service Water Strainer 2B D Start /Stop ry o a wnd Design AceswW Aushery Systems Page 9.2-63
SYtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-1 CCWS Water Quality Specifications Parameter Value pH at 77'F 8.3 to 10.St u Conductivity (minimum, before additives), pmho < 5000 Total dissolved solids, ppm 0.5 (max) Halogens, ppm 1.0 (max) Chloride, ppb < 500 Corrosion inhibitors Site-Specific (For insumce, alternatives include sodium molybdate-tolyltriazole, sodium nitrate. l sodium borate-benzotriazole, and hydrazine). O l 1 l l Ill O pil is adjusted to this range by addition of chemicals, if necessary. l Approved Desiert Material Auxnary Systems Page 9.2-64
System 80+ Design ControlDocument b
. Table 9.2.2-2 Component Cooling System Single Failure Analysis Inherent Components Failure Mode /Cause Effect on System Method of Detection Compensating Provision CCW pumps One pump inoperable / Iess of flow in one Motor status and flow The idle CCW pump mechanical or elec- division indication in the in the respective loop trical failure None-two pumps control room will automatically start are available per division on a low pump differential n'~sure signal.
Redundant loop /divisionis provided. One operable loop is capable of providing , 100% of heat removal requirements under normal and accident conditions CCW heat One heat exchanger Loss of heat sink Temperature Heat exchanger in exchangers malfunction / None-two heat indication in the redundant loop will ,O Leaking tubes or exchangers are available control room provide 100% of heat V blockage removal CCW surge One surge tank less of water level low level alarm in Redundant division is tank malfunction / None-redundant the control room provided Tank leaking division is available Valves Valve in the pump None-redundant loop / Flow indication and Redundant suction stays closed / division is available pressure alarm in the loop /divisionis operator error control room provided ' f \. V) i ANvowed Denien Motonial Auxnery Systems Page 9.2-65
Sy3 tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-2 Component Cooling System Single Failure Analysis (Cont'd.) Components Failure Mode / Effect on System Method of Inherent Compensating Cause Detection Provision Piping Loss of pump None--redundant Flow indication and Redundant loop / division is (pipe discharge / header / loop / division is flow alarm in provided breaks) linebreak or available the control room mechanical damage Non-essential Valve to pump None--redundant Flow indication and Redundant division is header suction header division is available flow alarm in provided stays closed / the control room operator error Piping loss of return None--redundant Flow indication and Redundant loop / division (pipe header /linebreak loop / division is flow alarm in the is provided breaks) or mechanical available control room damage Non-essential Valve to header None-pumps are Flow indication in Equipment sized to and fuel fails to close/ sized to prevent control room prevent pool header mechanical or flow degradation flow degradation electrical failure Containment Valve fails to None-redundant Valve position Redundant Containment Spray Heat open/ division (each and/or Spray Heat Exchanger is Exchanger mechanical or Containment Spray flow indication in sized to transfer the Isolation Valve electrical failure Heat Exchanger is the control room maximum Containment sized to transfer Spray heat load the maximum heat load Shutdown Valve fails to None-redundant Valve position Redundant division is Cooling Heat open/ division is and/or provided Exchanger mechanical or available flow indication in isolation Valve electrical failure the control room O Altwoved Deskrn Matenal Auxnery Systems Page 9.2-66
Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument r Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and i] Flow Requirements Nonnal Operation
~
Total Number Number With Heat Load Receiving Total Component Heat Load (E+ 06 How How Div.I Div. 2 mu/hr) Div.I Div. 2 (SPm) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor 0 0 0 1 1 60 Coolers Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow Heat 0 0 0 1 1 320 Exchangers Safety injection Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 160 Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Containment Spray Pump Motor 0 0 0 1 1 60 Coolers Containment Spray Mini-Flow Heat 0 0 0 1 1 320 Exchangers Component Cooling Water Pump 1 1 0.41 2 2 354 ( Motor Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor 1 0 0.62 1 1 80 Coolers Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor 0 0 0 1 1 60 Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat 1 0 9.6 1 0 5000 Exchangers j Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water 0 0 0 1 1 2000 l Coolers Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air 0 0 0 2 2 100 Aftercoolers Essential Chilled Water Condensers 0 0 0 1 1 1620 RCP Motor Air Coolers 2 2 6.44 2 2 1200 l RCP Motor Oil CoolersDI 2 2 0.612 2 2 192 RCP Oil Coolers 2 2 1.8 2 2 281.6 RCP High Pressure Coolers 2 2 0.748 2 2 300 letdown Heat Exchanger 0 1 22.7 0 1 1500 Charging Pump Motor Coolers 1 0 0.577 1 1 140 l l l l (D x,/ '
%. ..=' Des > Materie!. Auxnery Systems Page 9.2-67
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) Normal Operation (Cont'd.) l Total Number Total i Number With Heat Load Receiving Flow Component Heat Load (E+ 06 Flow (gpm) Div.1 Div. 2 Btu /hr) Div.1 Div. 2 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat 1 0 1.98 1 1 800 Exchangers Primary Sample Heat Exchangers 0 8 4.08 0 8 240 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat 0 6 3.24 0 6 120 Exchangers Gas Stripper 0 1 17.6 0 1 700 Boric Acid Concentrator 0 1 14 0 1 700 Normal Chilled Water Condensers 1 1 24 2 2 12000 Instrument Air Compressor Oil 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 Coolers, Intercoolers, Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers TotalIIcat lead per Division 1 = 30.0745 E+06 Bru/hr Total IIcat lead per Division 2 = 78.9175 E+06 Btu /hr Total Flow per Division 1 = 15123.8 gym Total Flow per Division 2 = 13383.8 gpm O Approvmf Desigrs Meterint
- Auxiliary Systems Page 9.2-68
Sy, tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow f] U Requirements (Cont'd.) Shutdown Cooling Onitial) Total Number Total Number With Heat Load Receiving How Component Heat Load (E+ 06 Flow (gpm) Div.1 Div. 2 Btu /hr) Div. 1 Div. 2 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 I 262.2 1 1 26000 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow Heat 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 Exchangers Safety injection Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 160 Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Containment Spray Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 60 Containment Spray Mini-Flow Heat 0 0 0 1 1 320 Exchangers Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2 2 0.82 2 2 354 Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 80 Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 60 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 p Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 2000 Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air 0 0 0 2 2 100 Aftercoolers Essential Chilled Water Condensers 0 0 0 1 1 1620 RCP Motor Air Coolers 1 1 3.22 2 2 1200 RCP Motor Oil Coolerstu i 1 0.306 2 2 192 RCP Oil Coolers I ! 0.9 2 2 281.6 RCP liigh Pressure Coolers 1 1 0.374 2 2 300 letdown Heat Exchanger 0 1 12 0 1 990 Charging Pump Motor Coolers 1 0 0.577 1 1 140 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat Exchangers 1 0 1.98 1 1 800 Primary Sample Heat Exchangers 0 8 4.08 0 8 240 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat 0 6 3.24 0 6 120 Exchangers Gas Stripper 0 1 17.6 0 1 700 Boric Acid Concentrator 0 1 14 0 1 700 Normal Chilled Water Condensers 1 I 24 2 2 12000 instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 Intercoolers, Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers Total Heat Load per Division 1 = 149.5505 E+06 Btu /hr Total Heat 1. cad per Division 2 = 197.9135 E+06 Bru/hr [3 (.,/ Total Flow per Division 1 = 23128.8 gpm Total Flow per Division 2 = 25878.8 gpm
? 2 Deelgrs nietersiel. Auuniery Systems Page 9.2-69 L
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) Shutdown Cooling (Final) Total Number Total Number With Heat Load Receiving How Component IIeat Load (E+ 06 How (gpm) Div.1 Div. 2 Div.1 Div. 2 Shutdown Cooling IIcat 1 1 60 1 1 26000 Exchangers Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Coolers Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 IIcat Exchangers Safety injection Pump Motor 0 0 0 2 2 160 Coolers Containment Spray lleat 0 0 0 0 0 0 Exchangers Containment Spray Pump Motor 0 0 0 1 1 60 Coolers Containment Spray Mini-Flow 0 0 0 1 1 320 lleat Exchangers Component Cooling Water Pump 2 2 0.82 2 2 354 Motor Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1 0 0.62 1 1 80 Motor Coolers Emergency Feedwater Pump 0 0 0 1 1 60 Motor Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling IIcat 1 0 9.6 1 0 5000 Exchangers Diesel Generator Engine Jacket 0 0 0 1 1 2000 Water Coolers , Diesel Generator Engine Starting 0 0 0 2 , 2 100 Air Aftercoolers Essential Chilled Water 0 0 0 1 1 1620 Condensers RCP Motor Air Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 1200 RCP Motor Oil CoolersIH 0 0 0 2 2 192 RCP Oil Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 281.6 Approved Desiges Material Auxikery Systems Page 9.2-70
l l Sy tem 80+ Design control Document i 1 l A lj Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) 4 Shutdown Cooling (Final) Total Number Total Number With Heat Load Receiving Flow Component Heat Load (E+ 06 Flow (gpm) Div.1 Div. 2 Div.1 Div. 2 RCP High Pressure Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 300 Letdown Heat Exchanger 0 1 0.51 0 1 35 Charging Pump Motor Coolers 1 0 0.577 1 1 140 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat 1 0 1.98 1 1 800 Exchangers Primary Sample Heat Exchangers 0 8 4.08 0 8 240 Steam Generator Primary Sample 0 6 3.24 0 6 120 Heat Exchangers Gas Stripper 0 0 0 0 1 700 O Q Boric Acid Concentrator 0 1 14 0 1 700 Normal Chilled Water Condensers 1 1 24 2 2 12000 ) Instrument Air Compressor Oil 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 Coolers, Intercoolers, Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers Total Heat Load per Division 1 = 56.2705 E+06 Bru/hr Total Heat Load per Division 2 = 65.3235 E+06 Bru/hr l Total Flow per Division 1 = 28123.8 gpm i Total Flow per Division 2 = 24918.8 gpm l I I l
)
? Y Anwovent Design Material Ausmery Systems Page 9.2 71
Syntem 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) Refueling Operations Number With Total l Number Receiving Total Heat Load Heat Load Flow Flow Component Div.1 Div. 2 (E+ 06 Div.I Div. 2 (epm) Btu /hr) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 1 60 1 1 26000 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow Heat Exchangers 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 Safety injection Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 160 Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Containment Spray Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 60 Containment Spray Mini-Flow Heat 0 0 0 1 1 320 Exchangers ~ Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2 2 0.82 2 2 354 Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 1.24 1 1 80 Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 60 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 1 1 9.1 9123 1 1 10000 Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 2000 Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air 0 0 0 2 2 100 Aftercoolers Essential Chilled Water Condensers 0 0 0 1 1 1620 RCP Motor Air Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 1200 RCP Motor Oil Coolerst'i 0 0 0 2 2 192 RCP Oil Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 281.6 RCP High Pressure Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 300 letdown Heat Exchanger 0 0 0 0 0 0 Charging Pump Motor Coolers 0 0 0 1 1 140 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 1 1 800 Primary Sample Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 8 240 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat 0 0 0 0 6 120 Exchangers Gas Stripper 0 1 17.6 0 1 700 Boric Acid Concentrator 0 1 14 0 1 700 Normal Chilled Water Coridensers 1 I 24 2 2 12000
~
Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, I 1 0.585 2 2 200 Intercoolers, Jacket Coolers. and Aftercoolers Total Heat Load per Division 1 = 53.7085 E+06 Bru/hr Total Heat Load per Division 2 = 85.3085 E+06 Btu /hr Total Flow per Division 1 = 28123.8 gpm Total Flow per Division 2 = 29883.8 gpm O Approved Desiger Material. AuxBary Systems Page 9.2-72
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Ov Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) i Design Basis Accident Number With Total Number Receiving Total Heat Load Heat Load How Flow WPonent Div l giv 2 W Div.1 Div. 2 Btu /hr) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor 0 0 0 1 1 60 Coolers Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow Heat 0 0 0 1 1 320 Exchangers Safety injection Pump Motor 2 2 0.044 2 2 160 Coolers Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 1 1 108(31 1 1 16000 Containment Spray Pump Motor 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Coolers Containment Spray Mini-Flow Heat 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 Exchangers ( Component Cooling Water Pump 1 1 0.41 2 2 354 Motor Coolers Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 0 0 0 1 1 80 Motor Coolers Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor 1 1 0.136 1 1 60 Coolers l Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Hear 0 0 0 0 0 0 Exchangers Diesel Generator Engine Jacket 1 1 38.1 1 1 2000 l Water Coolers ; I Diesel Generator Engine Starting 2 2 0.0344 2 2 100 l Air Aftercoolers Essential Chilled Water Condensers 1 I 6.48 1 1 1620 RCP Motor Air Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 1200 RCP Motor Oil Coolers 01 0 0 0 2 2 192 RCP Oil Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 281.6 RCP High Pressure Coolers 0 0 0 2 2 300
,m Letdown Heat Exchanger 0 0 0 0 0 0 i) 0 0.577 \m/ Charging Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 1 140 j 1
i Approved Deadgrr nieteniel Aunnery Systems _ Page 9.2-73 i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 9.2.2-3 Typical Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads and Flow Requirements (Cont'd.) Design Basis Accident Number With Total Number Receiving Total Heat lead Heat Load How Flow
" #"*" (gPm)
Div.1 Div. 2 Div.I Div. 2 Btu /hr) Charging Pump Mini Flow Heat 1 0 1.98 1 1 800 Exchangers Primary Sample Heat Exchangers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Steam Generator Primary Sample 0 0 0 0 0 0 lleat Exchangers Gas Stripper 0 0 0 0 0 0 Boric Acid Concentrator 0 0 0 0 0 0 Normal Chilled Water Condensers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Instrument Air Compressor Oil 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 Coolers, Intercoolers, Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers Total lleat Load per Division 1 = 134.2427 E+06 Bru/hr Total Heat lead per Division 2 = 131.6857 E+06 Btu /hr Total Flow per Division 1 = 12123.8 gpm Total Flow per Division 2 = 12123.8 gpm Notes: [1] Each set contains one upper and one lower bearing oil cooler. Data applies to the two cooler combination. [2] The listed beat load for the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers does not give consideration to a single active failure. Under this condition, the heat load on a single spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger would be 19.19 x 106 Btu /hr. Likewise, a single active failure coincident with a full core offload would result in a heat load of 67.25 x 10 6Bru/hr on a single spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. [3] This heat load must be carried by each division. O Astroved Design Material- Anifiery Systems Page 9.2 74
SyTtem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 9.2.2-4 System Component Design Parameters Component Cooling Water Pumps Number 4 Design Code ASME III, Class 3 l Type Centrifugal, Horizontal Split l Design Press tre 150 psig a Design Temperature 200*F Material of Construction Carbon Steel Casing Stainless Steel Impeller Design Flow 15200 gpm Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Number 4 Design Code ASME III, Class 3 Type Shell and Tube, Fixed Tubesheet Design Heat lead 39.05025 x 106 Bru/hr Shell - Fluid Component Cooling Water Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200*F () Design Flow 14977 gpm Shell Temperature - Out i Normal Operation 105'F , LOCA (initial heat load on CS) 120'F Initial shutdown cooling 120*F j Final shutdown cooling 100*F Fouling Factor 0.0005 Number of Passes 1 Material of Construction Carbon Steel Tube - Fluid Station Service Water Number of Passes 1 Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200'F Design Flow 14500 gpm Tube Temperature In 95'F Fouling Factor Dependent on Site Specific Station Service Water Chemistry Material of Construction Dependent on Site Specific Station Service Water Chemistry .n
^ r..J Deeign nearenial Auxiniary Systems Page 9.2-75
System 80+ Design controlDocument Table 9.2.2-4 System Component Design Parameters (Cont'd.) Component Cooling Water Surge Tanks Number 2 Design Code ASME III, Class 3 Design Pressure 10 psig Internal 3 psig External Design Temperature 200*F Material of Construction StainlessSteel Component Cooling Water Sump Pumps Number 4 Design Code None Type Sump Pump Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200*F Design Flow 75 gpm Material of Construction Stainless Steel Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure Maintenance Sump Pumps Number 2 Design Code None Type Sump Pump Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200*F Design Flow 75 gpm Material of Construction StainlessSteel Component Cooling Water Chemical Addition Tanks Number 2 Design Code ASME VIII Total Volume 50 gallons Design Pressure 150 psig Design Temperature 200*F Material of Construction StainlessSteel O Approved Design Material Auxmary Systems Page 9.2-76
Sy= tem 80 + Design controlDocument y Table 9.2.2-5 Active Valves, Component Cooling Water System ; Valve Safety Function Valve Type ASME Section III Actuator Type > Number Code Class CC-100 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC 101 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-102 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-103 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-110 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-111 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor CC-112 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-Il3 Close Butterfly 3 Electric Motor f CC-!!4 Open Butterfly 3 Electric Motor CC-122 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-123 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic l CC-130 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor h CC-1302 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-1303 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-131 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-136 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-137 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-1507 Operate Swing Check 2 None ! CC-1548 Operate Swing Check 2 None CC-200 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-201 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-202 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-203 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-210 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-211 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor l (O () ! i Neweved Dents niesenid- Ausney Systems Page 9.2 77 I I'
Syotem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-5 Active Valves, Component Cooling Water System (Cont'd.) Valve Safety Function Valve Type ASME Section III Actuator Type Number Code Class CC-212 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-213 Close Butterfly 3 Electric Motor CC-214 Open Butterfly 3 Electric Motor CC-222 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-223 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic CC-230 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-2302 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-2303 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-231 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-236 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-237 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-240 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-241 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-242 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-243 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor CC-2507 Operate Swing Check 2 None CC-2548 Operate Swing Check 2 None CC-2622 Operate Swing Check 2 None CC-2628 Operate Swing Check 2 None O Approved Desigrr Materia!- Auxhuary Systems Page 9.2-78
L Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-6 Component Cooling Water System Emergency Power (mV) Requirements Component Cooling Water System Pump Motors Motor Emergency Channel Component Cooling Water Pump Motor I A A Component Cooling Water Pump Motor IB C Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2A B Component Cooling Water Pump Motor 2B D Component Cooling Water System Motor-Operated Valves Valve Emergency Channel CC-106 A CC-107 C CC 108 A CC-109 C CC-206 B CC-207 D CC-208 B CC-209 D p CC-130 A (,) CC-131 y B CC-136 B CC-137 A CC-230 B CC-231 A CC-236 A CC-237 B CC-240 B ; CC-241 A 1 CC-242 A CC-243 B 1 CC-Ill A CC-ll3 C CC-Il4 C CC-211 B CC-213 D CC-214 D , I i 1 o s I j 1 I l 4preved Deeniprr ninterial Auxi6ery Systems Pope 9.2-79 1 1 I
Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 9.2.2-6 Component Cooling Water System Emergency Power Requirements (Cont'd.) I Component Cooling Water System Controls Controls Emergency Channel Component Cooling Water Pump 1A Stan/Stop A Component Cooling Water Pump IB Start /Stop C Component Cooling Water Pump 2A Stan/Stop B Component Cooling Water Pump 2B Start /Stop D Non-essential Header i Supply and A Return Isolation Valves CC-102 and CC-103, Open/Close Non-essential IIcader 1 Supply and C Return Isolation Valves CC-122 and CC-123 Open/Close
~
Non-essential IIcader 2 Supply and Return B Isolation Valves CC-202 and CC-203, Open/Close Non-essential lleader 2 Supply and Return D Isolation Valves CC-222 and CC-223, Open/Close Flow Control Valve, Component Cooling Water A Ileat Exchanger I A By-pass Valve CC-100, Position Control Flow Control Valve, Component Cooling Water C lic.tt Exchanger IB By-pass Valve CC 101, Position Control Flow Control Valve, Component Cooling Water B lleat Exchanger 2A By-pass Valve CC-200, Position Control Flow Control Valve, Component Cooling Water D ) liest Exchanger 2B By-pass Valve CC-201, i Position Control j Flow Control Valve, Shutdown Cooling fleat A Exchanger 1 Control Valve CC-110, Tosition Control 1 Flow Control Valve, Shutdown Cooling licat B Exchanger 2 Control Valve CC-210, Position j Control Flow Control Valve, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling C IIcat Exchanger 1 Control Valve CC-112, Position Control Flow Control Valve Spent Fuel Pool Cooling D l Ileat Exchanger 2 Control Valve CC-212, j Position Control l O I Approved Design Mstwiel- AumiGary systems Page 9.2-80
)
d System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument I OV Table 9.2.3-1 Primary and Secondary Makeup Water Limits l l Parameter Limits pH 7.0 to 7.5 i Conductivity . less than 0.1 mhos/cm ) Chloride Less than 0.005 ppm
]
Fluoride Less than 0.005 ppm Suspended Solids less than 0.05 ppm l Silica (reactive) Less than 0.01 ppm Sodium Less than 0.003 ppm Sulfate Less than 0.005 ppm Magnesium Less than 0.04 ppm Calcium plus Magnesium less than 0.08 ppm Aluminum Less than 0.08 ppm Iron Less than 0.02 ppm Copper less than 0.002 ppm Oxygen Less than 0.1 ppm Table 9.2.3-2 Process Monitoring Parameters >
/~N Mixed Bed Degasifier
( Demin. Cation Decarbon. Anion I E m uent'l ParameteritJ1 InletI31 Emuent E m uent Emuent Emuentt31 Sodium C C W Chloride C C ___ Sulfate W W Silica C C > pH C C : Conductivity C C W ' Dissolved Oxyger. C Pressure C C Flow C C Notes:
- 1. Parameters are either continuously monitored (C) or grab sampled on a weekly basis (W). ,
- 2. Recorders are provided for all continuous parameters except pressure. A flow
- pal'ru is also provided.
- 3. ~ Alarms are provided for mixed bed effluent chemistry parameters, low demineraliser flow and degasifier effluent dissolved oxygen.
AnwomiDeelyn ateteriel* Auanery Systems Page 9.2-81
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