IR 05000333/2013005
| ML14042A129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2014 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Coyle L Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| Burritt A | |
| References | |
| IR 13-005 | |
| Download: ML14042A129 (34) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ary 11, 2014
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2013005
Dear Mr. Coyle:
On December 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 23, 2014, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The report documents one Severity Level IV violation. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at FitzPatrick.
As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0310. Cross-cutting aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the previous terminology will be converted to the latest revision in accordance with the cross-reference in IMC 0310. The revised cross-cutting aspects will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment review. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000333/2013005 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I== Docket No: 50-333 License No: DPR-59 Report No: 05000333/2013005 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Dates: October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013 Inspectors: E. Knutson, Senior Resident Inspector B. Sienel, Resident Inspector J. Brand, Reactor Inspector S. McCarver, Physical Security Inspector J. Nicholson, Health Physicist S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Rolph, Health Physicist T. Setzer, Senior Project Engineer Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000333/2013005; 10/01/2013 - 12/31/2013; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick); Problem Identification and Resolution.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of when it should reasonably have been discovered, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, identification that issues with two of the condensate storage tank (CST) level detectors that provide automatic transfer of the HPCI suction from the CSTs to the suppression pool would have caused this transfer to occur at less than the minimum CST level allowed by Technical Specifications (TSs) and therefore caused the HPCI system to be inoperable, was not promptly recognized as a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-06344.
The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the HPCI system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process; in that, a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence)violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. (Section 4OA2)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On October 19, 2013, operators reduced power to 50 percent to address main condenser tube leakage. Operators further utilized the period of reduced power operations to perform single control rod scram time testing, channel-control blade interference testing, and a control rod sequence exchange. Following completion of these activities and identification and repair of the main condenser tube leak, operators restored power to 100 percent the following day. On October 21, 2013, operators reduced power to 75 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment and restored power to 100 percent later that day. On four other occasions (November 6, November 10, December 9, and December 25, 2013), operators performed similar short duration power reductions to 50 percent to address main condenser tube leakage.
On December 22, 2013, operators reduced power to 65 percent to remove the C condensate booster pump from service to replace its lube oil cooler and restored power to 100 percent later that day. On December 31, 2013, operators reduced power to 75 percent to isolate a main condenser water box due to tube leakage and remained at 75 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of FitzPatricks readiness for the onset of seasonal low temperatures. The review focused on the HPCI, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), and emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TSs, control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure FitzPatrick personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including FitzPatricks seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions.
Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdown (71111.04 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: A and C EDGs while D EDG was inoperable for planned maintenance on October 22, 2013 B and D EDGs while offsite 115 kilovolt (kV) Line 4 was unavailable due to planned offsite maintenance on November 14, 2013 A residual heat removal (RHR) system while B RHR and RHR service water (RHRSW) systems were inoperable for planned maintenance on November 20, 2013 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.
The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection