ML081370256

Feb-Mar 05000259/2008301 Exam Draft RO Written Exam (Part 4 of 4)

ML081370256
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/08/2008
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-259/08-301 50-259/08-301
Download: ML081370256 (87)

See also: IR 05000259/2008301

Text

(3.3-EOI APPENDIX-IS

Rev.2 Paqe 2 of 4 (continued

from previous page)b.IF Main Condenser is desired drain path, THEN OPEN 3-FCV-74-62, RHR MAIN CNDRFLUSHVALVE.

c.IF Radwaste is desired drain path, THEN PERFORM the following:

1)ESTABLISH communications

with Radwaste.2)OPEN 3-FCV-74-63, RHR RADWASTESYSFLUSHVALVE.

d.NOTIFY personnel in Unit3RB, El 519 ft, Torus Area to start RHR Drain Pump 3A(3B).e.THROTTLE 3-FCV-74-10S, RHR DR PUMP 3A/B DISCH HDR VALVE, as necessary.

4.WHEN Suppression

Pool level reaches-5.5 in., THEN SECURE RHR Drain System as follows: a.DISPATCH personnel to STOP the Drain System as follows (Unit3RB, El 519 ft, Torus Area): 1)STOP RHR Drain Pump 3A(3B).2)CLOSE the following valves:*3-SHV-074-0564A(B), RHR DR PUMP A(B)SEAL WTR SPLY*3-SHV-074-0529A(B), RHR DR PUMP A(B)SHUTOFF VLV.3)CLOSE and LOCK 3-SHV-074-0765A(B)

, RHR DR PUMP A(B)DISCH.b.CLOSE 3-FCV-74-10S, RHR DR PUMP 3A/B DISCH HDR VALVE.c.VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-62, RHR MAIN CNDR FLUSH VALVE.d.VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-63, RHR RADWASTESYSFLUSH VALVE.e.WHEN...Suppression

Pool level can be maintained

between-1 in.and-5.5 in., THEN...EXIT this procedure.

(5.3-EOI APPENDIX-18

Rev.2 Pa e 3 of 4 IF.....Directed by SRO to Emergency Makeup to the Suppression

Pool from Standby Coolant, THEN...CONTINUE in this procedure at Step 9.6.IF Directed by SRO to add water to suppression

pool, THEN MAKEUP water to Suppression

Pool as follows: a.VERIFY OPEN 3-FCV-73-40,HPCICSTSUCTIONVALVE.

b.OPEN 3-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.c.IF.....HPCI is NOT available for Suppression

Pool makeup, THEN...MAKEUP water to Suppression

Pool using RCIC as follows: 1)VERIFY OPEN 3-FCV-71-19, RCIC CST SUCTION VALVE.2)OPEN 3-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.d.IF.....3-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE, CANNOT be opened from control room, THEN...DISPATCH personnel to 250V DC RMOV Board 3B, Compartment

50, to perform the following:

1)PLACE 3-XS-071-0034, RCTC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE EMER TRANS SWITCH, to EMERG.2)OPEN 3-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.7.WHEN Suppression

Pool level reaches-5.5 in., THEN VERIFY CLOSED the following valves:*3-FCV-73-30, HPCI PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE*3-FCV-71-34, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE.8.DISPATCH personnel to 250V DC RMOV Board 3B, Compartment

50, to VERIFY 3-XS-071-0034, RCIC PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE EMER TRANS SWITCH, in NORMAL.

55.RO295031G2.4.6

OOl/C/A/TlGl/Cl//295031G2.4.6//RO/SRO/NOGiventhefollowingplantconditions:*Unit2wasoperatingat98%powerwhenan

automatic scram occurredduetoaGroupI

isolation.*Allcontrolrodsfullyinsertasreactor

water level immediatelydropsbelowLevel2

.*TheRecircpumpstrip.*HPCI automaticallyinitiatesbut

immediatelyisolatesduetoablowninnerturbineexhaust

rupture diaphragm.*RCIChadbeentaggedoutofservicepreviouslytorepairanoilleak.*Allother systemsareoperable.*EOI-1,RPVControl,isentered.

• Pressurecontrolwas

establishedwithSRVs.Theremaininghigh

pressure injection systemsareunabletomaintain

reactor waterlevelwhichiscurrentlyat-150inchesandlowering

.WhichONEofthefollowing

contingencyprocedureswouldbe

appropriatetoexecute?

A.to!C1 ,AlternateLevelControl

B.C2 , Emergency RPV Depressurization

C.C4 ,RPVFlooding

D.C5, Level/Power

Control KIA Statement:295031ReactorLow

WaterLevel/2 2.4.6-Emergency Procedures/PlanKnowledgesymptombasedEOPmitigation

strategies

KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the appropriate

EmergencyProcedureusedtomitigatealow

reactor waterlevelcondition

.References:2-EOI-1,EOIPM

SectionsO-V-CandO-V-G

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemble, sort ,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.This

requiresmentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

((REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctly the candidate must determinethefollowing:

1.Whetherthegiven conditionsareindicativeofa

1055ofHPinjection

.2.BasedonItem#1above

,whichEOI Contingencyisappropr iate to mitigatethatcondition.Ais correct.Bis incorrect.ThisisplausiblesinceEDwilleventuallybecome

necessaryfollowingtheinitialactionsof

EOI-C1.However ,additionalactionsarerequiredbeforeEOI-C2is

appropriate

.Cis incorrect.ThisisplausiblesinceOW

temperaturemaybehighenoughfollowingEDtocreateaconditionwhereRPVlevel

instrumentsbecomeunavailable.However, additional

actionsarerequiredbeforeEOI-C4is

appropriate

.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausiblesincetheonlygivenconditionwhich

contradictstheuseofEOI-C5isthecurrentrodpattern.However,withallrodsinserted,EOI-C5isnot

appropriate.

..*-o III LU 0 0 I 1£1111 ,I 1 ft!'e ee"'1 1" 1 I I iii'.I fiI.11 L iill,1 i_1'rT*I , I S n-w rf4 I , ,: 1 ,

, , , I I.1 II I I I**!..!.!,.,.1 I I

.1;r lill-lll-l-ll++.++.hlllI-i!I I!I...;II I I I**,iif Iii!';I-.II i II I II II I aU!I.I i!'i ,.,"i<9 i'I..*-o III*No..z o u>L

56.RO 295037E K2.l 1 OOl/C/A/TlGI/RMCS//295037EK2.Il//RO/SROINO

A hydraulicATWShas occurredonUn it2andtheUn it Operatorisinsertingcontrolrods

i n accordancewiththeEOI

appendices

10 ,1F ,&2.(Withtheseplant

conditions...A.>Iallinsertblocksare

bypassed.B.roddrift indication

is receivedassoonasrodmot

ion beg ins.C.stabilizing

valvesopento provide increased drive pressure.D.allRMCSt imer functions are bypassed exceptforthesettlebus

.KIAStatement:295037SCRAMCondition PresentandPower Above APRM Downscale or Unknown 11 EK2.11-Knowledgeofthe interrelationsbetween

SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTORPOWERABOVEAPRM

DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWNandthefollowing

RMCS: Plant-Specific

KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequir ingthecand idatetousespec ificplantcond itions to determine the statusoftheRMCSwhile

executing procedurestomitigateanATWS condition.References:

2-EOI Appendicies1D,1F,and2Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedas CIAduetotherequ

irementtoassemble

, sort , and integratethepartsofthe

questiontopred ict an outcome.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeand

itsmean ing to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: NonePlausibilityAnalysis:Inorderto answer this quest ion correctly the candidate must determine the following: 1.Whataffectthe actions performedbyEOIAppendiximplementationhaveontheRMCSsystem.

2.Whataffectthe RMCS manipulat ionsrequiredby

implementationoftheEOI Appendicishaveonplant

indications

.Aiscorrect.8isincorrect.Thisis plausiblesinceaRodDriftindicationwill

occurforeach insertedcontrolrod

, however the indicat ion does not occuruntiltherod

isfully insertedandtheCRD

NOTCH OVERRIDEswitchisreleased

.Cisincorrect.Thisis plausible because CRD stabilizing

valvesDOhavean effectondrive wate rpressure,butthe

efffectisto prevent oscilationswhilemov ingcontrolrods

, NOT increase pressure.(Disincorrect.Thisis plausible sinceRMCSt imers are bypassedbyusingtheCRD

NOTCH OVERRIDE switch i n accordance

w ith EOI Appendix1D.However ,theSettleBust

imer isalsobypassed.

(2-EOI APPENDIX-1D

Rev.6 Page 1 of 3-----------

...2-EOI APPENDIX-1D

INSERT CONTROL RODS USING REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM LOCATION: Unit 2 Control Room, Panel 9-5 ATTACHMENTS:

1.Tools and Equipment 2.Core Position Map NOTE: This EOI Appendix may be executed concurrently

with EOI Appendix 1A or IB at SRO's discretion

when time and manpower permit.1.VERIFY at least one CRD pump in service.NOTE: Closing 2-85-586, CHARGING WATER ISOL, valve may reduce the effectiveness

of EOI Appendix 1A or lB.2.IF Reactor Scram or ARI CANNOT be reset, THEN DISPATCH personnel to close 2-SHV-85-586, CHARGING WATERSHUTOFF(RBNE, El 565 ft).3.VERIFY REACTOR MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN.4.BYPASS Rod Worth Minimizer.5.REFERTO Attachment

2 and INSERT control rods in the area of highest power as follo ws: a.SELECT control rod.b.PLACE CRD NOTCH OVERRIDE switch in EMERG ROD IN position UNTIL control rod is NOT moving in ward.c.REPEAT Steps 5.a and 5.b for each control rod to be inserted.NOTE:A ladder may be required to perform the following step.REFERTO Tools and Equipment, Attachment

1.IF necessary, an alternate ladder is available at , the HCU Modules, EAST and West banks.It is stored by the CRD Charging Cart.6.WHEN...NO further control rod movement is possible or desired, THEN...DISPATCH personnel to verify open 2-SHV-85-586, CHARGING WATERSHUTOFF(RBNE, El 565 ft).ENDOFTEXT

(2-EOI APPENDIX-IF

Rev.4 Page I of 7-----------

...2-EOI APPENDIX-1F

MANUAL SCRAM LOCATION: Unit 2 Control Room ATTACHMENTS:

1.Tools and Equipment 2.Panel 2-9-15, Rear 3.Panel 2-9-17, Rear 1.VERIFY Reactor Scram and ARI reset.a.IF...*.ARI CANNOT be reset, THEN.*.EXECUTE EOI Appendix 2 concurrently

with Step 1.b of this procedure.

b.IF Reactor Scram CANNOT be reset, THEN DISPATCH personnel to Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument

Room to defeatALLRPS logic trips as follows: 1)REFER to Attachment

1 and OBTAIN four 3-ft banana jack jumpers from EOI Equipment Storage Box.2)REFER to Attachment

2 and JUMPER the following relay terminals in Panel 2-9-15, Rear: a)Relay 5A-K10A (DQ)Terminal 2 to Relay 5A-K12E (ED)Terminal 4, Bay 1.b)Relay 5A-K10C (AT)Terminal 2 to Relay 5A-K12G (BH)Terminal 4, Bay 3.3)REFER to Attachment

3 and JUMPER the following relay terminals in Panel 2-9-17, Rear: a)Relay 5A-K10B (DQ)Terminal 2 to Relay 5A-K12F (ED)Terminal 4, Bay 1.b)Relay 5A-K10D (AT)Terminal 2 to Relay 5A-K12H (BH)Terminal 4, Bay 3.2.WHEN RPS Logic has been defeated,THENRESET Reactor Scram.3.VERIFY OPEN Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves.

(57.RO 295038EKl.Ol

OOlIMEMlTlGlINEWI1295038EKl.Ol//RO/SRO/RWMGiventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Unit2has experiencedaLOCAwithalossofPrimary

Containment.*Youhave volunteeredforateam dispatchedfromtheOSCto

enter the ReactorBuildingand

attempt to energize 20 480v RMOV board.*Dueto environmental

and radiological

conditions

presentinthe ReactorBUilding,Radconprovidesyouwitha

Sodium Chloride and Potassium Iodine tablet duringtheprejobbriefing

.WhichONEofthe

following describesthebenefitof

ingesting Potassium IodinepriortotheReactorBuildingentry?

A.Itwillreducetheriskof

dehydrationandheatstress

.B.Itwillreducethe

absorption

of radioactiveIodinebythelungs

.Itwillreducethe

absorption

of radioactiveIodinebythethyroid

.D.Itwillreducethe

absorption

of radioactive

Potassiuminthebloodstream.KIAStatement:295038High

Off-site Release RateI9EK1.01-Knowledgeofthe

operational

implicationsofthefollowing

conceptsastheyapplytoHIGH

OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE: Biological

effects of radioisotope

ingestion KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetocorrectlyidentifythepathwayand

adverse effectofiodineingestion.

Reference:EPIP-14 Revision18,page4 Level of Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information

.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Ais incorrect.

The sodium chloride tabletswouldbeusedforthis

purpose.Itis plausibleifthe candidateisunsureofthe

purposeofKI tablets.B is incorrect.Onlythethyroidistheorganatrisk,butitisplausibleifthe

candidate assumes thatairborneingestionislimitedto

absorptionbythelungs.Cis correct.D is incorrect.Iodineisthe

element thatisabsorbed.

Potassium becomes a plausible answerduetorecentmedia

coverage regardinghealthrisksrelatedtolow

potassium levelsinthebloodstream.

(BROWNSFERRY

RADIOLOGICAL

CONTROL PROCEDURES

EPIP-14 3.6IssuingPotassiumIodide(KI)3.6.1IftheTSCRPManagerhasreasontobelievethataperson'sprojected

cumulativedosetothethyroidfrominhalationofradioactiveiodinemightexceed10rems(seeAppendixA),theexposedpersonshouldbestartedimmediatelyonadoseregimenofKI.Thisdecisionshallbe

immediatelycommunicatedtothe

SED.3.6.1.1IftheTSCisnotstaffedortheRP

Managerpositionhasnotbeenfilled,thenthesenioronsiteRP

SupervisorhastheauthoritytoissueKIutilizingthebasesdescribedinstep3.6.1.3.6.1.2TheinitialdoseofKIshouldbenotdelayedsincethyroidblockagerequires30to60minutes.AnyoneauthorizedtoinitiateKIshallbe

familiarwiththeFoodandDrug

Administration(FDA)patientpackageinsertandbesurethateachrecipientis

similarly informed.3.6.1.3PriortoissuingKItoanindividual

,thepersonshouldbeaskedifhe/sheisallergictoiodine

.IfthepersonindicatesapossiblesensitivitytoiodinetheyshouldnotbeissuedKI.

3.6.2KIisstoredintheplantRPsupplycageandtheREPVan

instrument

kits.3.6.3 RP normallywillnotdispensea

containerorpackageofKItoTVAPersonnelinvolvedinactivitiestosupporta

radiological

emergency.RP will howeverdispenseasingleindividualdoseofKItoteammembersdispatchedfromthe

OSC.3.6.4FollowthedosageoutlinedontheFDApatientpackageinsert(AppendixB)

.AcopyoftheFDAapprovedpatientpackageinsertshall

accompanytheissuanceofKI.IfKIisdistributedinindividualdosesthenverbalinstructionsofthe

significantinformationonthepatientpackageinsertbya

knowledgeableindividualissufficient.

3.6.5CompletetheKIIssueReport(AppendixC)or

documentonanRWPtimesheet

as appropriateforissuanceofKI.IftheRWPtimesheetisusedtodocument

distributionoftheKI ,notethetimeofKIdistributiononthebackofthetime

sheet.PAGE4OF9REVISION0018

((58.RO 600000AA 1.08 00 l/MEM/Tl GlIRSWl1600000AA1

.081IRO/SRO/I

1120107 RMSWhichONEofthefollowing

describes the appropriate

fire extinguishingagentforthe

specificclassof fire?A.WaterusedonClass"B"fires

.B."LowpressureCO

2usedonClass"C"fires.

C.DryChemical(PKP)usedonClass"c" fires.D.AqueousFilmFormingFoam(AFFF)usedonClass"A"fires.KIAStatement:600000PlantFire

On-siteI8AA1.08-Abilityto

operate and I or monitorthefollowingastheyapplytoPLANTFIREONSITE

Fire fighting equipmentusedoneachclassoffire

KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetoidentifythe

correctfirefightingagentfora

specificclassoffire.

References:TVASafetyManualLevelof Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information

.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

question correctly the candidate must determinethefollowing

1.Which flammable materialisofconcernbasedonFireClassA

, Band C.2.Which extinguishing

agent is appropriateforeachclassoffire.

3.Which extinguishing

agent is inappropriateforagivenclassoffire.Aisincorrect.Class"B"firesare

flammable liquids.Using watercouldcause

seriousdamagebyallowingtheliquidto

splatterandspread.Biscorrect.Cisincorrect.

Dry chemicalagentsare extremely corrosivetoelectrical

componentsandinsulationtypicalofClass"B" electrical

fires.Dis incorrect.AFFFis designedasafloodinganddilutingagentforClass"B" flammableliquidfires

.ApplicationonaClass"A"fireisnot

effective in extinguishing

flammable materialssuchaswoodand

paper.

59.RO29 5009AK2.01 OOl/C/A/TlG2/PR.INSTRl13/295009AK2

.0l/9619/RO

/SRO/ll/20/07

RMS G iventhefollow ingUnit1plantcond

itions:*Duetomult

iple h igh pressure injectionsystemfailures,1-EOI-C1, AlternateLevelControlhas

been entered.*RHRPump1Aisrunn

ingandl inedupforLPCI injection.*CoreSpray

Pumps 1 Band1Darerunningandlinedupfor

injection.*Drywell Temperature

is240 OFandrisingslowly

.WhichONEofthe

following conditions

descr ibes the appropriate

point where Emergency Depressurizationmaybe performed i n accordancewith1-EOI-C1, Alternate Level Control?Post AccidentFloodingRangelevel

instrument

3-L1-3-S2isread ing__incheswith reactor pressure at___ps ig.REFERENCES

PROVIDEDKIAStatement:29S009Low Reactor Water LevelI2 AK2.01-Knowledgeofthe

interrelations

between LOW REACTOR WATER LEVELandthefollow

ing: Reactor water level indication

KIA Justification:

Th is question sat isfiestheKIA statementbyrequ iring the candidatetousespecificplantcondit

ions to determine actual reactor water level under conditionsoflow reactor water level.References:

1-EOI-C1 Flowchart , PIP-9S-64Rev12Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This quest ionisratedas CIAduetotherequ

irement to assemble , sort , and integratethepartsofthe

question to predict an outcome.Th is requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeandits

meaningtopredict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED:1-EOI-C1Flowchart,PIP-95-64Rev12.

Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthisquestioncorrectlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.Recognizethe

requirementthatRPVlevelmustbelessthan-162inchesbefore

EmergencyDepressurizationis

appropriate

.2.RecognizethattheindicatedRPVlevelmustbecorrectedforpressureusingPIP-95-64.3.Recognizethattwoormoreinjectionsystemsmustbelinedupwithpumpsrunn

ingtomeettherequirementto

Emergency Depressurize.4.RecognizethatonlyoneRHRpumpisrequiredtoqualifyasaninjection

subsystemsinceeachRHRpumpisratedfor100%capacity.

NOTE: Each distractorisplausiblebecausetheconditionsspecifiedarepossiblegiventhecurrentplant

conditions

.Ais correct.Bis incorrect.Levelis5inchestoohighorpressureis100psigtoohigh.Cis incorrect.Levelis-4inchestoohighorpressureis240psigtoohigh

.Dis incorrect.Levelis-4inchestoohighorpressureis100psigtoohigh.

(-150" TAF-162"-175"....J W>W-200"....J 0 W....-c o-225 0 Z-250"-268" 3-LI-3-52&62 CORRECTION

CURVES--162"=TAF(REDLINE)-185"=MSCRWL (GREENLINE)-200"=MZIRWL (BLUELINE)-215"=TWO-THIRDSCOREHEIGHT (BLACK UNE)1\r-.l-o 1;0"" r\....t lJ r-.I'"I" t-II 1"-""""""'to-........J......o10020030040050060070080090010001100

REACTOR PRESSURE (PSIG)ACTUAL LEVEL-162"-185"-200"-215" PIP-95-64 REV.12

OPL171.003 Revis ion 17Page22of54

INSTRUCTOR

NOTESSincenotripsor

alarms are associatedwiththisrange

, thislevelsignalisnot

directedthroughthe

Analog Trip System.(d)OneMCR indicatoronPanel9-3

monitorsthisrangeoflevel

indication

.(4)Post-accident

Flood Range(a)-268"to+32"range

coveringactivecoreareaand

overlappingthelowerportionofthe

NormalControlRange

.(b)Referenced

to instrument

zero(c)Intendedforuseonly

under accident cond itions with reactorat0psigand

recirculation

pumps tripped.(d)Variablelegtapisfrom

diffuser ofjetpumps1and6(or11and16)

.(e)PerSafety

Analysis on water level instruments

the conclusionInjectingwithRHRisthatthe accident range L1-3-52and62 instruments

adequately

indicate (Accident Range)water level--providedtheyare Technical Support corrected for off-calibrationletterdated9/13/95

conditionsofRPV pressure(SeeLPFolder)utilizingthe

operatoraidonPanelUse

Conservative9-3forlevel

correction

.DecisionMaking

Obj.V.8.15.(f)An interlock associatedwiththis Obj.V.8.11.rangewill preventusingtheRHRSystemfor containment

de pressurizationwhenitis neededtofloodthecoreregion

.(g)The-68"to-168"portionofthisrangeis recordedintheMCRonUnit3 Recorder 2-L1-3-62 Recorderandtwo displaysascaleof indicators

monitorthefullrange+32"to-268

"ofthese instruments

.

E MINATION REFERENCE (PROVIDED TO CANDIDATE

, t liP:I if!!!I ,..." I I I..U l , I;h!I.II.I t l*I'1,1!oJ fuu I!II bi i f E I I i I II..'P*u*...o ar=...z o u...II>III..III=Z ar=III......ce'jl!11J I If.I til I..*I;!*i'I.I I e'II II ifi"'I I I i

II ,;iii!.I.."'".I I II!I*El*lt*E R Ii liB*I lid*i i!!.1111'P i 11!Ii!Ii*1*U

(-150" TAF-162"-175"....J w>w-200"....J 0 W'-<<o-225 0 Z-250"-268" 3-LI-3-52&62 CORRECTION

CURVES--162"=TAF(REDLINE)-185"=MSCRWL (GREENLINE)-200"=MZIRWL (BLUELINE)-215"=TWO-THIRDS

CORE HEIGHT (BLACK LINE),....,..i'o I"-......" 1-0\.'I"-"-1-0-r"I i"...., J..""" i".."" J"" ACTUAL LEVEL-162"-185"-200"-215" I o100 200300400 500 600 700 800 90010001100 REACTOR PRESSURE (PSIG)PIP-95-64 REV.12

60.RO 295012G2.2.22

00 l/C/A/Tl G2/64/12/2950

12G2.2.22/IRO/SRO/0606S

NEW6/28/2007Giventhefollowingplant

conditions

• YouaretheoncomingUnit3UnitSupervisor.*During turnover the onshift Unit Supervisorinformsyouthat2DrywellCoolershadbeensecuredduringhisshiftwhileperforminggroundisolationon3C480v

RMOV board.*DrywellAverage

Temperatureis152°Fandstable

.WhichONEofthefollowing

describes the appropriateconditionandrequired

action?A'!Exceeded3-SR-2, Instrument

ChecksandObservations,Drywell

temperature

limit.Address TechSpecsection3.6.

B.ExceededthenormaloperatingDrywell

temperaturelimit.Drywell

temperaturemustbeloggedhourlyuntilbelowthelimit.

C.ExceededthenormaloperatingDrywell

temperaturelimit.RestoreDrywellaverageair

temperaturebelowthelimitin24hours

.D.Exceeded3-EOI-2,Primary

ContainmentControlentrycondition

.Enterand execute 3-EOI-2, Primary Containment

Control.KIA Statement:295012HighDrywell

Temperature

15 2.2.22-Equipment Control Knowledgeoflimitingconditionsfor

operations

and safety limits KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine that Technical Specificationlimitshavebeen

exceeded.References:Unit3TechSpecsSection3.6.1.4

Level of Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble,sort,andintegratethepartsofthe

questiontopredictanoutcome.This

requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED:1-EOI-C1Flowchart, PIP-95-64Rev12.Plausibility

Analysis: (Inorderto answer this question correctly the candidate must determine the following: 1.The appropriate

entry conditionforU3TechSpecSection3.6.1.4.2.The appropriate

entry conditionfor3-EOI-2,Primary

Containment

Control.3.The appropriateactionbasedonthegivencondition.Aiscorrect.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheTechSpecIimtwas

exceeded, howevertherequiredactionistorestoretheOrywell

Temperaturewithinthelimitin8hours

.Thereisno requirementforhourlyloggingofOW temperature

.Cis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheTechSpeclimtwas

exceeded , howevertherequiredactionistorestoretheOrywell

Temperaturewithinthelimitin8hours

.The24hourlimitisbasedonperformingthesurveillanceonOrywell

Temperature

.o is incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheentry condition for 3-EOI-2isonly8 ofabovethegiven

temperature

.However,theentryconditionhasnotbeenmetandOW

temperaturewasreportedas"stable".

DrywellAirTemperature

3.6.1.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT

SYSTEMS3.6.1.4DrywellAir

TemperatureLCO3.6.1.4Drywellaverageairtemperatureshallbe

s 150°F.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.

ACTIONS CONDITIONREQUIREDACTION

COMPLETION

TIME A.DrywellaverageairA.1Restoredrywellaverage8hours

temperaturenotwithin air temperaturetowithin limit.limit.B.RequiredActionandB

.1BeinMODE3.12hours associated

CompletionTimenotmet.

ANDB.2BeinMODE4.36hoursBFN-UNIT3 3.6-17 AmendmentNo.212

(SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCEDrywellAir

Temperature

3.6.1.4 FREQUENCY (SR3.6.1.4.1

BFN-UNIT 3 Verifydrywellaverageair

temperature

iswithinlimit.

3.6-1824hours AmendmentNo.212

(61.RO 295015AKl.02

OOlIMEMlTlG2IBASISI1 295015AKl.02

///lll21107

RMS EOI-1 flowchart path RC/Q directs the operator to inhibittheADSautoblowdownfunctiononceStandbyLiquidControlinject

ionhasbegun.WhichONEofthe

following describeswhyADSisinh

ibited under these conditions?

A.ADSactuationwould

imposeasevere pressure and temperature

transientonthe reactor vessel.B.The operatorcancontrol

pressurebetterthanan

automaticsystemlikeADS.

C.otISeverecore

damagefromalargepower

excursioncouldresult

,iflow pressure systems automaticallyinjectedon

depressurization

.D.Ifonlysteamdrivenhigh

pressure injection systemsareavailableanADSactuationcouldleadtoalossof adequatecorecooling

.KIA Statement:

295015 Incomplete

SCRAM I 1 AK1.02-Knowledgeofthe

operat ional implica tions o fthefo llowing conceptsastheyapplyto

INCOMPLETE

SCRAM:(CFR41.8to41.10)Cooldown

effects on reactor power KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantcond itions to determine the effectofas ignificantcooldownwhenan

incompletescramhas occurred.References:

Level of Knowledge Justification:

Th isquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requiremen

ttoreca llorrecogn izediscreteb its of informat ion.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerth

is question correctly the candidate must determ inethefollowing:1.ThebasisforinhibitingADSunde rthespecific cond itionsofboron injection.NOTE:Eachofthethree

distractorsareplausiblebasedontheirrelationsh

iptothebasesfor

inhibitingADSunder circumstances

OTHERthanboron injection.Specifically

, AlternateRPVLevelControl

actions.Refertothe

attached excerptfromEOIPMSect

ion O-V-G.Ais incorrect.Thisappl ies wheneverADSactuates

, but isonlythe precursortotheissuerelatedtoboroninject

ion.Bis incorrect.

This statementistrue , but isnot addressed inthebas isforboron inject ion.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.

Th is statementappliesparticularlytoalowRPVlevelcondition.

I (EOIPROGRAMMANUAL

SECTION O-V-C STEP: RC/Q-14 and RC/Q-15EOI-1,RPV CONTROL BASES*EJlECUlE RC/Q-, 2"",0 RC/Q-22CONCVRRENllY

Re/Q-'1BORONINJ I S REQUIRED (£0 1-I.RC/P-8)L Re/Q-13'----r-e-----'L Rc/Q-14*INHlBIl NlS RC/Q-15 L----,-.JL VERIFY RWCU SYSTEI.I ISOLATION L RC/Q-1S WHILE EXECUTING THE FOLLOWING STEPS: 1£Ii:!lli SLC tNlK LVlDROPSTO c....3>.tRIPTHESLC PUMPS RC/Q-I7__-...-----...L 034*SECTION o-v-cPAGE116OF127REVISION1

EOI-1,RPV CONTROL BASES EOI PROGRAM MANUAL SECTiON o-v-c RC/Q-14 and RC/Q-15 STEP DISCUSSION:*1 1 The RC/Q-14actionstep

directs the operator to manually initiatetheSLCSystem

.Because thisstepis prioritizedwiththe miniature before decisionstepRClQ-12symbol,thisactionshould

be performed before suppression

pool temperaturereaches<A.64>,Boron

Injection Initiation

Temperature.

EOI Appendix3Aprovidesstep-by-stepguidancefor

manual initiationoftheSLCSystem.Boroninsolution

absorbs neutrons , providing negative reactivity

to achieve reactor subcriticality,sincethereactor

isnotyet subcritical

on control rod insertion alone.The RC/Q-15actionstep

directs the operatortodefeat automatic ADS function by placingtheADS inhibit switches in the inhibit position.Becausethisstepis

prioritizedwiththe miniaturebeforedecisionstep

RC/Q-12symbol,thisactionshould

be performedbeforesuppressionpool

temperature

reaches.<A.64>,BoronInjection

Initiation

Temperature

.ADS initiationmayresultintheinjectionoflargeamounts

ofrelativelycold, unboratedwaterfromlowpressureinjectionsystems.Withthe

reactorstillcriticalorsubcritica1onboron

,thepositivereactivity

additionduetoborondilutionand

temperature

reductionfrominjectionofcoldwatermayresultina

reactor power excursion largeenoughtocause

substantial

core damage.DefeatingADSis,therefore, appropriate

wheneverboroninjectionis

required.If emergency depressurizationoftheRPV is subsequently

required, explicit directionisprovidedintheappropriateEOLTherefore,theabilityto

maintain automatic initiation

capabilityofADSisnot

required.*(*REVISION1PAGE117OF127

SECTION O-V-C

EOI PROGRAM MANUALSECTIONO-V-G

STEP: Cl-l C1, ALTERNATE LEVEL CONTROL BASES.*I fOl-l RPv CbNTROL 1 RC/L-12*,......,." fH::#1 AMB iEN T TEMP MAYAffECTRPv WA TER LVl t: INDICATION

AND TREND i.,"'.....,"...-."....'.";'.L I INHIBIT ADS I L Cl**1 WH ILE EXECUT ING TH IS PROCEDURE: lE.I1::f.£.N

-..'.--AL L CONTROL RODS ARE l\lOI ExIT THIS

AND INSERTED TO Pc¥: BFYOND ENTER C5.LEVEL POWE R CONTROL POSITION<A.0>, RPV WATfRCMINQI[XIT THIS PROCEDURf AND BE DETERMINE , ENTER C4, RPV flOODING RPV WATERLV!.IS RISING.EXIT THIS PROCEDURE ANDLNT£R£01-1, RPV CONTROL, AT STEP RC/L-l CI-2 L**SECTIONO-V-GPAGE8OF50REVISION0

EOIPROGRAMMANUAL

.SECTION O-V-G.DISCUSSION:

STEP Cl-l cr,ALTERNATELEVEL

CONTROL BASES 1 1*Thisactionstepdirectstheoperatortodefeat

automatic ADS function.AnADSactuationwiththeRPVatpressureimposesaseverethermaltransientontheRPVandmay

significantly

complicateeffortstorestoreandmaintainRPVwaterlevelasspecifiedinthis

procedure..BecauseADSinitiationlogicreceiveslimitedinputsignals,avariety

of plant conditionsmayexist where automatic depressurizationoftheRPVisnot

appropriate

.Incertaincases(e.g.,RCIC

availablebutLPCI/CSinjectionvalvesclosedandcontrolpowerfortheiroperationnot

available)

ADS actuationmaydirectlyleadtolossof

adequatecorecoolingandcore

damage, conditionsthatmightotherwisehavebeen

avoided.Further, conditions

assumed inthedesignofADS

actuationlogic(e.g.,nooperatoractionforten

minutes)donotexistwhenactionsspecified

in this procedurearebeingcarriedout.

.*Finally,anoperatorcandrawonmuchmoreplant

informationthanisavailabletoADSlogic (e.g.,equipmentout

ofservicefor

maintenance, operatingexperiencewithcertain

systems, probabilityofrestoration

ofoffsitepower,etc.)andthuscanbetterjudge,basedonlogic

specifiedinthis procedure,whenandhowto

depressurizetheRPV.Forall

ofthesereasons,itis

appropriatetopreventautomaticinitiation

ofADSasspecified.

• REVISION0PAGE9OF50 SECTION O-V-G

62.RO 295020AK3.08 OOl/MEMlEOI/BASIS//295020AK3.08///l1/21/07

RMSUnit-2wasat100%rated

powerwhenaspuriousGroupIisolation

occurred.The pressure transientcausedasmallLOCAto

occurinsidethedrywell.EOI-2,sectionPC/Prequirescertain

actionsbeforeandafterreaching12psig

Suppression

Chamber pressure.Whichofthefollowingisthereasonthat12psiginthe

Suppression

Chamber was selected?A.Drywellspraysmustbeinitiatedpriortothispressureto

preventopeningthe

Suppression

ChambertoReactorBuilding

vacuum breakersandde-inertingthe

containment.

B.Abovethis pressure indicates that almostallofthenitrogenand

other non-condensiblegasesinthedrywellhavebeen

transferredtothetorussoinitiatingDrywellSprayswillnotresultin

containment

failure.C.oIAbovethis pressure indicates that almostallofthenitrogenand

other non-condensiblegasesinthedrywellhavebeen

transferredtothetorusandchuggingispossible

.D.Abovethis pressure indicates that almostallofthenitrogenandother

non-condensiblegasesinthetorushavebeen

transferredtothedrywellairspaceand

Suppression

ChamberSprayswillbe

ineffective

.KIA Statement:

295020 InadvertentCont.Isolation

I5&7AK3.08-Knowledgeofthe

reasonsforthefollowingresponsesastheyapplyto

INADVERTENT

CONTAINMENT

ISOLATION: Suppression

chamber pressure response KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the effect on Suppression

Chamber pressureduetoan inadvertent

containmentisolationandthebasisforthatresponse

.References:EOIPMSectionO-V-D

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognize

discretebitsof information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None j Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthis

question correctly the candidate must determinethefollowing

1.Thebasisforthe

Pressure SupressionPressureLimitof12psig

Suppression

Chamber pressure.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausiblebecauseinitiationofOWspraysathighSC

pressurecouldreducepressurelowenoughtoopentheSCtoRBvacuum

breakers.However ,thisispartofthebasesfortheOrywellSprayInitiation

PressureLimitCurve#5.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausiblebecauseinitiatingSCsprayswithhigh

temperature

non-condens

iblegasesintheSCwillresultin

evaporativecoolingandarapidpressuredrop.However,theSCtoOWvacuumreliefsystemis

capable of compensatingforthispressuredrop.Thisisalsopartofthebasesfor

the OrywellSprayInitiation

PressureLimitCurve#5

.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausibleiftheLOCA occurredinsidethe Suppression

ChamberandNOTtheOrywellasgiveninthestem

.

(EOIPROGRAM

MANUAL SECTION O-V-OSTEP:PC/P-6

.NO L YES L o INITIATE SUPPR CHMBR SPRAYS USII\C w..x RHR PUMPS WI REQI)RED TO ASSURE ADEOUA.TE CORE COOLING BY" COO11NlJ()J$

IN!(N)PX 17C)PC/P-5 EOI-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTROL BASES L*SUPPR CHI.4BR PRESS EXCEEDS<A.65>CONTINUE IN THIS PROCEDURE PC/P-6 L*i (SECTION O-V-O TO CURVE 5 (Refer to EOI Program"'onuotSection IV , Appendi.A.CurvesandTablesUsed

i n the EOls)PAGE42OF244

NO L NO L TO PC/P-llREVISION0*

EOI-2.PRIMARY

CONTAINMENTCONTROLBASES

EOI PROGRAM MANUAL SECTION o-v-n DISCUSSION:

STEP PCIP-6 1 1 This contingentactionstep

requires the operator to waituntilthe stated conditionhasbeenmet

before continuinginEOI-2.Performance

of subsequent

actionsinthis section ofEOI-2willnot be performed until suppression

chamber pressure exceeds Suppression

Chamber Spray Initiation

Pressure.Engineering

calculations

have determined

that if suppression

chamber pressure exceeds<A.65>, Suppression

Chamber Spray InitiationPressure,thereisno

assurance that chuggingwillbe prevented at downcomer openings ofthedrywellvents.This

value is rounded-o ffintheEOItousetheclosest,most

conservativevaluethatcanbe

accurately

determined

on available instrumentation.

• Suppression

Chamber Spray Initiation

Pressure is definedtobethe lowest suppression

chamber pressurethatcan occur when 95%of noncondensablesinthedrywell

have been transferred

to airspace of the suppression

chamber.Scalemodeltestshave

demonstrated

that chuggingwillnotoccursolongasthe

drywell atmosphere

containsatleast1%noncondensables.

To prevent the occurrence

of conditions

under which chuggingmayhappen, Suppression

Chamber Spray Initiation

Pressure is conservatively

defined by specifying

5%noncondensables

.Chuggingisthe cyclic condensation

ofsteamat downcomer openings of the drywell vents.Chugging occurs when steam bubbles collapseattheexit of downcomers.Therush of water thatfillsthevoid(some

of which is drawnupintothe downcomer pipe)induces a severe stressatthe junction of the downcomer and vent header.Repeated application

of this stresscancausethese

joints to experience

fatiguefailure(cracks),thereby

creating a pathway that bypasses the pressure suppression

function of primary containment.

Subsequent

steam that discharges

through downcomers

wouldthenexit through the fatiguedcracks,and

directly pressurize

suppression

chamberairspace, rather than dischargingtoand condensinginthe suppression

pool.Although operation of suppression

chamber sprays by itselfwillnot prevent chugging, the requirement

to wait to initiate drywell sprays until reaching Suppression

Chamber Spray Initiation

Pressure assures that suppression

chamber spray operation is attempted before operation ofdrywellsprays.

Therefore, actions to initiatedrywellsprays

needtobe directed only if suppression

chambersprayswere

unable to reduce primary containment

pressureorthey couldnotbeinitiated.

• REVISION0PAGE43OF244

SECTION O-V-O

EOI-2,PRIMARY

CONTAINMENTCONTROLBASES

EOI PROGRAM MANUAL SECTION O-V-O DISCUSSION:

STEP PCIP-8*IThis decisionstephastheoperatorevaluatethepresentstatus

ofdrywellpressureand

drywell temperaturetodetermineifconditionsare

favorablefordrywellsprayoperation.

Drywellsprayoperationreducesdrywellpressureand

temperaturethroughthecombinedeffects

of evaporativeandconvectivecooling.During

evaporativecooling,watersprayundergoesachangeofstate,liquidtovapor,whereas

convectivecoolinginvolvesnochange

of state.Evaporativecoolingoccurswhenwaterissprayedintoasuperheatedatmosphere.Wateratthesurfaceofeachdropletisheatedandflashestosteam,absorbingheatenergyfromthe

drywell atmosphereuntiltheatmospherereaches

saturated conditions.Inthedrywell,withatypical

drywell spray flowrate,theevaporativecoolingprocessresultsinanimmediate,rapid,large

reduction in pressure.Thispressurereductionoccursataratemuchfasterthancanbe

compensatedforbytheprimary

containmentvacuumreliefsystem.Unrestrictedoperation

of drywellsprayscouldcauseanexcessivenegative

differentialpressuretooccurbetweenthe

drywellandsuppressionchamber,largeenoughtocausealossofprimarycontainment

integrity.

• Convectivecoolingoccurswhenwaterissprayedintoasaturatedatmosphere

.Sprayedwater

dropletsabsorbheatfromthe

surrounding

atmospherethroughconvectiveheattransfer(sensibleheatfromtheatmosphereistransferredtothewater

droplets).Thiseffectreducesdrywell

ambient temperatureandpressureuntil

equilibriumconditionsareestablished.The

convectivecoolingprocessoccursataratemuchslowerthanthe

evaporativecoolingprocess.

An operator can effectivelycontrolthemagnitude

of a containment

temperature/pressurereductionfrom

convectivecoolingbyterminatingoperationofdrywell

sprays.Consideringthepressuredropconcerns

describedabove,engineeringcalculationshave

determinedthatprimarycontainmentintegrityisassuredwhendrywellspraysareoperatedinthesafeareaofDrywellSprayInitiationLimitCurve(Curve5).DrywellSprayInitiationLimitis

definedtobethehighestdrywell

temperatureatwhichinitiation

ofdrywellsprayswillnotresultinan evaporativecoolingpressuredroptobeloweither:1)

drywell-below-suppression

chamber differentialpressurecapability,or2)high

drywellpressurescramsetpoint, If drywell temperatureandpressurearewithinthesafearea

ofCurve5,theoperatorcontinuesat

Step PCIP-9.If drywell temperatureandpressurearenotwithinthesafearea

ofCurve5,thendrywellspray

operationisnotpermitted,andtheoperatoris

directedtoStepPCIP-l1.*REVISION0PAGE47OF244

SECTION O-V-D

c'63.RO295032EAl.OI

OOl/C/A/TlGI/E0I-3//295032EAl.Ol//RO/SR0/1l/20

/07 RMSGiventhefollow

ingplantcond itions:*Un it 2 experiencedaMSLbreakfromfull

power.*Both inboard and outboard MSIVsonthe"B"steamlinefailto

isolate however ,thereactor

scramsandallrods

insert.*SteamLeak

Detectionpanel9-21indicationsareasfollows

-2-TI-1-60A-2-TI-1-60B

-2-TI-1-60C-2-TI-1-60D

320°F 323°F 33rF 318°F (*Noother temperature

indicationsarealarmingatthistime

.WhichONEofthe

following describes the appropriate

operator actionsandthe reasonsforthose actions?REFERENCE PROVIDED A.Emergency depressurize

the reactorduetotwoEOI-3areasbeingaboveMaxSafe

.B.Rapidly depressurize

the reactorduetooneEOI-3areasaboveMaxSafeandoneareaapproachingMaxSafe

.c.';Enter2-EOI-1,RPVControlandin

itiate a ReactorScramduetooneEOI

-3areabeingaboveMax

Safe.D.Enter2-GOI-100-12A, Unit Shutdown and commenceanormal shutdown and cooldownduetoa primary system dscharging

outs ide Pr imary Containment.KIAStatement:295032High

Secondary Containment

Area Temperature/5EA1.01-Abilityto

operate and/or monitorthefollow ingastheyapplytoHIGH

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

AREA TEMPERATURE

Area temperature

monitoring

system KIA Justification:

Th is quest ion sat isfiestheKiA statementbyrequiring the candidatetousespec ificplantconditions to determ inetherequiredact

ionswhichresultfromhigh

secondary conta inment temperatures

as indicatedbyArea

Temperature

Monitoringinstrumentation.

References:

2-EOI-3 Flowchart ,EOIPMSect ion O-V-ELevelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirement

to assemble , sort , and integratethepartsofthe

questiontopred ict an outcome.Th is requ ires mentally us ing thisknowledgeandits

meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

((REFERENCE PROVIDED: 2-EOI-3 Flowchart Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.Whicharea(s)areaboveor

approachingMaxSafe 2.BasedonItem#1above, determine the appropriateactionandthebasisforthataction

.Aisincorrect.Thisis plausible becauseallfour temperaturesprovidedare

greaterthan3150FasindicatedonTable3.However,onlyone

indicatorappliestoanEOI3area, thereforeonlyONEareaisaboveMaxSafe.Bisincorrect.ThisisplausiblebecauseoneareaisaboveMaxSafeandgiven

conditionsindicateanun-isolableleakexistswhich

implies conditionsaredegrading.However,withno

other temeratureindicationsinalarm, anticipating

the requirement

to Emergency DepressurizeisNOTppropriate.Ciscorrect.Dis incorrect.Thisisplausible

becauseallfour temperaturesprovidedare

greaterthan3150FasindicatedonTable3.However,onlyone

indicatorappliestoanEOI3area, thereforeonlyONEareaisaboveMaxSafe

.Inaddition,thisstepisonlyaddressedif

Emergency Depressurizationwillnotreducethedischargeinto

Secondary Containment.Inthiscase,itwould

.

EOI-3, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

CONTROL BASES EOI PROGRAM MANUALSECTIONO-V-E

ENTRY CONDITIONS:

EOI-3 DISCUSSION:

• ----IEntryconditionsforthis

procedure are symptomatic

ofconditionswhich,ifnot

corrected,coulddegradeintoanemergency.Adverseaffectsonequipmentoperabilityandconditionsthat

directly challenge secondary containmentintegritywere

specifically

consideredintheselection

oftheseentry

conditions

.Followingisadescriptionofeachentrycondition:

Area temperature

above the maximum normal operating value of Table 3Asecondary

containment

area temperatureabovethemaximum

normal operating value ofTable3,SecondaryContainmentArea

Temperature,isanindicationthatsteamfromaprimarysystemmaybe

discharging

intosecondarycontainment.As

temperaturescontinuetoincrease,continued

operability

of equipmentneededtocarryoutEOIactionsmaybe

compromised.Highareatemperaturesalsopresentadangerto

personnelsinceaccessto

secondary containmentmayberequiredbyactionsspecifiedbyEOls.

Maximum normal operating temperatureisdefinedtobethehighestvalue

of a secondary containment

areatemperatureexpectedtooccurduring

normalplantoperatingconditionswithalldirectlyassociatedsupportandcontrolsystems

functioning

properly.Differential

pressure at or above<A.38>inchesof

water*Highsecondary

containmentdifferentialpressureisindicative

ofapotentialloss

of secondary containmentstructuralintegrity,andcouldresultinuncontrolledrelease

of radioactivitytothe environment.

Reactor Zone Ventilation

exhaust radiation level above<A.39>HighReactorZoneVentilationexhaustradiationlevelsmayind

icate that radioactivityisbeingreleasedtotheenvironmentwhenthesystemshouldhave

automatically

isolated.RefuelZone

Ventilation

exhaust radiation level above<A.40>HighRefuelZoneVentilationexhaustradiationlevelsmayindicate

radioactivityisbeingreleasedtotheenvironmentwhenthesystemshouldhave

automatically

isolated.Floor drain sump water levcl above<A.41>Asecondary

containmentfloordrainsumpwaterlevelabovemaximum

normal operatinglevelisanindicationthatsteamorwatermaybe

discharging

into secondary containment.

Maximum normal operatingfloordrainsumpwaterlevelisdefinedtobethe

highestvalueof secondarycontainmentfloordrainsumpwaterlevelexpectedtooccurduringnormalplant

operating conditionswithalldirectlyassociated

supportandcontrolsystemsfunctioningproperly.

Area watcr level above<A.42>*Secondary containmentareawaterlevelabovemaximumnormaloperatinglevelisanindicationthatsteamorwatermaybedischarginginto

secondary containment.Maximumnormal

operating secondary containmentareawaterlevelisdefinedtobethehighestvalueofsecondarycontainmentareawaterlevelexpectedtooccurduring

normalplantoperating

conditionswithalldirectlyassociatedsupportandcontrolsystemsfunctioningproperly.REVISION1PAGE9OF73 SECTION O-V-E.............._._----------------------------_

....

EOI PROGRAM MANUAL SECTION O-V-E scrr-6 and SCrr-7 DISCUSSION:

EOI-3, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

CONTROL BASES el 1 (Step SCrr-6isabeforedecisionstepthathasthe

operatorevaluatecurrentandfutureeffortstolowersecondarycontainmentarea

temperatures,inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrend

of secondary containment

areatemperatures,todetermineifareactorscramisnecessary.Thebeforedecisionsteprequiresthatthisdeterminationandsubsequentactionsbe

performedbeforeanysecondary

containment

area temperaturereachesitsrespectivemaximumsafeoperating

temperaturevalueprovidedinTable3.Maximumsafeoperating

temperatureisdefinedtobethehighest

temperatureatwhichneither:I)

equipmentnecessaryforthesafeshutdown

oftheplantwillfail,nor2)personnelaccess

necessaryforsafe shutdown of theplantwillbeprevented.Themaximumsafeoperatingtemperaturevalueforall

secondary containmentareasisprovidedinTable3, Secondary ContainmentAreaTemperature.Thisstepisreachedonlywhen

additionalactionshavebeenrequiredtoreversean

increasing

secondarycontainmentarea

temperature

trend.Ifall secondary containment

area temperaturescanbe maintainedbelowtheirrespectivemaximumsafe

operatingvalues,the

operatorreturnstoStep

SCrr*I.Ifit is determinedthatall secondary containment

area temperaturescannotbemaintainedbelowtheir

respective

maximumsafeoperatingvalues,the

operator continuesatStep scrr-7.*Step SCrr-7 isanenterandexecute

concurrentlystepthatrequiresthe

operator to enter EOI-I,RPVControl,atStepRC-I

,andtoperformtheactions

concurrentlywiththis procedure.Becausethisstepisprioritizedwiththemin

iaturebeforedecisionstepsymbolrelatingto

SCrr-6,thisactionshouldbeperformedbeforeanysecondaryconta

inment area temperaturereachesitsrespective

maximum safe operatingvalue.Initiationofreactorscram(Step

RC-I)beforeanysecondary

containment

area temperaturereachesitsrespectivemaximumsafe

operatingvaluemayhalttheincreaseinsecondary

containment

area temperature(s)

,sincetheRPVistheonly significant

source ofheat,otherthanafire,thatcouldcausesecondary

containment

area temperatures

toexceedtheirrespectivemax

imumsafeoperatingvalues.

• REVISION1 PAGE27OF73 SECTION O-V-E

TABLE 3 SECONDARY CNTMT AREA TEMP

PAN EL 9-21 MAX MAX POTENTi6,L

AREA AlARM WINDOW TEMP EleMENT NORMA\.SI.,FE ISOlATION (UNLESS NOTED)(UNLESS NOTED)VALUE of VALUE of SOURCES RHRSYSI PUMPS XA-6!>-36-4

74-95.1., A\..I.,RMED

160 FCV-7447,48

RHRSYSII PUMPS X6,-65-3E-4

74-958 ALARMED 210 FC\L1441,48

HPCIROQM X"I-65-3F-l0 73-65.1., ALI.,RMED 270 FCV-73-2 , 3,44, 81 CS SVSI PU MPS XA-.55-30-10

11-41A ALARME D 190 FCV-1'-2, 3.39 RCICRooM CSSYSIlPUMPS

X4-.55-3E-29

7lH>9B

ALARME D 150 NONE X6,-.55-3D-10

71041S,C , D AlARMED 200 FC\L1'-2,3

TO?OFTORUS X6,-55-3F-10 73-55B.C ,D Al.6,RME D 240 FCV-13-2, 3, 81 XA-65-3E-4

74-9SG, H AlARMED 240 FCV-1404i.48

STEAM TUNNEL (RB)XA-.5!:--3D-24

1-00.4 (PANEL9-3)

Al.A,RMED 3 15 MSIVa FCV-71-2, 3, FCV-'S9-1, 2, 12 QWACCESS X4-55-3E-4

74-95E Al.6,RMED 170 FC\L74047.48

R8 EL565W X4-55-.5B-32 (PANEL 9-5)69-S3SA.B ,C.D ALARMED 170 2 , 12 (RWCU PIPE TRENCH)XI.,-.55-.5B-33 (PANEL 9-5){AUXINST ROOM}ALARMED RWCU H.X.ROOM X4-5'".>-3D-t1

G9-29F ,G , H AL4.RMED 220

2, 1 2 RWCUPUMPA X4.-.55-3D

-17 G9-29D ALARMED 2 15 FCV-&.:!-1

.2.12

XA-55-3D-17

G9-29E ALARMED 2 15 FCV.(;'9-1

, 2.12 RBE L593 X4-.55-3E-4

7 4-95C, D Al.6,RMED 195 FCV-14047,48

RBEL621 XI.,-.55-3E-4

74-95 F ALl.,RMED 155 FCV-43-13 , 1 4/"""'\

...J.J...J I:l...J!..i'......Ii SIC.all..Il.!I UI:)o\!.l.!J I m*..i'"

L...WHILE EXECUTING THE FOLLOWING STEPS: IF THEN EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION

IS ANTICIPATED

AND RAPIDLY DEPRESSURIZETHERPVWITHTHEMAINTURBBYPASSVLVs

THE REACTOR WILL REMAIN SUBCRITICA,L

IRRESPECTIVE

OF COOLDOWN RATE WITHOUT BORON UNDER ALL CONDITIONS(SEENOTE)RCIP-3)--

E MINATION*REFERENCE PROVIDED TO (CANDIDATE

il"u3 i!I=I J j.C")*-o w (If)*-fa

i l'W-l-\++-t+tT1 S IU': "'H.++-t+t l i ll*.."!i i I H II'[n'*11: 1'..l i t!II!!!l II.!Ii!.i:1*.ill i li II!iit 11 I I I itI ilillIiI fl.1 III I II:I.111"1*I'II*II I,,, t*LI C")*-o w

64.RO295033EA2.01

OOl/C/A/TlG2/SC/R//295033EA2

.0l//RO/SR0/1l/20/07

RMSGiventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Unit-2isat100%ratedpower.*ARWCU drain line crackedandisspillingintothe

Reactor Building.*Area Radiation Monitorsinthe ReactorBuildingreadas

follows: ReactorBuildingElevation593

ReactorBuildingElevation565

West ReactorBuildingElevation565East

ReactorBuildingElevation565

Northeast All other ReactorBuildingareasRWCUhasbeen

successfully

isolated 1100 mR/hr 800 mR/hr 850 mR/hr 1050 mR/hr NOT ALARMEDWhichONEofthe

following describestherequiredactionthat

MUST be directedbytheUnit Supervisorand/orShift

Manager?REFERENCE PROVIDED A.Enter2-EOI-1,RPV

Controlandinitiatea

ReactorScramduetotwoEOI-3areasbeingaboveMax

Safe.B.oI Enter 2-GOI-100-12A, Unit Shutdown and commenceanormal shutdown and cooldownduetotwoareasaboveMaxSafewiththesourceoftheleakisolated

.C.Scramthe reactor and Emergency depressurize

the reactorduetotwoEOI-3areasbeingaboveMaxSafe.D.Rapidly depressurize

the reactorwithBypass

Valvesdueto Emergency Depressurization

being anticipated

.KIA Statement:295033High

Secondarv Containment

AreaRadiationLevels/9

EA2.01-Abilityto

determine and/or interpretthefollowingastheyapplytoHIGH

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

AREA RADIATION LEVELS:Arearadiationlevels

KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecific

plant conditions

to determinetherequiredactionswhichresultfromh

igh secondary containment

radiationlevelsas indicated by Area Radiation Monitoring

instrumentation.

References:

2-EOI-3 FlowchartLevelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemble, sort , and integratethepartsofthe

question to predict an outcome.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeandits

meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

(REFERENCE PROVIDED: 2-EOI-3 Flowchart Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answer this question correctly the candidate must determine the following: 1.Whicharea(s)areaboveorapproachin,gMaxSafe

2.BasedonItem#1above, determine the appropriate

action.Aisincorrect.Thisis plausible becausethisactionrequiresatleastonearea

greaterthanMaxSafe

.However,thisisnot

appropriatesincethesourceoftheleakis

isolated.Biscorrect.Cis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausethisactionrequirestwoareas

greaterthanMaxSafe.However,thisisnot appropriatesincethe sourceoftheleakisisolated

.Disincorrect.Thisis plausible becausethisactionrequiresatleastonearea

greaterthanMaxSafeand

another area approachingMaxSafe.However,thisisnot appropriate

since the sourceoftheleakis

isolated.

TABLE 4-SECONDARYCNTMTAREA RADIATION APPUCABLE MAX MAX P01ENTIAL AREA RADIATION NORMAL SAFE ISOLATION INDICATORS

VALUEMRlHR

VALUEMR/HR

SOURCES RHR SYS J PUMPS 9o-2!iA ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-41*.1a RHR SYS II PUMPS 9O-2M ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-41*.1a HPClROOM 9O-2AA AlARMED 1000

CSSYS I PUMPS 9O-26A ALAfUAED 1000

RClCROOM CS SYS II PUMPS<X>-27A ALARMED 1000 NONE TQPOFTORUS

FCV-13-2.3.81 ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-47.48

GENERAL AREA FCV-71-Z,3

RBEI.$5W ALARMED 1000

SDVVENfS&DRAINS RBEl.56SE ALARMED 1000 SDVVENfS 8;DRAINS RBEI.!05NE AlARMED 1000 NONE TIPROOM ALARMED 100.000 TIP 8All VALVE R8E1.593

ALARMED 1@FCV-74-47.48

R8 El.G21 9O-9A ALARMED 1000 FCV-43-13, 14 RECIRC tAG SETS 00-4A ALARMED 1000 NONE REFUEl.FLOOR 00-1A.2A.3A AI.A.QMED 1000 NONE

NO L L L\_..**....'.;'/.'.'.'...".....SC/M NO L L l0 ,,I'............................................_\.'..\<<,,#..'.'I'..-...'*1" YES L SC/R-4

\....L L_._-.___._--\L WHEN AADlATJONlVlslN20R

MOREAAEAS--AAEA80VE MAX SAFE{rABLE4}ll1EN CONnNUE SClR-7EMERGENCYRPV

DEPRESSURIZAnONISREQUIRED

{EOI-1, RClN;C1-2;C1-21;C5-1)SCJR-8

L.,WHILE EXECUTING THE FOLLOWING STEPS: IF THEN EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION

IS ANTICIPATED

AND RAPIDL Y DEPRESSURIZE

THE RPVWITHTHEMAIN

TURB BYPASS VLVs.THE REACTOR WILL REMAIN SUBCRITICAL

IRRESPECTIVE

OF COOLDOWN RATE WITHOUT BORON UNDER ALL CONDITIONS (SEE NOTE)

E MINATION REFERENCE PROVIDED TO (CANDIDATE

(C"')*-o III (If)*-rl o W J 1 1HT-tTTi":rn I il'ltTt1lnTTm

S*" iII!U IJ.I l.:!**;.II!*-*IIIIII i il1 r 0'UII!liil ll i II j"I II ill II_'Sj.iIillII Ii!f I I 1.._.!I!'","I*I tlPI*1.1*1 (If)*-o II

65.RO 295035EA2.02 OOl/C/A/EOI/EOI-

3/S85/29503

5EA2.02//RO/SRO

/Giventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Unit2isat100%power.*Dur ing the backwashofaRWCU demineralizerthebackwashreceiv

ingtankruptured

.*TheRWCU systemhasbeenisolated.

• Secondary containment

conditionsareasfollows

-All ReactorandRefuelZoneradiation

monitorstriponh igh radiation.-ONLYSGTtrain

"C"canbestarted.

-I t i s operat ingat10000scfmandtakingsuct

ionontherefueland

reactor zones.-Refuelzonepressure

-Reactorzonepressure

-AREA RADIATION LEVELSRBEL565W ,565E ,565NE:RBEL593RBEL621-0.12inchesof

water.+0.02inchesofwater.

250 mr/hr upscale upscale Wh ichONEofthefollowing

describestherequ iredactionandthetypeof

radioactive releaseinprogress?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.Initiateashutdownper2-GOI-100-12A.Elevatedradiation release.Init iateashutdownper2-GOI-100-12AGroundlevelradiationrelease

.C.Scramthe reactor , emergency depressur izetheRPV.Elevatedradiationrelease

.D.Scramthe reactor , emergency depressurizetheRPV.Groundlevelradiationrelease

.KIAStatement:295035Secondary

Containment

High Differential

Pressure EA2.02-Abilityto determine and/or interpretthefollow ingastheyapplyto

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

HIGH DIFFERENTIAL

PRESSURE:Off-sitereleaserate:

Plant-Specific

KIA Justification:

This question sat isfiestheKIA statementbyrequir ingthecand idatetocorrectly

ident ifythetypeof off-site releaseandrequiredact

ionsduetohigh differential

pressure inthesecondary

containment.

References:

2-EOI-3 FlowchartLevelof Knowledge Justification:

Th is quest ionisratedasCIAduetotherequ

irementtoassemble

,sort,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontosolveaproblem

.Th is requ ires mentallyusingth isknowledgeand

itsmeaningtoresolvetheproblem

.0610NRCE xam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: 2-EOI-3 flowchart Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.Whicharea(s)areaboveor

approachingMaxSafe2.BasedonItem#1above, determinetheappropriateaction

.3.Whether plant conditions

indicateanelevatedorgroundlevelrelease

.NOTE: EOI-3stepsSC/R-8andSC/R-9apply,requiring

shutdown per 2-GOI-100-12Abecause2ormoreareasareabovemaxsaferadlevelsbutaprimarysystemisnot

dischargingtotheRB.InsufficientRBtoatmospheredp (greaterthan-0.25inchesofwater)

indicateslossof secondary containment

integrity.Thepositive

reactor zone pressureiscausingan

unmonitored

and uncontrolledgroundlevelreleaseof radioactive

contaminants

.Aisincorrect.ThereleasefromtheReactorBuildingisnotelevated

.Thisis plausiblebecausetherequiredactionsare

correct exceptthedifferentialpressureresultsinagroundlevelrelease

.Biscorrect.Cisincorrect.

Conditionsdonot warrantascramatthispoint.Inaddition,thereleasefromtheReactorBuildingisnotelevated

.Thisis plausibleifthecandidatefailsto

recognizethataprimarysystemisnotdischargingtothe

Reactor Building.Disincorrect.

Conditionsdonot warrantascramatthispoint.Thisis

plausibleifthecandidatefailstorecognizethataprimary

systemisnotdischargingtothe

Reactor Building.

TABLE 4-SECONDARY CNTMT AREA RADIATION APPLICABLE

MAX MAX POTENTIAL AREA RADIATION NORMAL SAFE ISOLATION INDICATORS

VALUEMR/HR

VALUEMRIHR

SOURCES RHR SYS I PUMPSALARMED 1000 FCV-74-47.48

RHR SYS II PU}.1PS gO-2M ALARt.1ED 1000 FCV-14-47.48

HPCIROOM 9O-2AA ALARMED 1000 FCV-73-2.44.81 CSSYS I PUMPS 9O-2GA AlARMED 100039 RCICROOM CS SYS II PUMPS 9O-27A ALARMED 1000 NONE TOPOFTORUS FCV-73-2.3

, 81 9O-29A AlARMED 1000 FCV-74-41.

48 GENERAL AREA FCV-11-2 ,3 RBEl&S5W 9O-2OA AlARt.IED 1000

SOVVENrS&.DRAINS RB El!i65 E 90-21 A AlARMED 1000 SOVVENrS 8.DRAINS RBEl!i65 NE 9O-23A AlARMED 1000 NONE TIP ROOM 9O-22A AlARMED 100.000 nPBAtt VALVE RBEl593 90-13A., 14A AlARMED 1 00:>FCV-14-47.48 RBEl621 9O-9A AlARMED 1 00:>FCV-43-13.14

RECIRC MG SETS 9iJ.4A AlARMED 1000 NONE REFUel A.OOR 9O-1A.2A, 3A AlARMED 1 (XX)NONE

ISOIoATe&.SYSTEMS

THAT ARE DISCHARGING

INTO THE AREA EXCEPT SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO;*8EOPEAAlEO

8YEO's QR..SUPPRESS A FIRE L SCIR-3 NO L L\,..:/.'./.'"*....*/.SCfR-9 L (0/'.............................................\.,.-".'/,..".-." I J"<<,r,ff YES L SCIRr4

f)\NO L L L 80M L.__---_._--_

_.__\L VllHEN RADIATION LVls IN:2 OR MORE AREAS AREABOVE MAX SAFE{TABLE 4)D:!.Sti CONl1NUE SCJR-7EMERGENCYRPV

DEPRESSURlZAll0N

IS REQUIRED (EOI-1, RClP-4: C1-2;C1-21;C5-1)L SCIR-8

E MINATION REFERENCE..PROVIDED TO CANDIDATE

CW)J*-I ri....0 f (W..m*:!e , i!J ii II!I ih II III.1 11 1 111III I I I: IIII 1 I i i'Ill!I!II!!I III Ht>I 1 m I IIII i J j: I., I I d 111lfl!!!mll J..!I t ell!t***iII il , I C")*-o III CW)*-o w J 11$'iii'nl I'a_t Ill!l!l!.!*I.i'I.iP II 1 Ii Ii.'Ii-I If 1.1 II Iii IiiIillII I I I Ir II,..III II",I.J 1;1;

(66.ROGENERIC2

.1.33 OOl/C/A/T3///GENERIC

2.1.33//RO/SRO/ll/25/07

RMSWhichONEofthe

following describes the protective

function(s)requiredtobe

Operableforthespecifiedmodeand/or

condition?

A.StartingupinMode2withIRM'sonrange1to2

IRMHiScramfunction

BPWS RBMAPRMHi (setdown-15%).B.StartingupinMode2withAPRM

downscales

clear:APRMHi (setdown-15%)APRMHi(120%)Modeswitch-

Shutdown position RWM.C'!"ShuttingdowninMode2withIRM'sonrange1to2

IRMHiScramfunct

ion BPWSManualScrampushbuttons

RWM.D.ShuttingdowninMode2withaverageSRMreadingsat

-5x101 cps:IRMHiScramfunctionAPRMHi (setdown-15%)OPRMupscaletrip

RWM.KIA Statement:Conductof Operations2.1.33Abilityto

recognize indicationsforsystemoperating

parameterswhichare entry-levelconditionsfor

technical specifications

KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determinewhenentryinto

Technical Specificationsisrequired

.References:

Technical Specifications

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemble,sort,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.This

requires mentallyusingthisknowledqeandits

meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

(REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

question correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:1.TechSpecapplicab

ilityforthelisted

systemswiththegivenplantcondition.

NOTE: The distractorsareallplaus

ibesinceonlyonesystemorfunctionis

incorrectineachdistractor

.Aisincorrect.TheRBMisnotrequireduntil>27%ratedpower

.Sis incorrect.TheAPRMHi(120%)isnotrequireduntilMode1Ciscorrect.Disincorrect.

the OPRMsarenotrequireduntilMode1and>25%rated

power.

ControlRodBlock

Instrumentation

3.3.2.1Table3.3.2.1-1(page1of1)ControlRodBlockInstrumentation

FUNCTION APPLICABLEMODESOR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE

ALLOWABLE REQUIREMENTS

VALUE 1.RodBlockMonitor

a.LowPowerRange-Upscale (a)2 b.IntermediatePowerRange-Upscale (b)2 c.HighPowerRange-Upscale (f),(g)2d.Inop (g),(h)2e.Downscale (g),(h)2 2.RodWorthMinimizer1(c),2(c)SR3.3.2.1.1 (e)SR3.3.2.1.4SR3.3.2.1.8SR3.3.2.1.1 (e)SR3.3.2.1.4SR3.3.2.1.8SR3.3.2.1.1 (e)SR3.3.2.1.4SR3.3.2.1.8SR3.3.2.1.1 NASR3.3.2.1.1 (i)SR3.3.2.1.4SR3.3.2.1.2 NASR3.3.2.1.3SR3.3.2.1.5SR3.3.2.1.7 3.ReactorModeSwitch

-ShutdownPosition (d)2SR3.3.2.1.6 NA (a)THERMAL POWER27%ands62%RTPandMCPRlessthanthevaluespecifiedintheCOLR.(b)THERMAL

POWER>62%and s82%RTPandMCPRlessthanthevaluespec

ifiedintheCOLR.(c)With THERMAL POWER s10%RTP.(d)Reactormodeswitchintheshutdownposit

ion.(e)LessthanorequaltotheAllowableValuespecifiedintheCOLR.(f)THERMAL

POWER>82%and<90%RTPandMCPRlessthanthevaluespecified

intheCOLR.(g)THERMALPOWER90%RTPandMCPRlessthanthevaluespecifiedintheCOLR.(h)THERMALPOWER27%and<90%RTPandMCPRlessthanthevaluespecifiedintheCOLR.(i)GreaterthanorequaltotheAllowableValuespecifiedintheCOLR.

(BFN-UNIT1 3.3-20 Amendment No.2-M,262 September 27 , 2006

RPS Instrumentation

3.3.1.1Table3.3.1.1-1(page1of3)

ReactorProtectionSystem

Instrumentation

FUNCTION APPLICABLE

MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

REQUIRED CHANNELSPERTRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS

REFERENCED

FROM REQUIRED ACTION 0.1 SURVEILLANCE

ALLOWABLE REQUIREMENTS

VALUE 1.IntermediateRangeMonitors

a.NeutronFlux-High

2 3 GSR3.3.1.1.1 s 120/125SR3.3.1.1.3 divis ionsoffullSR3.3.1.1.5 scaleSR3.3.1.1.6SR3.3.1.1.9SR3.3.1.1.14 5(a)3 HSR3.3.1.1.1120/125SR3.3.1.1.4 d ivisionsoffullSR3.3.1.1.9 scaleSR3.3.1.1.14 b.Inop 2 3 GSR3.3.1.1.3 NASR3.3.1.1.14 5(a)3 H SR 3.3.1.1.4 NASR3.3.1.1.14 2.AveragePowerRangeMon

itors a.NeutronFlux

• H igh , 2 3(b)GSR3.3.1.1.115%RTP SetdownSR3.3.1.1.6SR3.3.1.1.7SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.16 b.FlowB iased Simulated 3(b)FSR3.3.1.1.1 s 0.66 W Therma l Power-HighSR3.3.1.1.2+66%RTPSR3.3.1.1.7ands120%SR3.3.1.1.13 RTP(c)SR3.3.1.1.16 c.NeutronFlux-High

3(b)FSR3.3.1.1.1120%RTPSR3.3.1.1.2SR3.3.1.1.7SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.16 (cont inued)(a)Withanycontrolrod

withdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuel

assemblies

.(b)EachAPRM channel provides inputstobothtripsystems.(c)[0.66 W+66%-0.66 t>W]RTPwhenresetforsingleloopoperationperLCO3.4.1,"RecirculationLoopsOperating

BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-6 Amendment No.236 , 262 , 269March06 , 2007

(RPS Instrumentat

ion 3.3.1.1Table3.3.1.1-1(page2of3)ReactorProtectionSystemInstrumentation

FUNCTION 2.AveragePowerRangeMonitors(continued)

d.Inop e.2-0ut-Of-4

Voter f.OPRMUpscale

3.ReactorVesselSteamDomePressure-High(d)4.ReactorVesse

lWaterLevel

Low , LeveI3(d)5.MainSteamIsolationValveClosure 6.DrywellPressure-High

7.ScramD ischarge VolumeWaterLevel-High

APPLICABLEMODESOR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

1,2 1,2 1 ,2 1 , 2 1,2 REQUIRED CHANNELSPERTRIP SYSTEM 2 2 8 2 CONDITIONS

REFERENCED

FROM REQUIRED ACT ION D.1 G G G G F G SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.1.16SR3.3.1.1.1SR3.3.1.1.14SR3.3.1.1.16SR3.3.1.1.1SR3.3.1.1.7SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.16SR3.3.1.1.17SR3.3.1.1.1SR3.3.1.1.8SR3.3.1.1.10SR3.3.1.1.14SR3.3.1.1.1SR3.3.1.1.8SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.14SR3.3.1.1.8SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.14SR3.3.1.1.8SR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.14 ALLOWABLE VALUE NA NA NA:S1090psig528inchesabovevessel

zero:S10%closed:s 2.5 psiga.ResistanceTemperature

Detector 1 ,2 2 GSR3.3.1.1.8 s50gallonsSR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.14 5(a)2 HSR3.3.1.1.8 s50gallonsSR3.3.1.1.13SR3.3.1.1.14 (continued)(a)'Mthanycontrolrod

withdrawnfromacorecellcontainingoneormorefuelassemb

lies.(b)EachAPRMchanne

l provides inputstobothtripsystems

.(d)Duringinstrumentcalibrat

ions ,iftheAsFoundchanne

l setpo int isconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValuebutouts

ideitsacceptableAsFoundbandasdefinedby

its assoda ted Surve illance Requ irementprocedure,thenthereshallbean

initialdeterminationtoensureconfidencetha

tthechanne lcanperformasrequired befo re retumingthechanne ltoserviceinaccordancewiththeSurveillance.IftheAsFound

instrumentchanne

l setpoint isnot conservat ivewithrespecttothe

Allowable Value ,thechannelshallbe

deda red inoperable.Priortoretumingachanneltoservice

, the instrumentchannelsetpo

int shall becalibratedtoavaluethatisw

ithintheacceptableAsLefttoleranceofthe

setpoint;otherwise,thechannelshallbe

dedared inoperable.Thenom inalTripSetpo intshallbe spedfiedondesignoutputdocumentat

ion whichi s incorporatedbyreferenceintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalys

isReport.The

methodologyusedto determinethenomi nal T ripSetpoint,thepredefinedAsFound

Tolerance ,andtheAsLeftToleranceband

,andalistingofthesetpo

int des ign output documentation

sha ll be spedfiedinChapter7oftheUpdatedF

inalSafetyAnalysisReport

.BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-7 Amendment No.269234,262,259,257,258

, 266 March 06, 2007

67.RO GENERIC 2.1.1600 IIMEM/T3//B17/G 2.1.16///ONEofthefollow

ing announcements

isan INAPPROPRIATEuseofthePlantPagingSystemin

Iaccordancew

ith OPDP-1 ,ConductofOperations

?(A.ThereisafireintheUnit-2ShutdownBoardRoom

.Irepeat.Thereisafire

intheUnit-2ShutdownBoardRoom.B.Operationswillbestartingthe2AlphaRHRpump

.C.Shift Managerdial2391.Shift

Managerdial2391 D."Thisisadrill

.AllpersonnelevacuatetheUnit2ReactorBuildingduetoh

igh radiation.KIA Statement:Conductof Operations

2.1.16Abilitytooperateplantphone

,pagingsystem

,andtwo-wayrad

io KIA Justification:ThisquestionsatisfiestheKiA

statementbyrequiringthecandidatetodemonstratespecificknowledgeoftheuseofthePlantPagingSystemwhile

communicating

w ithplantpersonnel.

References:

OPDP-1 Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMdue

tothereq uirement to recallorrecognized

iscretebitsofinformation

.0610NRCExamREFERENCEPROVIDED: No ne Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestioncorrectlythecandidatemustdeterm

inethefollow ing: 1.Therequirements

associated

w ithmakingPage

AnnouncementsperOPDP-1.2.Whether the announcementmeetsthoserequirementsAis incorrect.Thisisplausiblebecauseitisanexpected

announcementduringafire

.Bis incorrect.Thisisplausiblesincethepageisnot

repeated.However , repeat ingpagesforano

rmaloperationisnotrequ

ired.Cis incorrect.Thisisplaus

iblesincethepageisrepeated

.However ,theremaynotbea

requirementtrepeatthe announcement, but itisnotaninappropriateact

ion.Dis correct.The line"Thisisadrill"is

requiredatthebeginningandENDofeachcommun

ication duringdrillsorexerc

ises.Inaddition, an announcementofsuchurgencyshouldberepeated

.

TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1 Department

Rev.OOOS Procedure Page 55 of 103 Appendix I(Page3 of 5)Communicationsb.Useequ ipmentnounnamesand/oridentificat

ion(10)numbersto

descr ibe a component.

,c.Theuseofsignlanguageisundesiredbutmaybeusedwhenverbal

communicationsisnotpractical.

d.Taketimewhenreportingabnormalconditions

.Speak deliberately, distinctlyandcalmly.Identify yourselfandwatchstationor

yourlocation.Describethenatureandseverityoftheproblem.Statethelocationoftheproblemifappropriate.Keepthe

communicationlineopenifpossibleoruntildirected

otherwise.

e.Thecompletionofdirectedactionsshouldbereportedtothegoverningstation,normallythecontrolroom.

f.Requireotherplantpersonnel(including

contractors)

conducting

operational

communicationtodosoinaccordancewiththis

procedure.g.Ifthereisanydoubtconcerninganyportionofthe

communicationortaskassigned,resolveitbeforetakinganyaction

.h.Whenmaking

announcementsfordrillsorexercisesbeginandendthe

announcementwith"ThisisaDrill.

"4.Emergency

Communications

SystemsWhenpersonnelareworkinginareaswherethepublic

address(PA)systemoremergency

signals cannotbeheard, alternatemethodsforalert

ingthesepersonsshouldbedevised.Flashinglights,personalpagersthatvibrateandcanbefelt,andpersonsdedicatedto

not ifications

are examplesofalternatemethods.5.PASystema.UseoftheplantPAsystemshallbelimitedtoensureitretainsitseffectivenessincontactingplantpersonnel.ExcessiveuseofthePAsystemshouldbeavoided.Plant

telephonesandother point-to-point

communications

channelsshouldbeusedinlieuofthePAsystem

whenever practical.

b.The announcementofplannedstartingorstoppinglarge

equipmentshouldbemadetoalertpersonnelworkinginthatarea.

c.TheplantPAsystemmaybeusedinabnormalor

emergencyconditions,to

announcechangeofplantstatus,orgivenotificationofmajorplanteventseitherinprogressor

anticipated.

(TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1 Department

Rev.OOOa Procedure Page56of103 Appendix I(Page4of5)

Communications

d.WhenusingtheplantPAsystem:(1)Speakslowlyanddeliberatelyinanormaltoneofvoice.(2)Whenannouncementsofabnormaloremergencyconditionsaremade,theyshallbemadeatleasttwice

.(3)Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexercisesbeginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill

." 6.PlantTelephonesWhenusingPlanttelephones

a.Identifyyourselfandwatchstation.

b.WhentryingtomakecontactwiththemainControlRoom

,ifthemessageisofaroutinenature,thesendershouldhangupwhenthemainControlRoomfailstoanswerafterthefifthringtoavoidunnecessaryControlRoomnoise

.Thephoneshallbeallowedtoringuntilanswerediftheinformation

isimportantto

Operations.c.Dur ingtimeswhentheDONOTDISTRUB(DND)functionhasbeenusedbyMCRpersonnel

,followthedirectionsontherecordingasappropriate.d.Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexerc

isesbeginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill.

" 7.Radio/phoneCommunicationRadio/phoneusageshallnotbeallowedinareaswhereelectronicinterferencewithplantequipmentmayresult.a.Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexercises,beginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill.

"b.Sendershouldidentifythemselvesbywatchstation

.c.Threewaycommunicationsshouldbeused.d.Clearconciselanguageshouldbeusedsinceradio/phonecontactdoesnothavetheadvantageoffacetofacecommunication

.

68.ROGENERIC2.1.18OOl/MEM/T

3/1 2.11/GENERIC

2.1.18//RO/SRO/l l/27/07 RMSWhichONEofthefo

llow ing isan INEFFECTIVEuseofthephoneticalphabet

i n accordance

with OPDP-1 ,Conductof Operations?

A.PlaceGulfIRMinBypassper1-01-92-Bravo

.B.Start2-AlphaRHRpumpper3-01-74.

C." Place Romeo-Papa-Sierra2-AlphaonAlternateper

2-0scar-lndia-99

.D.Transfer2-Alpha480voltshutdownboardtoAlternate.

KIA Statement:Conductof Operations

2.1.18Abilitytomakeaccurate,clearandconciselogs

,records,statusboards

,andreports

KIA Justification:ThisquestionsatisfiestheKIA

statementbyrequiringthecandidatetodemonstrateknowledgeofthe

requirementsrelatedtoverbal

communicationsorreportsduringshift

operations

.References:

OPDP-1 Level of Knowledge Justification:Thisquestion

isratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: No ne Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswer

thisquestioncorrectlythecand

idate must determine the requirementsforuseofthe

phonet icalphabetandapplythatknowledgetotheg

iven communications

.NOTE: Each distractorisplausiblebecausetheyallcontainatleastoneuseofthphoneticalphabet.Ais incorrect.

Th is communicationisappropriate.Bis incorrect.

Th is communication

isappropriate

.Cis correct.Theuseofthephonetic a lphabetforcommon acronyms ,suchasRPS,isnotrequiredandcouldreducethe

effectivenessofthe communication

.Dis incorrect.Thiscommun

ication is appropriate.

/TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1 DepartmentRev.0008 Procedure Page 54 of 103 Appendix I(Page2 of 5)Communicationsb.Thereceiverrepeatsbackthemessagetothesender.Therepeatbackcanbeverbatimorfunctional.Inmanycasesafunctionalrepeatbackbestcommunicatesthereceiversunderstandingofthemessage.Thiscanbedoneinseveralwaystoaccomplishthedesiredgoals.Forexamplethesendermightsay,"Bob ,reportRCSpressureandtrend."Thereceivercouldrespondineitheroftwoways.(1)Thereceivercouldrespondwith,"ReportRCSpressureandtrend.RCSpressureis2250psigandstable." Or(2)Thereceivercouldrespondwith,"RCSpressureis2250psigandstable."c.Thesenderverballyacknowledgesthatthereceivercorrectlyunderstoodthe

message.Theverbalacknowledgementcanbesimplesuchas,Thatis

correct".Ifthesenderhasrequestedandreceivedinformationthenthesendershallprovideeitherverbatimorfunctionalrepeatbacktodemonstratehisunderstandingofthereceiver'smessage

.Fortheexampleabovethesendercouldrespondwith,"Iunderstand2250andstable."2.Phonetic

AlphabetThephoneticalphabetisatooltoimprovecommunications.Ingeneral,operationscommunicationshouldusethephoneticalphabetexceptwhenwellestablishedacronymsdescribethesubject.Ifuseofphoneticalphabetwillreduceeffectivenessofcommunicationsthenitshouldnotbeused

.Thefollowingareexamplesofwhenthephoneticalphabetshouldnotbeused

a.ItisnotdesirabletouseRomeo-Charlie-SierratodescribetheRCS(ReactorCoolantSystem).

b.Ifaproceduralstepiswrittenusingacronyms,itmaybereadandorderedas

such.c.Ifa componenttagorlabeliswrittenusingacronymsthentheacronymsmaybe

used.3.GeneralStandards

a.All communicationsshallbeclear

,concise,andprecise

.Alloperational

communicationsshallbeconductedinaformalandprofessionalmanner.Inallcommunications,thesenderandintendedreceivershouldbereadilyidentifiable.

69.ROGENERIC2.2.13

00I/MEM/T3/10.2/7/18/GENERIC

2.2.13/3.6/3

.8/RO/SR0/11/26/07

RMSWhichONEofthefollowing

describes the requirementswhenplacinga

clearanceonairoperated

valves?A.AnairoperatedvalvethatfailsclosedonlossofairSHALLNOTbe

consideredclosedforblockingpurposesunlessitisheldclosedwithagaggingdevice.

B.AnairoperatedvalvethatfailsopenonlossofairSHALLNOTbeusedforblockingpurposes.

C.';Anairoperatedvalvethatfailsopenonlossofair

,willbeheldclosedwithagaggingdevicethatistaggedasa clearance boundary.D.Anairoperatedvalvethatfails'as-is'onlossofairSHALL

NOTbeusedforblockingpurposesuntilitisverifiedclosedandagaggingdeviceinstalled

.KIA Statement:EquipmentControl

2.2.13Knowledgeoftaggingand

clearance procedures

KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidate to demonstrateknowledgeofthe

ClearanceandTagging

requirements

.References:

spp 10.2 Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information

.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answer this question correctly the candidate must determine the requirementsforClearanceandtaggingprocedure.SPP10-2andapplythatknowledgetothegiven

conditions.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausiblesincealockingdevicewouldensurethevalvedoesnotopen

, howeverSPP10-2requirestheairsupplytoactuatethevalvebe

mechanically

or electrically

isolated.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausiblesinceusinga"Fail-Open" valve presents a difficult problem.howeverSPP10-2provides

specific guidancetoallowtheiruseasa

clearance boundry.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseinmostcasesitistrue.However,SPP10-2providesspecificguidanceand

controls to allowusingthemasa

clearance boundry under conditionthattheclearancebe

considered"working on energized equipment".

((NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to SPP-10.2 Programs and Safely Control EnergyRev.0010 Processes Page 50 of 66 Appendix E(Page1 of 2)Special Requirements

for Mechanical

Clearances1.0REQUIREMENTS

A.An air-operatedvalvethatfailsopenonalossofairisnotbeconsideredclosedfor

.blocking purposesunlessitisheldclosedwithaninstalled

jackingdeviceordeviceusedtosecurethevalveintherequiredposition.A

clearancetagwillbeissuedandattachedtothe

jackingorotherdevice

.B.An air-operatedvalvethatfailsclosedmusthaveitsairsupply

electrically

or mechanically

isolated, depressurized,andthevalve

visuallychecked-to-be-c1osedbylocalorremoteindication.Theairsupply

energy-isolating

devicesmustbetagged

.C.An air-operatedvalvethatfails"asis"shallbeclosedand

mechanicallyrestrained.Itsairsupplyshouldbe

electrically

or mechanically

isolated, depressurized,andthevalvevisuallycheckedtobeclosedbylocalorremoteindication.Theairsupplyisolatingdevicesandmechanicalrestraintmustbetagged.D.Incaseswhereitisnotpossibletophysicallysecureanairoperatedvalvethatfails"as-is"intheclosedposition,thevalvewillbetaggedclosedbyapplyingclosingairtothevalve diaphragmbytheuseofthesolenoidvalveair

overridesandtaggingboththe

hand-switchintheclosedpositionandthesolenoidvalveair

overrides.Priortoallowingworktobegin,the

equipmentwillbedrainedand

de-pressurizedtoensuretheboundaryvalvesareholding.Thisconditionwillbenotedintheremarkssectionofthe

clearancesheettoinformPAE/Authorized

Employee(s)thatpressurizedairisrequiredtoensurethevalveremainsclosed.Thisworkis

considered"workingonenergized

equipment"andmustbeapprovedbythe

managementofficialincharge

.E.Pressure controlledvalves,reliefvalves,andcheckvalveswillnotbeusedasisolationboundaryvalvesundernormalconditions.Wheresuchavalvedoesnothaveanexternalmeansofphysicalrestraint,theworkis

considered"workingonenergized

equipment"andmustbeapprovedbythe

managementofficialincharge

.F.Thefollowing

instructionsgoverntheuseoffreezeplugs1.The clearanceshouldbeinplace,butnotissued,beforeestablishingthefreeze

plug.2.TheneedforthefreezeplugshouldbeidentifiedontheRemarksSectionofthe

clearancesheet.Thefreezeplugshouldnotbelistedasadeviceheldonthe

clearancesheet.The establishment

and maintenanceofthefreezeplugshallbe

in accordancewithapprovedproceduresorwork

documents.3.Thefreezeplugmustbeattendedbyqualifiedpersonneltoensurethatitis

maintained

intactuntilallworkiscompleteandthe

properPostMaintenanceTests(PMTs)areperformed.4.Ifthe clearancemustbereleasedtoallow

performanceofaPMT,theequipmentmustberetaggedbeforeallowingthefreezeplugtothaw.Thiswillpreventmigrationofaportionoftheplug.

(70.ROGENERIC2.2.33

00l/CIA/SYS/RWM//G2.2.33/RO

2.5//10122/07Giventhefollowingplant

conditions

-A reactor startupisin progress-Reactor Power: 3%-RWM latched into Group8(12controlrods)

-Group9rodsarethesamerodsasGroup8

.-SequenceControl:ON

-Group8Limits:08-12-Group9Limits

12-16WhichONEof

following describeswhentheRWMwill

automaticallylatchupto Group 9?A...;allrodsin group8havebeen withdrawntothegroup8

withdrawlimitandarodingroup9hasbeen

selected.B.allrods EXCEPT3in group8are withdrawntothegroup

withdrawlimit,andarodingroup9is

selected.C.allrods EXCEPT1ingroup8are

withdrawntothegroup

withdrawlimitandarodingroup9hastobeselectedand

moved.D.thelastrodin

group8is withdrawntothegroup8

withdrawlimitandthe

in-sequencerodingroup9hasNOTbeen

selected.KIAStatement:

Equipment Control 2.2.33Knowledgeof

control rod programming.

KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetorecognizeandapplylimitationson

control rod programming

enforcedbytheRodWorth

Minimizer program.Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedas CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble

,sort,andintegratethe

partsofthe questiontosolveaproblem.This

requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeandits

meaningtoresolvethe

problem.0610NRCExam

(REFERENCE:LessonPlanOPL171

.024Rev.13pages13-15

Plausibility

Analysis: Answer Aisthe correct answer.Answer Bisincorrect.Thisis

plausiblebecausetheRWM

normallyallowsthreeinserterrorsw

ithoutgeneratingarodblock, howeveritwillnotlatchuptoahighergroup

underthisconditionbecausethethreerodsaremorethanonenotchfromthe

withdraw limit.Answer Cisincorrect.TheselectedcontrolroddoesnothavetobemovedtolatchtoGroup9

.ThisisplausiblebecausetheRWMwilllatchtothe

highestgroupwithonerodpastthe

insertlimitiftheRWMislatchingtoagroupfroman

unknown condition.Sincethisisaknowncondition,theRWMwilllatchtoGroup9withoutmovingtheselectedrod.

Answer Disincorrect.TheRWMwillnotlatchtothenextgroupuntilthe

correctrodisselectedinGroup9becauseSequenceControlisON

.Thisisplausibleif

SequenceControlisOFF

.Underthatcondition,theRWMonlylooksforrodswithintheGroupandnotwithina

specific sequence.With Sequence ControlinOFF,theRWMwilllatchupto

Group9assoonasthelastrodreachesthe

withdraw limit.

These3rodswouldcauseaninsertblockifGP8were

latched.OPL171.024Revision13

Page13of53

(INSTRUCTOF1

NOTES(8)Upondemandbythe

operator viatheScan/Latchrequestfunction.(9)FollowingcorrectionofInsertorWithdrawErrors

..d.Thelatchedgroupisthehighestgroupwhichcanbeachievedwithoutproducinganactiveinsertblockcondition

.(1)TheRWMsystemwilllatchtothehighestgroupinthe

sequence with:(a)Atleastonerodwithdrawnpastthegroupinsertlimitand(b)Noothergroupsbelowhavethreeinserterrors(2)Example:Relatchatan

intermediatepowerlevel(a)AssumethatRWMhasbeenoutofserviceandrodshavebeenmovedoutofsequence.Thefollowingroddistribution

exists:(1)AllrodsinGroup1thru7areattheir

withdraw limit, exceptrods35,38-43and38-27(GP.7)whichareatposition02.(2)AllrodsinGroups8andaboveareattheirinsertlimit(04)exceptforrod30-03(GP8)whichisatposition06.(3)Norodisselected

((b)After returningtheRWMto service: OPL 171.024Revision13Page14of53INSTRUCTORNOTES

11.(1)Group 7willbethe latched group(2)Rod 30-03willbe displayedasa withdraw error.(3)The withdraw block status indicators

will indicate a withdrawal

block conditionontheRWM system displaysandRWM switch panel.(4)No other controlrodmay be inserted or withdrawnuntilthe withdraw errorrodfrom Group 8 (30-03)is corrected.Itcan only be inserted.(c)The proper way to correct the out of sequence conditionisto insert the withdraw errorrod03)to position"04".This removes the withdraw error;leaves group7asthe latched group, and removes the withdraw block indicationsonthe RWM system displaysandRWM switch panel.Automatic Latching Up/Down a.The automatic latching process depends on whetherornotRWM Sequence ControlisONorOFF.Sequence Control is normally selected(ON)and enforces a specific order topullrods within a latched group.b.When operating below the LPSP with sequence controlOre" , latchingtothe next higherornext lower rod group is done internallybytheRWM program only after arodinthe next group is selected.NOTE:Upon select ofrod30-03,an

RWM system messagewillbe generated indicating

a target position ofnotch"04"forthis control rod Obj.V.B.10 NOTE: Latching within Transistion

Zonewillbe discussed later.

(3)(2)(c.(1)Theprogramwilllatchdown(latchthe

nextlowergroup)whenalltherodsin

the presently latched group have beeninsertedtothegroup

insertlimitandarodinthenextgroupis

selected.(2)The programwilllatchup(latchthe

next highergroup)upon

selection of arodwithinthenext

higher group provided thatonly2 insert errorsorless resultfromwithinthe

current latched group and/or any lower groups.When sequencecontrolis NOT selected, (OFF), latching automatically

occursbasedon rod movement within repeating BPWS banked groups (ex: 2/3/4/5/6 and 7/8/9/10/11/12).(1)For example,iftherodsina

group (GP.4)arethesamerodsasinthe

next.highergroup(GP.5)

,theRWMwill

NOTlatchupbased

solely upon control rod selection.Latchupto Group5will automatically

occurwhenanyoftherodsGroup4are

movedtoa position definedforGroup5 provided that<3 inserterrorswouldresult.Iftherodsina

group(GP.5)arethe

samerodsasthe next lower group(GP.4),theRWMwillnotlatch

down based solely upon control rod selection.Latchdowntothe

next lower RWM group will generally occurinthiscasebasedupon movementofany of therodswithinthegrouptoa

position definedforthenext

lower RWM group.Ifthenextrodgroupis

NOT repeating ,thenlatchingoccurswhenthe

next rod is selected.OPL 171.024Revision13Page15 of 53 INSTRUCTOR

NOTES NOTE:Willlatch downifinsert errorsinGPislower

thanlatchGP.Willlatchup

providedthatthe numberofinsert errors produced willnotgivean insert block.WithrodsatbothaGP4andGP5 defined position, thelatchedGPaftera

movementwillbetheGPmovedinto

.

71.ROGENERIC2.3.10

OOl/C/A/GFES/GENERIC/C/A/G2.3.l0/BF0030l/2.9/3.3/GEN

2.3Giventhefollowing

conditionsata work site.(Airborne activity:Radiationlevel

Radiationlevelwith

shielding:Timetoplace

shielding:Timeto conducttaskwith respirator

Timeto conduct task without respirator:

Assumethefollowing

3DAC40mr/hr10mr/hr15minutes1hour30minutes-the airbornedosewitha respiratorwillbezero.-adoserateof40

mr/hrwillbereceivedwhileplacingthe

shielding.-alltaskswillbe

performedbyoneworker.-shieldingcanbeplacedin15

minuteswithorw ithout a respirator.

WhichONEofthe followingwouldresultinthe

lowestwholebody dose?A.Placethe shielding while wearing a respirator

and conductthetaskwitha

respirator

.B.Placethe shielding while wearing a respirator

and conduct the task withoutarespirator.

C.Conduct the taskwitha respirator

and without shielding.

D.Conduct the task without a respiratororshielding

.KIAStatement:RadiationControl

2.3.10Abilityto perform procedurestoreduce excessivelevelsofradiationandguard

against personnel exposure.KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidate to calculate the expected exposurefora job and determine the correct precautions

and radiological

controlsrequiredto

minimize exposure.Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedas CIAduetothe requirement

to assemble ,sort,and integratethe

partsofthe question to predict an outcome.Th is requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeandits

meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

((PlausibilityAnalysis:Thisquestionrequiresthe

candidatetocalculatethe

exposurereceviedforeachofthefouroptionsinthedistractors.Althoughthisquestiondoesnot

specifically

contain incorrect but plausiblepossibilities,itisbasedentirelyonthetypeofdecisionwhichmustbemadewhile

performingdutiesasaLicensedOperator.Usingthe

calculationbelow,the candidatemustcorrectlyperformthe

analysisandapplyALARAprinciplesto

select the correct answer.Calculations

required:3DACx2.5mr/DACX0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />s=3.75 mra.10mrplacingshielding,10mr

conductingtask,zeroairborne

=20mrb.10mrplacingshielding,5mr

conductingtask,3.75mr

airborne=18.75 mr (lowest dose=Correct)c.40mr conductingtask,zero airborne=40mr d.20mr conductingtask,3.75 mr airborne=23.75 mr

(72.ROGENERIC2.3

.9 OOl/C/A/T3/PR.CMPTR//ROGENERIC2.3

.9//RO/SRO/ll/27/07

RMSUnit2reactorshutdownisin

progressandprimary

containment

de-inertinghasbeenauthorized

.WhichONEofthefollowingisthebas

isforNOTallowingboth

2-FCV-64-19 (SUPPRCHBRATMSPLYINBDISOLATIONVLV)and

2-FCV-64-18 (DRYWELL ATM SUPPLY INBD ISOLATIONVLV)tobeopen

simultaneouslyduringthe performanceofthisevolution?

A.Topreventthehighflowratefromdamagingthe

non-hardened

ventilation

ducts.B.TopreventcreatingahighdPbetweentheprimary

containmentandthe Reactor Building.C."Topreventthe

possibility

of overpressurizingtheprimary

containmentduringaLOCA.

D.Topreventreleaseofthedrywell

atmospherethroughan unmonitored

ventilationflowpath.KIA Statement:RadiationControl

2.3.9Knowledgeofthe

process for performing

a containment

purge.KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsandtimesto

correctly determinetheprocessfor

performing

a containment

purge.References

2-01-64,Rev

.106,section8.1 Level of Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble,sort,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.This

requiresmentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibilitv

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

question correctlythecandidatemust

determine the requirementsforde-inertingthePrimary

Containmentandtheirbases

.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausiblebecauehighflowrateswouldresultfrombothvalvesbeingopen,howevertheventductsare

designed to accomodate

such flowrates.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausethede-inertinglineupraisesthedPbetweentheDrywellandReactorBuilding

, howevertheriseisrelatively

insignificantandwellwithinthedesignlimits

.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausiblesincetheventpathis

unmonitored

,however,hav

ingbothvalvesopen

simultaneouslyprovidesno

additionalpathforarelease.

(BFN Primary Containment

System 2-01-64 Unit2Rev.0106Page40 of 194 8.0 INFREQUENT

OPERATIONS

8.1 Purging the Drywell and Suppression

Chamber with Primary Containment

Purge Filter Fan NOTES1)TOE970823identifiedapotentialforabypassflowpathtoexistbetweentheDrywell

and SuppressionChamberwhenpurgingtheDrywelland

SuppressionChamberatthesametime(bothFCV-64-18and64-19openedconcurrently).ShouldadesignbasisLOCAoccurwiththesetwovalvesopenedatthesametimewiththeReactorNOTinColdShutdown(Mode4or5),apotentialexistsfor

overpressurizing

primarycontainmentduetothepressuresuppressionfunctionbeingbypassed.Therefore,whenPrimary

ContainmentpurgingisrequiredwiththeReactorNOTinColdShutdown(Mode4or5),theSuppressionChamberandtheDrywellarepurged

separately.2)ThissectionisusedwhenpurgingboththeDrywelland

Suppression

ChamberconcurrentlywiththeReactorinColdShutdown(Mode4or5).3)WhentheReactorisNOTinColdShutdown(Mode4or5),theSuppressionChamberandtheDrywellarepurgedseparately.[1]REVIEWallPrecautionsandLimitationsinSection3.0.[2]VERIFY all Prestartup/StandbyReadinessrequirementsinSection4.0aresatisfied.

o o[3]VERIFYthefollowinginitialconditionsaresatisfied:*Drywellventedtolessthan0

.25 ps ig.REFERTOSection6.1

.0*HzOzanalyzersareinserviceREFERTO2-01-76

0*Suppression

Chamberventedtolessthan0

.25 psig.REFERTOSection6.2.

0 o[4]*ReactorZoneFansinoperationwith

ReactorZoneSupplyandExhaustFaninfastspeed

.REFERTO2-01-308.

0 REQUEST ChemistrytoobtainaDrywellsample.REFERTO

2-SI-4.8.8.2-6.

([5]IFsampleiswithinlimitsof

2-SI-4.8.8.2-6, THENNOTIFYShiftManager.

o

73.RO GENERIC 2.4.47 OOl/C/A/T3/C4/6/G2.4.471IRO/SRO/IO/25107

RMSGiventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Reactor pressureisbeingmaintainedat50psig

.*Temperaturenearthe water level instrumentruninthedrywellis220°F

.*TheShutdownVesselFloodingRange

Instrument

(L1-3-55)isreading+35".WhichONEofthefollowing

describesthehighestDrywellRun

Temperatureatwhichthe

L1-3-55 reading(+35")isconsideredvalid?

REFERENCE PROVIDED KIA Statement:EmergencyProcedures

IPlan2.4.47Abilityto

diagnose and recognizetrendsinanaccurateandtimely

mannerutilizingtheappropriatecontrolroom

reference material KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the correct reactor waterlevelunder

emergency conditions

.References:

2-EOI-3 Flowchart Level of Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble,sort,andintegratethepartsofthe

questiontopredictanoutcome

.This requiresmentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: 2-EOI-1 flowchart Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemustuseEOI

Caution#1to determine operable RPV water level instruments

.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible since 200°Fisavalidindication, howeverthequestioncallsforthe

HIGHEST temperature.Bis correct.Cis incorrect.Thisis plausibleifthe candidateinterpolatestheCaution#1table, howeverthisisnot permissible

.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausibleifthe candidateinterpolatestheCaution#1table, howeverthisisnot permissible.

• AN RPV WATER LVL INSTRUMENT

MA.Y BE USED TO DETERMINE OR TREND LVL ONLY WHEN IT READS ABOVE THE MINIMUM INDICATED LVLASSOCIATEDWITHTHE HIGHeSTMAXOWORSCRUN

TEMP.*IFOW TEMPS.ORSCAREA TEMPS (TABLE6).AS APPLICABLE, ARE OUTSIDE THE SAFE REGION OF CURVE 8.THE ASSOCIATED

INSTRUMENT

MA.Y BE UNR8..IABlE

DUE TO BOIUNGINTHERUN.MINIMUMMAXDWRUN TEMP MAXSC INSTRUMENT

I RANGE I INDICATED (FROM XR-64-50 RUN TEMP LVL OR TI-64-52AB)(FROM TABLE 6ONSCALE N/A 8ElOW150-145 N/A151TO 200 L1-3-S8A, B I EMERGENCY-140 N/A 201 TO 250-155 TO+60-130 N/A 251 TO 300-120 N/A 301 TO 350 L1-3-53ONSCALE N/A 8ELOW 150 L1-3-60-s N/A 151T0200 L1-3-206 NORMAL+15 N/A 201 TO 250 OTO+60 L1*3-253+20 N/A 251 TO 300 L1-3-20aA.

8 , C , D+30 N/A 301 TO 350 L1*3-52 I POST L1-J.62A ACCIDENT IONSCALE N/A NfA-268TO+32+10 8ELOW100 N/A+15 100 TO 150 N/A SHUTDOWN I+20 151 T0200 NfA Ll-3-55 I FLOODUP I+30 201 T0250 N/A OTO+400 I+40 251 T0300 NfA+50 301 T0350 N/A+65 35110400 N/A

E MINATION REFERENCE PROVIDED TO (CANDIDATE

o 2*EOI*1 RPVCONTROL

---

1 11.....I(

--r-J L:-u....._..1=="='::-L[-'I.*..=")*I-$---I_, L..---j......l!!Q I;>-11-==--'dlL t'-..---,---I L""'"_n_f<I.OCIUN<PI.Nff

W'i"'""co..-**iiiiiiiii..t;rJ.,....,

!!!!!!--'woo---i*-........IL I: II: l i lll.,.,-._-...=I:::'1::'_-

--=.::mz=r--=--..-:=-:1-==:!-'L iiiii="===-I

'...........

--_.....":.-::.-0-\.j"",,->.k<ol<!>-...-,;;;" 1__.....-'L 1__--IL 1__---'L 1__'L------fw:o I'L'-.._......j-.I LJ_i L I---_.'L-I 1 1[-..[: J$'"":'1f_i L ,",lII\II_L

.....L-if"" L_L J.......>_C=:"_----**-I[I--iii I I l*---..-....I L 1"'----r--'MlllAtulIlIfllIlM

rDU.OlIIlIIIlmNl

-_...__.*1--1.---"-'

10"""""......." C'oIIIID:IIG'M"ZoIor

._1_--.---,--------, L r.:==:=,,=

11"-----=I--_.__..I'L**...:--:.....iti:-m--.-.-E==:.-.........-_--'_"I='=-_

...-...A I..........-.:r:t=.lIP'"-..-c'I I I........-L I o:.:;:-.-."..M fVllA lQI"!'J"--.I

MIo\TIIofoIWlmfDl'L

IWf I i""::.....-

1 1..II--_._--J r==....-====-L. I iiijj A'lIlm"A.v.:.u.,"t'Hr

-,...____::_n......!:-i 4 L

II_._---I L I WiiU D,IOInWOTtll,OLJ,OIMII'-.'0-f'-

.1lItl7W....--*.IIU__L I 1**..-'*

1_1--1 B.'::..-'...--1='----"1

_1A......_4;,:ur:ll_

...;L.***MI ,"".,"'............

'=,"""\t.,.I'

...Illli....-.T:ow=--.....=.:-._z.:::r=::::"-.....-I::-.::;=.::

-II.WtIlUlJlI lliITIfl l rii ii oUOWiiiiOlTliN........llUn..II'"'.JOU..C:W

IIII......----I iiiWr----.-:;......-=\:, 1 z,"'Hiih";;;'t--._-/I L L 1--*_..**1-0-'1 iimr 7i.."lIlI":'

I iiiiliiW'.

ii=" f----, C'=l!oIIIIIl\l'-

'.'_'" EOI*1

((74.ROGENERIC2.4

.15 00I/MEM/T3///GENERIC

2.4.15//RO/SR0/11/27/07

RMSGiventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Unit-2has

scrammedandmultiplecontrolrodshavefailedtoinsert.*TheUnit SupervisorhasenteredEOI-1,RPVControl

,andC-5, Level/Power

Control.*Youhavebeen

designatedtoassistthecrewbyperformingEOI

Appendiciesastheyare assigned.WhichONEofthefollowing

precludestheuseofahandheldradioto

communicatewithControlRoom

personnel?

A.EOI Appendix2inthe2AElectricalBoardRoom

.EOI Appendix1CintheU-2Aux

Instrument

Room.C.EOI Appendix16Hatthe2C

250V RMOV Board.D.EOI Appendix1Binthe ReactorBuilding565elevation.

KIA Statement:

Emergency Procedures

IPlan 2.4.15Knowledgeof

communications

proceduresassociatedwithEOP

implementation

KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidate to demonstrateknowledgeof

communication

requirementsthatapplyduring

execution of Emergency Operating Instructions

.References:

OPDP-1 Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctly the candidate must determinewhichofthegivenlocationsviolatesthe

requirementsofOPDP-1, ConductofOperation.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible bacuseofthesafetyrelated

equimentpoweredfrom2A

Electric Board Room , however radio communicationisauthorized.Bis correct.Cis incorrect.Thisisplausible

becauseofthesafetyrelated

equipmentfedfrom2C 250V RMOV Board , however radio communicationisauthorized.Dis incorrect.Thisisplausible

becauseoftheproximityoftheRPVlevel

instrumentation

,howeverradio

communicationisauthorized.

USER'SGUIDEFOR EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

ExitingtheEOIs L.EOI PROGRAM MANUALSECTIONO-VIII-A

_(The operatorsremainintheEOIsuntileitherdirectedoutbytheEOIorwhentheSMIUSconcludesthatanemergencyconditionnolongerexists.Exitfrom

EOI-l and associatedcontingencyproceduresalwaysrequiresSMIUS

determination

,sincetheseprocedureshavenoexplicitexittootherplant

proceduresexceptfromRC/Qto100-1.Appendix100-1shouldbereviewedpriortoEOIexittodetermine

,restore,and

documentabnormalalterationsthatwere

establishedduringEOI execution.AfterexitingtheEOIstheoperatorsurveysthe

presentplantconditionstoensurenoreasonforre-entrytotheEOIsexist.DuringEOIexecution

,aSAMGENTRYIS

REQUIRED conditionmayarise.Entryintoand execution ofSevereAccident

Management

Guidelines(SAMGs)arethe

responsibility

oftheSEDintheTSC

.SignificanttimemayberequiredtomantheTSCwiththe appropriateSAMTeammembersandtumoverplantconditionsbetweenthecontrolroomandtheTSC.Thecontrolroom

staffterminate

execution ofALLEOIflowchartsONLYwhentheSEDdeclaresthattheSAMTeamhasassumedcommandandcontrol.EOIappendicesmaycontinueinuseas

directedbytheSAMGs.Duringthetimebetweenthedevelopment

oftheSAMGENTRYISREQUIRED

conditionandthetime

of assumption

ofcommandandcontrolbytheTSC,thecontrol

room staffshallcontinueuse

ofavailableEOIguidancetomitigatetheevent.

Development

ofaSAMGENTRYISREQUIRED

conditionalwaysrequiresentryintotheSAMGswhentheTSCSAMTeamassumes

commandandcontrol,even

ifplant conditionssubsequentlydevelopwhichseemtonolongersatisfyarequirementtoenter

SAMGs.3.5Duties oftheControlRoomTeamMembersWhile

Executing EOIsThespecificduties

oftheControlRoomTeamMembersareoutlinedinConduct

of Operations.3.6Shift CommunicationsDuringExecution

ofEOIs The methodologyassociatedwithcommunicationsduring

execution oftheEOIsisoutlinedin

Conduct of Operations3.7Use ofInstrumentationandICS/SafetyParameterDisplaySystem(SPDS)

Various instrumentsinthecontrolroomarequalifiedforPost

Accident Monitoring

.These instruments

are identifiedwithblacklabels.Duringthe

performance

oftheEOIs,these

instrumentsarerequiredtobeutilizedasmuchaspractical.For

parametersthathavemultiplereadoutsinthecontrolroom,theoperatorshouldobserveasmany

ofthemultiplereadoutsaspracticalfora

verification

ofthevaluesbeingobserved.

Most instrumentsinthecontrolroomareprovidedwithwhatmaybe

consideredstandardscale

divisions (increments

of 1,5,10,etc.),althoughtherearesomethatmaybeconsidered

normal (increments

of2,3,4,etc.),Somepressure

instrumentsmayreadoutinPSIAratherthanthemorecommonvalue

ofPSIG.(The operatorisrequiredtoremainaware

ofthesepossible

differenceswhenreadingthevaluesfromthe instruments.Forpressureinstruments,thepressure

shouldbecalledoutinvaluesofPSIAorPSIG,asapplicable.Whentheoperatorreadingthe

flowchartasksforthevalue

of a pressure parameter,itshouldbeassumedthatthevaluebegivenasPSIGunlesshe/shesolicitsthevalueinPSIA.SECTIONO-VIlI-APAGE48OF52REVISION4

(TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1 Department

Rev.OOOa Procedure Page56of103 Appendix I(Page4of5)

Communications

d.WhenusingtheplantPAsystem

(1)Speakslowlyanddeliberatelyinanormaltoneofvoice

.(2)Whenannouncementsofabnormaloremergencyconditionsaremade,theyshallbemadeatleasttwice

.(3)Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexercisesbeginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill." 6.PlantTelephonesWhenusingPlanttelephones:a.Identifyyourselfandwatchstation

.b.WhentryingtomakecontactwiththemainControlRoom

,ifthemessageisofaroutinenature,thesendershouldhangupwhenthemainControlRoomfailstoanswerafterthefifthringtoavoidunnecessaryControlRoomnoise

.Thephoneshallbeallowedtoringuntilanswerediftheinformationisimportantto

Operations.c.DuringtimeswhentheDONOTDISTRUB(DND)functionhasbeenusedbyMCRpersonnel,followthed

irectionsontherecordingasappropriate.

d.Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexercisesbeginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill.

" 7.Radio/phoneCommunicationRadio/phoneusageshallnotbeallowedinareaswhereelectronicinterferencewithplantequipmentmayresult.a.Whenmakingannouncementsfordrillsorexercises,beginandendtheannouncementwith"ThisisaDrill."b.Sendershouldidentifythemselvesbywatchstation.

c.Threewaycommunicationsshouldbeused.

d.Clearconciselanguageshouldbeusedsinceradio/phonecontactdoesnothavetheadvantageoffacetofacecommunication.

(75.RO GENERIC 2.4.8 OOIIMEM/T3

///GENERIC

2.4.8//RO/SRO/ll/27

/07 RMSWhichONEofthefollowing

describestheuseofEventBased

procedures

dur ing Symptom Based Emergency Operat ing Instructions (EOI)execut ion?EventBased

procedures

are_A.NOTusedduring

SymptomBasedEOIexecution

.B.ALWAYSused

i f equipmentorplantstatusrequiretheir

implementation.usedONLYiftheydonotinterferewithEOI

implementat

ion.D.usedONLYif

specifically

d irectedbyanEOI flowchart step.KIA Statement:

EmergencyProcedures/Plan

2.4.8Knowledgeofhowthe

event-based

emergency/abnormal

operating procedures

are used i nconjunctionwiththe

symptom-based

EOPs KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidate to demonstrateknowledgeof

procedure hiearchy dur ingexecutionof

Emergency Operating Instructions

.References:EOIPMSection

O-VI II-ALevelof Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscreteb

its of informat ion.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecand idate must deterine the rulesforus ingEventBased

proceduresduringEOI execution.Aisincorrect.

Thisisplaus iblebasedonthecontradictionoftenfoundbetween

EventbasedandSymptombased

guidance.However ,theiruse ispermitted

under controls c ircumstances.8is incorrect.Thisisplaus

ible because no specific Event Based procedure i s expressly proh ibited from use , howeverifaconfl ict ex istsbetweentheEventbased

procedureandtheEO I,theEOItakes

precedence

.C iscorrect.Dis incorrect.

Thisi s plausible becauseseveralEO I steps direct actions in accordance

w ith EventBasedprocedures, howeveritisnota prerequisitetotheiruse.

EOI PROGRAM MANUALSECTIONO-VIII-A

USER'S GUIDE FOR EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

I.EOIFlowchartUseWithOtherPlantProceduresTheEOlsareentered,baseduponspecificconditions

symptomatic

ofemergencies,or

conditionsthatcoulddegradeintoemergencies.

Thereforetheoperatoractions,providedwithintheEOls,allowtheoperatortomitigatethe

consequences

ofabroadrange

ofaccidentsandmultiple

equipment failures.Otherprocedures,suchasAOIs,ARPs

,EPIPs,etc.,haveeventspecificentryconditionsandmaybeusedto

supplement

EOls.InsomeinstancestheEOIswilldirecttheoperatorstotheunitoperatingprocedures(Ols,OOIs,andAOIs)forcompletion

ofspecifictasks

.Usually,theEOIsdirecttheoperatorstospecificEOIAppendices

.TheAppendicesarespecifictaskrelatedprocedureswrittentosatisfydirectivesgivenwithintheEOIs.Actionsthatcontradictanydirectiongivenbythe

EOls,orreducetheeffectiveness

ofanydirectionsgivenbytheEOIs,WILLNOTbe

implementedforanyreason

.The exceptiontothisrulearetheSSlsandAOI-IOO-2

.The conditionswhichcauseentryintotheSSlsaresuchthatthereliability

of the informationsystemsrequiredtoexecutetheEOIsarenolongerataconfidencelevelthatwouldmaketheEOIseffective

.Anytimethattheoperatorsmustleavethecontrolroom,asdirectedby

AOI-lOO-2 , theEOIsshallbeexitedandAOI-lOO-2shallbeusedtoshutdownandcooldownthereactor.TheEOlsarenotdesigned,orwritten,to

supporttheiruseoutside

ofthemaincontrolroom.

ConditionsmayariseunderStationBlackout(SBO)

conditionsinwhichtherate

ofRPV cooldownisreduced,oralternateHeatCapacity

TemperatureLimitorPressure

SuppressionPressurecurvesareappropriatetoavo

idanunnecessaryemergenc

y depressurization,inordertomaintainRCIC

injection capability.TheTSC stafforan associatedabnormaloperatinginstructionmay

recommend use ofthesealternatecurves,whichhavebeencalculatedaspart

ofEOIPMsection2-or3-VI-Fand-H

.These alternatecurvesmeettheassumptionsusedwithintheEOls.

It is recognizedthatduringexecution

oftheEOIsthecontrolroomwillreceive

assistancefromvarioussupportgroups

.ThisisespeciallythecaseunderconditionsintheEPIPsthatresultintheTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC)beingstaffed

.Forexample

,theTSCmaymake

recommendationsregardingwhenitisbesttoventprimary

containment,baseduponpresentorpredicted

meteorological

conditions

.Thiswouldnot

contrad ictthedirectionsprovidedbytheEOIs,buthelptomeettheintent

of minimizing

radiologicalreleasestothegeneralpublic.

(J.Execution ofEOI AppendixesTheEOIsrelyheavilyupontheEOI

Appendices

to implementEPOandPSTO

actionsandtasksthataretooinvolvedtooutlineontheflowchart

procedure.Thesetasksincludethedefeating

ofvariousinterlocksandlog

ic systems.Thestepswithinthe

Appendicesinvolvetheremoving

offuses,placing

jumpersacrossterminals

, andplacingbootsonrelaycontacts,aswellassome

ofthemorecommonfunctionssuchasopeningandclosingvalvesandoperation

ofsystemsto supporttheEOIflowchart

procedure steps.SECTIONO-VIII-APAGE46OF 52REVISION4